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Abstract
This dissertation contributes toward the building of a theory of the evolution of business
ecosystems. In the process, it addresses a question that has been posed by evolutionary theorists
in the economics and sociology literatures for decades: "Why do firms in the same industry vary
systematically in performance over time?" Seeking a systematic explanation of a longitudinal
phenomenon inevitably requires characterizing the evolution of the industrial ecosystem, as both
the organization (firm) and its environment (industry, markets and institutions) are co-evolving.
This question is therefore explored via a theoretical sample in three industrial ecosystems
covering manufacturing and service sectors, with competitors from the US, Europe and Japan:
commercial airplanes, motor vehicles and airlines. The research is based primarily on an in-
depth seven-year, multi-level, multi-method, field-based case study of both firms in the large
commercial airplanes industry mixed duopoly as well as the key stakeholders in their extended
enterprises (i.e. customers, suppliers, investors and employees). This field work is supplemented
with historical comparative analysis in all three industries, as well as nonlinear dynamic
simulation models developed to capture the essential mechanisms governing the evolution of
business ecosystems.
A theoretical framework is developed which endogenously traces the co-evolution of firms and
their industrial environments using their highest-level system properties of form, function and
fitness (as reflected in the system sciences of morphology, physiology and ecology), and which
embraces the evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention. The framework
captures the path-dependent evolution of heterogeneous populations of enterprise architectures
engaged in symbiotic inter-species competition and posits the evolution of dominant designs in
enterprise architectures that oscillate deterministically and chaotically between modular and
integral states throughout an industry's life-cycle. Architectural innovation - at the extended
enterprise level - is demonstrated to contribute to the failure of established firms, with causal
mechanisms developed to explain tipping points.
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Executive Summary
Int ent Destn:
Architecting World-class Enterprises
and Evolving Business Ecosystems5
As industries evolve, so do winning strategies,
successful organizational forms and effective leadership styles.
Image: "The Ancient of Days (God as an Architect)" by William Blake, 1794.
. . .... .... .. .. .. .. 
Architecting World-class Enterprises
Recently, the business world has experienced a
global downturn, the likes of which hasn't been seen
in living memory. We have witnessed some of the
world's most powerful incumbents like General
Motors, United Airlines and even Boeing struggle to
successfully launch new products and services,
access capital reliably, manage global supply chains,
avoid damaging labor strikes, maintain strong
balance sheets and in some instances avoid
bankruptcy.
In understanding these complex times, while the devil
undoubtedly lies in the details, it is often enlightening
to take a 100,000 ft. "god's-eye" view of our business
ecosystems and how they are evolving. We propose
an architectural view.
Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Focus
One common view of the objective of business firms
is the maximization of shareholder value, where the
residual cash flow is returned to the shareholders.
This can be seen in many famous incumbent firms,
who have built their respective industries, General
Motors and Ford in the automotive industry, and
United Airlines and American Airlines in the US
Airline industry.
Toyota Motors and Southwest Airlines however
appear to be maximizing a very different objective
function, that of "stakeholder surplus", where the
residual cash flows are shared among the firm's key
stakeholders, and in the process, the firm's investors
fare better than if their interests were pursued at the
expense of the other stakeholders.
The extraordinarily high performance of these firms has
been sustained for so long, that perhaps we a oking at
a f 1_1 grt d a on e- !2~i177*~LIQR~$ jQe~4SI
In diverse industries ranging from manufacturing to
services, two world-class companies have
monopolized the business press for decades now,
holding numerous lessons for senior managers in
recent decades: Toyota Motors and Southwest
Airways. This article explores what the two firms
have in common - what DNA are shared by this
organizational "species"?
First and foremost, is how the "architects" (the senior
leaders and leadership teams) of these world-class
enterprises manage their environments, i.e. the things
outside of their direct control or responsibility. How
do they design their extended enterprise's objective
function? How is power and wealth is created and
shared? Examples of how the architects of these
enterprises think and act are shown below:
"Under Japanese company law, shareholders are the owners
of the corporation. But if corporations are run exclusively in
the interests of shareholders, the business will be driven to
pursue short-term profit at the expense of employment and
spending on research and development To be sustainable,
corporations must nurture relationships with stakehoklers
such as suppliers, employees and the local community. So
whatever the legal position, the corporation does not belong
to its owners. It's not enough to serve shareholders. "
(Source: Mr. Okuda, Chairman, Toyota Motors; Financial
Times, 1 August 2001).
"We can't let investors guide the company. That 's not to say
that investors aren't smart and don't have good ideas,
because they do. They just have different motives. We 've got
to say true to who we are as a company and build for the
long term. " (Source: Gary Kelly, CEO, Southwest Airlines;
The Dallas Morning News, 20 December 2007).
As seen in the figure below, if those companies
designed to maximize shareholder value are in fact
delivering significantly less than those who are not
trying to maximize that metric, then the question
becomes, What on earth is going on here?
I
E 0
Market Capitalization
1990-2005
Market Capitalization
1990-2005
Such significant variance in the dependent variable
would suggest that significant variance should reside
in the explanation or the independent variable. In
other words, the extraordinarily high performance of
these firms has been sustained for so long, that
perhaps we are looking at a fundamentally different
organizational species - a fundamentally different
enterprise architecture, which is better-suited to
significantly different environmental conditions.
Theodore F. Piepenbrock, lectures at MITs Engineering
Systems Division & the Sloan School of Management and at
the University of Oxford's SaTd Business School.'
Charles H. Fine is a Professor at MIT's Sloan School of
Management & Engineering Systems Division.
On the Origin of Corporate Species
Darwin's work has stirred controversy 150 years ago
that, surprisingly is alive today: the confrontation
between God and Science...
Within businesses, a "generation" can be thought of
as a firm's product or service offering, each new
launch, a birth whereby some of the "genes" of the
family are carried forward. In this way, the lifecycle
of the organization may represent many generations,
and a collection of such similar organizations
represent a "species".
Modular & Integral Enterprise Architectures
As summarized in the diagram below, a typology of
enterprise architectures - a continuum spanning two
polar opposites - can be developed which form the
basis the DNA of each species.
Objective functions range from the modular
enterprise architecture's narrow maximization of
shareholder value (competition between
stakeholders) to the integral enterprise architecture's
broader maximization of stakeholder surplus
(cooperation among stakeholders).
In biology and business, morphology trumps physiology -
i.e. species type is more important than health of the beast.
~A w~eak .ca w outve a stn-g o i a der t
Organizational theorists, called ecologists define
"species" as the goals, boundaries and activities of an
organization. Similarly architectural theorists define
"forms" as objective functions, boundaries, and
interfaces. The form or species provides a first-order
explanation of performance. In biology and business,
whether in organisms or organizations, morphology
trumps physiology - i.e. species type trumps the
health of the beast. A weak cactus will typically
outlive a strong oak... in a desert.
Architectures define how functions decomposed and
divided among stakeholders. For simplicity we
consider customers and suppliers (the value chain)
and capital and labor (the factors of production).1
Modular
enterprise architecture
Capita Rimo
marketsmaoral
Boundaries define the extent of the stakeholder space
and time horizon. Modular EAs have relatively
narrow stakeholder interest and shorter time horizons.
Integral EAs have relatively broad enterprise
boundaries and longer time horizons.
Interfaces define the quantity and quality of the
stakeholder relationships. Modular EAs have a large
number of competing stakeholders in each class
managed with short-term, arm's length contracts,
while integral EAs have a small number of
cooperating stakeholders in each class managed by
long-term trust-based relationships. Modular EAs are
therefore "positionally' strong, while integral EAs are
positionally weak."'
Integral
enterprise architecture
Singular Objective Plural
(Maximization of Shareholder Value) Function (Maximization of Stakeholder Surplus)
Narrow Enterprise Broad
(narrow spatial, short temporal) BoundlCI0 (broad spatial, long temporal)
Simple Stakehoder Complex
(High quantity of participants in a stakeholder class, I t.rface (Low quantity of participants in a stakeholder class,
Low quality of stakeholder relationships) High quarlity of stakeholder relationships)
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The Evolution of Business Ecosystems
Having defined a typology of enterprise architectural
forms, we can now assemble a theory of how, why
and when these forms grow and die. For this, we
must describe the evolution of the environment,
which puts pressure on enterprise architectures to
either adapt to it, or to die under competitive
pressures from new enterprise architectural forms -
survival of the fittest, with "fit" crucially meaning in
synch with what the environment demands, as
opposed to "fit" meaning in good shape.
While enteprss s
Inter-species Competition
But these two principles raise a perplexing puzzle for
corporate leaders. If the ecosystem financially
rewards dis-integration of the enterprise architecture
in early part of an industry's evolution, but then
rewards reintegration as the industry matures, is it
easier for the incumbent to do this, or is it easier for a
new integral enterprise architecture to be born? This
is the crux of architectural leadership: the ability to
adapt the boundaries of the enterprise architecture in
stakeholder space and time horizons.
aura i y ds ntegrate over
time, reversing this process appears to require extraordinary
(and extraordinarily rare) architectural leadership.
The environment and firm growth trajectories are
characterized on two classical managerial
dimensions: market growth rates (i.e. how much) and
technology growth rates (i.e. what type). Many
industries exhibit a classical S-shaped growth over
time, with the annual rates of output therefore
following a bell-shaped curve as shown below."v
Enterprise architectures early in the industry's
evolution are integral, for radical product innovation.
They then dis-integrate for speed to build a fast-
growing market, and for greater cost-leadership and
more modest product innovation. As the ecosystem
begins to mature, integral enterprise architectures are
required for radical process innovation.
The principle of enterprise entropy states that
enterprise architectures tend to dis-integrate over
time. The principle of ecosystem dominance,
however states that winning enterprise architectures
oscillate over the life-cycle of their industries from
integral to modular and back to integral states.
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If such architectural leadership is in fact
extraordinarily rare, then this raises the possibility for
multiple species to occupy the same niche, incumbent
firms having modular enterprise architectures, and
late entrant challengers having integral enterprise
architectures. Such competition between species is
symbiotic, that is one species needs the other.
The market-making "r-strategists" are opportunists
that attack markets with unlimited apparent growth
potential. One the underlying growth opportunities
begin to slow down, they are designed to exit that
niche, leaving it to the market-taking "K-strategists",
which are designed to thrive in environments with
low resource availabilities. In the automotive and
airline industries, GM & Ford, and American &
United are market makers, while Toyota and
Southwest are late entrant market makers.
Ironically, what works against competitors in one's
own species, is precisely what doesn't work when
competing against another species.
Accelerating Decelerating
Industry Industry
Decline Decline
Challenger
lifecycle
\0 0 oo
time
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Evolution in the Airplane Ecosystem
Having described a theory of how business
ecosystems evolve, we can now look at the empirical
evidence in the ecosystem of commercial airplane
design and manufacture - a rich dataset spanning 100
years of evolutionary data thus far, and including
such famous r-strategists like Douglas, Lockheed and
Boeing, who created and dominated the ecosystem
for some half-century, before the emergence and
eventual dominance over the subsequent half-century
by the K-strategist, Airbus with its renewed integral
form of enterprise architecture.
The Fossil Record
As can be seen in the diagram at the bottom, Boeing
began its life, early in the industry's evolution as
integral enterprise architecture - integral for radical
product innovation. It then dis-integrated for speed
to build a fast-growing market, and for greater cost-
leadership and more modest product innovation.
Airbus began its life late in the industry's evolution
as an integral enterprise architecture - integral for
radical process innovation. Both Boeing and Airbus
are on similar trajectories, but Airbus is in a much
less advanced state of dis-integration.
Boeing, the powerful racehorse, finds itself in a desert
against Airbus, a fragile, young camel - but a carel
nonetheless.
The ecosystem is now locked in an epic evolutionary
battle between the strongest remaining survivor of the
r-strategists (created from the merger of Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas) and the only K-strategist,
Airbus. This rare inter-species competition - a mixed
duopoly - is one of the most fascinating and famous
competitions in international business today. We will
next examine the "fossil record" of each species to
determine who was/is winning, how, when and why.
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Boeing, the powerful racehorse, finds itself in a
desert against Airbus, a weak young camel - but a
camel nonetheless. Recalling Collins' famous book,
Boeing is evolving from "Good to Great"... to Gone.
Let us now turn our attention as business ecologists
to the environment to see what types of forces have
created and are destroying these enterprise
architectural forms - these species.
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Ecosystem Maturity: Quality
We characterize the maturity of the ecosystem using
two dimensions: the rate of change of technology and
the rate of change in market size. In other words we
are interested in what is being demanded - the type
or quality of goods and services, and how much is
being demanded - the quantity of goods and services.
Both dimensions have limits to growth in supply and
demand. We begin by briefly exploring the maturity
of the ecosystem in terms of technology quality.
Airplane Ecosystem Maturity: Quality
In order to illustrate ecosystem maturity in quality
space, we turn briefly to the large commercial
airplane industry.
As can be seen in the figures below, the number of
major companies competing in this space appears to
have risen gradually over the first fifty years of
evolution, followed by a gradual fall of companies
from this space either through exit or consolidation.'
"Onceke dor nat des gn emeges, ~te basis of
coptiio cas dica. , and firms are put to
the test that very few will pass."
Researchers of the evolution of technological
innovation have noted that significant technological
events - called "dominant designs" can mark
significant transformation of the competitive
environment. James Utterback noted, "once the
dominant design emerges, the basis of competition
changes radically, and firms are put to the test that
very few will pass." '
Prior to the dominant product design, the
environment is characterized by radical product
innovation, with firms competing to establish a
standard product, and for customers to accept this as
the benchmark. Christensen referred to this as
"under-served" markets. After the establishment of
the dominant product design, the environment is
characterized by incremental product innovation and
the opportunity for radical process innovation, with
firms competing to win customers on a quality, cost
and delivery basis, as opposed to increasing product
performance. Christensen referred to this as "over-
served" markets with the conditions ripe for the
emergence of a disruptive innovation.
0* +
As can also be seen in the figure at the bottom, the
transition from firm proliferation towards
consolidation occurred in the late 1950s at the
emergence of the dominant design: the jet airplane.v"
Prior to its arrival marked a period of significant
uncertainty, experimentation and radical product
innovation. After its arrival marked a period of
diminishing returns from radical product innovation
as technological saturation began to occur in terms of
higher (40,000 ft cruising altitude), faster (just below
the sound barrier) and farther (half-way around the
world).
The basis of competition gradually switched from
"higher, faster, farther" to "better, faster, cheaper"
which is dominated by radical process innovation,
best enabled by integral enterprise architectures - the
same which launched the industry 50 years earlier,
but this time focused on a radically different
objective.
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Ecosystem Maturity: Quantity
Having defined the first dimension of an ecosystem's
maturity, the rate of change of technological growth -
quantity space, we now turn to the complementary
dimension of the rate of change of market growth -
quality space.
"Perhaps
structural change as
Airplane Ecosystem Maturity: Quantity
One measure of the maturity of the global
commercial airplane industry is to observe the
maturity of its customers, the annual global airline
industry's available seat kilometers (ASKs).
C leading to
En the long-rn
In Michael Porter's seminal book, Competitive
Strategy, he noted: "Perhaps the most ubiquitous
force leading to structural change is a change in the
long-run industry growth rate.""
As all ecosystems have limits to growth or "carrying
capacities", one would expect the rates of change of
growth to begin to diminish. The carrying capacities
could be defined by the penetration of an innovation
into a constant population, or in addition it could
capture the slowing of the growth of the population
size representing the total market.
As can be seen in the figure below, the rates of
change of environmental growth can impact the types
of enterprise architectures which thrive in
environments of rapid or slow growth.
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As can be seen in the figure below, global annual
ASKs have grown exponentially since the industry
began in the 1920's.
As the world's population is beginning to saturate,
with ultimate size of around 10 billion people
occurring between 2050 and 2100, one would expect
this to impact the amount of air travel. Early
indications are that this long-term rate of growth has
started to inflect and will continue to grow, but at
increasingly slower rates.
The implication of this slowing underlying growth
rates is to continue to favor those enterprise
architectures which are built to grow in environments
that aren't. This will be discussed in the following
sections.
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Firm Strategies: Quality
While the "ecosystem" defines the broad industry
where competition is taking place (e.g. automobiles,
airlines, airplanes), "niches" define where these
species chose to live and compete. In market strategy
space this can be thought of as Michael Porter's
generic strategies of differentiation and cost-
leadership. We refer to these distinctions as either
"Higher, Faster, Farther" (which refer to competition
based on product performance) and "Better, Faster,
Cheaper" (which refer to competition on the basis of
quality, delivery and cost).
Differentiation vs. Cost-Leadership
We now briefly look at the long-term trajectories of
market strategies of each pair of species in our three
ecosystems. As shown in the figure below, the
respective incumbents General Motors, United
Airlines and Boeing initially gained their dominance
via product innovation which moved them initially
from differentiation (enabled by an integral enterprise
architecture) towards cost-leadership strategies
(enabled by a modular enterprise architecture), which
later constrained their ability for cost-leaderhip.
Enterprise architectures enable and constrain strategy.
Integrl EAs confsr ex~oration advanta ss, wh a
MTodrlr EAs consfer explo~~,iaion~ advanages.
As Porter popularized in his 1996 HBR article, firms
have an efficiency frontier which conceptually
demonstrates a tradeoff between the generic
strategies of differentiation and cost-leadership."'
What our research demonstrates is that a) enterprise
architectures both enable and constrain choice of
generic strategies, and b) each enterprise architecture
has a skewed efficiency frontier which can bias its
strategic choice.
As shown in the figure below, integral enterprise
architectures confer exploration advantages in radical
innovation of both products and processes, via patient
capital investing in long-term physical or human
capital, with rapid and frequent feedback between
customers and suppliers. Modular enterprise
architectures on the other hand confer exploitation
advantages via impatient capital driving faster short-
term decisions, functional-specialization and market-
based competition between and among stakeholders.
I9
Low
h
-
15
High Low
Relative Cost
(of product/service)
Conversely, the late-entrant challengers Toyota
Motors, Southwest Airlines, and Airbus initiated their
dominance competing in mass markets as cost-
leaders via process innovation enabled by integral
enterprise architectures. Examples from the early
decades of each late-entrant include Toyota's cheap
cars, Southwest's cheap seats, and Airbus' short-haul,
high-volume airplanes. Over time, their enterprise
architectures are disintegrating, enabling them to
move from mass markets of cost-leadership into
fragmented niches of differentiation. Examples of
these new niches might include Toyota's Lexus, and
Airbus' long-haul, low-volume A380 superjumbo.
Today, all the companies in our sample find
themselves in maturing, commoditizing mass
markets, and with the late entrants out-competing
their powerful incumbents in the cost-leadership
space, as their architectures enable them to do so.
Low
Relative Cost
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Firm Strategies: Quantity
The level of vision or myopia appears to be a
function of the enterprise architecture. That is, the
more patient the capital, the more long-term the
trust-based partnerships, the more complex the
stakeholder tradeoffs, the slower the short-term
speed, but the faster the long-term speed of integral
enterprise architectures, like Toyota, Southwest and
Airbus. Conversely, the less patient the capital, the
more short-term and contractual the relationships, the
more simple the inter-stakeholder objective function,
the faster the short-term speed, but the slower the
long-term speed of the modular enterprise
architectures, like GM, United and Boeing. This is a
classic "tortoise-hare" story, where the race does not
always go to the swiftest.
The Tortoise and The Hare
"Boeing quickly moved last week to cut commercial
transport delivery in an announcement that surprised even
some veteran Boeing-watchers by its swiftness and scope. At
a hastily arranged news conference Sept. 18, one week after
the terrorist attacks in the US., the company said it could
also lay off up to nearly one-third of its commercial aircraft
workforce. Alan R. Mulally, Boeing president and CEO of
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said 'When you order
airplanes today, the lead time is anywhere from 10-14
months, so we need to make these decisions for production
next year as soon as possible. "' (Source: Alan Mulally,
President & CEO, Boeing Commercial Airplanes; Aviation
Week, 24 Sept. 2001).
"History tells us that the quicker a company acts to counter
adverse economic conditions, the better able it will be to
work its way through a downturn and emerge stronger when
the economy recovers. " (Source: Jim McNerney, Chairman,
President & CEO, The Boeing Company; memo to
employees, 17 Feb. 2009).
Modular enterprise architectures are built for short-term
speed, while integral enterprise architectures are built for
long-term speed. i a css t h story.
Modular enterprise architectures, therefore create or
amplify the instabilities that they are designed to
serve - i.e. the boom-and-bust "business cycle".
Integral enterprise architectures, on the other hand
create or dampen the stabilities that they are designed
to serve - i.e. Toyota, Southwest and Airbus do not
see such a severe cycle. The principle of optimum
speed states that in maturing environments, the
optimum rate of growth is much slower than the
maximum possible as summarized below.
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"I am always a bit surprised by the speed with which
Americans take decisions: that in three days (after 9-11) they
announce 25,000 lay-offs at Boeing seems to me totally
stupefiing, " (Source: Noel Forgeard, CEO, Airbus; AFX, 21
Sept. 2001).
"We 've always been much more carefid about production
rates. We do see peaks and troughs but we've always
managed to limit the highs and lows better than they do in
the USA. " (Source: Philippe Camus, EADS Co-Chairman;
AT1, 20 Sept. 2001).
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Financial Performance: Revenues
Corporate value - or at least expected value - comes
from a company's ability to grow its top-line
revenues, and ultimately convert this into bottom-line
profits. The data seem to suggest that early entrant
modular and late entrant integral enterprise
architectures grow in different ways in different
stages of an industry's life-cycle and therefore focus
on different sides of this income statement equation.
Modular enterprise architectures, those which launch
and exploit industries, attract investors who value
top-line revenue growth potential. The conversion of
this into bottom-line profits is taken as an article of
faith.
Financial Performance: Profits
Conversely, where growth investors favor industries
with inherently rapid top-line revenue growth, value
investors tend to be more impressed with the
conversion of top-line growth into bottom-line
profits. This emphasis tends to be more prevalent in
industries where top-line growth has diminished and
focus has shifted towards companies that can grow
profits in environments that aren't growing.
Integral enterprise architectures, those which
overtake incumbents, attract investors who value
bottom-line profit growth. Top line growth occurs
inadvertently, as these companies take market share
from incumbent modular enterprise architectures.
Modular enterprise architectures are focused on top-line
rePw nU e S ,T h while integral enterprise architectures are
focused on
Agency Theory posits that the separation of
ownership from management creates the principal- . -
agent problem, in which the managerial agents are
incentivized to grow the top-line revenues, while the .
investors would prefer the growth of bottom-line
profits. 0
As seen in the figures to the right, we combine the
top -line and bottom-line revenues into a profitability
or return on sales metric. Over the last 30 years, in
industries that are in a maturing state, it appears that
late entrant integral enterprise architectures are
exhibiting profit margins that are not only higher than
those in incumbent modular enterprise architectures,
but their trajectories are increasing over time, while i
those of the modular enterprise architectures are
falling.
_,_ . ......................
The Power of Architecture
Let us now summarize the journey that we have been
on. In order to explain the sources of long-term firm
performance, we traced two concurrent causal loops
in technology (quality) and market (quantity) space,
through the macro-organizational architectural form,
function and fit with the environment. These
processes arise in the study of organisms as well as
organizations: morphology and physiology and
ecology - the definitions of species. The power of
architecture is summarized in the figure below.
The Architecture of Power
What makes the design, operation and evolution of
organizations many of orders of magnitude more
complex than that of organisms, is that the functional
"modules" of organisms (e.g. heart, brain, etc.) tend
not to have different goals and objectives from the
whole organism. The same is not necessarily true
with macro-organizations or extended enterprises,
where investors, unions, customers and suppliers can
and often do have conflicting goals and objectives
from that of the enterprise.
'Thea bus ness firm is political coaliton and ahe
exer a potcal ke. The composition and
goals are not given, they are negotiated and bargained."
The architecture of the extended enterprise is one of
the most powerful concepts in determining long-term
firm performance as it both enables and constrains
choice of strategic position as well as growth rates.
The entrepreneurial architect can seek to radically
transform the environment by launching the next
discontinuous innovations via integrality. S/he can
dis-integrate the architecture to exploit the market
growth, or s/he can either attempt to re-integrate the
architecture to fit with the demands of a maturing
ecosystem, or establish a new integral architecture.
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Many years ago, organizational theorist James March
developed a theory of the firm as a political coalition,
in which "The business firm is a political coalition,
and the executive is a political broker. The
composition of the firm is not given; it is negotiated.
The goals of the firm is not given; they are bargained.
Political scientist Robert Dahl defined "power" as
"the ability to get things done when goals conflict".
From these power and political perspectives, we
begin to see the secrets of successful enterprise
architecting, which we will summarize next.
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Design Intelligence: Knowledge & Courage
The nervous system of the organization appears to be
distributed vertically throughout the hierarchy as well
horizontally throughout the extended enterprise like
the nervous system of an organism. Within the
macro-organizational "brain" lies the development
and dissemination of system-level knowledge and
courage - design intelligence. We must first learn
the right things to do (before we can do things right),
but often the bottleneck is having the courage to do
what we have learned is the right thing to do.
Evolution by Intelligent Design
So which is it that drives the evolution of business
ecosystems - Intelligent Design or Evolution by
natural selection? Visionary and courageous
architects create both the enterprises and the
environment that their business will operate in. Both
these will enable and later constrain what future
leaders can do. After creating the environment,
subsequent architects can match the environment's
demands by disintegrating their enterprises. Further
reintegration of the incumbents has (thus far) proven
elusive, providing a new opportunity for new
visionary and courageous architects to re-set the
evolutionary clock back to integrality.
In the Intelligent Design vs. Evolution debate,
System-level knowledge, what do each set of
stakeholders want? What is the optimum balanced
tradeoff to maximize the enterprise's value over the
time horizon that I am interested in. This is a raw
intelligence exercise, both at the top and distributed
vertically and horizontally.
System-level courage, how do I enact this decision?
This is an emotional intelligence exercise, both at the
top and distributed vertically and horizontally.
For Southwest Airlines, the source of integrality may
be/have been it pull from the center by CEO Herb
Kelleher. For Airbus, it may be pushed together from
the outside social forces. For Toyota, it might be
both push and pull.
Architectural Leadership Lessons:
From this research, we have seen that architectural
leadership has the following characteristics:
* Architectural Leadership is a political
process of making complex trade-offs with
"external" stakeholders.
* It requires extremely high levels of
intelligence or personal knowledge of the
ecosystem and emotional intelligence to
develop long-term, trust-based relationships,
and the courage to enact complex decisions.
* This knowledge and courage, while often
developed at an early age, is in fact
strengthened via enterprise crucibles, in
which key leaders of one's enterprise
develop shared knowledge and courage
together over time.
It appears therefore, that in the Intelligent Design vs.
Evolution debate, dominant organizational species
evolve through the intelligent design of their
extended enterprises. Variation is not entirely
random, and the selection forces directing such
evolution are not supernatural. Instead such
architectural direction is often superhuman,
notwithstanding the fact that even the most powerful
business "gods" appear to have their limits.
This research is "agnostic" over which enterprise
architecture is better - there is no one best way that
excels in all situations. Like evolution, it merely
states that the state of the environment defines which
"leadership genes" will be selected and which
"organizational species" will dominate.
'i This article is based primarily on the finding s of a seven
year international research project. See Theodore F.
Piepenbrock, "Toward a Theory of the Evolution of Business
Ecosystems", MIT PhD Dissertation, 2009.
This is a development of the theory presented in Charlie H.
Fine's Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of
Temporary Advantage, 1998, Perseus Books.
m This is according to classic organizational economic
theory, like Porter's Five Forces framework.
v Michael Porter noted: "The grandfather of concepts for
predicting the probable course of industry evolution is the
familiar life-cycle." See Michael E. Porter, Competitive
Strategy, 1980 The Free Press: New York, pg. 157.
James M. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of
Innovation,1994, HBS Press, pg. 24.
' See Murman et al. Lean Enterprise Value, 2002.
v" See McMasters and Cummings, "Airplane Design - Past,
Present and Future." Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 39. 2002
ViI See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy, 1980, The
Free Press: New York, pg. 164.
x See Michael E. Porter, "What is Strategy?" Harvard
Business Review, November-December, 1996, pp. 61-78.
Expanded Executive Summary
Toward a Theory of the Evolution of Business Ecosystems:
Enterprise Architectures, Competitive Dynamics, Firm Performance and Industrial Co-Evolution
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ABSTRACT
This paper contributes toward the building of a theory of the evolution of business ecosystems. In the
process, it addresses a question that has been posed by evolutionary theorists in the economics and
sociology literatures for decades: "Why do firms in the same industry vary systematically in performance
over time?" Seeking a systematic explanation of a longitudinal phenomenon inevitably requires
characterizing the evolution of the industrial ecosystem, as both the organization (firm) and its
environment (industry, markets and institutions) are co-evolving. This question is therefore explored via
a theoretical sample in three industrial ecosystems covering manufacturing and service sectors, with
competitors from the US, Europe and Japan: commercial airplanes, motor vehicles and airlines. The
research is based primarily on an in-depth seven-year, multi-level, multi-method, field-based case study
of both firms in the large commercial airplanes industry mixed duopoly as well as the key stakeholders in
their extended enterprises (i.e. customers, suppliers, investors and employees). This field work is
supplemented with historical comparative analysis in all three industries, as well as nonlinear dynamic
simulation models developed to capture the essential mechanisms governing the evolution of business
ecosystems.
A theoretical framework is developed which endogenously traces the co-evolution of firms and their
industrial environments using their highest-level system properties of form, function and fitness (as
reflected in the system sciences of morphology, physiology and ecology), and which embraces the
evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention. The framework captures the path-dependent
evolution of heterogeneous populations of enterprise architectures engaged in symbiotic inter-species
competition and posits the evolution of dominant designs in enterprise architectures that oscillate
deterministically and chaotically between modular and integral states throughout an industry's life-cycle.
Architectural innovation - at the extended enterprise level - is demonstrated to contribute to the failure of
established firms, with causal mechanisms developed to explain tipping points.
This research lies at the intersection of the intellectual domains of strategic management, organization
science and complex systems theory. It aims to contribute to fundamental debates in these fields
regarding the sources of superior long-term performance. Specifically, do the sources reside within the
firm or in the firm's environment (i.e. industry structure)? What are the roles of managerial adaptation
and environmental selection in the creation and sustainment of such performance? Furthermore, how
does this shape our understanding of strategic leadership? Our empirical findings suggest that sources of
superior firm performance lie neither exclusively within the firm, nor in its industrial environment, but in
how the firm interacts with its environment - i.e. in the network architecture of the firm's extended
enterprise. It appears that these enterprise architectures, which both enable and constrain managerial
agency and adaptation through spatially and temporally bounded rationality, give rise to architectural
inertia and the power of environmental selection. Finally, the data suggest that the qualities of strategic
leadership, which maximize firm performance over the industry's evolution, are architectural: namely the
definition and maintenance of enterprise objective functions, boundaries and interfaces.
INTRODUCTION
Research Question
At its most fundamental level, this paper addresses the following question that has been posed directly and
indirectly by evolutionary theorists in both the economics (Nelson, 1991) and sociology (e.g. Hannan &
Freeman, 1977; Carroll, 1993) literatures:
"Why do firms in the same industry vary systematically in performance over time?"
Although it is typical that the unit of analysis is the firm and the dependent variable is long-term
performance, addressing this question more subtly requires a systematic explanation of longitudinal
phenomena, which inevitably requires characterizing the evolution of the business ecosystem, as both
firm and industry are co-evolving.6
Early in our research, intriguing empirical data began to be revealed: as firms and industries co-evolved,
the dominant form of the firm's objective function and its resulting interaction with its environment
appeared to change. This manifested itself in the counter-intuitive observation that firms which were not
focused on exclusively maximizing shareholder value, were in fact delivering significantly more of it than
firms who focused exclusively on maximizing it. This result appeared in a variety of industries ranging
from manufacturing to services. The exploration of why, when and how this phenomenon happens
became a driving impetus of the research. Thus a second question emerged which appears to lie at the
heart of the first question which was originally posed fifty years ago by Edith Penrose (1959):
"How do firms that have a stakeholder approach differ in competitiveness from firms that
maximize stockholder wealth?"
Proposed Theoretical Framework
Most research implicitly assumes that competing firms are of the same species, and thus focus on second-
order efficiency-based explanations. We propose an alternative first-order effectiveness-based
explanation, namely that where significant sustained long-term variance in performance between firms
exists (e.g. Toyota Motors vs. General Motors, or Southwnest Airlines vs. United Airlines) it is more
productive to classify such competition as inter-species. We therefore characterize a late-entrant
"challenger" species of organization (driven to maximize stakeholder surplus) which has evolved to
systematically out-compete over the long term, the traditional "incumbent" species (driven to maximize
shareholder value).7
We will argue that firms adopting different objective functions, will have different enterprise architectural
forms (Hannan and Freeman, 1977), and will present a typology of isomorphic (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983) organizational sets ranging from integral to modular enterprise architectures, and having different
levels of fit with their environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In addition, the greater the variance in
architectural forms, the greater the potential variance in long-term firm performance, contingent upon the
demands and opportunities provided by the competitive environment of the enterprise's ecosystem.
6 Wiggins & Ruefli (2002) empirically explore the sustainability of competitive advantage using a rare longitudinal
sample comprising 6,772 firms in 40 industries over 25 years, demonstrating just how rare the phenomenon is.
7 Note: in order to assist the reader to easily and rapidly identify the various "species" throughout this paper, we
highlight in blue, the early-entrant incumbent species and in red, the late-entrant challenger species.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Situating within the Literatures
While significant research has been undertaken to understand how firms compete and (separately) how
environments evolve, little theoretical work has been undertaken to understand how organizations and
environments interact and co-evolve, and even less empirical work exists to begin to ground such
theoretical studies. In the following, we briefly summarize three broad literatures, situating our potential
contribution within them.
Strategic Management. Research on competition between firms is mature, and captures a rich debate
which spans exogenous industry-level explanations for firm performance (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1956;
Porter, 1980 and 1985), as well as endogenous firm-level explanations (Penrose, 1959, Wernerfelt, 1984)
known as the resource-based view.8 Relatively little work has been done to begin to endogenize the
environment in order to provide a higher-level of analysis - that of competition between organizational
sets (i.e. extended enterprises), and the resulting evolution of organizational fields (i.e. ecosystems) as
shown in Figure 1 below. Importantly, this analysis of"how" the firm engages the environment begins to
re-ingtegrate strategy process and strategy content schools (Petttigrew, 1992).
Figure 1: Contributing to the Debate in Strategic Management
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The industrial organization literature characterizes the firm's environment as a locus of competition or
"extended rivalry" (Porter, 1980), with the objective function of the firm being profit-maximization,
usually for maximizing the objective function of one specific stakeholder: the shareholders, resulting in a
zero-sum competition within the organizational set. Conversely, relatively little work has been done to
characterize other forms of organizational set, where the objective function is a more plural maximization
of stakeholder surplus (Freeman, 1984) and the interaction between the two in mixed duopoly (e.g.
Lambertini & Rossini, 1998). The strategic complementarities literatures in economics and political
science (e.g. Milgrom & Roberts, 1990 and 1995; Hall & Soskice, 2001) have produced the basis from
which to build empirically.
8 We also aim to integrate the heretofore opposed literatures from organizational economics (e.g. transaction costs,
agency theory, property rights and information economics) and organizational capabilities.
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Organization Science. Within the broad field of open systems organization science, the past 30 years
has seen the emergence and maturing of four major "schools" under the rubric of "organizations and
environments" (Scott, 2003): organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977 and 1984), neo-
institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Uzzi, 1997), resource
dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975 and 1985).
While these schools tend to address the limitations inherent in the strategic management literature -
namely exogenous treatment of the environment - each has its limitations in endogenizing the
environment. Organizational ecology and neo-institutionalism tend to focus on populations of isomorphic
organizations; resource dependence tends to focus on static distributions of power within an
organizational set; transaction cost economics tends to focus on efficiency as the primary driving
mechanism defining firm boundaries. This paper attempts to address these limitations, namely:
heterogeneous populations, competing dynamically, with effectiveness (not efficiency) being the
governing performance mechanism (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Brittain, 1994).
Finally, the theory that contributed significantly to the development of the aforementioned four schools
over 40 years ago, structural contingency theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967) proposed a similar framework to the ecological contingency theory presented herein
with two noteworthy differences. First, their intra-organizational characterization of the processes of
differentiation and integration has similarities to architectural modularity and integrality presented herein,
but now with inter-organizational focus. Second, their contingency theoretic framework was essentially
expressed as variance theory, with the environmental variable expressed as a moderator variable, and no
explicit mediator variable. This paper attempts to build from Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) classic by 1)
moving from firm to organizational set as the unit of analysis, and in doing so, 2) endogenize the
environment in a process theory. The micro-mechanisms of managerial agency are captured across the
macro-level of the organizational set and included as mediator variables covering strategic and operations
choices. The differences between the variance-based structural contingency theory and the proposed
process-based ecological contingency theory are summarized in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Comparing Structural Contingency Theory with Ecological Contingency Theory
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Complex Systems Theory. While the two literatures mentioned above, each focus on organizational
systems, the complex systems literature concentrates on the abstract principles governing general systems
ranging from physical, to biological, to organizational. While general systems theory is a broad and
mature literature (Von Bertalanffy, 1950 and 1962), we aim to focus this discussion on three primary
threads of system science: system architecture, system dynamics, and ecosystem dynamics which theorize
about complexity.
System architecture has its roots in managing functional complexity (Simon, 1962; Alexander 1964;
Rechtin, 2000). It has impacted various socio-technical domains, including: product design (Ulrich,
1995) and more recently in intra-organization design (Anderson and Tuslunan, 1990; Henderson and
Clark, 1990) and inter-organization design (Langlois, 1988; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Fine, 1998;
Schilling, 2000; Sako, 2003; Aoki and Jackson, 2008). While much of this work focuses on supply chain
design, little of it focuses explicitly and more broadly on the architecture of entire organizational sets.
This literature would therefore be an example of progressive intertextual coherence (Locke and Golden-
Biddle, 1997).
System dynamics has its roots in defining and managing dynamic complexity in social systems (Forrester,
1961; Sterman, 2000), that is, where cause and effect are distant in space and time. Although it has been
applied to various complex organizational settings (Forrester, 1958; Hall, 1976; Morecroft, 1985; Sastry,
1997; Repenning, 2002), it has only occasionally been used to explain how the competitive dynamics
among firms interacts with the industry's evolution. Where such studies have been made (Paich and
Sterman, 1993), inter-firm competition occurs between homogeneous enterprise architectures. System
dynamics has yet to be combined with system architecture to develop a theory of how functional and
dynamic complexity evolve in organizational settings. Again, this literature would be another example of
progressive intertextual coherence.
Ecosystem dynamics has its roots in defining competitive complexity. While population growth models
have a long history (Verhulst, 1938), and simple intra-species competition models have been proposed
(Lotka, 1925; Volterra, 1931; Hannan and Freeman, 1977), only more recently have inter-species
typologies been proposed in biology (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967) and subsequently in sociology
(Brittain and Freeman, 1980). The science of ecosystem dynamics has yet to develop significant
theoretical and empirical research on inter-species competition. Again, this literature would be another
example of progressive intertextual coherence.
Problematizing the Literatures
Having situated this paper within the extant literatures, we would like to now note where this paper
departs and where possible contributions may lie.
Incomplete. From the above discussion of a variety of literatures interested in explaining the dependent
variable of organizational performance, it is clear that the literatures, while mature, are incomplete. A gap
exists regarding how competition occurs at the organizational set level and how these co-evolve with the
organizational fields within which they are embedded.
Inadequate. The extant literatures have not adequately addressed the question, by underemphasizing the
role that complexity (functional, dynamic, behavioral, and competitive) plays in understanding the
evolution of business ecosystems. System architecture and ecosystem dynamics serve as a set of
organizing principles which characterize the evolution of a spectrum of system forms, functions and
environmental fit.
Incommensurate. Finally, because these extant literatures have gaps that have not been filled, or have
been filled with inadequate literatures, there are rare but noteworthy cases where the extant theories can
result in misleading characterizations of competition and industry evolution. Examples of such
counterintuitive insights, which go against the received conventional wisdom - discussed later in this
paper - are briefly summarized.
In the strategic management literature's industry structure school (Porter, 1980), the treatment of
members of one's organizational set as "extended rivals", may not under certain conditions result in
maximization of profits to the focal firm. Likewise, the objective function that seeks to maximize
shareholder value, may not under certain conditions achieve its aim. Conversely, the objective function
that seeks to maximize stakeholder surplus, may under certain circumstances achieve more shareholder
value than firms who are expressly trying to maximize this metric.
In the organizational ecology literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1977), which assumes homogenous intra-
species competition, late entrants exhibit higher mortality rates than early entrants. However, when
competition involves heterogeneous inter-species competition, late entrants not only survive, they can end
up dominating the industry.9
Contribution to the Literatures
Although the fields of strategic management and organization science, with their half-century old roots in
economics and sociology are considered by many to be mature, there is clearly an opportunity to integrate
prior streams of research from distant disciplines to produce a new framework in order to resolve its
original unsolved debates of internal vs. external sources of finn performance and adaptation vs.
selection processes of organizational change. A contribution might be made in bringing for the first time,
a typology or configuration from the intellectual domains of system architecting and system dynamics
(i.e. complexity science) formally and systematically to the study of organizations in order to explain their
evolution, structure, function and performance.
Methodological Fit with the State of Literature
From this discussion of the extant literatures, it is clear that the strategic management field exists in a
general state of maturity, particularly with respect to the establishment of variance theories that explain
sources of competitive advantage and firm performance. Strong methodological fit exists, therefore with
more quantitative methods to test and validate these existing theories (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).
However, as little empirical and theoretical research exists to describe how business ecosystems evolve,
the state of the field with respect to process theory can be considered nascent. In this research
environment, strong methodological fit exists for a more qualitative approach to the research design.'0 In
the following section, therefore we will describe the research methods that are designed to meet the
challenges of this nascent literature.
9 Under the environmental conditions of industry maturity.
10 Edmondson and McManus (2007) note that the use of qualitative methods in a mature field represents an "off-
diagonal" methods strategy, which may generate new opportunities for insights provided that a study's focus is
reframed from the broad to the narrow. In this case, we are focusing from variance to process theory.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Empirical Sample
We build grounded theory from a comparative study of inter-species competition between pairs of firms
possessing heterogeneous enterprise architectures" in three industries. The theoretical sample is
summarized in Table 1 below.12
Table 1: Summary of Research Sample
Sample Research Sector Industry Focal Nat- Date of Current Firm
Type Methods Firm ional Birth Enterprise Long-term
Origin Architecture Performane
Primary Field- Mfg. & Large Boeing US 1916 Modular Decreasing
based Services Commercial
ased Services Commercial Airbus EU 1970 Integral Increasing
case study Airplanes .. .
Second- Available Mfg. Automotive GM US 1908 Modular Decreasing
ary data Toyota Japan 1937 Integral Increasing
analysis
Services US Airlines United US 1926 Modular Decreasing
Southwest US 1970 Integral Increasing
The theoretical sample was chosen to expose and explain variance in both the dependent variable (firm
performance) and independent variable (enterprise architecture), while balancing the needs for
generalizability and parsimony in this exploratory stage of grounded theory building. The cases
succinctly demonstrate that the theoretical framework has the possibility of applying to industries ranging
from manufacturing to services, and in socio-economic environments including the US, Japan and
Europe. In addition, in order to gain and sustain access to executive-level informants of the competing
firms in the primary sample, we used the secondary sample to stimulate action-learning via the
exploration of acknowledged world-class firms in both manufacturing e.g. Toyota Motors (Womack,
Jones and Roos, 1990) and services e.g. Southwest Airlines (Hoffer Gittell, 2003). This served as the
basis of discussion around which the senior decision-makers of the primary sample revealed their
cognitive frames regarding themselves and those of their competitor.'3
Potential Limitations. This non-random, small-N, theoretical sample used for theory building
necessarily draws critiques of theory validation using random, large-N, statistical sample. As we aim to
build process (not variance) theory which links "dependent" and "independent" variables in endogenous
closed-loop feedback, capturing longitudinal switching of high and low performers, we begin to mitigate
the concerns of sampling on the dependent variable 4 and survivorship bias.15
" Each firm is posited to be representative of a population of isomorphic organizational sets, giving the theoretical
sample potential for increased external validity.
12 This comparison of pairs of high- and low-performers in the same industries is similar to other theory building
research in strategy content (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and strategy process (e.g. Pettigrew and Whipp,
1990).
3 In order to protect the anonymity of the informants, evidence is reported based on generic enterprise architecture
type, and not individual firm.
14 Where the criterion for selecting the sample of firms is based on the "dependent variable", firm performance.
'" Where the survivors are fallaciously compared with the historic average, despite having unusual properties.
Research Methods
As a theory of industrial evolution implies the study of a longitudinal or diachronic phenomenon, we
employ a tripartite temporal logic to research methods: collecting and analyzing data from the past,
present and projecting it into the future. The three methods used therefore are historical comparative
analysis, field-based case study and dynamic simulation model as shown in Figure 3 and discussed
below.16
Figure 3: Summary of Research Design
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Field-based Case Study. We build grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989) from an
in-depth, seven-year, field-based case study of the primary sample, in which coding of observational,
interview and archival data generated robust sets of constructs and propositions.
Historical Comparative Analysis. In order to verify and project the analysis of the above field-based
case study back in time, analysis of past data followed methods of business history (Penrose, 1960;
Chandler, 1962) using secondary data sources in both the primary and secondary samples.
Dynamic Simulation Model In order to verify the historical analyses as well as project them forward in
time, a dynamic simulation model (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2007) was created to integrate the
explicit causal structures and to explore the dynamic behavior generated by the model.1
16 While the three methods were used concurrently, data and analysis evolved from more qualitative to quantitative.
17 The purpose of this numerical simulation is not for quantitative calibration and prediction, but instead to gain
qualitative understanding and insight into the posited governing "physics" of the underlying causal structures. This
combination of case-based grounded theory and numerical simulation has been recently used in the management
literature (Rudolph and Repenning, 2002) to induce theory both from data and other theories.
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Data Collection
The data collection strategy utilized multiple methods and multiple sources as is briefly described in the
following sections.
Primary Data Sources. For the primary case study, we constructed a macro-level model of the structure,
function and evolution of the organizational set from the micro-level cognitive frames of senior decision
makers within each stakeholder of the organizational set. These data came from over 100 senior level
informants (e.g. CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents and directors) distributed both vertically within the
organizations and horizontally across both organizational sets.
The field-based data for the primary sample are largely taken from over 3,500 hours of ethnography (Van
Maanen, 1988) and clinical methods participant observation (Schein, 1987) spread longitudinally over
seven years from January 2002 to January 2009. Three-month field visits occurred every summer for
seven years, with additional two-week trips every winter and spring. This included over 150 in-depth,
semi-structured interviews and interview-based surveys, totaling over 300 hours. My relationship to the
informants in both organizational sets was as a doctoral student paid to teach strategy in executive
education and workshop format to senior decision-makers.
This longitudinal design allowed for intensive triangulation of the data sources across endogenous and
exogenous changes. For example, during the five years of the study informants occupied multiple
positions and positions (such as CEO), were occupied by multiple informants. In addition, the
longitudinal design allowed for observation of how the competing organizational sets responded to
changing environmental conditions including the exogenous shock of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, the normal rise and fall of the business cycle, as well as the change in market leadership, which
for the first time shifted from the incumbent to the challenger during the time of this study.
Secondary Data Sources. In addition, in order to ascertain the structure, function and evolution of the
organizational sets beyond the temporal scope of direct observation, access was acquired to historical
available data sources, including public documents and official records (e.g. annual company reports and
SEC filings), private documents (e.g. internal company memos) and mass media (e.g. historical
interviews of leaders in the business press and trade journals). By way of example, in order to paint a
historical record of the evolutionary trajectory of the firms in the primary sample, all of the annual
company reports covering nearly 100 years of history, totaling over 3,500 pages were collected for
analysis.
Data Smoothing for Trends. Finally, as this research aims to explain long-term trends (i.e. a "first-
mode" signal), the transfer of data to theory requires a smoothing of short-term noise, manifested as local
events."8 Such smoothing requires "empirical patience", which operationally implies a long data gestation
time constant, before the stock of potential data, is drained by an outflow into the stock of theory-building
data.
18 By analogy, in a theory of annual seasonal weather change (i.e. "due to the earth's tilt and its solar orbit, winter is
colder than summer in the northern hemisphere") the fact that "noisy" daily temperature measurements might reveal
local "inconsistencies" with the trend does not necessarily invalidate the theory.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Overview of Theoretical Framework
Definitions. Before specifying the unit of analysis and levels of analysis, we provide four definitions
along the dimensions of competition-cooperation and substitutes-complements as continuous (not binary)
variables. These definitions, given in both economics and sociology terminology, are summarized in
Figure 4 below.
The type of organization under consideration is thefirm, which is comprised of a collection of interacting
internal functional organizations (e.g. marketing, R&D, manufacturing). These internal interactions tend
toward the cooperative trading of complementary services.
The organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or population (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) or
industry (Porter, 1980) is defined as an aggregate collection of externally interacting organizations or
competing firms. These external interactions tend toward the competitive selling of substitute products
and services.
The organizational set (Blau and Scott, 1962) or "extended enterprise" is defined as a focal firm and its
key exchange actors (e.g. customers, suppliers, investors and employees). The set is therefore a collection
of interacting internal functional organizations (or stakeholders). These internal interactions tend toward
the cooperative selling of complementary products and services.
Finally, the organizational community (Aldrich, 1999) or ecosystem is defined as an aggregate collection
of externally interacting heterogeneous organizations or competing enterprises. These external
interactions tend toward the competitive selling of substitute products and services.
Figure 4: Summary of Primary Definitions
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Units of Analysis. The theoretical framework utilizes multiple units of analysis operating at different
levels. The formal unit of analysis that defines the dependent variable is that of the business firm and
specifically the performance of the single product "strategic business unit" within the more general
diversified corporation (Porter, 1980).
In order to understand and explain the sources of firm performance, this framework posits the construct of
an extended enterprise19 that serves as the primary explanatory or independent variable of the framework.
Finally, in order to understand and explain the evolutionary forces that generate the primary explanatory
variable, this framework posits the construct of an ecosystem of competing extended enterprises having
different ecological forms or belonging to different ecological species (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).20
Levels of Analysis. The levels of analysis occur both above and below the level of the firm. At a micro-
level, the cognitive frames (Goffinan, 1974) of the most senior leaders are mapped across the macro-level
extended enterprise in order to determine and triangulate on the enterprise's architectural form and its
function. In this dual micro- and macro-level of analysis, the enterprise architecture is analyzed as an
enacted system that enables and constrains but does not determine managerial action (Giddens, 1979).
Variables. This paper however breaks with traditional strategic management research which strives to
build and test variance theory - relating dependent and independent variables under strict necessary and
sufficient conditions. Instead, this paper favors the building and testing of process theory, which seeks
only necessary conditions plus a recipe for how they interact (Mohr, 1982; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).
In this way, the "dependent" and "independent" variables are linked via "moderating" and "mediating"
variables to become a system of temporally and causally-linked "interdependent" variables. The entire
system of causal relations therefore forms a closed feedback model whereby the evolution of business
ecosystems is actually an endogenous theory, and the variables become antecedents (Richardson, 1991).
Despite this focus on process theory, we believe it useful to also characterize the four primary variables in
familiar variance theoretic terms for illustrative purposes. In its simplest form, the dependent variable is
long-term firm performance, and the independent variable is the enterprise architecture. We identify two
types of intervening variables that relate the "dependent" and "independent" variables: environmental
maturity, which describes the conditions that create and sustain different enterprise architectures, and
enterprise stability, which describes how the enterprise functions or competes in strategic and operational
terms.
'9 Researchers using the organizational set level of analysis include: resource dependence theorist (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978), transaction cost economists (Williamson, 1975 and 1985) and industry structural analysts in
strategic management (Porter, 1980).
20 Scott (2003) notes that "organizational field" has similar definitions within organization studies: "inter-
organizational community" (Hawley, 1950; Warren, 1967), "organizational community" (Aldrich, 1999), "industry
system" (Hirsch, 1985), and "societal sector" (Scott and Meyer, 1991).
Framework Summary. The theoretical framework is comprised of four constitutive construct sets
representing the highest-level industry system properties of environmental fitness, enterprise architectural
form, firm function and performance (as reflected in the system sciences of ecology, morphology, and
physiology). These are linked by proposition sets as shown proceeding clockwise in Figure 5 below. In
addition, the theoretical framework captures the essential evolutionary processes of variation, selection
and retention, as first expressed for organizations in evolutionary sociology (Aldrich, 1979) and
evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
Figure 5: Overview of Theoretical Framework
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The first construct set defines the construct of enterprise architecture, which describes how the focal firm
interacts with its environment. A typology of ideal enterprise architectures will be defined along a
continuum ranging from modular to integral network forms. In variance theory terms, this module
captures the primary explanatory variables.
The second construct set describes the competitive dynamics between enterprise architectures. It
describes how each type of enterprise architecture functions in terms of key high-level operations and
marketing vafirm performanables. A typ logy of ideal operations and marketing strategies will be mapped to the
typology of enterprise architectures. In variance theory terms, this module captures the primary mediating
variables.
The third construct set describes how the competitive dynamics of each type of enterprise architecture
impacts long-term firm performance. A typology of ideal financial strategies will be mapped to the
typology of enterprise architectures. In variance theory terms, this module captures the primary
dependent variables.
The fourth construct set describes how long-term firm performance impacts the evolution of the industry,
which in turn creates the conditions for future enterprise architectural development. In variance theory
terms, this module captures the primary moderating variables.
Primary Construct: Enterprise Architecture
Theoretical Background. From the outset, we stated that seek a systematic explanation for long-term
performance. We thus seek to characterize the firm-environment as a system of strategic
complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 & 1995), and as a typology of such complementarities
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). The main construct of an enterprise architecture is introduced which originally
emanates from architectural theory, which maps form to function (morphology to physiology) and
specifies a typology of architectural forms ranging from modular to integral. Within design science, such
an architectural typology has been developed for information (Simon, 1962), products (Ulrich, 1995;
Baldwin and Clark, 2000), systems (Rechtin, 1991) and supply chains (Fine, 1998), but rarely to entire
organizational sets.
Within organization science, intra-organizational typologies have been posited (e.g. Bums & Stalker,
1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miles & Snow, 1978). In addition, inter-organizational interactions
have been proposed including: "the firm as a political coalition" (March, 1962), "theory of the firm" /
"transaction cost economics" (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), "resource dependence theory" (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978), "five-forces analysis" (Porter, 1980), "stakeholder theory of the firm" (Freeman,
1984), "social network analysis" (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) and "varieties of capitalism" (Hall and
Soskice, 2001). Finally, the evolution of isomorphic organizational forms has been posited in both neo-
institutional theories (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and organizational ecology at
the population- (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and community levels (Astley, 1985). Typologies of
"species" of organisms and organizations have arisen in biological ecology (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967)
and organizational ecology (Brittain and Freeman, 1980) respectively. These species range from r-
strategists (opportunists) to K-strategists (equilibrium-based) species. Table 2 below summarizes the
typologies and configuration theories that have bee proposed in disciplines ranging from economics to
sociology.
Table 2: Summary of Organizational and Economics-based Typologies
Micro Organizational Structure Mechanistic Organic Burns & Stalker (1961)
(Structural Contingency Theory)
Organizational Structure Differentiation Integration Lawrence & Lorsch (1967)
(Structural Contingency Theory)
"Strategic Types" Prospector Defender Miles & Snow (1978)
(Organizational Theory)
Organizational "Forms" r-strategist K-strategist Brittain & Freeman (1980)
(Organizational Ecology)
Organizational Learning Exploitation Exploration March (1991)
(Organizational Theory)
"Generic Strategies" Differentiation Cost Leadership Porter (1980)
(Economics)
"Mixed Duopoly" Profit Maximizer Labor Managed Lambertini & Rossini,
(Economics) , (1998)
Meso Network Theory Under-embedded Over-embedded Granovetter (1985), Uzzi
(Economic Sociology) (1997)
Inter-organizational Modular Integral Piepenbrock (2009)
"Architecture"
(Complex Systems Theory)
Macro Varieties of Capitalism Liberal Coordinated Hall & Soskice (2001)
(Political Economy) Market Economy Market Economy
~
Enterprise Architecture as Organizational Set. An enterprise architecture is defined as the form of the
organizational set.21 An organizational set is a network comprising the firm and its key stakeholders.
More specifically, the firm is seen to be the focal actor located at the center of a network of dyadic ties
connecting the stakeholders to the firm. The extent of this network or enterprise is defined as including
those stakeholders whose interactions with the firm significantly affect its performance (on a cost-benefit
basis) over the time horizon of interest to the goals of the firm.
Before we can define an architectural typology of enterprises, we must first define the key modules or
stakeholders of the organizational set, that is, we must first perform a functional decomposition or the
enterprise. Each module is chosen for its relatively high internal interdependence and its relatively high
external independence. For analytical simplicity, we decompose the enterprise along three dimensions or
axes, with a pair of stakeholders associated with each axis: 1) the "value chain" of classical strategic
management (Porter, 1985), which comprises customers and suppliers and captures classical demand and
supply relationships; 2) the "factors of production" of classical economics which comprises providers of
capital and labor22; and 3) the competitive axis, i.e. those stakeholders which enable and constrain
competition, (e.g. government and competitors). The primary modules of a generic enterprise
architecture are summarized in Figure 6 below.23
Figure 6: Constituent Modules (Stakeholders) in a Generic Enterprise Architecture
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2' The architectural form of the organizational set (or morphology in organisms) represents an organization's
"genotype", which may be common to both challenger (predators) and incumbent (prey). For example, the genotype
of entrepreneurial radical innovators is an integral enterprise architecture - whether incumbent or late-entrant. A
genotype's function and development within a specific environment, defines a richer concept of a "phenotype" or
species, which is captured in the ecology-morphology-physiology framework.
22 Note, while stakeholders in the "value chain" axis tend to represent "firms", stakeholders in the "the factors of
production" axis tend to represent investment and labor "institutions."
Note, for parsimony, the remainder of this paper focuses primarily on the first two dimensions of the enterprise,
namely on customers, suppliers, investors and employees. For a fuller discussion of the broader organizational set,
please refer to Piepenbrock (2009).
1.
Construct Definitions & Measures. As Nohria and Gulati (1994) point out, no single unified
perspective on organizations is shared between most major open systems schools of thought. For
example, while contingency theorists, organizational ecologists and institutional theorists focus broadly
on determinants of organizational form, resource dependence and transaction cost theorists focus on
determinants of organizational boundaries, while resource dependence and network theorists focus on
determinants of inter-organizational relationships.
The primary construct presented herein attempts to synthesize these theories, by proposing an integrated
construct set which combines organizational Jbrm, boundaries and relationships in the notion of an inter-
organizational or enterprise architecture. 24 These enterprise architectures are hypothesized to lie on a
theoretical continuum ranging from modular to integral forms. These two extremes represent ideal types
of architectures or archetypes, which can be defined in terms of three interrelated sets of properties:
objective functions, enterprise boundaries and stakeholder interfces.25  Each will be briefly defined
below.
Objective Functions: The objective function of the focal firm - within the classic corporate governance
framework (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) is defined by the way it appropriates residual profits to its
enterprise, which ranges from maximization of shareholder value for the focal firm to maximization of
stakeholder surplus. The former tends toward zero-sum inter-stakeholder competition, while the latter
tends toward positive-sum inter-stakeholder cooperation. Intermediate objective functions are a weighted
average of stakeholder claims.
Enterprise Boundaries. The objective function defines the spatio-temporal boundaries of the enterprise to
be managed. "Spatial" refers to stakeholder space (not physical or geographic space), and "temporal"
refers to the time horizon to which the enterprise is managed. For the shareholder value maximizer, the
enterprise boundaries tend to be more narrowly defined both spatially around the firm, and temporally
towards the short-term. For the stakeholder surplus maximizer, the enterprise boundaries tend to be more
broadly defined both spatially around the entire extended enterprise, and temporally towards the long-
term.2 6
Stakeholder Interfaces. The firm-stakeholder interfaces define the degree of complexity or functional
in(ter)dependence. High functional independence is associated with narrow spatio-temporal boundaries,
while high functional interdependence is associated with broad spatio-temporal boundaries. Interfaces
can be divided into dimensions of quantity and quality of stakeholder relationships. 2 7 The quantity
defines the number of providers within a stakeholder class and the quality defines the type of firm-
stakeholder relationships, ranging from arm's-length, contract-based, market transactions to trust-based,
relational coordination. The former tends toward zero-sum intra-stakeholder competition, while the latter
tends toward positive-sum intra-stakeholder cooperation.
24 This new construct redirects emphasis from formal aspects of the organization towards more informal aspects.
Schilling and Steensma (2001) employ different empirical measures for modular organizations.
25 In organizational ecology, a similar definition of a "species" or "organizational form" consists of: goals,
boundaries and activities (Aldrich, 1979, pg. 28.)
26 The spatial and temporal dimensions are posited to be non-orthogonal, i.e., the broader the set of stakeholders, the
longer the time frame that one must consider.
27 The quantity and quality dimensions are posited to be non-orthogonal, i.e. with high quantity being coupled with
low quality and low quantity being coupled with high quality.
Architectural Typology: Modular-Integral. The following three axioms, summarized in Figure 7
below, define the architectures of enterprises in terms of their objective fiunctions, enterprise boundaries
and stakeholder interfaces.
The first axiom relates architectural form to function. The form that an enterprise architecture assumes is
driven to some extent by its objective function, which represents the weighted average of the interests of
its constituent stakeholders.
Axiom 1: When modular enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the focal firm's
objective function will tend toward singluar maximization of shareholder value. Conversely
when integral enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the focal firm's objective
function will tend toward pluralistic maximization ofstakeholder surplus.
The second axiom relates architectural form to spatio-temporal boundaries. The form that an enterprise
architecture assumes is driven to some extent by the boundaries within which the leader(s) of the focal
firm manage(s) toward.
Axiom 2: When modular enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the spatio-
temporal boundaries of the focal firm will be relatively narrow and coincident with the
boundaries of the firm and the time expectations of its shareholders. Conversely when
integral enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the spatio-temporal boundaries of
the focal firm will be relatively broad and beyond the boundaries of the firm and its
shareholders.
The third axiom relates architectural form to the level of complexity of the stakeholder interfaces with the
focal firm. The form that an enterprise architecture assumes is driven to some extent by the quantity and
quality of stakeholder relationships with the focal firm.
Axiom 3: When modular enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the focalfirm will
tend to have a higher quantity of lower quality (i.e. contract-based) interactions within each
stakeholder group. Conversely when integral enterprise architectures are observed
empirically, the focal firm will tend to have a lower quantity of higher quality (i.e.
relationship-based) interactions within each stakeholder group.
Figure 7: Typology of Enterprise Architectures
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Empirical Data. The following representative qualitative data summarized in Table 3 below begins to
support the above axioms of modular and integral enterprise architectural forms.
Table 3: Sample Qualitative Data Indicating Architectural Forms
Industry Firm Quotation (Source)
Large Boeing "[Union President] Blondin recalls asking: 'I just don't understand why you always
Com- (Modular) fight us.' Blondin says [Boeing HR VP] Calhoun replied: 'You just don't get it. We
mercial represent Corporate America. You represent labor. We are always going to be
Air- adversaries."' (Source: BusinessWeek, 26 Sept. 2005).
planes Airbus "I am always a bit surprised by the speed with which Americans take decisions: that in
(Integral) three days (after 9-11) they announce 25,000 lay-offs at Boeing seems to me totally
stupefying," (Source: Noel Forgeard, CEO, Airbus; AFX, 21 Sept. 2001).
Auto- General "When the Japanese producers encounter these gigantic market waves, they will quickly
mobiles Motors become as mediocre as we are. They will have to start hiring and firing workers
(Modular) along with suppliers and will end up as mass-producers in short order." (Source: GM
Executive; Womack, Jones & Roos, 1990).
Toyota "Under Japanese company law, shareholders are the owners of the corporation. But if
Motors corporations are run exclusively in the interests of shareholders, the business will be
(Integral) driven to pursue short-term profit at the expense of employment and spending on
research and development. To be sustainable, corporations must nurture
relationships with stakeholders such as suppliers, employees and the local
community. So whatever the legal position, the corporation does not belong to its
owners. It's not enough to serve shareholders." (Source: Mr. Okuda, Chairman,
Toyota Motor Corporation; Financial Times, 1 Aug. 2001).
"Toyota's business philosophy is to realize stable, long-term growth by working hard
to strike a balance between the requirements of people and society, the global
environment and the world economy. Our goal is to grow with all our stakeholders,
including customers, shareholders, employees and business partners." (Source: Toyota
Motors Corporation Annual Report, 2003).
U.S. United "We don't want to kill the golden goose,' Dubinsky...nicknamed Mad Dog... [head of
Airlines Airlines, the Airline Pilots Association] told Goodwin [United Airlines CEO]. 'We just want to
Continent choke it by the neck until it gives us every last egg." (Source: Roger Lowenstien,
al A irlines "Into Thin Air", New York Times, 17 Feb. 2002).
(Modular) "I already hear labor leaders crying out, 'Let's go back to the old ways and let's get that
again.' Do you know that a walrus isn't born fat and ugly - they become that way? So,
if you want a date, you gotta kinda slim down and keep yourself in shape. So if you get
fat and ugly again, someone's just going to take it away from you. Who are the big
losers? The employees lost the most with pensions and incomes. The guy that overeats
is the one that dies. Where there's a management that says, 'Fine. We have to sign this
contract, that we know that if we do will put us at a very non-competitive situation and
will ultimately kill us'. Don't sign it! 'If we don't sing it they're going to strike and
take the company out.' Well, take it! Shit, you're going broke anyway! It might as
well be them that cause it and not you. How do you pull a band-aid off? If you do it
fast, do it quick. On hair at a time or get that goddamn thing off - it's got to come off.
Get it over with. United, Delta, Northwest, and others were a victim of compromise -
another layer of fat, another deal they shouldn't have signed, another concession."
(Source: Gordon Bethune, former CEO Continental Airlines; Airways, July 2007).
Southwest "We are willing to suffer some damage, even to our stock price, to protect the jobs
Airlines of our people." (Source: James Parker, CEO, Southwest Airlines; BusinessWeek, 8 Oct.
(Integral) 2001).
"We can't let investors guide the company. That's not to say that investors aren't
smart and don't have good ideas, because they do. They just have different motives.
We've got to say true to who we are as a company and build for the long term."
(Source: Gary Kelly, CEO, Southwest Airlines; Dallas Morning News, 20 Dec. 2007).
............  . . ... .........w w
1. Managerial Variation: Architecture-Function Relationship
Construct Definitions & Measures
Having defined a typology of enterprise architectures, the next step is to describe how these constructs
function and interact over time in a competitive environment. Two primary variables are used which
consider competition in terms of both quality or "what to offer?" and quantity or "how to offer it"? Porter
(1980) frames this quality decision as a strategic position choice, which is broadly either differentiation or
cost-leadership. Forrester (1961) frames this quantity decision as an operational stability choice, which is
broadly either unstable or stable growth.
While organizational scholars have posited relationships between organizational form and competitive
variables, for example that intra-organizational structure follows strategy (Chandler, 1962; Miles and
Snow, 1978; Arthur, 1992; Delery and Doty, 1996), little research has shown which inter-organizational
form delivers these strategic and operational choices the most effectively. Neither do they explain the
conditions under which the converse is true, namely, when strategy follows structure.
Similarly, while organizational scholars have posited a tradeoff between the activities of exploration and
exploitation (March, 1991), few have specified the inter-organizational forms that best deliver each
activity.
Enterprise architectures can enable and constrain choice in competitive variables. The following two
propositions serve to define the relationship between enterprise architectures and choices in strategic and
operational variables. 28
Proposition la: Quantity of Firm Growth. The first proposition relates enterprise architecture to
quantity-type variables or operational stability choices. The choices that leaders of focal firms make are
driven to some extent by their enterprise architecture.
Operations management scholars have advanced the construct of "stability" in the context of growth
strategies (Forrester, 1961). Growth can be characterized either as unstable exponential growth which
emphasizes reinforcing feedback, while de-emphasizing system carrying capacities or limits to growth29;
or conversely as stable goal-seeking growth which emphasizes balancing feedback and emphasizing
system carrying capacities and limits to growth.30
Proposition la: When modular enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the focal
.firm's operational strategy will tend toward unstable growth; it will have relatively high
short-term speed, but relatively low long-term speed. Conversely when integral enterprise
architectures are observed empirically, the focalfirm's operational strategy will tend toward
stable growth; it will have relatively low short-term speed, but relatively high long-term
speed.
28 For a discussion of how strategic and operational variables interact, see Piepenbrock (2009).
29 The presence of delays in balancing shorter-term demand with supply causes "boom and bust" oscillation, often
associated with unstable growth.
30 Recent research (Piepenbrock, 2004) has theorized that enterprise stability is an "enabling constraint" that allows
a slow enterprise to grow the capabilities to move quickly. Ironically, limiting the maximum short-term rate of
growth, can maximize the long-term rate of growth.
As shown in Figure 8 below, the time histories of input variables (like number of employees or amount of
R&D spend) and output variables (like number of units produced) reveal very different dynamic
behaviors. Note that the rate of change of the inputs or outputs (i.e. the slope of the time histories)
determines the "speed" of growth.
Figure 8: Comparison of Unstable vs. Stable Growth
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For short time horizons, the absolute value of the rate of change of output of the modular enterprises
tends to always exceed the rate of change of output of integral enterprises. Mathematically, this can be
expressed as:
I dQ/dt I > I dQi/dt (for small dt)
For longer time horizons, the absolute value of the rate of change of output of the integral enterprises
tends to always exceed the rate of change of output of long enterprises. Mathematically, this can be
expressed as:
I dQm/dt I < I dQidt I (for large dt)
In addition, it appears that rate of change of output of integral enterprises tends to not go negative. In
other words, integral enterprises are designed to grow at such a rate that they will not have to significantly
shrink output. Mathematically, this can be expressed as:
dQi/dt < 0
--
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Qualitative Empirical Data. Before presenting select quantitative date, we begin by reviewing select
qualitative data as summarized in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Sample Qualitative Data Supporting Proposition la
Boeing
(Modular)
Airbus
(Integral)
General Motors
(Modular)
Toyota Motors
(Integral)
"Boeing quickly moved last week to cut commercial transport delivery
estimates through 2002 in an announcement that surprised even some veteran
Boeing-watchers by its swiftness and scope. At a hastily arranged news
conference Sept. 18, one week after the terrorist attacks in the U.S., the company
said it could also lay off up to nearly one-third of its commercial aircraft
workforce. Alan R. Mulally, Boeing president and CEO of Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, said the layoffs would begin during the last quarter of this year.
'When you order airplanes today, depending on the model, the lead time is
anywhere from 10-14 months, so we need to make these decisions for
production next year as soon as possible.'" (Source: Alan Mulally, President &
CEO, Boeing Commercial Airplanes; Aviation Week, 24 Sept. 2001).
"History tells us that the quicker a company acts to counter adverse economic
conditions, the better able it will be to work its way through a downturn and
emerge stronger when the economy recovers." (Source: Jim McNerney,
Chairman, President & CEO, The Boeing Company; memo to employees, 17
Feb. 2009).
"Airbus has continually increased its market share. This performance
highlights Airbus's ability to meet sustained growth targets by steadily
increasing production output." (Source: EADS Annual Report 2000). "We've
always been much more careful about production rates. We do see peaks and
troughs but we've always managed to limit the highs and lows better than
they do in the USA." (Source: Philippe Camus, EADS Co-Chairman; AT, 20
Sept. 2001).
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"When the Japanese producers encounter these gigantic market waves, they will
quickly become as mediocre as we are. They will have to start hiring and firing
workers along with suppliers and will end us as mass-producers in short order."
(Source: GM Executive; Womack, Jones & Roos, 1990).
"In a high-growth period, productivity can be raised by anyone. But how many
can attain it during the more difficult circumstances induced by low-growth
rate? This is the deciding factor in the success or failure of an enterprise."
(Source: Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Motors Company Executive Vice President;
Ohno, T. 1978, pg 114).
"The Toyota Production System can be realized only when all the workers
become tortoises. Speed is meaningless without continuity. Just remember
the tortoise and the hare." (Source: Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Motor Company
Executive Vice President Ohno. T. 1978, D. 63).
U.S. United Airlines "I don't' want to take advantage of the situation, but we have to do what is
Airlines (Modular) right for the company... and events of September 11 have opened certain
doors for the company that were pretty much closed before." (Source:
Rakesh Gangwal, US Airways President; Hoffer-Gittell, 2003).
Southwest "The 'experts' always think we need to expand at a more rapid pace. What
Airlines these so-called experts express is their desire for Southwest to jump at
(Integral) opportunities at a more rapid clip. Apparently growth excites investors. [But]
nobody is pushing us. That could never happen." (Source: Matt Hafner,
Director, Southwest Airlines; Jody Hoffer Gittell, (2003), pg. 246).
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Quantitative Empirical Data. Proposition la describes the rates of growth and associated enterprise
stability in enterprise architectures within an ecosystem. One would expect Boeing's more modular
enterprise architecture to grow at higher short-term rates, while lower long-term rates (i.e. with less
stability). Conversely, one would expect Airbus' more integral enterprise architecture to grow at lower
short-term rates, while higher long-term rates (i.e. with greater stability). Figure 9 summarizes the output
quantities for the competing focal firms in the primary sample, after the emergence of the dominant
product design.
Figure 9: Quantity Growth of Competing Enterprise Architectures in the Airplane Industry
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Qualitatively, after nearly 100 years of dominance, the market share-leading incumbent, Boeing is
eventually overtaken by the late-entrant challenger, Airbus. Note that the late-entrant exhibits smoother
growth (i.e. slow short-term growth, with fast long-term growth). Three observations can be made
regarding quantity outputs: 1) during an upturn, the rate of change of output growth of a modular
enterprise architecture generally exceeds that of an integral enterprise architecture; 2) during a downturn,
the rate of change of output decline of a modular enterprise architecture generally exceeds that of an
integral enterprise architecture; and 3) negative growth of an integral enterprise architecture is rare.
These three observations combine to state that the long-term growth rates of integral enterprise
architectures exceed those of modular enterprise architecture. Finally, note that the late-entrant appears to
experience a prolonged incubation period of relatively low production, while capabilities are presumably
built. This behavior might imply the need for patient capital.
Quantitatively, over the long-term since Airbus began production in 1974, its output CAGR is 12.5%,
which is approximately seven times Boeing's output CAGR of only 1.8% over the same time period. A
simple least squares fit regression analysis31 using logistic, third order cubic polynomial trend lines,
demonstrates both Airbus' higher long-term growth rate, as well as continued exponential growth. Boeing
on the other hand has a lower long-term growth rate, and has begun to inflect towards downward
concavity (i.e. industry exit).
31 Note that for simplicity, the regression analyses shown use Ordinary Least Squares method. However, as the
longitudinal time-series data are not independent, but autocorrelated, they require more advanced regression
methods like Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) models.
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As illustrated in Figure 10 below, similar trajectories can be seen in the automotive industry.
Figure 10: Quantity Growth of Competing Enterprise Architectures in the Automotive Industry
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Qualitatively, after nearly 100 years of dominance, the market share-leading incumbent, General Motors
is eventually overtaken by the late-entrant challenger, Toyota Motors. Note that the late-entrant exhibits
smoother growth (i.e. slow short-term growth, with fast long-term growth). Note also that while GM's
output is beginning to resemble an S-curve, with the inflection point occurring in the mid-1960s, Toyota's
output is best described as exponential growth, with an inflection point not yet attained. Finally, again
note that the late-entrant appears to experience a prolonged incubation period of relatively low
production, while capabilities are presumably built. This behavior might imply the need for patient
capital.
Quantitatively, over the long-term since Toyota began production in 1937, its output CAGR is 11.8%,
which is approximately five times GM's output CAGR of only 2.6% over the same time period. A simple
least squares fit regression analysis using logistic, third order cubic polynomial trend lines, demonstrates
both Toyota's higher long-term growth rate, as well as continued exponential growth. GM on the other
hand has a lower long-term growth rate, and has begun to inflect towards downward concavity (i.e.
industry exit). Note also that the polynomials cross - i.e. competitive dominance switches - after the
incumbent species has peaked in output growth rates, while before the challenger species has inflected.
As illustrated in Figure 11 below, similar trajectories can be seen in the airline industry.
Figure 11: Quantity Growth of Competing Enterprise Architectures in the USAirline Industry
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Qualitatively, after nearly 100 years of dominance, the market share-leading incumbent, United Airlines is
being overtaken by the late-entrant challenger, Southwest Airlines. Note that the late-entrant exhibits
smoother growth (i.e. slow short-term growth, with fast long-term growth). The integral enterprise
architecture's relative stability is evidenced by an absence of downward labor strikes, upward acquisitions
and its ability general to dampen significant exogenous events like 9-11 terrorist attacks on the US, as
well as the "noise" of minor seasonal fluctuation. Finally, again note that the late-entrant appears to
experience a prolonged incubation period of relatively low production, while capabilities are presumably
built. This behavior might imply the need for patient capital.
Quantitatively, over the long-term since Southwest Airlines began operation in 1970, its output CAGR is
20%, which is approximately six times United Airline 's output CAGR of only 3% over the same time
period. A simple least squares fit regression analysis using logistic, third order cubic polynomial trend
lines, demonstrates both Southwest's higher long-term growth rate, as well as continued exponential
growth. United on the other hand has a lower long-term growth rate, and has begun to inflect towards
downward concavity (i.e. industry exit).
... ...................................................
Table 5 below summarizes the empirical data supporting proposition la which captures the relationship
between enterprise architectures and their function in quantity space.
Table 5: Summary of Data Supporting Proposition la
1916-1970 CAGR = 2% 1970-2010 CAUR = 3%/
1970-2010 CAGR = 13%
Auto- General Modular 1908-1937 CAGR = 15% 1937-2010 CAGR = 3%
mobiles Motors
Toyota Integral 1937-2010 CAGR = 12%
Motors
Airlines United Modular 1926-1970 CAGR = 23% 1970-2010 CAGR = 3%
Airlines
Southwest Integral 1970-2010 CAGR = 20%
Airlines
The question of how profitable this growth is will be covered in the next proposition set.
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Proposition lb: Quality of Firm Growth. Strategic management scholars have advanced the construct
of an "efficiency frontier" in the strategic positioning space (Porter, 1996), which is defined by the
orthogonal axes of differentiation and cost-leadership, or as specialist and generalists in ecological niche
theory (Brittain & Freeman, 1980). As shown in Figure 12 below, a tradeoff between the two strategic
positioning choices is posited to exist. Efficiency is defined as the distance of the firm from the frontier.
Conversely, effectiveness is defined as the distance of the frontier from the origin. As the enterprise
architecture enables and constrains performance, it defines the effectiveness potential of the enterprise
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The shape of this efficiency frontier, while conceptually symmetrical at the
industry level, is not symmetrical at a firm level. Firms that choose to focus on one strategy, develop
capabilities and inertia around that choice, which makes switching to another strategy, while possible,
lower in potential performance than a firm which chose to focus on it.
The second proposition relates enterprise architecture to quality-type variables or strategic positioning
choices, The choices that leaders of focal firms make are driven to some extent by their enterprise
architecture. When firms want to explore (March, 1991) or innovate radically in either products for
differentiation or processes for cost-leadership, they will emphasize integration (Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967). Conversely, when firms want to exploit or innovate incrementally32 in either products for
differentiation or processes for cost-leadership, they will emphasize modularity33 as shown in Figure 12
below.
Proposition ib: When integral enterprise architectures are observed empirically, the focal
firm will be engaged in exploration (or radical innovation in either products or processes) of
niche markets. Conversely, when modular enterprise architectures are observed empirically,
the focalfirm will be engaged in exploitation of mass markets.
Figure 12: Exploration and Exploitation in Strategic Position Space
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32 Often modular enterprise architectures will continue (unsuccessfully) to achieve radical product innovation.
33 When the theory of modularity is applied to physical products (Ulrich, 1995) or even supply chains (Fine, 1998),
the opposite conclusion is reached: namely that modularity leads to lower cost. This conclusion appears not to
consider dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).
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Qualitative Empirical Data. Before presenting select quantitative date, we begin by reviewing select
qualitative data as summarized in Table 6 below.
Table 6: Sample Qualitative Data Supporting Proposition lb
Large Boeing "In 1966 The Boeing Company will observe its fiftieth anniversary. It is
Com- (Modular) difficult to conceive any other half century in man's history more
mercial stimulating, challenging and more rewarding. In those fifty years man's
Airplanes scientific and technological progress has surpassed the total of such
advancement in all previous history, and Boeing is proud to have played a
leading role in that fantastic acceleration. There is a moment now for a
rededication to the next fifty years, and the next, and the next..." (Source:
The Boeing Company, Annual Report, 1965).
"Our products bring better value to our customers, and our pricing reflects that
value. We also have a responsibility to our shareholders, and that means pricing
that allows us to make our financial goals. Do I think that we will ever be the
lower-price option? No. Do I think that should keep us from gaining more
than 50 percent market share? I answer "no" to that as well. (Source: Scott
Carson, Vice President of Sales, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Boeing
Frontiers, April 2005).
"Fundamental, game-changing innovation like that we're pursuing on the 787
usually has a 'bleeding-edge' quality to it - meaning it goes beyond 'leading
edge' into a realm where both the risks and the potential returns are high."
"We're on the bleeding edge of taking a big, big step that was just a quarter step
too far." (Sources: Jim McNerney, Chairman & CEO, The Boeing Company;
BusinessWeek, 23 April 2008; The Chicago Tribune, 22 May 2008).
Airbus "When we set up 30 years ago, Airbus' goal was to pool European capabilities
(Integral) and technological resources to build an aircraft that would reliably and cost-
effectively carry passengers in true wide-body comfort. The name Airbus is
synonymous with lower operating costs for airlines. Airbus has continually
increased its market share. Why? Operational efficiency is the first and last
word in analyzing Airbus's unique market success." (Source: EADS Annual
Report 2000).
Auto- General Motors "Here's what's new about GM's strategy this year: Nothing." "GM brought
mobiles (Modular) brand differentiation to the world in the 1920s. As the decades passed, and our
product portfolio expanded, we slowly drifted away from that simple but effective
strategy. Today the GM product revolution again is strengthening our brands."
(Source: General Motors Annual Report, 2003, pp. 3 and 8).
Toyota Motors "Cost Reduction is the Goal: At Toyota, as in all manufacturing industries,
(Integral) profit can be obtained only by reducing costs. Cost reduction must be the goal
of consumer products manufacturers trying to survive in today's marketplace."
(Source: Taiichi Ohno 1978).
U.S. United Airlines "We have chosen to close our discount subsidiary, Ted in order to focus on our
Airlines (Modular) strengths in serving our premium customers - the historic source of our
competitive advantage."
Southwest "Southwest's business model, like that of Toyota, is to provide a low-cost
Airlines product by utilizing its resources efficiently, while providing record levels of
(Integral) reliable service." (Source: Jody Hoffer Gittell, 2003 pp. 3-4.)
... ... . ..
Quantitative Empirical Data. Proposition lb describes the strategic position taken by enterprise
architectures within an ecosystem. One would expect Boeing's more modular enterprise architecture (as
well as that of its dominant competitive predecessor) to compete via a differentiated product strategy that
stresses product capabilities based on product innovation. Conversely, one would expect Airbus' more
integral enterprise architecture to compete via a cost-leadership product strategy based on process
innovation.
Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15 below summarizes the quality of output for the firms in the airplane,
automotive and airlines industries respectively.
Figure 13: Quality Space of Competing Enterprise Architectures in Airplane Industry
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2. Competitive Selection: Function-Performance Relationship
Construct Definitions & Measures
The dependent variable used in this research - which is typical for most research in strategic management
- is long-term firm performance, defined specifically as economic or financial performance. As such,
there are a vast number of measures and metrics upon which to base the research (McGrahan and Porter,
1997). This is made even more complicated given the fact that the spectrum of enterprise architectures
represents a range of performance objective functions, making a direct comparison of performance
difficult.
In order to reconcile this dilemma, the common performance metric that will be used for all enterprise
architectures will be maximization of shareholder value as represented by market capitalization.
Although this is the explicit goal of the shareholder-based enterprise architecture, and only an indirect
and implicit goal of the stakeholder-based enterprise architecture, it allows crucial comparison of zero-
sum vs. positive-sum outcomes, which reveal the conditions under which an integrated approach
outperforms a modular approach to enterprise architectures.
Shareholder value has been demonstrated to be dependent upon both past financial performance and
future growth prospects (Dobbs and Koller, 2005). These sub-variables will be important in
understanding the distinction between enterprise architectures and their underlying mechanics. Past
performnnance is reflected on the firm's income statement, and can be decomposed into top-line revenues
and bottom-line net income or profits. Longitudinal time-histories of these two variables can help explain
longitudinal trajectories of shareholder value.
Modular enterprise architectures assign a functional decomposition resulting in a clear separation and of
ownership (by principals, typically shareholders) and management (their agents). This "efficiency"
results in the classic principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency Theory posits that
managers are typically interested in maximization of top-line revenues, as their pay and influence is tied
to expanding the size of the firm, while investors are typically interested in maximization of bottom-line
profits. Integral enterprise architectures on the other hand assign a less clear functional separation of
ownership and management, alleviating some of the problems and costs of agency. Resolution of these
functional conflicts occurs above at the enterprise architectural level. Researchers have referred to this as
Stewardship Theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1990).
Proposition 2a: Quantity of Firm Performance (Revenues). Enterprise architectures, by enabling and
constraining choice in key competitive variables, ultimately lead to firm performance. The following
two propositions serve to define the relationship between enterprise architectures and key performance
variables of growth in revenues, profits and shareholder value.
The first proposition relates enterprise function to firm performance expressed as long-term quantity
growth or revenues.
Proposition 2a: When competing modular and integral enterprise architectures are observed
empirically, the focalfirm of the modular enterprise architecture will tend to have lower long-
term rates ofrevenue growth, relative to the focal firm of the integral enterprise architecture.
Empirical data. Proposition 2a describes the rates of growth of revenues in enterprise architectures
within an ecosystem. One would expect Boeing's more modular enterprise architecture to grow at higher
short-term rates, while lower long-term rates (i.e. with less stability). Conversely, one would expect
Airbus' more integral enterprise architecture to grow at lower short-term rates, while higher long-term
rates (i.e. with greater stability). Figure 16 summarizes the revenue quantities for the competing focal
firms in the primary sample.
Figure 16: Quantity (Revenue) Growth in the Commercial Airplane Industry
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Note that over the long-term since Airbus's founding (1974-2006), Boeing's revenue CAGR (unadjusted
for inflation) was only 7.3%, while for Airbus it was more than double at 18.6%. While Boeing grows its
revenues more quickly than Airbus during an upturn, it shrinks its revenues much more rapidly than
Airbus during a downturn, with the net result being that the long-term revenue growth rates of Airbus are
significantly higher than Boeing. The question of whether Airbus' higher long-term revenue growth is
associated with higher profitability will be considered next.
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As illustrated in Figure 17 and Figure 18 below, similar trajectories can be seen in both the automotive
and airline industries respectively. Quantitatively, over the long-term (1980-2010), Toyota's revenue
CAGR is 10%, which is approximately two times GM's revenue CAGR of only 4%. Similarly, Southwest
Airlines' revenue CAGR is 14%, which is nearly three times United Airlines' revenue CAGR of only 5%.
Figure 17: Quantity (Revenue) Growth in the Automotive Industry
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Figure 18: Quantity (Revenue) Growth in the US Airline Industry
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Proposition 2b: Quality of Firm Performance (Profitability). The second proposition relates enterprise
function to firm performance expressed as long-term quality growth orprofits.
Proposition 2b: When competing modular and integral enterprise architectures are observed
empirically, the focalfirm of the modular enterprise architecture will tend to have lower long-
term rates ofprofit growth, relative to the focalfirm of the integral enterprise architecture.
Empirical Data. While the firm may be growing in terms of quantity of revenues, this does not speak
about the quality of growth or the efficiency of converting such growth into residual cash flows or profits.
Proposition 2b describes the rates of growth of profitability in enterprise architectures within an
ecosystem. One would expect Boeing's more modular enterprise architecture to grow at higher short-
term rates, while lower long-term rates (i.e. with less stability). Conversely, one would expect Airbus'
more integral enterprise architecture to grow at lower short-term rates, while higher long-term rates (i.e.
with greater stability). Figure 19 summarizes the profitability quantities for the competing focal firms in
the primary sample, over periods for which data is publicly available.
Figure 19: Quality (Profitability) Growth in the CommercialAirplane Industry
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Qualitatively, while Boeing grows its profitability more quickly than Airbus during an upturn, it shrinks
its profitability much more rapidly than Airbus during a downturn, with the net result being that the long-
term profitability growth rates of Airbus are significantly higher than Boeing. There is some evidence to
support the proposition that high long-term revenue growth rates can be coupled with high long-term
profitability rates by integral enterprise architectures.
Quantitatively, as both data sets show large variation, resulting in low R2 values, only the most basic
descriptive statistic is reliable. Over the period for which comparative data exists (1997-2008), both
Boeing and Airbus have averaged 6% annual operating profits. This amount is in line with Boeing's
longer term (1980-2008) average of 6%.
As illustrated in Figure 20 and Figure 21 below, similar trajectories can be seen in both the automotive
and airline industries respectively. Quantitatively, over the long-term (1980-2010), Toyota's average
profitability is 5% and increasing, while GM's average profitability is only -1% and decreasing.
Similarly, Southwest Airlines' average profitability is 7% and stabilizing, while United Airlines' average
profitability is only -1% and decreasing.
Figure 20: Quality (Profitability) Growth in the Automotive Industry
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Figure 21: Quality (Profitability) Growth in the US Airline Industry
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3. Competitive Retention: Performance-Environment Relationship
Construct Definitions & Measures
Both strategy (Porter, 1980, pg. 164) and organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, pg. 19) researchers
have long recognized the importance rates of environmental change on competition and organizational
forms. As far back as 1838, Cournot postulated a profit-maximizing firm which was subject to the
constraints of demand and technology. This framework similarly distinguishes between two types of
industrial evolution: quantity and quality, each possessing its own growth trajectories, which can be
expressed stylistically as life cycle or S-curves. Just as the Architecture-Function relationship
distinguished between quantity and quality at the firm level, the same distinction is made at the ecosystem
level.
Proposition 3a: Quantity of Environmental Growth. The first proposition relates firm performance to
environmental maturity in quantity terms, as summarized in Figure 22 below.34
Quantity space refers to the amount of products and services supplied and demanded in an ecosystem,
which is influenced by such variables as population size, GDP growth, etc. This characterization of the
environment is well-known in marketing research and has been modeled using Bass diffusion processes
(Bass, 1969).
Proposition 3a: When considering the industry's rates of growth in customer demand,
emerging industries, i.e. those that exhibit slow but increasing rates of quantity growth tend
to be built by / reward integral enterprise architectures, which specialize in slow
(equilibrium) behavior. Transitioning industries, i.e. those that exhibit high rates of quantity
growth tend to be built by / reward modular enterprise architectures, which specialize in fast
(opportunistic) behavior. Maturing industries, i.e. those that exhibit fast but decreasing rates
of quantity growth tend to be built by / reward integral enterprise architectures, which
specialize in slow (equilibrium) behavior.
Figure 22: Co-Evolution of Firm Performance and Environment (Quantity)
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34 This "quantity" formulation captures organizational ecologists' construct of "mass dependence" (Barron, 1999).
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Empirical data. The carrying capacity of the ecosystem in quantity space can be defined by the
underlying availability of critical environmental resources from any of the stakeholders in the
organizational set. The data presented below35 takes customer demand as the key ecosystem variable,
which for the primary sample is the underlying market growth in the global airline industry. As can be
seen in Figure 23 below, the exponential growth trajectory appears to be following the logistic S-curve.
Figure 23: Market Carrying Capacity of the GlobalAirline Industry
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The critical question rate of change of this growth will reveal whether or not the market is beginning to
saturate, creating the environmental conditions for re-integration of the dominant enterprise architecture.
In order to determine if this ecosystem growth is speeding up or slowing down, Figure 24 below shows
the compound annual growth rate (CAGR). While the industry is growing, the annual rate of change of
this growth has been diminishing over time - signaling a "maturing" market - and is asymptotically
approaching the CAGR of global GDP.
Figure 24: CAGR of Market Carrying Capacity of the Global Airline Industry
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35 Data source: Air Transport Association (ATA). Excludes data from the USSR prior to 1970.
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As illustrated in Figure 25 and Figure 26 below, similar trajectories can be seen in both the global
automotive36 and US airline 37 industries respectively.
Figure 25: Market Carrying Capacity of the GlobalAutomotive Industry
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Figure 26: Market Carrying Capacity of the US. Airline Industry
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36 Automotive data source:s Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (wvww.oica.net) and
Hirooka (2006), pg. 73.
37 Note, the data come from the Air Transport Association (ATA), and includes all US airlines passenger and cargo
traffic for both domestic and international operations.
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Proposition 3b: Quality of Environmental Growth. The second proposition relates firm performance to
environmental maturity in quality terms and is summarized in Figure 27 below.
Quality space refers to the type of products and services supplied and demanded in an ecosystem, which is
influenced by such variables as technological innovation, etc. This characterization of the environment is
well-known in technology and innovation research (Christensen and Bower, 1996).
Proposition 3b: When considering the industry's rates of growth in technological innovation,
emerging industries, i.e. those that exhibit slow but increasing rates of quality growth (i.e.
under-served markets) tend to be built by and reward integral enterprise architectures, which
specialize in radical product innovation (i.e. exploration). Transitioning industries, i.e. those
that exhibit high rates of quality growth tend to be built by and reward modular enterprise
architectures, which specialize in incremental product and process innovation (i.e.
exploitation). Maturing industries, i.e. those that exhibit fast but decreasing rates of quality
growth (i.e. over-served markets) tend to be built by and reward integral enterprise
architectures, which specialize in radical process innovation (i.e. exploration).
Figure 27: Co-Evolution of Firm Performance and Environment (Quality)
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Empirical Data. The carrying capacity of the ecosystem in quality space can be defined by the
underlying availability of critical environmental resources from any of the stakeholders in the
organizational set. The data presented below takes supplier capability as the key ecosystem variable,
which for the primary sample is the underlying growth in technological carrying capacity of the global
airline industry as measured by an industry standard of airplane productivity (McMasters and Cummings,
2002). As can be seen in Figure 28 below, the growth trajectory appears to have followed the logistic S-
curve, with the inflection point having occurred in the late 1950's with the emergence of the dominant
product design of jet aircraft. Prior to this, competition existed in improving product performance, where
rates of change in performance were increasing. After the emergence of the dominant design, when the
rates of change of change in product performance began to diminish, competition is hypothesized to move
toward other dimensions of cost, quality and delivery. The current state of technological carrying
capacity is saturating around the asymptotic physical limits of speed, range, etc.38
Figure 28: Technological Carrying Capacity of the Global Airplane Industry
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In addition to saturation of product performance, the long-term trends in product operating costs have
dropped asymptotically toward zero (Philips, 1971), as shown in Figure 29 below.
38 Since the inception of the jet age, maximum speed (in economical mass transport) has been constrained to remain
just below the drag divergence Mach number to avoid excessive fuel consumption. In addition, maximum range is
confined to approximately half the earth's circumference.
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Figure 29: Technological Limits of the Global Airplane Industry
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4. Environmental Variation: Environment-Architecture Relationship
Construct Definitions & Measures
Enterprise architectures, through their competitive interactions, reflexively shape and are crucially shaped
by their environment. It is through this interaction between organization and environment, or more
precisely between organizational set and organizational field (Scott, 2003), that both co-evolve.
Organizational ecologists (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977) focus on macro-level constructs of
organizational founding (entry) rates, failure (exit) rates, and inertial (change) rates. In particular, they
observe that while organizational change does in fact occurs it tends to unfold at rates that are lower than
change demanded by the enviromnent. This organizational momentum is captured by the construct of
structural inertia, which helps explain failure rates and founding rates.
Structural contingency theorists (e.g. Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), have long
postulated that the environment is an important factor in defining the organizations within it. In
particular, they have pointed to rates of change of key environmental factors like technology and
customer demand as driving the optimum structure of organizations operating within these environment.
For them, however, the environment is considered as a static exogenous variable moderating
organizational structure and successful performance.
Technology and innovation theorists (e.g. Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) and affiliated organizational
theorists (e.g. Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990) have taken steps to advance
structural contingency theory by endogenizing technological evolution and its effect on organizational
evolution. These researchers posit the existence of "dominant designs" in products, which fundamentally
change the nature of competition from pre-dominant design focus on product innovation, to the post-
dominant design focus on process innovation. Later theorists (Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Klepper,
1996) in this vein have posited ecological firm entry/exit relationships to the evolution of industries.
This framework, by co-opting more of the environment (i.e. the organizational set) into the causal
explanation of organizational performance can begin to endogenize the dynamics of the evolution of the
environment and the enterprises within it. In this sense it is contingency theory at a higher level of
analysis than the organization, namely that of the organizational set, or ecological contingency theory. In
addition, by formalizing "dominant designs" in an architectural framework, one can begin to integrate the
organizational and environmental or technological evolution.
Proposition 4a: Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures. The first proposition relates
environmental maturity to required levels of integration in enterprise architectures, which is summarized
in Figure 30 below.
Proposition 4a: Dominant designs in enterprise architectures at the ecosystem level tend to
oscillate between integral and modular states throughout the lifecycle of the industry.
As the environment initially demands radical product innovation and patience, the dominant enterprise
architectures tend to be integral. Subsequently, as the environment demands incremental product
innovation, coupled with impatience, the dominant enterprise architectures tend to be modular. Then, as
the environment demands radical process innovation and patience, the dominant enterprise architectures
again tend to be integral. Finally, as the environment demands incremental process innovation, coupled
with impatience, the dominant enterprise architectures tend to be integral.
Figure 30: Stylized Co-Evolution of Enterprises and Ecosystem
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Empirical Data. Having established the birth dates and associated and founding conditions (e.g.
population densities) of the two firms in the primary sample, Figure 31 below summarizes the qualitative
evolutionary trajectories of the enterprise architectures of these firms.
Figure 31: Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures: Airplane Industry:
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The organizational sets appear to initially begin with an integral enterprise architectural form and
subsequently disintegrate monotonically into a modular form over time. Note that this phenomenon
appears to apply to both incumbent and challenger enterprises and be independent of the founding date of
the enterprise.
At the ecosystem (or organizational field) level however, the dominant design in enterprise architecture
appears to oscillate from integral to modular and back to integral forms. While re-integration of the
incumbent enterprise architecture in order to achieve fit with the demands of the ecosystem is not
theoretically precluded, empirically it is not observed. This suggests that in the theoretical sample
analyzed, the incumbents reach a tipping point, whereby their reinforcing behavior tips from virtuous to
vicious - that is, it is more efficient for the environment to select a new species, than for the existing
species to be retained via managerial adaptation.
Superimposed on the evolutionary trajectories of the enterprise architectures, is a notional S-curve,
representing the industry growth in both quantity and quality. One may begin to posit a relationship
between the state of these key environmental variables and the states of the incumbent and challenger
enterprise architectures. Empirical data will be offered in the following sections to refine this conceptual
relationship.
As illustrated in Figure 32 and Figure 33 below illustrate similar trajectories in both the automotive and
airline industries respectively.
Figure 32: Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures: Automotive Industry
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Figure 33: Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures: US Airline Industry
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Proposition 4b: Entry and Exit of Enterprise Architectures. The second proposition relates
environmental maturity to entry and exit of dominant enterprise architectures. 3 9
Proposition 4b: Early entrant (incumbent) enterprise architectures tend toward monotonic
disintegration, with increasing levels of architectural inertia inhibiting their reintegration.
Thus it is easier for the environment to produce a new species of late entrant (challenger)
enterprise architectures.
Empirical Data. Figure 34 below summarizes the birth dates within the population densities for the
firms in the primary sample.40
Figure 34: Commercial Airplane Industry Concentration / Population Density
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Soon after the invention of the airplane at the turn of the century, the number of firms in the aerospace
industry grew for approximately fifty years during an era of ferment (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978)
which was dominated by increasing product innovation resulting in improved product performance
characteristics (i.e. "higher, faster, farther"). A "dominant design" in the product occurred in the late
1950's with the emergence of the commercial jet airplane41, followed by a shake-out and consolidation of
the industry, which continued for the next fifty years. Following the merger of Boeing with McDonnell
Douglas in 1997, the large commercial airplane industry effectively became a global duopoly between
Boeing & Airbus.42
The founding dates of the two firms in the primary sample are also plotted in the figure above. Boeing,
the incumbent was founded in 1916, well before the dominant product design and Airbus the challenger
was founded in 1970, well after the dominant product design.
'9 Note: this "quantity" formulation captures the organizational ecologists' construct of "density dependence"
(Barron, 1999).
40 Based on Weiss and Amir (1999).
41 The Boeing 707 is considered representative of the "dominant design". Note however that other scholars (e.g.
Tushman and Murmann, 1998) have cited an earlier "dominant design" in the Douglas DC-3 in 1936. See
Piepenbrock (2008) for further discussion.
42 As the market segment, "large commercial airplanes" is broadly defined as airplanes having over 100 seats,
smaller airplane manufacturers (e.g. Embraer) have recently begun to enter this space.
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As illustrated in Figure 35 and Figure 36 below, similar phenomena in the trajectories in both the
automotive and airline industries respectively are observed.
Figure 35: Automotive Industry Population Density, Dominant Design & Founding Dates
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In the automotive industry, the dominant design was established in 1908 with Ford's Model T.43 General
Motors, the incumbent was founded in 1908, when the dominant design arrived and Toyota the challenger
was founded in 1937, after the establishment of the dominant design.
Figure 36: USAirline Industry Population Density, Dominant Design & Founding Dates
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In the airline industry, the dominant design was established around 1908 with Boeing's 707 jet airplane.ral
United Airlines, the incumbent was founded in 1926, well before the dominant design and Southwest
Airlines the challenger was founded in 1970, after the dominant design.
Figu Recent scholars (e.g. Kiepper, 1997) argue that the US auto industry shakeout occurred in 1908, coincident with
the arrival of the Ford Model-T as a candidate for dominant design. Utterback & Suarez (1993), citing a different
data set possessing a more coarse filter, demonstrate shakeout in 1923 arguing that Dodge's all-steel, closed body
automobile is the dominant design. See Piepenbrock (2009) for further discussion.
" See Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Kelly and Amburgey (1991).In the irlineindsty th oiatdsg a salse rud16 ihBen' 0 e ipae 4
44 See Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Kelly and Amburgey (1991).
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Summary of Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework, which traces the dynamic evolution of a generic business ecosystem is
summarized in Figure 37 below. 45 Two main causal loops describe the co-evolution of the ecosystem and
its constituent enterprises in terms of both product quantity (solid outer loop) and quality (dashed inner
loop) that is demanded and supplied. Beginning with the industrial output variables X4a(t) and X4b(t)
shown on the left of the figure, we will trace out two clockwise revolutions of the causal loop diagram to
describe how the ecosystem grows and eventually matures46, and how concurrently incumbent firms'
enterprises build the industry and are ultimately overtaken by late-entrant challenger firms' enterprises.
Figure 37: Simplified Summary of Theoretical Framework
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Industry Growth Phase. At time tl, when an industry is born, a significant gap exists between the
quantity and quality of a new product or service's supply and demand potential (shown in green). Firms
(like General Motors, United Airlines and Boeing) that can bring higher performing products to market
will gain early competitive advantage. In this phase of product innovation, integration is required in the
product, firm and enterprise architectures. Such integral enterprise architectures have relatively low rates
of growth due to their relatively "patient" capital, labor, customers and suppliers. Spatio-temporal
boundaries begin as relatively broad, with the firm's relationship with its stakeholders being long-term,
using trust-based relational contracts, and the resulting enterprise value being divided in a positive-sum
cooperative game among stakeholders.
45 A more detailed summary of the theoretical framework including the major balancing loops is discussed in
Piepenbrock (2009).
46 This framework traces the evolution of the business ecosystem from growth to maturity phases. For simplicity, it
does not play out the evolution beyond maturity into the decline phase.
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As the industry approaches time t2, the gap between the quantity and quality of a new product's supply
and demand potential diminishes at a faster rate as the rates of change of industry growth are rising. In
order to meet the demands of the rapidly growing mass market, firms that can rapidly build capacity reap
economies of scale. High rates of radical product innovation diminish, and are replaced by efficiencies of
functional specialization. In this phase, disintegration (or modularization) of product, firm and enterprise
architectures provide competitive advantage. Such modular enterprise architectures (like General
Motors, United Airlines and Boeing) have relatively high rates of growth due to their relatively
"impatient" capital, labor, customers, and suppliers. Spatio-temporal boundaries of the enterprise
diminish, with the firm's relationship with its stakeholders becoming short-term, using arm's length
contracts, and the resulting enterprise value being divided in a zero-sum competitive game among
stakeholders.
Industry Maturity Phase. At time t2, the industrial output S-curves are near their inflection points. After
the industry reaches time t2, the gap between the quantity and quality of a new product or service's supply
and demand potential begins to diminish at a slower rate as the rates of change of industry growth begin
to slow down. New customers are being added at slowing rates, and the appetite for higher performance
products is now being dominated by a demand for cheaper products. At this inflection point in the
industry's quantity and quality S-curves, two scenarios now occur.
Incumbent firms (like General Motors, United Airlines and Boeing) continue to over-serve the market by
chasing smaller and smaller market segments consisting of higher and higher profit-margin customers
(Christensen, 1997). Under new cost pressures, they continue to outsource, compete suppliers and unions
harder and continue to attract more and more impatient capital. Although the industry is slowing down,
the incumbent enterprise architectures continue to speed up, with their stocks of structural inertia and their
impatient capital growing.
Challenger finns (like Toyota Motors, Southwlest Airlines and Airbus), having a different enterprise
architecture can enter and take advantage of the industry's changing characteristics. Now, the rates of
technological innovation begin to slow down, as the dominant product design has been established by the
dominant enterprise architecture, which is now in a modular form. This slowing down of the industry,
both in quantity and quality terms, provides the conditions for a new firm with a different enterprise
architecture to enter and to bring supply and demand back in balance both in quantity terms (i.e. slower)
and quality terms (i.e. process innovation for higher quality, lower cost, faster delivery). As in the birth
of the industry, innovation requires integration of product, firm and enterprise architectures. Such integral
enterprise architectures have relatively low rates of growth due to their relatively "patient" capital, labor,
customers, and suppliers. Spatio-temporal boundaries of the enterprise increase, with the firm's
relationship with its stakeholders becoming long-term, using trust-based contracts, and the resulting
enterprise value being divided in a positive-sum cooperative game among stakeholders.
The competition to establish the dominant product architecture by the now-modular incumbent enterprise
architectures has sown the seeds of their own destruction. The emergence of a dominant design in
product architecture has established the conditions for the emergence of a new dominant design in
enterprise architecture. The dominant enterprise architecture oscillated throughout the industry's lifecycle
from integral to modular to integral.
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MATHEMATICAL MODEL and NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Generic Equations of Motion. The evolution of business ecosystems will be expressed formally by a
system of simultaneous differential equations,47 where the state variables, X, are stocks which accumulate
net flows (dXn/dt) over time.
dXl/dt = fi(XI, X2, ... , Xn)
dXz/dt = f2(X, X2, ... , Xn)
dXn/dt = f(XI, X2, ., Xn)
Note that such equations form a feedback system that generates system dynamics endogenously, via
information from the various state variables, which feed back to influence their own rates of change.
Model Build-Up. In the following subsections, the model will be constructed progressively, each time
adding a higher level of sophistication in order to more clearly understand the underlying assumptions,
parameters, structure and behavior of the model at each stage of complexity. The following stages will
be discussed sequentially:
* Single Firm Growth in an Infinite Market
* Single Firm Growth in a Constant Market
* Intra-species Competition in a Constant Market48
* Diffusing Market (Quantity)
* Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
* Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
* Commoditizing Market (Quality)
* Intra-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
* Inter-species "Competition" in a Commoditizing Market
* Diffusing, Commoditizing Market (Quantity and Quality)
* Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
* Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
47 In the traditions of the general system theory (e.g. Von Bertalanffy, 1950), cybernetics (e.g. Ashby, 1952), system
dynamics (e.g. Forrester, 1961); as well as organizational ecology (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
48 We will not cover the case of inter-species competition in an unchanging environment here, because theoretically,
significant sustained environmental variation is required in order to produce and sustain significant variation in
organizational species. Inter-species competition in a constant market would be a special parametric study when
exploring inter-species competition in a logistic growth market, in which the market diffusion rate is much greater
than the competitor growth rates.
Single Firm Growth in an Infinite Market. First, we assume a monopolist operating under increasing
returns to scale. This assumption captures a variety of business phenomena including economies of scale,
learning curve effects, etc. Under this reinforcing feedback, the more market the firm accumulates, the
faster it continues to be accumulated.
Second, we assume initially that the firm exists in a market of unlimited growth potential - unlimited
carrying capacity. The firm then is able to grow at its maximum fractional rate, r which is assumed to be
constant and is determined by a number of goals and constraints which might include the rate of return on
residual cash flows promised to risk bearers. 49
Most models in organizational ecology focus on population size or density - expressed as number of
organizations - as the primary state variable, which accumulates net flows of organizational entries and
exits (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Population size is of lower importance in these formulations.
This paper however focuses instead on organizational size as approximated by the amount of
environmental resources an organization accumulates, or more specifically in the case of business
ecosystems, the amount of a market a firm possesses. In this way, a population could consist of a
spectrum of organizations ranging from a large number of equally sized firms, each possessing the same
percentage of the total market; to a single firm operating as a monopolist possessing the entire market.
We will derive equations of motion for a firm accumulating sales, X over time.50
The following differential equation captures this simple reinforcing feedback:
dX/dt = rX (1)
Figure 38 below illustrates the causal structure 51 and resulting behavior of this linear first-order
formulation, which results in unrestrained exponential growth of the firm's market acquisition.
Figure 38: Structure and Behavior of Single Firm Growth in an Infinite Market
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dX/dt
X
r time
This equation also describes the early growth of a firm in a finite market, when its accumulated quantity
of market, X is far from the carrying capacity of the market. This will be covered in the subsequent
section.
49 This is actually the fractional net growth rate, and has the units of percent of market growth per unit of time.
S0 For the present discussion, we assume that the firm converts demand into supply instantaneously or without any
delays associated with order backlogs, inventory backlogs etc. Such delays in a balancing loop can account for
cyclical oscillatory behavior. As the time horizon of interest in this evolutionary research is measured in centuries,
the oscillations which manifest themselves over timeframes of decades are of secondary importance.
51 In the diagrammatic representations of the differential equations, the variables within "boxes" represent stocks or
accumulations, while the variables below the "valves" represent rates or flows in and out of the stocks.
Single Firm Growth in a Constant Market. As no firm exists in an infinitely rich resource
environment, we next constrain the model by imposing finite but constant market carrying capacity, K,
which might represent the size of population of potential customers or sales. The assumption here is that,
as the firm acquires more of the finite market, K, the rate of firm growth, r begins to reduce linearly52,
making the organization's rate of growth dependent upon the proportion of the carrying capacity that
remains unexploited 53, as shown in Figure 39.
Figure 39: Fractional Net Growth Rate Assumption
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We therefore extend the previous differential equation (1) to capture the mode-switching from reinforcing
to balancing feedback as the firm approaches the carrying capacity of the market. This new logistic
equation is shown below:54
dX/dt = rX - rX2/K (2)
Figure 40 below illustrates the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear first-order
formulation, which results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth of the firm's market capture.
Figure 40: Structure and Behavior of Single Firm Growth in a Constant Market
Market
size K
X
52 This linear relationship, which produces logistic growth, will be relaxed in subsequent sections which explore
interspecies competition.
5 This is called "mass dependence" in the organizational ecology literature.
54 This was first formulated in social systems by Verhulst (1838) in his logistic population growth model.
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Intra-species Competition in a Constant Market. In most markets, no firm exists without competition;
we therefore need to next introduce competition between firms for customers in a common market. At
this point, we assume two identical isomorphic competitors, X, and X2 having homogeneous enterprise
architectures occupying the same mathematical point niche. We therefore extend the previous differential
equation (2) to account for the simple fact that the addition of sales to either competitor decreases the rate
of growth of the other competitor." Both competitors are now connected via a reinforcing loop that
amplifies differences in market share resulting in an unstable equilibrium. 56 The new, coupled system of
differential equations is shown below:57
dX,/dt = rxlX - rxX 12/K - rxXX 2 c 12/K (3a)
dX 2/dt = rx2X2 - rX2X22/K- rx2X2XlCa2 1/K (3b)
Figure 41 below illustrates the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear second-order
formulation, which results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth of each competitor's market capture. Provided
that both firms have identical forms and occupy the same market niche, no two-firm (or more generally,
two-population) equilibrium can be stable - any exogenous shock to the system will result in the
elimination of one of the firms (or populations).5 8
Figure 41: Structure and Behavior oflntra-species Competition in a Constant Market
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"5 In ecology, this is called "exploitation" (vs. "interference") competition (Brian, 1956). Other dynamic models
formulate competition using more operational variables (Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker and Newman, 2007).
56 This severe "winner-takes-all" competitive assumption is akin to Bertrand (price) competition, rather than the
weaker form of Cournot (quantity) competition where the market is shared in proportion to relative firm growth
rates. Under this assumption, the "competition coefficients", al12 and a21 equal 1.
7 This system of equations formed the basis for modeling competition within the seminal organizational ecology
framework (Hannan and Freeman, 1977: 942). It is based on the classic Lotka-Volterra equations for competing
populations, after Lotka (1925) and Volterra (1931). Note that this is different from the classic Lotka-Volterra
equations for predator-prey populations which generate chaotic oscillation due to a central balancing loop.
'8 This is known in ecosystem theory as the "principle of competitive exclusion" (Gause, 1934).
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Diffusing Market (Quantity). Next, we relax the assumption of a constant carrying capacity of the
resource environment, K (Brittain, 1994). Instead, we permit sigmoid growth as it approaches its own
inherent carrying capacity. 59 This assumption captures the scenario of a new product/service that either:
1) diffuses logistically throughout a constant population of potential consumers (Bass, 1969), or 2)
diffuses instantaneously through a logistically-growing population of potential consumers (Verhulst,
1838), or 3) some combination of the two.60
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown in its most simple form below:
dP/dt = RR - DR = K/ - rdPK/CC (4a)
dK/dt = DR -RR = rdPK/CC -K/1 (4b)
Here, P denotes the potential market; K denotes the adopting market; CC denotes the carrying capacity of
the system; DR denotes the difusion rate; rd denotes the fractional diffusion rate; RR denotes the
replacement or repurchase rate; I denotes the average product life. Figure 42 below illustrates the causal
structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear first-order formulation, which again results in sigmoid
or S-shaped growth for the resource environment.
Figure 42: Structure and Behavior of a Diffusing Market
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For simplicity, we will assume that the average product life, 1 approaches infinity (i.e. the market consists
of durable goods)6", making the replacement rate, RR approach zero. Noting that P = CC - K, the new
differential equation which captures the dynamics of diffusion is:
dK/dt= rdK (1 - K/CC) (4c)
59 For simplicity, we model a linear relationship between the diffusion rate and available carrying capacity, which
results in logistic growth.
60 The more general formulation of a resource environment comprising an interaction of logistic consumer
population growth with logistic diffusion of an innovation is discussed in Piepenbrock (2009).
1 This assumption is not an unreasonable approximation for the primary case study of large commercial airplanes,
with average product lives ranging from 25-50 years.
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Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market. Next, we reintroduce two members of the same
species, competing for the logistically growing market. The new, coupled system of differential
equations is shown in its most simple form below:
dXj/dt= rxlXj - rxI X 12/K- rxXIX 2 (L12/K
dX 2/dt = rx2X2 - rx2X22/K- rx2X2Xlat 2i/K
dK/dt = rKK - rKK2/CC
(Sa)
(5b)
(5c)
Figure 43 below illustrates the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear third-order
formulation, which again results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth for both the resource environment and
the dominant firm (or population of firms) that created it.
Figure 43: Structure and Behavior ofIntra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
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Although this refinement of Hannan and Freeman's (1977) classic does not itself add new insights into
the behavior of competing organizations or populations, it is a necessary building block for the next step
of the formulation of the evolution of business ecosystems, namely, it establishes the condition necessary
for the establishment of interspecies competition, resulting in an extension of the theory of competitive
exclusion (Gause, 1934).
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Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing Market. Since in the previous stage, we have allowed the
environment to grow logistically, we can now acknowledge the possibility of variation in organizational
forms as a consequence of variation in environmental rates of growth. This gives rise to the potential for
dominance switching: i.e. the late entry of a new species of organization, and the associated early exit of
the incumbent species. The two types of competing organizational species modeled therefore reflect
either increasing rates or decreasing rates of environmental growth.
The incumbent species, X which builds the market is known in bio-ecology as an r-strategist, and the
late-entrant challenger species, Y which takes the market is known as a K-strategist (MacArthur and
Wilson, 1967). The primary difference between this formulation and the previous, is that each
competitor's fractional net growth rates are no longer linearly density-dependent, with the (Modular) r-
strategist growing faster when the environment is experiencing rapid growth, and the (Integral) K-
strategist growing faster when the environment's rate of growth is slowing down, as shown in Figure 44
below.
Figure 44: Fractional Net Growth Rate Assumptions
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The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
rx > ry when (X+Y) < K/2 dX/dt = rxX - rxX2/K - rxXYtxv/K (6a)
rx < ry when (X+Y) > K/2 dY/dt = ryY - ryY2/K- ryXYacx/K (6b)
dK/dt = rdK - rdK2/CC (6c)
Figure 45 below summarizes the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear third-order
formulation which results in S-shaped (but no longer logistic) growth for the competitor's state variables.
Crucially note that the r-strategist tends to exit when the growth rate of the market begins to drop below
its own growth objectives. Environmental variance therefore produces variance in the architectures of the
organizational sets, which creates symbiotic inter-species competition, with a more complex theory of
competitive exclusion.
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Figure 45: Structure and Behavior of Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
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Commoditizing Market (Quality). Having permitted the carrying capacity of the market, K to grow
logistically, we now go back to a constant market assumption, but instead allow the quality of the market
customer preferences to diffuse from high-performance differentiated products and services towards low-
cost products and services (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Christensen, 1997). This in effect allows
market niches to evolve, which has the potential to shape the entry and exit of different species of
organizational sets.
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown in its most simple form below:
dD/dt = - CR = - rcDC/K (7a)
dC/dt = CR = rcDC/K (7b)
Here, C denotes the cost-based market; D denotes the differentiation-based market; K denotes the
adopting market's capacity; CR denotes the commoditization rate; r, denotes the fractional
commoditization rate. Figure 46 below illustrates the causal structure and resulting behavior of this
nonlinearfirst-order formulation, which again results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth for the transforming
resource environment.62
Figure 46: Structure and Behavior of a Commoditizing Market
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Noting that D + C = K, the new differential equations which capture the dynamics of commoditization is
shown below:
dD/dt = rD (1 - D/K) (7c)
dC/dt = roC (1 - C/K) (7d)
62 Again, as in the characterization of the diffusing market, the commoditizing market's sigmoid growth is assumed
to proceed logistically, for analytical simplicity.
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Intra-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market. In the previous stage, the resource environment
was characterized as existing in one dimension: the rate of change of market growth, dK/dt. This
formulation extends the model to include a second dimension: the rate of change of technology
commoditization, dC/dt. This captures the construct of a dominant design in the product offering
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), which marks the shift in market demand from increasing rates of
change of improvement in product performance, where competition is based on product innovation, to
increasing rates of change of improvement in product cost, where competition is based on process
innovation.63 In order to control for the previous effects of market growth, we hold the market size, K
constant.64 The new coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
dXj/dt = rxlXj - rx1X12/D- rxlXIX 2 ct2/(D + C) (8a)
dX 2/dt = rx2X2 - rx2X22/C - r 2X 2XiG21/(D + C) (8b)
dD/dt = reD (1 - D/K) (8c)
dC/dt = roC (1 - C/K) (8d)
Figure 47 below summarizes the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear third order
formulation6s which results in sigmoid or S-shaped transition from a market dominated by sales of
products/services based on diferentiation, D to a market dominated by sales of products/services based
on cost, C. Note that this formulation represents direct competition between organizations within the
environment.
Figure 47: Structure and Behavior oflntra-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
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63 Although a "dominant design" is often seen as a discrete event, the market is modeled as a continuously evolving.
64 This control will relaxed in the next section, where both market size, K and type, C will grow logistically.
65 The addition of two state variables is only a first-order addition as one is completely determined by the other.
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Inter-species "Competition" in a Commoditizing Market. In the previous stage, both competitors were
assumed to be of the same species, and therefore broadly able to compete in both the differentiation-based
and cost-based niches (i.e. the competition coefficients a were at or near 1) - for example both intra-
species competitors, GM and Ford can transition from a differentiated product focus towards a cost focus.
However, the emergence of a new species, having an integral enterprise architecture (like Toyota) is much
better suited towards cost-leadership, making their competition coefficient a approach zero. In this
extreme case of interspecies competition, each species focuses on the niche that they are best suited to,
and "competition" takes on a symbiotic nature, due to the presence of architectural inertia. The new
coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
dX/dt = rxX - rxX2/D (9a)
dY/dt = ryY - ryY2/C (9b)
dD/dt = rD (1 - D/K) (9c)
dC/dt = rC (1 - C/K) (9d)
Figure 48 below summarizes the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear third order
formulation6 6 which results in sigmoid or S-shaped transition from a market dominated by sales of
products/services based on differentiation, D to a market dominated by sales of products/services based
on cost, C. Note that this formulation represents indirect competition between organizations occupying
different niches within the environment.
Figure 48: Structure and Behavior of nter-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
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66 The addition of two state variables is only a first-order addition as one is completely determined by the other.
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Diffusing, Commoditizing Market (Quantity and Quality). We now combine the previous two
descriptions of the market environment, where the quantity of the market, K grows logistically (Bass,
1969), while simultaneously, the quality of the market customer preferences diffuses from high-
performance differentiated products and services towards low-cost products and services (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978). This allows the entry and exit of different species of organizational sets for two
reasons: the rate of change in market quantity and the rate of change in technological quality enable
market niches to evolve. The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
dP/dt = -rdP (1 - P/CC) (10a)
dK/dt = rdK (1 - K/CC) (10b)
dD/dt = -r0D (1 - D/K) (10c)
dC/dt = r0C (1 - C/K) (10d)
Figure 49 below illustrates the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear second-order
formulation. Although the total market, K again results in logistic sigmoid or S-shaped growth, niches D
rises and falls, while niche C rises in S-shaped growth to eventually characterize the entire market. Note,
however that if the fractional diffusion rate, rd >> than the fractional commoditization rate, r,, then the
behavior approaches that shown in Figure 43.
Figure 49: Structure and Behavior of a Difusing, Commoditizing Market
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Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market. The model now has two different
ways of defining the state of evolutionary maturity of the environment: quantity and quality - that is, how
much product is produced/consumed, and what type of product is produced/consumed. This section
therefore combines these two characterizations of the market environment into one model, where two
firms of the same species (characterized by the architectures of their respective extended enterprises)
compete. The extent of competitive intensity is defined by the ability of each firm to overcome
architectural inertia and transition from niche D to niche C as the market evolves. A summary of the
coupled system of differential equations is shown below.
dX,/dt = rxlXl - rxIX12/D- rxIX 1X2 C12/K - rXIXIX 2 ar 2/(D + C) (1 la)
dX2/dt = rX2X2 - rX2X 22/C- rx2X1X2 c 21/K - rX2X2Xa21/(D + C) (l1b)
dK/dt = rdK (1 - K/CC) (1 1c)
dD/dt = -rD (1 - D/K) (11 ld)
dC/dt = roC (1 - C/K) (11e)
Figure 50 below summarizes the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear fourth-order
formulation which results in S-shaped growth of the general market K, and the niche, C. Due to
architectural inertia, each species is constrained to its own niche resulting in early exit, late entry and
dominance-switching throughout the life-cycle of the industry.
Figure 50: Structure/Behavior of Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market. The model now has two different
ways of defining the state of evolutionary maturity of the environment: quantity and quality - that is, how
much product is produced/consumed, and what type of product is produced/consumed. This final section
therefore combines these two characterizations of the market environment into one model, where two
different species of firms (characterized by the architectures of their respective extended enterprises)
compete. The extent of competitive intensity is defined by the ability of each firm to overcome
architectural inertia and transition from niche D to niche C as the market evolves. A summary of the
coupled system of differential equations is shown below.
rx>ry when (X+Y)<K/2
rx<ry when (X+Y)>K/2
dX/dt = rxX - rxX 2/D - rxXYoaxy/K
dY/dt = ryY - ryY 2/C - ryXYavyx/K
dK/dt = rdK (1 - K/CC)
dD/dt = -roD (1 - D/K)
dC/dt = rC (1 - C/K)
Figure 51 below summarizes the causal structure and resulting behavior of this nonlinear fourth-order
formulation which results in S-shaped growth of the general market K, and the niche, C. Due to
architectural inertia, each species is constrained to its own niche resulting in early exit, late entry and
dominance-switching throughout the life-cycle of the industry.
Figure 51: Structure/Behavior of Inter-species Competition in a Diifusing, Commoditizing Market
dt Market CC
/ size ..........
time
rX > rY before K/2
rX < rY after K/2
Market
growth rates
dC/dt
I '
dK/dt
,I I
time
dP/dt
118
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
(12d)
(12e)
........
DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Findings and Results
Industry-leading firms like Airbus, Toyota Motors, and Southwest Airlines in the manufacturing and
services sectors respectively while not trying to solely maximize shareholder value have ironically
delivered significantly more of it than their competitors who are trying to maximize this metric. In the
process, these late-entrant challengers have displaced significant market-making incumbents - in fact, the
dominant competitors of their species - in Boeing, General Motors and United Airlines respectively.
The key to this puzzle lies in understanding the how such firms interact with their environments - that is,
in the architecture of their organizational sets. The theoretical sample revealed the integral enterprise
architectures (or K-strategists) can be successfully grown in socio-economic environments as diverse as
Europe, Japan and the United States.
Discussion of Plausible Rival Hypotheses
At the outset of the is paper, we clearly stated that the objective of the research was to begin to answer a
fundamental question in strategy and organization:
"Why do firms in the same industry vary systematically in performance over time?"
The theory presented herein attempted to explicitly pose a systematic explanation for a longitudinal
phenomenon: namely, how does a firm interact with its external stakeholders as a system, and how does
this interaction evolve over time. Most plausible rival hypotheses concerning the explanation of long-
term firm performance, however seem to be non-systemic and focused on short-term "noisy" data.
Another way of stating this is that they tend not to focus on the evolution of the environment and the
subsequent evolution of the competing species of competitors. Such explanations implicitly assume intra-
species competition, which relies on explanations of exogenous events, simple execution problems or
even legitimacy.
Exogenous Events. One of the most common non-systemic explanations is that GM, United or Boeing
are experiencing events beyond their control, whether they are labor strikes, oil shocks or global credit
crunches. This overlooks that their competitors Toyota, Southwest and Airbus experience the same events
with fewer consequences, as their enterprise architectures endogenize or co-opt (Selznick, 1948)
environmental constraints more effectively, for example by offering employment stability in return for
year-on-year productivity improvements, thus avoiding labor strikes; by using a conservative hedging
strategies to minimize the effects of high oil prices; or by maintaining conservative balance sheets with
reserve cash to assist customers with financing of their products and services.
Execution. Another common non-systemic explanation frequently put forward by the leaders of their
organizations is that GM, United or Boeing are simply experiencing execution problems. This class of
plausible rival hypothesis, which focuses on poor execution of strategy, rather than on poor strategy itself
or even more fundamentally, enterprise architectural misfit with environmental conditions is embedded in
the focus on increasing efficiency, given a fixed strategy or enterprise architecture. A problem with this
hypothesis may develop if longitudinal evidence demonstrates that such execution problems are
persistent. Clearly, if a firm consistently and persistently is unable to execute its strategy successfully
over the long term, then perhaps it has the "wrong" strategy, or an enterprise architecture which
constrains its ability to pursue the most effective strategy.
Legitimacy. Another more ideologically-based non-systemic explanation is that Toyota, Southwest and
Airbus are "cheating" due to their unusually close relationships with capital, labor and supplier markets or
government and are therefore "illegitimate" forms of business systems. This is manifested by their
competition referring to them as "Japan Inc.", Texas Inc.", or "Europe Inc." respectively. This
explanation may in fact be defensible, provided that an external refereeing organization had the power to
declare their illegitimacy and enforce rules systematically and longitudinally against their existence. The
fact that such refereeing organizations do not exist, or are not able to enforce rules legitimating only one
enterprise architecture, might seem to imply that a plurality of architectures may in fact exist and thrive
empirically in real business ecosystems.
Liability of Maturity. One of the most common plausible rival hypotheses which attempts to explain
firm success is that the younger the challenger firm, the lower its costs, and the easier it is to be the cost-
leader; or conversely, the older the incumbent firm, the higher its costs (e.g. due to pensions for an aging
work-force), and the harder it is to be the cost-leader.
This can be questioned for example by looking at the evolution of the US airline industry, which is
currently populated by a collection of expensive "legacy" carriers who created the industry and the
relative late arrival of the challenger, Southwest Airlines. Southwest's long-term cost leadership has
sustained a thirty-year attack from a series of newer and therefore (potentially) less expensive
competitors, who arrived nearly a decade after Southwest's founding, due to deregulation of the US
market.67 What distinguishes Southwest, is the relative integrality of its enterprise architecture relative to
younger challengers. This supports the claims of the organizational ecologists, who contend that
mortality rates should be high for late entrants.
It is interesting to note that organizational ecologists have determined across a broad range of industries
that in populations of isomorphic organizations, late entrants have statistically higher mortality rates than
early entrants. In these cases however, the late entrant not only survives, but it overtakes the incumbent.
In other words, the explanation for integral enterprise architectures' success as late entrants is that the
form of its enterprise architecture is more adapted to a maturing environment - it is a new species in an
evolving environmental niche.
67 See Kelly and Amburgey (1991, pg. 603) for their analysis of entry and exit in the US airline industry.
Interest, Importance and Contributions
As business ecosystems continually evolve, a framework exploring the co-evolution of organizations and
their environment would be of theoretical interest to strategic management, organization science and
complex systems researchers, as well as of practical interest to senior executives in industry, particularly
those facing significant environmental change and potential lack of organization-environment fit, and
those engaged in "inter-species" competition. By adapting organizational ecology's focus on multiple
organization density to strategic management's focus on single organizations, we attempt to bridge the
two domains.
Firm-Industry Debate in Strategic Management
It was from this open-ended intensive, in-depth, longitudinal inductive study of both focal firms, that the
data revealed something that the literature had not allowed for: a different species of organizational set
which possessed fundamentally different architectural form, function, structure and behavior from its
competitor. This allowed us to revisit and shed new light on Porter's (1996) classic construct of an
efficiency frontier in light of heterogeneous enterprise architectures. Later analysis of the environment
revealed fundamentally different conditions at the founding of each organizational set, which promoted
their growth and development. In addition, the data revealed that both organizational sets served a
symbiotic function for the other. While both were locked in conventional competition, one created the
environmental conditions that enabled the other to grow and ultimately dominate. Concurrent analysis of
the secondary samples confirmed that the same evolutionary processes and symbiotic inter-species
competition occurred in a variety of settings ranging from manufacturing to services and across national
boundaries from the US to Japan to Europe.
Adaptation-Determinism Debate in Organization Science
The framework acknowledges the concurrent roles of managerial adaptation and environmental selection
in the co-evolution of firms and industries through the construct of organizational set architecture, which
simultaneously enables and constrains agency. Rather than diminishing the role of agency, the
framework identifies an enhanced role of top management, namely CEO not as chief executive, but as
"chief architect" who defines and maintains the objective function, boundaries and interfaces of the
organizational set. These findings contribute to the understanding of strategic leadership as an
architecting activity which focuses upward and outward of the organization (Durbin, 1979), as opposed to
downward and inward. As such, these findings refocus the attention of strategic management scholars
from their traditional focus on efficiency (i.e. doing things right) to a focus on effectiveness (i.e. doing the
right things) for a broader set of stakeholders than just customers or investors. This in turn implies that
new models firms and their leaders, may focus again on power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and politics
(March, 1962).
Although the theoretical framework developed herein was constructed inductively from multiple case
studies, it does confirm and support both theoretical propositions from the literature's illustrious past (e.g.
Burns and Stalker, 1961 and Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), as well as from its more recent cutting edge.
For example, Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006 & 2007) recently developed numerical simulations of
Kaufinann's (1993) NK model to demonstrate theoretically that for industries with high interdependency
among activities, there will be only a few high performers earning profits well above the industry average
and a relatively large number of laggards. The three pairs of case studies presented herein support not
only this claim, but also present a theoretical model which describes how such interdependencies evolve
at both the ecosystem and organizational levels.
Modular-Integral Debates in Complex Systems
Simultaneity. This research attempts to shed more light on the classic intra-organizational architectural
forms implied in Lawrence and Lorsch's 1967 classic: Organization and Environment: Managing
Differentiation and Integration. From the title, we can see clear references to modularity and integrality
within organizations as reflected in the demands of their environments. Their proposition that when the
environment demands increasing intra-organizational differentiation, this must be accompanies with
associated increasing intra-organizational integration (no matter how difficult combining these two may
be). The research presented in this paper however, demonstrates how such apparent difficulties of
matching these two opposing activities actually occur in modular enterprise architectures, and how and
why this can both lead to competitive advantage and competitive disadvantage.
Functional Performance. The framework also begins to expose an apparent contradiction regarding the
relative functional performance of modular vs. integral systems, depending upon the underlying
ontological underpinnings of the phenomena under observation. When viewing systems as mechanistic
e.g. in products (Ulrich, 1995) or even supply chains (Fine, 1998), a set of architectural propositions
emerge which may in fact differ from those which emerge from a more complex organic point of view of
organisms - and crucially - organizations, where dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997)
may exist.68
Architectural theorists have posited that modular (or loosely-coupled) systems exhibit relative lower-cost.
This may in fact be true for products or organizations viewed mechanistically, however for those
organizations exhibiting integral architectures which enable the development of dynamic capabilities, the
converse appears to be true.
Conversely, the same architectural theorists have posited that integral (or tightly-coupled) systems exhibit
efficiency due to function-sharing, resulting in relatively higher performance system architecture. Our
theory however demonstrates that "high-performance" is a relative property which is contingent upon the
demands of the environment, whereby modular (or loosely-coupled) enterprise architectures can exhibit
higher performance than integral, provided that the environment demands and rewards short-term speed
and flexibility.
Evolvability. Finally, the framework also engages the classic premises of theories of systems
architecture, and in doing so, begins to expose an apparent contradiction regarding the relative
"evolvability" of modular vs. integral systems. Architectural theorists from Simon (1962) to Baldwin and
Clark (2000), have posited that modular (or loosely-coupled) systems create an "option value" which
copes well with future environmental design uncertainties, resulting in a more adaptable system
architecture.
However, this research begins to demonstrate that by applying the same principles of system architecture
to the more complex settings of organisms - and crucially - organizations, one can begin to observe
empirically from the case studies discussed herein, that integral (or tightly-coupled) systems may in fact
have higher evolutionary capabilities than modular systems - the key being the time horizon over which
design evolution occurs. If the environment is relatively stable and certain, requiring only continuous
albeit incremental design changes, then wholesale system-wide change is possible, and it is the integrality
of the architecture of the enterprise that creates the setting for such organizational learning. If, however,
68 As an aside, the dynamic capabilities theorists (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) define these capabilities as "the
firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing
environments". We note that such capabilities appear apply also to firms in less rapidly changing environments, like
Toyota Motors and Southwest Airlines (which ironically, Teece et al. name in their seminal paper).
the environment is relatively unstable and uncertain, the potential for radical design changes over a
relatively short period of time is beneficial, and it is the modular architecture that enables such short-term
flexibility.
The establishment of a universal "design rule" of architectural evolvability, appears to be contingent
therefore in the epistemological characterization of the system under consideration, with modularity
apparently conferring adaptability in mechanistic systems in turbulent environments, while integrality
appears to confer adaptability in organic systems in stable environments.
Varieties of Capitalism & Mixed Duopoly Research
While most of the recent research in applying theories of the political economy to the firm (Hall and
Soskice, 2000) has focused on descriptive models of macro-organizational forms, few have focused on
firm performance as the dependent variable, explaining the environmental contingencies (e.g. market
maturity) under which firms embedded in each of the national institutional archetypes (Liberal Market
Economies vs. Coordinated Market Economies) tend to dominate.
This research empirically identifies a significant outlier (i.e. Southwest Airline's integral enterprise
architecture), a Coordinated Market Economy-based firm, which is embedded within the archetypal US
Liberal Market Economy. It has not only survived, but has grown to dominate the US airline industry
comprising a population of incumbent LME firms. This case appears to offer significant counter-intuitive
insights for both managers and a rich data set for researchers on how to create an inter-organizational
architecture which does not utilize the apparent "natural" strengths of a national institutional archetype.
Similarly, in recent micro-economic research about mixed duopolies (e.g. Lambertini & Rossini, 1998),
much has focused on theoretical models which determining equilibrium states, whereas this research
attempts to demonstrate dis-equilibrium dominance-switching dynamics, and presents empirical evidence
for such preliminary claims.
Limitations of Theoretical Framework
The framework presented herein aspires to initiate a theoretical basis for explaining the evolution of
business ecosystems, by building from the foundations of the intellectual domains of strategic
management and ecological-level organizational theory, and bridging across them with system
architecture theory. Inevitably, such an endeavor will fall far short of its aims, some of the limitations of
which are briefly discussed below.
External (Spatial) Validity. While the framework possesses reasonably strong internal validity, it is
clearly limited in its external validity, i.e. in its generalizability or the scope of its applicability. This is
due both to the small N theoretical sample size inherent in this initial exploratory study, as well as due to
the rather narrow boundary around the environmental conditions for applicability: i.e. industries which
exhibit product & process innovation (Klepper, 1996, pg. 565.). Such limited generalizability is likely to
limit the utility of the framework, provided that the pursuit of greater generalizability is possible with
such dynamically and functionally complex systems.
External (Temporal) Validity. The framework is limited temporally in its ability to explain the
evolution of business ecosystems only from growth through maturity phases. Empirical data, upon which
the framework was founded does not yet exist for industrial decline phases.
Future Research
As such a framework undoubtedly raises more questions than it answers, a rich research agenda can be
developed which seeks to characterize the structure, function, and evolution of various species of
organizational sets and their ecosystems. Some examples of this research might include the following:
Increase External Validity. The most important next steps would include additional longitudinal field-
based case studies of competitors in other industries, exhibiting significant long-term variance in
dependent and independent variables, enterprise architecture and firm performance respectively. This is
needed not only to improve the external validity of the existing theoretical framework, but more
importantly to begin to map out the key parameter ranges, which might alter the structure and behavior of
the industry's evolution. For example, what is the effect of rapid changes to the exogenous variables like
technology supply? Would environmental selection create a new enterprise architecture in such an
environment, or would managerial adaptation evolve the incumbent firm due to the perpetually low
levels of structural inertia?
Expand Temporal Scope of Framework. Additional empirical work is required in the case studies
involved in this paper to determine what happens as industries evolve into later stages of maturity and
eventually decline. Do all enterprise architectures begin as integral for exploration and eventually
disintegrate for exploitation, creating a law of enterprise entropy? Conversely, do late entrants with
integral architectures increase their integrality as the industry matures and declines, as the mathematical
formalism would suggest?
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Part I: RESEARCH DESIGN
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Setting
This chapter will briefly answer the key "what?" and "why" questions regarding the research
design. Chapter 2 will then go on to answer the "how?", "where?" and "when?" questions.
"It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one that is most
responsive to change. '69
"In the natural world, species evolve - that is, they change to meet new challenges - or they die. The
same genetic imperative operates in business. "7o
At its fundamental level, this research is about explaining long-term organization performance,
at an architectural or morphological level - namely how do organizational species evolve, via
managerial action or via environmental selection?
1.1.1 Research Abstract
"This is a comparative study of six organizations [three pairs, each] operating in the same industrial
environment. The subsystems in each organization were differentiated from each other in terms of
subsystem formal structures, the member's goal orientation, member's time orientations and
member 's interpersonal orientations. A relationship was found between the extent to which the states
of differentiation and integration in each organization met the requirements of the environment and
the relative economic performance of the organizations. ""
This research aims to contribute to a fundamental debate in the field of strategic management
regarding the source of long-term firm performance - namely does it reside within the firm or in
the firm's environment? The answer is hypothesized to lie neither exclusively within the firm,
nor in its environment, but in how the firm interacts with its environment - i.e. in the nature of
the architecture of the firm's extended enterprise2
"One of the enduring problems facing the field of strategic management is the lack of theoretical
tools available to describe and predict the behavior of firms and industries. The fundamental
problem is that industries evolve dynamically over time as a result of complex interactions among
firms, government, labor, consumers, financial institutions, and other elements of the environment.
Not only does industry structure influence firm behavior, but firm behavior in turn can alter the
structure of an industry and the contours of competition. "'7
Using concepts from the emerging field of engineering systems taken from the intellectual
domains of system architecture and system dynamics, a framework is developed which traces the
co-evolution of firms and their environments using their most abstract system properties ofform,
,function, structure, behavior and environmental fit. The framework, which is rooted in the
69 Charles Darwin.
70 Charles Fine (1998), pg. 3.
71 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b), pg. 1.
72 Fine (1998) and Dyer (2000) argue that competition is between supply and value chains. This research
dissertation attempts to develop and extend such research to stakeholders beyond the supply chain.
73 Levy, D. (1994), pg. 167.
intellectual traditions of contingency and configuration theories, posits the evolution of
"dominant designs" in enterprise architectures throughout an industry's life-cycle, which
oscillate deterministically and chaotically between modular and integral states.
"From a complexity perspective, research will have tofocus on hypotheses about whole systems, their
dynamics and the relationship between the dynamic and success. "74
The research builds grounded theory based initially on a seven-year, multi-level, multi-method,
longitudinal case study of the enterprises of Boeing vs. Airbus, the global duopoly in the
commercial airplane industry. The theory is further tested and generalized across a theoretical
sample of firms in manufacturing and service sectors, with nonlinear dynamic simulation models
developed to capture the governing dynamics of long-term firm performance. The developed
framework is grounded empirically, analytically as well as theoretically by synthesizing a broad
literature of enquiry ranging from economics to organizational theory.
"A fundamental understanding of industry evolution is critical to strategy research. The mechanisms
that impart advantage Jbr some firms over others should be evident in their effects on industry
dynamics, and their efficacy will likely be altered with the course of industry evolution. The study of
the effects of interdependency on industry evolution provides a very useful mechanism for
strengthening the connections between both past and future strategy research at the firm and industry
levels. " 7
1.1.2 Rhetorical Style
This dissertation is written in the style of "scholarly dialogues". As opposed to merely citing
relevant references, original quotations from prominent researchers are used throughout in order
to capture the richness and clarity of their original arguments.
As one of the central points of this research is the identification and characterization of inter-
species competition, where relevant, any quotation referring to growing market environments, or
incumbent species, which manifest themselves today as having modular enterprise architectures
will be shown in blue. Conversely, any quotation referring to maturing market environments, or
challenger species, which manifest themselves today as having integral enterprise architectures
will be shown in red.
74 Stacey, R.D. (1995), pg. 493.
75 Lenox. M.J., Rockart, S.F. and Lewin, A.Y. (2007), pg. 613.
76 Bold has been added expost by this author in order to emphasize points made in this dissertation.
1.1.3 International Academic Collaboration
As shown in Figure 52 below, this work is the product of a series of both collaborative and
competitive and yet integrative partnerships between the following world-class institutions:
" The academic institutions of MIT and The University of Oxford:
o Within MIT:
* Engineering Systems Division
* Sloan School of Management
o Within Oxford:
* Templeton College77
* Said Business School
* The academic / industrial partnerships:
o Within MIT:
* Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM)78
* Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)79
o Within Oxford:
* Oxford Executive Education (OEE)
* The industrial competitors engaged with these academic institutions:
o Boeing
o Airbus
Figure 52: Integrating Academic Collaborators and Industrial Competitors
Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Oxford
Engineer-ng a ystems Division", Templeton College
Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) p a-
Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM) Oxtord Executive Education (OEE) A
'Sloan School of Management/ Said Business School
77 Now, Green Templeton College.
78 Now, Leadersfor Global Operations (LGO)
79 Now, Lean Advancement Intitative (LAI)
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1.1.4 Doctoral Committee
The doctoral committee is designed to meet the overall logic inherent in the research plan. Its
composition is an integral part of the research design supporting the research question and
methodology. The committee, shown in Figure 53 below, represents the academic institutions
upon which this research is based: the MIT Engineering Systems Division, the MlIT Sloan School
ofManagement.
The committee individually and collectively has functional, epistemological and industry-based
domain expertise. In support of the international case study upon which this research is based
(which will be outlined in detail in this document), the committee is based out of the following
geographical centers:
Dr. Charles Fine
Professor, Sloan School ofManagement and Engineering Systems Division
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
* Dr. Deborah Nightingale
Professor, Engineering Systems Division and Aeronautics & Astronautics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
* Dr. Yossi Sheffi
Professor, Engineering Systems Division and Civil & Environmental Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
* Carolyn Corvi
Vice-President / General Manager of Airplane Programs
Boeing Commercial Airplanes
1.1.4.1 Informal Committee
In addition to my core committee at MIT in the US, I was priviledged to have intellectual support
during the European phase of my research, at the University of Oxford in the UK, the base from
which I studied Airbus. The primary faculty with whom I worked were:
* Dr. Mari Sako
Professor, International Business
Said Business School, The University of Oxford, UK
* Dr. Sophie Marnette
Professor, Linguistics & Philology
The University of Oxford, UK
80 Recently retired.
Figure 53: Doctoral Committee
EDr. Charles H. Fine
* Chrysler LGO Professor of Management & Engineering Systems
" Director, MIT International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP)
* PhD committee Chairman and Thesis Supervisor
Dr Deborah J. Nightingale
* Professor of the Practice of Engineering Systems and Aeronautics & Astronautics
SDirector, MIT Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI)
* PhD committee member
Dr. Yossi Sheffi
* Professor of Engineering Systems and Civil & Environmental Engineering
* Director, MIT Engineering Systems Division (ESD)
* PhD committee memberE Vice President & General Manager, Boeing Commercial Airplanes (retired)
" MIT Sloan Fellow
" PhD committee member
1.2 Research Questions
"Hinnings and Greenwood (2002) bemoan the fact that organizational scholars have stopped asking
big, important questions and instead have devoted an increased focus on technical precision and
manageable research projects.
This research dissertation is driven to answer some of the most fundamental academic questions
within the field of strategic management as well as some of the most pressing questions facing
senior leaders in some of the most competitive environments in industry. In this sense, theory
and empiricism are tightly coupled and are the driving impetus behind this research endeavor.
"Often by definition, truly important research questions do not have clear solutions until after the
research has been conducted. If solutions are well known in advance of the research, the question
may be appropriate for consulting practice, but clearly not for basic scientific research... At issue
here is not that strategic management research incorporates elements of consulting practice. The issue
is one of formulating and addressing important research questions that capture the attention and
motivation of scholars and practitioners alike in the merits for studying them. "8 2
81 Pfeffer (2005), pg. 99.
82 Van de Ven, A.H. (1992), pp. 181-182.
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1.2.1 Primary Research Questions
This research attempts to answer a set of primary questions seeking explanations for firm
performance and the nature of competition as well as a set of secondary questions regarding the
origins of firm performance and the nature of strategic choice. The primary set of research
questions focus on "what" is the relative explanatory power of different determinants of firm
performance. The secondary set of research questions focus on "how" the different determinants
of firm performance are formed.83  Each set of questions will be discussed briefly in the
following sections.
1.2.1.1 High-level question
In its highest, most abstract form, this research plan focuses on the following question:
"Why do firms in the same industry vary systematically in performance over time?" 84
Seeking a systematic explanation of a longitudinal phenomenon inevitably requires
characterizing the evolution of the industrial ecosystem, as both the organization (firm) and its
environment (industry, markets and institutions) are co-evolving. This question is therefore
explored systematically and longitudinally through the lens of Engineering Systems: 1) within
the domain of Extended Enterprises, where architectural competition is examined in a theoretical
sample of three classic engineering systems: aerospace, automotive and airlines; and 2) using the
approaches of Design and Dynamics, by analyzing enterprise architectures and their change
management processes and by modeling their competitive dynamics.
This fundamental question, which lies at the center of an ongoing debate in the strategic
management research community, is the most generalized form of the research question posed by
the doctoral plan described herein.85 The debate in question is between those who assert that the
sources of differential firm performance and competitive advantage lies in firm positioning
within the external environment of the industry versus those who assert that advantage lies in a
firm's internal resources.
The industry structure proponents argue that in a competitive environment, firm heterogeneity is
a short-lived phenomenon, and that any internal advantage would be quickly discovered and
competed away. The resource-based theorists argue that such sustainable advantages arise from
rare and inimitable capabilities. 8
While recent empirical studies (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; Powell, 1996;
Roquebert et al., 1996; McGrahan and Porter, 1997; Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002; Hawawini et al.,
83 Farjoun, M. (2002), pp. 565.
84 This question has been posed by numerous researchers, including Nelson, R. (1991) and Hoopes, D.G. et al.
(2003). I am indebted to Prof Mari Sako for pointing this out to me.
85 Population ecologists are interested in the general question on why firms differ in disequilibrium as well as
equilibrium states, while strategic management researchers are implicitly interested in a subset of firm
heterogeneity: namely why firms differ in equilibrium or, why successful firms differ (Carroll, G., 1993).
86 Wiggins and Ruefli (2002) explore the sustainability of competitive advantage using a rare longitudinal sample
comprising 6,772 firms in 40 industries over 25 years, demonstrating just how rare the phenomenon is.
2003)87 have in fact begun to quantify the relative importance of each point of view, other
researchers have noted that this debate in fact misses the point:
"The debate as to which of the resource-based or the industry structure perspectives on firm strategy
is the more valid is not a particularly useful one as both organizational capabilities and the firm 's
environment drive strategy and performance. "88
Noted economist Alfred Marshall characterized the irony of choosing in this external-internal
debate via analogy:
"Context and capability provide two blades of strategic scissors that come together in the creation of
a corporately value-added output. "89
This research therefore attempts to discover the deep underlying foundational nature of long-
term firm competitive performance as the dependent variable, and the evolutionary systemic
interactions between the firm's capabilities and its environment. This research therefore
attempts to:
"...respond to the lack of understanding about co-evolutionary processes within the field of strategic
management and to calls for more studies that synthesize firm- and industry-level perspectives in
strategy and organization research. "90
"The interplay between organizational processes and industry dynamics in determining the firm's
'capability trajectory '... [as] an open systems perspective is clearly not new. However, the strategy
field has not been terribly effective at bridging such levels of analysis and perspectives."9'
In particular, the notion of enterprise architecture is developed to provide a guiding causal
explanation for the observed phenomena, as shown in Figure 54 below.92 It is hypothesized that
this meso-level enterprise architecture reflexively shapes and is shaped by the firm's internal
capabilities as well as simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the external environment. In the
spirit of structuration theory (Giddens, 1979), an enterprise's architecture simultaneously
enables and constrains managerial action, but does not necessarily determine it.
Various "species" of enterprise architectures will be described which have varying degrees of
designed environmental fit. Instead of the environmental determinism defining managerial
action or vice versa, we will investigate the conditions under which managers reflexively "define
how the environment defines my organization." This theory therefore attempts to build on
theories of influential scholars like Edith Penrose:
"Firms not only alter the environmental conditions necessary for the success of their actions, but, even
more important, they know that they can alter them and that the environment is not independent of
their own activities. "93
87 See Appendix B for a summary of the external-internal debate.
88 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W. (1997).
89 Loveridege, R. (2003), pg. 99.
90 Huygens M. et al. (2001), pg. 972.
91 Levinthal, D. and Myatt, J. (1994), pg. 49.
92 The original pilot research study which explored these concepts is Piepenbrock T.F. (2004).
93 Penrose, E.T. (1959), pg. 42.
Figure 54: Enterprise Architecture as a synthesis of External-Internal Theories
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In addition to merely describing enterprise architectures as static phenomena, this research also
aims to explore how they compete diachronically, and finally how this diachronic competition
shapes the evolution of the enterprise architectures themselves over time.
.... ...........................
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1.2.1.2 Mid-level question
Embedded in the preceding discussion lies a slightly lower-level, less abstract, and more specific
question which derives from Penrose's (1959) original research:
"How do firms that have a stakeholder approach differ in competitiveness, commitment, and strategic
flexibility from firms that maximize stockholder wealth? "94
This question actually forms the central focus of the research. In fact, as will be demonstrated in
Chapter 3, the question will be stated more provocatively as "How do firms whose primary
objective is to maximize shareholder value, deliver significantly less of it than those firms who
are not trying to maximize shareholder value?" Figure 55 below summarizes the question as
applied to two world-class companies, Toyota Motors in the manufacturing sector, and Southwest
Airlines in the services sector.
Figure 55: Comparing the Performance of Shareholder- vs. Stakeholder-focused Firms
Manufacturing Example:
Toyota Motors
What's
going on
here? SOUTHWESTService Example:
Southwest Airlines
Blue's main objective
is to maximize this...
Market Capitalization
1988-2008
Market Capitalization
1988-2008
The answer will be hypothesized to lie in how firms manage their firm-environment ecosystems;
in whether or not cause and effect are perceived to be close or distant in space and time. Such a
complex and counterintuitive question will drive the need for a research design that embraces
both dynamic and behavioral complexity, as will be discussed in Chapter 2.
94 Rugman, A.M. and Verbeke A. (2002).
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Although clearly a subset of the original abstract, high-level firm performance question, this
question focuses the problem more clearly on those firms that have different objective functions.
It is important to note that this question therefore focuses the research away from the more
generalized question of competition among firms regardless of their objective functions, whether
they be the same or different.
It will be hypothesized later in this research, that the firm's objective function drives the firm's
relationship with its immediate environment or extended enterprise - both spatially and
temporally. More explicitly, enterprise architectural form follows function.
1.2.1.3 Low-level question
Finally, the above high- and mid-level questions ultimately derive from the idiosyncratic,
context-specific, low-level question that arose from industry:
"How did Airbus emerge from obscurity in the commercial aircraft industry and unseat Boeing as the
premier commercial aircraft company in the world?"9,
This question is interesting given previous research studies (Collins and Porras, 1994) have
classified Boeing as "built to last" - that is "visionary", "successful" and "enduring" compared to
its lifelong rival, McDonnell Douglas (which it ultimately acquired).
"How did Boeing emerge from obscurity in the commercial aircraft industry and unseat McDonnell
Douglas as the premier commercial aircraft company in the world?'" 6
Again, this form of the question is clearly a subset of the original abstract, high-level firm
performance question. In addition, is can be demonstrated to be a form of the more specific mid-
level question regarding the stakeholder-shareholder dichotomy.
In attempting to provide an answer to this low-level question, this research plan will in addition
attempt to move back up in abstraction to provide a more general, mid-level theory explaining
systematic long-term performance differences between competing enterprise architectures.
While no explicit claims will be made for a higher-level theory, this research attempts to
incrementally contribute to the original debate of firm performance in the field of strategic
management.
9' This question, which originated from Boeing senior executive committee during the initial two-year pilot study is
an example of other industry and firm-specific questions like explaining Toyota & Southwest Airlines success over
their dominant rivals GM & Ford and American & United Airlines respectively.
96 Collins and Porras (1994), pg. 17.
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1.2.2 Secondary Research Questions
While the primary research questions come from the applied field of strategic management, a
second set of questions arose as the research progressed from strategic management's
foundational disciplines: economics and sociology as shown in Figure 56 below. These
surrounded the fundamental nature of firms (vs. markets) as well as the epistemological nature of
strategic choice (vs. determinism).
"I advance two related theses. First, economic theory predicts that organizations will be a mess but
not a mystery. Second, classic case studies conducted by organizational sociologists support this
prediction. Fully defending and articulating these theses will require a book... "
Figure 56: Primary Intellectual Social Science Fields
Strategic
Management
"I suspect that there is an enduring reason that the neoclassical 'economic man' theories seem to
have more reach, resonance, and staying power than people-centered stakeholder relations theories.
They are easier to teach, easier to do. Economic theories are neat People are messy. Analytics are
crisp, emotions are messy. "98
97 Gibbons, R. (1999), pg. 145.
9 Kanter (2005), pg. 94.
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1.2.2.1 Debates in Economics
1.2.2.1.1 Markets vs. Hierarchies
A fundamental question in the field of economics surrounds the very nature of the firm (Coase,
1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985), positing their existence is due to the failure of markets.
The fundamental construct posited by this research dissertation - enterprise architecture -
attempts to engage this market-hierarchy debate by challenging the boundaries of the firm as a
unit of competitive advantage via such mechanisms as transaction costs and relational
contracting.
1.2.2.1.2 Firm Boundaries and Minimization of Transaction Costs
Williamson's (1975, 1985) transaction cost economics (TCE) proposed that firms should
organize their spatial boundaries to minimize transaction costs. This proposed research attempts
to enrich the TCE dialogue by exploring the nonlinear dynamic relationships governing which
time horizons do Williamson's prescriptions apply. As shown in Figure 57 below, do temporal
boundaries affect the spatial boundaries? Does short-term minimization of transaction costs
result in different firm boundaries than those for long-term minimization of transaction costs?
Figure 57: The Relationship between Spatial and Temporal Boundaries of the Firm
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1.2.2.2 Debates in Sociology
1.2.2.2.1 Debates in Organizational Theory
This firm-environment interaction forms a central and ongoing debate in strategic management
and organization theory. The richness and complexity of this debate is captured through the
following two "diagonal" questions of Astley and Van de Ven's (1983) integrative meta-
theoretical framework and shown in Figure 58 below.99 Namely, the northwest-southeast
diagonal:
"Is organizational life determined by intractable environmental constraints, or is it actively created
through strategic managerial choices? "
and the equally challenging southwest-northeast diagonal:
"Are organizations neutral technical instruments engineered to achieve a goal, or are they
institutionalized manifestations of the vested interests and power structure of the wider society?"
Figure 58: Central Debates in Organization Theoryloo
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99 Astley and van de Ven (1983), pp. 245-273.
100 Astley and van de Ven (1983).
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1.2.2.2.1.1 Social Determinism vs. Human Choice
In the first question, the enterprise architecture is either defined by the environment - leaving no
room for managerial action, or it is built endogenously by powerful proactive leaders.101
1.2.2.2.1.2 Macro-Industry vs. Micro-firm
In the second question, the firm is seen as being either overwhelmed by the exogenous forces of
the environment, or as being an integral part of an endogenized extended enterprise. The
implications are that managers should either react to the contingent demands of the environment,
or they should interact with their extended enterprise.
What these two questions clarify is that long-term firm performance is a complex interaction
played out on at least two dimensions: the macro- (industry) vs. micro- (firm) level, and the
social determinism vs. free will duality of human nature.
"As far as 'choice vs. determinism' is concerned, the alternative perspective focuses on the possibility
of open-ended choices available to agents made possible by chaotic dynamics, but constrained by the
feedback structure of the system. Even though the system may be deterministic with regard to
structure, it is open-ended with regard to outcome. "02
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this research proposes an intermediate vehicle for
explanation between the choice-determinism debate. The enterprise architecture construct
simultaneously enables and constrains, but does not determine the outcomes.
1.2.2.2.1.3 Differentiation vs. Integration
Organizational theorists - and most notably structural contingency theorists (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967) - noted that tasks tended to be differentiated and then reintegrated. This research
dissertation empirically clarifies that successful firms match appropriate levels of differentiation
with integration, while in less successful firms, levels of differentiation tend to exceed levels of
integration.
101 Empirically, this question arises when examining the origin of integral enterprise architectures like Southwest
Airlines and Airbus Industrie. In the Southwest example, it is hypothesized that the enterprise architecture is built
proactively and internally (or endogenously) by the visionary founder and chairman, Herb Kelleher. Conversely, in
the Airbus example, it is hypothesized that the enterprise architecture is built inactively and externally (or
exogenously) by the governments of the founding European nations.
102 Stacey, R.D. (1995), pg. 490.
1.2.2.2.2 Debates in Population Ecology
1.2.2.2.2.1 High Mortality Rates of Late Entrants
The sociological sub-field of population ecology has long observed that late entrants in an
industry's evolution (e.g. those arriving post-dominant design) tend to have higher mortality
rates (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Plausible hypotheses and explanations have focused on firm
age and inertia, both as a strength and a weakness in determining firm mortality.
This research dissertation however identifies a special "species" of late entrant, who not only
survive against the odds, but in fact thrive and go on to dominate the industry. This research
further moves beyond the traditional theories of inertia and explores the hypothesis of firm-
environment co-evolutionary fit.
1.2.3 Tertiary Research Questions
While the primary research questions centered on the field of strategic management, and the
secondary research questions centered on its constituent fields of economics and sociology, the
tertiary research questions focus on the fields at the core of the primary explanatory variable of
this research: the architecture of the extended enterprise. As will be discussed later, this builds
from well-established theory in engineering systsms (i.e. theories of systems, complexity and
architecture), as well as from well-established theory in political science (i.e. theories of power
and politics), as shown in Figure 59 below.
Figure 59: Multi-disciplinary Approach
Engineering
Systems
Economics Sociology
Political
Science
While the above are the broad scientific disciplines embraced with this research, it would be
helpful to narrow down the intellectual space so that I might point out a few notable interactions
which this work attempts to contribute. As shown in Figure 60 below, this research is effectively
about the intersection of strategy, leadership and macro-organizational design and change. The
intersections most relevant to this research are: Strategic Leadership, Strategic Organization, and
Leadership of (not in) Organizations (Hooijberg et al., 2007).
Figure 60: Research at the Intersection of Strategy, Organization and Leadership
Leadership
Organization
Leadership of Organizations
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1.3 Research Objectives
The purpose and objectives of the research are three-fold: First to describe empirically the
evolutionary trajectory of internal capabilities of selected competing firms and the evolutionary
characteristics of the external environment within which they compete. Second, to explore the
evolutionary trajectories of the strategies employed by these firms, and finally to explain how the
external environment and internal capabilities interact over time to produce performance
trajectories - that is how, when and why these firms dominate their industry.
"The final product of building theory from case studies may be concepts, a conceptual framework,
propositions, or possibly mid-range theory."o0 3
Although admittedly ambitious, the intended output of this research is a meta-theoretical
framework or model whose purpose is to organize and advance existing mid-range theoretical
models. 104
1.3.1 The Rigor-Relevance Dialectic
The dialectic between the thesis (rigor) and antithesis (relevance) is well-known in the academic
and practitioner literatures.
"Academic fights are more brutal than fights in the real world because the stakes are so lov. "105
"Organizations have become the dominant institution on the social landscape. Yet the body of
knowledge published in academic journals has practically no audience in business. "'06
"Cooperation between academics and managers is so rare that when it happens, it makes national
newspaper headlines. It is hard to be both rigorous and relevant. This dilemma occurs because the
set of skills, vahres, mind-sets, and attitudes that are needed to conduct rigorous academic research
are fundamentally different from the set of skills, values and attitudes needed to conduct managerial
research. The two skill sets also conflict. By trying to do both, an academic researcher runs the risk
of paying a huge straddling cost.., one has the trade-offs that arise from inconsistencies in an
academic's image or reputation... Although great ideas are always welcome, the truth of the matter is
that most good managerial research is not of this kind... One type of managerially relevant research
is the one intended to develop grand new theories without the necessary empirical evidence to support
them. Ihe idea is to develop these theories and then have future researchers empirically test them for
accuracy and validity (think of Darwin's theory of evolution). This type of research requires a writer
to take creative leaps an offer ideas and insights not immediately supported by available data. This is
risky business, and we should enourage young colleagues to avoid this type of research. It is better
suited to academics who can afjbrd to take such risks - perhaps academics who have already received
tenure in the system. ,"17
103 Eisenhardt, K. (1989), pg. 545.
104 This ambition was similarly stated by Farjoun, M. (2002), pp. 572.
105 This quote is most recently from an interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger (Summer 2003 issue of Bulletin, the
American Association of Neurological Surgeons). He embraced both sides of the relevance-rigor debate as a
professor for nearly 20 years at Harvard University, US national security advisor, secretary of state under two US
presidents, and Nobel laureate. He playfully highlights both sides by acknowledging the importance of rigor, but
evaluates it within the relevance frame.
'
06Daft & Lewin (1990), pg. 1, in their paper launching the new academic journal, Organization Science.
107 Markides, C. (2007), pp. 762, 764 and 766.
"Analyzed are 32 established organizational science theories in terms of their rated importance,
validity, and usefulness. Little evidence of any relationships among these variables isfound. "s0 8
The resolution of this dialectic between thesis and antithesis into a workable synthesis - while
difficult - requires a higher level of abstraction.
"I have striven in these writings of mine, without defacing the truth, to satisfy everybody; and perhaps
I have not satisfied anybody, and if this should be so, I shall not be astonished by it, because I judge it
impossible, without angering many, to write of the affairs of their own times. "'09
As shown in Figure 61 below, these complementary objectives refer to the classic 'rigor-
relevance' debate in management (Argyris and Schon, 1991), which are distinguished as 'mode 1'
knowledge production which is primarily driven by academic concerns, and 'mode 2' which is
primarily an intense interaction between knowledge production and knowledge dissemination
and application (Gibbons et al., 1994).
Figure 61: Rigor-Relevance Interaction
* Rigor for academia
* Context-fee general theory
* Focus on the general
* Few variables (clarity)
* Large-N stafislcal sample
* Reductonistthinking
* Quanftative bias
Mode 1: Explanation
"Why do firms in the same industry vary
systematically in performance over time?"
High
Deductive
theory
validation
IV "How did Airbus emerge from obscurity
Indutve to unseat Boeing?"
Low theory
building > Mode 2: Design
Low High L Relevance to practitoners
* Context-spcieproblesoWving
* Focus on the particular
* Muliple variables (Complexity)
* Sna-N ter.ucsample
* HolIstic / Systerni thinking
* Quatatve bias
"Somewhere between the specific that has no meaning and the general that has no content there must
be, for each purpose and each level of abstraction, an optimum degree of generality ".o
10s Miner, J. (1984), pg. 296. The relevance-rigor dialectic is posed by Vermeulen, F. (2005).
109 From Niccolo Machiavelli's The History of Florence, quoted in Feaver, G. (1984), pg. 564.
0o Boulding, K.
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1.3.2 Multi-modal Objectives
"To predict requires that we posit a correlation between present and future events; to explain we
posit a correlation between present and past events. "11
The objectives of this research are divided in the following subsections into the primary
objectives rooted in the explanatory sciences, and the secondary objectives rooted in the design
sciences (van Aken, 2004) or policy sciences (Etzioni, 2006).
1.3.2.1 Mode 1 objective: Explanation / "Prediction"
"Evolutionary explanations are scientifically legitimate, even if they can't be used to predict the
exact nature of changes. ,""
Due to the inherently complex, highly nonlinear and potentially chaotic nature of the
phenomenon being studied, long-term prediction is not feasible in a deterministic sense.
However, as the theory developed herein is evolutionary, processes of variation, selection
and retention act to make probabilistic predictions.
"Hypothetical probability predictions do not have any value for actual prediction except insofar as
the conditions mentioned in the hypothesis are predictable or experimentally producible; hence there
will be cases where we can explain why certain animals and plants survived even when we could not
have predicted that they would "113
The research does however aspire toward understanding and explanation by uncovering the
underlying causal structure which drives behavior. While the establishment of the causal
structure is possible, the variety of parameters in the form of decision rules, ultimately
makes behavior impossible to predict. It is the pursuit of this "generic" causal structure that
is "universal" and that allows for "generalization" of the theory, not in the prediction of the
resulting behavior.
"The complexity, situation specificity, and changing nature of the firm and its environment strains
conventional approaches to theory-building and hypothesis testing. ",14
"From a complexity perspective research will be unable to yield predictors of or prescriptions for
long-term success - research will have to focus on explanation instead, on hypotheses about whole
systems, their dynamics, the conditions under which they will display different kinds of dynamic, and
the relationship between the dynamic and success. "-115
Figure 62 below summarzes the objectives of explanation and "prediction" superimposed
on the phenomena of interest - namely, interspecies competition and the co-evolution of
business ecosystems. These objectives will be matched by a research method as discussed
in chapter 2.
." Aldrich, H.E. (1979), pg. 52.
112 Aldrich, H.E. (1979), pg. 52.
113 Scriven (1959), pg. 478.
114 Porter, M.E. (1991), pg. 97.
115 Stacey, R. (1995).
Figure 62: Research Objectives of Explanation and "Prediction"
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1.3.2.2 Mode 2 objective: Design
"The scientist discovers that which exists, the engineer creates that which never was."116
"Policy research is always dedicated to changing the world while basic research seeks to understand
it as it is. "17
The difference between the objective of the scientist and the engineer is vast. In fact social
"scientists" (like Jay Forrester) who came to management from an engineering background,
tended to transport a design objective for organizations.
" The goal is 'enterprise design' to create more successful management policies and organizational
structures... which influence growth and stability. ""8
However, it was Nobel prize laureate, Herbert Simon (1988) who noted that the design objective
was not private domain of engineers:
"Engineers are not the only professional designers. Everyone designs who devises courses of action
aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones. The intellectual activity that produces
material artifacts is no different fundamentally from the one that... devises a new sales plan for a
company. Design, so construed, is the core of all professional training: it is the principal mark that
distinguishes the professions from the sciences. Schools of Engineering as well as schools of
architecture and business... are all centrally concerned with the process of design ""9
116 From aerodynamicist, Theodore von Karman (1881-1963).
"7 Etzioni, A. (2006), pg. 833.
s8 Forrester, J.W. (1961).
"9 Simon, H. (1988), pg. 67.
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Unlike engineering in the physical sciences or medicine in the biological sciences, management
did not evolve from administrative sciences. In the field of organization studies, the design
objective languished.
"Social scientists are trained to do good empirical research and descriptive theory building without
being overly concerned with implications for organization design or performance outcomes.
Researchers try to develop parsimonious theories based on a small number of variables that can
explain phenomena across a range of organizations. Prescriptive research, however, requires
comprehensive understanding of a specific situation that is not often generalizable to other settings.
Most scientific journals do not encourage publication of papers whose objective is prescription or
design application. Scientific.journals typically favor manuscripts that provide generalizable theories
from comparative empirical studies, which frequently are not sufficiently concrete or detailed enough
to yield design suggestions. ,120
With regard to the field of strategic management, Porter (1991) notes that the two primary
approaches to theory building in strategy include rigorous, situation-specific, mathematical
models of limited complexity vs. multivariate frameworks like the "competitive forces"
approach, which capture the complexity. 121
"The need to inform practice has demanded that strategy researchers ... pursue the building of
frameworks rather than restrict research only to theories that can be formally modeled. "122
For these reasons, while this research ultimately aims for mid-range theory, it simultaneously
strives for building a conceptual framework, generating rich propositions and ultimately testable
hypotheses.
Although much strategy research has progressed quickly from the descriptive to the normative as
it has transitioned from theory to practice, this work aims to cautiously engage the normative
debate. Due to the relative immaturity of the theories developed from this research, much more
confirmatory work is needed before confident normative recommendations can be made.
"The field of strategic management is avowedly normative. It seeks to guide those aspects of..
management that have material effects on the survival and success of the business enterprise. ""'
Normative prescription limitations notwithstanding, this research plan does not aim to stop with
a rich, complex description of the case study. Rather, it adopts a positivist view of research, in
which the goal is to develop testable hypotheses and theory which are generalizable across
different settings (Eisenhardt, 1989).
"A more ambitious result would be an effective partnership of descriptive-driven and prescriptive-
driven research. ,,24
120 Daft and Lewin (1990), pg. 4.
121 Porter, M.E. (1991, pg. 98) notes that the use of frameworks can be challenged because their complexity makes it
difficult to falsify arguments.
12 2 Porter, M.E. (1991), pg. 98.
123 Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., and Shuen A. (1997).
124 van Aken (2004), pg. 242.
This research plan therefore takes its queues from Forrester (1961), Simon (1969, 1988), van
Aken (2004) and Etzioni (2006) for the development of design knowledge, which occupies the
middle ground between descriptive theory and actual application.
1.3.3 Four Types of Scholarship
"In his book Scholarship Reconsidered, Ernst Boyer (1990) described four different kinds of
scholarship: the scholarship of discovery (research), the scholarship of integration (synthesis), the
scholarship of practice (application), and the scholarship of teaching (pedagogy). Historically,
business schools have celebrated and accommodated as equals the practitioners of all four kinds of
scholarship. Over the last 30 years, we have lost this taste for pluralism. Those with primary
interests in synthesis, application, or pedagogy have been eliminated from our milieu or, at best,
accommodated at the periphery and insulatedfrom the academic high table that is now only reserved
for the scientists. "'25
It is important at the outset to set the expectations of the reader of this research. While by the
very definition of doctoral research, this work intends to focus on the scholarship of discovery, it
moreover attempts to embrace the pluralism of the other three forms of scholarship: integration,
practice and teaching (Boyer, 1990). One of the primary reasons for such attempted plurality of
scholarship is that it is in the process of engaging these "lesser" three (integration, practice and
teaching) that the "primary" research form emerged. In fact, stated in a more counter-intuitive
way, although the desired end is "good" research, the means employed is clearly the pursuit of
the other three forms of scholarship.
"We need to temper the pretense of knowledge and re-engage with the scholarships of integration,
application, and pedagogy to build management theories that are broader and richer than the
reductionist and partial theories we have been developing over the last 30 years. "126
"More and more business schools are currently embarking on campaigns to hire significant numbers
of clinical professors (sometimes called 'professors of practice '). These clinical professors typically
excel at what Boyer called the scholarships of practice, synthesis and pedagogy. ",127
125 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 80.
126 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 87.
127 Hambrick, D.C. (2005), pg. 105.
1.3.3.1 The Scholarship of Integration (Synthesis)
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, much of the value of this research lies in its
integration of a variety of disparate intellectual traditions, ranging from economics to sociology
in the social sciences to engineering and architecture in the physical sciences.
1.3.3.2 The Scholarship of Practice (Application)
As was discussed briefly in this chapter, much of the impetus for the development of this
research was grounded in the application of real problems rooted in practice.
1.3.3.3 The Scholarship of Teaching (Pedagogy)
As was alluded to in the acknowledgements section, much of the actual content of this research
framework was derived from the teaching and learning from research participants in the spirit of
knowledge "co-creation". This included the opportunities to "teach" graduate students, faculty
and senior executives at MIT and the University of Oxford, as well as executives in numerous
companies within Boeing and Airbus' ecosystem.
1.3.3.4 The Scholarship of Discovery (Research)
Finally, although the ultimate aim of this project is to pursue the process of academic discovery
within the bounds of "normal science," it must be said that any success or lack thereof will be
largely constrained by the trade-offs inherent in the active pursuit of the other three forms of
scholarship.
1.4 Research Framework
1.4.1 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis will be presented using both economics and sociological terminology, which
while not identical in meaning, convey a richness of constuct unavailable with only one
convention.
1.4.1.1 Economics-based terminology
While the dependent variable focuses on the long-term firm performance, this research
hypothesizes that a source of this performance lies in the firm's relationship with its
environment, therefore the unit of analysis is the firm's extended enterprise.
"The importance of the concepts of differentiation and integration to the analytic scheme developed
here can best be indicated by the definition of the primary unit of analysis in this study - the
organizational system. An organization is defined as a system of interrelated behaviors ofpeople who
are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each subsystem
performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective
performance of the system ""12
The above definition of "organization" taken from Lawrence and Lorsch's classic 1967 work
was used to describe intra-firm subsystems or functional divisions. In this research, the same
definition of "organization" can be applied, only this time, defining inter-firm subsystems or
stakeholder groups.
"By these definitions, the boundaries of organizations will not always coincide with their legal
boundaries: some institutions, such as large corporations, encompass a number of organizations by
our definition; while others, such as certain subcontractors, do not constitute a single complete
organization. "29
The following definitions briefly draw distinctions among the various levels of analysis.
128 Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. (1967), pg. 3.
129 Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. (1967), pg. 4.
1.4.1.1.1 Firm
Within the firm, this research more specifically aims to focus on a subset of the firm, namely the
"strategic business unit" (or SBU) as shown in Figure 63 below. This research thereby focuses
on long-term firm performance in the realm of business strategy, as opposed to corporate
strategy.
Figure 63: Working Definition of Firm
Firm
a collection of cooperating organizations ("functions" & "products")
selling compliments
One of the reasons that the strategic business unit was selected as the unit of analysis is its
relative importance in determining variance in profitability. Researchers (Rumelt, 1991; Powell,
1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; McGrahan and Porter, 1997; Hawawini et al., 2003) have
demonstrated that 32%-45% of variance in firm profitability is directly attributed to SBU effects
while only 1%-18% is attributed to corporate effects, and 10%-20% attributed to industry
effects. 10
1.4.1.1.2 Industry
In ecomonics, an industry is the supply side of a market. For clarity, this research uses Porter's
(1980) definition of "industry" as a collection of firms selling substitute goods or services as
shown in Figure 64 below.
SFirmrli m rt trFigure 64: Work ing Definition ofl. Industryrs(r e
Industry
a collection of competing organizations ("firms")
selling substitutes
0
0/
.................
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1.4.1.1.3 Extended Enterprise
"The battlefront in today's competitive wars, and the ultimate core competency of a business
organization, is the design of the... extended enterprise. "
Instead of taking an "engineering" perspective, by looking downwards and inwards into the firm
itself for answers, this research takes an "architectural" perspective, by looking upwards and
outwards into the firm's ecosysteml32 or extended enterprise 3 as shown in Figure 65 below.
The enterprise is defined as those organizations which impact the firm's success. In this sense,
the enterprise can be thought of as the "environment" in traditional organizational theory.
Figure 65: Working Definition of Enterprise
Enterprise
a collection of cooperating organizations ('stakeholders")
selling complements
.. '.. . . .. . ...... ... *..
This definition of an enterprise draws upon Barnard's (1938) concept of organizations as
cooperative systems. Note that the stakeholder axes and constituent stakeholders will be
discussed in detail in essay #1, as will a discussion of the firm as a "nexus of contracts" / "nexus
of relationships".
The name of the firm at the center of the extended enterprise will be the "keystone" firm,
borrowed from biological ecosystem theory. 1
34
"In strategy courses, we have presented the five forces' framework (Porter, 1980) to suggest that
companies must compete not only with their competitors but also with their suppliers, customers,
employees and regulators. "35
130 See Appendix B.
131 Fine, C.H. (1998).
132 In the biological ecology literature, the organism, whose presence in the ecosystem drives the behavior and
performance of many others is known as the "keystone" organism.
3 As a diversified firm's SBU is the unit of analysis, one cannot ignore the parent firm's relationship to the SBU
when taking an architectural perspective of the extended enterprise.
134 Recently, ansiti, M. and Levien. R. (2004) applied this metaphor to business ecosystems.
135 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 75.
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1.4.1.1.4 Ecosystem
Finally, if an industry is defined as a collection of competing organizations (firms), and an
enterprise is defined as a collection of cooperating organizations (stakeholders), then as shown in
Figure 66 below, an ecosystem is defined as a collection of competing enterprises or "competing
cooperators".
Figure 66: Working Definition of Ecosystem
Ecosystem
a collection of competing cooperators ("enterprises"),
selling substitutes
Product
markets //
: Firm
From above it should be noted that in theory, competing enterprises can be coupled through any
or all stakeholders, the most common of which can be customers (i.e. product markets).
As will be discussed in the next chapter, this research dissertation will focus on the competitive
dynamics of a duopoly ecosystem, that is, not just two competing firms, but two competing
enterprises. We will also begin to explore when such "competing cooperators" become
"cooperating competitors".
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1.4.1.2 Sociology-based terminology
1.4.1.2.1 Organization
"Organization is the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed
purpose through the allocation oJfunctions and responsibilities"136
Although the definition of an organization varies, I use a classic definition from Selznick (1948)
which emphasizes goal or purpose and functional decomposition as important aspects. Given this
research project's interest in business ecosystems, this would be similar to firm (or more
colloquially, company) using economics terminology.
1.4.1.2.2 Organizational Set
Moving up one level of analysis is the organizational set, that is the organizational unit that
consists of the focal organization and its interdependent organizations (or stakeholders). Again,
using economics terminology, this would be similar to enterprise or extended enterprise.
"A crucial defining characteristic of the concept of organization set is that it views the environment
f'om the standpoint of a specific (focal) organization. "37
The organization set level of analysis is typically used by a variety of disciplines focused on
studying organizational-environment interactions, like resource dependence (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975)
"Analysts employing the resource dependence approach, typically work at the level of the
organization set as do many of those utilizing transaction cost approaches. "38
This research will posit a typology of organizational sets which range from internally competitive
to internally cooperative (like an interorganizational community - see below).
1.4.1.2.3 Organizational Population
"[Populations consist of ..] all the organizations within a particular boundary that have a common
form. "139
Although population ecologists define a population of organizations as those organizations
having a common form, the precise definition of what constitutes form is rather elusive -
sometimes purposefully so.
"Hannan & Freeman (1977, 1989) explicitly refrained from proposing any fixed rules or typology for
identifying organizational forms. They argued that form may be generally inferred from an
136 Selznick, 1949, pg. 114.
137 Scott, 2003, pg. 126.
138 Scott, 2003, pg. 127.
139 Hannan and Freeman, 1977, pg. 936.
organization's formal structure or normative order, and that the classification of an organization as
one form or another may be specified according to the interests of the investigator. "140
Having noted the plurality in the current literatures, this research tends to focus on the systemic
properties inherent in both architectural as well as biological definitions, namely: goals,
boundaries and activities.
"Organizational forms - the specific configurations of goals, boundaries, and activities - are the
elements selected by environmental criteria, and change may occur through new forms eliminating old
ones or through the modification of existing forms. "14
Organizational populations are collections of isomorphic organizations, competing within the
same niche. Thus, an economist's "industry" may be comprised of one or more populations.
"Ecologists define populations as organizations exhibiting the same structural form while economists
define industries as including all organizations serving the same demand or function, which could
include quite diverse types ofproviders of substitutable products. ,,"42
In light of the primary construct of this research - the enterprise architecture - an organizaional
population refers to those enterprise architectures (organizational sets) having similar
architectural forms, this is modular or integral.
1.4.1.2.4 Organizational Community/Field
"Interorganizational communities and organizational fields... focus attention on a collection of
diverse types of organizations engaged in competitive and cooperative relations. '143
"An organizational community is a set of co-evolving organizational populations joined by ties qf
commensalism and symbiosis through their orientation to a common technology, normative order, or
legal-regulatory regime. "144
An organizational community or field transcends the level of analysis of an organizational
population by encompassing both similar and dissimilar organizations, which allows for the
potential for birth and death of organizational populations.
"A number of advantages are associated with this level of analysis. First, we can examine the
interdependence and coevolution of organizations of differing types. Organizations that both
compete and cooperate with similar and diverse organizations. Second, a community or field-level
perspective allows us to observe not only the waxing and waning of a particular type of organization
but also the disappearance of some types and the emergence of new forms (Astley, 1985). Third, the
organizational field can be viewed as encompassing the other levels: the individual organization, the
organizational set, and two or more populations of interdependent organizations. "145
140 Romanelli, E., (1991), pg. 82.
141 Aldrich, H.E., (2006), pg. 28.
142 Scott, (2003), pg. 127.
143 Scott, (2003), pg. 129.
144 Aldrich, H.E. and Ruef, M, (2006), pg. 243.
145 Scott, (2003), pp. 130-131.
1.4.1.3 Comparision of Terminologies
Table 7 below summarizes the terminology used for the analyses in both economics and
sociological terms.
Table 7: Terminology Comparision in Economics and Sociology
Notes Economics Sociology
Focal unit of Enterprise Firm Organization
Primary construct Enterprise Organizational Set
Homogenous collection of competing Firms Industry Organizational Population
Heterogenous collection of competing Firms Organizational Community/Field
Homogeneous collection of competing Enterprises Ecosystem Population of Organizational Sets
Heterogeneous collection of competing Enterprises Community/Field of Organizational Sets
Figure 67 below summarizes the definitions in both economics and sociological terms.
Figure 67: Summary of Working Definitions
Narrow
spatio-temporal
boundaries
Broad
spatio-temporal
boundaries
Single
organization
"Hierarchy"
Multiple
organizations
"Market"
Organization:
Firm
a collection of internally competing or cooperating
organizations (i.e. functions) selling complements
Organizational Field / Population:
Industry
a collection of externally competing
organizations (i.e. firms) selling substitutes
Organizational Set:
Enterprise
Modular Integral
or
=;
a collection of internally competing or cooperating
organizations (i.e. stakeholders) selling complements
Organizational Community:
Ecosystem
c4 intra-species,
compeition
iater-species ,- -
competition
a collection of extemrnally competing
organizations (i.e. enterprises) selling substitutes
1:56
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Figure 68 below summarizes conceptually the how the unit(s) of analysis are applied to the
proposed framework. Note that the primary construct of "enterprise architecture" is at the level
of organizational set, while the overarching unit of analysis is the level of organizational
community (of organizational sets).
Figure 68: Summary of Units of Analysis in Framework
Organizational
Community / Field
w -
A- -
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Il Organizational
Population
1*- - - ,-% 1
(small N)
Organizational
Population
Organizational
Sets
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(e.g. Ford) (e.g. GM) Organizations
.Honda)
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One final clarification of definitions is needed. This framework holds constant and focuses its
investigative lens on the environment or market. For example, this may be "the design and
manufacture of large commercial airplanes." This market may evolve over time in both quantity
and quality spaces, and it in fact may support differing species of competitors. When one of the
propositions states that dominant designs oscillate over time from integral to modular to integral,
it is referring to the enterprise architectures of the dominant species, which could theoretically be
the same species which evolves, or it could be the emergence and exit of multiple species. This
is illustrated in Figure 69 below.
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Figure 69: Focus is on the Evolution of Dominant Species within a Fixed Environment
Industry/Market (e.g. Commercial Airplanes)
-- - - --------------------- - ---
Boeing) Challeng~ies Airbus)
This is in contrast with a body of resesearch (e.g. Fine, 1998) which aims to postulate theories
concerning the evolution of market niches within a changing environment as illustrated in Figure
70 below. Here, the firm-supplier make-buy interface is posited to oscillate over time from
integral to modular to integral.
Figure 70: Focus is on the Evolution of Market Niches in a Changing Environment
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1.4.2 Variables
The following subsections briefly discuss the relevant variables used in the research dissertation.
The dissertation is initially introduced in terms of the familiar and traditional correlative terms of
dependent and independent variables.
"The scope of variables that basic research encompasses can be quite legitimate and effective but
also rather narrow. Policy researchers must be more eclectic and include at least all the variables
that account for a significant degree of variance in the phenomenon that the policy aims to
change. ",146
As the goal of this research is to develop complex causal mechanisms, the dissertation then
proceeds to clarify the variables as interdependent.
1.4.2.1 "Dependent" variable: Long-term Firm Performance147
At the highest, most abstract level, this research seeks to explain the variable of performance -
and specifically long-term firm performance. The following subsections will decompose this
variable into the definitions used for the purpose of the research.
Explanations of sustained superior firm performance in the industrial organization-based
"barriers" or resource-based "inimitability" frameworks, tend to focus on cross-sectional
distributions either between or within industries. This research however focuses on longitudinal
data of intra-industry sustained long-term firm performance. As such, we are interested in
tracking the performance of dominant firms as they grow and die throughout the industry's life-
cycle, as illustrated in Figure 71 below.
Figure 71: Longitudinal Trajectories of Dominant Firms within an Industry's Evolution
Pmobabity
A
Pe/
1960 , cs
Dom nant Firms outliers)
190 iov Industry LifeCycle
Time
46 Etzioni, A. (2006), pg. 838-839.
147 It should be pointed out that this research attempts to explain the circular causal interactions of competence-
competition using feedback principles, therefore the explicit acknowledgement of "dependent" and "independent"
variables can be misleading.
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1.4.2.1.1 Defining "Long-term"
As this research seeks underlying mechanisms for how the external competitive environment
shapes and is shaped by firms' internal capabilities, long-term trends must be observed. This
research therefore seeks systemic "first mode" explanations of long-term trends and performance
trajectories. As this research also seeks to explain co-evolution of firm performance with
industrial evolution, the definition of "long-term" will correspond to the development of the
industrial life-cycle S-curve. While this period will vary from industry to industry, it is observed
to take from 10 to 50 years depending on the speed of industrial development.
As shown in Figure 72 below, "long-term" performance will therefore exceed the length of the
typical 3-5 year business cycle. In doing so, local "non-systemic" (or higher mode) explanations
for firm performance will be "filtered out". Examples of such non-systemic causal explanations
include various endogenous functional explanations: e.g. a better/worse product design, a
more/less effective marketing campaign, a labor strike, or various exogenous environmental
explanations: e.g. the oil-crisis, 9-11 terrorist attacks, etc. This research is interested in those
enabling and constraining "structures" (or enterprise architectures) which consistently and
systematically create better product designs, more effective marketing campaigns, no expensive
labor strikes or which consistently and systematically control exogenous events.
Figure 72: Explaining Long-Term (1st Mode) Trajectories of Firm Performance
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1.4.2.1.2 Defining "Firm Performance"
Such performance can be measured in a number of ways148, including survival/longevity, market
share or profitability.
"Profit is an opinion... "
The continuous dependent variable used in this research (as is typical for most research in
competitive strategy) is long-term firm competitive performance, defined specifically as
economic or financial performance. 149 As such, there are a vast number of measures and metrics
upon which to base the research.150 This is made even more complicated given the fact that the
theory constructed herein identifies a spectrum of enterprise architectures each having
diametrically-opposed performance objective functions (as characterized by Penrose's question
above). This makes a direct comparison of performance difficult, as each architecture purports
to achieve different objectives.
In order to reconcile this dilemma, the common performance metric that will be used for all
enterprise architectures will be maximization of shareholder value as represented schematically
in Figure 73 below as market capitalization, even though this is the explicit goal of the
shareholder-based architecture, while it is an indirect and implicit goal of the stakeholder-based
architecture.
Figure 73: Key "Dependent" Variable: Shareholder Value
Market Capitalization
IL W 11
The research will demonstrate the circumstances under which shareholder value is maximized by
those architectures actively attempting to do so, and when it is maximized by those architectures
that are not solely focused on this objective.
14s Ford and Schellenberg (1982) identify three different frameworks: the goal approach, the systems recource
approach and the constituency approach.
It is well-known in strategic management literature (Powell), that performance based on financial measures is
sensitive to the financial measures chosen, and moreover, the notion of performance, is actually a socially-
constructed phenomenon (Fligstein).
150 A common financial performance metric used within the strategic management literature is "accounting profit"
(McGrahan and Porter, 1997).
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1.4.2.1.2.1 Sub-variables: profitability and growth
"Growth might be the lifeblood of a business, but it isn't always the best or most sustainable way to
create value for shareholders. Return on invested capital (ROIC) is often just as important a measure
of value creation and can be easier to sustain at a high level. "151
The notion of shareholder value (or market value) has been demonstrated to be mediated by the
effects of growth and profitability, which have direct linkages to the exploitation and exploration
tendencies of different enterprise architectures (Cho and Pucik, 2005). The firm's growth
performance will be measured by the three compound annual growth rates of total assets
(inputs), total revenues (outputs) and economic and market value added, EVA & MVA
(value). 152 The firm's profitability performance is measured by three profitability ratios of ROA,
ROE and ROI. 53
As will be argued later, the different enterprise architectures tend to have objective functions
based on either profitability or growth (Thurow, 1992). For this reason, both will be tracked.
1.4.2.1.2.2 Sub-variables: past performance and future health
"Managing companies for success across a range of time frames - a requisite for achieving both
performance and health - is one of the toughest challenges in business. "154
In addition, the notion of shareholder value has been demonstrated to be dependent upon past
financial performance and future growth prospects. 55 These sub-variables will be important in
understanding the distinction between enterprise architectures and their underlying mechanics.
"It's common corporate-finance knowledge that something on the order of 60 to 80 percent of the
value of a business lies in its long-term cash flows. And ifyou 're investing with a short-term horizon
you 're giving up the value creation of a business. ,,156
151 Cao, B. Jiang, B. and Koller, T. (2006), pg. 12.
152 Note that there is an inherent conflict embedded in strategy research between the typical unit of analysis, and the
metric used as the dependent variable. Desirable market-based financial variables like MVA are typically reported
for the corporate entity in a diversified conglomerate, while those for the disaggregated strategic business unit are
more difficult to determine.
153 It should be noted for the Boeing-Airbus duopoly that the notions of returns on assets, equity and investment are
difficult to measure and not necessarily reliable measures of profitability (Dess and Robinson, 1984). As each firm
embarks on different strategic make-buy paths for example, the boundaries of the firm change, as does the
ownership of assets and therefore the meaning of ROA. In addition, each firm is on a different trajectory of equity
offerings and ownership, the notion of ROE is difficult to compare. In this instance, a more transparent and
meaningful measure in a capital-intensive duopoly with large economies of scale would be used like market share.
154 Dobbs, Leslie and Mendonca (2005), pg. 63.
"' Dobbs and Koller (2005).
156 David Blood, Managing Partner of Generation Investment Management, in Mendonca and Oppenheim (2007),
pg. 4.
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1.4.2.2 "Independent" variables
1.4.2.2.1 Primary variable: Enterprise Architecture
"A proposed theory may posit that construct A leads to outcome B, but since A is a 'consruct,' the
reader often wonders what A is in real life. How would one measure A? How would one know that
the empirical variable that one has obtained really captures A? By seeing a concrete example of
every construct that is employed in a conceptual argument, the reader has a much easier time
imagining how the conceptual argument might actually be applied to one or more empirical
settings.57
The primary construct developed to explain the dependent variable of long-term firm
performance is the enterprise architecture, that is the firm and is relationships with its key
stakeholders, as is shown in Figure 74 below. As was addressed earlier, this construct attempts
to resolve a key debate in the field of strategic management between the source of competitive
advantage as residing internally within the firm or externally in the environment.
Figure 74: Primary "Independent" Variable: Enterprise Architecture
"Independent" Variable:
Enterprise Architecture
Iii
Market Capitalizaton
"Dependent" Variable:
Long-Term Firm Performance
163
157 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 22.
1.4.2.2.2 Intervening variables: Firm Function & Environment Evolution
"The ability to get closer to theoretical constructs is particularly important in the context of
longitudinal research that tries to unravel the underlying dynamics of phenomena that play out over
time. As scholars have increasingly begun to appreciate the role of dynamic processes (e.g., path
dependency or evolutionary processes), rich longitudinal research is needed to provide the details of
how these processes actually play out. "58
In addition to explaining the source of long-term firm performance, the research seeks to explain
where the "independent" variable itself comes from. In order to do this, the research proposes
two other mechanisms or variables for this purpose: enterprise function as a mediating variable
between enterprise architecture and long-term firm performance, and environmental evolution as
a moderating variable between long-term firm performance and enterprise architectures as
shown in Figure 75 below.
Figure 75: Intervening Variables: Enterprise Function & Environment Evolution
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Enterprise Architecture
Variance
theory
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interdependent " variable, Y (t):
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15" Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 22.
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1.4.2.3 Interdependent variables
"The only meaningful way to study organization is to study it as a system. As Henderson [1935] put it,
the study of a system must rely on a method of analysis, '... involving the simultaneous variations of
mutually dependent variables. ,,'159
Modem organizational theory has long recognized the organization as a system of mutually
dependent variables (Scott, 1961). Such mutually dependent variables has been referred to by
noted organizational studies scholar, Karl Weick (1979) as "interdependent" variables.
"The cause-effect relationships that exist in organizations are dense and often circular. "'60
Such interdependent variables can be thought of as arranged in a system of causal feedbacks
(Forrester, 1961; Weick, 1979) generating both positive and negative feedback loops operating
in complex organizations (Richardson, 1991).
"Modern organization theory asks a range of interrelated questions: (1) What are the strategic parts
of the system? (2) What is the nature of their mutual dependency? (3) What are the main processes
in the system which link the parts together? (4) What are the goals sought by systems? [5] What
research tools should be used for the study of the system? "'61
This research dissertation therefore embraces the underlying systemic nature of the
organizational phenomena under consideration and its highly interdependent variables. The
operational questions being answered reflect those of a systems-theoretic approach applied to the
study of organizations.
"The utility of the notions of 'mechanistic' and 'organic' management systems resides largely in their
being related as dependent variables to the rate of environmental change.
There are other 'independent variables' which directly affect the form taken by any management
system (although, even conceptually, their independence from each other as well as from the
management system, is not to be insisted upon; causal relationships in this, as in other social fields,
are not one-way affairs). "'62
1.4.2.3.1 Correlative vs. Causal approaches
Although the preceding discussion of the dependent and independent variables implies that the
research dissertation will focus on traditional large sample statistical regression analyses to
establish correlation among variables, in fact due to the nature of the question, data and
epistemology, a feedback causal approach will be undertaken as shown in Figure 76 below. 163
159 Scott, W.G. (1961), pg. 15.
160 Weick, K. (1979), pg. 7.
161 Scott, W.G. (1961), pg. 16.
162 Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M.. (1961), pp. vii and 96.
163 Sterman (2000), pg. 141 warns about the importance and difficulty in establishing causal not correlative
relationships between variables in system dynamics.
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Figure 76: Correlative vs. Causal approaches
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Statistical Correlation vs. Causal Feedback Structure
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"We must wait until theories have been much better developed before we can highlight the relatively
few variables which can be measured and rigorously examined statistically. ""
As mentioned earlier, the theory generated from this research intends to identify the fundamental
macro-variables that drive long-term trends and trajectories in firm performance. It is hoped that
further future theory development and refinement will lead to the justification for the use of more
rigorous statistical methods needed to fully validate and extend the theory. For the purposes of
this research program, the establishment of underlying causality takes precedence over
correlation. This focus on seeking underlying causality takes its queue from the pragmatic
design-oriented tradition of architectural theory, upon which much of the grounded theory of this
research is based:
"Instead of just looking for statistical connections between variables, we may try to find causal
relations between them... The search for causal relations of this sort cannot be mechanically
experimental or statistical; it requires interpretation: to practice it we must adopt the same kind of
common sense that we have to make use of all the time in the inductive part of science. The data of
scientific method never go further than to display irregularities. We put structure in them only by
inference and interpretation. In just the same way, the structural facts about a system of variables in
an ensemble will come only from the thoughtful interpretation of observations. We shall say that two
variables interact if and only if the designer can find some reason (or conceptual model) which makes
sense to him and tells him why they should do so.""6
166
164 Porter, M.E. (1991).
16s Alexander, C. (1964), pp. 108-109.
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1.4.2.3.2 Variance vs. Process approaches
"Process research is concerned with understanding how things evolve over time and why they evolve
in this way. Whereas variance theories provide explanations for phenomena in terms of dependent
and independent variables, process theories provide explanations in terms of the sequence of events
leading to an outcome. "66
Variance theories attempt to point toward correlation in the constructs. They are concerned with
what the relative explanatory power of different constructs are (e.g. external competition vs.
internal capability in determining firm performance).
Process theories, conversely attempt to uncover plausible causality in the system. They are
concerned with how the constructs are formed (Van de Ven, 1992).
As will be described in more detail in chapter 2, this research dissertation will attempt to build
theory primarily from process data, although the aim of using variance data is recognized and
will ultimately be recommended (Markus and Robey, 1988; Langley, 1999).
"Although process explanations featuring the role of history and learning were central in the founding
of the main [strategy] theories (e.g. Selznick, 1957; Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1962), they have been
largely neglected by subsequent research. "'16
Over the past 40 years since the establishment of some of the most significant strategic
management theories, much research in the strategic management field has drifted away from a
process approach towards a variance approach, as would be expected. This research dissertation
however attempts to join the recent calls in the strategic management literature to restart the
cycle of knowledge creation by focusing again on process explanations, due to the observation
that over the past 40 years there have been significantly new phenomena which need to be
understood and explained. In this research, it is the nature of competition between two radically
different architectural forms or "species", which heretofore have not come into "contact" that is
unique and therefore requires a new approach.
166 Langley, A. (1999).
167 Farjoun, M. (2002), pg. 565.
1.4.2.3.3 Randomness and Indeterminacy
"The model suggests that the relationship between environments and organizations is not random but
is indeterminate, and that the very indeterminacy of environmental effects on organizations is
potentially explainable. "68
The emphasis of this research on process theory, with interdependent variables attempts to reveal
that the firm's relationship with its environment is not fully random, yet neither is it fully
determinate. The same situation of theory drove the research agendas of other scholars (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978).
"Given this causal sequence, one may not observe a perfect relationship between organizational
actions and structures and the environment for several reasons. First, since each intermediate
variable undoubtedly has other causes besides those specified, the relationship between between
environments and organizational actions and structures may be attenuated by these other factors.
Second, because of the linked nature of the causal process, any indeterminacy or error in the process
will be magnified because of the intermediate steps that link environments with organizations. For
instance, even if each of the causal links were as strong as a .8 correlation, the overall correlation
between environmental dimensions and organizational characteristics would be only .51. It is not
surprising, therefore, that researchers often fail to find strong relationships betwhveen environmental
characteristics and organizational outcomes. "169
168 Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978), pg. 228.
169 Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978), pg. 229.
1.4.3 Boundary Assumptions
1.4.3.1 Spatial
The framework developed herein has boundaries of application, and assumptions embedded in
the boundaries. They will be addressed in terms of the market (demand) environment and the
technological (supply) environment.
1.4.3.1.1 Market
The product and service offerings of the firms and industries studied are relatively homogeneous
and stable. That is, competitors in the automobile industry are largely competing on the
production of cars and competitors in the airline industry are largely competing on the delivery
of seat miles. The complex fracturing and fragmentation of markets into niches or the evolution
into services is not the primary focus of the research. 170
1.4.3.1.2 Technological
Technological development is assumed to progress smoothly between discontinuities.
170 I am indebted to Prof. Mari Sako for helping to identify this, and for challenging my thinking in this set of
assumptions.
1.4.3.2 Temporal
This dissertation aims to develop a theory of the evolution of business ecosystems. By definition
therefore, it aims to analyze the evolution temporally (that is diachronically) from the "birth" to
"death" of an industry (and its associated ecosystem), as well as between "life-spans" of
successive industries.
1.4.3.2.1 Long-term Trends
"The model is not intended to account for short-run changes, which are temporary responses to local
conditions, but rather for long-run transformations in the form of social organization. ""
1.4.3.2.2 Truncated Life-Cycle
In order to bound the analysis and more importantly to bring parsimony to the developed theory,
this dissertation will focus on a truncated version of the classical industry lifecycle (Porter, 1980,
pg. 158.), namely from the introduction phase through the growth phase, and finally through the
maturity phase. This research will therefore give less emphasis to the decline phase. As shown
in Figure 77 below, the dissertation therefore effectively maps out the classic "S-curve". An
implicit assumption is that the evolution of a new industry will occur near the peak of industry
sales.
Figure 77: Temporal Boundary of the Framework
Temporal boundary
Industrial
Output ......... ........
Stime
4W K~
I70
71 Aldrich, H.E. (2006), pg. 27.
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1.4.3.2.3 Bi- vs. Tri-phase Industry S-Curve
Finally, this dissertation initially sets out to describe a theory of the evolution of business
ecosystems in terms of a bi-phase temporal discretization of the industrial S-curve. This is done
to present the competing generic environmental regimes of exponential growth vs. that of goal-
seeking stability characterized by emerging and maturing markets respectively.
Once simplification is established, then a further refinement is made in which the environment is
characterized into a tri-phase temporal discretization of the industrial S-curve as shown in Figure
78 below.
Figure 78: Bi- vs. Tri-phase Temporal Discretization of the Industrial S-Curve
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1.4.4 Summary of Research Framework
The following section briefly summarizes the three main a priori constructs used for the research.
In addition, some of the fundamental propositions are developed. The mid-range theory that is
derived from these constructs and propositions, can be seen as an architectural design heuristic.
As the research develops, the intent is the development of testable proposition-derived
hypotheses that are based on measurable data. The low-level substantive theory that is derived
from these hypotheses and data can be seen as an engineering design law. The structure of the
mid-range theory is illustrated below in Figure 79.
Figure 79: Structure of Proposed Mid-Range Theory
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The theory attempts to show how long-term firm performance is ultimately caused by enterprise
architectural form, and how it causes the evolutionary environmental conditions which create the
architectural forms. Given the unit of analysis, the dependent and independent variables, the
equation that this research will attempt to derive, constrain (bound), and ultimately prove is the
following:
Performance = f(form, structure, environment)
or more explicitly:
Long-Term Firm Performance = f(enterprise architectural form, input-output structural
dynamics, industrial evolutionary dynamics) 2
n72 I am indebted to Prof. Charlie Fine for clarifying these relationships. Note that over the long term, each
"independent" variable is itself time-dependent, as well as dependent upon the other "independent" variables.
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1.4.4.1 Framework Summary
1.4.4.1.1 High Level Summary
The primary "independent" variables are derived from the propositions and constructs developed
in this research and are summarized in Part II. These include the construct of an enterprise
architecture, and the proposition that it drives the enterprise's structural dynamic behavior, (i.e.
its growth and profitability), which ultimately drives the industrial evolution. These constructs
and their propositional relationships are briefly summarized in Figure 80 below:
Figure 80: Summary of Proposed Co-Evolutionary, Meta-Strategic Framework
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"Key dimensions at the firm and environmental levels have reciprocal relationships so that firms develop
capabilities either through choice or selection, that then shape the environment which, in turn, further
shapes capabilities. Thus firm strategy and performance fundamentally arise from interactions between
organizational and competitive factors at several levels of analysis."17 3
173 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W. (1997), pg. 12.
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1.4.4.1.2 Detailed Summary
"Critical to understanding contemporary differences in market share and profitability among firms within
an industry is systematic knowledge of how those differences arose in the first place. Understanding the
structural evolution of industries- the rate of change in output and prices, the rates of entry and exit
(turnover), and the growth and decline of individual firms (mobility) and industry participation - is widely
recognized as fundamental to identifyling the origins of profitable market leaders who can sustain
performance over time. Industry evolution provides important important contingencies that affect the
viability of various firm strategies. Without a keen grasp of the underlying mechanisms driving industry
evolution and the resulting changes that occur at the industry level over time, we are less able to identify
why certain firms in an industry are the winners and other losers (Agarwal and Gort 2002). ,,"'74
As shown in Figure 81 below, the aforementioned high-level summary will be further developed
into a more detailed framework consisting of an endogenous causal model.
Figure 81: Detailed Causal Model
174 Lenox, M.J., Rockart, S.F. and Lewin, A.Y. (2007), pg. 599.
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1.4.4.2 Framework as Strategic Management Theory
The framework can be summarized as shown in Figure 82 below in terms of the classic industrial
organization / strategic management paradigms of "structure-conduct-performance" (Mason,
1939; Bain, 1956) and "the resource-based view" (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984).
Figure 82: Framework as Strategic Management Theory
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1.4.4.2.1 Market Structure
"The rate of growth of the market can serve as an important trait of market structure. Fast growth,
for instance, reduces the payout of short-run collusive strategies relative to strategies aimed at raising
the firm 's sustainable market share. "75
1.4.4.2.2 Firm Conduct
"Market conduct comprises the processes whereby firms choose their preferred price and product
outcomes and reconcile their divergent offers in the market place. It also covers predatory or
exclusionary conduct. ,176
1.4.4.2.3 Performance
"A chief test of market performance is the rate of return. "177
175 McGugan, V.J. and Caves, R.E. (1974), pg. 391.
176 McGugan, V.J. and Caves, R.E. (1974), pg. 392.
177 McGugan, V.J. and Caves, R.E. (1974), pg. 394.
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1.4.4.3 Framework as Social System Theory
Much of the early work on social systems in the 1950s and 1960s can be discussed within two
influential paradigms, structural functionalism and general system theory (Burrell and Morgan,
1979). 178 Later, social system theory "evolved" into an evolutionary theory as put forth by the
organizational ecologists (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) among others. The following three
subsections briefly discuss the proposed framework within these paradigms.
1.4.4.3.1 Framework as Structural Functionalist Theory
"The concept of function as defined thus involves the notion of structure consisting of a set of
relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the structure being maintained by a life-process made
up of the activities of the constituent units. "'79
Each of the three independent variables of the framework corresponds with the structural
functionalist problems of: social morphology (i.e. what kinds of social structure are there?),
social physiology (i.e. how do social structures function?) and social development (i.e. how do
new types of social structure come into existence?). As shown in Figure 83 below, the theory
presented within this dissertation can be expressed within the structural functionalist
paradigm. 180
Figure 83: Toward a Structural Functionalist approach to the Framework
+0
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What kinds of architectures are there ?
Development Physiology
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178 Note that structural functionalism makes explicit use of a biological metaphor, while systems theory does not
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, pg. 49).
179 Radcliffe-Brown (1952), pg. 180. Note that Radcliffe-Brown cautions that social structures can only be observed
through their function.
'80 As will be discussed later in this chapter, a "structural functional" explanation differs from the "causal"
explanation.
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1.4.4.3.1.1 Social Morphology
"Morphology: The branch of biology that deals with the form and structure of organisms without
consideration offunction. ,18
"Anatomy: The science of the shape and structure of organisms and their parts. "'182
To begin with, the architecture (i.e. form and structure) of the enterprise will be defined
independent of the strategic and operational functions they fulfill.
1.4.4.3.1.2 Social Physiology
"Physiology: The biological study of the functions of living organisms and their parts. "183
In particular, having defined the architecture (i.e. the form and structure) of the enterprise, the
framework will attempt to tie causal arguments to the strategic position (i.e. physiological
function) of the architecture. Specifically that integral enterprise architectures, born into mature
industries tend to have a cost-leadership posture or strategic function.
1.4.4.3.1.3 Social Development
Finally, having defined the architectural form, structure and strategic function of the enterprise,
the framework will endeavor to explain how these structures and functions evolve over time, for
example, how integral enterprise architectures, born into mature industries begin with a cost-
leadership posture or strategic function and later evolve into a differentiated strategic function.
81 From "Dictionary.com".
182 From "Dictionary.com".
183 From "Dictionary.com".
1.4.4.3.2 Framework as General System Theory
"Certain methods of studying behavior apply to all organized systems, namely structure, function
and evolution. Any organized system can be seen from these three perspectives which encompass the
broadest scope of a general system theory. "8 4
In addition, each of the four interdependent variables of the framework corresponds with the
system concepts of General System Theory (Rapoport, 1968): evolution, function, structure and
behavior (or performance - to use a variable pertinent to strategic management) as shown in
Figure 84 below.
Figure 84: Toward a General System Theory approach to the Framework
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1.4.4.3.2.1 System Goals: Stability, Growth and Interaction
Unlike traditional research in the strategic management literature which focuses on the isolation
of a few isolated low-level variables to explain firm performance, this work attempts to
aggregate many confounded variables into three high-level, aggregate, system variables.
In Essays #1 and #2, we will discuss the enterprise objective functions or goals, which in terms
of general systems theory, can be stated as stability, growth and interaction (Henderson, 1935,
pg. 86).
178
1s4 Rapoport, A. (1968), pg. xx.
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1.4.4.3.3 Framework as Evolutionary Theory
"Evolutionary theory explains how particular forms of organizations come to exist in specific kinds
of environments. Variation, selection, retention and struggle occur simultaneously rather than
sequentially. Analytically, the process may be separated into discrete phases, but in practice they are
linked in continuous feedback loops and cycles. "'85
Each of the four proposition sets of the framework corresponds with the evolutionary
mechanisms of: variation (i.e. how do new types of social structure come into being?), selection
(i.e. how do social structures compete successfully?) and retention (i.e. how do new types of
social structure become perpetuated?). Note that the variation mechanism is further subdivided
into "blind" or Darwinian variation, whereby the environment dictates organizational form, and
"semi-blind" or Lamarckian variation, whereby management dictates organizational activities
like market and production strategy. As shown in Figure 85 below, the theory presented within
this dissertation can be expressed within the evolutionary paradigm, with the proposition sets
shown below as the connecting yellow arrows.
Figure 85: Toward an Evolutionary approach to the Framework
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185 Aldrich, H.E. and Ruef, M. (2006), pg. 26.
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1.4.4.4 Framework as Temporal Theory
The independent variables associated with function, structure and evolution each take on a
different temporal perspective as shown in Figure 86 below. The function-related variable takes
a (small dt) "static" view, defining the properties and characteristics of the architectures. The
structure-related variable takes a (medium dt) "dynamic" view of how the static structures
interact to drive dynamic behavior. Finally, the evolution-related variable takes a (large dt)
"evolutionary" view of how the environment evolves dominant architectural "species" which
oscillate nonlinearly. The evolutionary trajectories of enterprise architectures are seen from the
lenses of adaptation and selection.
Figure 86: The Framework viewed through a Temporal perspective
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Note that for very large dt, that is, after firms and industries cycle around the above loop
numerous times, the random processes of variation, selection and retention begin to take hold
and evolve the architectural characteristics of species. The scope of this research does excludes
such long-term evolutionary pressures.
18(
1.4.4.5 Framework as Architectural Design Theory
"A quest for field-tested and grounded technological rules, which in the field of management will be
predominantly qualitative and heuristic by nature, means trading the priestly beauty of truth for the
soldiery glory ofperformance. ' 86
The objective of building a rigorous and relevant conceptual framework, which aims to
contribute to the explanation and delivery of long-term firm performance, will be met using a
high level of abstraction. As such, the conceptual form of the firm and its relationship with its
environment will provide fundamental answers to the question of performance, whereas more
detailed, operational explanations using a lower level of abstraction will provide more precise
explanations, given an architectural-level explanation. In this sense, the architectural form is a
solution-neutral restatement of the problem' 87, and as such the architecture enables and
constrains (but does not determine) what the enterprise can do.
"Architectural insights are worth far more that ill-structured engineering analyses. "s8
As shown in Figure 87 below, the framework can be demonstrated to follow the architectural
design process, as in the process used to design and build artifacts of civil architecture.
Figure 87: Framework as Architectural Design Theory
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186 van Aken (2004), pg. 242.
s87 From MIT Prof. Ed Crawley.
188 Rechtin, E. (1991) and Rechtin, E. (2000), pg. x.
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1.4.4.5.1 Trends & Trajectories via Architectural Abstraction & Aggregation
Although the proposed framework is being derived empirically from the field-based data of
observing and developing the phenomena of business competition, it also (upon reflection) can
be seen to have its roots in the abstractions and aggregations of architectural design theory. The
act of architecting a social structure progresses (both linearly as well as iteratively) from the
intense study of the environment in the abstract, to the induction of a high-level form or concept,
to the deduction of lower-level structures (from well-tested laws), finally to the creation or
delivery of a high-performing entity (Piepenbrock, 2004).
As shown in Figure 88 below, this research will therefore attempt to explain the high-level
abstract architectural forms and their aggregate behaviors that firms and their extended
enterprises will need to exhibit long-term high-performance in different environmental
conditions. In this sense, this research dissertation is seeking underlying long-term trends and
performance trajectories - the "signals" through the "noise" of lower levels of abstraction.
Figure 88: Framework presented as "Ladder of Abstraction/Aggregation"
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+0
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Behavior
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Of more relevance to the performance objectives as stated in this research dissertation, another
analogy of the framework can be developed as shown in Figure 89 below. An analogy of
architectural abstraction might be to explain or design a high-performance solution in a motor
sport race. Instead of immediately launching into low-level detailed explanations of engine
power and torque or design for aerodynamics, an architectural approach would ensure the high-
level abstract form achieves fit with its environmental demands and its overall function.
Therefore observing that the race will take place in a mud bog as opposed to a slick racetrack
gives the abstract solution that a crude "tractor" form will dominate any race car, now matter
how powerful its engine or low its drag coefficients.
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Figure 89: Proposed Framework expressed as a Motorsport Race
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1.4.4.5.2 "Resolution" Limitations of an Architecture-based Framework
The framework presented herein attempts to contribute towards a general theory of the evolution
of business ecosystems, which in the process explains long-term firm performance. It is
however, by its very design, a conceptual framework with a low degree of "resolution". That is,
it predicts generally under which aggregate conditions, a firm should outperform its rivals over
the long term. For example: "the greater the maturity of the market, the more enterprise
architectures with greater integrality should dominate."
As such, it will be demonstrated that the high-level enterprise architecture transcends the firm's
strategy and its operational efficiency. Due to its low resolution, there will be "noisy"
exceptions, which will play out over the short term, where for example, excellent strategy
coupled with excellent execution trumps poor architecture in a near-transition environment.
....... .............. M llllll
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1.4.4.5.3 Ontological Primacy Embedded within Framework
"Of all the manifestos concerning the relationship of form and function, 'form follows function" is
surely the most famous, as well as being the most sweetly succinct. It is also one of the most
misinterpreted. It is not a statement of importance, granting function a greater stature than form, but
one of process: fimction must be discerned before form can be fashioned and, implicitly, to do
otherwise would be nonsensical. "189
Finally, a note should be made regarding the assumptions on ontological primacy embedded
within the framework presented. Although the framework appears to be presented as following
the ideals of institutional as opposed to neoclassical economic approaches to strategy 90; as
following the ideals of holism as opposed to reductionism; as being led from the front by
Aristotle's "causafinalis" (final cause) as opposed to being pushed from behind by the "causa
efficiens" (efficient cause); as following the teleological notions that:
* form followsfunction
* structure follows form
* performance follows structure
* environment follows performance
* function follows environment
* (repeat...)
In reality, the framework is intended to acknowledge the cyclic interdependence of these
variables, such that emergence is made possible. 19 In addition, the framework is intended to
acknowledge the richness of multiple causality of the "product-producer" relationship, as
opposed to the cause-effect relationship.192
189 Richardson, A. (1993), pg. 35.
10 Loveridge, R. (2003), pg. 99.
191 Weidlich, W. (2000), pp. 13-21.
192 Ackoff, R. (1981), pg. 21.
1.4.4.6 Framework as Contingency and Configuration Theories
"Contingency and configuration theories have received considerable attention, both in
organizational theory and in strategic management research. "193
The framework attempts to re-engage and moderate the internal-external debate within the
strategic management field by re-asserting the contingency and configuration theories as
described in the following subsections.
"For many years, contingency and configuration theorists have asserted a connection between
organizational alignments and performance (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967; Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Miller and Friesen, 1984.) "94
Over the past 50 years, strategic management researchers have identified a range of factors that
have been demonstrated to be influential in determining superior firm performance. These have
progressed chronologically from the external factors of industrial organization economics (Bain,
1956) to the external-internal fit of contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) to the
internal factors of the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984),
"[the] move from external factors, to 'fit' perspectives, to internal elements... highlight the range of
factors important to superior performance.
The shift away from contingency theory took place as theorists rediscovered the resource-based
view, which manifested itself in practice as the "core competencies" movement of the 1980s and
1990s. This movement tended to focus on benchmarking dissected best practices from world-
class companies, and attempting to copy them non-systemically, which was a noted departure
from the holistic thinking of contingency theory. Recently, an number of notable academics at
reputable institutions have called for a revisiting of the classical theories:
"Its one of the oldest, most fundamental ideas in management theory: that executives should
understand how the many distinct functional components of a firm interrelate to achieve the proper
fit. It is time to resurrect the idea of addressing the part-whole relationship of the firm. Without this
systemic way of looking at companies, firms run the risk of engaging in compartmentalized thinking
that can lead to the adoption of practices that are a poor fit and work to afirm 's disadvantage. ,196
While this research dissertation will appear to take the debate back along the intellectual
pendulum towards environmental fit, as shown in Figure 90 below, it is hoped that a new light
will be shed on contingency theory - particularly how and when external and internal factors
interact via the enterprise architecture construct.
193 Powell, T.C. (1992), pg. 120.
194 Powell, T.C. (1992), pg. 119 & 120.
195 Rouse and Daellenbach (1999), pp. 487-488.
196 Summary of the current research of Levinthal, D. and Siggelkow, N. at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton
School; in Knowledge at Wharton, May 17, 2006.
Figure 90: Intellectual "Double-Helix" in Strategic Management
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Note that this research attempts to re-engage the sociological literatures which tend to focus on
environmental "fit". While both contingency theory and population ecology tend to both agree
on this feature, each differs as to the level at which change or adaptation takes place, with the
contingency theorists focusing more on the organizational level in the form of "top-down"
leadership and choice, and the population ecologists focusing more on the population level and
the "bottom-up" leadership embedded in DNA (Levinthal, 1997).
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1.4.4.6.1 Framework as Contingency Theory
"This is a comparative study of six organizations operating in the same industrial environment. The
subsystems in each organization were differentiated from each other in terms of subsystem formal
structures, the member's goal orientation, member's time orientations and member's interpersonal
orientations. A relationship was found between the extent to which the states of differentiation and
integration in each organization met the requirements of the environment and the relative economic
performance of the organizations. "197
The above quotation, taken from the abstract of one of the most cited and influential pieces of
research in the fields of strategic management and organizational theory, Lawrence and Lorsch's
1967 classic, "Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations," offers a close
description of the research proposed herein.198
Like Lawrence and Lorsch's original work, this research also proposes a comparative study of six
organizations, albeit in three pairs of organizations each operating in the same environments. In
addition, this work proposes to identify differing member properties (e.g. goal- and time
orientations) as characteristic of different architectural forms.
As will be discussed later in Chapter 2, although this research dissertation is founded on the basis
of building grounded theory (in the same way as the original Lawrence and Lorsch work), it also
serves to validate, refine and extend their original findings.
1.4.4.6.1.1 Endogenizing Lawrence and Lorsch
The proposed framework makes assertions (in the vein of contingency theory) that firm
performance results from the alignment of endogenous organizational "design" variables with
exogenous environment or context variables.' 99 In fact, one of the aims of this research is to
begin to endogenize the claims of contingency theory, in that contingent exogenous
environmental variables can be endogenized causally, as shown in Figure 91 below.
Figure 91: Framework as Contingency Theory
+0
Structure
Environment/Context Function
Performance
17 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), pg. 1.
18 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) was among the top 20 most influential works in the field of strategic management
as determined in a bibliometric study by Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, (2004).
199 The noted "problems" with contingency theory (Schoonhoven, 1981) will be addressed in the research.
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On of the major differences of this research relative to classical contingency theory lies in its
positing how firm performance endogenously shapes the environmental context, which in turn
defines organizational form. Classical contingency theory (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) is
essentially variance theory, in which the environment is a variable which moderates between the
independent variable of firm structure and the dependent variable of firm performance.
As shown in Figure 92 below, the framework proposed herein explicitly endogenizes more of the
environment, and in this sense is now an inter-organizational or "ecological contingency theory"
as opposed to an intra-organizational "structural contingency theory." In this way, the
framework is essentially process theory, whereby environment is not a moderating variable, but
an interdependent variable. Crucially, classical contingency theory characterizes the
environment using discontinuous states, whereby for example, environmental instability may or
may not precede environmental stability. The framework presented herein however posits that
states of environmental instability (i.e. increasing rates of quantity and quality growth)
necessarily precede environmental stability (decreasing rates of quantity and quality growth),
under conditions of logistic growth.
Figure 92: Comparing Structural vs. Ecological Contingency Theories
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1.4.4.6.1.2 Differentiation and Integration in Inter-Firm Organizations
This research proposes to extend Lawrence and Lorsch's original ground-breaking research from
the analysis of firms as "complex organizations" to the analysis of firms and their extended
enterprises as "complex organizations". In this sense, this proposed extension of Lawrence and
Lorsch's research searches for a contingent explanation for differentiation and integration as
inter-firm as opposed to intra-firm phenomena, as shown in Figure 93 below.
Figure 93: Situating the Framework within the Contingency Literature
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1.4.4.6.1.3 Architecture-Context-Performance
At is simplest and most abstract level, this research points to a new form of the traditional
context-structure performance relationships in contingency theory (Drazin and Van de Ven,
1985). As shown in Figure 94 below, this architecture-context performance relationship is
hypothesized.200
Figure 94: Architecture-Context-Performance Relationship
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As will be discussed in greater detail in Part II, an "architect's dilemma" arises from this
relationship. To summarize, there appears to be a general trend over time towards increasing
pressure on enterprise architectures to "dis-integrate" as well as on environments to become
more dynamically complex and thus requiring greater integration. This implies that there is a
trend towards lower performance of incumbents, and towards greater opportunity for new firms
(late entrants) to become dominant.
200 Note: a more sophisticated version of this matrix discretizes context into three phases instead of two, whereby
high performance is associated initially with integral architectures, then modular architectures, and finally integral
architectures.
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1.4.4.6.2 Framework as Configuration Theory
"People in [the configuration] school, in seeking to be integrative, cluster the various elements of our
beast - the strategy-making process, the content of strategies, organizational structures and their
contexts - into distinct stages or episodes, for example, of entrepreneurial growth or stable maturity,
sometimes sequenced over time to describe the life cycles of orgnizations.
Configuration theory embraces rich, complex, holistic (not reductionistic) desciptions of
organizations and their supporting environments.
"A configuration represents a number of specific and separate attributes which are meaningful
collectively rather than individually. [It] represents a unique, tightly integrated, and therefore
relatively long-lived set of dynamics. ,202
From the previous brief description of the proposed meta-strategic framework, it is clear that our
research attempts to build and test archetype or "configuration" theories in strategic
management. The proposed archetypes include the enterprise architectures, their structural
dynamics and competitive outcomes as well as the environmental characteristics which "grow"
them.
"The use of configurations in studies of organizations allows researchers to express complicated and
interrelated relationships among many variables without resorting to artificial oversimplification of
the phenomenon of interest. Configurations are a means of achieving parsimony while presenting
rich, complex descriptions of organizations. ,,203
Dess et al. (1993) note that strategic management researchers often present their constructs as
gestalts, configurations or archetypes. This is similar to the way architects present their
constructs - with architects defined as "specialists in the simplification of complexity" (Rechtin,
1999).
"Charles Darwin (1887:105) once distinguished 'splitters'from 'lumpers. Configuration school
people are unabashed lumpers: they see the world in terms of nice, neat categories. Nuanced
variability is assumed away in favor of overall clustering; statistically speaking, outliers are ignored
in favor of central tendencies. ,04
Such a "lumped" architectural approach is important in the early "fuzzy front end" of
theory development, but whose use must be bounded by an appreciation for value and the
corresponding limits of parsimony.
"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler. "20 5
Some researchers also link organizational transformation as the logical complement to
configuration (Mintzberg et al., 1998).
201 Mintzberg, H., Ahistrand, B., and Lempel, J. (1998), pp. 6-7.
202 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
203 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
204 Mintzberg, R, Ahlstrand, B., and Lempel, J. (1998), pg. 303.
205 Albert Einstein, The Evolution ofPhysics.
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1.4.4.6.2.1 Configuration Theory: beyond Contingency Theory
"The configurational approach makes a clean break from the contingency mainstream, within which
researchers have been preoccupied with abstracting a limited set of structural concepts and
measuring their relationships with a limited set of abstracted situational concepts. ,206
At first glance, the multi-domain aspect of configuration theory appears to sound like
contingency theory. However a closer inspection reveals that configuration theory is an
intellectual advancement beyond contingency theory as it embraces the nonlinear dynamic and
evolutionary nature of organizations.
"Our comparison of the assumptions underlying contingency and configuration theories can be
likened to [the] distinction between the assumptions of Newtonian physics and those of emerging
chaos theories. Like contingency theorists, those taking the Newtonian perspective envision a world
where stability, order, uniformity, and equilibrium predominate. The important relationships are
linear. In contrast, the configurational approach shares chaos theory's acknowledgement of
'disorder, instability, diversity, disequilibrium, nonlinear relationships, and temporality - a heightened
sensitivity to the flows of time' (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, pp. xvi-xv). A central insight of chaos
theory is that patterns lurk beneath systems' seemingly random behaviors. Chaos theorists call these
patterns 'strange attractors'; organizational theorists call them configurations. "207
1.4.4.6.2.2 Classifications of Organizations
"Naming something, " saidAlice to the Red Queen, "isn't the same thing as explaining it. "208
One of the more important roles of configuration research is to classify organizations, which
aides in the development of theories in organization, and especially normative theories in
strategic management.
"Classification systems provide a means for defining sets of homogenous organizations which should
significantly increase levels of explained variance of key variables across organizations... By
aggregating and organizing a large body of facts and data into a meaningfuld set, propositions and
theories may be developed. ,209
The constructs of enterprise architectures developed in this research dissertation are essentially
configurations used for the aggregation of attributes and for the classification of homogenous
organization types, in order to aid in the development of theories of their long-term competitive
performance.
206 Meyer, A.D. et al. (1993), pp. 1176-1177.
207 Meyer, A.D. et al. (1993), pp. 1178-1179.
208 Lewis Carroll's Alice 's Adventures in Wonderland, cited in Meyer, A.D. et al. (1993), pg. 1180.
209 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
1.4.4.6.2.2.1 Single Domain Taxonomies and Typologies
In order to distinguish configurations from their "classification cousins" taxonomies
(empirically-driven) and typologies (theoretically-driven), this research dissertation uses the
definitions proposed by Dess et al., 1993).
"A typology or taxonomy contains elements or items that represent a single domain or an aspect of
organizations, such as environment, structure, or strategy... A configuration contains relationships
among elements or items representing multiple domains. "'21
Well-known typologies within the field of organization science include Bums and Stalker's
(1961) mechanistic and organic forms, while Woodward (1958, 1965) and Thompson (1967)
distinguished organizations based on the technologies they used. Additionally, Miles and Snow
(1978) distinguished among four organization types based on their strategies: defenders,
analyzers, prospectors and reactors.
1.4.4.6.2.2.2 Multiple Domain Configurations
"The multidimensionality of constructs used to describe strategy phenomena has always posed a
challenge for researchers. "211
Although the definition of appropriate domains in strategic management is not exact, researchers
(Miller, 1987) have offered theoretical justification for the four "imperatives" of: environment,
structure, strategy, and leadership.
"Configurations exhibit great stability because of their internal logic, integrity, and evolutionary
momentum. .212
Given these definitions of appropriate domains in strategic management, it will become clear
throughout this dissertation that the enterprise architectural configurations will embrace these
and others.
1.4.4.6.2.3 Theoretical Issues
When developing configuration theory, Dess et al. (1993) highlight three important theoretical
issues which will be addressed in this research dissertation.
1.4.4.6.2.3.1 Dimensional Complexity
"As the number of dimensions of a construct increases arithmetically, the number of combinations
increases geometrically... The theorist is forced to simplify by restricting each variable to a
dichotomy. "213
210 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
211 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
212 Miller, D. (1987).
213 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
However, such configuration research is not without its tradeoffs, particularly the costs of
parsimony. As will be discussed in essay #1, the construct of enterprise architectures will have
many possible variable combinations and therefore a multitude of possible forms. For
simplicity, however, the construct will be presented as a continuous spectrum of possibilities,
with the dichotomy of modular vs. integral being covered in great detail.
1.4.4.6.2.3.2 Causal Ambiguity
"When additional domains are added to the research question, the difficulty in establishing causal
relationships is exacerbated. Typically, however, in the context of configuration research, such causal
relationships among multiple variables are stipulated as reciprocal and mutually reinforcing. "214
As was illustrated previously in the framework summary, the enterprise architecture
configuration was shown to ultimately and reflexively cause its own evolution in closed-loop
feedback. This will be discussed further in essay #3.
1.4.4.6.2.3.3 Temporal Stability
"Configurations, because of the enduring themes that unify and organize them, are characterized by
considerable temporal stability... In order to cause a change in a configuration, a 'revolution 'would
be necessary.
Although it has been posited that configurations are stable through time, this does not mean they
are in a state of static equilibrium. In fact, in essay #3, we will contend that they are in a state of
dynamic equilibrium.
"Since it is theoretically possible to have more than one successful organizational configuration,
even within an industry, an interesting research issue would be: Are certain types of transitions easier
for organizations to accomplish than others? In other words, longitudinal studies may reveal certain
patterns orfavoredpaths that organizations follow as part of their evolutionary dynamics. ,216
Essay #3 will discuss ecological diversity in which multiple competing enterprise architectures
can co-exist, however at any given time, they will not be equally successful.
1.4.4.6.2.4 Methodological Issues
When developing configuration theory, Dess et al. (1993) highlight three important
methodological issues which will be addressed in this research dissertation.
1.4.4.6.2.4.1 Construct Specification
"Configurations are inherently multidimensional entities in which key attributes are tightly
interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The researcher's prime task involves disentangling these
complex relationships and isolation key constructs. "217
214 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
215 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).216 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
217 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
As configurations are made up of component constructs, Dess et al. (1993) identified four major
classification of constructs used in the strategy literature:
* environment (e.g. munificence, dynamism and complexity)
* structure (e.g. integration and differentiation)
* strategy process (e.g. rational and consensus)
* strategy content (e.g. differentiation and cost leadership)
"In empirical studies of configurations [researchers] use cross-validation of responses by comparisonsL
between different groups of executives and comparisons with alternate measures derived from
secondary data sources. "28
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the research methodology will clearly be rooted in a multi-
method approach which targets executives of multiple stakeholders within a given enterprise
architecture.
1.4.4.6.2.4.2 Data Aggregation
"With the exception offine-grained research methodologies such as single case studies, the analysis
and interpretation of research is dependent upon the aggregation of data collected from many
participants across firms. When such data are aggregated, the uniqueness or richness of each firm is
compromised. "219
Again, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the research dissertation is based on fine-grained
research methodologies based on a small theoretical sample of case studies in order to preserve
the richness of each firm.
1.4.4.6.2.4.3 Unit of Analysis
"Choices regarding the unit of analysis...could lead to what is often referred to as "ecological
fallacy", i.e. attempting to make inferences at a specific level on the basis of data obtained and
analyzed at a different level of aggregation. "220
As described in this chapter, the unit of analysis is the firm and its extended enterprise, in
order to arrive at the dependent variable of firm performance. In order to mitigate the
possibility of ecological fallacy (Datta, 1980), the research methodology described in
chapter 2 collects and analyzes data from the firm and it primary stakeholders.
1.4.4.6.2.4.4 Research Methodologies
"Longitudinal research designs or causal modeling techniques... can be helpiul in providing insights
into multivariate relationships... Longitudinal qualitative analysis of organizations can provide
meaningful insights about the evolution of configurations as well as the specific relationships among
the construct within a configuration. Through careful comparison of in-depth case studies, it is
218 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
219 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
220 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
possible to arrive inductively at relationships among environment, strategy, structure, processes and
outcomes... Qualitative studies are extremely labor intensive and subject to potential problems such as
researcher bias and non-replicability. ,221
As described in chapter 2, the research methodology will embrace longitudinal qualitative
methods as well as causal modeling techniques in order to capture the relationships
between constructs within the enterprise architectural configuration as well as the evolution
of the enterprise architectural configurations themselves.
1.4.4.6.2.4.4.1 Inductive development
Ketchen Jr. et al. (1993). Ketchen Jr. et al. (1997).
"Others have deplored the prevalence in the literature of 'armchair typologies' and fuzzy
frameworks,' which are characterized as 'pseudotheories' formed by causal induction instead of
rigorous deduction from theory. "222
1.4.4.6.2.4.4.2 Deductive development
Ketchen Jr. et al. (1993). Ketchen Jr. et al. (1997).
221 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
222 Meyer, A.D. et al. (1993), pg. 1179.
1.4.4.7 Framework as Three Essays
The main body of this dissertation consists of three essays, each of which is devoted to the
independent variables associated with function, structure and evolution as shown in Figure 95
below. Essay #1 defines a typology/taxonomy of enterprise architectural forms and functions.
Essay #2 translates the static architectural properties into a deterministic structure which drives
behavior. Finally, essay #3 defines the environmental events and processes which ultimately
shape or "grow" the enterprise architectures.
Figure 95: Layout of the Dissertation - the Three Essays
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1.4.5 Aspects of Theory
The following discussion briefly discusses the five aspects of theory (Neuman, 2006, pp. 58-77)
with respect to the framework proposed. The summary of the five aspects of the proposed theory
is shown in Figure 96 below
Figure 96: Summary of the Five Aspects of the Proposed Framework
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1.4.5.1 Direction of Theorizing
While the theorizing iterates both inductively and deductively, it clearly has an initial strong
emphasis on induction, whereby concrete empirical evidence was gathered and molded into more
abstratct concepts and theoretical relationships. The particular type of inductive social research
used, was grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989) which emphasizes
comparison in empirical observations.
1.4.5.2 Level of Analysis
Although much of the research gathers and analyzes data on a micro-level, which focuses on the
face-to-face interactions among individuals or small groups over short time horizions (measured
in days and months)223 , the primary level of analysis takes place on meso-and macro-levels.
1.4.5.2.1 Meso-level
The analysis is meso-level as it focuses on the relations, processes and structures of mid-leveel
social phenomena (like organizations and extended enterprises) operating over moderate
durations (measured in years, decades).
223 One of the more important micro-level case studies that this research has uncovered is the process by which
individual (or small teams of) leaders endeavored to transform a modular enterprise architecture into an integral
enterprise architecture. This work is the subject of later publications.
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1.4.5.2.2 Macro-level
Finally, the analysis also approaches macro-level as it focuses on social institutions (e.g.
international capital and labor markets) operating over long durations (measured in decades and
centuries).
1.4.5.3 Focus of Theory
The focus of the theory is clearly substantive, as it aims to builds theory focused on a particular
topic area of social phenomena: competition in business (firm-industry) ecosystems. The theory
does begins to reach toward more formal theory, which focuses on more general processes or
structures that operate across multiple areas of social phenomena: like competition in educational
(university) ecosystems or competition in political (party) ecosystems.
Therefore, if the research domain is defined relatively narrowly as "business ecosystems", then
the focus of the theory is formal, as it extends across mutiple industries (airplane, airline and
automotive) and multiple sectors (manufacturing and services). If the research domain is
defined more broadly as "social ecosystems", then the focus of the theory is substantive, as it
explicitly covers business ecosystems but not explicitly educational or political ecosystems.
1.4.5.4 Range of Operation
The range at which the theory operates beyond the rather narrow confines of empirical
generalization and lies between middle-range theory and theoretical frameworks.
1.4.5.4.1 Middle-Range Theory
The research can be seen as middle-range theory (or more precisely, four middle-range theories).
Within each "theory", the research has limited abstraction/range and is in the form of empirically
verifyable statements. This is manifested in the linking of the construct sets (e.g. environmental
fit, architectural forms, firm functions, and performance) to proposition sets.
1.4.5.4.2 Theoretical Framework
As an integrated theoretical framework, this research is a very general theoretical system with
assumptions, concepts and social theories. Like, for example "structural functionalism" which
purports that society is a system of interdependent parts that is in equilibrium, and over time it
has evolved from a simple to a more complex form, with highly specialized parts, the theory of
the evolution of business ecosystems purports that without limits to growth, similar evolutionary
processes occur.
1.4.5.5 Form or Explanation
The explanation includes both causal and structural forms of explanation, and less
interpretative. Due to the nature of the research as theoretical framework, a structural form of
explanation is deemed most effective, with attempts at causal explanation also offered.
As the theory of the evolution of business ecosystems is ultimately a theory of evolution (based
on Darwin's theory of evolution), it offers high-level process explanations (ased on variation,
selection and retention) while not negating the need for individual causal explanations, it merely
acknowledges the diffuculty in basing its theoretical explanation on traditional causal means.
"Darwin did not only proclaim that species had evolved, but also pointed to the causal mechanisms
of evolution. Darwinism invokes both a theory of natural selection and a universal commitment to
causal explanations. Darwin upheld that complex outcomes could be explained in terms of a detailed
succession and accumulation of step-by-step causal mechanisms. In a paper of 1874, Huxley
elaborated and generalized Darwin's argument as the 'doctrine of continuity'. Under specific
conditions, a broad and general version of Darwinism may apply to all complex, open and evolving
systems. The possibility of Universal Darwinism suggests that such principles might apply to the
social sciences, as well as to biology. ,224
Such complex systems can be modeled deterimistically, yet exhibit chaotic or unpredictable
outcomes. The theory herein (like Darwinism) is such a deterministic model, in that behavior is
not pre-determined (i.e. it can not necessarily be predicted ex-ante), but it can be explained ex-
post, without recourse to stochastic explanations.
"Statistical determination, as expressed in probabilities, does not imply the absense of a cause. As
Bertold Brecht [said] 'Their movements are difficult to predict, or cannot be predicted, only because
there are too many determinations, not because there are none.' .We now know that non-lineaer
systems addressed by chaos theory can simulate stochastic behavior. There are non-linear systems
with such a high degree of sensitivity to initial conditions that no amount of accurate measurement of
the appropriate parameter values can provide a sufficiently accurate prediction. It does not imply that
events are necessarily predictable, or that any one set of events will always lead to the same, regular
outcome. Furthermore the principle of determinacy does not imply a 'mechanistic' view... it upholds
that intentions are caused. ,225
224 Hodgson, G.M. (2004), pp. 1-7.
225 Hodgson, G.M. (2004), pp. 3-10.
1.4.5.5.1 Structural Explanations
Structural explanations differ from causal explanations in that they merely note where certain
aspects of social life fit within a larger structure. Such fit can take the form of temporal fit or
"sequential" theories, spatial fit or "network" theories, or "functional" theories.
"A structural explanation is a type of theoretical explanation about why events occur an how things
work expressed by outlining an overall structure and emphasizing locations, interdependencies,
distances, or relations among positions in that structure. "226
1.4.5.5.1.1 Sequential
Sequential theories communicate temporal structure and establish the order that events or stages
occur, as in for example an organization's growth and death. It is not a causal explanation, as
being in an earlier stage does not cause movement along the trajectory to the next stage.
This theoretical framework therefore goes beyond structural-sequential explanations that
"maturity follows emergence" in an industry's life-cycle. Instead it offers causal explanations
for the causal mechanisms driving the logistic S-curve (e.g. carrying capacities, reinforcing and
balancing feedbacks).
1.4.5.5.1.2 Network
Network theories communicate positional structure, which are less central to the theoretical
framework proposed herein.
1.4.5.5.1.3 Functional
Stinchcombe (1968, pg. 80) noted that a functional explanation is:
"one in which the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements to the
causes of that behavior. ,22/
Such closed-loop causality sounds like feedback in system dynamics, in which the analyst must
identify the causal feedback loops by which the forces maintaining the structure are themselves
activated by forces threating the equilibrium (Stinchcombe, 1968, pp. 88). The framework
presented herein therefore can be expressed in the structural-functional format where structure
(i.e. enterprise architecture) causes function (competitive dynamics), which in turn causes
evolution.
"Functional theories often assume long-term system survival or continuity over time, with a need for
balance or equilibrium for a system to continue smooth operation. "228
226 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 69.227 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 72.
228 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 72.
"A finctional theory of social change says that, over time, a social system moves through
developmental stages, becoming increasingly differentiated and more complex. It evolves a
specialized divison of labor and develops greater individualism. These developments create greater
efficiency for the system as a whole. "229
1.4.5.5.2 Causal Explanation
In order to establish a causal explanation, three things must be established: temporal order,
association, and the elimination of plausible alternatives. This dissertation aims to meet as many
of these three as possible, but recognizes that full causal explanation will not be possible. Each
will be briefly discussed in turn.
1.4.5.5.2.1 Temporal Order
While most causal relations are unidirectional in terms of cause and effect, the type of causality
invoked in this research is recursive or reciprocal, as in the feedback rich models of system
dynamics (Forrester, 1961).
"More complex theories specij, reciprocal-effect causal relations - that is, a mutual causal
relationship or simultaneous causality...or feedback relationships, but these are difficult to test. ,230
1.4.5.5.2.2 Association
"Two phenomena are associated if they occur together in a patterned way or appear to act together.
People sometime confuse correlation with association. Correlation has a specific technical meaning,
whereas association hais a more general idea. ,231
1.4.5.5.2.3 Elimination of Plausible Alternatives (Spuriousness)
"Eliminating all possible alternatives is impossible. ,232
229 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 72.
230 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 65.
231 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 66.
232 Neuman, W.L. (2006), pg. 66.
1.5 Bridging Intellectual Traditions: Engineering Systems & Strategic Management
1.5.1 Engineering Systems
While the research is designed to engage the academic field of strategic management, the
intellectual bridges will be drawn from developed as well as emerging disciplines of engineering
systems. This section therefore briefly outlines the research agenda for a bold new academic
division at MIT - the Engineering Systems Division, and places this research plan within the
context of ESD. It briefly explains why the ESD is uniquely placed to be the natural academic
"home" to sponsor and supervise this research. 233
As the MIT Engineering Systems Division is explicitly set up to embrace the disciplines of
Engineering, Management and Social Sciences, this research embraces the respective subfields of
Architectural Theory and Systems Theory, Strategic Management and Strategic Leadership,
Evolutionary Economics and Organizational Ecology. Within the Engineering Systems Division,
the domain that this research engages is "Extended Enterprises", and the approaches used focus
on "Design" and "Dynamics", as summarized in Figure 97 below.2 34
Figure 97: Domain and Approaches within Engineering Systems
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2 Significant debate has existed regarding the natural academic school or department as the "home" of this doctoral
work. The phenomena investigated in this research is clearly the domain of management or business schools (and
specifically within a department of strategic management). However, many doctoral programs in
management/business schools tend to be discipline-based (e.g. economics or organizational theory). As this
research focuses first and foremost on the phenomena (not the methodology), and takes a rather catholic, multi- and
inter-disciplinary approach to investigate the phenomena, it has proven to reside more comfortably within a multi-
disciplinary "systems division", in this case the MIT Engineering Systems Division.
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1.5.1.1 Engineering Systems Defined
"We believe that it is important for industry, government, academia and other stakeholders...to work
together to create a new field that we call Engineering Systems to develop a better understanding of
the issues surrounding large-scale, complex, technologically enabled systems." ,,235
The ESD was born out of the increasing demands on the design of complex socio-technical
systems (which also have significant socio-economic and socio-political components). The
investigation of such complex problems, inevitably involves taking intellectual risks.
"The management of the enterprises that perform design, manufacturing and operational processes is
a significant concern in the field. Furthermore, the economic, social and political context in which
the engineering systems operate is a significant concern. 236
"We value and accept intellectual risk. This means tackling issues that appear, at least in part, to be
non-quantifyable or vague. We have deep respect for all the disciplines we bring together and build
upon, including engineering, social sciences and management. "237
It is not a coincidence therefore, that the primary constructs used in this research plan: enterprise
architecture, enterprise structural dynamics and the industrial evolution of the enterprise's
environment all have their theoretical heritage rooted in "engineering systems".
"Engineering Systems is a field of study taking an integrative holistic view of large-scale, complex,
technologically-enabled systems with significant enterprise level interactions and socio-technical
interfaces. "2-38
An "engineering system - as conceived by the ESD - is comprised of the (micro-) product system,
the (meso-) enterprise system, and the (macro-) environment system. This research plan
therefore focuses on the meso-enterprise system 239 as the unit of analysis, as shown in Figure 98
below.
"The interaction between the designing enterprise and the engineering system is deep. While
organizational theorists have well-developed theories of how organizations fimnction and make
decisions, this understanding needs to be integrated into the design phase in a quantifiable way."240
234 These definitions are taken from the MIT Engineering Systems Division's "Strategic Report", 2009.
S35Moses, J. (2004), pg. 3.
236 Moses, J. (2004), pg. 2.
2-7 MIT Engineering Systems Division, "Strategic Report". (2009).
238 Hastings, D. (2005), pg. 17.
239 The enterprise system is sometimes referred to as an "extended enterprise" which includes the firm producing the
product system and its key stakeholders, (e.g. customers, suppliers, investors, employees).
240 Hastings. D. (2004), pg. 5.
Figure 98: General research focus within the construct of an "engineering system"
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1.5.1.2 Engineering Systems approach to Strategic Management
The following characteristics of engineering systems are particularly appropriate to the study of
strategic management.
1.5.1.2.1 Performance as the Dependent Variable
A common characteristic shared between engineering systems and strategic management is the
focus on performance, whether of products, product systems, production systems or enterprises
performing these functions. When the notion of relative performance becomes relevant or
important, then competition becomes important. This focus on competitive performance will be
discussed in more detail later in the section on enterprise architecting.
1.5.1.2.2 Holism and Feedback Processes
"A particular feature in the Engineering Systems mode of thought is holism. That is, emphasizing the
behavior of the whole in contrast to its parts. Holism lends itself to thinking about appropriate
abstractions for describing and analyzing engineering systems as a whole. ,,241
This research dissertation therefore attempts to use holistic, non-reductionist thinking to bring
heretofore absent "appropriate abstractions" (e.g. form, function, fit, etc.) to bear on the field of
strategic management in order to explain long-term firm performance.
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"Much attention is paid in the Engineering Systems mode of thought to certain feedback processes.
For example, the organization of an enterprise can influence the architecture of the system it designs.
Similarly, the architecture of a system can influence the organization of the enterprise. ,"242
In addition, this dissertation aims to entertain not a simple correlative approach, nor a linear open
loop causal explanation for long-term firm performance, but a closed-loop feedback explanation
via the development of an explanation for the evolution of business ecosystems.
1.5.1.2.3 Managing Change and the Life Cycle Perspective
"A key emphasis in the field is on managing change. Large-scale engineering systems tend to change
a great deal, especially when we consider long time frames, such as the entire lifetime of the system.
Engineering Systems takes a relatively optimistic view of ways of dealing with change. One way of
managing change is to consider those aspects of the system that will remain relatively stable. For
example, while the overall function of the system may change dramatically over time, its macro-scale
architecture may be relatively stable. ,,243
Unlike many studies in the field of strategic management which tend to be cross-sectional, this
research utilizes a longitudinal (including historical) approach examining long time frames in
order to examine the entire lifetime of a system (firm and industry). In this way, it is hoped to
determine whether or not the "system function" and its associated "macro-scale architecture"
changed significantly over the life-cycle. In this way, this research hopes to re-engage the debate
of social structure vs. agency in organizational theory.
1.5.1.2.4 The "-ilities"
"From the existing engineering science point of view, there are several traditional properties of
engineering systems. These include: function, performance and cost. Engineering Systems
emphasizes non-traditional properties or goals of systems, often called 'ilities.' They usually arise
from taking a long-term or life-cycle view of systems. These include: flexibility, robustness, etc. "244
The tendency of researchers in the field of strategic management is to focus on traditional short
term properties of the firm like "profitability" expressed as various efficiency ratios like return
on assets, return on equity, return on sales.
This research dissertation takes the long-term or life-cycle view of firms and their enterprise
systems by focusing on the "non-traditional" properties of systems including the following "-
ilities": flexibility, stability etc.
Therefore, although this research will use the traditional property of "profitability" as the
primary dependent variable, it will focus on causal mechanisms which introduce the "-ilities" as
independent variables.
242 Moses, J. (2004), pp. 1-2.
243 Moses, J. (2004), pg. 1.
244 Moses, J. (2004), pp. 6-7.
1.5.1.3 Engineering Systems sub-field: Enterprise Architecture
Within the emerging field of Engineering Systems, it is posited that the notion of "architecture"
has theoretical relevance to all systems, whether natural or artificial, whether consciously
designed or not. As shown in Figure 99 below24 5, this doctoral research plan will attempt to
contribute to a systems subfield called, Enterprise Systems Architecture, or Enterprise
Architecture for short.246 . The research attempts to address the architectures of "intellectual
frameworks" on "organizational forms", where the organizations in question are "larger than
single companies", namely business ecosystems as defined earlier.
Figure 99: Decomposition of Architectures
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"Architecture, especially the architecture of the highest level of an engineering system, is of great
interest to Engineering Systems. 247
The proposed research will attempt to characterize enterprises at their the highest, most abstract
level: i.e. theirform, function, structure and behavior (both transient and steady state).
245 Adapted from Whitney, D. et al. (2004), pp. 15-16.
246 The qualifying word "systems" is used to distinguish this endeavor from the growing body of research on
"enterprise architecting" which represents a narrower IT space.
247 Moses, J. (2004), pg. 8.
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As will be discussed in more detail in Essay #1, this research will posit the construct of an
enterprise architecture, which will draw concepts from civil, product and system architecture.
While these well-developed concepts tend to focus on the mapping of function to physical
entities, the notion of enterprise architecture focuses primarily on mapping of function to
organizational entities as shown in Figure 100 below.
Figure 100: Enterprise Architecture vs. Civil, Product & System Architectures
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Having defined an enterprise architecture, I will begin to explore questions that are central to the
emerging field of enterprise architecting relating to the properties of architectures, as expressed
by Nightingale and Rhodes (2004) below:
"How do you architect enterprises to optimize around certain properties? What enterprise
architecture could maximize long-term stability of the enterprise versus what architecture would
maximize the flexibility of the enterprise in regard to its ability to design innovative new products?
Can a single enterprise model be 'optimized'for both such properties, or do we need to select for one
over another? "248
248 Nightingale, D. and Rhodes, D. (2004), pp. 9-10.
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1.5.1.3.1 Enterprise Architecting subfield: Competion
"In enterprise architecting we are faced with an important consideration: How do you architect an
enterprise that can most effectively produce a desired product system'? '"2 49
By extension, an enterprise that is architected to effectively produce a desired product system,
will exhibit higher long-term firm performance than other competing enterprise system
architectures. The issue of enterprise architecture for effective product system delivery becomes
one of enterprise architecture as an explanatory strategic variable for long-term firm competitive
performance.
"Engineering systems are not designed, produced and operated in a vacuum. There are customers of
these systems, competing enterprises, societal concerns and governmental policies that also need to be
considered."250
One of the primary academic contributions of this research therefore attempts to bridge the
heretofore-separate intellectual traditions between engineering systems (an in particular, systems
architecting and system dynamics) and strategic management.
The research focuses therefore the dynamics of competing meso-enterprise systems, on complex,
competitive enterprise architectures251, characterized as having differing architectural forms, as
shown in Figure 101 below.
Figure 101: Specific research focus with the construct of an "engineering system"252
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249 Nightingale, D. and Rhodes, D. (2004), pp. 2.
250 Moses, J. (2004), pg. 8.
251 ESD Prof. Joe Sussman, furthered this concept in his white paper, "Home Run For LAI"', July 8, 2005.
252 Note that the overlap of the competing enterprises is shown to symbolically represent the fact that there are often
sharing of key stakeholders among enterprise (e.g. customers, suppliers, investors, etc.).
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1.5.1.3.2 Competition case study: Boeing vs. Airbus
"A Boeing-Airbus case study [could be] a 'home-run' [due to its]... high-visibility... international
frame of reference... multiple stakeholders interacting in complex and subtle ways... insights applied
to other domains. " 53
The primary case study in this research plan centers on the competition between Boeing and
Airbus' global enterprises that design and manufacture large-scale, complex, technologically
enabled systems. In addition, as these enterprises are embedded in complex economic, social
and political contexts, it is appropriate that international faculty whose interests and expertise
embrace these "non-engineering" disciplines, as well as engineering systems supervises the
research.
1.5.1.4 Mapping Proposed Research onto ESD Intellectual "Topology"
Finally, in order to place this work within existing intellectual traditions, I note that in the spirit
of ESD research, the work is intended to build systemic knowledge via bridges between
heretofore disconnected academic disciplines.
As is seen in Figure 102 below, the proposed research draws upon - and lies in the intersection of
- at least four academic areas identified by ESD254:
* Systems Analysis
* Systems Theory
* Organizational Theory
* Political Economy
Figure 102: Proposed Research within ESD Intellectual "Topology"
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1.5.1.5 Firm-Industry Research Tradition
The research plan described herein builds on the academic tradition of MIT's Engineering
Systems Division and its predecessor organizations in the scope of its studies of firms and
industries as large-scale, complex, technologically-enabled systems with significant enterprise
level interactions and socio-technical interfaces. ESD director, Prof. Dan Hastings gives the
following examples of engineering systems:
"Examples of Engineering Systems include: automobile production systems, aerospace enterprise
systems, air transportation systems... "255
Figure 103 below shows examples of previous ESD research2 56 in each of these three domains:
* The International Motor Vehicle Program's (IMVP) study of the automotive industry,
uncovered causal mechanisms of the emerging leader, Toyota Motors.25 7
* The Lean Aerospace Initiative 's (LAI) studies of the aerospace industry258 aim to uncover
the causal mechanisms of its emerging leader, Airbus Industrie.
* The Global Airline Industry's (GAI) study of the US airline industry, uncovering the
causal mechanisms of the emerging leader, Southwest Airlines.259
Figure 103: Case Study Building Blocks for Theory Development
Il
Toyat Motors Arkf bdusa* Souffhwe AkHirnes
Automobile Aerospce Air
production systems enterprise ystems transportation systems
TheSou
Airlines
WAY
IMVP LAI GAl
(1990) (2002) (2003)
As will be discussed later in the research methodology section, these three pieces of firm-
industry research will form the basis of a theoretical sample upon which the grounded theory is
developed and extended.
25 Hastings, D. (2005), pg. 14.
256 As well as Sloan Industry Studies research.257 Womack, Jones and Roos, (1990).
258 Murmann, E. et al. (2002).
259 Hoffer-Gittell, J. (2003).
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1.5.2 Strategic Management
Although the field of strategic management has had a rich intellectual history over the past 50
years, more recent critical debates have emerged among some of the field's most pre-eminent
scholars which challenge its relevance and epistemological basis (Ghoshal, 2005; Kanter, 2005;
Pfeffer, 2005; Hambrick, 2005; Mintzberg, 2005; Donaldson, 2005). This research dissertation
is timely in that it attempts to address theses topical discussions.
"Over the last 50 years business school research has increasingly adopted the 'scientific' model - an
approach that Hayek (1989) described as the 'pretense of knowledge.' This pretense has demanded
theorizing based on partialization of analysis, the exclusion of any role for human intentionality or
choice, and the use of sharp assumptions and deductive reasoning (Bailey and Ford, 1996). "26o
A recent paper, published posthumously by strategic management professor Sumantra Ghoshal
(2005)261 triggered an interesting academic debate among some of the leading academics in the
field. Ghoshal critiques his own profession - business school academics - as contributing to the
development of "bad management theories (which) are destroying good management practices."
This research dissertation is designed to attempt to address the concerns articulated by these
scholars.
1.5.2.1 The Scientific Model (and the "pretense of knowledge")
"Friedrich von Hayek dedicated his entire Nobel Memorial Lecture to the danger posed by scientific
pretensions in the analysis of social phenomena. Because of the very nature of social phenomena,
which Hayek described as 'phenomena of organized complexity,' the application of scientific
methods to such phenomena' are often most unscientific, and, beyond this, in these fields there are
definite limits to what we can expect science to achieve. "'262
"Why don't we actually acknowledge that companies survive and prosper when they simultaneously
pay attention to the interests of customers, employees, shareholders, and perhaps the communities in
which they operate? The honest answer is because such a perspective cannot be elegantly modeled -
the math does not exist. Such a theory would not readily yield sharp, testable propositions, nor
would it provide simple, reductionist prescriptions. With such a premise, the pretense of knowledge
could not be protected. Business could not be treated as a science and we would have to fall back on
the wisdom of common sense that combines information on 'what is' with the imagination of 'what
ought to be' to develop both a practical understanding of and some pragmatic prescriptions for
'phenomena of organized complexity' that the issue of corporate governance represents. This too is
scholarship, but it yields theory that does not pretend to be scientific laws but merely serves as
'walking sticks' - in Fritz Roethlisberger's (1977) terms - to aid sensemaking as we go along, to be
used only until a better walking stick can be found. "263
"In describing himself and his work, Sigmund Freud wrote: 'You estimate me too highly. I am not
really a man of science, not an experimenter and not a thinker. I am nothing but by temperament a
conquistador - an adventurer' (in Jones, 1964, 171). Freud's inductive and iterative approach to
260 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pp. 76-77.
261 Professor of strategic management at the London Business School. Ghoshal received dual doctorates in
management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Harvard Business School.
262 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 79.
263 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 81.
sense making, often criticized for being ad hoc and unscientific, was scholarship of common sense.
So indeed was Darwins , who too practiced a model of research as the work of a detective, not of an
experimenter, who was driven by the passions of an adventurer, not those of a mathematician.
Scholarship of common sense is the epistemology of disciplined imagination, as advocated by Karl
Weick (1989), and not the epistemology of formalized falsification that was the doctrine of Karl
Popper (1968). "264
"The trouble with the social sciences is that the logic offalsification, which is so very essentialjbr the
epistemology ofpositivism, is very hard to apply with any degree of rigor and ruthlessness in domain
of social theories. Typically, no theory - which are all, by definition, partial - explains a
'phenomenon of organized complexity' fully, and many different and mutually inconsistent theories
explain the same phenomenon, often to very similar extents. As a result, nothing can be weeded out
nor, given the very different framings, can anything be combined with anything else, except in a very
synthetic and ad hoc manner. "265
"The answer would help us understand the path toward replacing 'bad theories' with better ones - or
perhaps, I should say simpler theories with more complex ones, partial theories with fuller
explanations. I don't think ideas such as agency theory/economic man/shareholder rights~/incentives
as motivators are all wrong, and neither does Ghoshal. They are just too simple and leave out too
much. ,"266
1.5.2.2 Solving the Negative Problem (and the "gloomy vision")
"These negative assumptions are manifest in the strong form of determinism in both ecological (e.g.
Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and institutional (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) analysis of
organizations; in the denial of the possibility of goal-directed adaptation in behavioral theories of the
firm (e.g. Cyert and March, 1963); in the focus on value appropriation rather than value creation in
most theories of strategy (e.g. Porter, 1980); and in the assumptions about shirking, opportunism,
and inertia in economic analysis of companies (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson,
1975). ,,26
264 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 79.
265 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 79.
266 Kanter (2005), pp. 93-94.
267 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 82.
1.5.2.3 Self-fulfilling Theories (and the "double hermeneutic")
"All of this would not lead to any negative consequences for management practice but for the
distinctive feature of double hermeneutic that characterizes the link between theory and practice in
social domains. Unlike theories in physical sciences, theories in the social sciences tend to be self-
fulfilling (Gergen, 1973). A theory of subatomic particles or of the universe - right or wrong - does
not change the behaviors of those particles or of the universe. If a theory assumes that the sun goes
around the earth, it does not change what the sun actually does. So, if the theory is wrong, the truth is
preserved for discovery by someone else. In contrast, a management theory - if it gains sufficient
currency - changes the behaviors of managers who start to act in accordance with the theory.
Whether right or wrong to begin with, the theory can become right as managers - who are both its
subjects and its consumers - adapt their behaviors to conform with the doctrine. "268
When applying the scientific model to social domains, the object of the research (management
practice) has the opportunity to implement the subject of research (management theory), which
can lead to self-fulfillment (Ghoshal, 2005) as shown in Figure 104 below.
Figure 104: The Theory-Practice Double Hermeneutic in Social Science
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"Ifyou do not rest upon the good foundation of nature, you will labor with little honor and less
profit. ,269
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268 Ghoshal, S. (2005), pg. 77.
269 Leonardo da Vinci.
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1.5.3 Management / Engineering Knowledge as an Example of the Framework
Before proceeding into a discussion of the framework and its applications to competitive
business environments, it is interesting to note its application to the competitive academic
environments, namely the evolution of management / engineering knowledge.
1.5.3.1 Making "Intellectual Bricks" vs. Building "Cathedrals of Knowledge"
"... the one will kill the other...each mind is a mason. "270
As shown in Figure 105 below, theory building can be thought of metaphorically as building
buildings. One needs both structurally strong (i.e. rigorously derived and internally valid)
components or "bricks" deduced from scientific reductionism as well as functional (i.e. relevant)
systems induced from scientific holism. As the previous discussions on the current stalemate in
strategic management reveal (Ghoshal, 2005 et al.), the intellectual pendulum has swung back
towards the need to begin to reintegrate the bricks of knowledge.
Figure 105: Making "Intellectual Bricks" vs. Building "Cathedrals of Knowledge"
+ 0
Non-systemic collection Systemic (i.e. architectural)
of 'intellectual bricks" 
-cathedral of knowledge"
Integral,
Hofstic,
e.g. e.g. e.g. e.g. e.g. e.g.
Agency Transaction Cost .C.P. Architecural System Lfe-cycle
Theory Economics Theory Dynamics TheoriesPU-
This research takes as a point of departure, a collection of disconnected theories or well-
established intellectual "bricks", which are each internally-valid enough to venture to assemble a
structural system of knowledge which begins to have functional relevance and utility. One of the
270 Hugo, V. (1831) Notre Dame de Paris.
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clear difficulties with endeavoring such "systemic" research is that scholars having specialized in
building their strong "scientific" brick, are by definition unfamiliar with other scientist's
"bricks", and therefore demand a deep, narrow reductionist theory-testing approach to that
second "brick". This is precisely why rigorous and relevant theories have yet to be built in
complex socio-technical domains. A systemic framework or "cathedral of knowledge"
consisting of say 100 bricks can never get beyond the second brick. The following observations
from fellow academics reveal the dilemma:
"A PhD at the end of the day is the dedication offive years of your life to scientifically building a
small, tight, impenetrable brick of lknowledge in a very narrow, bounded intellectual domain. "271
"The frameworks that you suggest, are typically conceived by emeritus professors, neatr the end of
their careers... but come to think of it, we never really get around to it ... looking back on it all, the
reality is that probably the most opportune time to conduct such 'big' research was during our PhD
years. P272
1.5.3.2 Management / Engineering Science as Modular Enterprise Architecture
The deep and narrow functional specialisms of engineering science have grown up over the past
half-century in concert with the "higher, faster, farther" demands of industry and government.
The organizational forms that deliver such product innovation tend to be modular enterprise
architectures.
1.5.3.3 Management / Engineering Systems as Integral Enterprise Architecture
As the industrial and government customers begin to be "over-served" by the deep and narrow
functional specialisms of engineering science, the educational ecosystem has evolved a
complementary and symbiotically competitive architectural form which serves to integrate such
knowledge from management / engineering science and other contextual disciplines in the form
of engineering systems to serve the demands for "better, faster, cheaper" knowledge.
The organizational forms that deliver such process innovation tend to be integral enterprise
architectures with long-term trust-based partnership between stakeholders such as academia,
industry, government, etc. At MIT over the past 20 years, such separate integral enterprises like:
the Technology and Policy Program (TPP), the Leaders for Manufacturing Program (LFM, the
System Design and Management Program (SDM) have recently been brought under the umbrella
of the integrating mechanism of the Engineering Systems Division (ESD).
This research therefore takes an integral enterprise architectural approach as shown in Figure 106
below, as the environments for knowledge in both the management and engineering fields appear
to be more mature and therefore there is a need and opportunity to create innovative knowledge
via integration or synthesis using inductive methods and via building long-term trust-based
relationships with the phenomena under study.
271 MIT Sloan PhD student, spring, 2005.
272 MIT Sloan Professor, fall 2004.
Figure 106: Dissertation as the Evolution of the Dominant Research Architecture
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"Our primary endeavor as business school academics over the last half century has been to make
business studies a branch of the social sciences (Schlossman, Sedlak, and Wecshler, 1998). Rejecting
what we saw as the 'romanticism' of analyzing corporate behaviors in terms of the choices, actions
and achievements of individuals (e.g. Andrews, 1980), we have adopted the 'scientific' approach of
trying to discover patterns and laws, and have replace all notions of human intentionality with afirm
belief in causal determinism for explaining all aspects of corporate performance. Adoption of
scientific methods has undoubtedly yielded some significant benefits for both our research and
pedagogy, but the costs too have been high. Unfortunately, as philosophy of science makes clear, it is
an error to pretend that the methods of the physical sciences can be indiscriminately applied to
business studies because such a pretension ignores some fundamental differences that exist between
the different academic disciplines. ,273
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1.6 Literature Analysis
"Interesting research reported contrarian findings, disconfirmed established theories and challenged
accepted assumptions. The lesson is that researchers should try to develop theories and gather data
that disconfirm existing views. Scholars must know the current body of knowledge but not
champion it. ,"274
1.6.1 Previous Related Research
There is clearly a considerable wealth of constituent research in the field of strategic
management from two schools rooted in microeconomic theory: the Industrial Organization
subfield dating back to Bain (1956) advanced the industry structure emphasis and on the
resource-based view of the firm dating back to Penrose (1959), with their respective descendant
proponents appearing a quarter century later in Porter (1980) and Wernerfelt (1984). Since this
time, much research in this field has focused on the refinements of theories in each subfield,
including: asset stock accumulation and dynamic capabilities (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece,
Pisano and Shuen, 1990).
"We need equally rich models of the firm and the environment that take both organizational and
economic modes of explanation seriously. "275
Relatively little has been done in studying the longitudinal interactions between the firm and its
environment, particularly with respect to developing grounded theory, and particularly with
respect to embracing strategic management's primary constituent fields of economics and
organizational theory.
"Fortunately, strategy researchers have always been willing to study subjects that cut across existing
conceptual boundaries. "276
1.6.1.1 Economics and Sociology Literatures
In developing the concept of enterprise architecture and tying it to long-term firm performance,
this research cuts across economic and sociological boundaries, embracing such diverse sources
as: theory of the firm (Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1985), agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980), behavioral decision theory (Kahneman et al.,
1982, Simon, 1982); organizational contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), structural
functionalism (Selznick, 1948), chaos theory in strategy (Levy, 1994), complexity theory in
strategy (Stacey, 1995), structuration theory (Giddens, 1979; Whittington, 1992; Yates, 1997),
institutional theory (Fligstein, 2001, Loveridge, 2003), institutional economics (Veblen, 1898;
Commons, 1934), mixed duopoly economics (Law & Stewart, 1983; Mai & Hwang, 1989;
Horowitz, 1991; Cremer & Cremer, 1992; Futagami & Okamura, 1994), macro- and
international economics (Poire and Sabel, 1984; Thurow, 1992; Hall and Soskice, 2001),
strategic complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995; Whittington et al., 1999),
274 Daft R.L. and Lewin, A.Y. (1990), pp. 5-6.
275 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W. (1997), pg. 10.
276 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W, (1997), pg. 12.
stakeholder theory of the firm (Follett, 1918; Freeman, 1984; Evan and Freeman, 1988; Ackoff,
1990; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Ramirez, 1999; Schilling,
2000; Freeman and McVea, 2006), trust, voice and exit (Hirschman, 1970; Helper, 1990; Sako
and Helper, 1998), theory of the growth of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Forrester, 1966), general
systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1962) and systems view of the firm (Ashby, 1956; Forrester,
1961; Simon, 1969).
1.6.1.2 Architecture Literatures
In addition, enterprise architecture cuts across the many manifestations of "architecture" in
management literature: e.g. complexity in- (Simon, 1962) building- (Alexander, 1964), product-
(Ulrich, 1995), systems- (Meier and Rechtin, 2000; Nightingale and Rhodes, 2004), supply
chain- (Novak and Eppinger, 1998), organizational- (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Rechtin,
1999), human resource- (Lepak and Snell, 1999), innovation and- (Henderson and Clark, 1990),
as well as the various interactions between architectures (Fine, 1998; Sako, 2003).
1.6.2 Placement of Research within the Strategic Management Literature
While the proposed research intends to engage the strategic management intellectual community,
it attempts to do so via multi-disciplinary means, bridging both the economics and sociology
literatures.
Appendix C illustrates this placement by highlighting those works of the 50 most cited
publications in strategic management (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) that have had
the greatest impact on this dissertation.
1.6.3 Placement of the Proposed Framework within the Literatures
1.6.3.1 Framework as Typology (capturing the internal-external debate)
The framework proposes a typology of organizational sets, which has closest links to the
following typologies:
* Political Economy: "Varieties of Capitalism" (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001)
o Liberal Market Economy (LME) vs.
o Coordinated Market Economy (CME)
* Economics: "Mixed Duopoly" (e.g. Lambertini and Rossini, 1998)
o Profit Maximizer (PM) vs.
o Labour Managed (LM)
* Sociology: "Contingency Theory" (e.g. Bums and Stalker, 1961)
o Mechanistic vs.
o Organic
1.6.3.2 Framework as Evolution (capturing the adaptation-determinism debate)
The framework proposes a theory of the evolution of the organizational sets, which has closest
links to the following theories:
* Population / Community Ecology (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977)
* Evolutionary Economics (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982)
In order to begin to place the research and its proposed framework within the academic
literatures, Figure 107 below summarizes in stylized form a sample of some of the main
influences at the intersections between the key constructs.
Figure 107: Placement of the Framework within the Academic Literatures
Social Systems Theory:
* Forrester, J.W. (1961)
* Growth & Stability
* Two Competitive Strategies
* Weick, K.E. (1969)
* +ve and -ve feedback loops
Strategic Management:
* Penrose, E. (1959)
* Resource-based View
* Dierickx & Cool (1989)
* Asset Stock Accumulation
Contingency Theory:
* Woodward (1958)
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* Rice (1963)
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1.6.4 Gaps in Literature
"Unfortunately there is relatively little research that explicitly considers how capabilities and
environments jointly shape each other... Clearly, far more work remains to explore the reciprocal
relationship between capabilities and competition. ""77
"I scoured the literature of the theory of the firm in theoretical economics for discussions of [the
growth of the firm] with increasing frustration. ,278
While each of the aforementioned references represents well-developed areas of domain
knowledge, the interconnections among them have not yet been seriously explored. It is the
space in between existing disciplines that this research attempts to exploit. If any research
innovations are to be found in this research dissertation, they would lie in a framework which
connects the disconnected, which re-members the dismembered, which integrates the
disintegrated.
"Each of the research programs [in strategic management] has focused on a different element of the
strategy picture: environment, resources, and organizational structure. This division of labor between
programs of research has facilitated scientific progress - but at a price. "279
While there is a clear wealth of research from diverse theoretic sources - each providing different
explanations for long-term firm performance - there is relatively little research in the strategic
management literature providing more systemic, meta-theoretical frameworks which capture the
plurality and complexity of performance causality into a unifying meta-strategic framework.
"This loudly divided counsel on the best strategy...reflects a certain troubling inadequacy in both
perception and understanding. Of course, we do not mean that a good case cannot be made for some of
these remedies. We mean, rather, that the sheer cacophony ofprescription is itself evidence of a broad-
based failure of interpretation, an inability or unwillingness to see that [long-term firm performance]
defies the standard categories of analysis and discussion. "280
Gaps in the strategic management literature therefore exist in the synthesis and reconciliation of
existing competing theories, as well as in bringing existing theories from other non-strategy (and
in fact, non-management) sources like systems architecting.
"Much exciting theoretical and empirical work remains in coupling dominant designs and
technology cycles to environmental conditions and organizational evolution. "281
[Miller, 19861 "...represented an early attempt to apply the approach of configuration to the field of
strategy. Now, 10 years later, we still have far to go. What is often lacking from the configurational
literature is the search for the configuration itself for complex systems of interdependency and their
core orchestrating themes. ,"282
277 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W. (1997), pp. 10 and 11.
278 Penrose, E.T. (1985).279 Farjoun, M. (2002), pp. 566.
280 Abernathy, W., Clark, K. and Kantrow, A., Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for
America, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1983, pp. 3-4.
281 Tushman, M. and Murmann (1998).
282 Miller, D. (1996), pg. 505.
1.6.5 Contributions to Literature
The primary contribution that this research aims to make is in bridging two heretofore separate
and distinct academic and theoretical fields: strategic management and the emerging field of
engineering systems, and in particular, systems architecting and system dynamics.
"In addition to the integration gained by the increased recognition of reciprocal causation, integrative
frameworks have offered more eclectic views of concepts and phenomena, linked previously
disconnected constructs and levels of analysis, and attempted to fierther the bridging of fragmented
models. "283
The innovations that this research attempts to bring to the field of strategic management include:
* The notion of architecture applied to the extended enterprise.
* The notion that these enterprise architectures cause firm dynamics.
* The notion that these firm dynamics cause long term firm performance
* The notion of a "dominant design" applied to the extended enterprise architectures in the
evolution of the industry.
* The development of and distinction between two types of organizational inertia:
architectural and structural.
1.6.5.1 Theoretical Contributions to Literature
The three primary theoretical contributions to the strategic management and emergent
engineering systems literatures are:
The first is the introduction of the heretofore-absent theoretical construct of enterprise
architecture as an explanation for long-term firm performance. This construct acts both to unify
other disconnected theories as well as to simplify the complexity of long-term firm performance.
"The architecture is the form of the system and is the dominant factor in its behavior. ,284
The second theoretical contribution is the linkage of enterprise architectural form to the
enterprise structural dynamics of stability and growth, which in turn impact long-term
performance. In this sense, it is a modest theoretical extension and generalization of Edith
Penrose's seminal work on the growth of the firm.2 8 5
Finally, the third theoretical contribution is the feedback linkage between architectural form,
structural dynamics and firm performance to the dynamic evolution of the industrial
environment.
283 Farjoun, M. (2002), pp. 569.
284 Whitney D. et al, (2004), pg. 26.
285 Penrose, ET. (1959).
1.6.5.2 Empirical Contributions to Literature
"Considerable attention has recently been devoted to understanding behavior in large organizational
systems. Although some of this work has been based on research, it has more typically been general
theorizing with little support from research data. Our interest in examining complex organizations is
to study more systematically and empirically their internal functioning in relation to the demands of
the external environment on the organization and the ability of the organization to cope effectively
with these demands, contributing to a theory of the functioning of large organizations based on
empirical research. "286
As discussed previously, this research dissertation attempts to validate and extend the ground
breaking research performed by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Nearly forty years after their
work, there is still little empirical data to support theories on large organizational systems.287
Like their original work, this dissertation is based empirically in building grounded theory.
However, unlike their original research, this dissertation is interested in the phenomenon of the
external (i.e. inter-firm) functioning of large organizational systems (or "extended enterprises"),
as opposed to the internal functioning (i.e. intra-firm) functioning of large organizational
systems (or "firms").
As will be discussed later, the theoretical framework will be grounded empiricallly. As such, it
is envisaged that there will be empirical contributions to be made, particularly in support of the
theoretical work surrounding the shareholder vs. stakeholder debate - particularly by explaining
how, when and why each model seems to be more competitively dominant.
The following is a partial list of some of the empirical contributions that this dissertation begins
to make to the existing theoretical literature:
* Empirical evidence to begin to validate and extend Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967)
structural contingency theories regarding differentiation and integration as intra-firm
mechanisms to inter-firm mechanisms.
* Empirical evidence to begin to endogenize Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) contingency
theory - namely to explain what drives the dominance of differentiation and intergration
and when this dominance switches between the two.
* Empirical evidence to begin to identify and explain variation of enterprise architectural
forms in population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and to demonstrate that certain
late entrants do not have high mortality rates as the theory suggests, but not only do they
survive, they go on to dominate the industry.
* Empirical evidence to begin to support Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) claims of resource
dependence. As the authors themselves lament, 25 years after the publishing of their
influeitial work:
286 Lawrence, P.R. & Lorsch, J.W. (1967), pg. 2.
287 Lawrence, P.R. & Lorsch, J.W. (1967), pg. 2 cite the studies by: Burns & Stalker (1961), and Rice, A. (1965).
"The image presented is one of dynamic interaction and evolution of organizations, environments,
and interorganizational relations over time as the various actors maneuver for advantage. Again the
limits of both authors' methodological training and the available empirical methods and data did not
result in explicitly dynamic models showing the evolution of both environments and ourganizational
decisions and structures over time...Yet there is a limited amount of empirical work explicitly
extending and testing resource dependence theory and its central tenets. "288
* Empirical evidence to begin to contextualize and revese the findings Arthur's (1992) and
Delery and Doty's (1996) research in Strategic Human Resource Management that "high
commitment" workforces tend to have differentiation strategies.
* Empirical evidence to begin to lend support to Penrose's (1959) theoretical hypotheses
that firms have a stakeholder approach will differ in competitiveness, commitment, and
strategic flexibility from firms that maximize stockholder wealth.
* Empirical evidence to begin to lend support to Forrester's (1961) theoretical hypotheses
regarding the existence of firm strategies centered around attracting a particular portion
of the underlying market demand.
* Empirical evidence to begin to validate the work on strategic complementarities (e.g
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and 1995).
"We are hopeful that empirical work will provide evidence of distinctly separated clusters of firm
characteristics as support for our theory. Given our assumptions about time trends in prices, we also
expect to find an increasing proportion of manufacturing firmnns adopting the modern manufacturing
strategic cluster that we have described. "289
* Empirical evidence to begin to validate the recent work in mixed duopoly economics
(e.g. Lambertini & Rossini, 1995) which models the strategic interaction between profit-
maximizing (PM) and labor-managed (LM) firms.
* Empirical evidence to demonstrate that intra-market economy variation can exist and in
fact dominate an industry, supporting the "Varieties of Capitalism" theory (Hall and
Soskice, 2001) that international political-economic convergence is not occuring as
"Corporatism" would suggest. The case study of Southwest Airlines (a Coordinated
market firm) exists within a Liberal market economy (LME).
* Empirical evidence and theoretical framework to demonstrate the concept of
"Sustainable" Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
* Empirical evidence to support the claims of Lenox, Rockart and Lewin's (2006)
numerical simulation models which postulate a relationship between environmental
interdependencies and firm and industry profitability.
28 Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978), pgs. xii and xvi.
289 Milgrom and Roberts, (1990), pg. 527.
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1.6.5.3 Research Methods Contributions to Literature
As will be discussed in detail in chapter 2, this research aims to contribute to the literature on
appropriate and innovative research methods when studying complex socio-technical systems.
Few research designs in strategic management incorporate longitudinal field studies across
several organizations that comprise the firm and its extended enterprise, as well as those of its
competitor.
In addition, few research designs in strategic management view the phenomenon simultaneously
from strategic, political and cultural lenses, which entails a combination of both unobtrusive
ethnographic and obtrusive clinical methods.
1.6.6 Publication Plan
It is envisaged that this research would form the basis for both academic and practitioner
publications both in book and journal article forms.
1.6.6.1 Journal Articles
1.6.6.1.1 Academic Journals
"The journals of strategic management are potentially fruitful territory for the kind of
interdisciplinary conversation we believe is a key step in making progress on understanding why firms
undertake the actions that we observe and how those actions affect their performance. "290
It is envisaged that each of the essays of Part II would form the basis for a different stream of
publications in academic and practitioner journals. The likely traditional target academic
journals which have been most influential in the field of strategic management would be the
Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management
Journal and the Strategic Management Journal.2 91  In addition, some of the more recent
academic management journals would include Industrial and Corporate Change and
Organization Science.
1.6.6.1.1.1 Paper #1: Defining an Enterprise Architectural Typology
Paper #1 would introduce the concept of enterprise architectures and define a modular-integral
typology (and possible taxonomy) within the context of various academic literary traditions.
Although the paper would cite empirical archetypal examples ranging from Boeing-Airbus to
GM-Toyota to United Airlines-Southwest Airlines, its purpose would not be to explicitly tie
enterprise architectures to long-term performance. Its purpose would be to merely establish
290 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W. (1997), pg. 13.
291 In a recent bibliographic study of the most influential literature in strategic management from 1980-2000
(Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro, 2004, pg. 987), these journals were observed to be the most cited in the
Strategic Management Journal. Other research studies on the most influential journals (Tahai and Meyer, 1999)
revealed similar results.
definitions in the tradition of Ulrich's (1995) definition of product architectures and to advance a
social science framework like social network theory in the tradition of Uzzi (1997).
The likely target academic journals for Article #1 would be the Academy of Management
Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Science or Research Policy.
1.6.6.1.1.2 Paper #2: Competitive Dynamics of Enterprise Architectures
Paper #2 would present empirical evidence from the five-year Boeing-Airbus case study
illustrating the mechanisms of how position and capabilities interact within the construct of the
previously-defined construct of enterprise architecture. This article would be in the tradition of
Hall (1976).
The likely target academic journals for Article #2 would be the Strategic Management Journal,
Academy ofManagement Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly or Organization Science.
1.6.6.1.1.3 Paper #3: The Evolution of Enterprise Architectures
Paper #3 would present historical empirical evidence illustrating the mechanisms of how
environmental states shape the previously-defined construct of enterprise architecture, and how
competitive dynamic interactions contribution to the co-evolution of the environment which
ultimately shape the evolution of the enterprise architectures. This article would be in the
tradition of Tushman and Anderson (1986), Anderson and Tushman (1990 and 2001), Utterback
and Suarez (1993) and Suirez and Utterback (1995).
The likely target academic journals for Article #3 would be the Academy of Management
Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Science or Industrial and Corporate
Change.
1.6.6.1.1.4 Paper #4: The Evolution of Business Ecosystems
Paper #4 would integrate the previous three papers into a coherent theory. As such, it would be a
summary of this dissertation. A pure theoretical paper in the tradition of Schilling (2000) would
target the Academy of Management Review, while an empirically-based paper would target
Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy ofManagement Journal or Industrial and Corporate
Change.
1.6.6.1.2 Practitioner Journals
The likely target practitioner journals would be the Harvard Business Review, Sloan
Management Review, California Management Review and Long Range Planning.
1.6.6.2 Books
It is hoped that this document (and the subsequent dissertation) will form the basis for two
different book audiences: academic and practitioner/general audience.
1.6.6.2.1 Academic book
Due to the inherent complexity and multivariate nature of strategic management, it is not
unsurprising that of the 20 most influential publications in the field, 18 are in book form (Ramos-
Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro, 2004).29 As this research aims to bring a holistic
systems/enterprise view to the academic field of strategic management, by definition it will be
less effective and potent to decompose the work into separate coherent journal articles.
Although these books were based on empirical/theoretical research and were intended for
academic audiences (i.e. as textbooks), their relevance to practitioners allowed their cross-over to
more mainstream practitioner audiences (e.g. Porter, 1980 & 1985).
1.6.6.2.2 Practitioner book
In addition, a book primarily aimed at practitioners is planned along the conceptual lines of
various academic cross-over authors covering multi-industry studies like Christensen (1997),
Collins and Porras (1994), Dertouzos, Lester and Solow (1989), Fine (1998) and Utterback,
(1994) as well as those covering single-industry studies like Dyer (2000), Hoffer-Gittell, (2003),
Murmann et al. (2002) and Womack, Jones and Roos (1990).
A representation of the publication plan is shown in Figure 108 below against the proposed
framework.
Figure 108: Proposed Publication Plan
* Define EA typology
* Give stylized examples
* Target journals: AMR, OS
+0O
Joumrnal publication #1
Eroerprise Amchiecrjers
SEA-Ecosystem Co-evolution * EA Competitive Dynamics
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STarget journals: ASQ, AMR h Target journals: SM, AM
Journal publication #3 Journal publication #2
Ecosystem EvoluLo& Frn Competitive DyPamics
Book publication
TwarL a Theor of the Evolution of Business Ecosystems
* Evolution of Business Ecosystems
* Strategic Management text
* MIT, HBS, Oxford Press
292 Interestingly, the only two journal articles in the top 20 most influential publications in strategic management
(Wernerfelt, 1984 and Barney, 1991) re-ignited the resource-based view debate initiated 25-30 years earlier in the
6-ranked publication, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, by Edith Penrose (1959).
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1.7 Research Importance
"Longitudinal studies that explicitly focus on the nature of these organizational and environmental
interactions as they evolve over time, and that pay particular attention to the ways in which
capabilities and environmental conditions shape each other, are thus likely to be particularly fruitful
for both theory and practice. "293
"The models of firm decision making have not gone beyond the static implications of the fact that
firms are political coalitions. They do not attempt to reflect shifts in coalitions per se. The later task -
leading to a more general theory of coalition development - has hardly been touched except
conceptually The significance of such a theory to a theory of the business firm and its growth is
obvious. "294
If successful, the importance of the proposed research will lie in the value of the meta-theoretical
framework as exceeding the value of the sum or the existing theoretical models. Instead of
merely connecting heretofore disconnected models, it is hoped that the research will reveal a new
way of viewing the interaction of firms and their environments for competitive advantage.
As this research attempts to answer the recent calls from the strategic management academic
community to build systemic theory grounded in practice, it should prove to be important to
leaders of firms and strategy consultants who are primarily concerned with- and responsible for
delivering firm performance, long-term or otherwise.
"The practitioner and researcher are doubly-linked: the researcher supplies the insights,
relationships, and theory for the practitioner. But the practitioner supplies puzzles, ideas, judgments,
andprioritiesfor the researcher. "2 95
It is hoped that the importance for practitioners of understanding when and why different
enterprise architectures produce superior performance, will be matched by the importance for
academic theorists in understanding which ontological and epistemological lenses are needed to
understand each architecture.
Finally, for enterprise architects including CEOs and Strategy VPs, this work endeavors to assist
in advancing the understanding of how and why firms grow.
"The goal GE has set br sustained organic growth - two to three times the growth of global GDP -
translates to about 8% today. Few com anies have achieved the kind of growth GE is seeking, and
none on a revenue base of $150 billion. 96
As General Electric CEO, Jeff Immelt recently lamented:
"We're now in a slow growth world. Things were different 25 years ago. The business book that can
help you hasn't been written yet. "297
293 Henderson, R. and Mitchell, W. (1997).
294 March, J.G. (1962), pg. 678.
295 Bowman, E. H. (1990), pg. 27.
296 Stewart, T.A. and Immelt, J. (2006), pg. 62.
297 Stewart, T.A. and Immelt, J. (2006), pg. 62.
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Chapter 2 Research Methodology
Having described in chapter 1 what questions are to be tackled, and why they are important and
worthy of research, this chapter discusses how the research questions are to be approached,
namely it will answer the "how?", "where?" and "when?" questions.
2.1 Fit between Resesarch Methods and the State of Existing Theory
Recently, researchers have posited a contingent relationship between the state of the existing
theory in a field, and the appropriate research method (Carlisle and Christensen, 2004;
Edmondson and McManus, 2006). Hoskisson et al. (1999) propose such an evaluation for the
strategic management field.
Figure 109 below attempts to map the state of the field from the "double helix" discussed in the
previous chapter to the appropriate research methods that I plan to use for this research.
Figure 109: Fit between Research Methods and the State of Strategy Research
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2.2 Overview of Research Methodology
"Given the overwhelming changes taking place in organizations and their environments, how can
scholars contribute to knowledge? We believe that scholars who have been following traditional
research paradigms need to adopt a new mindset for research into the new organizational forms. We
believe that at this stage of theory development, research on new forms of organization requires a new
approach, quite different from research typically found in academic journals. This work will be
characterized by midrange theory and method, grounded research, and research that does not
presume to test hypotheses empirically. "298
In recent years, organizational scholars have noted rapid and radical changes to traditional
organizational forms as a result of significant changes in the environment including increased
volatility and hyper-competition in an interdependent global economy (Daft and Lewin, 1993).
These scholars have called for a new research paradigm and in fact have founded new research
journals.299
"The point of heretical research methods is to find new channels through which to obtain
organizational insights and to change the mix of research methods. Although no method is truly
heretical, researchers should be encouraged to do whatever it takes to learn about organizations. 300oo
As organizational theorists see organizational form as a strategic variable, such calls for new
research have found their way into the more mainstream strategic management journals.
"Strategy researchers are particularly well positioned to conduct the complex, multidimensional,
multilevel longitudinal studies that we suspect are necessary if we are to fully understand the
interactions between competence and competition. ,3"O
In order to answer the stated research questions, the philosophy that guides this research design
and execution is in-depth, fine-grained (i.e. case-based as opposed to large data base) grounded
theory building, using multi-method, multi-level, multi-industry longitudinal studies described in
302this section.
"Strategy research can benefit from using multiple time frames, comparative (historical) research,
simultaneous exploration of different levels of analysis, and multiple theoretical lenses. Clearly, such
a research agenda is more demanding and therefore it may be better approached in research
programs, [and] in large, book-length studies. '"
298 Daft, R.L. and Lewin, A.Y. (1993), pg. ii.
299 For example, Organization Science in 1990.
300 Daft, R.L. and Lewin, A.Y. (1990), pg. 6.
301 Henderson R. and Mitchell W., (1997).
302 A good introduction to theory-building research (which has proved influential in my research design) is the
October 1989 special issue of the Academy ofManagement Review, dedicated to theory building.
303 Farjoun, M. (2002), pg. 585.
2.2.1 Grounded Theory Building
2.2.1.1 Motivation
As this research endeavored to solve a rather perplexing substantive problem regarding Boeing
and Airbus' competitive advantages, I decided to take a more (initially) inductive approach to the
problem, by building theory from data, taking a fresh look at the phenomena of long-term firm
performance, unencumbered with the prevailing concepts, constructs, propositions and theories
of the day, and oblivious (initially) to the prevailing theoretical debates in the fields of strategy
and organization science.
"Glaser and Strauss criticized the 'overemphasis in current sociology on the verification of theory,
and a resultant de-emphasis on the prior step of discovering what concepts and hypotheses are
relevant for the area that one wishes to research' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 1/) and bemoaned
'that many of our teachers converted departments of sociology into mere repositories of 'great-man'
theories' (Ibid, p. 10) leading to an antagonism between 'theoretical capitalists' and a mass of
"proleteriat testers' (p. 11).,304
As this research plan has highlighted gaps in the existing literature pertaining to the questions
posed, the research design was guided by the need to build grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss,
1967; Eisenhardt, 1989; Dougherty, 2002). In other words, this research approach focuses on
building new theory and only indirectly on testing or verifying existing theories.
"Grounded theory building "reaches into the 'infinite profusion' of social action in organizations in
order to tease out, identify, name, and explicate themes that capture the underlying dynamics and
patterns in the blooming, buzzing confusion that is... management. Grounded theory building tries to
understand why and how structures, conditions, or actions might arise, to ferret out generative
mechanisms, to explore conditions under which these effects might vary or not, and to qualify their
temporary and emergent aspects. 305
"In fact, inductive and deductive logics are mirrors of on another, with inductive theory building
from cases producing new theory from data and deductive theory testing completing the cycle by
using data to test theory. ,0 6
As grounded theory building is inherently iterative, the research design unfolds longitudinally
over time visiting and revisiting various case history sites over and over as will be described later
in this chapter.
"Knowledge begins and ends in experience; but it does not end in the experience in which it
began. ,,307
304 Kelle (2005), pg. 2.
305 Dougherty (2002), pg. 851.
306 Eisenhardt, K.M. and Graebner, M.E. (2007), pg. 25.
307 Lewis, C.I. (1929).
2.2.1.2 Varieties of Grounded Theory
It should be noted that by "grounded theory", I do not restrict my methods to those defined by its
original authors, Glaser & Strauss (1967); nor do I wish to engage in the subsequent debate
between the Glaserian and Straussian schools over the split in methodology (Kelle, 2005). I
merely take a more catholic approach to grounded theory, as espoused by Eisenhardt (1989,
2007).
2.2.1.2.1 Glaser & Strauss (and Glaser vs. Strauss)
Although Glaser & Strauss (1967) were among the first to give a clear articulation of grounded
theory in the social sciences, they later disagreed as to how to best create grounded theory (Kelle,
2005).
"Grounded theory according to Glaser enmphasizes induction or emergence, and the individual
researcher's creativity with a clear frame of stages, while Strauss is more interested in validation
criteria and a systematic approach. "308
The primary distinction lies in the ability of the researcher to "architect" theory (abstractly and
conceptually) vs "engineer" theory (concretely and precisely).
"Strauss and Corbin 's coding paradigm is linked to a perspective on social phenomena prevalent in
micro-sociological approaches emphasizing the role of human action in social life. Researchers with
a strong background in macro-sociology and system theory may feel that this approach goes
contrary to their requirements and would be well advised to construct an own coding paradigm
rooted in their own theoretical tradition. Glaser's approach of 'theoretical coding' whereby
researchers introduce ad hoc theoretical codes and coding families which thay find suitable for the
data under scrutiny provides a strategy applicable for a greater variety of theoretical perspectives.
However, as has been said before following this strategy is much more challenging expecially for
novices since it lacks a readymade conceptual framework like Strauss and Corbin's coding paradigm.
Experienced researchers with a broad knowledge in social theory would clearly benefit from the
advantages of theoretical coding - having at their disposal not only one possible axis of developing
theory but being able to construct such an axis by themselves through the combination of theoretical
concepts from different schools of thought. 'o9
2.2.1.2.2 Eisenhardt
Eisenhardt (1989) moved the debate forward for organizational theorists by embracing a catholic
approach used by this research design.
"Glaser and Strauss (1967) and more recently Strauss (1987) have outlined pieces of the process, but
theirs is a prescribedformula, and new ideas have emerged from methodologists.... 3so
"A more subtle challenge arises from confusion about the meaning of 'grounded theory building.'
For some scholars, grounded theory building simply means creating theory by observing patterns
within systematically collected empirical data. This view often includes some notion of recursively
308 Wikipedia: "Grounded Theory".
309 Kelle, U. (2005), pg. 9.
310 Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), pg. 532.
.. ... ............ .....................
iterating between (and thus constantly comparing) theory and data during analysis, and
theoretically sampling cases (as described earlier). As Langley (1999) noted, this is a widely held view
of grounded theory building. In this view, the quality of the theory and the strength of its empirical
grounding are more central to research quality than the specifics of the theory-building process. But
for other scholars, grounded theory building has a more precise meaning that stems from the original
focus of Glaser and Strauss (1967) on the interpretation of meaning by social actors. For example,
Suddaby described grounded theory building as 'most suited to efforts to understand the process by
which actors construct meaning out of intersubjective experience' (Suddaby, 2006: 634). Others go
further to emphasize elaborate processes (and terminology) for how researchers should gather field
data and discover theory using a hierarchical structure of categories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).
Constant comparison and theoretical sampling take on precise meanings: 'constant comparison'
means simultaneous collection and analysis of data, and 'theoretical sampling' means that decisions
about which data to collect next are determined by the theory in progress (Suddaby, 2006). In this
view, adherence to specific grounded theory building processes is important in judging research
quality. But strict adherence can also result in theory with limited generalizability (Langley, 1999)
and idiosyncratic path dependence on the particular empirical starting point As when coping with
the multiple meanings of 'qualitative research, 'it is often helpful to deal with the multiple meanings of
'grounded theory building' by avoiding the term unless one is actually using the Glaser and Strauss
(1967) approach. theory. "31
This research uses Eisenhardt's eight-step research process (Eisenhardt, 1989) as a point of
departure for building theory from case studies.31 2 Below is a brief summary description of the
research process planned and/or executed thus far. Note that although this is described
sequentially, the approach taken was actually iterative in a "spiral development" process, typical
of theory-building or design exercises in general. Each point is explained in more detail in the
body of this document.
1. Getting Started
In order to broadly focus research efforts at the outset, the research question was defined
as: determining sources of firm competitiveness and long-term performance.
In order to provide better grounding of future construct measures, the following main a
priori constructs were used at the outset: enterprise architectural form, enterprise
competitive dynamics and the industrial evolution of the enterprise's environment.
In order to retain theoretical flexibility going into the research project, neither theory nor
hypotheses connecting constructs were developed at this early stage.
2. Selecting Cases
In order to constrain extraneous variation and sharpen external validity, the specified
population was limited the global duopoly in the large commercial aircraft industry,
comprising Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Airbus Industrie.
11 Eisenhardt, K.M. and Graebner, M.E. (2007), pg. 30.
312 Note that although quotation marks have been omitted in this section, the theoretical justification for the use of
each of the eight points is taken verbatim from Eisenhardt's paper to ensure sharpness and adherence to her
methodology is retained.
More descriptively, the case represents the evolutionary trajectories of one relatively
high-performing firm and one relatively low-performing firm. At the beginning of the
longitudinally-based research project, Boeing was the "market leader", and by the end of
the research, they had been overtaken by their rival, Airbus.
In order to focus research efforts on theoretically useful cases (i.e. cases that replicate
theory by filling conceptual categories), a theoretical (not random) sample was used
which covered the diametrically opposed archetypal constructs: modular enterprise
architecture (i.e. Boeing) and integral enterprise architecture (i.e. Airbus).
3. Crafting Instruments and Protocols
In order to strengthen grounding of theory by triangulation of evidence, multiple data
collection methods were used, including: archives, interviews, experiment and
observation.
In order to provide a synergistic view of the evidence, both qualitative and quantitative
data were combined as typified by the interviews and observations, as well as by the use
of numerical archival data used to quantify the performance trajectories.
"For while systematic data create the jbundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal data that
enable us to do the building. Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness
that comes from anecdote. We uncover all kinds or relationships in our hard data, but it is only
through the use of this soft data that we are able to explain them. "313
In order to foster divergent perspectives and strengthen grounding, evidence surrounding
each firm was taken from multiple stakeholder perspectives including: the firm itself, its
customers, its suppliers, its employees, and its investors.
Also, multiple investigators were used in the data collection, analysis and theory
building. This included an active research group of professors and researchers at MIT's
Lean Aerospace/Advancement Initiative, which was set up explicitly to tackle this class
of problem. 14 In addition, an active and diverse on-site case-study team was assembled
for the same purposes.315
4. Entering the Field
In order to speed-up the analyses and reveal helpful adjustments to data collection
activities, a concurrent (as opposed to sequential) approach was taken in which there was
an overlap of data collection and analysis.
313 Henry Mintzberg (1979), quoted in Eisenhardt, K.(1989), pg. 538.
314 The LAI's Enterprise Architecting research team was headed by Prof Deborah Nightingale and Dr. Kirk
Bozdogan.315 Boeing's research team was lead at various times by Sherry Carbary (VP of Strategy), Carolyn Corvi (VP of
Airplane Production), Tim Meskill, Adam Kohorn, and Dan Wheeler.
In order to take advantage of emergent themes and unique features of the case, there were
flexible and opportunistic data collection methods employed such as: the establishment of
an informal and semi-permanent "strategy discovery" discussion series with senior
leaders within Boeing and its stakeholders. Although the general research topic and
timing of the "data-collection" opportunities were held fixed, the participants and themes
were kept flexible to attract committed people and issues relevant to the topic at the
time.316
5. Analyzing Data
In order to gain familiarity with the data and to generate preliminary theory, analysis of
the data was restricted initially within-case (i.e. Boeing-Airbus).
In order to look beyond initial impressions and see evidence through multiple lenses,
cross-case pattern searches were undertaken of theoretical samples using the enterprise
archetypes in industries like automotive (GM-Toyota) and airlines (United-Southwest).
6. Shaping Hypotheses
In order to sharpen construct definition, validity and measurability, the research design
iteratively tabulated evidence for each construct through the longitudinal re-exploration
of the constructs with the stakeholders as the hypotheses (i.e. the relationships between
the constructs) were evolving. Constructs were continually revisited as hypotheses were
emerging, and concurrently, hypotheses were continually revisited as constructs were
reviewed.
In order to confirm, extend and sharpen the theory, replication of observations (as
opposed to further sampling for new observations) became the modus operandi as the
research progressed, particularly across cases.
In order to build internal validity, the research searched for evidence for the "why"
behind the construct relationships by building simulation models using dynamic causal
mechanisms via the system dynamics method.
7. Enfolding Literature
In order to continue to build internal validity, raise the theoretical level and sharpen
construct definitions, an effort was made to compare the theory with conflicting literature.
Examples include apparent conflicts with the theory of product and supply chain
architectural fit (Fine, 1998), the theory of organic-mechanistic firm structures (Bums
and Stalker, 1961), and the population ecology theory of firm exit (Hannan & Freeman,
1984).
316 An important role of the researcher in these settings was to act as the research "gate-keeper" to maintain focus on
the research question, and defend a rigor to the methodological approach defined in this document.
In order to sharpen generalizability, improve construct definition and raise the theoretical
level, a significant effort was made to compare the theory with similar literature. This is
described in more detail in the section of this document entitled: "Previous Related
Research & Literature Gaps".
8. Reaching Closure
In order to end the process to ensure "theoretical saturation", the results of iterations were
monitored to determine when marginal improvements become small. This tended to
occur when the collection of additional supporting and/or dissenting data diminished.
A summary of the research process is illustrated in Figure 110 below. As can be seen, the
process is highly iterative; it begins with an inductive focus but progresses toward
inductive/deductive regimes; it begins with gathering confirmatory evidence, but progresses
toward anomalous evidence.
Figure 110: Research Process Summary
Research Question Theory Generation
& Sample Selection & Refinement
Proposition Generation Construct Generation
& Refinement & Refinement
2.2.1.3 Small-N Intra-Case and Medium-N Inter-Case Inference
As this research can be described as the search for "outliers" (in both long-term performance) as
well as the underlying causes (e.g. species), the case study method is well suited to examine non-
obvious phenomena. For example, while Toyota, Soutwest and Airbus seem on the surface to be
"modal" firms, a more intimate study reveals that they may in fact be outlier forms of
organizations or a "black swan" in a lake of white swans (or in my heuristic, a "red swan" in a
lake of blue swans, as shown in Figure 111 below. 317
Figure 111: Search for Outliers via In-Depth Case Studies
"You cart a pig into my living room and tell me that it can talk. I say, 'Oh really? Show me.' You
snap your fingers and the pig starts talking. I say, 'Wow, you should write a paper about this.' You
write up your case report and send it to a journal. What will the reviewers say? Will the reviewers
respond with 'Interesting, but that's just one pig. Show me afew more and then I might believe you'?
I think we would agree that that would be a silly response. A single case can be a very powerful
example. 3'18
A first-order, architectural (or "special") explanation for high long-term variance in firm
performance may be viewed as far-fetched, however the fact that we attempt to demonstrate its
feasibility in only one case study (or in fact in a small set of case studies) does not diminish the
theory's validity. The small set of case studies, however may be a powerful example, which
serves to stimulate other research in this vein.
"Research involving case data can usually get much closer to theoretical constructs and provide a
much more persuasive argument about causal forces than broad empiricial research can. One should
use this advantage. However, one will not be able to say, 'You should believe my theory that A leads
to B, because I show you an example here. ' That is asking too much of a single case study, or even a
few cases. The theory should stand on its own feet. One needs to convince the reader that the
conceptual argument is plausible and use the case as additional (but not sole) justification for one's
argument. 19
317 Note the ironic reference to Karl Popper's falsification proof in which he notes that the observation of a single
black swan would falsify the proposition that "all swans are white." See Flyvbjerg, B. (2006).
318 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 20.
19 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pp. 22-23.
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Management research has become increasingly positivist and reductionist, relying on large-N
statistical samples to prove an existing theory. This fact, however, does not diminish the
importance of small-N theoretical samples from which to build theory in an exploratory mode.
"Since writers of papers based on case research do not have recourse to the canonical statement
'results are significant at p < 0.05' that helps assuage readers' skepticism of empirical papers,
researchers usuing case research often feel they are fighting an uphill battle to persuade their
readers. "320
While the majority of research using small-N, in-depth case studies, usually claims that the state
of existing knowledge is nascent, meriting exploratory research in defining appropriate
constructs, this research admits a more naive, and emergent justification: namely, when the
phenomenon was first studied, the researcher entered the field, relatively blind to the existing
state of the art of strategic management and organizational theory, and instead, entered equipped
with the tools and frameworks of an allied field - architecture and engineering.
"The near-ubitiquous claim that 'not much is known, hence we engage in grounded theory
building,' does not seem to me a necessary condition for the justifJcation of case research. Moreover,
such claims of existing ignorance at times do not ring true It can also get writers tied up in knots
about professing to have entered the field with no preconceptions. In my view, an open mind is good;
an empty mind is not. It is true that one wants to retain the capacity to be surprised, but it seems
useful (and inevitable) that our observations be guided and influenced by some initial hunches and
frames of reference. ,321
As will be discussed in more detail later, this research proposes to build grounded theory both
from a small-N theoretical sample with intra-case inference (namely the Boeing-Airbus duopoly
in the large commercial airplane industry), as well as extended to include a medium-N
theoretical sample with inter-case inference (namely the GM-Toyota and United-Southwest
rivalries in the automotive and airline industries respectively).322
The extension to medium-N theoretical sample uses quasi-statistical modes of inference across
cases, with pure randomization of a true statistical sample being sacrificed for extreme high-
performers of a theoretical sample.
320 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 20.
321 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 21.
322 MIT ESD and Political Science Professor Ken Oye characterizes such research as "Blue Cluster", as opposed to
large-N statistical samples coupled with formal models of the "Red Cluster".
2.2.1.4 Empirical vs. Conceptual Theory Building
"My rule of thumb is that the grander the theoretical claims, the more free-standing the theory has
to be. In other words, even of the reader were only to read the conceptual part of the paper, he or she
would be convinced of the internal logic of the conceptual argument. "323
As the theory developed herein has broad ambitions, it has been critiqued as having grand
theoretical claims. This, coupled with the fact the theory was grounded in a small-N theoretical
sample of comparative case studies, makes the internal logic of the argument, paramount.
Nonetheless, the theory building proposed herein can be categorized both as "empirical" as well
as merely "conceptual". Although the very nature of grounded theory building implies theory
generated inductively from empirical data, the strategic management community has put a
further restriction on the definition of "empirical" theory building - namely that single case
studies are insufficient (Saunders and Thompson, 1980). As will be discussed later, this research
is based primarily upon in-depth case studies of both firms (and their extended enterprises) in a
global duopoly.
"...empirical papers were separated from conceptual papers according to the test that the former had
to display an empirically-oriented research design and had to promise (at least) to utilize studies of a
number of organizations. Papers based on generalized or non-specific experience or evidence and
those drawn from a single case-study were not deemed 'empirical' under this regimen. ,324
As an aside, it is interesting to note that one of the most influential pieces of grounded theory
building (Penrose, 1959), which ultimately inspired the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984),
was based on only one in-depth case study inside the Hercules Powder Company (Penrose,
1960).325 Although Penrose may argue that the origin and purpose of her ground-breaking
research was empirically-motivated, by today's definitions, it would be "marginalized" to
conceptual theory building due to its focus on one firm.
In addition, the theory building proposed herein can be categorized as "conceptual" as its is also
constructed from the aggregation or synthesis of other existing theories and datasets, as was
discussed previously under the notion of "logical compound synthesis."
Within both empirical and theoretical bases, the detailed method of theory building includes
exploration, concept development and hypothesis generation (Saunders and Thompson, 1980).
"Case-based research is more at the level qf an existence proof: Here is one example of how A leads
to B. If the reader can reply, 'I'm not really that surprised that you can find in the world at least one
example of A leading to B, 'the value of the contribution of the paper can be in doubt. '326
The value of the contribution of the theory developed herein will lie in its explanation of an
existence proof, which may be used to guide further empirical research.
323 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 21.
324 Saunders and Thompson, (1980), pp. 123-124.
325 Rouse and Daellenbach, (1999), pp. 489-490.
326 Siggelkow, N. (2007), pg. 23.
2.2.2 Multi-method
The goal of the research design is to bridge the more qualitative traditions of case study with the
more quantitative traditions of numerical modeling. This inherently requires a multi-method
approach.
"Studying variations over time in organ izational forms requires not only longitudinal research
designs but also knowledge of historical trends and changes in political systems, modes of economic
production, law, patterns of international trade, and other topics often neglected in case studies and
surveys of isolated organizations. "327
Solid research methodology in strategic management is based on four important components: (1)
mathematical models; (2) statistical data analysis; (3) logical compound synthesis; and (4) in-
depth case studies (Itami and Numagami, 1992). This research design proposes to embrace
multiple methods, working backward from the qualitative case studies, incorporating logical
compound synthesis, and finally due to the high levels of dynamic complexity inherent in
longitudinal multi-stakeholder research, ends with the development of nonlinear dynamic
numerical simulation models.
"I do not believe that Jbrmal modeling should be the only style of organizational research. To the
contrary, I think the nwmost successful literatures are those that blend detailed description, informal
theory and formal modeling. '28
As shown in Figure 112 below, these three methods form an integrated approach toward building
and testing grounded theory. The developed framework is grounded empirically via comparative
case studies, theoretically via synthesis of a broad literature of empirical and theoretical research
ranging from economics to sociology, as well as being grounded analytically via nonlinear
dynamic numerical simulation modeling.
327 Aldrich, H. (2006), pg. xii.
328 Gibbons, R. (1999), pg. 146.
Figure 112: Integrated and Triangulated Research Design
Toward a Theory of
the Evolution of
Business Ecosystems
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It is important to note that these three approaches were not applied in a purely linear, sequential
fashion. In order to capture the rich potential of emergence in grounded theory building, the
three approaches were applied integrally, concurrently and iteratively and are therefore mutually
reinforcing. Justification of the theory developed solely from any one approach would be
incorrect and misleading.
Figure 113 below summarizes conceptually how the three approaches unfold longitudinally,
combining a pre-determined linear sequential plan, with superimposed iterative cycles. From
this figure, it is observed that although the majority of the impact (not necessarily time spent)
from each approach took place within the approach's allotted time frame, time spent iterating
both before and after the allotted phase contributed significantly to the final theory developed.
"Indeed, after having laboriously worked out for myself what I took to be an important and 'original'
idea, I have often had the disconcerting experience of subsequently finding the same idea better
expressed by some other writer. I try always to mention such earlier expositions; I am sure that there
are many that I have overlooked, for which I offer advance apology. '"329
Finally, note that although the theory developed was generated initially from field-based
empirical research, subsequently supported and refined by existing research literatures, and
finally refined and extended by analytical modeling, it is estimated that the impact of the three
approaches over the life cycle of the theory development is approximately equal (e.g. 33%).
329 Penrose, E.T. (1959), pg. 2, footnote 2.
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Figure 113: Combining Linear Sequential and Nonlinear Spiral Development Processes
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Figure 114 below summarizes the proposed multi-method dissertation in three phases,
terminating in the balanced objective of mid-level theory. Note that while this philosophy is
broadly inductive, the actual process was certainly iterative between deduction-induction. Each
of the phases will be summarized in the following subsections.
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Figure 114: Multi-Method Research and the Rigor-Relevance Tradeoff
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2.2.2.1 Case-studies (Field-based & Historical)
The research plan attempts to initially build grounded theor inductively from the qualitative
comparative case study described above (Eisenhardt, 1989). 30 Eisenhardt's research process,
which is used as a template for the research design is summarized in Appendix D.
"Academic journals have traditionally not accepted or encouraged the deep examination of case
studies, but the nature of strategy requires it. The greater use of case studies will be necessary for
real progress at this stage of the field's development. I am convinced that more research of this type
will be needed to address the dynamics of strategy. '-3
While the purpose of the case studies aim initially at exploration and description, the ultimate
objective is explanation, as it attempts to explain how events occurred and predict how they
might qualitatively unfold via cause-effect relationships. As the research plan also calls for
multiple case studies, this is the most ambitious, comprehensive and potentially rich use of the
case study method (Yin, 2003).332
330 Eisenhardt specifically notes the centrality of inductive process and the role of literature in successfully building
theory from cases.
331 Porter, M.E. (1991).
332 Yin (2003) refers to this as "Type 6" case study research.
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Whereas case studies are often dismissed as too qualitative for real science, this is a clear
misunderstanding of the reality of grounded theory building is quite different:
"Case histories of firms and industries that were instrumental to the field's early development are
sometimes labeled 'prescientific' (e.g. Rumelt et al., 1994). However, a renewed interest in historical
and clinical research is not a sign of regression but of the field's maturity. The benefits of such an
approach are too great to be ignored by strategy researchers. "3"'
"Although sometimes seen as 'subjective,' well-done theory building from cases is surprisingly
'objective, ' because its close adherence to the data keeps researchers 'honest. ' The data provide the
discipline that mathematics does informal analytic modeling. "334
The research design is modeled after those that produced some of the most influential and
frequently cited works in the strategic management literature, like the longitudinal case studies of
Penrose (1959), Chandler (1962) and Lawrence & Lorsch (1967). 335
"Whereas Chandler (1962) conducted case histories and classified them to reveal patterns, subsequent
researchers have measured strategic and structural variables and used statistical variables to test for
connections. "336
2.2.2.2 Comparative Method
"To find answers to our major question, we made a comparative study of competing organizations in
each of several industries. ,37
Like Lawrence and Lorsch's classic 1967 work, Organization and Environment: Managing
Differentiation and Integration, this research dissertation uses a comparative approach of
studying pairs of competing organizations in each of several industries.
"... the intensive comparative analysis ofa few cases may be more promising than a more superficial
statistical analysis of many cases. In such a situation, the most fruifid approach would be to regard
the comparative analysis as the first stage ofJ' research, in which hypotheses are carefully
formulated... "338
The comparative method is one of the basic methods for establishing general empirical
propositions, along with experimental and statistical methods. All three methods have been
demonstrated to have the objective of scientific explanation, which comprises the establishment
of empirical relationship among at least two variables, while all others are held constant
(Lijphart, 1971).339 As will be discussed later in the sample selection process, the small-N
theoretical sample of case studies, will form the basis of the comparative method to generate the
hypotheses.
333 Farjoun, M. (2002), pg. 585.
334 Eisenhardt, K.M. and Graebner, M.E. (2007), pg. 25.
335 See Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, (2004) for a good bibliometric analysis.
336 Donaldson, (2001), pg. 78.
337 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), pg. 19.
338 Lijphart, A. (1971), pg. 685.
339 Note that the method has been criticized for being deterministic in its causality (Lieberson, 1991, 1994;
Savolainen, 1994), a charge similarly brought against systems dynamics.
2.2.2.3 Logical Compound Synthesis
"IfI have seen farther; it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. "340
In addition to building theory inductively from the empirical data, this research also builds
theory from existing theories and their associated empirical data sets.
"Just like chemists synthesize various materials into some chemical compounds that are new to the
world, researchers of this approach pick up various theoretical concepts and empirical findings as
materials and synthesize them into a plausible logical story. "41
An important part of the grounded theory building is the supplementing of comparative case
studies with a rich survey of theoretical concepts and empirical findings within the strategic
management literatures as well as in other academic disciplines, including but not limited to:
economics, sociology and architecture. To this end, each of the three essays will commence with
a summary of these relevant theories and how they contribute (or conflict) with the theory
developed herein.
"Gems in isolation are worth far less than when they are strung together in a necklace. They all gain
greatly by being compared and contrasted in an orderly fashion, even if we can not yet weld them
together by means ofa single, over-arching theory. "342
Researchers however have cautioned against the premature and excessive integration of
theoretical models - particularly contingency findings - in the quest for a holistic midrange
theory of organizations (Moberg and Koch, 1985, pg 110).
"This approach derives its plausibility from the robust coherence among its component stories and
reveals logical connections among conceptual constructs. "343
One of the most influential publications in the field of strategic management itself, Thompson's
1967 classic, Organizations in Action (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) was not based
upon original empirical work, but on the synthesis of a multitude of empirical studies within the
contingency theory field. As Thompson, himself noted in the preface to his classic:
"I have written this book to call attention to some of [those] developments, which tend to go unnoticed
because we are encouraged to converse within disciplines, while organizations are multidisciplinary
phenomena. A central purpose of this book is to identify a framework which might link at important
points several of the now independent approaches to the understanding of complex organizations. ",44
Thompson's 1967 classic represents a powerful example of what part of this research dissertation
aims towards, effective logical compound synthesis, which in Thompson's case led to 100
testable propositions.
340 This quotation is taken from my doctoral dissertation committee co-chair, Prof Charles Fine, who used the
reference in his book, Clockspeed (Fine, 1998). The saying was originally attributed to Sir Isaac Newton.
341 Itami and Numagami (1992), pg. 133.
342 Landsberger, quoted in Magnusen K. (1973), pg. 17.
343 Itami and Numagami (1992), pg. 133.
344 Thompson, J.D. (1967), pg. xxv-xxvi.
"This book might be considered a conceptual inventory. I assume merely that the concepts relevant
to important relationships exist, and once having identified some, I hope to generate potentially
significant propositions. We lack the systematic evidence that eventually must come, but there are
illustrative studies to indicate that the propositions are plausible. Illustrations are drawn from a
variety of fields; and concepts from a variety of disciplines. I have carried concepts from one
discipline into fields not typically studied with those concepts. I have tried to say more, using some
concepts, than has typically been said with them. At the same time, I have said considerably less,
using those same concepts, than has been said. The economist, sociologist, political scientist, or
social psychologist will each find that I overlooked refinements and intricacies in concepts he knows
well. I hope, however, that I have avoided outright distortion of concepts. " 45
2.2.2.4 Numerical Simulation Modeling
"But how to 'test' that theory, or at least demonstrate its plausibility? The vehicle used in this article
is the design and running of a 'history-friendly' model. 'History-fiendly' models are intended to
enhance understanding of particular interesting and important economic phenomena, in this case the
swings in vertical integration and disintegration in the American computer industry. History-friendly
models generally are simulation models. The aim of history-friendly modeling is not to explain, in
the sense of closely matching through a simulation, the quantitative values observed in the historical
episode under investigation, nor in the specification of the model parameters driven by the objective
of getting as close as possible to actual empirical values of variables in the actual context being
modeled. Rather, the objective is to explore whether the particular mechanisms and forces built into
the model can generate, and in that sense explain the patterns in question. The design of a history-
friendly model is guided by the theories, generally verbal, that informed observers and empirically
oriented economists hwo have analyzed the phenomena have put forth as their causal explanations,
and which the model builders find plausible and interesting. History-friendly modelers believe that
much of productive economic theorizing is presented as explanations of particular empirical
phenomena by those who know a lot about the empirical details. However, we also believe that it is
difficult, sometimes impossible, to check out the logic and the explanatory power of such verbal
qualitative theorizing, without formalizing the argument A history-friendly model is built on a
simplified formal representation of the theory being considered, and aims to test the consistency and
power of that theory by exploring the performance of the model. ,346
One of the key tenets of theory development in this research is the translation of a qualitative
theoretical framework from its qualitative and quantitative empirical grounding to a more
precise formal model as Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo and Winter (2008) argue.
"Simulation modeling provides a powerful methodology for advancing theory and research on
complex behaviors and systems, yet it has been embraced more slowly in management than in some
associated social science disciplines. Because organizations are complex systems and many of their
characteristics are often inaccessible to researchers, especially over time, simulation can be a
particularly useful research tool for management theorists. Simulation is a legitimate, disciplined,
and powerful approach to scientific investigation, with the potential to make significant
contributions to management theory." , 3 47
"We... position simulation in the 'sweet spot' between theory-creating methods, such as multiple case
inductive studies and formal modeling, and theory-testing methods. Simulation strengths include
internal validity and facility with longitudinal, nonlinear, and process phenomena. Simulation's
primary value occurs in creative experimentation to produce novel theory. "348
345 Thompson, J.D. (1967), pg. xxvi-xxvii.
346 Malerba, F., Nelson, R., Orsenigo, L. and Winter, S. (2008), pp. 204 and 205.
347 Harrison, J.R., Lin Z, Carroll, G.R. and Carley, K.M. (2007), pp. 1229 and 1243.
348 Davis, J.P., Eisenhardt, K.M. and Bingham, C.B. (2007), pg. 480.
The meta-theoretic framework proposed by this research is as interested in states as it is inpaths
- that is in an enterprise's architecture and its complementary evolution. As a result, a formal
modeling technique is proposed to capture these dual and complementary interests.3 49
Due to the systemic coupling between firm competence and industry competition, the dynamic
hypotheses that are generated will be converted into more formal nonlinear simulation models
via the system dynamics method (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000), in an attempt to bring some
explanatory power to the theory. 35
System Dynamics "is a quantitative and experimental approach for relating organizational structure
and corporate policy to industrial growth and stability.
System Dynamics is well suited to representing social change processes of growth and stability,
and has already been used for testing macro-sociological theories (Jacobsen, Bronson and
Vekstein, 1990).352 Regarding the use of system dynamics, its originator, Jay Forrester
ambitiously called for "courage" in its use:
"The solutions to small problems yield small rewards... One does not achieve innovation and
creativity by being timid... The attitude must be one of enterprise design. The expectation should be
for major improvement in the systems.35
As shown in Figure 115 below, the tripartite research design is superimposed on a longitudinal
time-history of the phenomenon under consideration.
349 A similar discussion is given by Farjoun (2002), pp. 575.
350 Note that due to the relatively small sample sizes employed in this research design, quantitative methods like
structural equation modeling may not be appropriate due to low statistical confidence issues.
351 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pg. 13.
352 As noted by Sastry A. (1997).
353 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pp. 449-450.
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Figure 115: Tripartite Research Design Superimposed on Phenomenon
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2.2.3 Multi-level
This research draws empirical data from multiple levels: micro-level (i.e. individuals alone or in
groups), meso-levels (i.e. organizational learning, culture, etc.) and macro-level (i.e. clusters of
organizations, extended enterprise).
2.2.3.1 Micro-level
The micro-level perspective is developed through the in-depth, qualitative exploration of the
decision heuristics of the most senior leaders of each firm. While there are over 70 different
terms used to describe individual cognition used in organization studies (Walsh, 1995), the most
common areframes, mental models or cognitive maps.
2.2.3.2 Macro-level
The macro-level perspective is developed through the modeling of these decision heuristics in
the complex dynamic feedback interactions of each extended enterprise as well as their
competitive interactions within the ecosystem.
2.2.3.3 Meso-level
By investigating the micro-level practices of individuals and groups as they perceive, react to,
and (possibly) shape macro-level environmental change, this research occupies the "meso-
domain" (Hall, 1995) where action and structure converge. 54
354 This aspect of the research design was influenced by Kaplan, S. (2004).
2.2.4 Multi-lens
Research within complex socio-technical systems requires a multiplicity of "frames" or "lenses"
through which to observe the phenomenon, in order to ensure the internal validity of findings. It
is important to note that each researcher has certain ways of look at the world which may bias
what they see and how they analyze it. It is equally important to note that each class of research
problem is best viewed through a particular "lens" and most often through multiple lenses. As
such, this research dissertation is designed first to solve the problem defined in chapter 1, and
second to utilize lenses which this researcher has most comfort and skill and to acknowledge the
potential associated biases.
Ancona et al., (1999) posits three different complementary theoretical lenses for analyzing
organizations: the strategic design, the political and the cultural as shown in Figure 116
below.3 5 5 Additionally, Ancona et al. (2001) more recently posits an additional organizational
lens, the temporal which encompasses and integrates the others. This section briefly summarizes
each, and how they specifically inform the research dissertation.
Figure 116: The Three (+ one) Theoretical Lenses
+0
2.2.4.1 The Strategic Design lens
"This perspective asserts that by understanding the basic principles of organization design, by
aligning the organization's design with its strategy, and by making sure that both strategy and design
fit the environment in which the organization is operating, managers can make their organizations
successful. "356
This perspective looks at the flow of tasks, how people are assigned to these tasks, and how the
organization can be rationally optimized to achieve its goals.
35 Ancona et al. (2001) actually posit the existence of a fourth lens: the temporal lens. Note that this will be
considered in essay #2.
356 Ancona, D. et al. (1999), module 2, pg. 12.
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Within the enterprise architectural framework presented in this dissertation, the strategic design
lens helps to define the mechanisms of differentiation, integration andfit within the organization
and between the organization and its environment. However, as the notion of an enterprise
architecture embraces a stakeholder view of the firm, it is by definition a power-sharing entity,
which explicitly must also take a political view.
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the research methods required to successfully access
and analyze the data include traditional desk-studies of company documents and other secondary
data sources as well as ethnographic methods.
"If only it weren'tfor the people, the goddamned people, " said Finnerty, "always getting tangled up
in the machinery. If it weren 'tfor them, earth would be an engineer's paradise. '"
Although the strategic design lens undoubtedly captures the preponderance of observations in the
strategic management literature, the following subsections summarize other points of view of at
least equal importance dealing explicitly with human and organizational effects.
2.2.4.2 The Political lens
The Political lens can be used on both micro- and macro-phenomena (Mintzberg et al., 2008).
Micro-politics arises on the individual actor level, while macro-politics arises social aggregates.
2.2.4.2.1 Micro-politics
The most important aspect of the research design was to ensure high-fidelity micro-data from the
most senior decision-makers of each organizational set. As such, it was imperative to treat each
data source as having high behavioral complexity - i.e. as having a local politic.
"Fancy what a game of chess would be if all the chessmen had passions and intellects, more or less
small and cunning; ifyou were not only uncertain about your adversary 's men, but a little uncertain
also about your own; ifyour knight could shuffle himself on to a new square by the sly; if your bishop,
in disgust at your castling, could wheedle your pawns out of their places; and if your pawns, hating
you because they are pawns, could make away from their appointed posts that you might get
checkmate on a sudden. You might be the longest-headed of deductive reasoners, and yet you might
be beaten by your own pawns. You would be especially likely to be beaten, ifyou depended arrogantly
on your mathematical imagination, and regarded your passionate pieces with contempt. ,358
While the influence of the political lens can dominate the quest for scientific truth in complex
enterprises, the exist little academic theory in this domain, and the precious little theory
(Machiavelli, 1515) that exists is highly controversial, no matter how influential.3 59
"One of the pervasive, really significant reasons for application of Machiavellianism in today s
organizations centers around the ugly problem of loyalty. Loyalty here refers to dedication or
commitment to persons, to task, and to organization. Loyalties today are at odds with one another.
357 Vonnegut, (1952).
58 From George Eliot's, Felix Holt, The Radical (1980, pp. 237), as quoted in Mintzberg, H. et al. (1998), pg. 234.
359 In fact, one of the building blocks of Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics theory is "opportunistic behavior
with guile" (1985).
Of the various forces affecting loyalty, self-interest is perhaps the most powerful, influencing both
those who employ Machiavellianism and the recipients thereof "s60
2.2.4.2.2 Macro-politics
"A political perspective views an organization as composed of multiple 'stakeholders' i.e. individuals
and groups who contribute important resources to an organization and depend on its success but who
also have different interests and goals and bring different amounts and sources of power to bear in
organizational interactions. ,361
This perspective looks at how power and influence are distributed and used within the firm and
its constituent stakeholders.
"A political perspective defines power as the ability to get things done when goals conflict. "362
As discussed above, the very definition of an enterprise architecture as being a collection of
stakeholders, implies that the political lens will have at least as much influence as the traditional
strategic design lens.
"Machiavellian concepts are much more germaine to the 'guts' of interactions in business than
social scientists and/or management analysts care to recognize. ,363
As will be discussed later in triangulation methods to ensure theoretical validity, controlling for
"political" effects can be important. To this end it is important to recognized when and how the
powerful forces of self-interest may be at play.
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the research methods required to successfully access
the data differ from those of the strategic design lens.364 These methods include clinical
methods.
"The clinician has the license to ask embarrassing questions, to elicit confidential information, and
to ask for the airing of organizational 'dirty laundry'. They are licensed to encourage their
informants to 'confess', to tell what is 'really going on' as they see it, and, in this sense to gain a
'deeper' dynamic understanding of what is happening and why it is happening. ,"65
2.2.4.3 The Cultural lens
"The cultural perspective rejects claims that strictly structural, rational or interest factors best
explain human behavior. People are thus more than cogs in a machine or self-interested political
actors. They are also meaning makers and through interaction with one another, they continually
create, sustain, and modiJf organizations. ',366
360 Calhoon, R.P. (1969), pg. 211.
361 Ancona, D. et al. (1999), module 2, pg. 40. Paul Carlile was acknowledged as developing the material.
362 Dahl, R. (1957), pg. 203.
363 Calhoon, R.P. (1969), pg. 205.
364 References to Machiavelli (1515), are made in management: Calhoun (1969) and Feaver (1984).365 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 41.
366 Ancona, D. et al. (1999), module 2, pg. 64.
This perspective looks at how history has shaped the meanings of different people within an
organization.
As discussed above, an enterprise architecture is rooted in both the strategic design and the
political lenses. However, as this research endeavors to discover how such rational and yet
political systems have evolved over time, as well as the forces which have shaped such
evolution, it is important to view such architectures through the cultural lens to determine how
history has shaped inertia.
"Inasmuch as culture is a dynamic process within organizations, it is probably studied best by action
research methods, qualitative research approaches that combine field work methods from
ethnography with clinical and consulting work. ,"36
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the research methods required to successfully access
this data differ from those of the strategic design and political lenses. These methods include
action research.
2.2.4.4 The Temporal lens
"Management science has only begun to deal with the time dimension in business. ,368
As discussed above, researchers (Ancona et al., 2001) have recently posited the need for a fourth
lens through which to view organizations: the temporal lens. They acknowledge however that
such a point of view for research is difficult:
"It is hard enough to gain organizational access. It is even harder to capture events over time using
multiple measures. This not only takes time but additional resources and lots of cooperation. We are
accustomed to getting in and out of organizations quickly. These additional considerations preclude
the use of a temporal lens. There are also broader, institutional reasons for the lack offocus on time.
Doctoral dissertations are planned around short rather than longer stays. We [must] (1) rethink
how we do our research (e.g., we need to create new 'contracts' with firms that will let us explore
important temporal issues), (2) rethink some of our institutional arrangements, such as encouraging
more time-based research in theses and journals, and (3) experiment with new forms of data
collection and analysis. "369
367 Schein, E. (1990).
368 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pg. 3.369 Ancona et al. (2001), pg. 647.
2.2.5 Multi-temporal (longitudinal)
"Over the last decade, longitudinal and dynamic analyses of organizations and populations have
come to dominate empirical work in organizational sociology. ,37
As discussed above, researchers (Ancona et al., 2001) have recently posited the need for a fourth
lens through which to view organizations: the temporal lens. They acknowledge however that
such a point of view for research is difficult:
"It is hard enough to gain organizational access. It is even harder to capture events over time using
multiple measures. This not only takes time but additional resources and lots of cooperation. We are
accustomed to getting in and out of organizations quickly. These additional considerations preclude
the use of a temporal lens. There are also broader, institutional reasons for the lack offocus on time.
Doctoral dissertations are planned around short rather than longer stays. We [must] (1) rethink
how we do our research (e.g., we need to create new 'contracts' with firms that will let us explore
important temporal issues), (2) rethink some of our institutional arrangements, such as encouraging
more time-based research in theses and journals, and (3) experiment with new forms of data
collection and analysis. ",37
This research dissertation therefore attempts to answer the recent calls from reputable academic
researchers for a more serious and dedicated research design approach in order to capture the
heretofore absent richness of organizations that a temporal lens might provide.
"Longitudinal field studies across several organizations offer another promising approach. In
general these are large-scale projects, and the participation of organizations is based on a close
relationship between senior managers and the researchers. "372
As will be discussed in more detail in subsequent subsections, this research dissertation aims to
establish new longer-term contracts with closer trust-based relationships with multiple firms
which simultaneously occupy the same competitive space.
One of the fundamental characteristics of this research dissertation, therefore is the study of
organizations across time, as the causal mechanisms driving long-term performance unfold
longitudinally.
"... it will be necessary for researchers to place themselves into the manager's temporal and
contextual frames of reference. Presumably, this would initially involve conducting a retrospective
case history to understand the context and events leading up to the present strategy being investigated.
However the major focus of the study would entail conducting real-time observations of the events and
activities in strategy development while they occur in time, and without knowing a priori the outcomes
of these events and activities. "33
In addition, a longitudinal approach will enable the observation that both change has taken place
within the organizations, as well as how such change occurred (Van de Ven, 1992).
370 Romanelli, (1991), pp. 99-100.
371 Ancona et al. (2001), pg. 647.
372 Daft, R.L. and Lewin, A.Y. (1990), pg. 6.
373 Van de Ven A.H. (1992), pg. 181.
"... there is a need to supplement regularly scheduled data collection with intermittent real-time data.
For example, this would involve observing key committee meetings, decision or crisis events, and
conducting informal discussions with key organizational participants. "74
The research therefore takes a longitudinal approach towards data collection and analysis. This
allows the developed theory to take an ex ante perspective (i.e. before the outcomes are known).
Such a longitudinal approach is important to develop and test theories on organizational change,
development or evolution. The ex ante perspective allows the opportunity to understand the
direction of causality. 375
"... it is widely recognized that prior knowledge of the success or fiilure of a strategic change effort
invariably biases a study's findings... it is generally better, if possible, to initiate historical study
before the outcomes of a strategic change process become known. It is even better to undertake real-
time study of strategic change processes as they unfold in their natural field settings. "376
374 Van de Ven A.H. (1992), pg. 181.
375 This aspect of the research design was influenced by Kaplan, S. (2004).
376 Van de Ven A.H. (1992), pg. 181.
2.2.6 Complementary Qualitative & Quantitative Methods
Researchers (e.g. Jick, 1979) have advocated the use of "hybrid designs" which embrace both
quantitative and qualitative methods in order to achieve triangulation to enhance the internal
validity of the theories being developed.377 The evolution from qualitative case studies towards
quantitative mathematical models requires a rigorous research methodology described herein
(Luna-Reyes, 2003).
"The coupling of [the case study] and system models would preserve the richness of [the case study]
and allow more generalization of thefindings. "78
In particular, as the primary problem with the qualitative case study is generalizing beyond the
particular case, researchers have argued for complementing case studies with simulation. 79
"Although system dynamics models are mathematical representations of problems, it is recognized that
most of the information available to the modeler is not numerical in nature, but qualitative. 80
Forrester (1994) points out that the progression from the qualitative to the quantitative
accesses a different quantity and quality of data, as shown in Figure 117 below.
"The amount of available information declines, probably by many orders of magnitude, in going from
mental to written information and again by another similar large factor in going from written to
numerical information. Furthermore, the character of information content changes as one moves from
mental to written to numerical information. In moving down the diagram, there is a progressively
smaller proportion of information about structure and policies. ",,38
Figure 117: Quantity and Quality of Data382
Ca se
Study data base
Logical
Compound
Synthesis
Mathematical
Model
/
data base
data base
Action Research /
Clinical Methods
with
Focus groups/
Delphi groups
Grounded
Theory
coding
System
Dynamics
model
377 My thanks goes to Prof. Amy Edmondson who pointed this out in her PhD
on the Design ofField Research Methods.
3 Atkinson, G. (2004), pg. 282.
379 Radzicki, M (1988), pp. 634-637 and (1990), pp. 58-60.38 0 Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2003), pp. 271.
381 Forrester, J.W. (1994), pp. 72.
382 Source: Forrester, J.W. (1994).
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2.2.7 Induction-Deduction iteration
"This dialectic of the double-loop learning approach to building strategy theory can help in
reconnecting strategy theory with the realities faced by managers in dynamic environments. ",
In the quest for creating new 'bisociation' (i.e. connecting things that were not formerly seen to
be connected), the research aims to use both inductive and deductive reasoning. Using purely
deductive reasoning, new theory development is unlikely, while using purely inductive reasoning
(i.e. without identifying assumptions, constructs and interrelationships between them), only
description of the phenomena might result.
As shown in Figure 118 below, the research attempts to build theory by cycling inductively and
then deductively in creating and testing constructs, frameworks (or typologies) and ultimately
models. Equally, this process moves between informal correlative models towards formal causal
models as it endeavors to move from descriptive theory towards normative theory.3 84
Figure 118: Process used for Theory Building38 5
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Regarding the question of what are the sources of hypotheses, this research design is modeled
after the approach taken by Penrose for her classic book, "Theory of the Growth of the Firm". In
particular, the research aspires to use the same rich sources, namely: interviews with managers
pragmatically rooted in real-world problems, conversations with students and professors,
research on economic and sociological theories of architecture and growth, studies of business
history, research on business literature and annual reports, extended company visits and
observations (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).
While the dissertation itself is likely to be written deductively, the logic of discovery comes
inductively from managerial practice. Again, as inspired by Penrose, the aim is to connect the
383 Mahoney, J. T. and Sanchez, R. (1997). "Competence Theory Building: Reconnecting Management Research and
Management Practice." In Heene, A. and Sanchez, R. (Eds.) Competence-Based Strategic Management. Chichester:
John Wiley, 43-64.
34 Carlile and Christensen, (2004).
385 Source: Carlile and Christensen, (2004).
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reconstructed logic of deductive sociology and economics with the theories-in-use of
management (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).
"We argue that Penrose's knowledge-creation process can be facilitated if strategic management
researchers become engaged in an interactive, reciprocating process. Such rich connections are the
stuff that classic management books and research creativity are made of "386
386 Kor Y. Y. and Mahoney J. T. (2000).
2.3 Research Metaphysics
"Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory but a metaphysical research programme. And yet,
the theory is invaluable. I do not see how, without it, our knowledge could have grown as it has
done since Darwin. In trying to explain experiments with bacteria which become adapted to, say,
penicillin, it is quite clear that we are greatly helped by the theory of natural selection. Although it
is metaphysical, it sheds much light upon very concrete and very practical researches. It allows
us to study adaptation to a new environment (such as a penicillin-infested environment) in a
rational way: it suggests the existence of a mechanism of adaptation, and it allows us even to study
in detail the mechanism at work. And it is the only theory so far which does all that. "s
With these words, Karl Popper "the father of the philosophy of science", situated Darwin's
theory of evolution within science, and characterized the general criticisms weighed against the
research in this disseration. Yet even Popper (1978) changed his mind later upon reflection:
"This is an immensely impressive and powerful theory. The claim that it completely explains
evolution is of course a bold claim, and very far from being established. All scientific theories are
conjectures, even those that have successfully passed many severe and varied tests. However,
Darwin's own most important contribution to the theory of evolution, his theory of natural
selection, is difficult to test. The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led
some people, anti-Darwinists and even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology. A
tautology like 'All tables are tables' is not, of course, testable; nor has it any explanatory power. I
mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these
authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as 'almost tautological', and I have tried to
explain how the theory of natural selection could be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of
great scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most
successful metaphysical research programme. It raises detailed problems in many fields, and it
tells us what we would expect of an acceptable solution of these problems. I still believe that
natural selection works in this way as a research programme. Nevertheless, I have changed my
mind about the testability and the logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad
to have an opportunity to make a recantation. My recantation may, I hope, contribute a little to the
understanding of the status of natural selection.. "3
The problem with most forms of evolutionary theory - from Darwin's to this research - lies in the
underlying metaphysics: the ontology and epistemology.
"All social scientists approach their subject via explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of
the social world and the way in which it may be investigated. First there are assumptions of an
ontological nature - assumptions which concern the very essence of the phenomena under
investigation. Associated with this ontological issue, is a second set of assumptions of an
epistemological nature. These are assumptions about the grounds of knmvledge - about how one
might begin to understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings. "389
This section briefly describes the philosophy of the research methodology, including both its
underlying ontological (philosophy of existence or reality) assumptions as well as its overriding
epistemological (philosophy of knowledge) assumptions.
387 Popper, K. (1976), pg. 151, 171-172.
388 Popper, K. (1978).
389 Burrell and Morgan (1979), pg. xiii.
"The distinction between methodology and method is not a trivial one. A method is a tool or a
technique used in the process of inquiry. In contrast, a methodology may be regarded as an 'intricate
set of ontological and epistemological assumptions that a researcher brings to his or her work'
(Prasad, 1997, pg. 2). "39
2.3.1 Positivism and Organizational Science
"This article describes the deficiencies of positivist science for generating knowledge for use in
solving problems that members of organizations face. There is a crisis in the field of organizational
science. The principal symptom of this crisis is that as our research methods and techniques have
become more sophisticated, they have also become increasingly less usefid for solving the practical
problems that members of organizations face. "391
This section briefly summarizes the difficult intellectual journey of an avowed positivist
(originally trained academically and professionally to understand and design complex technical
systems) toward a more interpretivist paradigm, as the nature of the phenomenon to be
understood and "designed" (i.e. complex social systems) became more exceedingly more
"wicked", rendering my positivist inclinations a hindrance in the quest for the "truth".
"Normal science is concerned with internal validity, experimental rigor, planning, control of
confounding variables, and to a lesser extent, external validity. Understanding the phenomenon
beforehand makes for clean, tidy research, but the actual knowledge return will be incremental. If a
researcher understands the phenomenon well enough to predict and control what happens, why ask
the question? The significant discoveries, the best science, require us to be more venturesome and
heretic in research design, and to explore fundamental questions without knowing the answer in
advance. The worth qf the research outcome is measured by surprise. The greater the surprise, the
more interesting the result, and the greater the new knowledge about organizations. ,"392
Leading organizational scientists have recently called for a break from the straitjacket imposed
by normal science (Daft and Lewin, 1990, 1993). They have based their arguments on the fact
that the phenomenon of effective organizations is so dynamic and complex, that researchers
need to explore build theory outside the established confines of the positivist, normal science.
This is where this research dissertation takes its que.
"Frameworks can be challenged because their complexity makes it difficult tofalsify arguments. ,393
Finally, as this dissertation develops a multivariate framework, this inherently makes positivistic
falsification difficult (Popper, 1963).
2.3.2 Constructivist Methodology in Strategic Management
"While realists conceive of the research process as excavation, where the terrain of phenomena is
minedJ br valuable nuggets of naturally occurring insight, constructivists view the process more as an
9 Mir, R. and Watson, A. (2000), pg. 944.
391 Susman G.I. and Evered R.D. (1978), pg. 582.
392 Daft, R.L. and Lewin A.Y. (1990), pg. 7.
393 Porter, M.E. (1991), pg. 98, footnote 7.
act of sculpting, where the theory-base of the artist interacts with the medium of the phenomena to
create a model of reality which we call knowledge."394
In the linear causal world of natural science where the realist paradigm dominates, researchers
(subjects) study natural phenomena (objects) without modifying- or being modified by them. In
the nonlinear causal world of organizational science, where the constructivist paradigm may
begin to dominate, researchers (subjects) reflexively shape and are shaped by the phenomena
(objects) they are studying as shown in Figure 119 below.
Figure 119: Realist vs. Constructivist Paradigms
east Constructivist
methodology
"Excavatfon" "sculpUng"
Subject Subject
(researcher) (researcher)
Object Object
(phenomenon) -(phenomenon)
While research in the field of strategic management is currently dominated by the realist
paradigm, this dissertation takes a slightly different constructivist approach, which has been
argued to be more logical and appropriate for the field of strategic management (Mir and
Watson, 2000).
"Constructivism occupies a methodological space characterized by ontological realism and
epistemological relativismt Ontological realism is an important cornerstone of a field as applied as
strategy, while epistemological relativism helps us explore the constructed nature of the field, where
the researcher is an active participant rather than a reactor or information processor. "
As shown in Figure 120 below (derived from Mir and Watson, 2000), constructivism is not a
polar or binary opposite of realism, but an intermediate form of methodology which is grounded
in the reality of realism, while embracing the "messiness" of highly complex social systems, as
particularly the higher-level, more "architectural" and power-laden echelons (as will be
discussed in a later methods section on "Action Learning / Clinical Methods").
394 Mir, R. and Watson, A. (2000), pg. 943.
395 Mir, R. and Watson, A. (2000), pg. 941.
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Figure 120: The "Construction" of Constructivism
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Such a constructivist approach helps to explain the logic behind the necessity of spending time
living, studying and researching in the academic and professional environment of each of the two
firms in the primary case study (which will be discussed later in chapter 2). While the existence
ontologically of an enterprise is not in socially-constructed, the goals, utility etc. of an enterprise
is socially-constructed, requiring immersion in and participation with the society a necessary act
of creating the knowledge about the phenomenon.
2.3.3 Pragmatist Epistemology in Strategic Management
Finally, a note regarding the philosophical and epistemological approach taken to both the
research design and the subsequent theory development is warranted. In the spirit of the
practical and applied nature of strategic management research, this work supports a pragmatist
epistemology (Powell, 2001). It therefore stands in contrast to the purely positivist views that no
theory can ultimately satisfy its demands, and the purely anti-positivist views that any theory
would satisfy its demands. The criterion used for evaluation is the theory's capacity to solve
human problems.
"Truths in strategy are neither certain nor final. The better theory is the one that stimulates better
research, better teaching, better practice. 396
Under this pragmatist epistemology, the hypotheses developed will be justified through the
method of 'abduction' (O'Hear, 1989), which acknowledges the ability to withstand competition
among rival theories.
'96 Powell, T. (2002), pg. 879.
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2.4 Research Settings
The research setting(s) were selected to strengthen the internal and external validity of the theory
developed. As will be discussed in the following sections, internal validity was strengthened by
using multiple lenses (i.e. those of different enterprise stakeholders) through which the case
study firms were observed. External validity was strengthened by applying the theory developed
in multiple industrial settings.
2.4.1 Primary Sample Selection
"Examining outliers departs from accepted methods because the range is restricted and outliers may
represent sampling error, a misspecified model, or measurement error. This view of errors of course
is based on a premise that normal science 'proof' is the research goal. But outliers are a powerful
source of new ideas. Significant insights can arise from studying the best or the worst of a
population. "397
"A particularly important theoretical sampling approach is 'polar types,' in which a researcher
samples extreme (e.g. very high and very low performing) cases in order to more easily observe
contrasting patterns in the data. ,'98
Given that the primary focus of this research is on building grounded theory, a theoretical
sample is created. 399  The theoretical sampling was designed to build theories of relative
competitive performance based on in-depth field-based research of "polar" types of enterprise
architectural forms, representing different "strategic groups" within the same industry (Porter,
1981).
"Industry-specific groups create heterogeneity. Firms in different strategic groups within an industry
may react differently to environmental disturbances and competitive patterns. "400oo
Although the typical model for much of the strategic management research consists of selecting a
large 'N' statistical sample consisting of many firms competing within a given industry, this
research centers on a small 'N' theoretical sample which consists of the remaining two large
firms in a mature global duopoly. 40 1 This duopolistic situation presents a unique opportunity to
control for industry effects by empirically investigating the strategic trajectories of all (i.e. both)
the firms within their industry (Dess, Ireland and Hitt, 1990).402
Multiple firms will be used as data sources however, as the sample will embrace the stakeholders
in the extended enterprise of each of the two main members. This is done to give a rich systemic
view of the firm's competing enterprises.
397 Daft, R.L. and Lewin, A.Y. (1990), pg. 6.398 Eisenhardt, K.M. and Graebner, M.E. (2007), pg. 27.
399 With small 'N' theoretical samples, "plausible rival hypotheses" (threats to validity) must be ruled out which
make research findings tentative and ambiguous.
400 Dess, G.G., Ireland, R.D. and Hitt M.A. (1990), pg. 20.
401 See March, J.G. et al. (1991) on learning from samples of one or fewer.
402 Firm "survivor bias" is present as the data set contains only those firms that survived during the time period.
The theory developed herein attempts to understand and predict the competitive dynamics of
firms throughout the lifecycle of an industry, from birth to maturity. As a result, the theoretical
sample is designed to contain an early entrant firm (which is now the incumbent) and a late
entrant firm (which is now the challenger). By definition therefore, the theoretical sample
focuses on large, mature firms. 40 3
As this research attempts to understand the co-evolution of firms and industries, datasets in
which industries have gone through most of their lifecycle are important. In addition, as
industries mature, they tend to shake-out towards oligopoly. By definition, therefore, a large-n
statistical sample of the firms in a mature industry becomes difficult. In addition, in the SCP
paradigm, firm conduct is deemed to govern over industry structure in oligopoly settings. This
fact allows us to examine the highly important firm conduct in oligopoly settings (as shown in
Figure 121 below), provided that a set of well-conceived theoretical samples can be assembled.
Figure 121: Influence of Industry Structure and Firm Conduct on Sample Selection404
Spectrum of Industry Structure
Perfect Imperfect Dominant Monopoly
Competition Competition Firm
Mixed Duopoly
Strategic Interaction
Industry Firm Industry
Structure Conduct Structure
Determinants of Firm Performance
This discussion specified the constraints for the selection of the primary theoretical sample:
* Oligopolistic industry structure to ensure relevance of firm conduct (preferably duopoly).
* Mature (post-dominant design) stage of industry evolution with clear incumbent and
challenger.
* Firm objective functions representing both shareholder value and stakeholder surplus
focus (i.e. "mixed duopoly").
* Enterprise architectural forms representing both modular and integral.
* Firms belonging to different "strategic groups" with strategies representing both
differentiated and cost-leadership.
Given these constraints, only one industry and one firm set met all of the above criteria.
403 The focus on large, mature firms is also found in Penrose (1959) and Porter (1980).
404 Source: Saloner, G., Shepard, A., and Podolny, J. (2001).
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2.4.1.1 Spatial setting
2.4.1.1.1 Industrial setting
Spatially, the primary research is confined to a particular global industry: the large commercial
airplane industry 5.
2.4.1.1.2 Incumbent and Challenger
"The distinction between entrants and incumbents is critical to future studies of performance
variation within and across industries. '06
After nearly 100 years of intense competition in this industry, the population of competing firms
has gone through the various evolutionary stages of variation, selection and retention, resulting
in a global duopoly comprising: the US incumbent, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, and the EU
challenger, Airbus Industrie.
For parsimony, the incumbent firm will be referred to as "Firm a", while the challenger will be
referred to as "Firm 3" in all industries.
2.4.1.1.3 Firms and their Ertended Enterprises
Beyond the two firms in the large commercial airplane industry, this research will additionally
study their extended enterprises - on multiple dimensions. While there will be tendencies to
draw conclusions about the two firms based on the historical trajectories of their respective
ownership structures, this research will attempt to enrich this description.
"Airbus was a 'groupement d'intirit conomique', a form of commercial partnership established in
French law in the mid-1960's, which was mainly intended to help wine growers. A GIE, as it is
known, is a flexible and user-friendly form of corporate structure, although it tends to baffle Anglo-
Saxons - and Americans in particular - used to the rigid structure of the limited company. "407
As shown in Figure 122 below, it is tempting to declare that Airbus possesses a modular
enterprise architecture based on the observation that it is a loose collection of national
companies 408, while Boeing is largely a monolithic or integral enterprise architecture which
designs and manufacturers more within the confines of one nation's borders and within one
company's logo.
45 Standard Industrial Classification, SIC as follows: Division D: Manufacturing; Major Group 37: Transportation
Equipment; Industry Group 372: Aircraft and Parts; Industry 3721: Aircraft. "Large" airplanes being defined as
those having over 100 seats.
406 Walker, G., Madsen, T. L., and Carini, G. (2002). "How does Institutional Change Affect Heterogeneity Among
Firms?" Strategic Management Journal, 23: 89-104.
407 Lynn, M. (1997), pg. 113.408 Airbus is the collection of French (Adrospatiale), German (DASA), Spanish (CASA) and UK (BAE Systems)
companies.
Figure 122: Modular or Integral Enterprise Architectures?
Adrospatiale DASA
(France) 
(Germany)
CASA BAE Sys.
(Spain) (UK)
As will be discussed in greater detail in Essay #1, systems or enterprises require both
differentiation and integration, with effective enterprises having: a) levels of structural
differentiation which are suitable to the demands of the environment, and b) levels of structural
integration which match the levels of differentiation.
All complex systems are de-composed in to parts, whether visible or not. Just because one
enterprise (Airbus) is composed of four visible "modules", namely French, German, Spanish and
British companies, does not mean that the enterprise has a "modular" architecture - it depends on
the quality of interaction between modules. Conversely, just because another enterprise (Boeing)
is composed of one visible "module", does not mean that the enterprise has an "integral"
architecture.
As will be defined and discussed later, we will need much richer definitions to extract structure
from behavior - definitions that transcend the low-level explanations of geographical location
and asset ownership. Once these are established, one can then proceed to posit relationships
between organizational architectures and the architectures of the products and services they
produce.
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2.4.1.2 Temporal setting
2.4.1.2.1 Industry Clockspeed
"Fruit flies are what I call a fast-clockspeed species. That is, they have an extremely brief life cycle.
Mammals, such as elephants and humans live by much slower clockspeeds. They measure their lives
in decades, not days. Even slower are reptiles. The hardy sea turtle, whose life span can exceed a
century, has evolved little since its terrestrial cousins, the dinosaurs roamed the earth... But my work
[on researching business evolution], focused primarily on the dinosaur-like metal bending industries,
proceeding slowly - painfully so... For all the supply chain dynamics on view, I might as well have
been watching glaciers advance... At the slowest end of the clockspeed scale - up there with the sea
turtles and the California redwoods -- are the manufacturers of aircraft. '409
Recently, researchers have begun to study the dynamic and simultaneous evolution of products,
processes and organizations in terms of their "clockspeeds" (Fine, 1998). In an effort to
dramatically increase the productivity of such research, Fine cleverly compressed time by
choosing to focus his research on the study of those industries and portions of value chains
having fast-clockspeeds. In this way he could observe their evolution over a large number of
lifecycles, and develop theories which may extend to a more generalizable range of clockspeeds.
While he laments the difficulties of studying corporate "dinosaurs", like Boeing (i.e. those having
slow product, process or organizational clockspeeds), he recognizes the merit of doing so in order
to validate the "dynamic laws of the extended enterprise" that he derived from the fast-
clockspeed species. This research dissertation represents one such effort.
The benefit of researching a slow-clockspeed firm like Boeing is that one can slowly and
carefully observe, dynamically develop and test hypotheses and analyze in real time the
movements of the species, as it is locked in a competition with another slow-moving species,
Airbus. While the benefits are apparent, the costs are high in terms of required resources (e.g.
time, money, access, etc.). In addition, the long, extended periods of field observation must
inevitably be supplemented and complemented with historical research methods, as even a 5-7
year field-based participatory research program captures only a small fraction of the lifecycle of
the products, processes and organizational lifecycles inherent in the industry.
2.4.1.2.2 Time span
Temporally, the longitudinal quantitative research spans the 36-year period from the birth of the
challenger, Airbus in 1970 up to today, where it has recently overtaken the incumbent, Boeing.4 10
In addition, the longitudinal qualitative field-based research is designed to occur over six years.
The past four-and-a-half years, spanning from January 2002 to June 2006, documented the
managerial cognitive frames of Boeing and its enterprise stakeholders. In the three years from
2005-2008, the managerial frames of Airbus and its enterprise stakeholders are being researched
and documented.
409 Fine, C.H. (1998), pp. 4-7.
410 As measured by annual airplane deliveries (in 2003-2005) and annual airplane orders (in 1998-2005).
The historical milestones of the main competitors within the primary case study industry are
shown in Figure 123 below.
Figure 123: Historical Milestones of Main Competitors in Commercial Airplane Industry
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2.4.1.2.3 "Critical Event" / Temporal Discontinuity
"If there was ever a stress test for a good business, this is it, '""
In addition, this research uses the exogenous industry discontinuity of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the US as a "critical situation" within which to examine firm strategic
response.
411 Presentation by Kevin Murphy, airline industry analyst for Morgan Stanley at MIT Sloan School of Management,
October 2001 (as reported in Hoffer-Gittell, 2003, pg. 236).
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2.4.1.3 Industrial idiosyncrasies
2.4.1.3.1 "Wicked" problems
The industry chosen for the primary case study has a high degree of complexity measured on two
distinct (but coupled) dimensions: dynamic complexity, and behavioral complexity (Ackoff,
1974; Roth and Senge, 1995). As shown in Figure 124 below, each will be discussed briefly in
the following subsections.
Figure 124: Dynamic and Behavioral Complexity
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2.4.1.3.1.1 Messy problems: high dynamic complexity
Dynamic complexity occurs when cause and effect are distant in space and time (Senge, 1990,
pg. 71). This tends to arise within integral enterprise architectures. Ackoff (1974) refers to such
problems as "messes". Sterman (2000, pg. 22) notes that such problems tend to be nonlinear,
whereby effect is not proportional to cause.
"The real leverage in most management situations lies in lies in understanding dynamic complexity,
not detail complexity.' 412
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412 Senge, P. (1990), pg. 73.
Senge (1990) differentiates dynamic complexity from detail complexity, which is merely the
existence of many variables.413 Focus on detail complexity often results in "laundry lists' '4 14 Of
important variables, but does not reveal sources of dynamic complexity. Later in chapter 3, a
multitude of plausible explanations for long-term firm performance (or lack thereof) will reveal a
focus on detail complexity, and a lack of understanding of dynamic complexity.
2.4.1.3.1.2 Negotiated problems: high behavioral complexity
Behavioral complexity arises when many diverse agents (or stakeholders), each with conflicting
goals and or values have decision-making power. Solution of this class of problem tends to
require negotiation, as various zero-sum behavioral games are played among stakeholders,
whereas positive sum results would benefit all as in the case of integral enterprise architectures.
For example, when shareholders attempt to value firms, they often rely on "research" conducted
by investment bank anaylsts. The potential conflicts of interest and subsequent objectivity of
such "research" is clearly disclosed by such investment banks. The extent to which this warning
is observed and heeded is a worthy research question.
"/[Investment Bank X] does and seeks to do business with companies covered in [Investment Bank X
Research]. As a result, investors should be aware that [Investment Bank X] may have a conflict of
interest that could affect the objectivity of [Investment Bank X Research]. "415
2.4.1.3.1.3 Wicked problems: Examples
The classic example of the "mildly wicked" problem is the Beer Game or the simple stylized
supply chain. Here cause and effect are distant in space and time, and various agents have
conflicting local goals and behave as if locked in a zero-sum game. Note that the problem is
"wicked" even in the presence of low detail complexity.
As will be argued later, the global commercial airplane industry is "clearly wicked", as cause and
effect are very distant in space and time due to the reasons explained below (e.g. high fixed
costs, economies of scale, strong learning curve-experience effects, long-development times,
long-lived products, etc.).
Finally, "extremely wicked" problems include the Cold War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
U.S. war on terror, etc.
413 Sterman, J. (2000), pg. 21, refers to detail complexity as "combinatorial complexity".
414 Senge, P. (1990), pg. 130.
415 Anonymous financial services / investment bank research report.
2.4.1.3.2 Economies of Scale & Barriers to Entry
Other industry structural factors include the tend towards natural monopoly, i.e. the minimum
efficient scale is rather large, given the high fixed production costs, the relatively small annual
volumes of sales and the high inherent market and technological risks associated with launching
a $10 billion project, for which there will only be around 1,000 units sold over 20 years (i.e. 50
units per year).416 In most natural monopoly settings, such an environment makes regulation an
expected part of the competitive enterprise dynamics.
As competition tends more and more towards cost-leadership as the modus operandi, production
volumes and therefore economies of scale and learning curve effects are a crucial source of cost
leadership. It is for these reasons that market share (i.e. delivery share) is an unusually,
important metric or proxy for long-term competitive performance.
"International high-technology industries are typically characterized by structural mobility barriers
such as irreversible commitments and product differentiation; static and dynamics economies of scale,
scope and learning that create increasing returns to scale; and path dependencies and R&D races
with high uncertainty and potential first mover benefits. These structural characteristics are viewed
as creating imperfectly competitive markets in which supernormal profits or rents, may be possible,
and in which time becomes afundamental dimension of competition. 4
Various research studies have investigated the commercial aircraft industry, including The AIT
Commission on Industrial Productivity (Dertouzos et al., 1989).
"The argument in the MIT study, that many of the difficulties ofAmerican firms are having are self-
inflicted, is quite persuasive. '41
2.4.1.3.3 Increasing Returns & Imperfect Competition
"Aerospace is afflicted with many of the classic cases of market failure. "419
Economist Paul Krugman (1987) argued for free-trade in all but a few rare instances, notably
where increasing returns and imperfect competition dominate (e.g. in commercial airplanes).
"If increasing returns and imperfect competition are necessary parts of the explanation of
international trade, however, we are living in a second-best world where government intervention
can in principle improve on market conditions. "420
2.4.1.3.4 Strategic Trade (Industrial) Policy
"As businessmen have always said and economists have usually denied, a protected domestic market
can - under some circumstances! - promote rather than discourage exports, and possibly raise
national income. ,42'
416 This point was recently reiterated in The Economist, June 25 th, 2005, pg. 89.
417 Braham, R. (1995), pg. 73.
418 Nelson, R.R. (1991), pg. 63.419 Neven, D. Seabright, P. and Grossman, G.M. (1995), pg. 316.
420 Krugman, P. (1987), pg. 134.
2.4.2 Secondary Sample Selection: Counterfactuals
"This work was carried out in two distinct, but related phases. The first was a detailed study
of.. firms operating in one industry. The second phase was a study of a highly effective organization
(by conventional economic and commercial standards) and a less effective competitor in each of two
other industries. ,422
Like Lawrence and Lorsch's classic 1967 work, Organization and Environment: Managing
Differentiation and Integration, this research dissertation uses a two-phase comparative approach
between highly effective and less effective competitors in three different industry settings. The
first phase was described in the previous section. The second phase covering competitors in two
other industries will be presented in this section.
In an attempt to extend the generality of the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. to ensure
external validity of the theory), the research will test from a longitudinal quantitative perspective
using panel datasets, the applicability of the theory to archetypal competitive spaces in both
manufacturing and services: General Motors and Toyota Motors in the global automotive
industry from 1970-2005 and United Airlines and Southwest Airlines in the US airline industry
from 1970-2005.
"Since accurate evidence is not so crucial for generating theory, the kind of evidence, as well as the
number of cases, is also not so crucial. A single case can indicate a general conceptual category or
property; afew more cases can confirmn the indication.'423
The following subsections briefly describe how the theoretical sample will be selected to
"control" for various variables by seeking counterfactual case studies.
2.4.2.1 Control for Industry effects
"Adequate controls for potential industry effects have not been used in many strategic management
studies. '424
Many of the most influential empirical studies in strategic management have been demonstrated
not to use sufficient controls for industry effects, resulting in erroneous conclusions (Dess et al.,
1990). For example, it was observed that firms sampled across multiple industries that use
related diversification performed better than firms that used unrelated diversification (Rumelt,
1974). Careful re-analysis of this research revealed that the high firm performance was due to
the high profitability of the firm's industries, and those successful industries tended toward
related diversification (Rumelt, 1977 and 1982).
"Single industry studies are a relatively straightforward approach to control for industry effects. '425
421 Krugman, P. (1987), pg. 136.
422 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), pg. 19.
423 Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967), pg. 30.
424 Dess, G.G., Ireland, RD. and Hitt, M.A. (1990), pg. 7.
425 Dess, G.G., Ireland, R.D. and Hitt, M.A. (1990), pg. 20.
The logic of the sample selections therefore is to use single industry studies (Dess et al., 1990)
which investigate an incumbent and its primary challenger. However, to extend the
generalizability of the theory while maintaining control for industry effects, the sample will be
expanded to include a collection of single industry studies.
As more industries are added, the logic of the sample selection is to use stratified samples by
industry (Dess et al., 1990), in which the samples are consistent with the variables and
relationships being measured. All industries investigated would therefore share fundamental
characteristics: (e.g. high consolidation, high entry/exit barriers) as well as share fundamental
environmental characteristics (e.g. mature stage).
2.4.2.2 Control for Environmental effects
"Use of a single dimension qf an industry's environment to build theory and to test proposed
relationships empirically may result in a failure to investigate alternative plausible explanations of
observed relationships. "426
Even though a set of firm pairs operating in the same industry will be analyzed, it is important
that the environmental state is controlled. The study therefore proposes to look at firm pairs (an
incumbent and challenger), each having been established in different environmental regimes (e.g.
emerging and maturing industries), and both competing in an industry that has run its full course
to maturity. As will be described later in essay #3, the environment will be characterized using
multiple dimensions (e.g. quantity and quality of output) to capture the essence of the
environmental state (e.g. munificence, dynamism, and complexity).
2.4.2.3 Control for Sector effects
In addition, the sample is intended to begin to control for sector effects, i.e. to determine if the
methodology can apply to both manufacturing as well as service industries. It is for this reason
that a world-class manufacturing firm (i.e. Toyota Motors) and a world-class service firm (i.e.
Southwest Airlines) are used.
2.4.2.4 Control for International and Socio-Economic effects
Finally, these two case studies, taken together with the primary case study of Boeing vs. Airbus,
form a collection of three cases each representing an incumbent US firm against a challenger
representing the three "triad" economic powers: the US (Southwest Airlines), EU (Airbus) and
Japan (Toyota). In other words, they were selected to begin to control for national and socio-
economic effects - to determine if integral enterprise architectures, which tend to dominate in the
mature industries, are not just a product of "socialist societies". The small theoretical sample is
not intended to be statistically robust, but merely to present a counterfactual example.
426 Dess, G.G., Ireland, R.D., and Hitt, M.A. (1990), pg. 16.
2.4.2.5 Selection Criteria for Incumbent and Challenger
As the primary sample comprises an industry in a state of duopoly, having a clear incumbent
(firm a) and a clear challenger (firm P), the selection criteria need not be very explicit.
However, in the secondary and tertiary theoretical samples, clearer definitions are required.
The incumbent (firm a) is defined as the acknowledged leader in the industry, typically
measured as having the largest market share at one time in its history.
The challenger (firm P) is defined as having been founded sometime after the current incumbent,
and on a clear and sustained trajectory towards displacing the incumbent - regardless of whether
or not it has surpassed the incumbent.
2.4.3 Tertiary Sample Selection
Finally, in an effort to further extend the validity and generality of the theory, other case studies
are recommended for future in-depth analysis. These are meant to control for other effects like
industry clockspeed, and state of industrial evolution. Figure 125 below summarizes the key
attributes of the theoretical sample used in this research.
Figure 125: Proposed Theoretical Sample
Independent
variable
x(t)
Independent
variable
(t)
Independent
variable
XO(t)
Dependent
variable
Y(t)
j Com. Airplane
for theoT (manufacturing)
S Airline
LAme (services)
an Automotive
Arche (manufacturing)
Con Computer
I (manufacturing)
Comp. Chip
(manufacturing)
LIndustif
Boeing (US)
Airbus (EU)
United (US)
Southwest(US)
GM(US)
Toyota (JPN)
Modular
Integral
Modular
Integral
Modular
Integral
Incumbent
less stable
Incumbent
less stable
Incumbent
less stable
Post-
dominant destgn
Post-
dominant design
Post-
dominant design
-4 1 4 I I
IBM (US)
Dell (US)
Intel (US)
???
Modular
Integral
Modular
Incumbent
less stable
Post-
dominant design
Pre-
dominant design
Incumbent
overtaken
Incumbent
overtaken
Incumbent
being overtaken
Incumbent
overtaken & exits
Incumbent
leads
Com. Airplane Bombar. (CN) Modular Incumbent Post- Incumbent
(manufacturing) Embraer (BR) Integral less stable dominant design being overtaken
Air Cargo Fedex (US) Modular Incumbent Post- Incumbent
(services) UPS (US) Integral less stable dominant design being overtaken
Retail Walmart (US) Modular Incumbent Post- Incumbent
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2.4.4 Addressing Sample Selection Bias
Selection bias occurs when the non-random selection of cases results in inferences based on the
resulting sample, that are not statistically representative of the population. The sample selection,
therefore (whether large-N or small-N) can bias the theory. We review some of the more
frequent concerns and evaluate them in the final chapter.
2.4.4.1 Survivor Bias
"One limitation of the data is that all the firms examined were survivors. As Freeman (1986) noted,
studying only surviving firms can create biases if survivors vary from nonsurvivors on critical
dimensions being studied. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, it is nearly impossible to obtain
accurate historical measures of business strategy for... firms that have failed, particularly those that
failed some time ago.'427
2.4.4.2 Sampling on the Dependent Variable
A confirmatory bias, like sampling on the dependent variable (or "front-runners bias") can be
important source of spuriousness in theory-building. In the case of this research the "dependent
variable" can be argued to be long-term firm performance.
427 Boeker (1989), pg. 498.
2.5 Data Sources
Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered from both primary and secondary sources
which allowed the establishment of construct validity.
As summarized in Figure 126 below, in light of the three essays of this proposed research, both
primary and secondary data sources are important to define the structure of enterprise
architectures (Essay #1); primary data sources, in terms of cognitive mental models of the most
senior decision makers, gathered longitudinally are important in Essay #2 in order to define how
the enterprise architectures function; finally secondary data sources, in terms of archival
documents are important in Essay #3, in order to define how enterprise architectures evolve.
Figure 126: Important Data Sources for each part of the Framework
Primary Data:
* Mental models of Executives
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* E)dsting empirical and theoretical research
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Essay #1: Structure
Enterprise Architectures defined
Primary Data:
Secondary Data: - Mental models of current Executives
* Historic archival documents Secondary Data:
* Historic Letters to Shareholders * Archival documents
Essay #3: Evolution Essay #2: Function
Evolution of Enterprise Architectures Competition between Enterprise Architectures
2.5.1 Primary data sources
As will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections, the primary data sources consisted
of senior decision makers (informants) at each stakeholder within a given firm's extended
enterprise, namely the firm, its customers, suppliers, investors, unions and competitors. The data
collection methods and techniques will be discussed in the following section.
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2.5.2 Secondary data sources
Examples of secondary data sources included archival documents including published company
annual reports as well as interview transcripts from published trade and news journals.
By way of example, longitudinal analysis of The Boeing Company alone required the acquisition
and review of over 75 years of annual reports totaling over 2,200 pages of text.
Additionally, review of the ongoing dynamics of the Boeing-Airbus rivalry included analysis of
over 10 news sources per day (from sources like Factiva) over the past seven years, totaling over
5,000 pages of text.
In order to begin to piece together the respective histories of Boeing and Airbus, numerous texts
documenting their development were consulted (e.g. Lynn, 1997).
2.6 Data Collection Methods and Techniques
2.6.1 Executive Summary
The plan is simply to work with the most senior leaders of both competitor firms as well as the
leaders of their key stakeholders to solve their most difficult strategic problems using whatever
methods and techniques are most effective for the situation at hand. Repeat this process
periodically over time until theoretical saturation occurs and/or financial and temporal resources
expire. Beyond that, there is no more specific plan - there can not be - as the nature of the
problem that one is asked in "solving" is continually changing, as well as the composition of the
leadership in the enterprises.
2.6.2 Methods
The best way to describe the data collection process is the author led an intensive 6-year
longitudinal group model building, critiquing and testing exercise primarily with the senior
leaders of the major stakeholders of both enterprises in a global duopoly. The purpose of the
model (or grounded theory) development focused on understanding the competitive dynamics
within the industry. The resulting model is ultimately then transformed into a more formal
simulation model.
"The specific methods appropriate for this kind of research do exist but are relatively rarely applied to
strategy process research - longitudinal studies, action science, the ethnographic approach, and
clinical methods. "428
As shown in Figure 127 below, the approach taken to data collection is highly pluralist and full-
cycle (Chatman and Flynn, 2005), and the primary methods of data collection span the spectrum
of researcher presence, ranging from "invisible" ethnographic techniques (Van Maanen, 1988) to
the more "visible" techniques of participatory action research (Heron and Reason, 1997), and in
particular, action learning (Clark, 1972; Pedler, 1991; Revans, 1980, 1982) and ultimately
clinical methods (Schein, 1987). These will be compared and contrasted in the following
sections and implications will be drawn for this research plan.
"We advocate a full-cycle approach to conducting organizational behavior research. Full-cycle
research begins with the observation of naturally occurring phenonema and proceeds by traveling
back and forth between observation and manipulation-based research settings, establishing the
power, generality, and conceptual underpinnings of the phenomenon along the way. Compared with
more traditional approaches, full-cycle research offers several advantages, such as specifying
theoretical models, considering actual and ideal conditions, and promoting interdisciplinary
integration. '.429
428 Stacey, R. (1995).
429 Chatman, J.A. and Flynn, F.J. (2005), pg. 434.
Figure 127: Researcher Intrusion Spectrum
Ethnographic Clinical
methods methods
Participant
observation
Low intrusion (invisible) High intrusion (visible)
Trust-building is less important Trust-building is important
(field-work is less time consuming) (field-work is more time consuming)
Positivist paradigm Interpretivist paradigm
"As the relationship with the organization develops, it is perfectly possible, indeed quite likely that
(ethnographic and clinical) roles will merge more and more. Clinicians find opportunities to 'wander
around' and 'observe'...and thus are able to gather the kind of data that the ethnographer is seeking.
Ethnographers are likely to be thrust increasingly into clinical roles as they come to be taken for
granted and build up trust. ,430
As we transition the discussion of the research methods used in this dissertation from the
more passive towards the more active role of the researcher, it is important to observe the
continuity of theoretical legitimacy not discontinuity.
"Open-ended interviews and participant observation... are ways of discovering how economic
participants think about the world. They are means, in other words, of identifying toe model of that
portion of the socioeconomic world which the participants themselves use in making decisions. The
conventional interpretation is captured in what at MIT is called Robert Hall's law: You can never
believe the answer to a direct question about behavior, or more crudely, 'businessmen always lie '
This intrpretation, however, suggests that this law misses the point: what interviews can reveal is not a
set of specific answers to specific questions, individual bits and pieces of information. What they
reveal are patterns of responses. Each answer, whether true or false, is a piece of that pattern.
Individual responses cannot be interpreted in isolation. But the responses groyed together, and
taken as a whole, are clues to the mental processes of the economic participants.
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Finally, it is instructive to compare this approach to methods with those from previous
influential researchers in the intellectual domains that this research aims to contribute, for
example the original contingency theorists. This description of Burns & Stalker's research
method bears a strong resemblance to the methods employeed herein.
"The method" of study we have followed are those common to what is called field sociology and to
social anthropology. These are simply directed towards gaining acquaintance, through conversation
and observation, with the routines of behavior current in the particular system being studied, and
trying thereafter to reach an appreciation of the codes of conduct which are supposed by the members
of the system to underlie behaviour. All this emerged fairly slowly in the course of the interviews,
meetings, lunch-time conversations, and the like. At the same time we, as outside observers, have
tried to construct some systematic explanatory description of what we have been told and have
observed.
All this is very far removed from any method of investigation which could possibly be called
scientific. It does not share the principal advantage of anthropological field method, which lies in a
lengthy period of residence in the community being studied Everything has had to depend on what
ability we had to appreciate the significance of the things and happenings we saw during out spells
inside fJctories, and to elicit information in interviews and conversations. We had also to learn to
distinguish the tones and additives which were occasioned by our roles as outsiders, as academic
people, as confidants, as critics.
Our usual procedure, after the first interview with the head of a firm, was to conduct a series of
interviews with as large a number of persons as possible (some 300 persons) in managerial and
supervisory positions. Such interviews lasted anything from one hour to a whole working day.
It was during this stage that it proved possible to create a more productive relationship than can be
constructed on the basis of one person's seeking information from another. The conventions
governing such interviews and the limits of of information regarded as admissible or relevant are
nowadays prescribedfairly strictly. To go beyond these limits, it is not enough to demonstrate interest
or even sympathy; in the writers' experience, an informant will get to the point offormulating and
presenting his experience, beliefs, opinions, anxieties, and criticisms only when there has been
established a relationship which is reciprocal in some genuine sense; when there is some point for
the informant in going further than the needs of courtesy, and compliance with an undertaking by the
firm to co-operate with the researcher, seem to require of him. Thus the researcher has to make the
relationship 'real'; one in which he is prepared to behave on his side as what he declares himself to
be. This can be done only by showing how he is making use of the information he is receiving; by the
occasional interpretation of a situation in terms which are both derived from his perception of the
situation as an outsider and as a sociologist or psychologist, and which are also appropriate to his
informant's ability or preparedness to comprehend it. From then on, whether the interpretation is
accepted or not, there is a freer, more satisfactory quality about the interview, a stronger desire to
recruit and present facts, examples and views. There are no interpretations and appraisals
contained in any part of this report which have not been communicated at some time or other to
persons involved in the situations at issue. Invariably, also, we have found our own ideas being
amended, extended or corrected by such traffic.
After we had become acquainted with the general structure and functioning of the organization, we
sought opportunities of observing how people dealt with each other, and also of pursuing, by.further
interviews, some of the problems of description and interpretation which by this time had appeared. In
their simplest and most significant form, these problems were presented as discrepancies between the
account of the same functions or parts of the organization given us by different people concerned in
them. Such discrepancies, in our experience, are always present, and provide the most direct
introduction to the analysis of a situation or social system in sociological terms. 'P32
432 Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. (1961), pp. 12-15.
2.6.2.1 Ethnographic Methods
"The goal is to reveal the underlying structure that is out there, and the assumption dominates that if
the ethnographer had sufficient time to observe passively it would eventually reveal itself. 433
Nearly all of the initial fieldwork began as a series of unobtrusive ethnographies at multiple
enterprise stakeholder sites. Various techniques such as observation, participant observation,
archival documentation review, unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews, and
focus groups434 were employed in order to build empirically valid, albeit relatively shallow data
sets.
Within strategic management, recent interest in studying firm heterogeneity with an industry via
the resource-based view tradition, has lead to calls from academic to employ more obtrusive
methods (Rouse and Daelenbach, 1999).
"Ethnographic methods include those that range from the low-intrusion types such as semi-structured
and unstructured interviews, and unobtrusive observation, to high-intrusion methods such as
participation observation... Generally speaking, the higher level of intrusion, involvement or
participation in an organization, the higher level of understanding, the greater the degree of sense-
making, and the richer the descriptive and analytical possibilities for the data. Participant
observation, because it permits trust relations to develop, allows the researcher to collect data that
are different in kind and quality from data produced by any other method. It is hard to imagine survey
respondents, for example providing sensitive, confidential, or highly consequential data. Similarly,
interviewers who do not spend sufficient time within an organization are unlikely to gain access to
data that would be exchanged only among trusted insiders within the culture. '435
As the next step for the research problem, therefore was to gain focus and sharpness, the
opportunity began to slowly emerge to evolve the data collection towards more depth via clinical
methods described next.
"It may be true that until the ethnographer becomes 'helpful', he or she will not truly be accepted into
the group and given access to the data he needs. ,436
433 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 30.
434 Luna-Reyes, L.F. (2003), pp. 281-282.
43' Rouse and Daellenbach (1999), pg. 490.
436 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 28.
2.6.2.2 Action Research / Clinical Methods / Policy Research
"The relationship between the analyst and the client has significantly evolved with the analysis being
more often used as a platform for dialog between stakeholders with very different objectives and
problem views, rather than a simple delivery of a best solution. ,37
"While the analyst him/herself may not be neutral, the analysis must be with extensive tradeoff
analyses and even game playing to show the interrelationships between different objectives. We are
just beginning here but this is a major paradigm shift from the analyst, problem definer and solution
provider to the analyst aiding in a complex stakeholder consensus building process providing neutral
information and convening - but not dominating - the debate. '438
Academics have begun to question the role of analysts in research (Marks, 2003), leaning toward
a more clinical approach, employing action research methods.
"This article describes the deficiencies of positivist science for generating knowledge for use in
solving problems that members of organizations face. Action research is... a method for correcting
these deficiencies. When action research is tested against the criteria of positivist science, action
research is found not to meet its critical tests. The appropriateness of positivist science is questioned
as a basis for judging the scientific merits of action research. Action research can base its legitimacy
as science in philosophical traditions that are different from those which legitimate positivist
science. 439
In order to capture the depth and complexity of the phenomenon under study, this research
dissertation aims to complement the traditional low-intrusion methods of ethnography with the
higher-intrusion methods of action research.440 In order to understand how strategic change
processes occur, Argyris (1968, 1985) has argued that significantly new research methods of
action science are required.
"...it implies significant researcher commitment and organizational access, which few researchers
have achieved to date. As a consequence, very few developmental studies of strategy formulation and
implementation have been conducted. One reason why gaining organizational access has been
problematic is because researchers seldom place themselves into the manager's frame of reference to
conduct the studies. ,441
"Pettigrew's book is based on eight years of research. In fact, two of the eight years of research
were funded directly by ICI. In the worst case, organizations that pay the costs of becoming the
subject of advanced research will try to manipulate the researcher, either by socializing him or her
into their value systems or by making cooperation dependent on 'useful' results or at least the
display of a 'reasonable' attitude. It is a disturbing proposition that the theory of organization may
have finally approached a point where methodological requirements make further advances
dependent on the good will ofpowerful insiders. ,442
437 Marks, D.H. (2003), pg. 2.
438 Marks, D.H. (2003), pg. 5.
439 Susman G.I. and Evered R.D. (1978), pg. 582.
440 1 am indebted to Prof. Sarah Kaplan for coaching me through the use and validity of clinical methods research,
and in particular for pointing me towards the work of Prof. Ed Schein.
441 Van de Ven, A. H. (1992), pg. 181.
442 Streeck, W. (1986), pg. 92.
Action research is known under various names with slightly different meanings in a variety of
contexts. These include: "clinical methods" (Schein, 1987), "policy research" (Etzioni, 2006),
and "Collaborative Interactive Action Research" (Rapoport et al., 2002).
"Policy research requires a profoundly different nmethodology from that on which basic research
relies, because policy research is always dedicated to changing the world while basic research seeks
to understand it as it is. '43
The following subsections each briefly discuss the focus of action research on: strategic
capability-building, organizational change and theory building.
2.6.2.2.1 Focus on Strategy Process (not Content)
"In the clinical model, an important distinction is between process consultation that highlights
helping the client solve his or her own problems, and expert consulting that puts the clinician into a
doctor or expert role from which he or she prescribes solutions. "444
As previously discussed, this research is designed to establish long-term trust-based relationships
with the most senior leaders of both Boeing and Airbus as well as with the senior leaders of their
respective key stakeholders, namely their customers, suppliers, investors and employee unions.
"I have learned much from my teachers, even more from my colleagues, but I have learned the most
from my students. "445
The primary stance of the researcher is as an independent in-house strategy process consultant446
and executive education provider to the most senior leaders of firms comprising both enterprises.
The stated objective of the researcher is to build each enterprise's strategic thinking capabilities,
which is broadly achieved by facilitated group model-building exercises, with representatives of
each enterprise's key stakeholders. The concurrent participation with both enterprises has been
acknowledged a priori, with the obvious stipulation that there would be no exchange of sensitive
or proprietary information.447 As will be discussed later, the data collection methods range from
action learning/clinical methods to ethnography.
"To understand architecture and its impact one needs to understand the political and cultural
dimensions of leadership and architecting, as Ted Piepenbrock described. [When considering] Ted
Piepenbrock's efforts at Boeing, the audience is the Board of Directors, who are trying to make
architectural decisions about the Boeing enterprise. Ted's role is not to be an outside architect;
rather he is operating as a kind offacilitator in the board's own thinking about its architecture He
does, however, carry out his own research in the firm - this gives him credibility with the audience
and helps him elucidate the key choices and consequences facing them in their architecting (i.e.
modular versus integral enterprise). "448
443 Etzioni, A. (2006), pg. 833.
444 Schein, E. (1987), pp. 37-38.
"' From the Talmud / Book of Proverbs.
446 As opposed to a strategy content provider, which implies no exchange of sensitive or proprietary information.
447 Non-disclosure agreements (NDA) as well as non-compete agreements (NCA) without express written consent,
were obviously part of the research contracts.
448 Comments and critiques of this framework by graduate students in the Spring 2006 MIT ESD class, Enterprise
Architecting.
In order to integrate information from across intra-firm functions as well as external inter-firm
stakeholders, the organizational development literature has acknowledged the importance of
boundary-spanning "boundary objects". In this tradition, the process consulting described above
resembled a "boundary object" - in as much as a conversation, or a trust-based relationship can
be seen as an invisible boundary object.
2.6.2.2.2 Focus on Intervention and Change
"One can not understand a human system without trying to change it. The essential dynamics of the
system are assumed to remain invisible to the passive observer. ,449
Unlike, the ethnographer who takes great care not to disturb or contaminate the human system
that they are observing, the clinician's aims are the opposite - to purposefully disturb the human
system via an intervention designed to change and ultimately improve the organization. While
clinical data tends to be deeper and richer than ethnographic data, it may suffer from
experimental validity. The research design recognized these trade-offs, and was customized to
fit the situation as described below.
"Clinical fieldwork demands a long-term, open-ended, give-and-take commitment to bringing about
organizational change. "4o
The use of clinical methods, focused on organizational change requires special characteristics of
both the researcher as well as the organization itself Sterman notes that the researcher requires a
unique multidisciplinary set of skills:
"You have an ethical responsibility to carry out your work with rigor and integrity. You must 'speak
truth to power', telling the clients that their most cherished beliefs are wrong... even it if means you
will be fired. If your client's minds are closed...you must quit. Get yourself a better client. [This
requires] both first-rate analytical skills and excellent interpersonal and political skills. ,"4
Throughout this intensive longitudinal field study, in order to maintain ethical responsibility and
integrity, I opted to terminate the fieldwork on multiple occasions. This served to maintain the
appearance objectivity in the relationship with the informant organizations, as well as to counter
the claims from academics in the ethnographic tradition (but not in the clinical methods tradition)
who are concerned with the observer "going native".
The use of clinical methods varied from across firms in the case study depending upon the firm's
perceived needs or organizational change. For example, Boeing, the incumbent under attack
from the challenger, Airbus, felt more urgent need at high organizational levels to initiate
organizational change. For this reason, clinical methods emerged from initial ethnographic
methods at Boeing, while the ethnographic methods were more appropriate at Airbus. In the
quest for sharp methodological fidelity, the clinical phase at Boeing was a long-term452, open-
ended endeavor with "pull" coming from the highest levels of management.
449 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 29. Also in Starbuck and Nystrom (1981).
450 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 5.
451 Sterman, J. (2000), pp. 85 and 105.
452 A brief survey of recent field-based doctoral research in management reveals that duration of field-based data
collection ranges from approximately 6-12 weeks (e.g. W. Orlikowski, 1990; S.Kaplan, 2003).
"The clinician, unlike the ethnographer, is welcome in the halls, meeting rooms and corner offices
occupied by those in high position. '53
Finally, Schein (1987) differentiates between process consultation and expert consultation in
clinical fieldwork.454 As process consultation focuses on helping the client to solve their own
problems (as opposed to expert consultation, which solves the client's problems), this research
design focused primarily on the use of process-oriented clinical methods. In this way,
managerial frames were more readily revealed through the process of guided joint-discovery or
co-creation of knowledge. To this end, the primary technique used was the development of
scenarios as strategic conversations (van der Heijden, 1996; Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002).
2.6.2.2.3 Focus on Theory Development
"The clinical perspective is oriented towards the dynamics of change and improvement. It is
therefore normative in its orientation and requires underlying theories that provide normative
direction - concepts of health, effectiveness, growth, innovation, integration, and the like. "55
As clinical methods tend to generate normative theory, it fits well within the aims of strategic
management scholarship.
"The best use of clinical data is in the construction of variables and theoretical models. The clinician
learns about some of the most fundamental dynamics that operate in an organization, and it is often
very clear, even though not provable, what those dynamics are."456
As will be discussed later, in the analytical techniques section, the use of nonlinear dynamic
numerical simulation via the system dynamics method relies greatly on clinical data for the
development of solid theories and the subsequent robust policy design.
"The power of clinical work.., under the label of 'action science'...is that such work provides better
variables and better understanding of the system dynamics than other research methods and thus
must be utilized more in building useful and parsimonious theory."457
One of the more influential theories developed in organizational science is Contingency Theory
as developed by researchers like Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). While numerous criticisms of the
theory abound, particularly surrounding the adequacy of their concepts and measures (Aldrich,
2006: 126), Lawrence and Lorsch defend their theory by noting the inherent qualitative, clinical
nature of their methods.
"As Lawrence and Lorsch (1973) pointed out in reply to their critics, they conducted a clinical study
rather than a highly quantitative, rigorously-controlled field study, and their conclusions owe as
much to their clinical and professional insight as to the rudimentary data analysis presented.""58
453 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 5.
454 Schein, E. (1987), pp. 37-38.
455 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 40.
456 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 54.
457 Schein, E. (1987), pg. 55.
458 Aldrich, H. E. (2006), pg. 127.
2.6.3 Techniques
2.6.3.1 Temporal (longitudinal)
The research program is designed to span the social, economic, cultural, institutional and
academic environments within which the two enterprises of the case study are embedded. As the
theoretical construct of "enterprise architecture" compares the efficiency-based mass production
firm (e.g. Boeing) and its counterpart, the value-infused lean institution (e.g. Airbus)459 the
research program is based out of two leading universities in the US and Europe, with their
notable strengths rooted in each tradition: MIT and the University of Oxford.
As shown in Figure 128, the research was designed to take place over a nearly eight-year period,
being broken down roughly into the following three two-and-a-half-year periods:
Figure 128: Research Timeline
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Phase I consisted of an initial three-year pilot study was conducted at (Boeing) the
primary case study site under the academic auspices of the joint MBS/MS Leaders for
Manufacturing program of the Engineering Systems Division. The purpose of the pilot
study was to clearly define the research problem, develop preliminary grounded theory
and secure a platform (e.g. doctoral funding, doctoral committee, industrial commitment
and access) for a doctoral research plan. The results of this pilot study is summarized in
the document, "Enterprise Design for Dynamic Complexity: Architecting and
Engineering Organizations using System and Structural Dynamics" (Piepenbrock, 2004).
459 The "Organization-Institution" dichotomy was first discussed by Selznick, 1957.
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* Phase II consisted of another two-year block which was designed to more fully develop
grounded theory from empirical field-based case studies by establishing and validating
theoretical constructs and propositions.
* Phase III will consist of a final two-year block which is designed to validate and extend
the theory developed using two means: first, an via analysis of other firms and industries;
second, via extensive multidisciplinary review of theoretical literature. If Phase II built
theory grounded in empirical data, Phase III will build meta-theory from existing
theories, as well as extend and validate the theory.
As shown in Figure 129, the field-based data collection has been executed from January 2002 to
July 2009. Typically, three-month visits were conducted every twelve months for over seven
years at Boeing and the sites of its constituent stakeholders. The total field contact time thus far
exceeds 4,000 hours, including approximately 500 hours of action learning based interviews and
discussions with stakeholders described below.
Figure 129: Fieldwork Timeline
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Also as is shown in Figure 130 below, the 4,000 hours of fieldwork at both competitors in the
global airplane duopoly took place over the time period that the incumbent (Boeing) was
overtaken by the challenger (Airbus). This was an opportune time to capture the complex
dynamics of managerial cognitive frames as the reality changed for the first time in such a slow
clockspeed industry.
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Figure 130: Fieldwork Timeline & Competitive Duopoly Dynamics
800
600
A400
200
0
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
In addition, as the industry produces capital goods, it is subjected to well-known oscillations
(Sterman, 2000), having a period of approximately ten years. As shown in Figure 131 below,
The research therefore took place over one full-cycle in order to capture the dynamics first
during the downturn, where integral enterprise archiecture was expected to outperform the
modular enterprise architecture, as well as during the upturn, where the converse occurs.
Figure 131: Fieldwork Timeline & the Business Cycle
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2.6.3.2 Spatial (triangulation)
"Interviews often provoke a 'knee-jerk' reaction that the data are biased in which impression
management [by image-conscious informants] and retrospective sensemaking are deemed the prime
culprits. The challenge of interview data is best mitigated by data collection approaches that limit
bias. A key approach is using numerous and highly knowledgeable informants who view the focal
phenomena from diverse perspectives. These informants can include organizational actors from
different hierarchical evels, functional areas, groups, and geographies, as well as actors from other
relevant organizations and outside observers such as market analysts. Another approach to
mitigating bias is to combine retrospective and real-time cases (Leonard-Barton, 1990). "
In addition to the collection of data temporally across time, this research plan calls for spatial
collection of data both "horizontally" across the key stakeholders of the enterprise, as well as
"vertically" within each stakeholder's hierarchical structure. In this sense, the goal is to map the
micro-frames of key decision makers across the macro-enterprise of key stakeholders.
2.6.3.2.1 Horizontal (Inter-firm) triangulation
"The theory that we are developing together represents the exact opposite way we that currently see
our strategy... [it] challenges the conventional wisdom and power structure of the highest levels of
this company. Having relentlessly discussed [it] over and over again over the past few years, with
people who have a strong vested interest in disproving it, has been given the theory a 'baptism by a
hundredfires'- it certainly has been pressure-tested'".461
In order to ensure internal validity of the theory, the research design included triangulation of the
data sources. To this end, the above-described data collection techniques were applied internally
within Boeing at senior leadership levels across multiple functions such as marketing,
engineering, manufacturing and supplier management as well as externally to Boeing's
stakeholders such as its customers, suppliers, labor unions, etc., as shown in Figure 132 below.
Figure 132: Empirical "Triangulation" of Boeing Case Study
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460 Eisenhardt, K.M. and Graebner, M.E. (2007), pg. 28.
461 Quotation from Boeing director, Summer 2005.
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The research was designed to sample a number of the 'internal" functional problems. Examples
of the types of intra-firm research studies performed for the functional leaders are shown below
in Figure 133.
Figure 133: Intra-firm Research "Projects"
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For the second phase based out of the University of Oxford, a similar schedule and approach is
envisaged for Airbus and its constituent European stakeholders. In this way, triangulation of data
from interconnected sources can begin to paint a systematic picture of the global commercial
airframe industry ecosystem which may share common stakeholders like customers or suppliers
as shown in Figure 134.
Figure 134: Empirical "Triangulation" of the Commercial Airplane Industry
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2.6.3.2.2 Vertical (Intra-firm) triangulation
"I have the biggest risk profde and the broadest time horizon in the company. I can bring to bear the
right risk-taking and time horizon trade-offs. ,s62
In order to further increase internal validity, data collection methods took place a multiple levels
with each stakeholder organization. As shown in Figure 135 below, as one ascends an
organization vertically, the level of power, control and integration (or "architectural design
authority") increases, facilitating the need for different approaches in accessing reliable data. At
these levels, as meaning and reality are more socially-constructed, this makes accessing the data
more difficult via conventional positivist methods, and easier via more constructivist methods.
Figure 135: Mapping Micro-Frames Across the Macro-Enterprise
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Note that this vertical triangulation within the organization's hierarchy is supported by
Thompson's (1967) claims that organizations operate more like closed-systems (i.e. rational,
strategic design lens) at lower levels and more like open-systems (i.e. satisficing, political design
lens) at higher levels. Thompson refers to three levels: technical, managerial and institutional.
While this research engages all three levels, it particularly emphasizes the open-systems
institutional levels where the formal design authority of the "architect" resides.
462 General Electric chairman and CEO, Jeffrey R. Immelt, interviewed by Thomas A. Stewart in the Harvard
Business Review, "Growth as a Process," June 2006, pg. 69.
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2.6.3.2.3 Political, Cultural and Temporal triangulation
Research designs dominated by the strategic design lens, view organizations as objective,
rational optimizers. As such research methods like survey questionnaires are deemed as logical
vehicles to access valid data. The researcher is able to treat the data sources and the data itself as
"commodities" in that precious research time and resources are not "wasted" nurturing long-
term, trust-based relationships with the data sources, the answers received represent truths or
valid data, and that any researcher (given a proper specification of how the original data was
collected) can go back to the same data sources, issue the same surveys and get broadly similar
"truths" (controlling obviously for longitudinal effects).
This approach may in fact be valid for research in organizations under certain conditions.
However, as this research dissertation aims to access data across multiple external stakeholders
as well as across multiple internal functions, divisions and levels, as well as longitudinally across
multiple time frames, it is by definition crossing important political, cultural and temporal
boundaries, requiring the research lenses to incorporate these points of view.
"You have an ethical responsibility to carry out your work with rigor and integrity. You must 'speak
truth to power', telling the clients that their most cherished beliefs are wrong... even it if means you
will be fired If your client's minds are closed...you must quit. Get yourself a better client. [This
requires] both first-rate analytical skills and excellent interpersonal and political skills. "463
Viewed from these lenses, the researcher sees that the data and data sources can not be treated as
commodities in that research time and resources must be spent nurturing long-term, trust-based
relationships with the data sources, understanding their local objectives and conflicts of interest
both within the firms and between firms. In addition to time and resources, this requires specific
skill on the part of the researcher to build these relationships with the data sources. As failure to
consider these organizational complexities could result in invalid data.
The following examples taken from early phases of this research dissertation illustrates that
failure to control for such political, cultural and temporal effects results in significantly different
data and theoretical models. Figure 136 below illustrates the significance of not controlling for
"political effects" when collecting and analyzing data from the customer stakeholder group.
463 Sterman, J. (2000), pp. 85 and 105.
Figure 136: Data from the Customer stakeholder with and without "political controls"
Early Question to Customers: Later Question to Customers:
How do you make purchasing decisions? How do you make purchasing decisions?
Answer (from surveys, low trust, or Answer (from the same informant
"politicar environments): Customer in confidence or high trust environment):
"We use a complex rational algorithm based on "Look, the DCF breaks even in seven years -
a DCF evaluation carefully optimized to total I won't be around then. It's a lowest price game!"
product life-cycle cost."
document, is that customers for the firm's products make purchasing decisions base on complex,
yet rational decision algorithms which minimize total long-term costs to the customer. It is
interesting to note that this answer from senior managers from the customer stakeholdertriangulated co sistently w th senior managers in the firm and by s nior lead s within the
investor stakeholder group. This "truth" led the firm, to launch differentiated high-performance
products which could balance the initial purchase cost of their product with the long-term
operations costs of owning the product.
After spending over three years and over 1,500 hours of research time with the firm and its key
stakeholders, and importantly building long-term trust and political capital, when the same data
sources were sampled again for longitudinal validity checks, the data was found to be
significantly different. This time, in a high-trust, apolitical environment, the same customer
informant indicated that although company policy was as he had initially indicated, he was not at
liberty to share "the truth" of how he really made decisions, which were ultimately based on
lowest initial acquisition costs. This "truth" would lead the firm to precisely the exact opposite
product strategy (in fact to that of its competitor) which focused on maximizing productivity so
that initial price could be minimized, even at the expense of lower product capabilities and life-
cycle costs.
What had changed in this dramatic turn-around in the quality of the data? It appears that the
quality of the relationships with the data sources matter significantly. As will be discussed later
in Essay#1, there may be a fundamental systemic characteristic of the architecture of the
enterprises under study (including the academic community) that encourage short-term, arms
length commodity treatment of data sources to make decisions.
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Another one of dozens of potential examples is shown below in Figure 137 regarding the
supplier stakeholder group.
Figure 137: Data from the Supplier stakeholder with and without "political controls"
Customers
Resulting action
Maintain sho
relationships.
statement to a sma
Early Question to Suppliers (to both a and ):
Which firm do you like working for most?
Answer (from surveys, low trust or "political"
environments):
"We enjoy working for [Firm a] more."
N% relationships with
Later Question to Suppliers (to both a and ):
W1hich firm would you rather work for?
sppl)M Answer (from the same informant
in confidence or high trust environment):
It is much harder supplying to [Firm P],
but it Is better for our business to serve them."
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2.7 Data Analysis Methods and Techniques
Having discussed the techniques for data collection, this section briefly summarizes the
techniques for the analysis of the data. That is, the process in taking written data and
transforming it into numerical data suitable for numerical simulation.
"Since 'linking' is at the heart of system dynamics, grounded theory speaks to the same goal of
drawing relationships among factors in a targeted system. "4
Two primary methods (and associated techniques) for analyzing data are briefly discussed:
grounded theory and simulation modeling. While these have occasionally been seen as
complementary (Burchill and Fine, 1997; Perlow, Okhuysen and Repenning, 2002; Luna-Reyes
and Andersen, 2003; Laws and McLeod, 2004), it is the purpose of this section - and in fact this
research design - to integrate them into a unified method contributing in a coherent way to the
broader research design.
"We used a combination of ethnography and causal loop diagrams. The resulting model is both
tightly grounded in our data and provides a logical and internally consistent explanation qof how the
micro-level interactions involved in decision making combined to create the more macro-level
changes we observed The utility of our approach lies not in the direct transferability of our findings,
but in the ability to produce grounded theory that could not be identified with a broader-brush data-
collection method. Further, by using causal loop diagrams to specify our emerging theory, we have
made it easier for scholars to mathematically formalize and empirically test our results. ,465
2.7.1 Qualitative Analysis Methods
The primary two broadly qualitative analysis methods used for data analysis were: grounded
theory and linguistic analysis. Each will be discussed in turn.
2.7.1.1 Grounded Theory
Grounded theory consists not only of a set of techniques to identify major concepts across texts,
but more importantly it links the concepts together to generate meaningful theories.
The "texts" used in this research range from first-hand interview transcripts, to second-hand
magazine interviews and letters to shareholders. Through the process of "memoing", the
concepts and categories that arise through textual analysis are likely to become the stocks and
flows of the system dynamics model, described in the next section.
For this research thus far, memos were composed each night summarizing the emerging themes
of the day's interview, meetings and discussions. Approximately two hours of off-site work was
spent coding and analyzing the field data for every one of the approximately 500 hours of
facilitated action-learning / group model building exercises.
464 Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2003), pp. 284-285.
465 Perlow, Okhuysen and Repenning (2002), pg. 932 and 934.
Based on this information, a conceptual model was built by inferring hypotheses from the field
data about causal structural relationships that led to observed patterns of behavior.
"Accurate description and verification are not so crucial when one 's purpose is to generate theory.
This is especially true because evidence and testing never destroy a theory (of any generality), they
only modify it. A theory 's only replacement is a better theory. "466
2.7.1.2 Linguistic Theory
"The linguistic turn in the social sciences prompted calls for more complex understandings of
organizations that would emphasize language not only as enabling information exchange but also as
constructing social and organizational reality (Dandridge, Mitroff & Joyce, 1980; Pondy & Mitrqff
1979). This linguistic approach has led to increased interest by organization theorists in such issues
as the intimate relationship between language and organization (Daft & Wiginton, 1979). "467
Linguistic analysis has taken an increasing role in the analysis of organizations (Heracleous and
Barrett (2001). Multiple methods have emerged which capture the richness of organizational
exchange (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). This research focuses on using two such accepted
approaches: discourse analysis and textual analysis.
"Semiotics (Barley, 1983), hermeneutics (Philips and Brown, 1993), and discursive (Kilduff 1993)
and narrative analyses (Boje, 1995) have each been introduced as a method for understanding
organizational phenomena. "468
At the core of the theory presented herein, is an organizational (or relational) construct, namely,
are enterprise architectures modular or integral. In order to observe this empirically, the chances
for success in arriving at a truth (to the extent that such a quest is epistemologically possible) is
to observe such relational quantities as "trust" and "patience." This is not a trivial activity. Can
one observe these quantities, and if so, how can one communicate these observations as "truths".
"There is a tradition in the analysis of social life that treats the social world as an independently
perceivable phenomenon, something that observers delineate, describe, and make coherent.
Observation and the observer stand removed Recent trends in social philosophy challenge this
subject-object distinction, viewing as isomorphic the seer and the seen, the knower and the known
(Ryan, 1970). The correspondence theory of thuth is rejected, Jbr within a phenomenological
perspective, there is no single 'correct' reading of the 'external world.' The problem of qualitative
analysis based on fieldwork is that of avoiding solipsism on the one hand and avoiding positivism on
the other. One approach to this problem is to make language the locus of analysis and not to confuse
the language system used to 'explain' orformulate the world with the objects of study. '469
2.7.1.2.1 Discourse Analysis
"The concept of 'deep structures' is essential to afuller understanding of social and natural systems
at all levels of analysis (Gersick, 1991; Light, 1979). Deep structures can be defined as relatively
466 Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967), pg. 28.
467 Heracleous and Barrett (2001), pg. 755.
468 Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), pg. 39.
469 Manning (1979), pg. 660.
stable, largely implicit, and continually recurring processes and patterns that underlie and guide
surface, observable events and actions. Accounts of deep structure vary indifferent theoretical
domains. In the domain of discourse, we hae approached deep structure as persistent features of
discourse that transcend individual texts, speakers, authors, situational contexts, and
communicative action as a whole and over the long term..470
This research seek to reveal the underlying "deep structures" within the discourse of competing
enterprise architectures.
2.7.1.2.1.1 Rhetorical Analysis
Within the analysis of deep structures in discourse between stakeholders within an enterprise
architecture, this research focuses on a particular type of discourse, that of rhetoric, which
focuses on political or interest-laden discourse between stakeholders. A table with the
chronological listing of the inter-stakeholder discourse (for primary and secondary firms in the
theoretical sample) is given in Appendix I.
"Rhetoric, or the art of persuasion, has a long history in the humanities (Richards, 1936; Burke,
1969, Aristotle, 1991) and at one time, supersceded logic as a mode of assessing truth (Zald, 1993)...
Rhetorical analysis shares this interest in the role of language in structuring social action but is
distinguished by a very specific focus on suasion and influence. In this context, rhetoric forms a
subset of discourse analysis.. Rhetoric restricts its focus to explicitly political or interest-laden
discourse and seeks to identify genres or recurrent patterns of interests, goals, and shared
assumptions that become embedded in persuasive texts (Freedman and Medway). '
2.7.1.2.2 Textual Analysis
Although much of the linguistic analysis in this research captures stakeholder discourse broadly,
it focuses also on capturing language used in texts in more formal texts, like annual reports to
shareholders.
470 Heracleous and Barrett (2001), pg. 758.
471 Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), pp. 39-40.
2.7.2 Quantitative Analysis Methods
2.7.2.1 Simulation Modeling
"Grounded theory approaches are used to develop variables which have significant explanatory
power and are intimately tied to the data The cause and effect relationships among these variables
are then shown using causal-loop diagramming techniques from the field of system dynamics. '472
Having transformed the empirical case data into concepts and categories via memoing, the
concepts and categories are then assembled into a causal model with multiple feedback
relationships in a method recently described as Inductive System Diagrams (Burchill and Fine,
1997).
"The Inductive System Diagram method builds on the strengths of accepted coding practices for
variable development and causal-loop diagramming for variable integration. 473
This causal model is then transformed into a nonlinear dynamic simulation model via the
identification of state variables (stocks or levels) and decision heuristics (flows or rates) which
change the states of the system. This method is known as system dynamics (Forrester, 1961,
Sterman, 2000).
"Unlike many formal models in the social science literature, ours was not deduced from general
principles but, using the methods of grounded theory, was induced from a range of domains. While
commonly used to build theory from raw data using qualitative analysis, the grounded theory
approach is not limited to this activity. Strauss and Corbin (1994) advocated the development of
formal (or general) theories grounded in previously generated domain-specific (what they call
substantive) analyses. They remind the reader that Glaser and Strauss (1967) not only urged the use
of grounded theory in conjunction with quantitative analysis but also recommended its use to generate
theory from theory .' 74
2.7.2.2 Philosophical Stance on Modeling Complex Enterprises
"Chaos theory provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the dynamic evolution of
industries and the complex interactions among industry actors... which exhibit both unpredictability
and underlying order. 4'75
When modeling complex socio-technical enterprises, this research takes the epistemological
view that the range of behavior in question can be best understood via nonlinear dynamic
deterministic methods (including, but not limited to chaos theory).
"All nonlinear feedback systems, including human organizations, can be expressed in terms of lawful
rules and relationships: that is, such systems are deterministic in the same fuindamental sense as
Newton's laws or the laws of supply and demand in neoclassical economic theory. "476
472 Burchill and Fine (1997), pg. 469.
473 Burchill and Fine (1997), pg. 476.
474 Rudolph, J.W. and Repenning, N.P. (2002), pg. 3.
475 Levy, D. (1994), pg. 167.
While Beer (1959) classified the firm or the economy as an "exceedingly complex, probabilistic
system", this research takes its philosophical queue from one of Beer's contemporaries in
feedback thinking, Forrester (1961) who believed that firms and economies could be modeled as
"exceedingly complex, deterministic systems", a space that Beer deemed pointless. 477
"Patterns of... the evolution of industries can be depicted but there is novelty in each... industry. "478
System dynamics does not model in order to predict, but in order to understand the underlying
structure driving dynamic behavior. It is a pattern-modeling process. 479
2.7.2.3 Modeling Epistemology
A note of clarification is warranted regarding the use of simulation methods to simulate
nonlinear dynamic structure-behavior relationships. As the problem being posed in this research
contains high degrees of dynamic complexity 480, conventional methods of positivist science are
challenged. A different epistemology is necessary - one rooted in generative science is better
suited.4 81 As Sterman (2000) points out, this is not without its caveats:
"Engineers and econometricians have long struggled with the problem of uniquely identifying the
structure and parameters of a system from its observed behavior. In practice the data are too scarce
and the plausible alternative specifications are too numerous for statistical methods to discriminate
among competing theories. -482
The structure and parameters may be sufficient to describe the observed dynamics, but may not
necessarily be the right structure and parameters.
2.7.2.4 Developing Causal Structures form Empirical Data
"Interview data is rich, including descriptions of decision processes, internal politics, attributions
about the motives and characters of others, and theories to explain events. "483
Sterman (2000, pg. 141) notes the importance of ensuring that correlative relationships are not
mistaken for causal structures. In addition, Sterman (2000, pg. 157) also notes that the ability of
gathering rich contextual data is important in developing system dynamics models. Therefore
survey data tends not to be as effective as semi-structured interviews.
"The modeler must triangulate by using as many sources of data as possible to gain insight into the
structure of the problem situation and the decision processes of the actors in it... People have only a
476 Stacey, R.D. (1995), pg. 481.
477 Richardson, G.P. (1990), pp. 170-171.
478 Atkinson, G. (2004), pg, 282.479 Radzicki, M. (2003), pg. 151.
480 Senge, P. (1990), pp. 71-72.
481 Epstein, J.M. (1999).
482 Sterman, J.D. (2000), pp. 26.
483 Sterman, J.D. (2000), pg. 157.
local, partial understanding of the system, so you must interview all relevant actors, at multiple
levels, including those outside the organization (customers, suppliers, etc.) ",484
Finally, Sterman (2000, pg. 157) notes that interviewees have the potential to share much less as
well as much more than they really know, making the development of internally consistent
causal structures extremely difficult requiring both scientific rigor as well as artful skill.
2.7.2.5 Model Complexity
Regarding model complexity, Repenning (2003) notes that there are two interdependent
considerations: the state of the existing theory, and the modeler's ability to develop their
audience's intuition for how the model's structure drives its behavior.
"For areas of inquiry where there have been few attempts to understand dynamics in a systematic
fashion, simple models are needed, not because the phenomenon is simple, but because there is little
on which to build. '4s
In the field of strategic management, while many calls have been to understand the dynamics,
relatively little has been done. Therefore, simple models utilizing "generic structures" (Senge,
1990) are expected to be the most effective, and will therefore be the focus of this research plan.
Such simple models can be rigorous provided that the underlying assumptions for the relatively
few variables used are justified using field data.
"In almost every field of science, a tension has existed constantly between the experimentalists and the
theorists. Certainly some of the difficulties between the two groups stem from basic misunderstanding
on both sides, of the nature and function of mathematical models. Models are too often considered
simply as predictors, and any inability to predict accurately is accepted as prima facie evidence of the
uselessness of the technique. Actually, only those engineering models designed to fit a particular set of
circumstances are even moderately successful as predictors. The more general models of theoretical
biology are used to deduce the form of the possible solutions, rather than to predict future states of
the system being modeled.' 86
2.7.2.6 Proposed System Dynamics Modeling within Framework
Having defined the conceptual properties of the archetype enterprise architectures in Essay #1, it
is envisaged that high-level system dynamics models would be built or adapted for each of the
remaining two essays in order to capture different dynamics aspects behavior implicit in the
framework.
As shown in Figure 138 below, Essay #2 would focus on the medium-term competitive
dynamics between two firms in a "mixed" duopoly setting where each firm had diametrically-
opposed objective functions, enterprise architectural forms, structural dynamic strategies. In this
model, the architectures are assumed to remain constant throughout the simulation i.e. while
there may be evolution in the market environment, there will be no "disintegration" and exit of
incumbents or re-integration and appearance of new entrants. It is envisaged that the model
484 Sterman, J.D. (2000), pg. 157.
485 Repenning, N. (2003), pg. 314.
486 Wangersky, P.J. (1978), pg. 189.
would take on a simplified version of existing market growth and competition models in the
system dynamics literature (Sterman, J.D. 1991; Paich, M. and Sterman, J.D. 1993; Sterman,
J.D., Henderson, R. Beinhocker, E.D. and Newman, L.I. 1995; Langley, P., Paich, M. and
Sterman, J.D., 1998). 487
"As a maturing industry adjusts to slower growth... companies' orientations towards adding capacity
and personnel must fundamentally shift...these shifts in perspective rarely occur in maturing
industries. ,"488
Finally, Essay #3 would focus on the higher-level, more abstract, long-term competitive
dynamics in a market in which firms can enter and exit. Here competition occurs primarily
between competing technologies serving a mass market, as individual competitor firms are
aggregated. In this model, dominant designs form tipping points between archetypal strategic
groups. "Mixed" duopoly therefore occurs at an aggregated "strategic group" level. The
enterprise architectures are permitted to "evolve" throughout the simulation i.e. there could be
"disintegration" and exit of incumbents or re-integration and appearance of new entrants. It is
envisaged that the model would take on a simplified version of existing industrial evolution
models in the system dynamics literature (Weil and Utterback, 2005; Sterman, J.D., Henderson,
R. Beinhocker, E.D. and Newman, L.I. 2005).489
Figure 138: Proposed System Dynamics Models of Framework
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487 These system dynamics models are all centered around the core "B&B Enterprises" model of Mark Paich's MIT
PhD.488 Porter, M.E. (1980), pg, 239.
489 Note it is possible that a high-level conceptual model synthesizing the models in Essays #2 and #3 could be
added to Chapter 7.
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2.8 Research Dissertation Critique
"Your doctoral proposal is rather ambitious - it is what a senior tenured faculty member would
propose at the end of a long and distinguished career. '"490
"This is just a doctoral dissertation. It's not like you are Charles Darwin, trying to develop a theory
of evolution... "91
This work aims to develop a theory of evolution - not of organisms, but of organizations - which
although ambitious, will inevitably fall short of the classic work of Charles Darwin. Like
Darwin's field research while aboard the HMS Beagle from 1831-1836, this research involved
intensive longitudinal field work, documenting, analyzing and theorizing about a variety of
species in their natural habitats.
"'It is simplistic in its obsession with afjw types, it's dogmatic in style, and it contains not one shred
of empirical evidence. Reputable academics will hate it. " 92
The following briefly summarizes some of the major perceived strengths and weakness of the
research design which are evaluated against the perceived norms established within the academic
fields that the research aims to impact, namely strategic management and engineering systems.
2.8.1 Research Tradeoffs
As this dissertation aims to build theory, it will inevitably come up against the "postulate of
commensurate complexity" (Thorngate, 1976), which asserts that social theories cannot
simultaneously maximize the goals of generalizability (external validity), accuracy (internal
validity) and simplicity.
"As noted by Weick (1979), the research process involves the inevitable tradeoffs among
generalizability, accuracy and simplicity. "'93
It is clear that by design, the theory generated by this dissertation will differ from the norm of
most research in the strategic management literature. If well executed, the theory is likely to be
above the norm on accuracy, near the norm on simplicity (relative to the level of complexity of
problem addressed), and below the norm on generalizability.
By way of an example of one such tradeoff, due to the high level of detail and effort expended on
the study of two firms (a duopoly) in one industry, the gains in accuracy come at the inevitable
cost of generalizability and potentially parsimony.
490 Comment on research from a senior Professor at a renowned university (2004).
491 Comment on research from a senior Professor at a renowned university (2007).
492 Miller, D. (1996), pg. 505. Quotation is feedback that Miller received from an SMJ reviewer on his paper on
'configurations'. Note that ten years later, Miller writes: "It was therefore a wonderful surprise to win the 1995
Strategic Management Society SMS Award for my article."
493 Dess, G.G., Newport, S. and Rasheed, A.M.A. (1993).
"Given growing interest in the evolution of organizational communities, some scholars have also
deployed a multi-population census, which tracks a number of interdependent populations
simultaneously. Resource limitations may require limited temporal coverage and less precise
measurement of vital events (Ruef 2000). "4
2.8.1.1 Accuracy (internal validity)
Merriam (1998, pp. 204-205) notes that internal validity can be strengthened by a number of
strategies that have been incorporated in this research design: triangulation in time, space and
organizational level (Denzin, 1970); long term observation of the same phenomenon,
continuously and at discrete intervals; peer examination in which comment on findings is
solicited among both academic and practitioner groups; and participative or collaborative modes
of research in all phases of the research design.
These and other strategies are employed to ensure that the theory built by this research is
empirically grounded in the data, which has been studied intensely through multiple lenses over
considerable spatial and temporal variables. To this end, the accuracy is anticipated to be
relatively high and therefore above the norm.
2.8.1.2 Generalizability (external validity)
"No useful theory can rest on the assumption that everything is unique. It is probably inevitable that
the early history of a scientific endeavor will be characterized by the opposite assumption, and by the
search for universals. I believe it is a sign of relative maturity when a field begins to focus on
patterned variations. "495
This proposed research, like that of contingency theory, acknowledges partial uniqueness in
theory development. It recognizes the relative maturity of the strategic management field and
therefore seeks "patterned variations" and not fully generalizable universals.
The fact that a theoretical sample of multiple case studies were used across a variety of industry
and geographic settings, establishes some initial degree of external validity. This is however far
from the traditional statistical sample approaches to the positivist branches of both the strategic
management and engineering systems fields. As such, it is likely that external validity would be
deemed below the norm - a consequence of the high internal validity tradeoff.
Recall also, that this research does not make claims for grand theory, and aims only for the
contingent modes of explanation that can be expected when building theory on complex socio-
technical systems.
2.8.1.3 Simplicity (parsimony)
"Construction of a simulation model involves a tension between simplicity and elaboration. We we
give talks on our simulations, afrequent (perhaps the most frequent) question we get is 'Why don 't you
494 Aldrich and Ruef (2006), pg. 268.
495 Thompson, J.D. (1967), pg. xxv.
add variable X to the model?' For theory development purposes, the objective is to construct a model
based on a simplified abstraction of a system - guided by the purpose of the simulation study - that
retains the key elements of the relevant processes without unduly complicating the model (Burton &
Obel, 1995).,,496
Finally, although this research aims to cover multiple variables, across multiple strategy
domains, covering the inputs of multiple levels of multiple stakeholders in the quest for building
configuration research in strategic management, the resulting theory is potentially very simple at
the highest level of abstraction - which is the level at which this research intends to be evaluated.
Of course, more internal validity is gained by using the lower levels of abstraction into the
mechanics of architectural properties, structural dynamics, financial valuation and industrial
evolution as this research strives to do, which necessarily makes the work far from parsimonious.
As such, it is likely that the simplicity would be at or near the norm on aggregate.
"Artful simplification is the hallmark of skillful modeling. 497
2.8.2 Research Strengths and Limitations
Due to the nature of this research design, which uses case-based theoretical sampling, the
resulting theory, although potentially rich in accuracy and ecological validity, is bound to be
limited both in its generalizability and the confidence in its causality (Hammersley, 1990).
2.8.2.1 Accuracy (internal validity)
Due to the robustness of the research design, particularly with respect to the longitudinal primary
case study, the constructs and propositions generated are likely to have relatively high internal
validity.
Determination of causality in complex systems is by definition, problematic, particularly if
some of the main "input" causal variables are difficult to observe and measure directly (e.g.
enterprise goals, boundaries, interfaces). The "output" variables (e.g. enterprise production
output) tend to be easier to observe and measure. Simulation modeling is used therefore to
lend indirect support to claims of difficult to measure and specify variables.
"Even if some variables in the computational model cannot be easily observed, the output variables
often can be. Empirical confirmation of a simulation's predictions provides indirect support for the
theory embodied in the model of the underlying (unobserved) processes.498
496 Harrison, J.R., Lin, Z., Carroll, G.R., and Carley, K.M. (2007), pg. 1238.
497 Nelson and Winter (1982), pg. 402.
498 Harrison, J.R., Lin, Z., Carroll, G.R., and Carley, K.M. (2007), pg. 1238.
2.8.2.2 Generalizability (external validity)
"One strength of building theory from cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory... [a weakness
is that it] may result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory. Such theories are likely to be testable, novel
and empirically valid, but they do lack sweep... they are essentially theories about specific phenomena.
,499
While the creation of a theoretical sample, which consists of single industry studies does avoid
the problems inherent in much strategic management research of controlling or industry effects,
it does suffer from generalizability of the results (Dess et al., 1990).
"Generalizability is based on the uniqueness of the industry's environment... clearly the more unique
the environment, the less generalizable the results. "0
The theoretical sample selected was a collection of single industry studies, designed to extend
the generalizability of the theory. However, it is important to characterize the uniqueness
common to of all the industries studied, which share among other traits relatively high industry
concentration, entry/exit barriers, and some degree of product and service differentiation - the
imperfect competition of oligopolies.
As the research was not designed to cover the cases of perfect competition for commodities, but
to focus on firms in oligopolies where firm conduct is more relevant, the resulting theory is not
expected to extend to such a general class of firms.O'
2.8.2.3 Simplicity (parsimony)
"A surprising challenge can arise from readers who are disappointed by parsimonious theory. Single
cases can enable the creation of more complicated theories than multiple cases, because single-case
researchers can fit their theory exactly to the many details of a particular case. In contrast, multiple-
case researchers retain only the relationships that are replicated across most or all of the cases.
Since there are typically fewer of these relationships than there are details in a richly observed single
case, the resulting theory is often more parsimonious (and also more robust and generalizable). "502
The use of multiple-cases (i.e. the primary and secondary cases) in this research allowed for a
more parsimonious (as well as more generalizable) theory to emerge than would have been
generated from only one case, due to the removal of "degrees of freedom" inherent in theorizing
across phenomena.
499 Eisenhardt, K. (1989), pp. 546-547.
500 Dess, G.G., Ireland, R.D. and Hitt, M.A. (1990), pg. 13.
501 An independent survey-based sample of critiques of this research is summarized in Appendix J. It is the result of
teaching the material to senior executives in the Wharton-Oxford Gateway to Strategic Leadership program from
2005-2006.
502 Eisenhardt, K.M, and Graebner, M.E., (2007), pg. 30.
2.8.3 Towards "Good" Theory
"We suggest that if the field is serious about producing stronger theory, journals need to reconsider
their empirical requirements. We argue that journals ought to be more receptive to papers that test
part rather than all of a theory and use illustrative rather than definitive data. "503
The goal of this research of developing grounded theory is hoped to be evaluated against criteria
as established by writers and evaluators of theory in organizational theory (Sutton and Staw,
1995; Weick, 1995).
"People's natural inclination is to require greater proof of a new or provocative idea than one they
already believe to be true. Therefore, if a theory is particularly interesting, the standards used to
evaluate how well it is tested or grounded need to be relaxed, not strengthened We need to recognize
that major contributions can be made when data are more illustrative than definitive. "504
"Not everything discussed in the introduction of a manuscript need be operationalized in the method
section nor show up in a set of regression equations. If theory building is a valid goal, then journals
should be willing to publish papers that really are stronger in theory than method. Authors should be
rewarded rather than punished for developing strong conceptual arguments that dig deeper and
extend more broadly than the data will justify. "505
"We have even counseled our graduate students to leave out portions of their theory that are not
measured well and to delete otherwise interesting data that did not directly relate to their theoretical
argument. The result of these omissions is that the craft of manuscript writing becomes an art qf
fitting concepts and arguments around what has been measured and discovered. 'P506
"Consider whether the evidence provided by people such as Freud, Marx, or Darwin would meet the
empirical standards of the top journals in organizational research. When theories are particularly
interesting or important, there should be greater leeway in terms of empirical support. A small set of
interviews, a demonstration experiment, a pilot survey, a bit of archival data may be all that is needed
to show why a particular process might be true. "50o
503 Sutton, R.I. and Staw, B.M. (1995), pg. 371.
504 Sutton, R.I. and Staw, B.M. (1995), pg. 382.
5os Sutton, R.I. and Staw, B.M. (1995), pg. 382.
o06 Sutton, R.I. and Staw, B.M. (1995), pg. 381.
507 Sutton, R.I. and Staw, B.M. (1995), pg. 383.
2.8.4 Future Research
"We need perhaps contingent theories of explanation... we would not expect a single unified theory to
emerge from such efforts, because such a unified explanation is clearly a long way off even if it is a
desirable goal, but we would expect that it would produce fruitful and novel generalizations. "508
Therefore, in the quest to discover the deep underlying foundational nature of long-term firm
competitive performance and the evolutionary systemic interactions between the firm's
capabilities and its environment, this research will necessarily be bounded by contingent theories
of explanation, however novel and fruitful they may aim to be.
"Perhaps 'grand' theory requires multiple case studies - an accumulation of both theory-building and
theory-testing empirical studies. "509
In order to more deeply validate and extend the generalizability of the mid-range theory
developed by this research plan, another concurrent doctoral research plan has been proposed
(and is being undertaken by the author) which is grounded in more traditional, deductive,
correlative, statistically quantitative, hypothesis-based, theory-testing methods.
508 Henderson R. and Mitchell W., (1997).
509 Eisenhardt, K. (1989), pg. 547.
Part H: THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS & PROPOSITIONS
Chapter 3 Firm Performance
We begin decomposing the theory, by examining what we are trying to explain: superior long
term firm performance.
3.1 Shareholders vs. Stakeholders: The Counterintuitive Puzzle
"How do firms that have a stakeholder approach dffer in competitiveness, commitment, and strategic
flexibility from firms that maximize stockholder wealth? "'o
The primary purpose of this investigation is to explore the sources of firm competitive advantage
and specifically on the relatively narrow metric of maximization of shareholder value.
3.1.1 Market Value
As shown in Figure 139 below, the market capitalization of two "world-class" firms, one
representing manufacturing (Toyota Motors) and one representing services (Southwest Airlines)
greatly exceeds that of the sum of their major competitors. And yet as will be argued in chapter
4, this is a not metric which they are trying to maximize, while ironically it is the prime goal of
their competitors.
Figure 139: Dominant Firm Performance
Manufacturing Example:
Toyota Motors
-AJ
Service Example:
Southwest Airlines
While the blue firms
are trying to maximize
shareholder value,
the red firms are not.
What is going on?
Market Capitalization
(1994-2004)
Market Capitalization
(1994-2004)
Instead of illustrating the shareholder value performance as a static or averaged snapshot as
shown above, we will explore most dependent and independent variables in this research as
longitudinal time histories. Figure 140 illustrates the trajectories of market capitalization for the
incumbent-challenger pairs in the global automotive industry: General Motors & Toyota Motors.
510 Rugman, A. M. and Verbeke A. (2002).
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Figure 140: GMvs. Toyota Market Capitalization Trajectories
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-IToyota -GM
Similarly, Figure 141 illustrates the trajectories of market capitalization for the incumbent-
challenger pairs in the US airline industry: United Airlines and Southwest Airlines.
Figure 141: United vs. Southwest Market Capitalization Trajectories
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3.1.2 Market Value Decomposition: The Income Statement
One of the determinants of stock market value is the firm's past performance, as is evidenced by
the residual cash flows which are deconstructed on the firm's income statement: i.e. its top-line
revenues, its bottom-line net income or profits and the hypothesized enabling system properties
which feedback to transform top-line revenue growth into bottom-line profit growth and then
back into top-line revenue growth again.
This dissertation will therefore review the performance of dominant incumbent "market-makers"
(growth and productivity) as being top-line driven, and the challenger "market-takers" (growth
through productivity) as being bottom-line driven as shown in Figure 142 below. In the
following subsections, we will examine evidence of each type of enterprise architecture as
revealed on the income statements.
Figure 142: Architectural Imprint on the Income Statement
Revenues
T ($/year) o
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Revenue
growth
3rd
time Productivity
Inputs & + improvement
Outputs enables top-line
Enabler: revenue growth, via:
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enables long-term time cost leadership
productivity strategy.
Profit & improvements:
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3.1.2.1 Top-line Revenues
"The goal GE has set for sustained organic growth - two to three times the growth of global GDP -
translates to about 8% today. Few companies have achieved the kind of growth GE is seeking, and
none on a revenue base of $150 billion.' 5
3.1.2.1.1 Auto Industry
25-year time histories of revenues for major competitors in the automobile industry are shown in
Figure 143 below.
Figure 143: Top-line Revenues: Auto Industry
Auto OEM Annual Revenues
(25-year trajectories, not inflation-adjusted)
$200
$150
$100
$50
$0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
As can be seen, the late entrant Toyota has grown its top-line revenues at compound annual
growth rates that are approximately twice their major competitors, GM and Ford." While their
output has grown, they have achieved this by more than just volume, but on generating premium
prices, especially in the last decade or so. From this evidence, Toyota may be a company that
GE wishes to learn from if they want 8% organic growth on a revenue base of $150 billion.
511 Stewart, T.A. and Immelt, J. (2006), pg. 62.
512 Note that Japan's "lost decade" (1992-2002) adversely affected Toyota's revenue growth as domestic sales were
still significant.
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3.1.2.1.2 Airline Industry
25-year time histories of revenues for major competitors in the U.S. Airline Industry are shown
in Figure 144 below.
Figure 144: Top-line Revenues: Airline Industry
Airline Annual Revenues
(25-year trajectories, not inflation-adjusted)
$25-
$20 --
$15 -
$10 -
$5 --O
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As can be seen, the late entrant Southwest has grown its top-line revenues at compound annual
growth rates that are approximately twice their major competitors, United and American. It is
interesting to note the relative stability of revenue growth of Southwest, especially under extreme
exogenous events like 9-11, which affected all three carriers.
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3.1.2.1.3 Airplane Industry
25-year time histories of revenues for major competitors in the Large Commercial Airplane
Industry are shown in Figure 145 below.513
Figure 145: Top-line Revenues: Airplane Industry
Commercial Airplane OEM Annual Revenues
(25-year trajectories, n t ination-adjusted)
$40,000
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$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
More refined data reveal that Airbus's revenue growth (which broadly tracks its market share
growth) has outpaced Boeing's by a factor of two.
13 Note that the data for Airbus are scarce because it has only existed as (a subsidiary of) a publically listed
company, EADS since 2000.
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3.1.2.2 Bottom-line Profits
3.1.2.2.1 Auto Industry
25-year time histories of profit for major competitors in the automobile industry are shown in
Figure 146 below.
Figure 146: Bottom-line Profits: Auto Industry
Auto OEM Net Income
(25-year trajectories, not inflation-adjusted)
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$0
-$2
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Note that while GM and Ford's profits appear to oscillate, Toyota's profits are more stable. Also
note that the trajectory of GM and Ford's profits remain flat with no growth, while Toyota 's
trajectory is one of clear growth.
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3.1.2.2.2 Airline Industry
25-year time histories
Figure 147 below.
of profit for major competitors in the U.S. Airline Industry are shown in
Figure 147: Bottom-line Profits: Airline Industry
Airline Annual Net Income
(25-year trajectories, not inflation-adjusted)
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
Again, note that while United and American's profits appear to oscillate, Southwest's profits are
more stable. Also note that the trajectory of United and American 's profits remain flat with no
growth, while Southwest's trajectory is one of clear growth.
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3.1.2.2.3 Airplane Industry
25-year time histories of profit for major competitors in the Large Commercial Airplane Industry
are shown in Figure 148 below.
Figure 148: Bottom-line Profits: Airplane Industry
Commercial Airplane OEM Annual Operating Profit
(25 year trajectories, not hflation-adjusted)
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
-$1,000
-$2,000
Again, although the data are limited for Airbus, we see a higher, less volatile, faster growing
profit trajectory.
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3.1.2.3 Profit-ability
In order to determine the relative profitability, one must normalize profits with respect to
revenues, which results in an efficiency metric.
3.1.2.3.1 Auto Industry
25-year time histories of profitability for major competitors in the automobile industry are shown
in Figure 149 below.
Figure 149: Profit-ability: Auto Industry
Auto OEM Annual Profit ability
(25-year trajectories)
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%
-4.0%
-6.0%
D
Here we see the trajectory of the ability of GM and Ford to translate revenues into profits
actually decreasing over time. One might expect that in the not-to-distant future, these
companies might need to seek bankruptcy protection, especially under an exogenous deleterious
shock.
From Toyota 's upward profitability trajectory, one might infer that they would be able to survive
deleterious shocks without resort to bankruptcy.
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3.1.2.3.2 Airline Industry
25-year time histories of profitability for major competitors in the U.S. Airline Industry are
shown in As shown in Figure 150 below.
Figure 150: Profit-ability: Airline Industry
Airline Annual Profit ability
(25-year trajectories)
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Again, we see the trajectory of the ability of United and American to translate revenues into
profits actually decreasing over time. One might expect that in the not-to-distant past or future,
these companies might need to seek bankruptcy protection, especially under an exogenous
deleterious shock, like 9-11.
From Southwest's stable profitability trajectory, one might infer that they would be able to
survive deleterious shocks without resort to bankruptcy.
~I***~ ~ -- "
3.1.2.3.3 Airplane Industry
25-year time histories of profitability for major competitors in the Large Commercial Airplane
Industry are shown in Figure 151 below.
Figure 151: Profit-ability: Airplane Industry
Commerdal Airplane OEM AnnualProfit ability
(25 year trjectory)
12.0%
- BCA
8.0% 
-ABI
4.0%
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Again, although the data are limited for Airbus, we see a higher, less volatile, faster growing
profitability trajectory.
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3.1.2.4 Enabling Enterprise Stability
Having presented some evidence of the financial trajectories of the firms in the theoretical
sample, we now postulate what system properties might contribut to the underlying long-term
superior performance. We have noted that stability might be such a system property. Although
this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, we briefly make some initial observations here.
3.1.2.4.1 Auto Industry
25-year time histories of output for major competitors in the automobile industry are shown in
Figure 152 below.
Figure 152: Enterprise Stability: Auto Industry
Auto OEM Annual Output
(25-year trajectory)
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3.1.2.4.2 Airline Industry
25-year time histories of output for major competitors in the US airline industry are shown in
Figure 153 below.
Figure 153: Enterprise Stability: Airline Industry
Airline Quarterly ASMs
(25-ear trajectories)
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Note that from a macro-temporal perspective, United and American have plateaued, while
Southwest contiues its near-exponential growth. On a more micro-temporal perspective, United
and American appear to have a more amplified (less dampened) second order oscillation, having
a period of vibration of one year, matching the seasonal cycles of air travel, while Southwest
appears to dampen this response.514
514 Also note in an extremely micro-temporal perspective (i.e. daily) United and American have greater output
variability as they serve business travelers who want to travel around 8am and 5pm, while Southwest have flights
evenly spaced throughout the day, which has lower operating costs and attracts price-sensitive travelers.
.............---------------------- ~ i
3.1.2.4.3 Airplane Industry
25-year time histories of output for major competitors in the large commercial airplane industry
are shown in Figure 154 below.
Figure 154: Enterprise Stability: Airplane Industry
Commercial Airplane OEM Annual Deliveries
(25-year trajectories)
800
-BCA
soo -~MDC
-ABI
400
200
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Finally, we return to the long-term firm performance in the global large commercial airplane
industry between the incumbent, Boeing and the challenger, Airbus. As Airbus only recently
became a publicly listed incorporated firm, a long-term longitudinal comparison of its share price
or market capitalization vis a vis Boeing is unfortunately not possible. As an initial proxy to
determine an indication of the relative longitudinal performance of the two firms, we can observe
market share time histories in Figure 155 below. Note we will later look at a richer matrix of
financial and operational performance metrics including profitability, R&D investment, etc.
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Figure 155: Boeing vs. Airbus Market (Delivery) Share Trajectories
ComnercialAirplaneOEM % DeiveyShare
(f50ar tecries)
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"For the past 30 years, we didn't worry about Airbus because we consistently held 60% market share
and we thought they were just taking market share from McDonnell Douglas. Now that Douglas is
gone and Airbus continues to grow, it turns out that there may be something deeply different in
Airbus, and something inherently similar in Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. "515
515 Boeing Senior Executive, Summer 2005.
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3.1.3 Market Value Decomposition: Balanced (top- and bottom-line) Growth
Total Return to Shareholders (TRS) has been demonstrated to be correlated with concurrently
high rates of both top-line revenues growth and bottom-line income growth.
Modular enterprise architectures assign a functional decomposition resulting in a clear separation
and of ownership (by principals, typically shareholders) and management (their agents). This
"efficiency" results in the classic principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency
Theory posits that managers are typically interested in maximization of top-line revenues, as
their pay and influence is tied to expanding the size of the firm, while investors are typically
interested in maximization of bottom-line profits. Recent research has begun to support these
claims (Cannella and Monroe, 1997; Gray and Cannella, 1997).
Integral enterprise architectures on the other hand assign a less clear functional separation of
ownership and management, alleviating some of the problems and costs of agency. Resolution
of these functional conflicts occur above at system or architectural level. Researchers have
referred to this as Stewardship Theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1990).
3.2 Explanations for Firm Success
3.2.1 Popular Explanations
Toyota Motors is seen as having a "lean" production model (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990).
Porter has noted that Japanese firms do not have strategy, but have excellence in operations
(Porter, 1996).
Southwest Airlines is seen as having a successful operational model. Porter extended this
explanation to include an "activity network" (Porter, 1996).
Airbus Industrie is seen as "cheating" in the sense that they are not playing on a level field,
largely due to the presence of government subsidies.
All these explanations tend to focus on tactical or operational issues, as opposed to some higher
level strategic or architectural explanation.
3.2.2 Plausible Rival Hypotheses
"The persuasiveness of the arguments is greatly strengthened if/ serious attention is given to
alternative explanations -and why these alternative are unlikely to hold. It is hard to overdo this part
of the paper. The more robustness checks one can of/er, the more convinced readers will become of
the newly proposed mechaninsms. "5 1
The proposed framework takes a decidedly systemic view of explaining long-term firm
performance. Typically these non-systemic explanations can be summarized under the following
two mental models:
3.2.2.1 Explanations based on Detail Complexity
"We have the right strategy.. we just need better execution."
The preponderance of senior executive reasons for inadequate firm performance lies in the
explanation of poor execution of strategy, rather than on poor strategy itself or even more
abstractly, architectural misfit with environmental conditions. This class of plausible rival
hypothesis is embedded in the focus on increasing efficiency, given a fixed strategy or
architecture. Such hypotheses tend to focus on "laundry list" thinking, and consist of a series of
disconnected causes, which typically persist over time.
By way of example, General Motors - after suffering the systematic 30-year decline of market
share - boldly exclaimed on the inside cover of its recent annual report:
"Here's what's new about GM's strategy this year: Nothing. ,517
516 Sigglekow, N. (2007), pg. 23.
517 From GeneralMotors'2003 annual report, pg. 3.
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These hypotheses are difficult to disprove using traditional reductionist approaches, due to their
focus on detail complexity. An alternative means of disproving this class of plausible rival
hypotheses lies in the observation of the longitudinal persistence of the problem, which may
point to deeper underlying systemic explanations, of the stylized observation: If a firm
consistently and persistently is not able to execute its strategy over the long term, then maybe it
has a strategy that is fundamentally not implementable, or which is simply out of synch with the
demands of the environment.
A means to attempt to counter such plausible hypotheses, is to conduct longitudinal research in
order to question whether poor long-term performance is in fact due to continued poor execution
(in which case, one might question if an un-executable strategy is in fact a good one), or is it due
to a series of disconnected deleterious exogenous events, or is something more systematic and
structural happening?
3.2.2.2 Explanations based on Dynamic Complexity
The largest class of plausible rival hypotheses are non-systemic in space and time (i.e with
narrow time horizon and local or functional explanations).
"No one could have predicted this terrible event which was obviously beyond our control. "
The other class of plausible rival hypothesis is based on explanations invoking dynamic
complexity (i.e. cause and effect are distant in space and time, and are outside of the firm's
control). As discussed later, these are valid explanations, given a firm's enterprise architecture,
but they are not robust when one relaxes this architectural constraint.
3.2.2.3 Example: International Trade Subsidies
"In high-technology industries, which typically are characterized by economies of scale and learning
curve effects, subsidized challengers who are expanding will gain a reduction in net costs as a direct
result of the subsidy, and a secondary efficiency gain from the increasing returns to scale as they
expand output. As a result, the profit-maximizing option for the incumbents typically would appear
to be to adopt an 'accommodating' or 'submissive' response. "8
In order to illustrate both types of explanations, we shall turn to the example from the primary
case study of the Boeing-Airbus global duopoly. By far, the most popular explanation for
Airbus' recent dominance of Boeing is the "subsidies" that it receives from the French, German,
Spanish and British governments. This will be demonstrated in the course of this research
dissertation not to be incorrect, but in fact an incomplete explanation in terms of detail
complexity as well as boundedly rational in terms of dynamic complexity.
As is shown in Figure 156 below519, aircraft manufacturers find it difficult to "close the business
case" on developing a new commercial airplane, with $10-$15 billion dollars in non-recurring
development costs front-loaded 5-7 years before any potential future revenue stream. With even
5 8 Brahm, R (1995), pp. 79-80.
519 Developed from Piepenbrock, T.F. (2004). Note: money is shown in green flowing counter-clockwise, while
products / services are shown in yellow flowing clockwise.
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the most conservative investment hurdle rates, the NPV of the cash flow is low and often
negative. Secondly, even if firms could secure financing on such low-return and risky projects,
their customer's governments often mandate industrial participation in the form of offset
agreements. Both of these scenarios give rise to the solution that Boeing and Airbus' suppliers'
governments ultimately take on the development costs under "risk-sharing partnerships".
Figure 156: "Wicked" Problems in the Commercial Airplane Industry
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Note how cause and effect are very distant in space and time (i.e. high dynamic complexity), and
multiple stakeholders with differing objectives are playing (i.e. high behavioral complexity).
The result is a very "wicked" problem.
Within the international and macroeconomic trade theory literature, comparative advantage is
deemed to be the mechanism driving international trade. This is based on the assumption of
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. However as Krugman (1987) points out,
economies of scale - which is based on the assumption of increasing returns to scale and
imperfect competition - is a cause of trade separate from comparative advantage.
"If increasing returns and imperfect competition are necessary parts of the explanation of
international trade, however, we are living in a second-best world where government intervention
can in principle improve on market outcomes."520
It may be that in certain industries under certain conditions, that government subsidies are not
only necessary, but rational and intelligent; or more generally, in certain ecosystems, at certain
times in it's evolutionary development, broader system boundaries will produce better system
performance that the converse.
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520 Krugman, P.R. (1987), pg. 134.
3.2.3 Intra-species vs. Inter-species Explanations
Explanations for competitive advantage - as posited in this methodology - can arise from two
sources: differences within a competitor species, and differences between species of competitors.
Intra-species competitive advantage is a survival of the "fittest", where here "fit" means in the
best shape (i.e. most efficient).
Inter-species competitive advantage is a survival of the "fittest", where here "fit" means the most
responsive or adaptive to change (i.e. most effective environmental fit). It is this second
explanation that this research will focus on. In other words:
* The competitive ecosystem will be composed of heterogeneous genotypes.
* The competitor exhibiting the greatest "efficiency-fitness" will not necessarily win the
survival of the fittest competition. The winner in the long-run is posited to be the one
which has best "environmental fitness".
* As a result, this research does not seek to advance traditional efficient-fitness theories of
explanation, but to advance effective-fitness theory.
Before we leave this chapter which has been focused on the primary "dependent" variable of
long-term superior firm performance, we want to briefly introduce the next chapter, which is
focused on describing the primary "independent" variable of enterprise architecture - the
underlying explanation of an inter-organizational species.
3.3 Notes from the Field: On Observing a Rare Species
After many years of intense adaptation and selection which saw the rise and fall of numerous and
diverse species, a rich global ecosystem was reduced to only two competitors, locked in a fierce
battle for survival as their environment grew ever colder.
Although they shared many similar characteristics - most scientists classified these competitors
as belonging to the same species - I had a hunch that there were far greater hidden differences
than visible similarities. In fact, the differences were so profound that I believed they could not
in fact be rival cousins within the same species, but rather wildly different species fighting over
the same territory. Outwardly they both looked like wild jackals, but inwardly one behaved
more like a tame turtle, with very different internal DNA structure that drove wildly different
outward behavior. Like the tale of the tortoise and the hare, the outcome of this struggle was far
from obvious - in fact it was counterintuitive to scientists and children alike with the weaker of
the two - the tortoise - appearing in fact to be slowly overtaking the stronger. In this battle of
survival of thefittest, it was in fact the least "fit" competitor (in terms of strength or health) that
was winning, because it appeared to be the competitor with the best "fit" with its harsh
environment.
I was delighted therefore to be given the opportunity to live with each species in their respective
lairs, observing them, testing them, getting to know them, their habits, their rituals, their
"personalities", and their relationships with their environment, in an attempt to decode their
respective DNA. It was a rare opportunity indeed for an aspiring scientist interested in studying
how ecosystems evolve to spend extended periods of time over a number of years with every
competitor of an ecosystem, especially during the crucial time when the "weaker" challenger
competitor began to overtake the stronger incumbent. In fact, as the data unfolded, there
appeared an interesting irony - the weaker challenger appeared to be defeating the stronger
incumbent by employing the same behavior (derived from the same structure) that was seen in
the ancestors of the incumbent itself A strange cycle of DNA renewal appeared to be taking
place on a population level over many generations.
Of course having been trained like most aspiring scientists, I was anxious to isolate a few
variables in which to study in large numbers of diverse species in many ecosystems to test other
scientist's theories, but this unique situation presented a very different opportunity. I had the
"constraint" not of studying countless diverse species under controlled experiments in the
laboratory, but of studying two apparently polar opposite species in the complex richness of their
own entire ecosystem, watching (and in fact, helping) each try to dominate the other.
This opportunity led me not to test existing theories, but to try to build a new theory appropriate
for a new phenomenon: the description of a new species and an explanation for the
counterintuitive ways in which it competes. The goal therefore is not a narrow, generalized truth
about some specific aspect of competition common in all ecosystems, but a broader systemic
understanding of the evolution of the underlying forms and structures that drive the behavior and
performance of diverse species.
3.3.1 Common Characteristics, Traits and DNA
Figure 157 below is a brief initial list of the common characteristics, or traits of the DNA of the
three companies that form the basis of our initial theoretical sample.
Figure 157: Common Characteristics of Dominant Competitors
Manufacturing Example: Aerospace Example: Service Example:
Toyota Motors Airbus Industrie Southwest Airlines
* Systematically outperform powerful incumbents over the long-term
* Maximization of shareholder value is not the over-riding priority
* Counterintuitive behavior is seen as "irrational" to competitors
* Born into mature / maturing industries
* Slower (short-term) growth than competitors
* Faster (long-term) growth than competitors
* Organic (not acquisition-based) growth
* Negative growth is rare (few downsizings or divestitures)
* Higher levels of stability (e.g. workforce, R&D, product, production, supply chain)
* Avoid playing the "market adjuster" (i.e."swing producer")
* Strategy (initially) is "cost leadership" (not differentiation)
* Don't outsource the ability to think strategically (limited use of consultants)
* Compete as extended enterprises against incumbent firms.
* Optimize performance more broadly over space and time.
* Integral "enterprise architectures"...
One of the more important characteristics of each species is the quality of growth - or level of
enterprise stability - which has many dimensions. As shown in
Figure 158 below, enterprise stability can be expressed in terms of high-level aggregate variables
like production output, production input or product performance characteristics. Stylistically,
modular enterprise architectures tend to exhibit time-histories which oscillate in the prime
enterprise variables, while integral enterprise architectures tend to exhibit time-histories which
possess more stability.
332i
Figure 158: Stylized Enterprise Stability
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3.3.2 Defining and Measuring Each Species
In the following three essays, a framework will be developed which enables qualitative and
quantitative description of each "species", allows for their competitive dynamics and finally
observes how the outcomes of these dynamics shape the evolution of the larger ecosystem in
which they inhabit.
In essay #1, it will be argued that each species can be described a priori using qualitative
descriptions of their high-level "input" forms and functions. These will be presented in a
typology / taxonomy format.
In essay #2, it will be argued that each species can be defined a posteriori (i.e. inferred from
observing their high-level "output" behaviors) using quantitative descriptions. These
quantitative descriptions will allow for numerical simulation of competitive dynamics between
the two species.
In essay #3, it will be argued that the dynamics arising from competition between species results
in an evolution of the larger ecosystem.
...........................- - - -~
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces three subsequent essays which form an integrated framework which
attempts to explain long-term firm performance. In this chapter, we defined the nature of the
problem, namely the maximization of shareholder value.
The context for this construct within the framework is shown below in Figure
following chapter, we will next discuss how enterprise architectures provide the
explanations for the performance of the firm.
Figure 159: Firm Performance within Framework
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Chapter 4 Enterprise Architectures
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Definition of Purpose, Precision and Accuracy
"Some of the concepts used here are not defined with great precision, largely because no highly
refined definition is required for my purposes; a more detailed or more precise application of the
analysis may well justify jiurther effort in this direction. "21
"There is no advantage (and much error) in making definitions of words more precise than the
subject matter they refer to. "522
As an enterprise architecture is a high-level, abstract and conceptual notion of complex social
phenomena, its precise definition can not and need not be articulated precisely.
"A nonlinear vision loses accuracy when it is converted into propositions. Theorists start with a
vision for a theory an change it 'fiom entwined ideas at the edge of words to a linear order in which
the ideas are unraveled and set Jbrth in the form or a propositional argument' (TenHouten and
Kaplan, 1973, pg. 147). ",52
In addition, as an enterprise architecture is complex, nonlinear, and emergent, the development of
a theory built around such a notion is likely to lose its accuracy in the translation to more linear
definitions.
"I am not aware of arty social scientists who claim to have a theory that precisely predicts human
behavior. Instead, we correctly speak in terms of 'tendencies,' 'inclinations,' and 'propensities.' In
empirical tests, we consider it a big success if our preferred theory explains just 10% of variance in
human or organizational behavior. Most social scientists, I believe, marvel at how little grasp we
have - after decades of trying - on the factors that influence human behavior. "524
4.1.2 Construct of Architectural Form
Based on this, the primary construct - which is borrowed from product design theory (Ulrich,
1995) and supply chain design theory (Fine, 1998) - is the notion of an architecture, which if
extended outward towards a firm's ecosystem, is termed herein as an enterprise architecture.
Note that this inter-firm architecture, is to be distinguished from the classical intra-firm
architecture, that is common in the organizational design literature.525
"Building on the product architecture concept enables development of the construct of supply chain
architecture, a richer concept than that of traditional make/buy or vertical integration, which focuses
primarily on ownership of assets in the supply chain." 526
521 Penrose, E.T. (1959), pg. 3.
522 Robinson, J. (1956), pg. 361, cited in Penrose, E.T. (1959), pg. 3, footnote 1.
523 Weick (1995), pg. 386. 1.
524 Hambrick, D.C. (2005), pg. 105.
525 The idea for this distinction came from Prof. Michael Tushman.
526 Fine, CH. (1998), pg. 136, referring to work by Novak, S. (1998).
Although reference is made to a product architecture, an enterprise architecture - being a socio-
economic construct - is not seen statically, but dynamically (or more accurately, as evolutionary).
It is a social construct, "built" by humans for social purpose. Like humans and human
organizations, it evolves whether by design or otherwise.
4.1.2.1 Basic definition of"Enterprise Architecture": Genotypes
The enterprise (or ecosystem) is broadly defined as the firm and its relevant stakeholder groups.
Drawing from the stakeholder theory of the firm (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997), the
architecture in question focuses primarily (but not exclusively) on the fundamental stakeholders
of: customers, suppliers, employees and investors.
"Typologies at their best are memorable, neat and evocative. ,527
"Taxonomic development is a critical element in the future health of organization science."528
This construct characterizes a typology of enterprise architectural forms or "archetypes", which
are fundamental basis for the underlying dynamic capabilities of the enterprise. While the
typology of enterprise architectures is a continuum, the extreme archetypal cases (fully modular
and fully integral) 529 are presented in their discrete binary form in Figure 160 below, and will be
described in detail in the dissertation. It must be stressed that various hybrid architectural forms
exist between these binary extremes, each having slightly different properties and structural
dynamics. These subtleties will also be discussed in the theoretical framework.
Figure 160: Simple definition of"Enterprise Architecture"
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52 Miller, D. (1996), pg. 506.
528 McKelvey, B. (1975), pg. 509.
529 Note, in software architecting, the notions of open modular and proprietary integrated are additional distinctions.
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4.1.2.2 Contingent definition of "Enterprise Architecture": Phenotypes
"The world consists of two kinds of people: those who divide everything into two groups and those
who don 't. ,"30
The enterprise architectures shown previously are generic, they are the genotypes. This
framework, however endeavors to provide an environmental context within which such
architectures thrive and grow, these are the phenotypes. In Essay #3, we will discuss in more
detail the environmental conditions which support these architectures, but for now, the following
color convention will be used ass shown in Figure 161 below.
o Blue signifies an architecture that grows in a growing market environment.
o Red signifies an architecture that grows in a maturing market environment.
Figure 161: Contingent definition of "Enterprise Architecture"
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4.1.3 Construct as Continuum
A qualitative view of the primary case study companies is shown in Figure 162 below, in order
to illustrate that the while the constructs are represented as discrete theoretical binary archetypes,
they are at the ends of a spectrum or continuum of enterprise architectures.
Figure 162: Continuum of Enterprise Architectures
Modular Integral
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Automobiles DaimierlChrysler HondV'
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a. Womack, Jones & Roos (1990)
b. Dyer (2000)
c. Sako (2006)
d Heracleous, Wirtz & Pangarkar (2005)
e. Hoffer-Gittell (2003)
As an explanatory construct, the enterprise architecture is likely to yield stronger and more
accurate predictions in the cases of GM vs. Toyota, and United vs. Southwest Airlines as they
represent clearer cases of archetypal extremes, given a state of environmental evolution. By
contrast, it will be argued that Boeing and Airbus represent both more moderate archetypal
forms, and therefore the enterprise architecture, while fundamental and primary in its
explanatory power, must concede to traditional explanations of efficiency etc.
It is fitting therefore to use the notion of architecture to describe complex social systems, as it is a
systemically complete, yet imprecise notion that captures "tendencies". As shown in Figure 163
below, an architecture neither predetermines choice, nor over-constrains action. It does however
enable and give tendencies. Within an enterprise architecture, firms can have a wide variation of
modular to integral tendencies in the components that make up their architectures. For example,
modular enterprise architectures can and certainly do have "Theory Y" managers (McGregor,
1960), they can and certainly do have low cost strategies in certain market segments (Porter,
1980), however this does not take-away from the mean properties of "Theory X" pre-dominance
and differentiated product strategy focus, which will be discussed in subsequent sections,
particularly as the environmental state defines the architecture.
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Figure 163: Architecture as Continuum of Probabilities
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4.1.4 Construct as Mediator...
Recalling from chapter 1, Astley and Van de Ven's (1983) characterization of key debates in
organizational theory was parsed along two axes: level of analysis and role of human agency.
The construct of enterprise architecture therefore attempts to address and unify both debates.
4.1.4.1 ...between Firm and Environment
In an attempt to answer the primary research question: "Is firm performance due to the
characteristics of the firm or the environment?", the answer is hypothesized to lie in how the firm
interacts with the environment - in other words, the nature of the architecture of the firm 's
extended enterprise.
4.1.4.2 ...between Determinism and Choice
"Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods
than our view of the nature of human beings whose behaviors we are studying... it makes a difference
to research, but it also makes a diference for the proper design of..institutions. "53
An enterprise architecture is primarily a social (not a physical) construct. Like physical
architecture, it both enables and constrains, but does not determine activity or human action.
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"We shape our buildings; thereafter, our buildings shape us. "532
While most people think of physical architecture as static and unevolving, the truth is that it does
on a rather slow and punctuated timeframe. An enterprise architecture, as a social construct is
more obviously dynamic and evolving. It is emergent, as its invisible structure must be recreated
every day in every new human interaction (Giddens, 1979).
"When does a building actually become built?. "53
4.1.5 Construct as Embedded Enabler of Strategic Change
The construct of enterprise architecture also serves as a pedagogical tool embedded within the
ongoing process of enacting an existing architecture to create a means of self-reflexive analysis
and enterprise (re)design.534
"To understand architecture and its impact one needs to understand the political and cultural
dimensions of leadership and architecting, as Ted Piepenbrock described. [When considering] Ted
Piepenbrock's efforts at Boeing, the audience is the Board of Directors, who are trying to make
architectural decisions about the Boeing enterprise. Ted's role is not to be an outside architect;
rather he is operating as a kind offacilitator in the board's own thinking about its architecture. He
does, however, carry out his own research in the firm - this gives him credibility with the audience
and helps him elucidate the key choices and consequences facing them in their architecting (i.e.
modular versus integral enterprise). It is, I would argue, more sophisticated in its understanding of
enterprises as enacted systems and enterprise architecture as a practice that requires embedding.
This isn't to say that implementation will be successfl -- Ted himself thinks it will be near impossible
for a modular enterprise to become integral. But he is putting the possibility of implementation at
the center by locating the architects and audience in the same, very powerful people and using himself
and his expertise as provocation and facilitator. ,535
532 Attributed both to architect, LeCorbusier (1887-1965) and to Sir Winston Churchill in a speech in 1943.
533 LeCorbusier (1887-1965).
534 I am indebted to fellow MIT PhD student, Jason Jay for helping me clarify this concept.
535 Comments and critiques of this framework by graduate students in the Spring 2006 MIT ESD class, Enterprise
Architecting.
4.1.6 Heuristics associated with Architectural Form
Heuristic la:
The architecture is the form of the system, and is the dominant factor in its behavior.5m The
architectural form of an enterprise (modular or integral) defines the enterprise's effectiveness.
Enterprise effectiveness, together with enterprise efficiency, define an enterprise's performance
capability. (Note: the more effective enterprise structure may not exhibit the highest performance
in the short term.)
Heuristic lb:
The architectural form of an enterprise is defined by the boundaries and interfaces between the
key stakeholders or input providers (i.e. those who significantly affect the firm's costs and/or
revenues). These are in turn defined by the quantity of stakeholders within a group and by the
quality of relationships with stakeholders. The boundaries are characterized both spatially (near
vs. far) and temporally (short-term vs. long-term).
Heuristic le:
The architectural form of an enterprise can be defined either by its inputs (i.e. the quantity and
quality of relationships with key stakeholders), or by its outputs (i.e. the growth and stability
characteristics). Given either inputs or outputs, one can infer the enterprise's architectural form.
Heuristic ld:
The power and influence distribution of the stakeholder space is not homogeneous with respect to
driving structural dynamics of growth and stability. (For example, the shareholders in a modular
enterprise contribute relatively more influence to enterprise growth requirements).
The enterprise architecture concurrently and reflexively defines and is defined by managerial
cognitive frames, which influence their behaviors and strategic choices and modes of operation.
In addition, the enterprise architecture defines the participant firm's robustness to various
environmental threats.
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4.2 Theoretical Foundations
The notion of inter-firm enterprise architectures - while not explicitly found in the management
literature - can be constructed from a variety of eclectic theoretical traditions. The following
briefly summarizes a few of the threads in various fields.
4.2.1 Economic theories
The discussion of economic theories is divided into micro- approaches, focusing on the firm and
markets, as well as macro- approaches, focusing on national and international economies.
4.2.1.1 Micro-economics
4.2.1.1.1 Specialization and the Division of Labor
One of the first important contributions to the discussion of enterprise architectures, lies in one
of the original theoretical justification for liberal free-market economics by Adam Smith (1776).
The notion of efficiencies based on specialization of tasks and the division of labor will loom
large in our later exploration of modular enterprise architectures. This focus on "division" (or
differentiation) lies in juxtaposition to the focus on "multiplication" (or integration) in integral
enterprise architectures.
Finally, note that Smith's work will also form the basis of a later discussion on craft, mass and
lean production.
4.2.1.1.2 New Institutional Economics
The definition of an enterprise architecture relies on some fundamental economic theory, which
questions the reasons why firms exist at all - and which hypothesize that firms arise when
markets fail.53 7  This line of theory, embedded in new institutional economics, attempts to
characterize a spectrum of economic production ranging from markets to hierarchies (Coase,
1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1985).
4.2.1.1.2.1 Theory of the Firm
"A firm is likely to emerge in those cases where a very short-term contract would be
unsatisfactory. 5
"It seems improbable that afirm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty. "5 39
The mechanisms of markets are quite different from those creating hierarchies, and in fact from
those of intermediate networks. Understanding this distinction will be fundamental in defining
the spectrum between modular and integral enterprise forms. From the above quotations from
Nobel laureate, Ronald Coase (1937), one might conjecture that while firms emerge due to the
presence of long-term contractual demands and uncertainty, integrated enterprises may emerge
due to the presence of even longer-term contractual demands as well as greater uncertainty.
4.2.1.1.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics: Markets, Hierarchies & Hybrids
In addition to the classical distinctions between markets and hierarchies, this work will advance
the recent theories which have characterized a form between market and hierarchy: the network
(Powell, 1990) or hybrid organization (Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001).
As shown in Figure 164 below, Gibbons (2004) posits that the transaction costs of non-
integration between firms in the form of rent-seeking/haggling (e.g. with the supplier
stakeholder) are similar to the costs of non-integration within firms in the form of politicking
(e.g. with the labor stakeholder).
"I am iully persuaded that rent-seeking between organizations is an important transaction cost of
non-integration. I will define rent-seeking as individually optimal (but socially destructive) haggling
over appropriable quasi-rents. Politicking within firms seems to be the inescapable internal-
organizational analog of haggling between firms. .54
537 Putterman and Kroszner, (1996), pp. 1-31.
538 Coase, R. (1937).
539 Coase, R. (1937).
540 Gibbons, R. (2004), pp. 25 and 30.
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Figure 164: Transaction Costs of Non-Integration between and within Organizations
Rent-seeking ("hagglng")
between organizations
The traditional focus on contracting between the firm and its employees (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972), was broadened by Jensen & Meckling (1976) to include other stakeholders:
"Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers,
customers, creditors, and so on. The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists jbr all of these
contracts, independent of whether there is [team] production. [As a result], it makes little or no sense
to try to distinguish those things that are 'inside' the firm (or any other organization) from those
things that are 'outside' of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships
(i.e. contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital
inputs and the consumers of output. ,541
4.2.1.1.2.3 Agency Theory
Jensen & Meckling (1976) observed that when interests diverge between principals and their
agents, losses may be incurred by the principals. These losses however can be minimized by
imposing various controls on the agents.
The complementary viewpoint to agency
(Donaldson and Davis, 1989 and 1991),
aligned.
theory has been suggested as "stewardship theory"
in which the interests of principals and agents are
"1 Jensen and Meckling (1976), pp. 310-311.
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4.2.1.1.3 Economics of Profit-Maximizing and Labor-Managed Firms
4.2.1.1.3.1 Terminology
Even within the academic discipline of economics, numerous names have been used to describe
the two different economic firm types as shown in Table 8 below. For the sake of simplicity, this
research uses the following terminology: profit maximization (PM) and labor managed (LM).
Table 8: Terminologies for Economic Firm Types
Alternative Terminologies
and Contexts
Capitalist,
Entrepreneurial,
Private
Cooperative,
Employee-controlled,
Illyrian,
Public
State-Owned
Welfare-maximizing
4.2.1.1.3.2 Objective Functions
"The force driving this outcome is the strategic asymmetry between the PM and the LMfirm in terms
of their respective objective functions. "542
One of the most striking differences between PM and LM firms lies in their objective functions.
In the following subsections, each will be briefly discussed in turn. In subsequent sections, the
objective functions will be translated into reaction functions to investigate competitive
interactive games.
4.2.1.1.3.2.1 Profit Maximizing (PM)
The objective function of the PM firm has been represented (Cremer and Crdmer, 1992; Delbono
and Rossini, 1992).
4.2.1.1.3.2.2 Labor Managed (LM)
The objective function of the LM firm has been represented (Lambertini and Rossini, 1998, pg.
15) as the maximization of the profit per worker, V:
V= (revenues - costs) / labor
V = (pq - rk) /L
Where p is the market price, q is the quantity sold by the firm, r is the price of capital, k is the
quantity of capital used in the production process, and L is the quantity of labor used.
542 Lambertini and Rossini (1998), pg. 20.
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4.2.1.1.3.2.3 Mixed Objective Functions
"The objective of a capitalist firm that engages in cooperative bargaining with its workforce can be
represented as a weighted function of profit-maximization and the typical LM objective. "543
While the objective functions of PM and LM firms vary, various researchers have noted that
there may be mixed objective functions (Law, 1977; Svenjar, 1982; Aoki, 1984; Miyazaki,
1984).
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4.2.1.1.3.3 Homogeneous Duopoly competition
While much has been written about homogeneous duopoly competition between PM firms, the
literature on duopoly competition between LM firms is more rare and recent. Each type of
homogeneous duopoly will be briefly examined below with respect to either quantity or price
competition under simultaneous or sequential conditions.
4.2.1.1.3.3.1 Cournot (Quantity) competition
As shown in Figure 165 below, Lambertini and Rossini (1998) develop the reaction functions for
an LM duopoly as upward-sloping, in contrast to the reaction functions for a PM duopoly as
downward sloping.
Figure 165: Reaction Functions for PM and LM Duopolies in Quantity Space
PM duopoly LM duopoly
Firm j's
reaction
function
Firm i's
reaction
function
, ()
Downward-sloping
reaction function:
"The more you make,
the less I will make."
(quantities treated as
strategic substitutes)
Upward-sloping
reaction function:
"The more you make,
the more I will make."
(quantities treated as
strategic compliments)
For the PM's downward-sloping reaction functions, quantities are treated like strategic
substitutes, while for the LM's upward-sloping reaction functions, quantities are treated like
strategic compliments, as first introduced by Bulow et al, 1985).
347
I~
Lambertini and Rossini (1998) then summarize the responses of homogeneous duopolies with
respect to capital commitment investments as shown in Figure 166 below.
Figure 166: Homogeneous Duopoly under Cournot (Quantity) Competition
Profit-Maximizing
Duopoly
Labor-Managed
Duopoly
Over-
Invest
Invest at
Market
Interest Rates
Under-
Invest
Zhang (1993) and Haruna
industries and economies.
(1993) discuss the use of excess capacity to deter entry in LM
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4.2.1.1.3.3.1.1 Stackleberg (sequential) competition
The issue of choosing roles in a sequential duopoly is summarized by Lambertini (1995), and
summarized in Figure 167 below.
Figure 167: Sequential Games in a Homogenous Duopoly
LM duopoly + +
PM duopoly
Follow LM duopoly
PM duopoly
Lead 4 401
Quantity Price
competition competition
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4.2.1.1.3.4 Heterogeneous ("Mixed") Duopoly competition
"The analysis of the behaviour of mixed markets, where firms with different objective functions
coexist, started at the end of the last decade [the 1980s] and still continues. ",,44
While the literature on the economics of homogeneous duopolies is extensive, the literature on
the economics of heterogeneous or "mixed" duopolies is more recent and more sparse (Law &
Stewart, 1983; Mai & Hwang, 1989; Horowitz, 1991; Cremer & Cr6mer, 1992; Futagami &
Okamura, 1994; Neary & Ulph, 1996; Lambertini & Rossini, 1998; De Fraja & Delbono, 2002).
See Appendix H for a summary.
This "mixed' duopoly characterizes the situation where each competitor has a different objective
function, namely profit maximization and labor managed. It is the contention of the framework
developed in this research dissertation that the modular enterprise architecture is characterized
by the PM objective function, while the integral enterprise architecture is characterized by the
LM objective function.
"Conventional wisdom suggests that firms deviating from profit-maximization will suffer forced
exit in the long run. We reverse this conclusion. Empirical evidence is consistent with this
prediction of relatively robust market survivability of LMfirms" 545
The empirical work undertaken in this research dissertation tends to support much of this
relatively recent theoretical work, which predicts the robustness of the LM form.
"The upshot is that the LMfirm is relatively more aggressive than the PM firm in its investment
behaviour. This combined with the LMfirm's relatively accomodatory behaviour in choosing
output levels at given levels of the capital stock, results in the LMfirm being a more robust
market competitor over an extensive subset of the parameter domain. ,546
If this theoretical result holds true, supported empirically by evidence in this research
dissertation, then one is confronted with the question, "why if LM firms are so robust, are there
apparently so few of them?" Leading hypotheses (Neary & Ulph, 1996) center around the
difficulty in formation of LM firms as opposed to their survivability once established.
"The LMfirm is not able to survive competition with a PM firm, when starting from scratch. The
LM firm is so 'prudential' that it doesn't enter the market. "47
Finally, as will be discussed more in chapter 6, the birth rates of various enterprise architectures
will be argued to be contingent upon the nature of the architectures of the existing competitors.
Specifically, it will be posited that integral enterprise architectures (or LM firms) will find it to be
very difficult to "grow" in the early environment, rich with modular competitors (or PM firms).
'" Lambertini, L. and Rossini, G. (1998), pg. 14.
545 Neary and Ulph (1996), pp. 1.
546 Neary and Ulph (1996), pp. 20.
547 Lambertini, L. and Rossini, G. (1995), pg. 11.
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4.2.1.1.3.4.1 Cournot (Quantity) competition
In order to investigate the equilibrium of a mixed duopoly under Cournot competition, one must
first begin with the reaction functions which is downward-sloping for the PM firm and upward-
sloping for the LM firm as shown in Figure 168 below.
Figure 168: Reaction Functions for a Mixed Duopoly in Quantity Space
Mixed duopoly
qPM
PM Firm's
reaction
function
Downward-sloping
reaction function:
"The more you make,
the less I will make."
(quantities treated as
strategic substitutes)
Lambertini and Rossini (1996) investigated
respect to capital commitment investments
understanding the seemingly counter-intuitive
reaction functions.
Upward-sloping
reaction function:
"The more you make,
the more I will make."
(quantities treated as
strategic compliments)
qLM
the responses of homogeneous duopolies with
as shown in Figure 169 below. The key to
results lies in understanding the respective firm's
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Figure 169: Heterogeneous Duopoly under Cournot (Quantity) Competition
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As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, not only does the LM firm keep expanding
output ("the more you make, the more I will make") more than a PM firm ("the more you make,
the less I will make"), but it relentlessly expands capacity more slowly than the PM firm.
4.2.1.1.3.4.2 Bertrand (Price) competition
When we model mixed duopoly competition in Chapter 7, we will take a rather severe "winner-
takes-all" competitive assumption is akin to Bertrand (price) competition, rather than the weaker
form of Cournot (quantity) competition where the market is shared in proportion to relative firm
growth rates.
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4.2.1.1.4 Strategic Complementarities
"...doing more of one thing increases the returns of doing more of another... "4
Milgrom & Roberts (1990 and 1995) argued within an economics framework the benefits of
integrated and interdependent activities. In fact later, Porter (1996) referred to such
complementarities as "activity networks". Later Whittington et al. (1999) empirically
demonstrated that such complementarities (while rare) are linked to increased performance. As
will be discussed later, the presence of such complementarities signal the presence of an integral
enterprise architectures.
While Hedlund (1994) and Whittington et al. (1999) posit that such complementarities are part
of a "new" and more successful form of organization, this research posits that they are note
necessarily new in an absolute sense, but they are new in a relative sense, that is new relative to
the state of the evolution of the industry in which firms are embedded.
548 Milgrom and Roberts (1995), pg. 181.
4.2.1.2 Macro-Economics and Political Economy
"Some Western economists and organization theorists go to great length to formulate theories of the
firm in terms of opportunism, moral hazard, incentive compatibility, and monitoring. Work in the
transaction cost tradition following Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), agency theory (for example
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and property rights (for example Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) all share
the preoccupation with opportunism obstructing the achievement of efficiency in given, specified
tasks or transactions. Aoki (1990) stresses the shortcomings of such models for understanding the
Japanese firm. '49
The literature in macro- and international economics has tended to focus on the Anglo-Saxon vs.
the German/Japanese models (Piore and Sabel, 1984). In fact, Aoki and Jackson (2008) use a
micro-economic game theoretic approach to define various equilibria in the linkages between
organizational architectures and corporate governance, which are reflected in the the Anglo-
American, German and Japanese models. The following subsections give examples of how each
of these models are characterized.
4.2.1.2.1 Varieties of Capitalism
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) perspective (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall and Soskice,
2001) is a national level explanation of integral enterprise architectures driven by institutional
complementarities (Goyer, 2006). At the core of these varieties of capitalism, expressed herein
as enterprise architectures, lies the constructs of trust and equity in interorganizational
relationships (Scheer, Kumar and Steenkamp, 2003).
"The VoC perspective emphasizes the critical importance of patterns of institutional
complementarities across the various sub-spheres (finance and corporate governance, industrial
relations, innovation system, and inter-firm relations) of the economy that lead to diverging forms of
behavior on the part of economic actors.
While rooted in political economy, it focuses on the firm as the center of analysis (Hall and
Soskice, 2001; March, 1962).
"It brings the firm back into a central position in our understanding of the political economy. "
The VoC literature has been characterized in a number of theoretical and empirical ways. The
theoretical characterizations have occured as liberal market economies vs. coordinated market
economies, as consumer economics vs. producer economics or as economic statics vs. dynamics.
The empirical charactizations have taken the form of Anglo-Saxon model vs. the German-
Japanese model. Each will be discussed briefly in turn.
549 Hedlund, G. (1994), pg. 80.
550 Goyer, M. (2006), pg. 401.
551 Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001), pg. v.
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4.2.1.2.1.1 Liberal Market Economies vs. Coordinated Market Economies
The Liberal Market Economy (LME) and Coordinated Market Economy (CME) represent the
ideal types at the extremes of the spectrum of a continuum of varieties of capitalism, as presented
by Hall and Soskice (2001). Figure 170 below qualitatively summarizes select nations on the
VoC spectrum. Note that this provides the macro-institutional context for firms operating within
these political economies. It does not, however, necessarily predetermine firm or enterprise
architectures, as a LME could support an enterprise architcture that has strong CME tendencies
as is the case of Southwest Airlines in the US LME.
Figure 170: Spectrum of Varieties of Capitalism
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Finally, Hall and Soskice (2001) posited that each variety of capitalism was better suited to
different forms of innovation: LME's produce radical innovation, while CME's produce
incremental innovation.
"In short, the institutional frameworks of liberal market economies provide companies with better
capacities for radical innovation, while those of coordinated market economies provide superior
capacities for incremental innovation. ,,552
552 Hall and Soskice. (2001), pg. 41.
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4.2.1.2.1.2 Consumer vs. Producer Economics
This dialogue within the field of macro- and international economics has tended to classify the
Anglo-Saxon model as profit maximizing based on consumer economics, while the
German/Japanese model is market share maximizing based on producer economics (Thurow,
1992).
It is interesting to note that while profit maximizing firms tended to grow-up in mass production
economies where the power was in the "producer push" world, and yet this is based on
macroeconomic consumer economics.
Conversely, market share maximizing firms tended to grow-up in lean production economies
where the power is in the "customer pull" world, and yet this is based on macroeconomic
producer economics.
Heuristic le:
The architectural form of an enterprise is governed by the institutional environment. While it
will be possible to find both integral and modular enterprise architectures within a given
institutional environment (e.g. U.S. capitalism), there are clear national tendencies.
General:
"Anglo-Saxon firms are profit maximizers; Japanese business firms play a game that might better be
known as 'strategic conquest'. Americans believe in 'consumer economics'; Japanese believe in
'producer economics. 553
"While firms in producer economics and consumer economics both want profits, the role played by
profits is very dfferent. In the profit-maximizing firm, profits are the goal - the objective function.
In the empire-building firm, profits are the means to the end of a larger empire - a constraint The
goal is market share. ""'5
"The time scale of what the Japanese mean by profit maximizing is so long that it isn't what Anglo-
Saxons mean by profit maximizing. "
"Firms based on the principle of producer economics are clearly on the offensive in international
markets, while those based upon profit maximizing are on the defensive. But perhaps this is jtst the
ebb and flow of economic battle. In the 1950s and 1960s the profit maximizing firms of the United
States put their competitors on the defensive. ,556
Key Stakeholders:
"The United States has organized a system that is the exact opposite of that of Germany and Japan.
Those countries have organized a system (business groups) to minimize the influence and power of
impatient shareholders, while the United States has organized a system (fund dominance) to
maximize the influence of impatient shareholders. ,
5.3 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 32.
s' Thurow, L. (1992), pp. 124-125.
55. Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 131.
556 Thurow, L. (1992), pp. 149-150.
557 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 136.
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"If the executives of profit-maximizing American firms are asked to state the order in which they serve
various constituencies, shareholders come first, with customers and employees a distant second and
third. Most managers will argue that the sole purpose of the company is to maximize shareholder
wealth. Customers and employees are only important to the extent that they contribute to this goal. If
Japanese firms are asked the same question, the order of duty is reversed - employees first, with
customers second and shareholders third. ",558
4.2.1.2.1.3 Profit maximization (Consumer economics)
General:
"The Anglo-Saxon model is not wrong. Individualism and the desire for consumption and leisure
are all parts of human nature. But they are not all of human nature. Individualistic consumer
economics is not wrong! It merely explains only part of what needs to be explained! Man is not just
a consumption-leisure-maximizing machine. He or she is also a producer. ",59
Market Share:
"If one examines the American consumer electronics industry, it is a history of profit-maximizing
strategic retreat into oblivion. But at every point in time, they made their demanded rate of return.
Being rational, they would go out of business before they would accept a below-market rate of
return. ,S560
"Fighting for greater market share is irrational to the rational profit maximizer. He would rather
surrender than fight. Fighting lowers one s consumption. Since his theories tell him that he can
always go workjbr the winner, going out of business is the rational thing to do. Who one works for is
not important. The consumption maximizer is a mercenary who would rather switch than fight. "56
Labor:
"The United States is in a statistical class by itself when it comes to labor-force turnover. From an
income-maximization perspective, this is a sign of efficiency. Workers are dismissed when they aren 't
needed. ,"562
Investment:
"In the United States, private research and development spending falls in recessions and rises in
booms. In Europe and Japan, it does not. To an American firm, cutting R&D is a technique fbr
maintaining profits during a period of declining sales. In Europe and Japan, R&D is not cut, since it
is seen as the source of long-run competitive strength. "56-
"In American accounting conventions, since R&D is expensed, cutting R&D spending leads to higher
bottom-line profits immediately. In Japan, where R&D is capitalized, it does not. The Japanese
accounting system is set up to discourage short-term behavior. The American counterpart is set up to
encourage it. "564
558 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 137.
"9 Thurow, L. (1992), pp. 118 & 120.
560 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 133.561 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 133.
562 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 139.563 Thurow, L. (1992), pp. 141-142.
564 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 142.
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"Private time horizons are believed to be too short. Private hurdle rates used in business-investment
calculations are always far above the economy's long-term rate of return on assets. In the United
States, the private hurdle rate is 15 to 20 percent, while the historical rate of return on business assets
is 7 percent. Banks such as the Japanese Development Bank or the Long-Term Credit Bank are
designed to finance the long-term investments that normal banks andfirms avoid. '565
4.2.1.2.1.4 Market-Share maximization (Producer economics)
General:
Japanese practices "should make Japanese business firms inefficient, yet when facing American or
European competition, they always seem to win. Their market share always goes up, never down.
What are handicaps for others are strengths for them. Are the Japanese just better as individuals -
playing the same game but just doing it better by working harder, saving more, and being smarter than
everyone else - or does their success spring fiom having organized a different system, playing the
game differently? Is Japan just better, or is it exceptional? "
"Germany, the dominant European economic power, sees itself as having a 'social-market' economy
and not just a 'market' economy. Codetermination is required to broaden the ranks of corporate
stakeholders beyond that of the traditional capitalistic owners to include workers. ,"67
Goals & Objectives:
"Their goal is market-share maximization (strategic conquest) and value-added maximization (a
measure that includes profits and wages), not simple profit maximization. 6
Investment:
"Empires overinvest relative to profit-maximizing firms, since they plan to last forever. Their aim is
future expansion, not maximizing current consumption. "
"To lengthen time horizons and accept a lower rate of return, impatient consumption-oriented
stockholders must be kept under control. The Japanese or German business groups have been
organized to do just that. With interlocking ownership, impatient consumption-oriented shareholders
can be held at bay. "5'o
Labor:
"The empire-building firm sees labor as a strategic asset to be nurtured. One wants the highest
quality and best-fed soldiers. ' "
565 Thurow, L. (1992), pp. 145-146.
566 Thurow, L. (1992), pp. 114.
567 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 36.
56S Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 118.
569 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 129.
570 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 134.
571 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 138.
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4.2.1.2.1.5 Economic (comparative) Statics vs. Economic Dynamics
One of the key issues of competitive advantage is short-term efficiency vs. long-term dynamic
capabilities, as captured by the economic concepts of "comparative statics" (i.e. getting onto the
maximum place on the production possibilities curve) and "economic dynamics" or moving the
production possibilities curve out.
"The theoretical advantages of profit maximization were in fact mathematically derived under the
assumptions of what economists call 'comparative statics'. In comparative statics, a stable no-growth
environment, firms prove their effectiveness by becoming efficient. The cost minimizer wins.
Japanese lifetime employment and seniority wages should, for example, be a handicap. In economic
dynamics, the central problem is rapid growth. In reaching this growth goal, many of the cost-cutting
advantages of comparative statics may be liabilities... a short-run static advantage that turns out to
be a long-run dynamic handicap. '"72
4.2.1.2.1.6 National Examples: Anglo-Saxon vs. German-Japanese models
"The German/Japanese model is one of close co-operation between banks and enterprises, a
paternalistic state and a communitarian view of management-worker relations. This model translates
into a long-term view of strategy, a readiness to invest in equipment and training and a respect for the
hands-on skills required for technology and production. '"
"The Anglo-Saxon model, associated with turbulent financial markets and impatient lenders, hostile
takeovers and a hire-and-fire approach to labour... an emphasis on short-term financial results, an
aggressive external orientation to strategy, and a high valuation put on speed andflexibility. "574
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72 Thurow, L. (1992), pg. 150.
5 Albert (1991).
574 Albert (1991).
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4.2.2 Sociology & Organizational theories
Much of sociological and organizational theories are predicated on the organization as an open
system which exchanges with the environment and therefore may or may not adapt to the
environment. Three broad schools of thought fall into this "fit" category with differing
emphases on the level of change and adaptation, as shown in Figure 171 below.
Figure 171: Organizational Theories of "Fit"
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4.2.2.1 Theories of Bureaucracy
4.2.2.1.1 Division of Labor vs. Centralization of Authority (Weber)
In his exploration of the ideal type of bureaucracy, Weber (1952) noted two primary and
opposing forces acting in all organizations: the division of labor and the centralization of
authority (or coordination).
4.2.2.1.2 Conflict vs. Order
Sociologists have different assumptions about the nature of society, with one of the key debates
surrounding the dichotomy of order-conflict, also known as "regulation-radical change." Cohen
(1968) presents two models of society with competing sets of assumptions:
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"Commitment, cohesion, solidarity, consensus, reciprocity, co-operation, integration, stability
and persistence. Coercion, division, hostility, dissensus, conflict, malintegration and
change. "
Burrell and Morgan (1979) simplify and summarize the work of and another prominent
sociologist, Dahrendorf's (1959).
"The order view of society emphasizes: stability, integration, functional co-ordination and
consensus. The conflict view of society emphasizes: change, disintegration, conflict and
coercion. ,576
These concepts will form the theoretical underpinnings of the grounded theory that is being
developed herein.
4.2.2.1.3 Theory X and Theory Y (McGregor)
McGregor (1960) was one of the first to acknowledge two very distinct styles of management
which are summarized in Table 9 below.
Table 9: Contrasting Managerial Styles: Theory X & Theory Y
Enterprise Modular Integral
Architecture
Managerial Theory X Theory Y
Style
Characteristics Authoritarian, directive, coercion, control Flexible, open, democratic, motivating,
delegation, trust and intrinsic job
satisfaction
575 Cohen (1968), pp. 166-167.
576 Burrell and Morgan (1979), pp. 12-13.
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4.2.2.2 Social Systems Theories
The following theories encompass a series of major threads in sociology and organizational
theory from General System Theory (with the focus on physics and biological metaphors),
Structural Functionalism (with the focus on the biological metaphor) and Contingency Theory.
4.2.2.2.1 Structural Functionalism
As was discussed in Part I, the framework presented herein can be expressed in terms of
structural functionalism. This sociological paradigm based its theories on biological analogies
and sought to explore morphology, physiology and development in social systems. As a result,
Essay #1 will confine itself to the exploration of morphology or form and structure without
reference to function.
4.2.2.2.1.1 Cooperative Systems
Barnard (1938).
4.2.2.2.1.2 Cooptation
As a structural functionalist, Selznick (1948) posited a sociological mechanism for ensuring
stability, called "cooptation".
"Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. This is a
defensive mechanism... "57
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4.2.2.2.2 General Systems Theory
"General system theory seeks to classify systems by the way their components are organized
(interrelated) and to derive the 'laws,' or typical patterns of behavior, for different classes of systems
singled out by the taxonomy. "78
"Certain methods of studying behavior apply to all organized systems, namely structure, function
and evolution. Any organized system can be seen from these three perspectives which encompass the
broadest scope of a general system theory."579
Foundationational theorists in General Systems Theory included von Bertalanffy (1962),
Boulding (1956), and Rappoport (1968).
4.2.2.2.2.1 Open vs. Closed Systems
Closed systems are characterized by isolation from their environment, while open systems are
characterized by an exchange with their environment. Within organizational systems, this
exchange might include information, material, energy, etc. While closed systems characterize
phenomena like physics, it was also used to characterize organizations up until the general
systems theorists (von Bertalanffy, 1950). Figure 172 below summarizes this distinction.
Figure 172: Closed vs. Open Organizational Systems
Closed Open
system system
e8
8
9
171 Rapoport, A. (1968), pg. xvii.
579 Rapoport, A. (1968), pg. xx.580 Ackoff, R. (1990), draws a similar diagram of an open systems (stakeholder) view of the corporation.
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4.2.2.2.2.2 Open-Closed Systems vs. Open-Closed Causality
"von Bertalanffy may have confused the concept of a closed loop of circular causality with his own
notion of a 'closed system' The later is a system that exchanges no material or energy with its
environment, an entirely distinct and independent idea from the notion of a closed sequence of causes
and effects. ,581
Richardson (1990) presents a compelling history of feedback thought in the social sciences. As a
fundamental part of his thesis, he chronicles the historical uses (and misuses) of the notion of
firms as "open" systems.
"A 'closed system' in general systems theory is a system that experiences no interchange of material,
energy, or information with its environment. In contrast, Forrester's concept represents a system that
is not 'materially closed,' but rather 'causally closed' - the closed boundary separates the
dynamically significant inner workings of he system from the dynamically insignificant external
environment. The two views of closed systems - materially closed and causally closed - are related
but are significantly different. No serious system dynamics model is closed in the general system
theory sense. Every one exchanges material with its environment. Because of such exchanges,
Forrester's 'closed boundary' systems are, in von Bertalanffy 's terms, 'open systems. ,"582
This point is very important to the theory developed in this dissertation, as although most strategy
research embraces firms as open systems which exchange material etc. with their environments,
the preponderance of this research implicitly assumes that firms' while openly exchanging things
with their environments have little active role in determining collectively with their environments
what is to be exchanged, how much, how often and why it is exchanged. This is shown in Figure
173 below.
Figure 173: Open and Closed Causality within an Open Systems Framework
Open system, Open system,
can the firm influence
-~se environmenntet
uinputsts
EnterpriseArchitectural nn 
rm
Forms
Modular Integral
Enterprise Architecture Enterprise Architecture
581 Richardson, G.P. (1990), pg. 122.
582 Richardson, G.P. (1990), pp. 297 and 298.
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4.2.2.2.3 Structural Contingency Theory
Structural contingency theory (Bums and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Blau, 1970) has left an important mark on organizational theory
in that it specifies that the most effective organizational structural designs are contingent upon
environmental (Bums and Stalker, 1961), technological (Woodward, 1965) and size (Blau, 1970)
factors. Table 10 below summarizes the primary research contributions of the contingency
theorists. 583
Table 10: Contingency Theory Research Summary
Y 'I Asb *e-arch Setn C
1954 Gouldner 1 Differences in work structuring reflected degree of
(gypsum company) danger and uncertainty in production.
1958 Woodward 92 Differences in structural features reflect complexity of
(industrial firms) technology employed.
1958 Rice 1 There are three environmental imperatives that must be
1963 (Indian textile firm) satisfied: technological, social and economic.
1961 Burns & 20 More simple & stable environments yield mechanistic
Stalker (industrial firms) structures vs. organic structures.
1967 Lawrence 6 More complex environments demand more
& Lorsch (firms) differentiation & integration.
1967 Thompson 0 Different levels within organizations are more open to
(theoretical) the environment than others.
1971 Blau et al. Effects of size and environmental complexity on
structure.
1973 Galbraith Related task complexity and structural complexity.
1978 Pfeffer & Power / dependence relations among organizations.
Salancik
As shown in Figure 174 below, contingency theory can be thought of as explaining
two ways: between organizations and within organizations.58 4
variation in
583 Source: W. Richard Scott in Introduction to Thompson (1967), pg. xix-xxi.
584 Source: W. Richard Scott in Introduction to Thompson (1967), pg. xix-xx.
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Figure 174: Summary of Two Contingency Models
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4.2.2.2.3.1 Mechanistic vs. Organic (Bums & Stalker)
Burns and Stalker (1961) identified environmental variability (characterized as "stable" and
"unstable") as a critical contextual factor in organizational design. They hypothesized two
corresponding organizational designs: formal "mechanistic" and informal "organic" which
would produce more effective performance in the respective environments of stability and
instability.
Classical organizational theorists tended to view organizations - no matter how complex they are
- as deterministic. To the contrary, modem organizational theorists tend to view organizations as
probabilistic. Burns and Stalker (1961) captured this dichotomy using the terms "mechanistic"
and "organic".
Table 11 below summarizes the mechanistic and organic archetypes.
366
Time
"We are now at the point at which we may set down the outline of the two management systems which
represent for us the two polar extremes of the forms (or 'ideal types') which such systems can take when
they are adapted to a specific rate of technological and commercial change. "585
Table 11: Mechanistic and Organic Organizational Archetypes (Burns & Stalker)586
Characteristic Mechanistic Organic
a. Knowledge & experience The specialized differentiation of The contributive nature of special
functional tasks knowledge & experience
b. Nature of the individual Abstract, with purposes distinct from Realistic, with tasks set by the total
tasks those of the organization as a whole situation of the organization
c. Means of task definition & Immediate superiors Interaction with others
reconciliation
d. Definition of rights, Attached to each functional role A limited field (shedding of
obligations & methods 'responsibility')
e. Translation of rights, Responsibilities of the functional Spread of commitment to the
obligations & methods position organization
f. Structure of control, Hierarchy Network
authority & communication
g. Location of technical & Exclusively at the top of the hierarchy Anywhere in the network
commercial knowledge
h. Direction of communication Vertical Lateral
& interaction
i. Content of communication Instructions & decisions (command) Information & advice (consultation)
j. Condition of membership Loyalty to the organization & Commitment to organization's tasks &
obedience to superiors ethos of progress & expansion
k. Sources of importance & Internal (local) knowledge, experience Affiliations & expertise external to the
prestige & skill firm
4.2.2.2.3.2 Small & Large Batch and Process Technologies (Woodward)
Woodward (1965) observed that there were more effective organizational designs depending
upon the type of production technologies employed.
4.2.2.2.3.2.1 Craft, Mass and Lean Production
A quarter century later, researchers at MIT's International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP)
studying the global automobile industry identified similar production technologies with
implications for organizational design (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990; MacDuffie, 1991).
"This dissertation examines the thesis that flexible production systems are supplanting mass
production systems because of their superior manufacturing perfomance. The dissertation argues that
flexible production systems follow a different 'organizational logic' than mass production. This logic
has two dimensions: structural and cultural. The 'structural logic' of a production system is identified
in terms of the deployment of resources, the link of core production activity to the market, the structure
s58 Bums, T. and Stalker, G. M. (1961), pp. 119 and xi..
586 Bums, T. and Stalker, G. M. (1961), pp. 120-122.
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of authority relations, and the link between conception and execution. The 'cultural logic' is identified
as a way of thinking about production activities that emphasizes their integration with innovation
activities. ",587
In our research, we take a more macro-enterprise view of such "organizational logic." In
addition, we define external environmental contingencies (as well as internal organizational
contingencies) which enable the success of mass and flexible production systems.
4.2.2.2.3.3 Uncertainty Reduction (Thompson)
Thompson (1967) argued that much of organizational action can be explained by the need to
reduce uncertainty, which originates in the environment (Kamps and Polos, 1999). He
articulated much of his theory through 95 propositions.
587 MacDuffie, J.P. (1991), abstract.
4.2.2.2.3.4 Differentiation and Integration (Lawrence & Lorsch)
From a systems theory point of view, Stacey (1995) notes that the forces of integration lead to
stable equilibrium via negative feedback, while the forces of division lead to instability via
positive feedback.
This "division of labor - centralization of authority" dichotomy would later be reiterated by
Lawrence and Lorsch, in their 1967 classic, Organization and Environment: Managing
Diferentiation and Integration.588  They demonstrated that organizational subunits adapted
separately to their own specific environments. Therefore, organizations which face dynamic (or
unstable) and diverse (or heterogeneous) environments, must possess a greater degree of
structural differentiation and integration in order to be effective.
4.2.2.2.3.4.1 Critiques
4.2.2.2.3.4.1.1 Invalid & Inconsistent Claim
Lawrence and Lorsch's claim that higher levels of environmental dynamism and diversity are
best met with higher levels of organizational differentiation is supported by the empirical data in
this research. However, their subsequent claim that these higher levels of organizational
differentiation are matched by corresponding higher levels of organizational integration, is
neither supported by empirical data in this research, nor in fact by the empirical data in their
original seminal research.
From an assessment of their original empirical data (albeit a small-N theoretical sample used for
building grounded theory), the first claim indeed seems plausible, as high-performing firms in
increasingly dynamic and diverse environments indeed do have higher levels of organizational
differentiation. See Table 12 below. 589
Table 12: Inter-Industry Difejrentiation and Integration Comparison
Industry Organization Performance Avg. Differentiation Avg. Integration
Plastics High Performer 10.7 5.6
F_ _ oo _; High Performer __
Containers High Performer 5.7 5.7
Note, however, that the second claim indeed seems implausible, as high-performing firms in
increasingly dynamic and diverse environments indeed have lower levels of organizational
differentiation. This finding is broadly in line with the empirical data gathered in this research.
'88 This connection between Weber and Lawrence and Lorsch was originally made by Scott and Mitchell (1972), pp.
7.
'89 Taken from Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), pg. 103.
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Finally, from their own theorizing, they seem to indicate the incompatibility of these opposing
forces:
"The findings of this study indicate that, other things being equal, differentiation and integration are
essentially antagonistic, and that one can be obtained only at the expense of the other. "9o
"Our findings have also indicated that the states of differentiation and integration are inversely
related The more differentiated an organization, the more difficult it is to achieve integration. "9
"Integration is a better single predictor ofperformance than differentiation alone. 92
Presumably, if the two are as incompatible and as hard to achieve as they suggest, then one
might expect that performance would suffer if firms didn't focus on one or the other, as the
environment dictates.
4.2.2.2.3.4.1.2 Longitudinal Discontinuity
Finally, while Lawrence and Lorsch's first claim of contingency appears to be supported by this
research, it is limited in that it represents a cross-sectional slice. They are able to make inter-
industry comparisons between high performing firms:
"In any case, the contrast between the plastics and the container organizations is very sharp. In a
sense, the represent opposite ends on a continuum, one dealing with a very dynamic and diverse
environment, where innovation is the dominant issue, while the other is dealing with a very stable and
homogeneous environment, where regularity and consistency of operations were important. "593
Conversely, the data represented by this research is longitudinal, and therefore allows for intra-
industry heterogeneity to be compared over time. This allows us to make intra-industry
comparisons between high performing firms.
'90 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b), pg. 47.
591 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), pg. 157.
592 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b), pg. 46.
593 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a), pg. 155.
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4.2.2.2.4 Political Theories of the Firm
As an extension of social system and contingency theories, political coalition theory sees the
interaction of the environment as a political process, with power relationships being contingent
on resource dependence. March (1962) was one of the first to articulate the case for the business
firm being a "political coalition".
"Basically we assume that a business firm is a political coalition and that the executive in the firm is a
political broker. The composition of the firm is not given; it is negotiated. The goals of the firm are
not given; they are bargained. We assume that there is a set of potential participants in the firm. At
least initially, we think of such classes ofpotential participants as investors (stockholders), suppliers,
customers, governmental agents, and various types of employees. "594
March (1962) characterizes the differences between economic theories of the firm and political
theories of the firm.
"The focus of attention shifts from the owners (and their objectives) to the actual, operating
organizers of the coalition -whoever they may be. In general, we view stockholders much as a theory
of political systems might view citizens. Their demands form loose constraints on the more active
members of the coalition. Their initiative in policy formation and in determining the nature of the
coalitions is small. "95
"The theory [of the business firm as a political coalition] does not solve the problem of conflict by
simple payments to participants and agreement on a superordinate goal. Rather it emphasizes the
importance of policy demands and payments and of sequential rather than simultaneous mediation of
demands. ,596
4.2.2.2.4.1 Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik)
The resource dependence theory looks at the ways in which organizations reduce environmental
uncertainty (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982). These include either
internal "buffering" or external "bridging".
Recent theorists have noted the limitations of Pfeffer and Salancik's formulation, by
disaggregating the notion of interdependence into two dimensions: power imbalance and mutual
dependence (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005).
4.2.2.2.4.2 Stakeholder Theory of the Firm
Much of the establishment of a theoretical construct of an enterprise architecture is based on the
relatively new theoretical notion that the firm is not necessarily designed specifically to advance
the unitary profit interests of the owners or shareholders. There are other types of firms driven
by different "objective functions", namely those who are trying to balance the plural objectives
594 March,
595 March,
596 March,
J.G.
J.G.
J.G.
(1962),
(1962),
(1962),
pg. 672.
pg. 674.
pg. 674.
of multiple stakeholders. Within the strategic management field, Whittington (2000) identifies
this range of objective functions or "profit motives" as a primary classification of firms.
The stakeholder view of the firm is a relatively new theoretical perspective within the fields of
economics and organizational theory (Follett, 1918; Freeman, 1984; Evan and Freeman, 1988;
Ackoff, 1990; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Ramirez, 1999).
While the major works have proliferated in the past 25 years, the thread can be traced back to the
ideas of Mary Parker Follett in the field of political science in 1920's (Schilling, 2000).
As will be discussed later in Essay #2, the stakeholder view of the firm implies a formal
recognition of a series of exchanges with entities or stakeholders outside the firm. This
relationship with the firm's environment is seen as an "open" system, however it may not be
seen as causally open, depending on how the causal mechanisms are constructed.
As will be discussed in the following section, this recognition of firms with differing objective
functions has been made recently within the field of economics under the heading of "mixed"
duopolies.
4.2.2.3 Ecological View
The ecological view of organizations and organizational change takes an evolutionary
perspective. Borrowed from the intellectual domain of biological ecosystem science, which is
divided into "synecology", which is the study of multiple, interdependent populations within
communities and ecosystems, and a subset called "autecology", which is the study of individual
organisms within single populations (Whittaker, 1975, pp. 4-5) as shown in Figure 175 below.
Figure 175: Two Ecologies: Community and Population
Community Ecology
(Synecology)
While much work in organizational sociology has focused on autecology (known as "population"
or "organization" ecology), relatively little work has focused on synecology (known as
"community" ecology). The framework developed herein is an attempt with this higher, more
general analysis of ecosystems.
"The perspectives adopt different levels of analysis and produce contrasting views of the
characteristic mode and tempo of organizational evolution. Population ecology limits investigation to
evolutionary change unfolding within established populations, emphasizing factors that homogenize
organizational forms and maintain population stability. Population ecology thusfails to explain how
populations originate in the first place or how evolutionaty change occurs through the proliferation or
heterogenous organizational types. Community ecology overcomes these limitations: it focuses on the
rise and fall of populations as the basic units of evolutionary change, simultaneously explaining
forces that produce homogeneity and stability within populations and heterogeneity between
them. '597
This research postulates that if intra-species structural inertia were zero, then variation would
take place within species, and population heterogeneity would not exist.
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4.2.2.3.1 Population Ecology (Autecology)
The first definitions of population ecology is the organizational unit and its environment, that is,
the organizational form and the organizational niche.
4.2.2.3.1.1 Organizational Form
Population ecologists define populations as the collection of organizations exhibiting the same
structural form (Carroll, 1984). Form is defined as a "blueprint for organizational action"
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977, pg. 935) that a number of organizations share. In this sense, an
organizational form can be expressed as a typology or taxonomy as will be suggested later in
this chapter under the categorization of architectural form.
"Form serves as the organizational ecologist's analogue to the biological ecologist's species. Form
summarizes the core properties that make a set of organizations ecologically similar. Oranizational
populations are specific time-and-space instances of organizational forms. "598
Note that while ecologists define populations as organizations exhibiting the same structural
form, economists define industries as including all organizations serving the same demand or
function, which could include quite diverst types of providers of substitutable products (Scott,
2003, pg. 127, footnote 2). This framework therefore defines multiple populations of
organizational forms serving an industry (or niche).
Hannan and Freeman (1989, pg. 51) identify four properties of organizations which can be used
to classify them into forms:
* Stated goals (i.e. objective functions)
* Forms of authority (i.e. modular vs. integral)
* Core technology (i.e. growth vs. stability)
* Marketing strategy (i.e. differentiated vs. cost-leadership)
4.2.2.3.1.2 Organizational Niche
We will consider explicitly and formally the niches (and niche overlap) in the mathematical
modeling in Chapter 7.
4.2.2.3.1.3 Structural Inertia
In chapter 6, we will present empirical evidence of the existence of structural (or architectural)
inertia, which facilitates the downfall of incumbent architectures and enables the late entry and
survival of challenger architectures.
598 Hannan and Carroll, 1995, pg. 29.
4.2.2.3.2 Community Ecology (Synecology)
"The organization field can be viewed as encompassing the other levels: the individual organization,
the organizational set, and two or more populations of interdependent organizations. 599
Synonymous with inter-organizational community is the organizational field (Scott, 2003, pp.
129-132).
Much of the focus of organizational ecology research has focused on populations of
organizations - otherwise known as "population" ecology - while relatively few references exist
in the management literature on multiple populations or "community" ecology (e.g. Astley,
1985; Beard and Dess, 1988). It is however at the community level, that populations of
organizations adapt to form new species of populations.
"That the community is the essential adaptive mechanism may be taken as the distinctive hypothesis of
ecology. "6o
4.2.2.3.2.1 Verhulst Population Growth in Finite Environment
In order to define how populations grow, we can determine the key variables which enable and
constrain their growth.
4.2.2.3.2.2 Species Archetypes: r-strategists and K-strategists
Birttain and Freeman (1980) adapted these concepts from organisms to organizations. We will
develop these further in Chapter 7.
4.2.2.3.2.3 Lotka-Volterra (Predator-Prey) Inter-species Competition
Although the Lotka-Volterra Predator-Prey equations are famous for their potential to generate
chaotic oscillation through a balancing loop between predator and prey, we will focus on the
reinforcing behavior between competitors in Chapter 7.
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4.2.2.4 Institutional and Neo-Institutional Theory
4.2.2.4.1 Institutional Theory
We note that the actors in the enterprise architectures may in fact not conform to rationality
assumptions of classical economics, and instead rely on informal mechanisms espoused by
Institutional Theory (Selznick, 1949). Selznck's work on co-optation will be particularly
relevant when we explore how an (integral enterprise architecture) organization engages the
environment for its survival.
4.2.2.4.2 Neo-Institutional Theory
As one of the "bit four" theories to grow out of the 1960's contingency theory, neo-institutional
theory was launched by the works of Meyer and Rowan, in1977 and DiMaggio and Powell in
1983.
"What makes organizations so similar? Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox
arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. "6Ol
While much of the new debate in economics and strategic management in the past two decades
has focused on what are the sources of firm heterogeneity (Barney, 1991), the debate in
sociology has been just the opposite: what are the sources of firm homogeneity or institutional
isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
601 DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, pg. 147.
4.2.2.5 Social Network Theory
This section deals with an important subset of social network theory, namely inter-firm network
theory.
4.2.2.5.1 Embeddedness
"Research on embeddedness is an exciting area in sociology and economics because it advances our
understanding of how social structure affects economic life. '602
Some of the original research on "embeddedness" within inter-firm networks was done by
Schumpeter (1950) and Granovetter (1985), and was subsequently developed by researchers like
Uzzi who focus specifically on "structural embeddedness" or on how the "network architecture
of exchange relationships influence economic activity" (Uzzi, 1997, pg. 36).603
4.2.2.5.1.1 Under-embedded network
Uzzi (1997) characterizes a continuum of exchange relationships with the neoclassical form as
follows:
"In the ideal-type atomist market, exchange partners are linked by arms-length ties. Self-interest
motivates action, and actors regularly switch to new buyers and seller to take advantage of new
entrants or avoid dependencies. Personal relationships are cool and atomistic. ,60
4.2.2.5.1.2 Over-embedded network
Conversely, the embedded form has the following characteristics:
"Embedded actors satisfice rather than maximize on price and shift their focus from the narrow
economically rational goal of winning immediate gain and exploiting dependency to cultivating
long-term, co-operative ties. The basic conjecture of this literature is that embeddedness creates
economic opportunities that are difficult to replicate via markets, contracts or vertical integration. "605
"ln an embedded logic of exchange, trust acts as the primary governance structure. Joint problem-
solving arrangements promote voice rather than exit. On a microbehavioral level, actors follow
heuristic and qualitative decision rules, rather than intensely calculative ones. These factors furnish
an alternative mechanism for matching customer demand to production. 'o
Uzzi (1997) then goes on to demonstrate empirically the competitive advantages of
embeddedness, but notes some economic limitations, particularly with regard to adaptability:
602 Uzzi, 1997, pg. 35.603 Uzzi does not consider the other three forms of embeddedness put forth by Zukin and DiMaggio (1990):
cognitive, political and cultural.604 UZZi, 1997, pg. 36.
605 Uzzi, 1997, pg. 37.
606 Uzzi, 1997, pg. 61.
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"Embeddedness is a logic of exchange that promotes economies of time, integrative agreements,
Pareto improvements in allocative efficiency, and complex adaptation. These positive effects rise up
to a threshold, however, after which embeddedness can derail economic performance by making
firms vulnerable to exogenous shocks or insulating them from information that exists beyond their
network. ,6o
"The same processes by which embeddedness creates a fit with the current environment can
paradoxically reduce an organization's ability to adapt. "~0
4.2.2.5.1.3 Hybrid network
Figure 176 below illustrates the concept of embeddedness with respect to the enterprise
architectural theory presented in this research.60 9
Figure 176: Embeddedness and Enterprise Architectures
Under-embedded
network
Hybrid
network
Modular
enterprise architecture
Over-embedded
network
Focal firm
Manufacturers
Contractors
Integral
enterprise architecture
67 Uzzi, 1997, pg. 35.
608 Uzzi, 1997, pg. 57.
6o9 Note that Uzzi's work appears to focus on the supply or value chain axis only. Note unfortunately that Uzzi
refers to the hybrid network as "integrated". This unfortunately is confusing with respect to the terminology used in
this dissertation.
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4.2.2.5.2 Socialization
Granovetter 's (1985) theories of socialization echo a typology of under-socialized behavior
underpinned by much of economics (modular enterprise architecture) and over-socialized
behavior underpinned by much of sociology (integral engerprise architectures).
4.2.2.5.2.1 Under-socialization
With price as the integrating mechanism, socialization processes are less relevant, and more in
line with the demands of modular enterprise architectures.
4.2.2.5.2.2 Over-socialization
When plural objective functions exist, adherence to the stability of social norms become more
relevant, which is in line with integral enterprise architectures.
4.2.2.5.3 Keiretsu as Inter-firm Networks
Various threads have emerged, including the empirical observation of social forms like Japanese
"keiretsu" (Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian, 1996).
4.2.2.6 Behavioral Decision Theory
4.2.2.6.1 Bounded Rationality
Much of the work on bounded rationality, (e.g. Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) will be
extended in an enterprise architectural setting, where decision makers will be subjected to
making decisions that are boundedly rational in stakeholder space and time.
4.2.2.6.2 Exploitation vs. Exploration
The tradeoff between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991) will be made apparent as is the
fundamental tradeoff between modular and integral enterprise architectural forms.
4.2.2.6.3 Loose vs. Tight Coupling
When Simon610 speaks of loosely-coupled systems as being more "stable", he is referring to their
"survivability" or "damage-tolerance", as they are able to localize disruptions. Later, I shall
argue that loosely-coupled systems correspond to the notion of modular architectures, which
generate greater degrees of instability - with stability meaning in this case variablility.
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4.2.2.7 Complexity / Complex Adaptive Systems Theory
More recently, sociological contingency theory has taken a new form, that of complex adaptive
systems.611 This has begun to find its way into the strategic management literature (Levy, 1994;
Stacey, 1995; Lengkick-Hall and Wolff, 1999; Caldhart and Ricart, 2004). Researchers have
explored evolutionary biological612 phenomena (Kauffman, 1993) and mapped them onto
business phenomena (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Sigglekow, 2002).
4.2.2.7.1 NK Model of Interdependencies
Kauffman's (1993) NK model defines interdependencies between activities, where each of N
total activities interacts with K other activities. The NK model has been transported to the
strategic management domain by Levinthal (1997) and Rivkin (2000). In management research,
the NK model can be thought of as a complex production function, which is comprised of these
activities as well as the traditional capital and labor (Lenox, Rockart and Lewin, 2006). In this
way, the NK model captures interdependencies between activities in a more general way than
Milgrom and Roberts' (1990, 1995) complementarity concept which invokes the power and
simplicity of supermodularity.
The presence of low interdependencies between parts, chunks, or stakeholders (i.e. N=l) signals
a modular enterprise architecture, whereas the presence of high interdependencies between parts,
chunks, or stakeholders (i.e. N=K) signals an integral enterprise architecture, as shown in Figure
177 below.
Figure 177: NK Model and Enterprise Architectures
N=4 (stakeholders)
K=1 (interdependency)
Modular
Enterprise Architecture
N=4 (stakeholders)
K>1 (interdependency)
Integral
Enterprise Architecture
6" I am indebted to Dr. Felix Reed-Tsochas of the University of Oxford for assisting me in developing this.
612 Note that the notion of afitness function in evolutionary biology is simply the negative of apotential function in
the nonlinear physics of attractors and basins.
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Modular enterprise architectures therefore possess a rather simple objective function or
"landscape", which is a single concave globally optimal peak. Integral enterprise architectures
on the other hand possess a more complex objective function or landscape, which consists of
multiple local optima, having the appearance of a rugged surface (as will be summarized in the
next section).
4.2.2.7.2 Fitness Landscapes
A fitness landscape is simply the representation of genotype similarity on the horizontal axis and
fitness or reproductive / business success on the vertical axis.
In applying this concept to the framework presented herein, it is posited that fitness or business
success in an emerging market is characterized by competition between enterprises having
similar genotypes / phenotypes in a stable landscape. Conversely, fitness or business success in
a maturing market is characterized by competition between enterprises having different
genotypes / phenotypes in a rugged landscape as shown in Figure 178 below.
Figure 178: Competition within Stable and Rugged Landscapes
Stable
(competitive) landscape
Winner has
low interdependencies
(modular enterprise architecture)
(D
16
Genotype
similarity
Rugged
(competitive) landscape
Winner has
high interdependencies
(Integral enterprise architecture)
Genotype
similarity
4.2.2.7.2.1 Part-Whole Relationships
In biology, the part-whole relationship is the relationship between an organism's genetic
structure (or internal interdependencies) and its phenotype (or overall structure), which is in turn
related to the organism's fitness with its environment (or external interdependencies).
4.2.2.7.2.2 Rugged Landscapes
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Kauffman (1993) modeled the selection dynamics in the biological domain with heterogeneous
interdependent traits. He found that as the number of interdependent elements increases, the
fitness landscape presents an increasing number of local optima (Dosi et al. 2003, pg. 105-106).
"In the presence of strong interdependencies (as is often the case in many complex products), the
system can not be optimized by separately optimizing each element from which it is made. Indeed, in
the case of strong interdependencies, it might well be the case that some, or even all, solutions
obtained by tuning each component 'in the right direction' yield a worse performance than the
current one. 613
4.2.2.7.3 Competition vs. Cooperation
Political scientist, Robert Axelrod, in The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) used game theoretic
research with the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma results in a TIT-FOR-TAT as optimal. This was
followed up more recently with agent based modeling in The Complexity of Cooperation (1997).
"Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me! "614
"Toyota has two faces. It is a stern father and a compassionate mother. "65
613 Dosi et al. (2003), pg. 106.
614 Ancient Chinese proverb.
615 Shogo Tsuru, former chairman of Nippon Oil Seal, as quoted in Hino, S. (2006), pg. 59.
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4.2.3 Strategic Management theories
4.2.3.1 SCP vs. RBV
There is clearly a considerable wealth of constituent research in the field of strategic
management from two schools rooted in microeconomic theory: the Industrial Organization
subfield dating back to Bain (1956) advanced the industry structure emphasis and on the
resource-based view of the firm dating back to Penrose (1959), with their respective descendant
proponents appearing a quarter century later in Porter (1980) and Wernerfelt (1984). Since this
time, much research in this field has focused on the refinements of theories in each subfield,
including: asset stock accumulation and dynamic capabilities (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece,
Pisano and Shuen, 1990).
It will be demonstrated theoretically later in this chapter that different enterprise architectures
will be built and operated by people and institutions having different mental models or who
operate a different "core logic" (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999) regarding the nature and
purpose of strategy.
In fact, it will be hypothesized that modular enterprise architectures operate a core logic, which is
more closely aligned with the SCP paradigm and the hypercompetitive and high-velocity
perspectives that embody "guerilla logic" (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999).
In contrast, it will be hypothesized that integral enterprise architectures operate a core logic,
which is more closely aligned with the RBV paradigm and the ecosystem/chaos perspectives that
embody "complexity logic" (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999).
4.2.3.2 Flexibility vs. Comittment
Ghemawat, (1992), Pacheco-de-Almeida, G., Henderson, J.E., and Cool, K.E. (2008).
4.2.3.3 Profit-Maximizers vs. Profit-Seekers
Each of these two schools can be seen to represent the assumptions behind modular enterprise
architectures (SCP) and integral enterprise architectures (RBV). The SCP school assumes firms
as profit-maximizers, while the RBV school (including Schumpter-Penrose-Nelson/Winter)
assumes firms as profit-seekers.616
4.2.3.4 M-Form vs. N-Form
Hedlund (1994) was one of the first to move from the multi-divisional form (Chandler, 1962) to
the network form. This has implications for the modular and integral enterprise architectures
respectively.
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4.2.3.5 Strategic Groups
The notion of "strategic groups" was asserted by Porter (1980, 1981), in an effort to discretize
heterogeneity of firms within an industry. As will be discussed later, enterprise architecture
configurations of modular vs. integral will be seen to belong to different strategic groups.
4.2.4 Architectural theories
The notion of enterprise architecture cuts across the many manifestations of "architecture" in
management literature: e.g. complexity in- (Simon, 1962) building- (Alexander, 1964), product-
(Ulrich, 1995), systems- (Meier and Rechtin, 2000; Nightingale and Rhodes, 2004), supply
chain- (Novak and Eppinger, 1998), organizational- (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Rechtin,
1999), human resource- (Lepak and Snell, 1999), innovation and- (Henderson and Clark, 1990),
as well as the various interactions between architectures (Fine, 1998; Sako, 2003).
Although, civil, product and system architecting are focused primarily on technological systems,
the concepts can be extended along the spectrum towards socio-technical systems and ultimately
towards social systems. As shown in Figure 179 below, this is a matter of increasing both
behavioral and dynamic complexity (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Senge, 1990).
Figure 179: From Technical, to Socio-Technical, to Social Systems
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Wicked
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4.2.4.1 Civil Architecture
4.2.4.1.1 Form (and Structure)
"Form: The shape and structure of an object. The essence of something. 61 7
"Structure: Something made up of a number ofparts that are held or put together in a particular
way. "18
4.2.4.1.2 Function
"Function: the action for which a person or thing is particularly fitted or employed "9
In classical architectural theory, the relationship between architectural form and function is
important and explicit. A similar relationship can be seen to drive the business enterprise's
architectural form, namely the business objective function.
"Form follows function. '6 20
Heuristic..f:
The architectural form of an enterprise will be governed by the objective function of the
enterprise (or at least by the "keystone" firm). Modular enterprises are driven by the
maximization of economic value, while integral enterprises are driven by the creation and
distribution of stakeholder surplus.
"The starting point for the book is therefore Chandlerian: How does strategy determine structure,
and what are the complex ways in which structure and strategy interconnect? Here strategy may be
defined as the planning and carrying out of the growth of organizations, and structure is understood
to mean the organizational form devised to administer activities and resources (Chandler, 1962, pg.
13). "621
This is a modification of Chandler's classic Strategy and Structure (1962), which explored intra-
firm design (focusing on the evolution of the multi-divisional "M-form") as opposed to inter-
firm design. Chandler asserted that the firm's internal structure should follow its strategy. In
comparison, this framework is asserting that a firm's external architecture should follow its
objective function. It is important to note that the concepts of both form and function are higher
level and more abstract notions than Chandler's.
"Form and function are one. "622
Finally, in the spirit of systems thinking and feedback causality, Frank Lloyd Wright (1939)
argued for the integration of form and function as existing in a concurrent duality.
617 From "Dictionary.com".
618 From "Dictionary.com".
619 From "Dictionary.com".
620 Louis Sullivan (1896).
621 Sako, M. (2006), pp. 1-2.622 Frank Lloyd Wright (1939).
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4.2.4.1.3 Fit
The notion of"fit" is well established in civil architectural terms (Wright; Alexander, 1964; etc.)
This topic will be taken up again in more detail in chapter 6, where the environment is explored
in more detail.
4.2.4.2 Product Architecture
While the focus of civil architecture was largely on environmental fit, as well as form following
function, the focus of product architecture lies in decomposing functions and mapping them onto
structures to achieve the desired performance.
The following briefly summarizes and attempts to disentangle the various definitions and uses of
"architecture" in the product development and management literatures.
4.2.4.2.1 Building Blocks, Components, Chunks, Modules
Product architecture is broadly defined as the mapping of function to form. Most researchers in
product development use different terms to express form (or components of form) ranging from
"building blocks" or "chunks", (Ulrich, 1995; Ulrich and Eppinger,1995) and "modules"
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000).
"Product architecture is the assignment of the functional elements of a product to the physical
building blocks of the product. '623
"Product architecture is the scheme by which the function of the product is allocated to physical
components. "624
"The architecture of the product is the scheme by which the functional elements of the product are
arranged into physical chunks and by which the chunks interact. "625
"An architecture specifies what modules will be part of the system, and what their functions will
be. ,"626
While product architecture is defined in both functional and physical terms, enterprise
architecture is defined in both functional and organizational terms as will be discussed in later
sections.
4.2.4.2.2 Interfaces
"In management literature, more than in the engineering literature, there is a tendency to home in on
interface specification as an important feature of modularity. "627
623 Ulrich, K. and Eppinger, S. (1995), pp. 182-183.
624 Ulrich, K. (1995), pg. 419.
625 Ulrich, K. and Eppinger, S. (1995), pg. 183.
626 Baldwin, C. and Clark, K. (2000).
627 Sako, M. (2003), pg. 231.
4.2.4.2.3 Typology of Product Architectures
4.2.4.2.3.1 Modular
According to Ulrich and Eppinger (1995, pg. 183), modular product architectures:
* have functions assigned to one chunk;
* therefore, a chunk executes only one function;
* interactions between chunks are clearly-defined;
4.2.4.2.3.2 Integral
According to Ulrich and Eppinger (1995, pg. 184), integral product architectures:
* have functions assigned to more than one chunk;
* therefore, a chunk executes more than one function;
* interactions between chunks are ill-defined;
"An integral architecture allows for redundancy to be eliminated through function-sharing. "'28
An example of the range of product architectures employed is shown in Figure 180 below. In this
example, a passenger airplane can be seen to have two primary functions, providing lift for flight,
and providing a cabin for the passengers.
A conventional modular one-to-one mapping of function to form would entail an architectural
solution in which separate physical "chunks" or modules would be separately designed, built and
operated to accommodate each function. In this example, the wings (with their special airfoil
shape) would serve to create lift, while the tubular fuselage would house the payload or
passengers.
Conversely, an integral many-to-one mapping of function to form would entail an architectural
solution in which one "chunk" or module would be integrally designed, built and operated to
accommodate both functions. In this example, the fuselage would become the lifting device, or
put another way, the wings would house the payload or passengers.
628 Ulrich, K. and Eppinger, S. (1995), pg. 188.
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Figure 180: Product Architecture Example
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product architecture product architecture
"Conventional aircraft comprising separate wings and fuselages accomplish the functions of
providing lift, carryingfiuel, and housing passengers using separate portions of the aircraft. Typically
wings and fuselages are designed by different engineers and made in different factories. The Airbus
Consortium was structured to take advantage of this architecture. Wings are made in the UK,
fuselage barrel sections in Germany, tail sections in Spain, and final assembly and integration takes
place in France. But there are some disadvantages in terms of coordination as well as transportation
of large subassemblies. For example, the International Space Station may have suffered from certain
mismatches between physical and organizational architectures. "629
As will be discussed in subsequent sections, product architectures may have an influence on the
design of organizational architectures. Because an integral product architcture like an airplane
(Fine, 2005), can have its product and organization chunked in an apparently "modular" fashion,
does not necessarily make the enterprise architecture modular. In fact, by the definitions
provided herein, Airbus is an integral enterprise architecture which enables it to decompose the
product into apparent "modules" designed and produced by apparently "modular" entities in
distant geographic locations. However, it maintains high-level integration between the
organizational chunks, thus delivering the intgeral product (and more importantly, the integral
product portfolio) in an integral way. Just because a complex organism has more functions
performed in different locations, does not necessarily make it more modular than a single-celled
organism. Both Boeing and Airbus have broadly similar functional decompositions in their
products (wings, fuselage, engines, avionics) and their enterprise architectures (customers,
suppliers, investors, employees). The differences lie in how the objectives, boundaries and
interfaces are managed ultimately define modularity or integrality. We are interested in function
as well as structure.
629 Whitney, D. et al. (2004), pg. 10. Also noted in "Airbus' Jigsaw Plane", BusinessWeek, March 14, 2006.
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4.2.4.2.4 Design Rules
"Design rules allocate functions to modules, identify operating principles, and set interfaces among
modules that determine how organizations evolve. "'~
Helper and Khambete (2006, pg. 10) note that Baldwin and Clark (2000) emphasize the location
of interfaces as opposed to the ways of governing the interfaces:
"Baldwin and Clark define a modular architecture as one which has few interdependencies between
modules (and more interdependencies within modules). Their book focuses on the impact of the
location of these interfaces (what happens if modules are split, recombined, etc.) They argue that a
modular architecture promotes innovation by allowing more division of labor. They pay little
attention to ways of governing interfaces (interdependencies) between components; mentioning only
two: Design rules (highly structured) and Discussion (loosely structured). ",63'
4.2.4.2.4.1 Three Types of Modularity
Modularity in design, manufacturing and use. (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). (Brusoni and
Prencipe, 2006).
4.2.4.2.4.1.1 Modularity in Design
4.2.4.2.4.1.2 Modularity in Manufacturing
4.2.4.2.4.1.3 Modularity in Use
630 Brusoni and Prencipe (2006).
631 Helper and Khambete (2006), pg. 10, footnote 6.
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4.2.4.2.5 Product Performance
"I define product performance as how well the product implements its functional elements. Product
performance excludes economic performance, except to the extent that it arises from the product's
technical performance, because economic performance is also highly dependent on the firm's
production, service, sales and marketing activities. ,"62
Having defined the spectrum of product architectures, the obvious question is: "Which
architecture performs better?" The answer is obviously, "It depends."
"Arguments for the integral design are often largely technical or performance-based, whereas
argumentsjbr modular tend to be based on business concerns such as cost and time to market. ,"'33
4.2.4.2.5.1 Modular performance
In general, modular product architectures are designed for local high performance (Ulrich, 1995,
pg. 432). In addition, modular architectures tend to exhibit lower acquisition cost, which must
be balanced against higher relative life-cycle costs.
4.2.4.2.5.2 Integral performance
"A product embodying an integral architecture will often be designed with the highest possible
performance in mind ',634
In general, integral product architectures are designed for global high performance (Ulrich, 1995,
pg. 433) defined for narrow and specific environmental conditions. In addition, integral
architectures tend to exhibit lower life-cycle costs, in spite of their higher acquisition costs.
632 Ulrich, K. (1995), pg. 432.
633 Fine, C.H. (1998), pg. 136, acknowledging D. Whitney's contribution.
634 Ulrich, K. and Eppinger, S. (1995), pg. 184.
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4.2.4.3 System Architecture
While the focus of product architecture was largely on decomposing functions and structures to
achieve the desired performance, the focus of system architecture lies in greater detail and
dynamic complexity, as well as design for emergence.
The following two sub-sections articulate two very different and potentially complementary
processes for architecting systems.
4.2.4.3.1 Top-down Deterministic Mechanistic Reductionism
"Reductionism relies on the assumption that a divide-and-conquer strategy will really work, that
understanding the behavior of each element and defining each interface correctly and completely will
assure a properly working system. This assumption brings with it a host of other attitudes and
methods, generally called top-down, that assume that things can be preplanned and scripted, and that
following the script is the way to get a successful result. "636
As we have discussed in other social science literatures, this top-down approach is reminiscent of
Theory X (McGregor, 1960), hierarchical command and control organizational structures. The
reductionist divide-and-conquer strategy is reminiscent of the efficiencies of division of labor
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The deterministic preplanned and scripted approach is
reminiscent of the mechanistic traditions (Burns and Stalker, 1961).
4.2.4.3.2 Bottom-up Emergent Organic Holism
"In contrast to top-down is bottom-up, in which requirements and system design are expected to
emerge over time and by means of trial and error. Under these assumptions, no complete script can be
written, not all of the events and decisions can be anticipated or scheduled, and the final result is not
known. ,"6Y
As we have also discussed in other social science literatures, this bottom-up approach is
reminiscent of Theory Y (McGregor, 1960), flat and empowered organizational structures. The
holist strategy is reminiscent of the effectiveness of integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
The emergent and unscripted approach is reminiscent of the organic traditions (Burns and
Stalker, 1961).
63 Weick, K. (1993) refers to the two types of organizational design as:formal and emergent.
636 Whitney et al. (2004), pg. 4.
637 Whitney et al. (2004), pg. 4.
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4.2.4.4 Organizational Architectures
"Modular and integral architectures are like oil and water. They don't mix. 638
In addition to the study of physical architectures, whether civil, product or system, the discussion
then tends towards the architectures of those organizations which design, produce and operate
the physical architectures.
A recent study of the literatures in 36 journals on modularity in product, process, organization
and innovation over the past 35 years revealed relatively little work in the area of organizational
modularity (Fixson, 2006). Table 13 below summarizes the literatures at the intersection of
modularity and organizations.
Table 13: Research on Modularity in Organizations
Authors Year Modularity Type Industry
Product Process Organ- IanovationIzation
Baldwin & Clark 2000 V I V Computer
Browning 2001 V V " Auto. sub-system
Djelic & Ainamo 1999 1 Luxury Fashion
Ethiraj & Levinthal 2004 1/ (non-specific)
Fine, Golany & Naseraldin 2005 v " I Automobile
Garud & Kumaraswamy 1995 V " Computer & Auto.
Helfat & Eisenhardt 2004 I Electronics & IT
Henderson & Clark 1990 V/ Photolithographty
Kusunoki, Nonaka & Nagata 1998 / Materials & Systems
Salvador, Rungtusanatham & Forza 2004 V V I (multi -industry)
Sanchez & Mahoney 1996 I WO Aircraft, Auto, Elec.
Schilling 2000 V " Stereo, Computer
Schilling & Steensma 2001 V I (multi -industry)
Siggelkow & Levinthal 2003 V/ (non-specific)
Sinha & Van de Ven 2005 %" (multi -industry)
Sosa, Eppinger & Rowles 2003 V I Aircraft Engine
Sosa, Eppinger & Rowles 2004 / Aircraft Engine
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Comparing Physical- and Organizational Architectures
4.2.4.4.1.1 Common Points
From both physical architectural theory as well as sociology / organizational theory, we know
the following:
4.2.4.4.1.1.1 Architecture Enables Function
Structure (or its more abstract form, architecture) is necessary to enable function. For
in order to conduct the function of producing manufactured goods, one
structure/architectural form like a factory. In order to conduct the social function of
one needs an organizational structure like a bureaucracy (Weber, 1952).
example,
needs a
business,
4.2.4.4.1.1.2 Architecture Constrains other Functions
In doing so, structure (architecture) constrains other functions. For example, the physical
structure/architectural form of a factory, while enabling some production functions, constrains
other functions like pursuit of leisure activities, like swimming. The social structure of
bureaucracy, while enabling some business functions, constrains other functions like conducting
639
an insurgent revolution.
4.2.4.4.1.1.3 Architecture does not Predetermine Choice
But within an architecture, a range of choice (i.e. functional flexibility) is preserved. For
example, within the physical architecture of a factory, one can manufacture goods or one can
even meditate (even if not in a church, synagogue, mosque or temple). Within the organizational
structure/architecture of a bureaucracy, one can conduct business or one can even raise a family
(even if not in a more informal, trust-based environment).
639 It is interesting to note that when radical environmental change occurs, people in social organizations tend to
preserve structures, instead of higher-order goals and objectives.
4.2.4.4.1.2 Differences
4.2.4.4.1.2.1 Visibility
Physical architectures are visible, while organizational architectures are invisible. This can
present problems in theory development and testing in social science via "unobservables".
4.2.4.4.1.2.2 Evolution
Physical architectures can be approximated as static, or at least they "evolve" very slowly.
Organizational architectures are dynamic, that is they have the potential to evolve very rapidly,
particularly if their structural inertia is low (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
4.2.4.4.1.2.3 Emergence
Physical architectures can be approximated as top-down deterministic, while organizational
architectures are bottom-up emergent, that is they are continually enacted by their constituent
agents.
4.2.4.4.2 Two Levels of Organizational Architecture
We will next explore both inter- and intra-firm architectures in the following sub-sections.
4.2.4.4.2.1 Inter-firm (Enterprise) Architectures
4.2.4.4.2.1.1 Concept Extended from Product Architecture
While we previously examined how the notion of architecture was used to map function to
physical form, we now use the concept to relate how function relates to organizational form as
shown in Figure 181 below.
Figure 181: Mapping Function to Organizational (not Physical) Form
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architectures
Product
architectures
Organizational
Enterprise modules
functions a (i.e. stakeholder
"chunks")
Product
functions
Physical
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4.2.4.4.2.1.2 Sub-case Example: Supply Chains
Baldwin and Clark (2000) show that firm boundary decisions in the computer industry are
mediated by stakeholder groups representing both labor and capital markets. They argue that
modularization or disintegration of the computer industry is driven by users demand for
compatibility (modularity-in-use), which lead to modularity-in-design. The "environmental" or
stakeholder factors that enabled such a transformation were the mobility of technical labor in the
first instance, and the availability of venture capital to fund modular design firms.
Sako (2003) compares the catalysts driving product and organizational architectures in the
computer and automobile industries, by searching for explanations in the stakeholder groups of
labor and capital markets. She argues that the catalyst driving modularity in the automobile
industry is modularity-in-production generated by the assembly of technologically and
ergonomically complex components. The "environmental" or stakeholder factors that enabled
such a transformation were the wage differentials of labor in the first instance, and the drive by
investors to push for outsourcing and consolidation in a maturing industry with overcapacity and
cost-competition.
Finally, Piepenbrock (2004) extends Baldwin and Clark (2000) and Sako's (2003) analyses to the
commercial airplane industry, by noting that the catalyst driving modularity is modularity-in-use
generated by the imperative of offset agreements in order to access international markets. This
adds another stakeholder to the discussion, namely the customer via access to product markets.
The "environmental" or stakeholder factors that enabled such a transformation were the wage
differentials of labor to a small degree, but the access to risk-sharing partnerships with suppliers
as a means of capital investment.
Figure 182 below, adapted from Sako (2003), applies the framework to illustrate the different
catalysts driving product and organizational architectures in three industries: computers,
automobiles, and airplanes.
Figure 182: Stakeholder Catalysts driving Product and Organizational Architectures
Product
;markets
Explaining "make-buy"
firm boundaries...
Labor
:markte
0
Industry Computers Automobiles Airplanes
Refrence Baldwin and Clark (2000) Sako (2003) Piepenbrock (2004)
Catalyst for MiU --* MiD MiP - MiD MiU, MiP -- MiD
Modularity (user demand for compatibility) (production complexity and ergonomics) (market access via production offsets)
Organizational Modular design teams & start- Outsourcing, tiering and Outsourcing, tiering and
Adaptation ups first, outsourcing later consolidation of suppliers consolidation of suppliers
Mobility of technical labor Wage differentials between International socio-political
OEM and suppliers demand for work-placement
Venture capital for start-ups Investment banking advice for Risk-sharing partner suppliers
M&A fund development costs
Offsets give market access to
intemational sales
Within the commercial airplane industry, the above-described stakeholder analysis, which
ultimately drives product- as well as organizational architectures (and subsequent outsourcing) is
shown in Figure 183 below.
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Figure 183: Product & Organizational Architectures in Commercial Airplane Industry
1. National industrial policies
to develop high-tech,
high-value jobs. m
wkProduetnwakets
5. "Risk-sharing" investments
by partner suppliers cover apia ..
non-recurring costs
(subsidized by governments).
2. As a precondition for market access to
government owned / regulated airlines,
work-placement (offsets) are mandated.
3. Firm must outsource
work content, causing
tensions with unions.
4. Production offsets
to "partner suppliers" in
return for market access.
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4.2.4.4.2.2 Intra-firm Architectures
A mapping can be posited to exist between inter-firm (enterprise) architectural functions, and
intra-firm functions or projects as shown in Figure 184 below. 640 It will be demonstrated that a
modular inter-firm enterprise architecture tends to be served by a modular intra-firm
architecture, while an integral inter-firm enterprise architecture tends to be served by an integral
intra-firm architecture.
Figure 184: Inter-firm to Intra-firm Functional Mapping
Product
markets
I
Labor
markets
Supplier
markets
Functional vs. Project (Forrester, 1961). Nadler & Tushman (1997).
640 Note that the customer-firm-supplier axis represents the three minimum internal business processes of marketing,
engineering and supplier management as discussed in Hagel and Singer (2000).
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4.2.4.5 Multi-Level Nesting: Product-Organizational Architecture Mapping
An overarching research question in this intellectual domain has been: "We know that
organizations design products, but do products design organizations?" Recent research has
observed that products do not design organizations, but knowledge does (Brusoni, 2006).641
"Modular products can lead to modular organizations, as product design rules define both the
technological and organizational architecture of the firm (e.g. Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Shilling,
2000; Sturgeon, 2002; Langlois, 2003). Empirical studies questioned such findings: non-modular
organizations that produce modular products were observed in the aircraft engine (Prencipe, 1997),
hard disk drive (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001) and automotive industries (Takeishi, 2002). These
studies illustrated that firms consist of different domains, e.g. organizational structures, technological
architectures, etc. that may obey different design rules. The evolution of the firm's knowledge bases
also plays a fundamental role in mediating the relationship between product and organization design
(Brusoni et al. 2001). ,642
While researchers like Fine (1998, 2005) have demonstrated that high firm performance results
when product and organizational (i.e. supply chain) architectures are aligned, other researchers
have demonstrated that integral organizations can indeed produce modular products (Prencipe,
1997; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Takeishi, 2002 and Piepenbrock, 2004).
In fact, examples of modular organizations successfully producing integral products are not
common. This research dissertation will attempt to show that in the commercial airplane
industry, Boeing is evolving toward a more modular enterprise architecture, while its products are
relatively more integral. Conversely, Airbus has a more integral enterprise architecture, while its
products are more modular.
"Conventional aircraft comprising separate wings and fuselages accomplish the functions of
providing lift and housing passengers using separate portions of the aircraft. Typically wings and
fiiselages are designed by different engineers and made within different factories. The Airbus
consortium was structured to take advantage of this architecture. Wings are made in the UK,
fuselage barrel sections in Germany, tail sections in Spain, and final assembly and integration take
place in France. ',64
Many researchers have observed the coincident relationship between product architecture and
higher level organizational and even supply chain architectures (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996;
Fine, 1998; Schilling, 2000; Sturgeon, 2002; Langlois, 2003; Helper and Khambete, 2006) as
shown in Figure 185 below.
641 I am indebted to Prof. Nightingale for helping me to clarify these concepts.
642 Brusoni and Prencipe (2006).
643Whitney et al. (2004), pg. 10.
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Figure 185: Deterministic Mapping of Product and Enterprise Architectures
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The observation that successful product architecture drives (or is driven by) coincident supply
chain architecture, does not necessarily imply that these in turn drive (or are driven by)
coincident enterprise architectures (Prencipe, 1997; Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001, Takeishi,
2002; Sako, 2003; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). The potential reasons are hypothesized to be:
The relatively narrow nature of the technologically-oriented interface information that
drives the relationship between firm (product) and supply chain, compared to the more
pluralistic information relating to investor and labor issues.
* Enterprise architecture does not necessarily drive product architecture, but product system
(or platform) architecture. For example, it is much easier and more likely for an integral
enterprise architecture (like that of Airbus) to produce a family or system of products
which share more commonality, than it is for a modular enterprise architecture (like that
of Boeing). In a sense, it is not Airbus' integral product's, but their integral product
strategy, that is produced by the integral enterprise architecture.
* If/when product architectural changes are required, it will take successively longer times
to evolve/adapt the architectures of the supply chain, and even longer to evolve/adapt the
architectures of the enterprise. The greater the scope of the system in space and time, the
greater the degree of architectural inertia.
402
Integral
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Heuristic 1f:
The nested architectures of product, supply chain and extended enterprise, will tend to be aligned
along the integrality-modularity spectrum, as an indication of optimized performance. It is noted
however that structural inertia increases with increasing extent of the architectures, making
alignment changes slower.
"To a significant degree, product and supply chain architectures tend to be aligned along the
integrality-modularity spectrum...in essence, product and supply chain architectures tend to be
mutually reinforcing. 44
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4.2.5 Summary of Theoretical Underpinnings of Construct
Figure 186: Construct in Architectural Theory
Modular
enterprise architecture
Integral
enterprise architecture
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Singular Objective Plural
(Maximization of Shareholder Value) Function (Maximization of Stakeholder Surplus)
Narrow Enterprise Broad
(narrow spatial, short temporal) Boundaries (broad spatial, long temporal)
Simple Stakeholder Complex
(High quantity of participants in a stakeholder class, Interfaces (Low quantity of participants in a stakeholder class,
Low quality of stakeholder relationships) High quality of stakeholder relationships)
. ................................ 
Figure 187: Construct in Economic / Political Science Theory
Modular
enterprise architecture
Integral
enterprise architecture
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Mechanistic (Unstable Environment) Contingency Organic (Stable Environment)
Loose-coupling Theory Tight-coupling
Resource Independence Resource Resource Dependence
(High Positional Power) Dependence (Low Positional Power)
r-strategist Organizational K-strategist
(Opportunist species) Ecology (Equilibrium species)
Exploitation Organizational Exploration
Learning
-
-
-
- ---- 
- --
Figure 188: Construct in Sociology / Organization Theory
Modular
enterprise architecture
Integral
enterprise architecture
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Market-based Hierarchy Transaction Cost Hierarchy-based Network
Economics
Low Trust, Asset Non-Specificity Game Theory High Trust, Asset Specificity,
Inequitable, One-shot Ultimatum Game Equitable, Repeated Ultimatum Games
Flexibility Strategic Commitment
Management
Liberal Market Economies Varieties of Coordinated Market Economies
(e.g. Anglo-American) Capitalism (e.g. Japanese-German)
................................................... --- - ------
Figure 189: Summary of Architecture Typologies in the Literature
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Level lypology Type Soure
Micro Organizational Structure Mechanistic Organic Bums & Stalker (1961)
(Structural Contingency Theory)
Organizational Structure Differentiation Integration Lawrence & Lorsch (1967)
(Structural Contingency Theory)
"Strategic Types" Prospector Defender Miles & Snow (1978)
(Organizational Theory)
Organizational "Forms" r-strategist K-strategist Brittain & Freeman (1980)
(Organizational Ecology)
Organizational Learning Exploitation Exploration March (1991)
(Organizational Theory)
"Generic Strategies" Differentiation Cost Leadership Porter (1980)
(Economics)
"Mixed Duopoly" Profit Maximizer Labor Managed Lambertini & Rossini,
(Economics) (1998)
Meso Network Theory Under-embedded Over-embedded Granovetter (1985), Uzzi
(Economic Sociology) (1997)
Inter-organizational Modular Integral Piepenbrock (2009)
"Architecture"
(Complex Systems Theory)
Macro Varieties of Capitalism Liberal Coordinated Hall & Soskice (2001)
(Political Economy) Market Economy Market Economy
--
4.3 Enterprise Architecture: 3D-Functional Decomposition
"A company is its chain of continually evolving capabilities - that is, its own capabilities plus the
capabilities of everyone it does business with. 45
"To extend a systemic approach to strategy, I suggest that a company be viewed not as a member of a
single industry, but as part ofa business ecosystem that crosses a variety of industries. 646
Although based on the theory of architecture/modularity where the "chunks" can be functionally
independent or interdependent, the enterprise architectue is not a physical / technological
construct, but an organizational / relational contruct. The stakeholders are defined in functional
"chunks" along three orthogonal axes: the axis defining the customer-supplier relationships of
the value chain, the axis defining the factors of production, and the axis defining the nature of
competition. Each will be briefly discussed in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Value Chain Axis
As shown in Figure 190 below, this pair of stakeholders comprise the customer and supplier
"chunk" taken from Porter's 1985 classic.
Figure 190: Enterprise Architecture: Value Chain Axis
Classical
Value Stream
stakeholders
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645 Fine, C.H. (1998), pg. 71.
646 Moore, J.F. (1993).
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4.3.1.1 Product/Service markets (customers)
4.3.1.2 Supplier markets (suppliers)
Firm boundaries (Sako, 2006). Make-Buy. Vertical Integration. Outsourcing. Offshoring
(Helper and Khambete, 2006).
4.3.1.3 Supplier "Push" vs. Customer "Pull"
"You can have any color you 'd like... as long as ii's black. "64
When markets are growing rapidly, the industry is generally capacity-constrained and the
producer tends to be in control in a "push" mode. Conversely, when markets begin to mature,
the industry is generally demand-constrained and the customer tends to be in control in a "pull"
mode as shown in Figure 191 below.
Figure 191: Supplier "Push" vs. Customer "Pull"
Capacity-constrained
environment
Demand-constrained
environment
Product
markets
Enterprise
Architectures
Capital
markets
Labor
markets
647 Henry Ford's famous "push" tactics in the early automobile industry.
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4.3.2 Factors of Production Axis
As shown in Figure 192 below, this pair of stakeholders comprise the capital and labor (K, 1)
"chunk" taken from classical economics. As will be discussed later, these stakeholders often
provide the "teleological pull" or objective functions for the enterprise.
Figure 192: Enterprise Architecture: Factors ofProduction Axis
Classical
Factors of Production I
stakeholders N
As we will discuss later in chapter 6, the relative dominance of capital vs. labor is contingent
upon the state of the industrial evolution.
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4.3.2.1 Capital markets (investors)
For the purposes of the framework, "capital" markets refers both to debt and equity markets,
having fixed and variable (or residual) claims on the enterprise's cash flows. Each will be
discussed in turn.
4.3.2.1.1 Capital Structure: Debt vs. Equity
Modigliani and Miller won the nobel prize for demonstrating (under certain circumstances) the
irrelevance of capital structure.
"When a company earns more on borrowed money than it pays in interest, returns on equity will rise,
and vice versa. Leverage thus improves financial performance when things are goin well, but
worsens performance when things are going poorly. It is a classic fair-weather friend. "
Higgins (2004) notes that leverage can both help and hurt ROE, depending on certainty of ROIC.
In fact, based on empirical research (McConnell and Servaes, 19995), Higgins (2004) notes that
debt levels should vary with firm growth.
"For 'high-growth'firms corporate value is negatively correlated with leverage, whereas for 'low-
growth'firms corporate value is positively correlated with leverage. 9
"[In] rapidly growing businesses... high growth and high debt are a dangerous combination. "650
"Slow-growth companies have a much easier time with financing decisions. Face the reality that the
business has few attractive investment opportunities, and seek to create value for owners through
aggressive use of debt financing. Use the company 's health operating cash flow as the magnet for
borrowing as much money as is feasible, and use the proceeds to repurchase shares. ",651
4.3.2.1.1.1 Debt markets
4.3.2.1.1.2 Equity markets
Equity markets can be divided into public and private equity. Within this classification, equity
investors can be characterized on the dimensions of patience as well as activism.
4.3.2.1.1.2.1 Quality of Equity Investors
4.3.2.1.1.2.1.1 Public vs. Private Equity
4.3.2.1.1.2.1.2 "Patient" vs. "Impatient" capital
64 Higgins, R.C. (2004), pg. 194.
649 Higgins, R.C. (2004), pg. 215.
650 Higgins, R.C. (2004), pg. 215.
651 Higgins, R.C. (2004), pg. 217.
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Within the Varieties of Capitalism framework, Goyer (2006) examines the varieties of
institutional investors (ranging from the "patient" capital of pension funds, to the "impatient"
capital of mutual/hedge funds) in France and Germany. He concludes that firm-level
institutional arrangements of workplace organization account for the most significant variable in
ascribing why French firms attract more short-term impatient capital (e.g. mutual/hedge funds)
particularly from Anglo-Saxon investors, while German firms attract more long-term patient
capital (e.g. pension funds).
"The concentration of power in the CEO of French companies is valued by mutual and hedge funds,
since it makes it easier to reorganize the strategy of the firm quickly -a key aspect of the preferences of
this type of investors given their short-time horizon. By contrast the relative absence of mutual and
hedge funds, coupled with the growing strength of pension funds with their demands for financial
transparency and long-term horizon, constitutes a stabilizing factor for the institutional arrangements
of workplace organization of German companies. P652
Conflicting accounts of pension funds exist however:
"Everyone who has worked with American managements can testify that the need to satisfy the
pension fund manager 's quest for higher earnings next quarter, together with the panicky fear of the
raider, constantly pushes top management towards decisions they know to be costly, if not suicidal,
mistakes. The damage is greatest where we can least afford it: in the fast growing, middle-sized, high-
tech or high-engineering firm that needs to put every available penny into tomorrow - research,
product development, market development, people development, services - lest it lose leadership for
itself and for the U.S. economy.653
A recent example of patient capital comes from Airbus' parent company, EADS.
"Lagardere recently reported a 57% drop in 2006 profit, due largely to the poor performance of its
7.5% stake in EADS. Chief executive Arnauld Lagardre, who also co-chairs EADS, also ruled out
the sale of the company's stake in EADS when announcing his annual results. 'I will play my role and
I want to carry on being part o EADS's growth, ' he told Le Monde. He added that he saw no need
for a capital increase at EADS, presumably in lieu of politicians who wish to take a bigger role in
Airbus. So concerned was Lagardere about EADS' future the he vowed to return any upcoming
dividend back to the company. 'The Airbus situation has affected everyone, the employees above
all, but also the shareholders and notably the small investors who have suffered from the drop in
shares, 'he said. ~654
4.3.2.1.1.2.1.3 Institutional vs. Individual Investors
Hansen and Hill (1991) determined empirically that contrary to popular belief, institutional
owners are not necessarily myopic and that greater institutional ownership may be associated
with greater R&D expenditures. They show that it is individual investors who exhibit more
short-term orientation.
652 Goyer, M. (2006), pg. 423.
653 Drucker, P. (1986), pg. 32, as quoted in Hansen and Hill (1991), pg. 1.
654 Olson, P. (2007), "Lagardere Won't Cut and Run from Airbus," Forbes magazine, March 14, 2007.
65 This research applied to time-series studies of four technology-driven industries: pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
computers, and aerospace. It should be noted that while in R&D investment in most technology-driven industries
was positively correlated with degree of institutional holdings, this relationship was reversed in the aerospace
industry - it appears that institutional investors are myopic in aerospace stocks.
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"American firms are myopic... in the sense that time horizons are short. [This] partly has to do with
the high cost of capital in the United States. ,'56
Goyer (2006) compares the varieties of institutional investors in France and Germany.
"I distinguish primarily between pension and mutual/hedge funds. Pension funds constitute long-
term investors that acquire an equity stake in corporations primarily for diversification purposes;
mutual/hedge funds seek to maximize assets under their management as they possess a shorter term
horizon and operate under competitive pressures to beat market benchmarks. The importance of this
distinction between different types of investors is primarily driven by its implications for the mode of
coordination of firms. As Hall and Soskice (2001) have argued, access to patient capital constitutes a
key feature of coordinated market economics, as opposed to liberal market economics that rely on
short-term, risk capital. The investment strategies and time horizons of mutual/hedge and pension
funds have di/ferent consequencesfobr the sustainability of national models. Mutual and hedge funds
posess short-term investment strategies and time horizons. They also exhibit firm-specific
preferences since the performance of their portfolio is shaped by the behavior of a smaller number of
companies than is the case for pension funds. "65
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4.3.2.1.1.2.2 Managerial capitalism
A variety of forms of "capitalism" have emerged, the most advanced of which is known as
"managerial capitalism" which is the result of the separation of ownership from management.
The capital markets or equity investors are traditionally seen as the "owners" of the firm. They
claim any residual profits from the operations of the firm. Recently, researchers (e.g. Ghoshal,
2005) have begun to call into question this theory.
4.3.2.1.1.2.2.1 Principal-Agent problem: Agency vs. Stewardship
In an effort to increase efficiency through specialization (Smith, 1776), the functions of firm
ownership and management were separated, resulting in a modular link in this portion of the
factors of production axis. This however created a misalignment of incentives resulting in
unintended inefficiencies, known as the 'principal-agent' problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Fama, 1980).
Note however as shown in Figure 193 below, that an integral enterprise architecture (by
definition) is one in which is designed to minimize or mitigate the misaligned incentives of the
principal-agent problem which is known as "stewardship" (Donaldson and Davis, 1989 and
1991).
Figure 193: Principal-Agent problem: Agency vs. Stewardship Theories
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(owners)
Enterprise aptl Labor rs
Architectures arkets markets Enterprise 7
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interests interests
("Agency" ("Stewardship"
theory) theory)
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) summarize the key characteristics of each form as is
shown in Table 14 below.
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Table 14: Comparing Agency and Stewardship Theories
Enterprise Architecture Modular Integral
Governance Theory Agency theory Stewardship theory
Model of Man Economic man Self-actualizing man
Behavior Self-serving Collective-servin
Psychological
Mechanisms
Motivation Lower order / economic needs Higher order needs (growth,
(psychological, security, economic) achievement, self-actualization)
Extrinsic Intrinsic
Social Comparison Other managers Principal
Identification Low value commitment High value commitment
Power Institutional (legitimate, coercive, control) Personal (expert, referent)
SituatonalMechanisms
Management Philosophy Control oriented Involvement oriented
Risk orientation Control mechanisms Trust
Time orientation Short-term Long-term
Objective Cost control Performance enhancement
Cultural Differences Individualism Collectivism
High power distance Low power distance
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, ownership and managerial
objectives of profit and growth.
functioning are driven by different
4.3.2.1.1.2.2.2 Board of Directors: "Architectural" Gatekeeper
The shareholders, via the board of directors, have an important power: selecting, evaluating and
rewarding the chief architect.
Many researchers have recently begun to question why the shareholders are the stakeholders that
get to select the leadership, most recently Ghoshal (2005). Ghoshal argues that the primacy of
shareholders interests was based on the (now) outdated notion that they were the risk-takers of
the enterprise. Instead he argues, the employees are the true risk-takers of the enterprise:
"In every substantive sense, employees carry more risks than do the shareholders. Also, their
contributions of knowledge, skills and entrepreneurship are typically more important than the
contributions of capital by shareholders, a pure commodity that is perhaps in excess supply. ""
This point of view is what was earlier described as "human capitalism", or "labor-managed
firms".
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4.3.2.2 Labor markets
The discussion of labor (or human capital) markets proceeds along the dimensions classically
associated with other capital markets - i.e. in the make vs. buy analysis (Miles and Snow, 1984)
of determining the boundaries of the firm, meaning is labor internalized or externalized?
Additionally the discussion of labor markets will include the quality of the interfaces between the
firm and its human capital stakeholders, specifically along the short-term arm's length and long-
term trust-based dimension.
4.3.2.2.1 Boundaries (make vs. buy)
Lepak and Snell (1999); Sako (2006).
4.3.2.2.2 Interfaces (arm's length vs. trust-based)
The integral EA form of the labor stakeholder sees long-term trust-based employment. Although
this does not preclude the existence of labor unions (as Southwest Airlines demonstrated) it does
tend to minimize their formal raison d'etre.
Although such integrality clearly exists in some enterprises (e.g. in the form of life-time
employment), it is debatable as to the degree of complete foresight about its long-term effects.
Evolutionary economists (Nelson, 1991) question the rationality of the origins of such practices:
"Thus, as I understand it, large Japanese firms adapted 'lifetime employment' for their skilled
workers in the early post war era to try to deal with a problem of skill shortages and labor unrest. It
is quite unclear how many Japanese managers foresaw advantages associated with worker
loyalty. '"659
Like other stakeholder architectures,
involve temporal tradeoffs.
"Guaranteeing job security intensifies
run performance is worse. "660
the effects of integrality in the labor stakeholder group
the tradeoff between short and long term effects. In the short
659 Nelson (1991).
660 Sterman, Repenning and Kofman (1997), pp. 515-516.
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In Table 15 below, Arthur (1992) defines two systems of workplace industrial relations.
Table 15: Two Systems of Workplace Industrial Relations
Industrial Relations Type of System
Functions Cost Reduction Commitment Maximizing
Organization of Work Job tasks narrowly defined Broadly defined jobs
Employee Relations Very little employee influence over High level of employee
"management" decisions; participation/involvement;
No formal employee complaint/grievance Formal dispute resolution procedures
mechanisms; (nonunion firms);
Little communication/socialization efforts Regularly share business/economic
information with employees
Staffing/Supervision Low skill requirements; High percent of skilled workers;
Intense supervision/control Self-managing teams
Training Limited training efforts More extensive, general skills training
Compensation Limited benefits; More extensive benefits;
Relatively low wages; Relatively high wages;
Incentive-based All salaried/stock ownership
In Table 16 below, Delery and Doty (1996) show the following rankings of human resource
practices from a survey study using Likert rankings of the banking industry.
Table 16: HR Practices in Configurations
Ideal Strategic Profiles Market-type Middle-of-the-Road Internal
Variables (Prospector) (Analyzer) (Defender)
Results-oriented appraisals 4.44 3.41 2.38
Profit sharing 6.33 4.26 2.19
Job descriptions 3.38 4.49 5.60
Employment security 2.79 3.90 5.01
Internal career opportunities 3.86 4.67 5.48
Training 3.08 4.24 5.40
Participation/voice 4.60 5.36 6.12
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4.3.2.3 Dominant Factor of Production (capital vs. labor)
In certain situations, capital is relatively the more dominant factor of production, while in other
situations, labor is relatively the more dominant factor of production. In the following
subsections, we will explore important contingencies; and in essay #3, we will integrate these
contingencies into a coherent environmental assessment in order to determine which
combinations of contingencies (i.e. traditional capitalism or human capitalism) are expected to
dominate during the life-cycle of an industry's (or more accurately, a business ecosystem's)
evolution.
4.3.2.3.1 Traditional vs. Human capitalism
4.3.2.3.1.1 Traditional capitalism (capital dominance)
Traditional capitalism is characterized by the relatively rapid building of physical capacity (e.g.
property, plant and equipment), often for economies of scale. For this to happen rapidly, capital
markets are required which demand high rates of growth. The main attributes of traditional
capitalism are:
o Capital (not labor) markets are the focus of the objective function: "profit maximization".
o Capital (not labor) is the risk-bearing factor of production (Ghohal, 2005)
o Capital (not labor) supply is the system constraint (Ghoshal, 2005)
o Capital (not labor) is the source of competitive advantage
4.3.2.3.1.2 Human capitalism (labor dominance)
Human capitalism on the other hand is characterized by the relatively slow growing of
knowledge-based capability, often for economies of scope. For this to happen, stability is often
required for the labor markets. The main attributes of human capitalism are:
o Labor (not capital) markets are the focus of the objective function: "labor-management".
o Labor (not capital) is the risk-bearing factor of production (Ghoshal, 2005)
o Labor (not capital) supply is the system constraint (Ghosahl, 2005)
o Labor (not capital) is the source of competitive advantage
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4.3.2.3.2 Enterprise Architectural tendencies
While it is theoretically not impossible for both enterprise architectural forms to focus on
traditional vs. human capitalism, this framework asserts that by definition, modular enterprise
architectures tend to focus on physical capital as a means to ramp up physical capacity
expansion, while integral enterprise architectures tend to focus on the capability of human assets
as the source in innovation (whether product or process) and therefore competitive advantage.
Figure 194 below summarizes the diametrically-opposed postures of each of the extremes of
enterprise architectures.
Figure 194: Traditional capitalism vs. Human capitalism
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4.3.2.3.3 Cultural / National tendencies
While Anglo-Saxon capitalism has tended to focus on the providers of capital, the German-
Japanese capitalism has tended to focus on the providers of labor (Thurow, 1992). Such
stakeholders tended to integrate in order to achieve scale and therefore market power in the
forms of unions. This would suggest that Anglo-Saxon traditions have a greater tendency
towards modular enterprise architectural forms, while the German-Japanese capitalism has a
tendency towards integral enterprise architectural forms.
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4.3.3 Competitive Enablers and Constraints Axis
As shown in Figure 195 below, this pair of stakeholders comprise the competitor and
government "chunk". "Government" is meant in the generic sense, covering local, state, federal
and "meta-" levels like its participation in the World Trade Organization.
Figure 195: Enterprise Architecture: Competition Axis
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4.3.3.1 Regulatory markets (governments)
[In the U.S.] "business and government seldom work together and often are at odds. "66'
"Many of the organizations which play an important role in resource
governmental organizations, are not profit-maximizers. "662
The role of governments both in regulating national industries and
interests is important (Krugman, 1987; Brahm, 1995).
4.3.3.2 Profit markets (competitors)
Game theory, mixed duopoly.
allocation, including
promoting international
661 Nelson, R. (1991), pg. 63.
662 Stiglitz, J.E. (1991), pg. 15, quoted in Braham, R. (1995), pg. 76.
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4.3.4 Functional Decomposition
"Decomposition is a time-honored problem solving strategy (Simon, 1969). It often works effectively,
provided the process under consideration is not strongly coupled to other systems. When couplings
are strong, however, decomposition may lead to ineffective policies. Worse, piecemeal policies may
intensify the problem (Forrester, 1971; Ackoff, 1978) or even lead to catastrophe (Perrow, 1984).
Decomposition methods ignore feedback processes and discount time delays and side efftcts.
Decomposition in complex, tightly coupled dynamic systems optimizes the parts at the expense of the
whole and the present at the expense of the future. "663
As shown in Figure 196 below, the functional decomposition among stakeholders creates chunks
(or stakeholder pairs) which are either functionally independent (in the case of modular
enterprise architectures) or functionally interdependent (in the case of integral enterprise
architectures).
Figure 196: Functional In(ter)dependence
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4.3.4.1 Functional Independence
When an industry is in "push" mode, stakeholder power resides with the central firm. Therefore
the interests of other stakeholders are relatively less important. Functions can be decomposed
successfully to stakeholders in a modular fashion, and the zero-sum game of wealth distribution
is played, particularly as this is the "dominant design" of enterprise architectures, and the winner
is the one who plays it the most efficiently.
4.3.4.2 Functional Interdependence
When an industry is in "pull" mode, the stakeholder power is more distributed within the
enterprise. Therefore the interests of other stakeholders are relatively more important.
Functions cannot be decomposed successfully to stakeholders in a modular fashion, and a
positive-sum game of wealth distribution is played. The winner is the one who plays it the most
efficiently.
663 Sterman, Repenning and Kofman (1997), pg. 519.
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4.3.4.3 Enterprise Performance
"In the presence of strong interdependencies (as is often the case in many complex products), the
system can not be optimized by separately optimizing each element from which it is made. Indeed, in
the case of strong interdependencies, it might well be the case that some, or even all, solutions
obtained by tuning each component 'in the right direction' yield a worse performance than the
current one. In the presence of strong interdependencies, the problem cannot therefore be
decomposed into separate sub-problems which could be optimized separately from the others
(Marengo, 2000). '6
The maximization of stakeholder surplus is by its very title a more global optimization around
the relevant stakeholders who impact the long-term strategic advantage of the firm. It recognizes
that the enterprise-level decomposition of functions across different stakeholders can and often
does result in sub-optimal system performance, particularly if strong interdependencies exist
across stakeholders, as shown in Figure 197 below.
Figure 197: Performance and Functional In(ter)dependence
If high functional Independence, If high functional Interdependence,
exists between stakeholders, exists between stakeholders,
Customess
Note that the converse statements are also true and important. For example, if high functional
interdependence exists between stakeholders, then a modular enterprise architecture based on
local optimization, would result in global sub-optimization and hence low performance. The
formula one race car finding itself in a mud-bog, would be an example of increasing the
functional performance of the parts (i.e. faster engine, or greater aerodynamics), would make the
system performance no better, and in fact worse off if one considers the amount of resource
spent on these activities as opposed to other "architectural" activities.
V
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4.4 Enterprise Architecture: Objective Functions, Boundaries & Interfaces
Having defined the constituent chunks of the enterprise, we can now define the three properties
that enable a typology of architectural forms: Objective Functions, Boundaries and Interfaces.
Each will be briefly discussed in turn.
4.4.1 Enterprise Objective Functions
At its core, the enterprise architecture construct is about the functinonal independence or
interdependence between stakeholder chunks. As different stakeholders have different and often
conflicting goals, this construct is deeply rooted in the notion of power an politics, in which we
build from past theoretical work:
"The business firm is a political coalition and the executive is a political broker. The composition of
the firm is not given; it is negotiated. The goals of the firm are not given; they are bargained. We
assume that there is a set ofpotential participants in the firm such as investors, suppliers, customers
and various types of employees. "665
"A political perspective defines power as the ability to get things done when goals conflict. "666
This section outlines the goals or objective functions which drive the ultimate forms of the firms
and their extended enterprises - the "forcing" functions. In this sense, the objective functions are
an acknowledgement of a goal-directed or teleological change process (Van de Ven, 1992).
The objective function of the enterprise is broadly classified as a problem of corporate
governance.
"Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure
themselves of getting a return on their investment.'"67
The following outlines two extremes in objective functions: maximization of shareholder value
vs. the maximization of stakeholder surplus. While objective functions are complex and varied,
this section will characterize them on a continuum from the traditional maximization of
shareholder value to the more recent maximization of stakeholder surplus. Figure 198 below
summarizes the spectrum of objective functions.
665 March J. (1962).
666 Dahl R. (1957).
667 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), pg. 737.
Figure 198: Enterprise Objective Functions
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4.4.1.1 Maximizing Shareholder Value
"Milton Friedman [said]: 'Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the vety foundation of ourfree
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much
money for their stockholders as possible' (Friedman, 2002, pg. 133). '"668
The maximization of shareholder value is by its very title a very local optimization around a
specific stakeholder group, the shareholders or equity investors.
"Whose income 'ought' to go down? Historically we have used economic growth to avoid having to
make this judgment. Economic growth has been seen as the social lubricant that can keep different
groups working together. ,669
We will note in Chapter 5 that during times of high growth, the zero-sum game does create
serious problems, as all stakeholders are growing. It is only when growth begins to slow down
that the zero sum game starts to become dysfunctional.
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669 Thurow, L. (1980), pg. 17.
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4.4.1.2 Maximizing Stakeholder Surplus
Henry Ford, perceived as one of the greatest (modular) "capitalists", defended himself from a
lawsuit by shareholders in 1919, for suspending Ford's dividend payments by arguing that Ford
should serve a broader constituency of stakeholders than just the shareholders. He stated Ford's
purpose as being:
".. to do as much good as we can, everywhere, for everybody concerned...and incidentally to make
,670
money.
This positive sum objective function, coupled with Ford's vertically integrated Rouge complex,
begins to sound like an integral EA, not the modular EA that we have come to observe over the
past 50 years. One explanation is that, like Boeing, incumbents originally began their lives as
integral EA, and have since disintegrated into modular EA.
Likewise, Owen D. Young, General Electric Chariman from 1922-1945 echoed the same
pluralistic stakeholder-based sentiments:
"Managers are no longer attorneys for the stockholder; they are becoming trustees for an
institution. It makes a great deal of difference in my attitude towards my job as an executive officer of
General Electric whether I am a trustee of the institution or an attorney for the investor. ',67
Leading academics have recently begun to challenge the most fundamental assumptions driving
business today, the firm's objective function (Ghoshal, 2005).
"After all, we know that shareholders do not own the company - not in the sense that they own their
homes or their cars. They merely own the right to the residual cash flows of the company, which is
not at all the same thing as owning the company. They have no ownership rights on the actual assets
or businesses of the company. We also know that the value a company creates is produced through a
combination of resources contributed by different constituencies: Employees, including managers,
contribute their human capital, for example, while shareholders contribute financial capital If the
value creation is achieved by combining the resources of both employees and shareholders, why
should the value distribution favor only the latter? If these truths are acknowledged, there can be no
basis for asserting the principle of shareholder value maximization. There just aren't any supporting
arguments. Why do we not fundamentally rethink the corporate governance issue? Why don't we
actually acknowledge in our theories that companies survive and prosper when they simultaneously
pay attention to the interests of customers, employees, shareholders, and perhaps even the
communities in which they operate? Such a perspective is available, in stewardship theory for
example (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1987), "
Toyota, arguably the world's premier manufacturing company and the current dominant
challenger in the automotive industry, states the following as its objective function:
"We maximize shareholder value over the long term by harmonizing the interests of all our
stakeholders: customers, suppliers, employees, and members of the community at large, as well as
shareholders. "673
670 Quote taken from FTmagazine, June 11, 2005, issue no. 109, pg. 22.671 Quote taken from FTmagazine, June 11, 2005, issue no. 109, pg. 22.
672 Ghoshal, S., (2005), pp. 79-81.
673 1998 Toyota annual report.
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4.4.2 Enterprise Boundaries
The academic discussion around the "boundaries of the firm" has historically (Coase, 1937)
embraced only its supplier markets in the traditional "make-buy" decision. More recently, it has
embraced the firm's labor markets (Sako, 2006). This framework attempts to address a broader
set of stakeholders which define the "boundaries of the firm", which include the complementary
stakeholders to suppliers and employees, namely customers and investors as shown in Figure 199
below.
Figure 199: Classical discussions around the "Boundaries of the Firm"
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As shown in Figure 200 below, the boundaries of the enterprise vary according to the objectives
of the firm. These vary from local optimization of the firm, to more global optimization of the
firm and its extended enterprise.
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Figure 200: Enterprise Boundaries
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Organizations have long been recognized as exchanging things with their environments, called
"open" systems. The boundaries of the organization (both spatial and temporal) define the extent
of the organization, and the degree of "openness". As will be shown below, the firm exchanges
things with entities outside of its control, and in that sense, all firms are open systems with
respect to their stakeholders. However, as we shall explore later, different enterprise
architectures (modular and integral) vary in their control over these exchanges with their
extended enterprises. Specifically in chapter 5, when we address the structural dynamics of
enterprises, we will draw a distinction between open and closed systems and open and closed
causal systems.
Rice (1958, 1963) focused on boundary management issues.
[The primary task of leadership is] "to manage the relations between the enterprise and its
environment so as to permit optimal performance of the primary task of the enterprise [which is] the
task that it must perform to survive. 74
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4.4.2.1 Spatial
"Firms and their attributes are parts of the environment and are linked to it by exchanges of
resources. "
As noted by various researchers (Fine, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998), the spatial boundaries of the
firm can be important in defining a firm's competitive advantage.
"Key firm resources may reside in afirm 's external network".6
4.4.2.1.1 Vertical Integration (boundaries)
The theory of the firm (Coase, 1937) provides insights into why firms exist vis a vis markets, and
where the efficient boundary of the firm should be. Either the price mechanism coordinates
economic activity in market transactions, or managerial authority coordinates economic activity
in vertically-integrated firms.
Later Williamson's transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) extended this theory by
positing logical firm boundaries based on the transaction as the unit of analysis. While Coase
focused on costs as the discriminating criterion between firms and hierarchies, Williamson
posited a set of factors which generated these transaction costs: asset specificity, uncertainty,
frequency, opportunism and bounded rationality, with asset specificity being the most important.
The classic case study of vertical integration or the make-buy problem is General Motors-Fisher
Body.
4.4.2.1.2 Virtual Integration (interfaces)
"General Motors and Toyota are helpful for illustrating why the categories in 'make versus buy' or
'vertical integration versus outsourcing' are inadequate: they do not account precisely for the
complexity of relationships we observe in practice. Rather than using the categorization of vertically
integrated or disintegrated, supply chain relationships can be categorized on a scale running from the
highly integral to the highly modular, depending on the degree of proximity of the members in the
chain along four dimensions: geographic, organizational, cultural and electronic. "677
More recently other researchers, while acknowledging power and clarity of transaction cost
economics, have questioned the complexity that it captures. Instead of focusing on asset
ownership, Fine (1998) posits four dimensions of "proximity": geographic, organizational
(including ownership), cultural and electronic.
In this sense, Fine (1998) is less interested in who owns the assets (i.e. legal boundaries), but in
how the assets are managed (i.e. interfaces). The quality of the relationships between
stakeholders (often called "relational coordination" or "relational contracting" is very important
in determining an enterprise's architecture and will be discussed in the following sections.
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676 Farjoun, M. (2002), pp. 577.
677 Fine, C.H. (1998), pg. 158.
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4.4.2.2 Temporal
"Time horizon is a temporal yardstick for evaluating success or failure that reflects the dynamics of
afirm and its context "67 8
"What are the implications of the difference in the time frames involved in firms sustaining superior
performance as opposed to experiencing decline and bankruptcy?"679
4.4.2.3 Effect of Spatio-Temporal Boundaries on Strategy
Those enterprise architectures which are managed to a narrow spatial and temporal boundaries
(i.e. modular), have great tactical advantages, while those which are managed to broader spatial
and temporal boundaries (i.e. integral) have greater strategic advantages. As shown in Figure
201 below, the analogy is to a game of chess, where the integral enterprise architecture, by
optimizing more globally has a greater vision both of the board as well as of many moves in
advance. It is "built" to deal with greater dynamic complexity, where cause and effect are distant
in (stakeholder) space and time, even though such extra vision has added costs.
Figure 201: Effect of Spatio-Temporal Boundaries on Strategy
Modular EA
(decisions are close in space & time)
Integral EA
(decisions are distant in space & time)
678 Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999), pg. 1119.
679 Farjoun, M. (2002), pg. 587.
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4.4.3 Enterprise Interfaces
4.4.3.1 Quantity of Stakeholders
The first obvious descriptor of the architecture is the quantity of stakeholders within a specific
chunk.
4.4.3.2 Quality of Stakeholder Relationships
The quantity-quality dimensions are not orthogonal. They are interrelated, with quality
ultimately driving the quantity.
Fine (1998) defines the supply chain integrality along four dimensions: geographic,
organizational, cultural and electronic.680
Within the context of off-shoring, Helper and Khambete (2006) define three types of
organizational interfaces: information (e.g. degree of tacitness), incentive alignment (e.g. asset
ownership, employment stability), and proximity (e.g. geographic and cultural).
Ghemawat (2001) defines proximity in terms of four distances: cultural, administrative,
geographic and economic.
Trust is an important construct in defining the quality of stakeholder relationships, and recently,
researchers have posited that trust is multi-dimensional, and differs between the firm and
different stakeholders (Pirson and Malhorta, 2008).
4.4.3.2.1 Two Relationship Archetypes
Two different types of relationships are discussed. The qualitative properties of each can be
extracted approximately via such classic games as the "ultimatum game".
4.4.3.2.1.1 Managing Contracts: Short-term, Arm's Length
Based on an ideology-based "gloomy-vision" (Ghoshal, 2005). Examples include: transaction-
cost economics having opportunism with guile (Williamson, 1975); agency-theory (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976); exit (Helper, 1990).
4.4.3.2.1.2 Growing Relationships: Long-term, Trust-Based
"A company run on the basis that nobody can be trusted will be a dysfunctional place that has ittle
chance of achieving anything much for its shareholders, let alone its customers or those who work
there...for trust lies at the heart of wealth creation. 'P81
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Based on an ideology-based "positive organizational scholarship" (Ghoshal, 2005). Examples
include: relational coordination (Hoffer-Gittell, 2003); relational contracting (Gibbons, 1999 and
2004); voice (Helper, 1990).
4.4.3.2.2 Costs of Quality (of Stakeholder Relationships)
In addition to the long-term cost reductions associated with the learning curve and economies of
scale, the costs of quality of relationships can have a significant impact on transaction costs as
shown in Figure 202 below.
Figure 202: The Costs of Quality (of Stakeholder Relationships)
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The properties of trust are highly nonlinear. It takes a long-time to build, and yet it can be
destroyed instantaneously.
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4.5 Enterprise Architectural Forms (Isomorphic Archetypes)
"The abstract concepts of modularity and integrality are shown to be useful for categorizing systems
and illustrating how architecturalform can influence important system characteristics. "2
This section will begin to differentiate between two extreme ends of the architectural continuum:
modular and integral enterprise architectural isomorphic forms.
"Some architectures are easier to manage during design, others easier to manage during operation.
Some are more robust to deliberate attack, while others are more robust to random failures. 68
4.5.1 Modular Enterprise Architectures
The "modem" notion of architecture arose in the 1960's (Simon, 1962; Alexander, 1964) around
the early concepts of nonlinear systems thinking & complexity science. Modular architectures
are based on the reductionist-based linear view of systems, whereby the system can be
functionally decomposed, optimized, and the resulting performance is equal to the sum of the
parts. 84 Integral architectures by contrast are based on the nonlinear view of systems, whereby
design and global optimization occurs on the system level, and the performance can be equal to
more than the sum of the parts.
Heuristic 1h:
A modular enterprise architecture will have relatively narrowly defined system boundarie
685
,
and its interfaces are characterized by short-term, arms-length management of contracts with
many undifferentiated stakeholders, i.e. a high quantity of a given stakeholder type, and
relatively low-quality stakeholder relationships.
Exploitation is best served by organizational forms which exhibit differentiation. Therefore, a
modular enterprise architectural form will have a greater degree of exploitation (or revenue
growth) potential than an integral enterprise architecturalform.
".. organizations innovate by switching between organic structures during early phases of an
innovation to mechanistic structures for execution phase. "686
Heuristic 11:
The modular enterprise is based on the offensive routines of the market-maker.
682 Whitney et al. (2004), pg. 1.
683 Whitney et al. (2004), pg. 9.
684 Adam Smith's "division of labor" is a classic formalization of efficiency-driven disintegration.
685' The broad system boundaries implies an "open systems" approach to the firm.
66 Tushman et al. (2004), summarizing Duncan (1976).
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4.5.2 Integral Enterprise Architectures
Heuristic 1k:
An integral enterprise architecture will have relatively broadly defined system boundarie?
and its interfaces are characterized by long-term, trust-based growing of relationships with few
differentiated stakeholders, i.e. a low quantity of a given stakeholder type, and relatively high-
quality stakeholder relationships.
Heuristic 11:
Exploration / innovation (whether in products or processes) is best served by organizational
forms which exhibit integration. Therefore, an integral enterprise architectural form will have a
greater degree of exploration (product or process innovation) potential than a modular enterprise
architectural form.
"Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. This is a
defensive mechanism...
Heuristic 1im:
The integral enterprise is based on the defensive routines (e.g. co-optation) of the market-taker.
Heuristic ln:
The integral enterprise has a more symbiotic, integral, long-term trust based relationships with its
competitors than do modular enterprises.
Heuristic lo:
For an enterprise to have an integrated architecture, does not necessarily
"vertically integrated" in the classical sense of ownership of assets.69
imply that it is
687 The broad system boundaries implies an "open systems" approach to the firm.688 Selznick, P. (1948), pg. 34.69 Novak, S. and Eppinger, S. (1998) noted this in the automobile industry; Fine, C.H. (1998) developed a richer set
of dimensions of "proximity"; Dyer, J. (2000) developed a the concept of "virtual integration".
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4.5.2.1 Intra-species Heterogeneity within the Integral Enterprise Isomorph
Although the framework has thus far focused on the development of isomorphic enterprise
architectural forms (i.e. exhibiting homogeneity within an isomorph while simultaneously
allowing for evolutionary heterogeneity, due to the stage of disintegration), this section will
begin to describe the complexity within the integral enterprise architecture species.
4.5.2.1.1 Institutional Exogenous Push vs. Individual Endogenous Pull
Enterprise architecture integrality can arise from two centripetal forces: either it can arise from
the institutional exogenous push from the external stakeholders, or individual endogenous pull
from the central architect(s), located within the firm that keeps the stakeholders engaged in a
long-term, trust-based way as shown in Figure 203 below.
Figure 203: Institutional Exogenous Push vs. Individual Endogenous Pull
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It will be argued in Essay #2, that regardless of which centripetal mechanism is operating, the
dynamic behavior of the integral enterprise architecture is the same.
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4.5.2.1.2 Examples and Sustainability of the Integral Enterprise Isomorph
We can use the three case studies used in the theoretical sample (Airbus, Toyota and Southwest)
to infer different sources or combination of sources of enterprise integrality as shown in Figure
204 below.
Figure 204: Examples and Sustainability of the Integral Enterprise Isomorph
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Airbus might be an example of an integral enterprise architecture pushed together exogenously
by strong environmental or institutional forces (e.g. European integration), while Southwest
might be an example of an integral enterprise architecture pulled together endogenously by
strong individual forces (e.g. CEO Herb Kelleher).
Toyota might however be an example of an integral enterprise architecture simultaneously pulled
together endogenously by strong individual forces as well as exogenously by strong institutional
forces. In fact, one might argue that the two forces feedback to create a more sustainable model,
in which sustainable integrality is achieved by early internal architects which designed an
exogenous environmental system which continues to nurture and select future internal architects,
who continually redesign the relationship with the environment.
The sustainability of such a system arises from its mitigation of the continual concerns of
leadership succession associated with the endogenous pull only (e.g. replacing a charismatic
leader like Kelleher at Southwest), and from its mitigation of the continual concerns of broad and
integrated social commitment associated with the institutional exogenous push only (e.g.
maintaining a strong pan-European resolve via Airbus to challenge the US).
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4.5.2.2 Integral Architecture and "New" Organizational Forms
"The business press heralds the twenty-first century corporation. Academic commentators identify
new forms of organization, variously characterized as 'individualised', 'network', 'postmodern',
'federal', or 'cellular'. '690
Recently in the management literature, researchers have begun to claim that there are new
organizational forms which are displacing the old (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Whittington et al.,
1999). The improved performance associated with these forms however have not systematically
been tested (Nohira, 1996), in fact some researchers have been rather critical of such claims
(Victor and Stephens, 1994).
"For Hedlund (1994 p. 83), too, the N-form comprises an 'integrated set' of practices, while Miles
and Snow (1992) emphasize the 'systemic' character of the new organizational forms. ',69'
This research attempts to acknowledge the existence of such "new" organizational forms, but
aims to define them as "new" not in absolute terms, but in relative terms - relative that is to the
state of industrial evolution. Although organizational forms will undoubtedly continue to follow
a unique path-dependent trajectory, making them "new" at each new future, this research seeks
to find the underlying and abstracted commonality, such that there is a predictable determinism
in the chaos.
690 Whittington et al. (1999), pg. 583.
691 Whittington et al. (1999), pg. 584-585.
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4.5.2.3 Integral Example: Japanese Keiretsu
"Groups allocate resources among their members according to a long-term vision of collective
welfare. They provide a safety net for their weak members, police profiteering by imposing penalties
when a member firm does too well, and insulate their membership from the harsh scrutiny of tax
authorities and investment analysts by managing the reporting of profits and losses to show steady,
incremental growth. The actions of groups in this regard are collectively 'rational'for the existing
membership as a whole, though not necessarily rational for its strongest members"6
Keiretsu are typically organized either horizontally or vertically. (Lincoln, Gerlach and
Ahmadjian, 1996). It appears that long-term corporate performance is different depending upon
which type of keiretsu and under which environmental conditions they are operating. For
example, Lincoln et al. (1996) noted that between 1965-1988, members of Japan's "big-six"
horizontal keiretsu have lower profitability than independents. The same cannot necessarily be
said for Japan's vertical keiretsu during that time frame.
Others. (Dyer, 1999?; Hino, 2006.)
4.5.2.3.1 Horizontal keiretsu
The "big-six" horizontal keiretsu in Japan include the three reincarnated pre-war zaibatsu:
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo as well as the post-war bank-centered groups: Fuyo, Dai-Ichi
Kangyo and Sanwa (Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian, 1996, pg. 68).
4.5.2.3.2 Vertical keiretsu
Vertical keiretsu are groupings of firms, their suppliers and distributors. In Japan for example
some of the most noteworthy are: Hitachi or Toyota (Ahmadjian, 1995; Aoki, 1988; Asanuma,
1989).
692 Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian, 1996, pg. 85 and 86.
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4.5.3 Orthogonality ofArchetypes
Modular and integral enterprise architectures are not just marked by differences in boundaries
and interfaces, by the quantity and quality of relationships with stakeholders, but by different
emphases in dominant stakeholders. The confluence of these influences begins to point out the
orthogonality of the enterprise archetypes.
As shown in Figure 205 below, the modular enterprise architecture is characterized by supplier
"push" in a capacity-constrained world, and is focused on shareholder profit-maximizing goals.
Conversely, the integral enterprise architecture is characterized by consumer "pull" in a demand-
constrained world, and is focused on labor-managed goals. Note that in each case, these are
diametrically opposed or orthogonal constructs.
Figure 205: Orthogonality of Archetypes
Modular Integral
enterprise architecture enterprise architecture
Customer
"pull"
Product
markets
"Traditional" "Human"
capitalism mark capitalism
Supplier
"push"
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4.6 The Process of Architecting Enterprises
The first step of architecting, is to understand the environmental conditions at a very deep level,
and then to design the enterprise (or artifact) to fit within the requirements of the environment.
"There is an overriding management task in first interpreting correctly the market and technological
situation, in terms of its instability or of the rate at which conditions are changing, and then
designing the management system appropriate to the conditions, and making it work. 'Direction' is
the distinctive task of managers-in-chief.. "693
Heuristic 1n:
Enterprise architectural "design" may or may not be a conscious, rational, strategic choice (i.e.
voluntaristic vs. deterministic). 694  One determining factor is the maturity of the enterprise
relative to the maturity of the industry.695
"We are called to be the architects of the future, not its victims. "696
"The architect must be a prophet... a prophet in the true sense of the term. If he can't see at least ten
years ahea4 don't call him an 'architect'. "697
Heuristic la:
Enterprise architectural "design" is possible, however it requires long-term vision to seek
environmental signals through the noise, boundary-spanning negotiation skills, and the ability to
simplify complexity.
Organizational theorists Karl Weick (1993) and Peter Senge et al. (1999), have noted that design
can be viewed from the perspectives of formal and informal or emergent design. In civil
architectural terms, these are also referred to as: self-conscious and unselfconscious design.
These will be discussed briefly in the following subsections.
4.6.1 Formal (self-conscious) design
"Formal design [is] the conscious, intentional architecture of organizations, such as guiding ideas
and strategies, established structures, and policies and rules. "698
4.6.2 Emergent (unself-conscious) design
"Emergent design [is] the ways that people naturally 'redesign' the organization as they live in it. "699
693 Burns and Stalker (1961), pg. viii (of the preface to the second edition by Tom Bums).694 Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, architected the enterprise's integral form.
69 For example, modular incumbents in a H.F.F. world were voluntaristic, while in a B.F.C. world, they become
deterministic. See Astley and Ven de Ven (1983), and Whittington (2000)696 Buckminster Fuller: engineer, architect, philosopher.
697 Frank Lloyd Wright.
698 Senge et al. (1999), pg. 360.
699 Senge et al. (1999), pg. 360.
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4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter was the first of three essays which forms an integrated framework which attempts to
explain long-term firm performance. In this chapter, we defined the construct of an enterprise
architecture, its sources and properties.
The context for this construct within the framework is shown below in Figure 206. In the
following chapter, we will next discuss how these architectures provide the highest level
explanations for the ensuing dynamic performance of the firm.
Modular
Enterprises
Integral
Enterorises
Maximization of Maximization of
Shareholder Value Stakeholder Surplus
Enterprise
Architectural
Forms
Figure 206: Enterprise Architecture within Framework
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Chapter 5 Competitive Dynamics
Having defined the various enterprise architectural forms (or species) occupying the ecosystem,
we can now discuss how these species function, that is, what market niches they occupy, how
they serve those markets, and the dynamics of competition both within and between species.
"We [Ford] have been going out of business for 40years. "700
5.1 Introductory Constructs and Propositions
"We should have a system of economics that is structure. We do not have it. We are all hanging by
our eyebrows from skyhooks economically, just as we are architecturally. "70'
Having outlined a framework for the understanding of an enterprise architectural form, we now
need to translate it operationally into a more concrete structural form, in order that we may
understand and ultimately predict the dynamics of the enterprise.
5.2 Theoretical Foundations
The notion of enterprise structural dynamics can be constructed from a variety of eclectic
theoretical management traditions ranging from general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1962)
to system dynamics (Forrester, 1961). The following briefly summarizes a few of the threads in
various fields within economics and sociology.
5.2.1 Economic Theories
5.2.1.1 Penrose and Firm Growth
"The question I wanted to answer was whether there was something inherent in the very nature of the
firm that both promoted its growth and necessarily limited its rate of growth. "702
Theories of firm growth have tended to focus on corporate growth through the inorganic
mechanism of mergers and acquisitions in the development of the diversified M-form and
beyond.
Theories of growth of the strategic business unit or the single product firm are relatively rare.
One of the first researchers to tackle the topic was Penrose, in her 1959 classic, The Theory of the
Growth of the Firm. It tended to focus internally on the constraints and enablers of the
development of resources of the firm, which ultimately led to the school of thought in strategic
management today known as the resource-based view of the firm.
700 Ford CEO, Alan Mulally, "The New Heat on Ford," by David Kiley, Business Week, June 4, 2007.
701 Frank Lloyd Wright.
702 Penrose, E. (1959).
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5.2.1.2 Marris and Growth vs. Profitability
"In the managerial utility function: growth rate is a proxy for income, power, prestige, and
accompanying managerial gains from growth; and stock-market value is a proxy for job security." 70 3
Following in Penrose's search for the enablers and constraints to firm rates of growth, Marris
(1963) noted that the separation of ownership from management created a principal-agent
conflict regarding the tradeoff between growth and profitability as shown conceptually in Figure
207 below.
Figure 207: Principal-Agent conflicts in Profits and Growth
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"Growth models, unlike managerial static models, required the development of a new of
transformation function to specify the constraint against which utility was to be maximized. They
required, that is to say, a body of theory to indicate the trade-off between growth rate and stock-
market value - a 'valuation curve' with the (normalized) level of stock-market value on one axis and
the expected growth rate of the size of the firm on the other. "704
It is interesting to note that the trade-off between profits and high rates of growth is hypothesized
to lie in the general "dynamic diseconomies of scale", or degradation of capabilities.
703 Marris, R. and Mueller, D.C. (1980), pg. 42.
70 Marris, R. and Mueller, D.C. (1980), pg. 42.
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"The relationships were also embellished by taking account of the costs of administrative
inefficiencies caused by rapid growth in size ('dynamic' diseconomies of scale, not to be confused
with static phenomena) as suggested by E. T. Penrose (1959)... "705
Empirical evidence both in the U.S. (Holl, 1977) and Australia (Lawriwsky, 1984), supports the
claims that managers - without contravening incentives - tend to maximize growth and satisfice
profits.
As will be discussed in chapter 6, a life-cycle theory of the firm (Mueller, 1972), predicts that
this severity of this owner-manager conflict varies throughout the age (and growth ability) of the
firm.
5.2.1.3 Goodwin and the Business Cycle
"Goodwin showed that the antagonist relationship between workers and capital owners could lead to
cycles. "706
Goodwin was one of the first economists who tried to combine the behaviors of growth and
cyclicality (Weber, 2005), which was based on the classical predator-prey models (Lotka, 1925;
Volterra, 1926).
Within the framework of the enterprise architecture presented herein, it is the tension created by
the separation of the interests of the factors of production (i.e. the capital owners and the labor)
which generates the business cycle oscillation as shown in Figure 208 below.
705 Marris, R. and Mueller, D.C. (1980), pg. 42.
706 Weber (2005), pg. 5.
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Figure 208: Enterprise Architecture as a Generator of the Business Cycle
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Note that system dynamicists (e.g. Forrester, 1968b; Mass, 1976; Sterman, 2000) have long
demonstrated via numerical simulation, the plausibility of workforce-inventory interactions in
the form of a balancing loop with delay as the origin of the business cycle.
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5.2.1.4 Kuznets and the Machine Investment Cycle
In addition to the lightly-damped, 3-5 year business cycle, the enterprise architecture can be used
to idealize the heavily-damped 20-year machine-investment or Kuznets cycle. As shown in
Figure 209 below, the enterprise architecture can be used to visualize the sources of both the
business cycle (i.e. the balancing behavior with delays between firm's inventory and labor
markets) and the Kuznets cycles (i.e. the balancing behavior with delays between the firm's
inventory and capital markets).
Figure 209: Enterprise Architecture and the Business Cycle and Kuznets Cycle
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5.2.2 Sociology and Organizational Theories
A good discussion of the various threads can be found in Burrell and Morgan (1979).
5.2.2.1 Structural Functionalism
5.2.2.2 System Theory
The multidisciplinary field of general systems theory began in the 1950's with great ambition
(von Bertalanffy, 1962). The intellectual traditions attempted to develop generic system
characteristics across many fields from mechanistic to organismic to organizational.
5.2.2.2.1 System Goals: Growth and Stability
"Organization has three goals which are growth, stability and interaction. ,707
Early social systems theorists (Henderson, 1935; Boulding, 1956; Forrester, 1961; Scott, 1961)
explored the range of system goals. Henderson (1935) hypothesized the goals of stability,
growth and interaction, which later researchers classified as development (Ackoff, 1999).
Boulding (1956) and Forrester (1961) focused on growth and stability.
"The goal is 'enterprise design' to create more successful management policies and organizational
structures... which influence growth and stability. "70o
System Dynamics "is a quantitative and experimental approach for relating organizational structure
and corporate policy to industrial growth and stability. "09
"Top-management structures have difjfrent brms, different attitudes, and difftrent histories. They
differ in courage, conservatism, flexibility, rapidity of reaching decisions, and in the objectives being
sought. Just as the operating unctions interact with one another to produce important dynamic
behavior characteristics, so will the interaction between top-management structure and the operating
departments favor different growth and stability patterns. "7'0
5.2.2.2.2 Open vs. Closed Causal Systems
Much of the theory of enterprise architectures and their resulting structural dynamics hinges
upon assumptions of the boundary of the firm (or of the unit of competitive analysis) which
defines how the firm engages its environment. This issue will become important again later in
essay #3 as we investigate the implications for industrial evolution.
There is a rich and slightly incoherent view of firms as either closed or open systems in the social
sciences. Clarification of the definitions of these terms is crucial to understanding the
discrepancies.
707 Scott, W.G. (1961), pg. 20.70 8 Forrester, J.W. (1961).
709 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pg. 13.
710 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pg. 329.
5.2.2.2.3 Open - Closed Systems and Functional In(ter)dependence
Modular enterprise architectures are characterized by functional independence. This can be
modeled causally as an open causal system.
Integral enterprise architectures are characterized by functional interdependence. This can be
modeled causally as a closed causal system.
5.2.2.2.4 Feedback Systems: Positive & Negative
While organizational theorists (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) have discussed the integration-
division dichotomy, systems theorists (Stacey, 1995) note that the forces of integration lead to
stable equilibrium via negative feedback, while the forces of division lead to instability via
positive feedback.711 Both forms of feedback can lead to different forms of growth: stable and
unstable.
It is interesting to note that the quest for efficiency is argued both for the forces of integration
(Stacey, 1995, pg. 484) causing stability via negative feedback and for the forces of division
(Smith, 1776), causing instability via positive feedback.
5.2.2.2.5 Feedback Systems: System Dynamics and Cybernetics
In a compelling historical review of feedback thinking, Richardson (1991) hypothesizes the
existence of two subtle but important threads within the social sciences: the servomechanisms
and cybernetics threads.
System Dynamics "is a quantitative and experimental aproach for relating organizational structure
and corporate policy to industrial growth and stability."'
System dynamics is a method for understanding how structure drives behavior in a wide range of
social and technical systems.
"To Professor Jay Forrester, for codifying the dynamics of social systems as long ago as the 1950 's.
I remain mystified as to why these essentially simple mechanisms that constitute the processes of
change in all social systems have lain largely unnoticed for four decades. ,71
711 Stacey, R.D. (1995), pp. 484-485.
712 Forrester, J. W. (1961), pg. 13.
713 Warren, K. (2002).
5.2.3 Strategic Management Theories
5.2.3.1 Dynamic Capabilities
"We define dynamic capabilities as the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and
external competences to address rapidly changing environments. ,,J4
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) define dynamic capabilities as operating in rapidly changing
environments. Yet they also ironically note that firm success, like Toyota Motors and Southwest
Airlines fall outside conventional exploitation of market power models. We present some
evidence to the contrary.
"We doubt that game theory can comprehensively illiminate how Chrysler should compete against
Toyota or Honda, or how United Airlines can best respond to Southwest Arilines since Southwest's
advantage is built on organizational attributes which United cannot readily replicate. "s
5.2.3.2 Functional Configurations
Miles and Snow (1978) defined a configurational typology which ultimately led to one of the top
ten most influential publications in strategic management (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro,
2004). By studying four industries: publishing, electronics, food processing and health care, they
defined a typology of four strategic types: prospectors, analyzers, reactors and defenders.
These strategic types were deemed to be equally effective independent of the environmental
conditions. In Essay #3, it will be shown that other researchers demonstrated environmental
contextual variables govern the performance of strategic types (Hambrick, 1983).
5.2.3.2.1 The Four Types
5.2.3.2.1.1 Prospectors
"Prospectors are characterized by their constant search for new products and markets. They
continually experiment with new product lines and venture into new markets. These organizations are
the creators of change in their markets and are the forces to which competitors must respond. As
such, prospectors are more concerned with searching for new opportunities and will likely not be as
efficient as defenders. 716
5.2.3.2.1.2 Analyzers
5.2.3.2.1.3 Reactors
5.2.3.2.1.4 Defenders
714 Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), pg. 516.
715 Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), pg. 512.
716 Delery and Doty (1996), pg. 810.
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"The defender has a narrow and stable product-market domain and seldom makes major
adjustments in its technology or structure. The emphasis is on better and more efficient ways to
produce a given product or service and on defending a market. A defender does little research and
development. When defenders persue new products, they import the technology from outside the
organization. "7
5.2.3.2.2 Empirical Examples
In Table 17 below, Arthur (1992) shows the results of an empirical study of IR practices and
strategy of US Steel Mini-mills. Note that while it does show empirical match between strategy
and IR practices, it does not specify levels of firm performance.
Table 17: Strategy-HRM Fit
Business
Strategy
Low Cost Differentiation
Industrial Relations Cost Reducing 8 (89%) 8 (40%)System
It is important to note that the three case studies presented in this dissertation demonstrate the
opposite matching, namely that commitment maximizing IR systems tend map to Low Cost
strategies, contingent upon the state of the industry's evolution.
In Table 18 below, Delery and Doty (1996) show the following rankings from a survey study
using Likert rankings of the banking industry.
Table 18: Configuration Attributes
Ideal Strategic Profldes Prospector Analyzer Defender
Variables
Technological progress 5.64 4.82 4.86
Product / market breadth 5.68 5.18 1.59
Product innovation 6.95 4.68 1.68
Quality 5.47 5.30 5.86
Price level 6.61 4.40 1.32
Active marketing 6.52 5.54 3.14
Long-range financial strength 4.11 5.83 4.88
Resources level 4.86 5.18 4.30
Investment in production 2.91 4.59 6.18
Internal analysis level 3.68 5.62 6.82
External analysis level 6.95 5.24 2.05
Level of risk 6.00 2.62 2.68
Proactive management style 6.76 4.90 2.86
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5.3 Structural Mechanics
5.3.1 Structural Building Blocks
In order to build a theory translating architectural form into structural dynamics, we must next
define the underlying structural building blocks which generate the dynamic reference modes.718
These include the following, which will be described in more detail:
* Positive (reinforcing) feedback
* Negative (balancing) feedback
* Delays
* Carrying capacity
"Learning to recognize and account for time delays goes hand in hand with learning to be patient, to
defer gratification, and to trade short-run sacrifice for long-term reward. The abilities do not develop
automatically. They are part of a slow process of maturation.
In a world of short time horizons, of annual, quarterly or even monthly performance reviews, the
incentives people face often mean it is rational for them to be aggressive and ignore the delayed
consequences of their actions.
The problem is one of aggregation. The individual firm tends to view itself as small relative to the
market and treats the environment as exogenous, thereby ignoring all feedbacks jiom prices to supply
and demand. ,719
The two key feedback relationships (positive and negative) will first be described along with the
two essential building blocks of time delays and system carrying capacity. These will
subsequently be assembled into a set of reference modes that capture the fundamental structural
dynamics of the enterprise architectures.
"The qualitative distinction between these two sorts of feedback mechanisms, one amplifying
heterogeneity and the other sustaining the current level of heterogeneity, is likely to be robust.
Heterogeneity in competitive position is sustained by existing market relations and tends to be
amplified by overall market position.
718 Forrester, J.W. (1968).
719 Sterman, J.D. (200), pp. 696-697.
720 Levinthal, D. and Myatt, J. (1994), pg. 61.
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5.3.2 Fundamental Reference Modes
Having defined the structural mechanics or principles of systems, we can next describe how
these generate the fundamental reference modes which are summarized in Figure 210 below.
Figure 210: Fundamental Reference Modes
Exponential Growth Goal Seeking I Exponential Smooth Oscillation
(18t Order) (1t Order) (2"d Order; delay = stock)
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"An appropriate caveat to these market positional advantages is that they are self-reinforcing in
competitive environments in which the bases of competitive advantage are stable. Conversely, in
changing environments, these same sel-reinforcing echanisms may lead to decline in the firm's
competitive position (Levinthal, 1992). ,22
721 See Peter Senge interview, "Illuminating the Blind Spot: Leadership in the Context of Emerging Worlds." on
McKinsey/SoL joint research project.
722 Levinthal, D. and Myatt, J. (1994), pg. 47.
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5.3.3 The "Physics" of Growth
The physics of growth depends upon the assumptions of model boundaries and therefore
exogenous constants. Figure 211 below summarizes the structures and behaviors of a variety of
single and multi-loop, linear and nonlinear first order systems, with exogenous constants shown
in green.723 Note that one would not expect to see any oscillation in any of these behaviors, due
to the fact that they are all first order systems.
Figure 211: First Order Growth Systems
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723 Sterman, J.D. (2000) pp. 118-127 and 282-290 provides a good discussion of growth modes.
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"The question I wanted to answer was whether there was something inherent in the very nature of the
firm that both promoted its growth and necessarily limited its rate of growth. ,724
"The analysis of the limits to growth -- the factors determining the maximum rate of growth of firms -
cannot, in its present formulation at any rate, be tested against the facts of the external world, partly
because of the difficulties in expressing some of the concepts in quantitative terms and partly because
of the impossibility of ever knowing for any given firm what is, or what would have been, its maximum
rate of growth. Perhaps some of these difficulties will be overcome in different formulations
constructed by others... "725
"In order to find comprehensive and rigorous answers to the questions Penrose (1959) posed
concerning firm growth processes, more conceptual and especially empirical research needs to be
done on the dynamics of growth, that is analyzing the paths and the effects of the outcome of different
sequences in the growth process. "726
724 Penrose, E. (1959).
725 Penrose, E. (1959), pg. 4.
726 Kor and Mahoney (2000), pg. 128.
5.3.4 Enterprise Inertias
In contrast to the traditional beliefs of "classical" strategic management, where managers have
high degrees of rationality and search capabilities, and where organizations have high degrees of
plasticity,727 the notions of inertia posit that organizations are typically unable to react to
environmental change in a timely manner. 728
This framework, however broadens the perspective of strategy by identifying not one, but two
separate forms of organizational inertia: architectural and structural, both of which ultimately
arise from the enterprise's architectural form, as shown in Figure 212 below. Broadly speaking,
architectural inertia limits the firm's response to environmental change, while structural inertia
limits the firm's response to operational change.729
Figure 212: Architectural and Structural Inertia
Architectural Inertia Structural Inertia
hna*Oy limits response to Fhm limits response to
O tput Environmental Change ou put Operational Change
Short-term SpeedStabl Markets & Flexibility(Economies of Scope)
Growing Markets
(Economies of Scale) 5gterm Speed
& Stability
1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
727 Gavetti and Rivkin (2004).728 Whittington, R. (2000).
729 While the terms "architectural" and "structural" inertia are coherent and consistent with the overall framework
developed herein, they will undoubtedly cause confusion in the strategic management community. My use of the
term "architectural" inertia to describe resistance to environmental change is termed "structural" inertia by
population ecologists, which is the term that I use to describe resistance to operational change.
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The following subsection briefly explores structural inertia and its effects on the dynamics of
operational change. Chapter 6 will explore architectural inertia and its effects on the evolution of
enterprise architectures in response to environmental changes.
5.3.4.1 Structural Inertia
The notion of structural inertia limits the firm's response to operational change. Specifically,
when looking at aggregate system variables like firm output (Q), it is clear that some enterprises
undergo more severe instability or oscillations than others when subjected to similar
environmental shocks (like variable customer demands). Structural inertia therefore is
fundamental in defining an enterprise's approach to such system goals as growth and stability.73 0
Heuristic 2a:
Modular enterprise architectures tend to have less structural inertia than equivalent integral
enterprise architectures. As a result, modular enterprise architectures have greater short-term
speed and instability than equivalent integral enterprise architectures.
The determinants of structural inertia are also different than the determinants of architectural
inertia. Although age and size have secondary impact on structural inertia, the fundamental
drivers are those material, information and mental state delays in the system, as shown in Figure
213. Such delays tend to inject time into the system, making its fundamental period of
oscillation longer. Instability therefore occurs when the fundamental period of oscillation is
close (i.e. near resonance) with the fundamental period of oscillation of the forcing function (e.g.
customer orders).73
Figure 213: Sources of Structural Inertia
Material +- rGrowth
Delays
As an aside, please note that not only can structural inertia cause the amplification or attenuation
of enterprise instability, but other structural quantities, like damping and stiffness can have
similar effects. These will be discussed later.732
Heurstic 2b:
As the nature of customer demand changes tends to consist of a series of small, frequent, pulses,
the "loading function" on the enterprise tends to be multi-frequency transients.
730 The field of System Dynamics explicitly addresses the mechanics of social system inertia. See Forrester (1961,
1968).
n7 Piepenbrock, T. (2004).
72 Piepenbrock, T. (2004).
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By way of a brief illustrative example, Boeing, the 90-year old large incumbent currently has a
modular enterprise architecture. This would imply high architectural inertia (due to its age, size
and routines) making it difficult to survive discontinuous environmental change733, while its
structural inertia is relatively low due to its short-term speed and growth objectives.
Conversely, Airbus, the 40-year old smaller challenger currently has an integral enterprise
architecture. This would imply lower architectural inertia (due to its age, size and routines)
making it easier to survive discontinuous environmental change734, while its structural inertia is
relatively high due to its long term speed and stability objectives.
"As we go back into a commodity supply system, the structural character begins to change. In the
distribution system for manufactured products, goods are shipped in response to orders. A product is
shipped to a customer only if he wants it. Stresses within the system manifest themselves more by a
change in the flow rate of goods than by changes in price. We commonly observe that afactory will
adjust production rate to market demand by production-rate changes that are larger and faster than
are the price changes. By contrast, the commodity system tends to be one in which supply rates can be
adjusted but slowly. The commodity is not produced to the specific order of the customer. Price
fluctuates more rapidly than supply rate ",73
73 Like "disruptive innovations" at the low end of its market from Embraer and Bombardier for example. See
Christensen et al. (2004).
734 Ibid.
73 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pp. 322.
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5.3.5 Time and the Causal Levels of Competition
Wernerfelt (1984) argued for clarity in the strategic management literature by differentiating
between competition based on products and competition based on a deeper generating
mechanism, namely resources.
This research argues for a deeper generating mechanism, namely that of an enterprise
architecture, which ultimately enables and constrains (but does not determine) what resources
can be generated and how they might be built and maintained.
As shown in Figure 214 below, the research assembles a causal logic in which integral enterprise
architectures are built based on the mutual consent of the stakeholder ecosystem to take the time
required to develop the capabilities necessary to dominate a market over the long term. This is a
"patient", long-term thinking ecosystem.
Conversely, modular enterprise architectures are built to extract as much rent from the ecosystem
as possible to be given to the shareholders. This stakeholder group typically demand high rates
of return (and therefore growth). This tends to be an "impatient" short-term thinking ecosystem.
Figure 214: Time and the Causal Levels of Competition
Grow Share Price/Market Cap.
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Grow Market Share
Lead in QC,D mtrics
Product-based
Competition
It has been observed empirically736 , that when a modular architecture is competing against an
integral enterprise architecture, and is losing ground over the long run, it tends to adopt the
"surface details" of the integral enterprise architecture, without changing the fundamental nature
of its modular architecture, making its long-term competitive position even worse.
736 Empirical observations include: automobiles (Womack et al., 1990), airlines (Hoffer-Gittell, 2003) and large
commercial airplanes (Piepenbrock, T. 2004).
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5.4 Enterprise Architecture Form-Structure Mapping
Having dfined the characteristics of enterprise architectural forms, this section will now begin to
map these forms to their associated "structures" or functional behaviors. These functional
behaviors will be divided into quantity-based and quality-based growth variables.
5.4.1 Quantity Growth (Operations Strategy)
This sections deals with the growth in quantity of enterprise inputs (e.g. workforce, R&D
spending) and outputs (e.g. annual number of cars produced, annual number of seat-kilometers
flown).
"Top-management structures have different forms, different attitudes, and different histories. They
differ in courage, conservatism, flexibility, rapidity of reaching decisions, and in the objectives being
sought. Just as the operating functions interact with one another to produce important dynamic
behavior characteristics, so will the interaction between top-management structure and the operating
departments favor different growth and stability patterns. "
Having defined the spectrum of enterprise architectural forms, characterized by the modular and
integral archetypes in chapter 4, we will now begin a stylized mapping of their structural
dynamics. As can be seen in Figure 215 below, the growth of the modular enterprise is
characterized by instability (i.e. positive feedback), while the growth of the integral enterprise is
characterized by stability (i.e. negative feedback). It is important to note that the growth
trajectories of each enterprise architecture are not subtly different, in fact they are 180 degrees
different.
Figure 215: Enterprise Architecture Form-Structure Mapping
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Heuristic 2c:
The structural dynamics of an enterprise (growth vs. stability), will be governed by the
architectural form (modular vs. integral) of the enterprise. The modular enterprise is "built" for
exponential growth, while the integral enterprise is "built" for goal-seeking stability.
"Firm growth is a result of a process of development... in which an interacting series of internal
changes leads to increases in size accompanied by changes in the characteristics of the growing
object. "738
Heuristic 2d:
The dynamic response of any socio-technical system is governed by three structural properties:
structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), structural damping, (e.g. time constants used in
exponential smoothing for decisions - i.e. level of "patience") and structural stffness. Modular
enterprise architectures tend to have shorter natural periods of oscillation (i.e. less inertia, less
damping and/or more stiffness) than integral enterprise architectures. 739
Heuristic 2e:
The dynamic response of the enterprise is a function of both the enterprise's endogenous
structural properties, and those of the exogenous environment. The "dynamic amplification" of
the enterprise is a function of the ratio of the natural periods of oscillation of the enterprise with
respect to the environment. 7
Heuristic 2f:
The structural mechanics of an enterprise defines the enterprise's efficiency. Enterprise
efficiency, together with enterprise effectiveness, define an enterprise's performance capability.
(Note: the more efficient enterprise structure may not exhibit the highest performance.)
Heuristic 2:
A modular enterprise architecture having a greater degree of exploitation potential will be driven
by shorter-term objectives, be able to have faster short-term growth rates, based on the positive
or reinforcing feedback dynamics of economies of scale, associated with mass production.
Rapid short-term growth is driven by competition for building capacity via the capital markets
(known as "capitalism").
"Mass production is, in fact, a system ideally suited to the survival of large enterprises in a highly
cyclical economy. Both workers and suppliers are considered variable costs. The problem with the
American pattern is that it is extremely corrosive to the vital personal relationships at the core of any
production process. ,
738 Penrose, E. (1959), pg. 1.
739 Piepenbrock, T. (2004).
740 Piepenbrock, T. (2004).
741 Womack, Jones and Roos (1990), pp. 247-248.
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Heuristic 2h:
A modular enterprise operates under the following reinforcing circular managerial mental model:
"demand for my products is not durable... therefore I can't keep my supply stable... therefore my
long-term costs are not lower.., therefore demand for my products is not durable....
Heuristic 2i:
An integral enterprise architecture having a greater degree of exploration potential will be driven
by longer-term objectives, be able to have faster long-term growth rates, based on the negative or
balancing effects of economies of scope, associated with lean production. Rapid long-term
growth is driven by competition for growing capability via the labor markets (known as "human
capitalism").
"... the well-known 'lean production system' was developed within a highly integral supply chain."742
Heuristic 2ij:
An integral enterprise operates under the following reinforcing circular managerial mental
model: "demand for my products is durable...therefore I can keep my supply stable .. therefore
my long-term costs are lower.., therefore demand for my products is durable....
5.4.1.1 Optimum Rates of Growth
A significant research area in strategic management explores whether there is an optimum rate of
firm growth, and if so, what are its bounds
Raisch and Krogh (2007) posit that minimum rates of growth are determined primarily by
competitive pressures for marktet share in order to achieve economies of scale and scope. They
also posit maximum rates of growth are determined by external market limits, external or
internal financial limits (i.e. the "sustainable growth rate"), or internal managerial limits
(Penrose, 1959).
"Not all growth is goodL An analysis of Fortune Global 500 companies shows that businesses that
grew within the limits of their growth corridors performed far better than others - even those that
grew faster. "743
Empirically, Raisch and Krogh (2007) demonstrate that "smart growth" firms which stay within
their "growth corridor" deliver average returns to shareholders that are nearly double those firms
that grow either faster or slower than their "growth corridors". They also note that such "smart
growth" firms are relatively rare, comprising only 25% of their sample of Fortune Global 500
firms (between 1995 and 2004).
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742 Fine, C.H. (1998). pg. 138.
743 Raisch and Krogh (2007), pg. 65.
5.4.2 Quality Growth (Marketing Strategy)
"Many economists would be wont to propose that the strategy represents afirm's solution of its profit
maximization problem, but this seems misconceived to me... firm strategies seldom determine the
details of firm actions, but usually at most the broad contours. ",,74 4
"The architectural form is the solution-neutral restatement of the problem. "745
5.4.2.1 Structural vs. Strategic variables
This section begins to explore the role of strategy within the context of an enterprise architecture.
It will attempt to contribute to the debate of the importance of "'structural" variables vs. the
importance of "strategic" variables.746 As shown in Figure 216 below, the relationships between
firm and industry structure are related to firm performance - either with or without strategy. As
can be seen, the main strategic frameworks of SCP, SSP and RBV are shown.747
Figure 216: Strategy vs. Structure(s)
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What this research aims to resolve therefore is the importance of strategy - namely under what
conditions does it matter?748
744 Nelson, R. (1991), pg. 67.
745 Crawley E. and de Weck, O.
746 Farjoun, M. (2002), footnote 14, pp. 577.
747 Fajoun, M. (2002), pp. 573.
748 Whittington, R. (2000).
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5.4.2.2 Strategic Positioning: Differentiation vs. Cost-Leadership
Classical strategy defines that firms achieve competitive advantage via strategic choices of
differentiation vs. cost-leadership (Porter, 1980).
5.4.2.3 Strategic Investment: Flexibility vs. Commitment
Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2008) highlight the strategic investment choices between flexibility
and commitment, which lie at the center of the choice between modular and integral enterprise
architectures: with the former being designed for flexibility, and the latter for commitment.
"This high-profile example [between Airbus and Boeing] illustrates the fundamental strategic
trade-off between commitment and flexibility that managers face when deploying firm resources to
establish product-market positions. Commitment and flexibility lie on the opposite ends ofta firm 's
investment spectrum, and scholars have been divides as to which of the two strategies is the main
driver of investment value. ""49
5.4.2.4 Enterprise Efficiency vs. Effectiveness
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) articulated clearly between internal efficiency and external
effectiveness.
"The effectiveness of an organization is its ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions. It is
important to avoid confusing organizational effectiveness with organizational efficiency. The
difference between the two concepts is at the heart of the external versus internal perspective on
organizations. Organizaitonal effectiveness is an external standard of how well an organization is
meeting the demands of the various groups and organizations that are concerned with its activities.
Organizational efficiency is an internal standard ofperformance. "750
The sources of long-term firm performance are known to emanate from the development of a
sound strategy along with the execution of that strategy through its operations. The positioning
school of strategy focuses on where in the cost-quality space to play, and the resource-based
view school of strategy focuses on how to get to the firm's efficiency frontier (Porter, 1996;
Markides, 2001; Saloner, Shepard and Podolny, 2001).
Porter (1996) famously argues that operational excellence is a necessary but insufficient
condition for success as shown in Figure 217 below. Similarly, this research argues that strategy
is a necessary but insufficient condition for success.
749 Pacheco-de-Almeida, Henderson and Cool, (2008), pg. 517.
750 Pfefer and Salancik, (1978), pg. 11.
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Figure 217: Efficiency vs. Effectiveness in Strategy Space
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5.4.2.5 Strategic Biases of Enterprise Architectures
Unlike the previous discussion, this research will attempt to demonstrate that different enterprise
architectures have different strategic predispositions, which bias shape of the performance
frontiers. As shown in Figure 218 below, the modular enterprise architecture has historical
biases toward differentiated products, and as such exhibits a vertical stretch of its performance
frontier. Conversely, the integral enterprise architecture has biases toward low cost (via its high
stability), and as such exhibits a horizontal stretch of its performance frontier. It will be argued
thin chapter 6 that environmental pressures act to bias these performance envelopes.
Figure 218: Efficiency Frontiers of the Enterprise Archetypes
Modular EA
Integral EA
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This research attempts to illustrate that the construct of enterprise architecture, which both
enables and constrains performance, lies above operations and even strategy. It can determine
what strategies are viable, and what operations - no matter how efficient - will be effective.
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5.4.2.6 Case Studies: Product Strategy in Commercial Airplanes
In order to illustrate the above concepts, we will focus on one link in the enterprise architecture:
the relationship between the firm and its customers through product markets, as shown in Figure
219 below.
Figure 219: Examining the Product Market Strategies in Commercial Airplanes
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Two cases will be briefly explored to illustrate systemic architectural thinking. The first is the
alleged competition between the Boeing 787 and the Airbus A380. The second is the real
competition between the Boeing 787 and the Airbus A350, and more importantly how the
evolution of product strategies can be explained by the respective enterprise architectures.
Note that in both cases, whether in direct or indirect competition, the trajectories of each firm are
out of phase.
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5.4.2.6.1 Boeing 787 vs. Airbus A380
"Two companies with fundamentally different products, based on diametrically opposite visions of the
future, [are] engaged in a Hafields versus McCoys battle with billions of dollars at stake. Boeing
versus Airbus is one of the most hard-fought, closely watched marketing battles out there. It is also
one of the most fascinating. Not long ago, it appeared as if Airbus had gained the upper hand. If
Boeing succeeds in winning this battle - and it appears to be well on its way - it will amount to one of
the great reversals of business fortunes. It will also serve as proof of the wisdom of understanding
the marketplace well enough to lead, rather than follow. "51
"Another gamble by Boeing [is] that the fJture of the airline business will be in point-to-point
nonstop flights with medium-size planes rather than the current hub-and-spoke model favored by
Airbus, which is developing the 550-seat A380 superjumbo as its premier long-hauljetliner. "752
Much has been said in the press about the "radically" different strategies of Boeing and Airbus,
since Boeing abandoned its Sonic Cruiser for the 7E7, renamed the 787. It has been suggested
that Boeing has adopted a strategy supporting "point-to-point" airline networks, with smaller
airplanes traveling greater distances, as is evidenced by the 787. Conversely, Airbus has adopted
a strategy supporting "hub-and-spokes" airline networks, with larger airplanes, as is evidence by
the A380. This is another example of non-systemic "laundry list thinking". If one were to look
spatially at the entire portfolio of products, as well as temporally the longitudinal timing and
phasing of new product introduction initiatives, it is obvious that the "spin" in the press is just
that (even though the sources of such spin come from the firm's PR functions themselves).
"A number of commentators have spuriously evaluated the prospects of the 787 and A380 as a
question of the hub versus spoke concept of aviation growth. This is wrong because it is abundantly
clear that the future will be characterized by both. These aircraft are not competitors; they are
designed for different markets. "753
Figure 220 below illustrates the current product performance portfolios of both the incumbent
(Boeing) and the challenger (Airbus).
71 Babej, M.E. and Pollak, T. (2006) "Boeing versus Airbus," Forbes, May 24, 2006.752 Wayne, L. (2006) "Boeing Bets the House on Its 787 Dreamliner," The New York Times, May 7, 2006.
753 Lawrence and Thornton (2005), pg. 149.
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Figure 220: Product Performance Portfolios in Commercial Airplanes - 2006
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By way of comparison, Figure 221 below illustrates the future product performance portfolios of
both the incumbent (Boeing) and the challenger (Airbus).
Figure 221: Product Performance Portfolios in Commercial Airplanes - 2016
Competing Airplane Performance Portfolios (2016)
* Airbus (10) a Boeing (16)
600
500
L 400
I300
5 200
100
0
0 2,000 4,000 6,000
Range (nm)
8,000 10,000
467
8,000 10,000
a4
. .. . ' . " ... . i - Ii
-I
.: •. Si ;
'.
. .
.
.
i. 
..
...
48,
While Airbus will have added the (hub-and-spokes) A380 to finally round out its product
portfolio, as well as the middle-market (point-to-point) A350, Boeing will have added its (point-
to-point) 787 and its (hub-and-spokes) 747-8. There is no significant difference in product
performance portfolio strategies.
5.4.2.6.2 The Evolution of Boeing 787 vs. the Evolution of the Airbus A350
The real competition in the "middle of the market" is between Boeing's 787 and Airbus' A350.
It is interesting to observe the inherent architectural tendencies of each firm's product
development trajectories (including their respective "false-starts").
As shown in Figure 222 below, Boeing, being true to its high-performance products culture,
initially offered the radically-improved "higher, faster, farther" Sonic Cruiser. Due to
performance oversupply, it was pulled by the market back down to the "better, faster, cheaper"
solution of the 787.
Airbus conversely and subsequently responded with its incrementally-improved modified A330
in order to protect its "better, faster, cheaper" low-cost system design. Due to performance
undersupply, it was pushed by the market up to the "higher, faster, farther" solution o the A350.
Note that in the final competitive space, it is anticipated that Boeing's 787 will be a higher
performing, but higher initial cost product than Airbus' A350.
Figure 222: Evolutionary Trajectories of Boeing & Airbus' Recent Product Offerings
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5.5 Opposing Dynamic Behaviors
5.5.1 Opposing means to Profit: Top-line Growth vs. Bottom-line Productivity
5.5.2 Opposing Strategies Towards Meeting Demand
"In some industries we find one company whose policies attract the fluctuating part of the market
demand, whereas another company has policies that attract a stable underlying continuity of
demand... Differences in policy that tend to differentiate a company on the basis of its dynamic
characteristics will be an important aspect of competitive models. ,754
As shown conceptually in Figure 223 below, different enterprises have fundamentally different
approaches toward demand and strategies for how it is best served. These can be decomposed
dynamically into the underlying stable demand and the superimposed fluctuating part.
Figure 223: Opposing Strategies Towards Demand755
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It will be argued later that the strategies chosen to chase the fluctuating part actually contribute
to the very existence of the fluctuating part of demand. Additionally, chapter six will later begin
to describe under what environmental conditions each growth strategy is more likely to be
successful.
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754 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pp. 336-337.
711 Graphic from The Economist.
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5.5.3 Opposing Assumptions of Demand Durability
As shown in Figure 224 below, there is a different causal logic used by those firms chasing the
fluctuating part of the market demand, than that used by those firms seeking the stable part of the
market.7
Figure 224: Opposing Assumptions of Demand Durability
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"The company that Jfllows the policy of pursuing every possible sale and having product available to
push into the hands of the customer even in peak periods of demand may find it is unknowingly
selecting peaks of demand as its share of the market. This will be especially true if the intrinsic value
of the product in the eyes of the customer is less than that of competitors and if the company is taking
advantage of sales that come to it because of the unavailability of preferred competitive products. On
the other hand, a contrasting company policy could be to establish a preferred position in design,
quality, and sales effectiveness so that all production is salable in the periods of lowered market
demand. This company might forgo possible higher sales in periods of increased demand in the
interest of greater continuity of operations and to prevent dilution of the quality and skill. In this
situation the first company has a much higher percentage fluctuation in its operations than has the
industry as a whole. "57
756 These relations were obtained empirically from the case studies and will be discussed in more detail later.
757 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pp. 336-337.
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5.5.4 Opposing Assumptions on Forecasting (managerial cognitive inertia)
"Expectations are usually modeled in system dynamics as adaptive learning processes such as
exponential smoothing. Adaptive expectations (single exponential smoothing) outperform many
other forecasting methods over the longer time horizons.
As Sterman (2000, pg. 632) points out, various researchers have noted the long-term
performance superiority of simple exponential smoothing (Makridakis et al. 1982; Makridakis et
al. 1984; Carbone and Makridakis, 1986).
Figure 225 below summarizes the differences between managerial cognitive inertia and decision
processes in modular and integral enterprises architectures.
Figure 225: Opposing Assumptions on Forecasting
change
in output
Modular EA
"Demand is
not durable
for my goods"
Integral EA
0
"Demand is
durable
for my goods"
response =
1st order delay
"In an embedded logic of exchange... on a microbehavioral level, actors follow heuristic and
qualitative decision rules, rather than intensely calculative ones. These factors furnish an alternative
mechanism for matching customer demand to production. "59
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5.5.5 Opposing Assumptions of Span of Enterprise Control
Given that the modular enterprise architecture locally optimizes on the performance of the firm,
it sees other stakeholders largely as inputs largely beyond their control. As a result, important
environmental phenomena like the business cycle are exogenous. More plainly, the business
cycle exists because the modular enterprise architecture needs it to - i.e. it creates the instability
that it serves.
Conversely, the integral enterprise architecture globally optimizes on the performance of the
ecosystem, as it sees other stakeholders largely as inputs largely within their control. As a result,
important environmental phenomena like the business cycle are endogenous. More plainly, the
business cycle does not exist because the integral enterprise architecture does not want it to.
These two opposing assumptions and therefore managerial cognitive decision sets are
summarized stylistically in Figure 226 below.
Figure 226: Opposing Assumptions of Span ofEnterprise Control
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This set of propositions clearly begins to offer problems for positivist science as it is stating that
two "realities" exist with respect to what is the nature of the environment of the firm. This
observation sits more comfortably with a relativist or interpretivist epistemology.
The question of which of the two "realities" offers competitive advantage will be addressed in
chapter six.
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5.5.6 Opposing Views of Speed: Short-term vs. Long-term
"The analysis of the limits to growth - the factors determining the maximum rate of growth offirms -
cannot, in its present formulation at any rate, be tested against the facts of the external world, partly
because of the dfficulties in expressing some of the concepts in quantitative terms and partly because
of the impossibility of ever knowing for any given firm what is, or what would have been, its maximum
rate of growth. Perhaps some of these difficulties will be overcome in different formulations
constructed by others... ",76
The causal mechanisms that underlie the dynamic reference modes can be used to predict and
observe the structural dynamics of important macro enterprise response quantities like output.
As shown in Figure 227 below which depicts data from the automobile industry, the output
quantities can have significantly different dynamic characteristics, depending upon the
underlying architectural forms.
Figure 227: Enterprise Structural Dynamics in the Automotive Industry
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From the above data, we can note the following observations:
For short time horizons, the absolute value of the rate of change of output of the modular
enterprises tends to always exceed the rate of change of output of integral enterprises.
Mathematically, this can be expressed as:
I dQm/dt I > I dQ/dt (for small dt)
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For longer time horizons, the absolute value of the rate of change of output of the integral
enterprises tends to always exceed the rate of change of output of long enterprises.
Mathematically, this can be expressed as:
I dQm/dt I < I dQi/dt (for large dt)
Taken together, these two observations comprise the "tortoise vs. hare" dynamic. Note that the
hare wins the race given a sufficiently long race, as well as certain environmental race conditions
which we will discuss later.
"Slow and steady wins the race. "76
In addition, it appears that rate of change of output of integral enterprises tends to not go
negative. In other words, integral enterprises are designed to grow at such a rate that they will
not have to significantly shrink output. Mathematically, this can be expressed as:
dQi/dt < 0
Causally, this observation can be explained as integral enterprises are in the pursuit of
minimizing long-term costs. If competitive advantage arises from lower long-term costs and
higher long-term quality, then advantage arises from stability conditions for the workforce in
order to avoid degradation of capabilities. This in turn results in continuous learning and
improvement. As market share is gained, then learning curve effects, as well as economies of
scale drive competitive advantage. The above observations can also be seen in Figure 228
below in the large commercial airplane industry, currently dominated by the incumbent, Boeing
and the challenger, Airbus.
Figure 228: Enterprise Structural Dynamics in the Large Commercial Airplane Industry
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5.5.7 Opposing Assumptions of Strategic Investment
When putting the enterprise architectural constructs in a head-to-head game theoretic setting, the
equilibrium outcomes vary according to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the duopoly as
determined by the relative reaction functions of the firms (Law & Stewart, 1983; Mai & Hwang,
1989; Horowitz, 1991; Cremer & Cremer, 1992; Futagami & Okamura, 1994) as shown below in
Figure 229.
Figure 229: Opposing Assumptions of Strategic Investment
Profit-Maximizing
Duopoly
Labor-Managed
Duopoly
Over-
Invest + +
Invest at
Market
Interest Rates
Under-
Invest
An interesting and counterintuitive result is that the outcomes of each
exact opposites when the composition of the duopoly changes
heterogeneous (or "mixed").
architecture flip to near
from homogeneous to
475
Mixed
Duopoly
0*
11111M
--
5.5.8 Opposing Financial Strategies
Integral enterprise architectures tend to employ more "conservative" financial strategies than
their modular counterparts. Such strategies include maintaining lower debt levels as well as
higher levels of cash on hand (Hoffer-Gittell, 2003, pp. 244-247).
"Most people think of us as this flamboyant airline, but we're really very conservative from a fiscal
standpoint. We have the best balance sheet in the industry. We've always made sure that we never
overreached ourselves. We never got dangerously in debt, and never let costs get out of hand And
that gave us a real edge during [the Gulf War crisis of 1990 to 1994]. "762
"At Southwest, the maintenance offinancial reserves is seen as integral to the organization's ability
to maintain and even strengthen its relationships in the f ce of crises... Organizations with plentiful
financial reserves in the form of low debt levels are better positioned to bolster their relationships by
maintaining commitments... to stakeholders in times of crisis. ""6
"A simple analysis of these data shows that prior cash levels did not predict the extent of their layoffs,
but their debt-equity ratios predicted the extent of their layoffs with 99 percent certainty. "764
"Southwest protects its financial reserves by sticking to its policy of gradual steady growth, despite
the fact that there is sufficient demand for Southwest's service to permit a far-faster rate of growth.
According to John Denison, Southwest's former executive vice president of corporate services: 'We
promise the marketplace 10 percent growth, but we are only going to grow as fast as we can
manage... But we try to maintain the balance sheet. It is no accident that we are the only single-A
rated company in the industry. ' 765
"Indeed, Southwest's leaders have often had to maintain their conservative financial policies in the
face of strong pressures from Wall Street to grow faster. According to Matt Hafner, one of
Southwest's regional directors: 'It is nothing new with Southwest. The 'experts' always think we need
to expand at a more rapid pace. What these so-called experts express is their desire for Southwest to
jump at opportunities at a more rapid clip. Apparently growth excites investors. [But] nobody is
pushing us. That could never happen. '"
"[Southwest's] conservative approach has been criticized by Wall Street analysts, who have argued
that the airline should use its extra cash to make acquisitions or buy back stock. Goldman Sachs
analyst Glenn Engel actually calls the balance sheet 'too strong' (though] Engel allows, 'this has
meant that when times are tough, they have a lot more flexibility. '"76
"Southwest's policy stands in contrast to accepted wisdom on Wall Street. Southwest's policy also
stands in contrast to the policy of People Express, an airline that, like Southwest, also faced
tremendous demand for its services and tremendous pressure from Wall Street to grow rapidly and
take advantage of every opportunity. While southwest has experienced 31 years of disciplined, steady,
profitable growth, always maintaining plenty offinancial reserves to flourish in times of crisis, People
Express under the leadership of Donald Burr grew at an exponential rate from 1981 to 1986 and then
simply collapsed into its own wreckage. "7&'
762 Southwest Airlines CEO, Herb Kelleher, in Brooker, K. (2001).
763 Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 245.
764 Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 245.
765 Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pp. 245-246.
766 Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 246.
767 Mount, I. (2002).
768 Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 247.
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5.6 Case Study: the Business Cycle (and other "Exogenous" Shocks769)
Summarizing and integrating some of the observations from the previous section, this framework
posits that the business cycle is not an absolute reality in the positivist science sense, but rather is
a socially-constructed phenomena in the interpretivist paradigm. It exists because certain social
structures are designed to create them, while other social structures are designed to mitigate
them.
"Contemporary management literature contains two significant gaps: it has neglected the strategic
problems of the business cycle and it lacks an adequate account of strategic choice. "770
One of the best tests to determine an enterprise's architecture is to observe its response to
"exogenous" shocks from the environment, most notably the business cycle.771  As noted by
Whittington (1989), the business cycle is a unique litmus test as it teases out the underlying
mental models and social constructs of enterprise leaders with respect to their notions of time.
"My contention shall be that the business cycle presents the strategic decision maker with a
particularly intriguing, even paradoxical set ofproblems. The contradiction at the level of the firm is
how to balance short-term survival during the recession with the need to preserve long-term
competitiveness for the recovery. ",772
5.6.1 Cross-Industry Examples
We will next explore the behavior of competing firms within four different industries, in their
reaction to the business cycle.
5.6.1.1 Appliance industry
In the opening page of his book, Corporate Strategies in Recession and Recovery, Whittington
captured the different recession strategies of two rival domestic appliance manufacturers coping
with the 1979-81 recession in the UK:
"The director from Exemplar:
When we come out of a recession in England, what happens? You begin to import like fury because
everybody has abandoned their production capacity and run down. This cycle has destroyed British
industry - this up and down - because no one can afford, due to the tax system et cetera, to develop
during the recession. But that's what you've got to do, and that's why we hung on and that's what we
did! (Bangs table)."77
"The director from Rose:
769 The word "exogenous" is kept in quotes to note later that various enterprise architectures have different degrees
of environmental control, and therefore different frames of reference of what constitutes being "exogenous".
70 Whittington, R. (1989).
77"' Note however that not all strategy scholars are equally impressed with the importance of the business cycle.
Porter (1980), pg. 6 regards the business cycle as being of merely 'tactical' importance, especially when market
penetration is deep.
2 Whittington, R. (1989), pp. 15 & 19.
77 Whittington, R. (1989), pg. 1.
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It is important to preserve things for the future and one would like to do that, and to drive one's way
through the recession by investment. But on the one hand the theory is good; but ifyou are faced with
a factory loss this month one has to decide what to do... We cut back heavily. "'74
Whittington notes that these different strategies had very different consequences for firm
performance both in the short- and long-term.
5.6.1.2 Automobile industry
"Westerners are resigned to the idea of the business cycle. Like gravity, it's simply there, although
nobody quite knows why. ,75
"The issue never arose in Japan. Neither the domestic auto market nor domestic production is
cyclical. The Japanese domestic industry has always been able to plow through slumps in export
markets by cutting margins. Indeed, the largest contraction in production in Japan over the past forty
years is smaller than the smallest contraction in North America. "776
This difference in viewpoint has played out in the global automobile industry over the past 50
years, as was brought to the attention to the academic research and professional communities by
Womack, Jones and Roos (1990). As a General Motors executive noted:
"When the Japanese producers encounter these gigantic market waves, they will quickly become as
mediocre as we are. They will have to start hiring and firing workers along with suppliers and will
end up as mass-producers in short order.,,
This statement reveals the mental models of a leader embedded within an enterprise architecture
which enables and constrains what he/she can do. It does not necessarily have to be the case
however for other enterprise architectures.
"Some observers have even wondered if the lack of a cyclical market in durable goods in Japan is a
direct result of lean production: an inventoryless, highly flexible system that may significantly damp
cyclicality. " '
In fact, some 15 years after the above GM quote, Toyota went on to systematically dismantle the
US mass-producers with its integral enterprise architecture and a view of stability which is
impossible for modular enterprise, mass producers.
"We will maintain long-term, stable growth by building a business structure that can respond to
market fluctuations. " (Fujio Cho, President, Toyota). 779
774 Whittington, R. (1989), pg. 1.
77 Womack, Jones and Roos (19901 pp. 247.
776 Womack, Jones and Roos (1990), pp. 249.
7 Womack, Jones and Roos (1990), pp. 249.
7s Womack, Jones and Roos (1990), pp. 249.
77 Toyota 2004 Annual Report, "President's Message", pg. 11.
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5.6.1.3 Airplane industry
A similar story is recorded 20 years later in the airframe and airline industries in the recession of
1999-2001 and the exacerbating exogenous shock of the September 1 1'h terrorist attacks in the
US, as the leaders of leading firms in these industries attest:
"I am always a bit surprised by the speed with which Americans take decisions: that in three days
after the attacks they announce 25, 000 lay-offs at Boeing seems to me totally stupefying. Airbus has a
bigger order book than Boeing and until now growing market share, which will allow the bumps to be
smoothed out. "780
"We had to take necessary steps to manage the cycle profitably. "8'
5.6.1.4 Airline industry
"At Southwest, we manage in good times as though we were in bad times. "782
"Nothing kills your company's culture like layoffs. Nobody has ever been furloughed [at Southwest],
and that is unprecedented in the airline industry. It's been a huge strength of ours. "73
"We are willing to suffer some damage, even to our stock price, to protect the jobs of our people. "784
5.6.2 Exogenous vs. Endogenous Views
Modular EA's create the instabilities that they are designed to serve, while integral EA's create
the stability that they are designed to serve. In other words, to the firm at the center of the
modular EA (with its narrowly-defined span of control) the business cycle is exogenous, outside
of its conrol, and the best it can do is to predict it, and "ride" it as tightly and efficiently as
possible. Conversely, to the firm at the center of the integral EA (with its broadly-defined span
of control) the business cycle is endogenous.
5.6.3 Dominant Firm Behavior
"When the Japanese producers encounter these gigantic market waves, they will quickly become as
mediocre as we are. They will have to start hiring and firing workers along with suppliers and will
end up as mass-producers in short order. "7
The mental model of leaders in modular EAs is that while integral EAs may be able to "get away
with" being stable as challengers, once they begin to dominate an industry in terms of market
share, they must begin to oscillate, just as the modular EAs have done. This research framework
posits that such behavior is not necessarily true, which the evidence begins to support.
780 Airbus CEO, Noel Forgeard, 20 Sept. 2001.781 Boeing executive, post- 9-11.
782 Quote from Southwest Airlines employees, as cited in Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 244.
73 Southwest Airlines' Chairman, Herb Kelleher, from Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 243.
784 Southwest Airlines' CEO, Jim Parker, from Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pg. 242.
785 Womack, Jones and Roos (1990), pp. 249.
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An interview with a senior executive in a modular EA prior to being overtaken by their
competitor predicted:
"Once [our competitor] takes more than 50% of the market, they will have to become unstable, just as
we are. " 8
Deeper probing revealed that the mental model is that the business cycle is a given, and that
whoever dominates the supply of that market must swing with it. In a subsequent interview with
the same executive three and a half years later (after the data showed that their prediction did not
come true), the executive offered the following explanation:
"Once [our competitor] starts behaving rationally, they will have to become unstable, just as we
are.
Again the mental model is that the competitor is of the same architecture, therefore if they do not
pursue the same policies, they must be behaving irrationally. This research offers that both
competitors are highly rational, given their enterprise archtictures.
5.6.4 Signal-to-Noise Ratios
The data suggests that as over time, as modular EAs are under pressure from integral EAs, they
oscillate more severely, with their signal-to-noise ratios (on output) decreasing.
Conversely, as integral EAs begin to dominate, their signal-to-noise ratios remain high, and in
fact they tend to "discipline" the market, giving it a higher signal-to-noise ratio, commensurate
with their own behavior.
786 Interview took place in January 2002.
787 Interview took place in August 2005.
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5.7 Symbiotic Inter-species Competition and Mixed Duopoly
Interspecies competition is a relatively new concept which is therefore underrepresented in the
economics and sociology literatures. In economics, it takes the form of "Mixed Duopoly"
competition, while in sociology (and biology), it takes the form of "Interspecies Competition"
between heterogeneous organizational set architectures under the heading of Community
Ecology (Astley, 1985).
5.7.1 Inter-species Competition in Community Ecology
"This paper distinguishes between two ecological perspectives on organizational evolution:
population ecology and community ecology. The perspectives adopt different levels of analysis and
produce contrasting views of the characteristic mode and tempo of organizational evolution.
Population ecology limits investigation to evolutionary change unfolding within established
populations, emphasizing f ctors that homogenize organizational jbrms and maintain population
stability. Population ecology thus fails to explain how populations originate in the first place or how
evolutionary change occurs through the proliferation of heterogeneous organizational types.
Community ecology overcomes these limitations: itfocuses on the rise and fall ofpopulations as basic
units of evolutionary change, simultaneously explaining obrces that produce homogeneity and stability
within populations and heterogeneity between them. "'"
Even the original classic work on population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) highlights
this important form of competition.
"The greater the unexhausted capacity in the environment, the faster should be the rate of growth of
populations of organizations. But the rate at which populations of organizations can expand into
unused capacity varies among forms of organization. So there are two distinctive ecological
considerations: the capacity of the environment to support forms of organizations and the rate at
which populations grow (or decline) when the environmental support changes. "'7
"Up to this point, we have presumed that the limits to growth reflect the finite nature of the
environment. It is now time to reintroduce competition. According to Hawley, competition enters
indirectly when the competitors lower the fixed supply. We can model this by following the lead of
bioecologists and extending the logistic growth model. The two populations are said to compete if the
addition of units [of market share] of either decreases the rate of growth of the other. This will be the
case when both populations are sustained by the same types of resources. "'o
"If two populations of organizations sustained by identical environmental resources differ in some
organizational characteristic, that population with the characteristic less fit to environmental
contingencies will tend to be eliminated The stable equilibrium will then contain only one population
which can be said to be isomorphic to the environment. ""'
The state of the environment has a significant effect on interspecies competition. Lenox, Rockart
and Lewin (2006) develop simulation models to theorize about the nature of environmental
interdependencies, and their effects on firm and industry profitability.
788 Astley (1985), pg. 224.
789 Hannan and Freeman (1977), pg. 941.
790 Hannan and Freeman (1977), pg. 942.
79' Hannan and Freeman (1977), pg. 943.
"For high PIA-industries [Potential for Interdependencies among Activities], we expect a few high
performers and a relatively large number of laggards. High levels of PIA produce industries where
most firms cluster around low profit levels and a few firms occasionally achieve vastly superior
profits. "792
"In low PIA-industries, individual firm profits are driven by the ability of all firms to find low cost
positions absolutely; while in high PIA-industries, individualfirm profits are driven by the ability of the
best firms to find better cost positions relative to those of rivals. ""'
"In high PIA-industries the potential exists for an individual firm to discover a highly efficient
configuration of business practices relative to rivals and to realize profits well-above the industry
average. Thus, the average profits in high-PIA industries are bolstered by the occasional highly
successfid firm. While the existence of this kind of skewed profit distribution is striking when observed,
it remains a relatively infrequent outcome even in high-PIA industries. Paradoxically, it is within
these otherwise unattractive industries that we are most likely to observe an outstanding firm that is
both high performing and highly profitable. ""
"Medium PIA-industries, present firms with a real potential for competing jbr a very long period
without becoming competitive. "79-
"The overall result that average industry profits are highest for intermediate levels of PIA proves
robust from one extreme ofpure innovation to the opposite extreme ofpure imitation. "796
"Our results provide guidance for identifying likely industries where competitive advantage accrues to
a chosen few firms that have valuable, rare, nonsubstitutable, and hard-to-imitate resources and
capabilities that allow for favorable market positions relative to rivals. In this way, interdependencies
provide an explanation not only for what sustains profit heterogeneity within and across industries, but
why it emerges in the first place in some industries more than in others. By recognizing that industries
can vary in terms ofpotential interdependency due to technology and other structural factors, we also
see the beginning of a reconnection offirm-level and industry-level analyses. To the extent that the
potential for interdependency is driven by structural elements of an industry, industry structure [SCP]
can be used to explain differences in firms' resources, capabilities, [RBV] and profits. ""'
"There has been a great deal of interest among economists in how firm heterogeneity may affect the
structural evolution of industries. "798
"Perhaps the most promising, those studying industry dynamics may find that a more explicit
treatment of interdependency provides new insights into the structural evolution of industries. ""
792 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 766.
793 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 766.
794 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 769.
795 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 770.
796 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 771.
797 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 771.
798 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 771.
799 Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2006), pg. 772.
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5.7.2 Example: Biological Ecosystem
Before investigating business ecosystems, the following discussion of the evolution of biological
ecosystems is used to illustrate the framework. We look at the well-known forest (or Canadian
boreal) ecosystem consisting of pine, aspen and spruce species of trees.800
As shown in Figure 230 below, the lifecycle of the ecosystem consists of the symbiotic
competition between two sets of species, designed to grow in different environments: the jack
pine and aspen in post-fire soil which is rich in nutrients, and the black spruce in later pine and
aspen environments.
Figure 230: Symbiotic Competition in a Biological (boreal) Ecosystem
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800 I am indebted to MIT PhD student, Jason Jay for bringing this example to my attention during one of my lectures
at the MIT PhD class, Enterprise Architecting, in Spring 2006.
Speces
Life-Cycle
r~;;;;;;;~ 1~8B_
483
The two species do not merely exist, they co-exist symbiotically, i.e. create the conditions for the
growth and ultimate destruction of the other species. In other words, they create and destroy
their own carrying capacities. The spruce create the conditions for "market-clearing" creative
destruction (Schumpeter, 1939) via forest fire; the forest fire creates the clear sunlight and rich
soil necessary to grow the "pioneer species", the pines and aspen; the pines and aspen create the
environment for the spruce, which ultimately choke off their sunlight. While the two species are
in a competitive struggle to the death, they need each other to create the conditions for life.
Note that like the framework presented herein for business ecosystems, this example shows how
the biological ecosystem evolves over time from one species of dominance to another, yet it does
not describe how the very long-term random processes of variation, selection and retention
evolve the species of trees that exist in the forest.
Recall this symbiosis was proved mathematically by the mixed duopoly economics of profit-
maximizing firms (i.e. pines & aspen) vs. the labor-managed firms (i.e. spruce), in which the LM
firms grew to slowly to survive in the rich growth environment.
The causal physics of the nonlinear dynamic interplay between the two species will be discussed
in subsequent sections under the classical "predator-prey" formulation.
5.8 Modeling Inter-species Competition
The following section discusses various formal simulation models used to understand the
competitive interaction between firms embedded within heterogeneous enterprise architectures
and the co-evolution with their industry. The formal modeling will be covered in Chapter 7.
5.8.1 Biological Competition within the Mathematical Modeling Tradition
5.8.1.1 Population Growth of Verhulst (1838)
"The positive loop corresponds to the tendency of the population to grow at a rate proportional to
itself The negative loop corresponds to the growth-limiting effects Verhulst envisioned in conflict and
stress. Thus over time the system changes its own growth tendencies. In feedback terms, the system
shows a gradual shift in loop dominance. '*so
Verhulst (1838) was the first to model nonlinear mode-switching (between reinforcing and
balancing feedback) of a population in an environment having fixed carrying capacity
(Richardson, 1990).
5.8.1.2 Predator-Prey Ecosystem of Lotka-Voltera (1925-1926)
"But unquestionably his [Lotka's] most quoted contribution is the model of a closed ecosystem
attributed jointly to him and to Volterra (1931). "802
Predator-Prey "competition" within a biological ecosystem was first put forth by Lotka (1925)
and Volterra (1926).
5.8.2 Firm Competition within the System Dynamics Tradition
Within the 50-year history of system dynamics, an intellectual thread has developed which has
embraced competitive dynamics between firms. After Forrester's original work in the 1960's
(Forrester, 1961 and 1968), the thread is picked up again by Sterman (Sterman, 1989; Sterman,
1991; Paich and Sterman, 1993; Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker, Newman, 1995; Langley,
Paich, Sterman, 1999; and Sterman, 2000) and again more recently by researchers in the UK
(Sice, Mosekilde, Moscardini, Lawler, and French, 2000; Warren, 2002; Kunc, 2004; Kunc and
Morecroft, 2004).
5.8.2.1 Embracing Macro-Structures: Forrester (1960-1970)
"If substantially different policies would be desirable for the industry, there then arises the question
of what will happen should one company unilaterally adopt these policies. Differences in policy that
tend to differentiate a company on the basis qf its dynamic characteristics will be an important aspect
of competitive models. 8o3
801 Richardson, G.P. (1990), pg. 33.
802 Richardson, G.P. (1990), pg. 36.
803 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pp. 336 and 337.
While Forrester (1961) originally noted the potential for explicit modeling of the competitive
dynamics of firms having differing policies, his first research effort focused on understanding the
dynamics of an industry composed of homogeneous firms.
"It seems wise to start a study of dynamic characteristics with the industry as a whole. Once the
nature of the industry is adequately understood, the study of different policies between companies
becomes important. "8O4
Forrester's subsequent research effort the "Market Growth Model" (1966) also represented the
competitive environment passively by specifying the exogenous benchmarks for competitive
success. The purpose of this benchmark was not necessarily to simulate the true behavior of
competitors, but to represent abstractly the standards that customers judge product attractiveness
(Kunc and Morecroft, 2004).
5.8.2.2 Embracing Micro-Behaviors: Sterman (1985-2005)
"The playing field is level - the structure and parameters for the firm and its competitor are
identical. ,'80
The focus on firm performance picks up again with the development of management flight
simulators looking at specific firms like People Express Airlines (Sterman, 1988), and more
generally, the Boom and Bust Enterprises (Sterman, 1991). The emphasis now was less on
industry dynamics but on managerial perceptions and misperceptions using behavioral decision
theory. This time, competition is modeled slightly more explicitly and directly, as a matrix of
discrete competitor pricing strategies and market environment scenarios.
Paich and Sterman (1993) identify a variety of competitive strategies ranging from "Adaptive" to
"Ballistic" in their models of competition to build a market. This dissertation argues that
"Adaptive" and "Ballistic" strategies are more advantageous at different phases during the
industry lifecycle.
5.8.2.3 Embracing the Meso-Interactions: Morecroft (2000-2005)
Recently the system dynamics group at the London Business School (Kunc, 2004; Kunc and
Morecroft, 2004), have modeled the dynamic interaction of competition between forms.
"However, not all business dynamics problems can be modeled as individual firms or as aggregate
industries. Industry evolution is one important exception. During the evolution of industries, the
process of mutual adjustment between heterogeneous firms is particularly relevant because the
actions of individual firms sooner or later influence the responses of other firms in the same
industry. "8o6
804 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pg. 336.
805 Paich and Sterman (1993), pg. 1442.
806 Kunc and Morecroft (2004), pg. 4.
Also other researchers have explicitly begun to look at duopolistic interations (Sice,
Mosekilde, Moscardini, Lawler, and French, 2000).
"The model reflects the essential relationships of two equivalent competitors and reveals the possible
dynamics of the battle for customers. "
5.8.3 Formal Models of Business Ecosystems
5.8.3.1 Bertrand Competition & "The Principle of Competitive Exclusion"
In ecosystem biology and population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), interspecies
competition, is traditionally modeled with rather simple and severe assumptions. "The Principle
of Competitive Exclusion" states no two species can occupy the same niche in equilibrium. The
underlying assumption to this principle is based on Bertrand (1883) or price-based competition,
in which, the winner-takes-all.
5.8.3.2 Predator - Prey Ecosystem Revisited
It is plausible that the modular enterprise architecture, which seeks growth and disregard for its
environment can be modeled as a "prey" species, whereas the integral enterprise architecture,
which seeks stability and harmony with its environment can be modeled as a "predator" species,
in the classic population ecological sense.
The governing growth dynamics of each population of species are driven separately by S-shaped
growth dynamics (Lotka, 1925; and Volterra, 1926).807 However, when "competing" together in
an ecosystem for resources (e.g. sales revenues), their dynamics are coupled as one provides the
carrying capacity for the other. This coupled nonlinear dynamic system generates stable but
unpredictable chaotic oscillations as shown in Figure 231 below, the likes of which were
discussed in the preceding sections.
Figure 231: Predator (Integral) - Prey (Modular) Architectural Competitive Dynamics
807 These S-shaped growth dynamics are generated by a reinforcing loop on the inflow and a balancing loop on the
outflow of the population; as well as the existence of a carrying capacity which modifies that fractional birth and
death rates.
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5.8.3.3 Classic System Dynamics Models of Enterprise Architectures
The following section defines the development of a formal model using the system dynamics
methodology (Forrester, 1961; Lyneis, 1980; Sterman, 2000) to quantify and simulate the
nonlinear dynamic interactions between the firm and its key input providers - its extended
enterprise. As shown in Figure 232 below, the key stakeholder interactions that have been
modeled in the system dynamics tradition, have tended to focus primarily on the value chain axis
of firm-supplier interaction (Forrester, 1961) and firm-market interaction (Forrester, 1968),
although a secondary focus on firm-employee interaction and firm-investor interactions were also
made.
Figure 232: System Dynamics Enterprise Subsystem Diagram
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Market Growth
(Forrester, 1964,19
Transient growth
of firms and indu
Industrial Dynamics Model
(Forrester, 1961)
Steady-state stability
of firms and industries
Employees
Supplier
Note that Forrester's two seminal studies have focused on the system goals of steady-state
stability appropriate to mature industries (Forrester, 1961) and transient growth appropriate to
new industries (Forrester, 1968) respectively.
"The first phase dealt primarily with the 'steady-state' dynamics of mature industries. The new phase
will deal more with transient situations... of industry and company growth. 08os
By way of example of stakeholder interactions, the classic firm-market interaction (Forrester,
1964) can be seen in Figure 233 below.80 9 Aside from the information (i.e. orders), material (i.e.
80s Forrester, J.W. (1961), pg. viii.
809 Other examples of system dynamics firm-environment interactions can be seen from Forrester's "Market
Growth" model (1968) and Sterman, Repenning and Kofman's (1997) quality improvement program.
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products) and value (i.e. money) flows, the two stakeholders are coupled through competitive
signals which importantly define the level of integration between stakeholders.
Figure 233: System Dynamics Firm-Market Subsystem Diagram
Core flows:
Market
1. Customer orders (information) (Demand)
2. Firm product (material)
3. Customer payment (value)
5.8.3.4 Modeling the Enterprise Archetypes: Modular & Integral
As shown in Figure 234 below, each firm in the mixed duopoly has a fundamentally different
view of its relationships with the key stakeholders in its extended enterprise. While the firm at
the center of the modular enterprise is an open system, exchanging information, material and
value with its environment, it also sees itself as causally open, with little ability to control the
strategic interests of the stakeholders in its extended enterprise. While the firm at the center of
the integral enterprise is also an open system, exchanging information, material and value with
its environment, it sees it self as causally closed (i.e. having many important strategic
feedbacks), with significant ability to control the strategic interests of the stakeholders in its
extended enterprise. The presence of a feedback rich environment, is both a cause and effect of
the fact that an integral enterprise architecture is managed to longer time constants.
Figure 234: Enterprise Archetypes: Modular and Integral
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5.8.3.5 Modeling the Competitor subsystem
In Forrester's early seminal studies, competition was treated as passively via an exogenous
benchmark representing relative attractiveness of the firm's products in the market (Kunc and
Morecroft, 2004). The assumption being that the industry structure supports multiple similar
competitors engaged in perfect competition. As a result, the feedbacks between competitor
decisions are deemed weak and are not assumed to significantly alter the competitive
environment over the time horizons of interest in the study (Kunc and Morecroft, 2004). A more
detailed survey of the treatment of competition within the system dynamics tradition is shown in
Appendix H.
5.8.3.5.1 Competition for Customers
In order to model the competitor subsystem in system dynamics, it is important to first
acknowledge which stakeholders will be characterized as territory for competition. While the
competitor stakeholder is typically modeled as competing through the customer stakeholder, in
principle the "competitive coupling" could take place across all stakeholders as shown in Figure
235 below. In fact, in pursuit of competition for customers (or market share), one could argue
that the successful firm will be the one that manages the highest quality providers of investors,
employees and suppliers (as an integral part of possessing the best strategy). Note this is where
the SCP paradigm begins to meet the RBV paradigm in strategic management. For each
stakeholder, there is a spectrum of quality ranging from undifferentiated commodity to
differentiated, dedicated asset.
Figure 235: Theoretical Competitive Coupling between all Stakeholders
Traditional
locus of
competition
Competition for goods & services
of other stakeholders
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5.8.3.5.2 Competition for Investors
While firms are in principle competing for investors or providers of capital, such input can (but
not always as we shall discuss later) be seen as an undifferentiated commodity. Although the
quantity of capital available may be large, the quality of capital may not be. Therefore, although
an institutional investor may like the structure of a particular industry (e.g. the duopoly structure
of the large commercial airplanes industry), they may choose between firms based on a more
integrated, dedicated logic.
5.8.3.5.3 Competition for Employees
In addition, firms are in principle competing for employees or managerial talent, as is
occasionally evidenced by the switching of high-profile executives in the automotive industry.
5.8.3.5.4 Competition for Suppliers
Finally, firms are in principle competing for suppliers, and not necessarily to create captive
supply. Although suppliers in some industries can make parts, subassemblies or subsystems for
competing OEMs, recent research (Dyer, 2003) has indicated that it not a given that such supply
is commodity. In other words creating a high quality relationship with a supplier who has a low
quality relationship with your competitor can be a competitive advantage, in terms of
productivity, continuous improvement, etc. Such relationships have "sticky" value.
The primary case study of this research focuses on the Boeing-Airbus duopoly which is primarily
characterized by a partial coupling between the stakeholders along the value chain - namely the
customers and suppliers as shown in Figure 236 below.
Each firm has its own "dedicated", "captive" or non-shared providers of capital and labor.
Competition takes place along the value chain for customers (either shared or dedicated) and
suppliers (also either shared or dedicated).
810 Consider for example EADS composed of Daimler, and BAE Systems as institutional investors in Airbus.
Figure 236: Competitive Coupling between Value Chain Stakeholders
4
5.9 Tying Structural Dynamics to Valuation and Firm Performance
From above, it appears that modular enterprise architectures are driven by "profitable growth",
while integral enterprise architectures are driven by "sustainable growth". Profitable growth can
be achieved by chasing demand in a market upturn, and releasing capacity (and thus short-term
costs) in a market downturn. Sustainable growth can be achieved by the opposite strategy,
namely, not chasing demand in a market upturn, and maintaining capacity in a market downturn.
The following quotations from leaders of various enterprise architectures illustrate the mental
models.
"Aiming to achieve sustainable growth, Toyota will implement a financial strategy emphasizing the
balance of growth, efficiency and stability. " (Ryuji Araki, Executive Vice President, Finance and
Accounting, Toyota).'
"I believe, no matter what the era, a company that has lost its appetite for growth cannot develop. In
my view, sustained growth drives corporate value. " (Fujio Cho, President, Toyota).812
811 Toyota Motors 2004 Annual Report, pg. 14.
812 Toyota Motors 2004 Annual Report, "President's Message", pg. 13.
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5.10 Chapter Summary
This chapter was the second of three essays which forms an integrated framework which
attempts to explain long-term firm performance. In this chapter, we defined the construct of
enterprise structural dynamics, its sources and properties. In addition, we discussed how these
dynamics drive the associated performance,
The context for this construct within the framework is shown below in Figure 237. In the
following chapter, we will next discuss how firm performance drives and is driven by the
evolution of the industry.
Figure 237: Enterprise Structural Dynamics with Framework
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Chapter 6 Industrial Co-Evolution
6.1 Introductory Constructs and Propositions
"Industry evolution takes on critical importance for formulation of strategy.' 13
Having discussed how the enterprise architectural form drives the enterprise structural dynamic
behavior, this section will explore the link between the enterprise's structural dynamic behavior
and the financial performance of the "keystone" firm and ultimately with the dynamic evolution
of the environment and co-evolution with the firms.
First, we will explore the enterprise's architectural evolution from integral to modular, as
exploration gives way to exploitation. Second, we will explore the environment's simultaneous
structural evolution from growth to stability. Third, we will explore industry's simultaneous
architectural evolution from modular to back to integral as exploitation gives way to a new type
of exploration (noting that change now takes place at a population level instead of at a firm level,
signaling the birth of a new integral firm in a new environment). This feedback mechanism will
attempt to explain the co-evolution of firm's ecosystem with the competitive environment.
"One of the enduring problems facing the field of strategic management is the lack of theoretical
tools available to describe and predict the behavior of firms and industries. The fundamental
problem is that industries evolve in a dynamic way over time as a result of complex interactions
among firms, government, labor, consumers, financial institutions, and other elements of the
environment. Not only does industry structure influence firm behavior, but firm behavior in turn can
alter the structure of an industry and the contours of competition. ,'14
6.1.1 Change from a System Perspective
Organizational and environmental change has been profitably expressed and subsequently
decomposed from a systems perspective (Bossel, 2007), which are the result of different
processes associated with different time constants. The following subsections address three
processes each having longer time constants and therefore deeper causality: adaptation, self-
organization and evolution as summarized in Figure 238 below.
813 Porter, M.E. (1980), pg. 156.
814 Levy, D. (1994), pg. 167.
Figure 238: The Structure of Adaptation, Self-Organization and Evolution
6.1.1.1 Adaptation
"Processes of adaptation ... in this case the system maintains its basic influence structure, but
parameters are adjusted to adapt to the situation. Adaptation means adjustment to a change in the
system environment by changing the system parameters and/or limited structural change. ,815
Within the context of this framework, adaptation of an enterprise architecture lies in its relatively
minor adjustments towards efficiency, while keeping the existing architecture constant.
6.1.1.2 Self-Organization
"On the next higher level we find processes of self-organization in respsonse to environmental
challenges. This means structural change in the system. Self-organization denotes the ability of a
system to change its system structure and its functions to cope with new challenges. 816
Within the context of this framework, self-organization speaks to the change of the underlying
structure (and associated functions), for the example, the natural dis-integration (or
modularization) of the enterprise architecture.
6.1.1.3 Evolution
"A system may also change its identity in the course of an evolutionary process. This means that its
functional characteristics, and hence its system purpose, change with time. Evolution is adaptation
and self-organization under fitness competition in a population of similar systems. "817
Within the context of this framework, evolution speaks to the change of the deep underlying
function and purpose of an enterprise, i.e. the re-integration of the enterprise architecture.
8" Bossel, H. (2007), pp. 13 and 48.816 Bossel, H. (2007), pp. 13 and 49.
817 Bossel, H. (2007), pp. 13 and 49.
495
II?
6.1.2 Employing Multiple Views on Change Processes
"It is the interplay between different perspectives that helps one gain a more comprehensive
understanding of organizational life, because any one theoretical perspective invariably offers only a
partial account of a complex phenomenon. "88s
Van de Ven and Poole (1991 and 1995) conducted an extensive review of the management
literature and discovered four distinct theories of change processes: life cycle, teleology,
dialectics and evolution (Van de Ven, 1992) - the former two being deterministic and predictive
and the latter two being probabilistic and non-predictive.
"Life-cycle, teleology, dialectics and evolution are viewed as abstract ideal types of theories of
change processes. These ideal types are based on fundamentally different logics, which represent the
underlying generative mechanisms or laws that explain why observed events occur in particular
sequence progressions when specific circumstances or conditions exist. ,'819
The following subsections will briefly describe each, and as is shown in Figure 239 below, essay
#3 will explore the change processes which occur in enterprise architectures from the primary
viewpoints.
Figure 239:
Industrial
Integrating Theories of Change Processes
Life-Cycles
of the
organizational
Set & Field
* single-entity
* deterministic
Evolution
of the
organizational
Set & Field
* multiple-entities
* probabilistic
0*0
88s Van de Ven and Poole, (1995), pp. 510-511.
819 Van de Ven, (1992), pg. 169.
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6.1.2.1 Life-Cycle theory
"The grandfather of concepts for predicting the probable course of industry evolution is the familiar
product lifecycle. '~820
The mode of change of life-cycle theory is deterministically prescribed and focuses on
continuity. The unit of change of life-cycle theory is the single entity, whether in the case of this
research, the entity is the enterprise (i.e. organizational set) or the ecosystem (i.e. organizational
field).
"According to life cycle theory, change is imminent; that is, the developing entity has within it an
underlying form, logic, program or code that regulates the process of change and moves the entity
from a given point of departure toward a subsequent end that is prefigured in the present state.
As Van de Ven (1992) notes, Greiner's (1972) model of organizational growth is rooted in a
life-cycle perspective in distinct opposition to a teleological perspective.
"...historical forces [organizational age, size, growth rate, and stages of evolution and revolution]
shape the future growth of organizations... the future of an organization may be less determined by
outside forces than it is by the organization 's history... behavior is determined primarily by previous
events and history, not by what lies ahead. ,'22
6.1.2.2 Teleological theory
"A teleology process theory is based on the assumption that the developing entity is purposeful and
adaptive. '23
The mode of change of teleological theory is emergent and focuses on discontinuity. The unit of
change of teleological theory is the single entity, whether in the case of this research, the entity
is the enterprise (i.e. organizational set) or the ecosystem (i.e. organizational field). Although
teleological theory is rooted in the purposefulness of human actors, this brings up an interesting
question: if an organizational set or organizational field are purposeful, who administers this
purpose and how?
The primary fields which have supported this theory include functionalism, general system
theory and strategic planning.
"Unlike life-cycle theory, teleology does not prescribe a necessary sequence of events or specify
which trajectory development of the organizational entity willfollow. ,'24
The underlying purpose or goal of an enterprise architecture is captured by its objective function,
whether maximization of shareholder value or maximization of stakeholder surplus. To the
extent that the enterprise architect(s) (e.g. CEO) are purposeful actors, teleological theory
applies to our theory of the evolution of business ecosystems. The question becomes, to what
820 Porter, M.E. (1980), pg. 156.
821 Van de Ven and Poole, (1995), pg. 515.
822 Greiner, L. (1972), pg. 166.
823 Van de Ven, (1992), pg. 178.
824 Van de Ven and Poole, (1995), pg. 516.
extent does the enterprise architecture enable and constrain purposeful action and strategic
choice?825 And at what stages in the development of an ecosystem do teleological factors
dominate?
6.1.2.3 Dialectical theory
"Different patterns for resolving dialectical oppositions can push an organization to flow toward
equilibrium, to oscillate in cycles between opposites, or to bifurcate far from equilibrium and
spontaneously create revolutionary changes. "826
The mode of change of dialectical theory is emergent and focuses on discontinuity. The unit of
change of dialectical theory are multiple entities, whether in the case of this research, the entity
is the enterprise (i.e. organizational set) or the ecosystem (i.e. organizational field). As will be
discussed below, dialectical theory is necessary (along with evolutionary theory) to explan the
emergence and disappearance of organizational forms in a community ecology approach.
"Dialectical theory begins with the assumption that the organizational entity exists in a pluralistic
world of colliding events, forces or contradictory values that compete with each other for domination
and control. These oppositions may be internal to an organizational entity because it may have
several conflicting goals or interest groups competing for priority. Also, oppositions may be external
to the organizational entity as it pursues directions that collide with the direction of other
organizations. ,N82
Within the enterprise architecture or organizational set, a zero-sum competition between
stakeholders for residual cash-flows is a form of dialectic. Also, external competition between
organizational sets represents a form of dialectic. The creation of a "win-win" is an example of
thesis and anti-thesis generating synthesis, while a "win-lose" is an example of maintenance of
thesis or replacement with anti-thesis (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, pg. 517). Unpredictable
change therefore can result within an organizational set from a power-struggle that results in
either the creation or destruction of a "win-win" in the enterprise's objective function. As inter-
enterprise competition is likely to preclude collusion, such unpredictable dialectic change would
be less common.
6.1.2.4 Evolutionary theory
"The evolutionary model suggests a blurring of the hard lines defining the adaptation-selection
debate ."828
The mode of change of evolutionary theory is probabilistically prescribed (in the sense that
variations can be "blind") and focuses on continuity. The unit of change of evolutionary theory
are multiple entities, whether in the case of this research, the entity is the enterprise (i.e.
organizational set) or the ecosystem (i.e. organizational field).
825 Recall from the Airbus case, the CEO's inablility to implement proposed changes to the enterprise architecture
led to his exit in 1996 after only 100 days on the job.
826 Van de Ven, (1992), pp. 179.
827 Van de Ven and Poole, (1995), pp. 517.
828 Scott, (2003), pg. 222.
"Variations, the creations of novel forms of organizaitons are often viewed to emerge by blind or
random chance (Aldrich, 1979; Campbell, 1969). Selection of organization occurs principally
through the competition for scarce resources and the environment selects entities that best fit the
resource base of an environmental niche. (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Retention involves forces
(including inertia and persistence) that perpetuate and maintain certain organizational forms. ,829
Evolutionary studies of organizations are comprised by the economics and the sociology
traditions (Barron, 2003). These tend to characterize the debate of whether managerial
adaptation or environmental selection dominates organizational change. Both processes can be
expressed in evolutionary terms, i.e. based on the processes of variation, selection and retention
as shown in Figure 240 below.
"Organizational scholars who adopt Darwinian evolution argue that traits are inherited through
intergenerational processes; whereas those who follow Lamarck argue that traits are acquired
within a generation through learning and imitation. A Lamarckian view on the acquisition of traits
appears more qppropriate than strict Darwinism for organization and management applications. "8 o30
Figure 240: Evolution in Managerial Adaptation & Environmental Selection
Managerial Environmental>
Adaptation Selection
vs.
Variation Selection Retention) ) Variation Selection Retention
Lamarckian evolution Darwinian evolution
('routines" = genetic material)
Evolutionary Economics Community/Population Ecology
(Nelson & Winter, 1982) (Hannan & Freeman, 1977)
6.1.2.4.1 Evolutionary Economics
Nelson and Winter (1982) define "routines" as the underlying genetic material of organizations.
Their approach to evolution is Lamarckian as the governing mechanism is the transfer of genetic
material across generations via learning.
6.1.2.4.2 Population Ecology
Hannan and Freeman (1977) note that the unit of selection are the organizations themselves
within their environment.
829 Van de Ven and Poole, (1995), pg. 518.
830 Van de Ven and Poole, (1995), pg. 519.
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6.1.2.5 Combinations of theories
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) assemble the fore aforementioned change theories into
combinations of theories to describe how well-known meta-theories are constituted. For
example, while population ecology is certainly an evolutionary theory, its more general parent
discipline, community ecology is rooted in both evoloutionary theory and dialectical theory,
thereby allowing for the explanation for the emergence and disappearance of new forms, which
population ecology does not focus on.
Figure 241 below summarizes the combination of change theories on the framework. At the
enterprise level, change occurs both via life-cycle theory, where organizations (like organisms)
go through the sequential stages of birth and death; and via teleological theory, where managerial
adaptation can work to disintegrate enterprises.
At the ecosystem level, change occurs both via evolutionary theory, where new organizational
forms (like Toyota) appear in "blind" variation, they are competitively selected and their forms
are retained (like the adoption of "lean"); and via teleological theory, where managerial
adaptation via entrepreneurship is evident.
At the interface between enterprise and ecosystem, change occurs via dialectical theory, where
thesis and antithesis compete and vie for synthesis.
Figure 241: Change Theories and the Evolution of Business Ecosystems
Industry Industry Industry Industry
Growth Maturity Decline Death
1 Life-cycle theory lifeccle
0n Teleological theory!
(manaogerial distegration)
.=....*h, .. n . Challen .
0)" c e t: "timeTeleifeogcacle l theo
Incumbent Challenger Incumbent Challenger
birth birth death death
Evolutionary theory
(variation, selection & retention)
Teleological theory
(entrepreneurship)
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6.2 Theoretical Foundations
"Models that integrate sociological and economic aspects of the environment, or that move beyond
traditional life-cycle conceptions of its evolution, are lacking. "'
As this chapter aims to understand the nature of the evolution of the environment, and it cause
and effect on the evolution of the enterprise, I will draw from a diverse set of theoretical
traditions spanning economics and sociology.
6.2.1 Economic and Strategic Management Theories
"In classical economic theory... change was within the structure but the structure was always stable.
Institutional economists examine institutions that provide economic order, and they study the
endogenous forces that cause these institutions to evolve. ',832
While classical economics is rooted in natural law, institutional economics rooted in human
organization. The framework derived from this research embraces both epistemologies. Change
is described both from the natural law of Newton's tradition, as well as from the human
organization of Darwin's tradition.
The most notable and influential economic theories of evolution come from Nelson and Winter
(1982). Unlike the sociological view of Darwinian evolution, they are avowedly Lamarckian in
their focus on learning routines.
6.2.1.1 Life Cycle of Industry Structure, Technologies & Markets
Oliver Williamson (1975) gave an early economics description of the different stages in an
industry's evolution, which predates some of the more established work on this topic in the field
of technology and innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978):
"Three stages in an industry's development are commonly recognized: an early exploratory stage, an
intermediate development stage, and a mature stage. The first or early formative stage involves the
supply of new product of relatively primitive design, manufactured on comparatively unspecialized
machineiy, and marketed through a variety of exploratory techniques. 'Volume is typically low. A
high degree of uncertainty characterizes business experiences at this stage. The second stage is the
intermediate development stage in which manufacturing techniques are more refined and market
definition is sharpened; output grows rapidly in response to newly recognized applications and
unsatisfied market demands. A high but somewhat lesser degree of uncertainty characterizes market
outcomes at this stage. The third stage is that of a mature industry. Management, manufacturing, and
marketing techniques all reach a relatively advanced degree of refinement. Markets may continue to
grow, but do so at a more regular and predictable rate.. established connections with customers and
suppliers (including capital market access) all operate to buffer changes and thereby to limit large
shifts in market shares. Significant innovations tend to be fewer and are mainly of an improvement
variety. 33
831 Fajoun, M. (2002), pg. 585.832 Atkinson G. (2004), pg. 275.
833 Williamson, 0. (1975), pp. 215-216, as cited in Klepper (1997), pp. 146-147.
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Subsequently, Gort and Klepper (1982) conducted one of the most extensive studies of industrial
evolution in which they examined the life cycles of nearly 50 industries which originated between
1887 and 1960 and which represented a diverse mix of products. As shown in the quote below,
they found a number of general (although not universal) patterns in the evolution of the structure
of industries along the dimensions of: number of firms, industry output growth, prices, and rate of
innovations.
"[Gort and Klepper, 1982]... observed that industries for new products pass through a brief period
with few firms, Jbllowed by a rapid increase in the number of firms, which then falls rapidly to a
relatively stable level (p. 639). During the evolution of the industry, [they] also observed that output
growth is initially high but declines steadily (p. 645); prices fall rapidly but at a decreasing rate (p.
647); and the rate of both major innovations and minor innovations rise, peak, and then remain
stable over time, with major innovations peaking earlier (p. 648). "34
While many researchers have focused on the causal mechanisms of scale advantages, recent
researchers like Lenox, Rockart and Lewin (2007) have generated numerical simulation models
to which use the the mechanism of interdependency to demonstrate similar patterns in the
evolution of the structure of industries:
"This model is able to recreate the patterns observed in improvements in efficiency (continued but
with less-substantial improvement as time passes), industry output (increasing at a decreasing rate),
prices (steady decline at a decreasing rate), and industry participation (rapid entry is followed by
mass exit, leading to a shakeout and a stable number of competitors). "835
834 Lenox, M.J., Rockart, S.F., Lewin, A.Y. (2007), pp. 600-601.
835 Lenox, M.J., Rockart, S.F., Lewin, A.Y. (2007), pp. 610-611.
................. ..........- --- --- ---- --- --- ---
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6.2.1.2 Life Cycle of Finance and Governance
In advancing a life cycle theory of the firm, Mueller (1972) posited that the distribution of
dividends back to investors would follow the traditional life cycle curve as shown in Figure 242
below.
"We therefore expect the growth-maximizing management to undertake-more investment than a
stockholder-welfare maximizer, pay equivalently smaller dividends, grow at a faster rate, and have a
lower market value for its firm. ,836
Figure 242: Dividend Distribution Life Cycle
CR
Industrial Output,
Level of Dividends
time
"This paper attempts to fill this void by developing a life cycle theory in which the tendency of
nmanagers to pursue growth, rather than stockholder welfare, increases as the firm grows and
matures. "3
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836 Mueller, D.C. (1972), pg. 206.
137 Mueller, D.C. (1972), pg. 199.
Building off of Marris' work (1963), Mueller (1972) also noted that as a market was emerging,
with increasing rates of growth, there was no negative trade-off between growth and
profitability, therefore principal-agent problems were minimized. However, as the market was
maturing, with decreasing rates of growth, there was a negative trade-off between growth and
profitability, exacerbating principal-agent problems, as shown in Figure 243 below.
"He postulated the existence of 'young' firms... that had 'taken off into a process of fast,
accelerating growth associated with good profitability. The valuation curve presented no negative
trade-off between growth and stock-market value because at this stage the return on retained profits
was better than could be obtained elsewhere. Later, as the exceptional circumstances fade, the
optimum growth rate for stockholders gradually declines and may finally become negative. During
this phase, which may be very long if not indefinite, conflict between managerial and stockholder
interests emerges.
Figure 243: Emergence of the Principal-Agent Problem with Industry Maturity
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"Mergers are an obvious way to avoid the slowdown in growth that product maturity brings. "9
838 Marris, R. and Mueller, D.C. (1980), pg. 44.
839 Marris, R. and Mueller, D.C. (1980), pg. 45.
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"Agency theory predicts that there will be greater divergence between the interests of managers and
shareholders in declining industries than in general. 4
Jensen (1986, 1988) noted that agency theory can be used to explain how and why the interests
of principals (investors) and agents (managers) diverge more in maturing or declining industries.
He argues that the value-driven goals of investors can be incompatible as shown in Error!
Reference source not found. below.
"Jensen (1988) suggests that the growth-oriented goals of managers during phases of industry growth
are compatible with shareholder goals because the opportunities in the industry simultaneously
address shareholder wealth maximization and revenue maximization (the latter is one of the more
important managerial motives). However, in the decline phase of the industry, these goals are
incompatible. Managers would still like to enlarge the firm or reduce risk through diversification,
whereas shareholders would rather let the firm shrink so that they can reinvest the capital in better
opportunities. Hence, managers may be biased in favor of diversification-oriented acquisitions in the
decline and mature stages of a business because such acquisitions represent a feasible path toward
growth in such environments. "4'
Chandler (1977) argues for the evolution of investor-management relationships as firms grow
and evolve. He notes the transition from personal enterprise to family capitalism to financial
capitalism to managerial capitalism. 842
Figure 244: Investor Disintegration in Maturing Industries
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Environment
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Decreasing rates of growth
create principal-agent problems
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"By conservative estimates, 10 percent of the invested capital in industrialized countries is in
industries that are suffering a decline in demand. "'84
840 Anand, J. and Singh, H. (1997), pg. 100. They cite agency theorists in Amihud and Lev (1981) and Jensen
(1986).
841 Anand, J. and Singh, H. (1997), pg. 101. They cite agency theorists in Jensen (1988).
842 As cited in Putterman and Kroszner (1996), pg. 83.
83 Anand, J. and Singh, H. (1997), pg. 99. They cite Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990).
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6.2.1.3 Life Cycle of Strategic Management Theories
This framework posits that the dominant theories in strategic management literature would
reflect the state of evolution of most major industries of the time.
6.2.1.3.1 Externally-focused SCP
This framework posits that as the majority of industries in the dominant region where strategic
management research was being undertaken - i.e. the US - was experiencing a boom of mass
production from the 1920's to the 1960's the strategic management literature reflected this
industrial phenomenon. As such exogenous industry structural variables would seem particularly
relevant. The Industrial Organization school (Mason,1939; Bain, 1959) reflected this external
view of structural variables.
6.2.1.3.2 Internally-focused RBV
Additionally, this framework posits that as the majority of industries in the dominant region
where strategic management research was being undertaken - i.e. the US - was experiencing a
saturation of the mass production markets from 1960's onwards, the strategic management
literature reflected this industrial phenomenon.
As the focus was then on growth in firms and/or industries experiencing limited rates of growth,
productivity would then be more important. Economies of scope would replace economies of
scale in such industries. Learning and the internal capabilities of the firm would begin to
dominate the external strategy schools. The Resource-Based View which initially began with
Penrose in 1959 was largely ignored until the mid-1980's (Wernerfelt, 1984).
"The question I wanted to answer was whether there was something inherent in the very nature of the
firm that both promoted its growth and necessarily limited its rate of growtk.' "
From Penrose's most fundamental question, one can infer that she was studying a firm that while
growing, its rate of growth was slowing down. In graphical terms, this is a firm in the later
stages of its "S-curve".
If a firm's rate of growth is in some way limited by the carrying capacity of the firm's
environment, then one might posit that Penrose was studying a firm in the later, maturing stages
of its development. It turns out that Penrose's classic 1959 book was based on the study of one
firm, The Hercules Powder Company, a commodity materials company, which in 1959 could be
demonstrated to be in the maturing stages of its industry.
This posited evolution of strategic management theoretical focus may have mapped
approximately to the evolution of major US industries as shown in Figure 245 below.
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Figure 245: Life Cycle of Strategic Management Theories
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6.2.2 Sociology and Organizational Theories
6.2.2.1 Environmental Descriptions
Sociologists and organizational theorists have long characterized the environment within which
firms operate, as they have established the environment as a source of critical contingencies with
respect to firm performance. The following summarizes some of the most influential in order to
situate their theories within the proposed framework.
6.2.2.1.1 Six Dimensions (Aldrich)
"Use of a single dimension of an industry's environment to build theory and to test proposed
relationships empirically may result in a failure to investigate alternative plausible explanations of
observed relationships. "845
Population ecologists have long identified multiple "dimensions" for characterization of the
environment (e.g. Aldrich, 1979, pp. 63-74), the most common of which include:
* Environmental Capacity
* Environmental Homogeneity-Heterogeneity
* Environmental Stability-Instability
* Environmental Concentration-Dispersion
* Domain Consensus- Dissensus
* Turbulence
Other organizational theorists have combined these dimensions into various descriptors of the
environment as will be seen below.
6.2.2.1.2 Four Causal Textures (Emery & Trist)
Emery and Trist (1965) identified four 'ideal types' of causal texture, which are briefly
summarized below and interpreted within the context of the industry life-cycle S-curve in Figure
246 below.
"Together, the four types may be said to form a series in which the degree of causal texturing is
increased. ,"846
6.2.2.1.2.1 Step #1: Placid, Randomized
The economist's "classical market" corresponds to this type. The firm can be though of as
entrepreneurial.
6.2.2.1.2.2 Step #2: Placid, Clustered
845 Dess, G.G., Ireland, R.D., and Hitt, M.A. (1990), pg. 16.
46 Emery and Trist (1965), pg. 23.
"Organizations tend to grow in size and also to become more hierarchical, with a tendency towards
centralized control and co-ordination. ,'47
The economist's "imperfect competition" corresponds to this type.
6.2.2.1.2.3 Step #3: Disturbed-Reactive
The economist's "oligopolic market" corresponds to this type.
important.
Strategic interaction is now
6.2.2.1.2.4 Step #4: Turbulent Fields
"The dynamic properties arise not simply from the interaction of the component organizations, but
also from the field itself The 'ground' is in motion. '48
Note that other researchers speak of discontinuity. Abernathy et al. (1983) speaks
"de-maturity".
of industrial
Figure 246: Four Causal Textures and the Industry Life Cycle
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847 Emery and Trist (1965), pg. 23.
48 Emery and Trist (1965), pg. 24.
I
6.2.2.1.3 Three Dimensions (Dess & Beard)
Aldrich (1979) defined the environment using six dimensions: geographic concentration and
heterogeneity, stability and turbulence, and domain consensus and capacity. In a subsequent
influential paper, Dess and Beard (1984) condensed these dimensions to three: munificence,
dynamism and complexity. 849
6.2.2.1.3.1 Munificence
Environmental munificence is the scarcity or abundance of resources (e.g. demand) in a given
environment. It represents the extent to which the environment can support sustained growth
(Starbuck, 1976). In the language of system dynamics, environmental munificence can be
considered as environmental "carrying capacity", which may or may not be constant over time.
High environmental munificence creates favorable supply-demand tradeoffs and therefore makes
it easier for firms to survive, perform successfully or create profit (Hart and Banbury, 1994).
Poorly managed firms can still survive and create profits, discouraging their efficiency levels or
improvement capabilities.
Conversely, low environmental munificence makes it harder for firms to perform successfully
and therefore forces firms to make more frequent adjustments to access resources from the
environment (Koberg, 1987).
"In a high-growth period, productivity can be raised by anyone. But how many can attain it during
the more difficult circumstances induced by low-growth rate? This is the deciding factor in the
success or failure of an enterprise. " 850
Lean competitors based on integral enterprise architectures tend to make frequent or continuous
incremental "kaizen" improvements in response to a mature, saturated anti-munificent
environment. The are well-suited to their harsh environment like a cactus in the desert.
6.2.2.1.3.2 Dynamism
Environmental dynamism is the level of change or rate of volatility in the environment. More
precisely, it is the extent to which such change is unpredictable (Dess and Beard, 1984). An
environment having a high level of dynamism has also been described as "unstable" (Mintzberg,
1990).
Note: from a system dynamics perspective, this instablilty mathematically corresponds to
dominant positive feedback generating exponential growth or decline.
849 Environmental "dynamism" and "complexity" are often combined under the concept of environmental
"uncertainty".
s50 Ohno, T. (1978), pg. 114.
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6.2.2.1.3.3 Complexity
Environmental complexity is the number and diversity of "forces" (e.g. stakeholders) with which
interaction is required, and the extent to which an organization must have sophisticated
knowledge about customers, competitors etc. (Aldrich, 1979).
"The environmental contexts in which organizations exist are themselves changing, at an increasing
rate, and towards increasing complexity. This point, in itself scarcely needs labouring.'"
This research posits that environments with high environmental complexity tend to exhibit more
boundedly rational behavior (March and Simon, 1958), and therefore present opportunities for
integral enterprise architectures to develop.
6.2.2.1.3.4 Discussion
When considering the trajectories of the three dimensions of an organizational environment, it is
clear that they have opposite levels (Castrogiovanni, 1996), as shown in Figure 247 below.
Figure 247: Trajectories of the Three Dimensions of Organizational Environments
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One can then begin to map these three dimensions of organizational environment onto the
industry life-cycle S-curve. As shown in Figure 248 below, emerging industries tend to exhibit
high levels of environmental munificence and dynamism and low levels of complexity, while
conversely, maturing industries tend to exhibit low levels of environmental munificence and
dynamism and high levels of complexity.
Figure 248: Three Dimensions of Organizational Environment & the Industry Life-Cycle
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6.2.2.1.4 Two Dimensions (Bums & Stalker)
In their classic exposition on Contingency Theory, Bums & Stalker (1961) describe the
environment as different rates of change in technical or market variables.
"These extrinsic factors are all, in our view, identifiable as different rates of technical or market
change. By change we mean the appearance of novelties: i.e. new scientific discoveries or technical
inventions, and requirements for products of a kind not previously available or demanded. "82
Burns and Stalker (1961) conceived of their two characterizations of the environment via
observing empirically the technical and market conditions for electronics during World War II,
which they called "stable", and those conditions after the war, which they called
"unstable".
"When novelty and unfamiliarity in both market situation and technical information become the
accepted order of things, a fundamentally different kind of management system be comes appropriate
from that which applies to a relatively stable commercial and technical environment. " 5
6.2.2.1.5 Three Dimensions (Chandler)
Chandler (1962) also conceded that different environmental conditions demanded different
(strategies and therefore) structures. These conditions were characterized as the rate of
environmental change in technology, markets and supply.
"As long as an enterprise belonged in an industry whose markets, sources of raw materials and
production processes remained relatively unchanged, few entrepreneurial decisions had to be reached
In that situation, such a weakness was not critical, but where technology, markets and sources of
supply were changing rapidly, the defects of such a structure became more obvious. "s854
6.2.2.1.6 Two Dimensions (Lawrence & Lorsch)
In their classic exposition on Contingency Theory, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, pg. 157)
describe two external variables: certainty and diversity of the environment.
6.2.2.1.6.1 Certainty (Dynamic-Stable)
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, pg. 151-152) describe environmental certainty as either dynamic
(i.e. uncertain or unstable) or stable (i.e. certain). Their empirical sample covered three
different industrial environments: plastics, packaged foods and standardized containers, ranging
from most dynamic to most stable. The following excerpt illustrates their definition of a stable
environment.
"One important consideration was to select industries with slower rates of environmental change. We
therefore sought one industry whose rates of growth and change were very slow... the most stable
852 Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. (1961), pg. 96.
853 Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. (1961), pg. vii.
854 Chandler, A. (1962), pg. 41.
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environment. Here the rate of sales increase was only slightly higher than the growth in national
population. "55
6.2.2.1.6.2 Diversity (Diverse-Homogeneous)
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, pg. 151-152) describe environmental diversity as either diverse
(heterogeneous) or homogenous. The following excerpt illustrates their definition of a
homogeneous environment.
"Even more important, no significant new products had been introduced in the past 20 years. 4"856
6.2.2.1.6.3 Critique
It appears that Lawrence and Lorsch's two characterizations of the environment - i.e. certainty
(or stability) and diversity (or heterogeneity) correspond roughly to the two dimensions in this
research (i.e. quantity and quality).
It also appears that these two external variables are meant to be used together, and therefore
define the "diagonal" states where dynamic (unstable) and diverse (heterogeneous), or stable and
homogeneous go hand in hand. It is not clear if they intended to cover the "off-diagonal" cases
of dynamic (unstable) and homogeneous or stable and diverse (heterogeneous). In a similar way,
the two external variables used in this research are meant to be used together although not
necessarily coincident temporally. Therefore the rate of change in quantity of output has similar
mapping to the rate of change in quality of output.
It is very important to note however that (unlike this research), Lawrence and Lorsch do not
appear to posit a continuous evolution between the two different environmental states, e.g. that
dynamic/diverse environments precede stable/homogeneous environments in the typical S-curve
of environmental development.
6.2.2.1.7 Environmental Uncertainty
While Aldrich (1979) and Dess (1984) have focused on six and three dimensions respectively
characterizing the environment, other researchers have combined these and other variables into a
notion of environmental uncertainty. Some researchers have combined Dess' environmental
"dynamism" and "complexity" into the concept of environmental "uncertainty".
"Uncertainty appears as the fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping with
uncertainty, as the essence of the administrative process. ,"857
Anderson and Tushman (2001) observed empirically the mortality rates of firms in longitudinal
studies of two industries.8 8 Instead of using Dess' three dimensions of munificence, dynamism
and complexity, they used the three dimensions of munificence, uncertainty and complexity and
g" Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. (1967a), pg. 85.
856 Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. (1967a), pg. 85.
857 Thompson, J.D. (1967), pg. 159.
858 The industries were the US cement industry (1888-1980) and the minicomputer industry (1958-1982).
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found that uncertainty is the key dimension which determines organizational mortality. While
firms can slowly adapt to changes in environmental munificence and complexity, it is rather
more difficult to respond quickly to unpredictable changes in the quantity and quality of demand.
Moberg and Koch (1975, pg. 115) observe that such a contingency variable as environmental
uncertainty has been operationalized in many different ways: Dill (1958) uses "homogeneous-
heterogeneous", Thompson (1967) uses "stable-shifting" and Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) use
"clarity of environment related information", "degree of certainty of cause-effect relationships"
and "time span of definitive feedback."
6.2.2.1.8 Rates of Environmental Change
"Perhaps the most ubiquitous force leading to structural change is a change in the long-run industry
growth rate. Industry growth is a key variable in determining the intensity of rivalry in the
industry. 8 59
Various researchers in fields ranging from economics to sociology - specifically, strategy
(Porter, 1980; Levinthal and Myatt, 1995) and organizational theory (Bums and Stalker, 1961;
Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a) - have argued that the rates of change of the
environment impact the development of organizations. These have typically been applied to
technological and market changes.
"Perhaps the most basic attribute of the markets and customers served that will impact the
development of the firm 's capabilities is their growth rate. Is the firm serving customers and market
segments that are growing rapidly and thereby can provide a rich experience base for the firm?
Similarly, consider the co-evolution of a firm 's capabilities when the industry is in decline. As
markets shrink, so does reinvestment in equipment. This yields a vintage effect on the firm's
production capabilities. ,s86
Researchers (e.g. Levinthal and Myatt, 1994) have posited the beneficial effects of positive
feedback in the generation of capabilities, and thus identify the underlying growth rate of markets
as a driver of success. It is interesting to note that this point of view is valid for modular
enterprise architectures as "market makers" in growing markets, while it is also valid for integral
enterprise architectures as "market takers" who grow by taking market share off incumbents and
therefore build capabilities, even when underlying growth rates of markets are low.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, pg. 19) focus on the rates of technological change in both products
and processes.
Chandler (1962), as reported in Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, pg. 197-198), focuses on rates of
change in "technology, markets, and sources of supply".
Bums and Stalker (1961), as reported in Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, pg. 187), focus on "rates
of change in the scientific techniques and markets".
859 Porter, M.E. (1980), pg. 164.
0 Levinthal, D. and Myatt, J. (1994), pg. 48.
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6.2.2.2 Theories of Firm Evolution
Organizational researchers have long posited theories of firm evolution: Scott (1971), Greiner
(1972) in Van de Ven, (1992).
6.2.2.3 Open Systems Theory
"The environment sets conditions that help shape the organization even as the organization shapes
and influences its environment. "'86
One of the most fundamental theoretical assumptions used is that of firms as open systems. A
considerable amount of open systems theories have proliferated, some of the most noteworthy
include: structural contingency theory (Bums and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Thompson,
1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), institutional theory (Selznick, 1957), population ecology
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984), economic theories of organizations (e.g. transaction cost
economics), resource dependence theory, and network theory.
"There is no one best way to organize...any way of organizing is not equally effective. ,63
Heuristic 3a:
The enterprise performance is contingent upon: the environment's evolutionary state, the
architectural form (i.e. its effectiveness), and the structural dynamics (i.e. its efficiency).
Contingency theorists Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), highlight the opposing forces of
differentiation and integration. Other organization theorists (Scott, 2002) introduce the notions
rational and natural systems. The rational (differentiation) perspective sees conflict as
something unhealthy to be resolved, while the natural (integration) sees conflict as part of the
healthy negotiation process of attaining consensus. These support the following propositions:
Heuristic 3b:
The modular enterprise architecture is based primarily on diferentiation and rational
optimization. The integral enterprise architecture is based primarily on integration and natural
compromise8 .
6.2.2.4 Structural Contingency Theory
Structural contingency theory has been an important mode of explanation of firm performance in
the organizational theory literature using context-structure-performance relationships.
One of the important contributions of structural contingency theory is the notion of "fitness" of
an organization with its environment. Not only does Van de Ven (1979) enumerate four
861 Lawrence and Dyer (1983), pg. 295.
862 As noted in Smelsner and Swedborg (1994), pg. 537.
863 Galbraith, J. (1973).
864 Simon referred to cognitive global suboptimization as "satisficing".
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different conceptual definitions of "fit, he also (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985), considers three
different notions of "fitness".
"Recently a systems approach to contingency theoty has emerged. Advocates of this approach assert
that the understanding of context-structure performance relationships can only advance by
addressing simultaneously the many contingencies, structural alternatives and performance criteria
that must be considered holistically to understand organization design. "865
6.2.2.5 Population (Organizational) Ecology
Within the field of sociology, population ecology explores the evolution (i.e. the birth, growth
and death rates) of populations of firms.
"Organizational ecology, unlike strategic management or industrial organization economics, models
competition as an explicitly dynamic phenomenon. Ecologists see competition and environmental
characteristics as having an interactive effect on the success of a given strategic approach.' 866
Boeker (1991) notes that strategic management researchers have classified strategy
typologies/taxonomies in much the same was as organizational ecology researchers have
classified organizational forms typologies/taxonomies.
6.2.2.5.1 Natural Selection
Selection works best in a static population, and is disguised by rapid growth of the population.867
6.2.2.5.2 Structural Inertia
Hannan and Freeman (1977 & 1984) notably espoused the contruct of structural inertia, which
inhibits organizational change. They do not claim that adaptation does not occur, but that it
merely occurs at rates that are slower than the demands from the environment.
6.2.2.5.3 Co-Evolutionary Dynamics
Recently, a proliferation of research on the co-evolution of firm and environment has come out
of the "Rotterdam school" Volberda and Lewin (2003).
6.2.2.6 Structuration
An enterprise architecture is a socially-enacted structure which simultaneously and recursively
enables and constrains, but does not determine human action. This duality of structure is called
"structuration" by its proponents (Giddens, 1979; Whittington, 1992; Yates, 1997).
"Giddens resists post-modernist pessimism as to the possibility of humanly engineered progress.
Nevertheless, he concedes that control within an organization is unlikely to be complete. , 68
865 Drazin and Van de Ven (1985), pg. 519.
866 Boeker, W. (1991), pg. 614.
867 The Economist, December 24h 2005, pg. 12 of "A Survey of Human Evolution".
868 Whittington, R. (1992), pp. 695.
6.2.3 Technology and Innovation Theories
6.2.3.1 Product Life Cycle
"Organisms are depicted as proceeding through distinct cycles in their lijf as they age (Bonner, 1993,
pp. 15-35). Can the same be said for industries? Is it meaningful to talk, as has been done, about a
product life cycle that captures the way many industries evolve? If so, what are the characteristics of
this life cycle? " 869
Product life cycles were postulated more than fifty years ago by a variety of authors including
Dean (1950), Levitt (1965), Vernon (1966), Cox (1967) as a means for firms to exploit
deterministic continuity of industrial evolution to their advantage.
6.2.3.2 Industry Life Cycle
The industry life-cycle gained acceptance in strategic management as a dominant model for
analyzing the external environment as a dynamic extension of Porter's (1980) five forces
model.870  Both were derived from the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm of the
Industrial Organization (IO) economics tradition.
6.2.3.3 Technological Discontinuities
[Technological discontinuities] "...command a decisive cost or quality advantage that strike not at the
margins of the profits and the outputs of existing firms, but at their foundations and their very
lives. "81
Like Schumpeter before them, researchers Tushman and Anderson focused on the technological
aspects of the organization's environment as a key determinant of environmental change. They
authored two influential papers (briefly discussed below) which define technological
discontinuities and their relationship to the other key punctuating event in the evolution of a
technology, the dominant design.
"Discontinuities predictably affect environmental uncertainty, munificence, and organizational
growth rates. "872
Tushman and Anderson (1986) noted that major technological breakthroughs or "discontinuities"
increase both environmental uncertainty and munificence. They noted that such discontinuities
can both enhance and destroy firm competence, with new firms (challengers) typically initiating
competence-destroying discontinuities which have increased environmental turbulence (or
uncertainty) and existing firms (incumbents) typically initiating competence-enhancing
"discontinuities" which have decreased environmental turbulence (or uncertainty).
869 Klepper, S. (1997), pg. 145.
870 Farjoun, M. (2002), pp. 565.
871 Schumpeter, J. (1942), pg. 84.
872 Anderson, P. and Tushman, M.L. (1990), pg. 606.
More recently, Anderson and Tushman (1990) further clarify, refine, develop and extend their
concepts of technological discontinuities, particularly with vis ia vis dominant designs, in their
cyclical model of technological change.
"Technological discontinuities (innovations that dramatically advance an industry's price vs.
performance frontier) trigger a period of ferment that is closed by the emergence of a dominant
design. A period of incremental technical change then follows, which is, in turn, broken by the next
technological discontinuity. "73
Furthermore, they began to quantify further relationships, namely:
"Sales always peak after a dominant design emerges. Discontinuities never become dominant
designs, and dominant designs lag behind the industry's technical frontier. " 74
From these two complementary pieces of research, one can begin to infer an internally
consistent set of propositions represented in Figure 249 below.
Figure 249: Discontinuities and Dominant Designs
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6.2.3.4 Disruptive Technologies
An important endogenous mechanism whereby firm performance feeds back to shape the
industrial evolution is the over-serving existing markets and the subsequent creation of disruptive
innovations (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997).
873 Anderson, P. and Tushman, M.L. (1990), pg. 604.
874 Anderson, P. and Tushman, M.L. (1990), pg. 604.
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6.2.3.5 Dominant Designs (Products)
"Linking technology cycles and dominant designs to organizational architectures and competencies
is a way to get more deeply to the roots of dynamic organizational capabilities. Much exciting
theoretical and empirical work remains in coupling dominant designs and technology cycles to
environmental conditions and organizational evolution. " 75
Research on dominant designs have productive developed this construct for thirty ranging from
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) to Tushman and Murmann (1998).
"We argue that the search for a dynamic theory of strategy and for a link between the product-
market and resource-based views may be incomplete without an explanation qf the evolution of the
technology that underlies products and heterogeneous firm capability. The evolution determines what
kinds of products (low cost, niche or differentiated) can be offered at each stage of evolution. '876
Researchers have demonstrated a life-cycle theory of product and process innovation, with the
establishment of a "dominant design" as the catalyst marking the tipping from one regime to the
other. This literature has evolved through the following theoretical phases:
* Product-Process evolution (Utterback & Aernathy, 1975)877
* Dominant Designs (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978)
* Technological discontinuities & political processes (Tushman & Anderson, 1986)
* Dominant designs on firm entry & exit (Utterback & Suarez, 1993)
The concept of a "dominant design" is itself fluid and evolving. The following for example
summarizes the claims in the automotive industry:
* Ford Model T in 1908 (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978)
* GM's Automatic transmission in 1940 (Abemathy, Clark & Kantrow, 1983, pg. 115)
* Dodge all-steel closed body in 1923 (Utterback & Suarez, 1993)
* Ford Model T in 1908 (Klepper & Simons, 1997)878
Attempts have been made recently to numerically model the interactions between products and
processes (Milling and Strumpfe, 2000), albeit over relatively short time horizions, and not over
the evolution of industries.
Table 19 below summarizes some of the research in this space.
875 Tushman, M. and Murmann (1998).
876 Afuah and Utterback (1997), pg. 184.
877 Note that product & process innovation was typically measured by number of innovations ("transilience") and
note level of product or process performance.878 Kepper and Simons (1997) pg. 448 noted a potential error in Utterback & Suarez's dataset.
Table 19: Chronological Research in Dominant Designs
Year Citation Empirical Basis NoteW
1966 Fabris (PhD US Auto. Empirical basis of product innovationa and demography
dissertation) for much of Abernathy-Utterback research.
1974 Utterback (paper) -- Presents a model of product evolution: performance-
maximization, sales-maximization & cost minimization
1975 Abernathy & Townsend -- Presents a model of process evolution; uncoordinated,
(paper) segmental, and systemic.
1975 Utterback & 5 industries in 120 Model of product and process evolution. ("Rate of
Abernathy (paper) firms (Myers & innovation" means number of innovations, not product
Marquis) performance). No mention of "Dominant Design".
1978 Abernathy US Auto.
(Productivity Dilemma)
1978 Abernathy & Electric light "Dominant Design" mentioned for the first time.
Utterback (paper) bulb, auto., Examples given: Model T in 1908 and DC-3 in 1935.
airplane Three phases identified: Fluid, Transitional & Specific.
1983 Abernathy, Clark & US Auto. (see "Dominant Design" term used, but not explained.
Kantrow (Industrial Appendix D) "Transilience" used to define competitive effects of
Rennaissance) (pp. technology. "Revolutionary change with the closed steel
109-118) body in the mid-1920's... in the 1940s, the dominant
design was completed"
1985 Abernathy & Clark US Auto. Summary of 1983 book. 1908 Model T 4 1913 moving
(paper) line - 1923 closed steel body - 1965 sports car.
1986 Tushman & Anderson Minicomputers, Dominant design (e.g. Model T in 1908) creation as a
(paper) Cement, Airlines technological discontinuity emerging from a political
process.
1988 Butler (paper) 747 airplane
1990 Anderson & Tushman Minicomputers,
(paper) Cement, Glass
1993 Utterback & Suarez Typrwriter, Auto., For auto. industry, Fabris data, dominant design in 1923
(paper) TV, TV tubes, with peak number of firms.
Transistor, IC,
Calculator,
Supercomputer
1994 Utterback (Dynamics of Assembled & "The (1923) Dodge all-steel closed body became the
Innovation) (pp. 34-37) Non-Assembled dominant design for the auto body..."
1995 Suarez & Utterback Typrwriter, Auto., Explicit reference to population ecology.
(paper) TV, TV tubes,
Transistor, IC,
Calculator,
Supercomputer
1995 Nelson (paper) -- Explores "dominant designs" as an outcome of "dynamic
increasing returns".
1996 Klepper (paper) -- Math model that supports the Abernathy-Utterback
hypothesis.
1997 Afuah & Utterback -- Applies strategy (IO and RBV) theories to dominant
(paper) designs.
1997 Klepper (ICC paper) US Automotive Transilience revisited for product and process innovation.
Data show a peak in firm no. in 1908.
1997 Klepper & Simons Autos., Tires, Generalizes Klepper's 1997 paper to 4 industries.
(82 page ICC paper) TVs, Penecillin
1998 Christensen, Suarez & Rigid Disc Drive
Utterback (paper)
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1998 Mazzucato (paper) US Auto. Their data show a peak in firm no. in 1908.
1998 Windrum & -- Dominant designs emerge in niche markets.
Birchenhall (paper)
1999 Mazzucato & Semmler US Auto. Effect on share price volatility
(paper)
2003 Simmons (paper) US Auto. Their data seems to match Mazzucato (1908 peak)
2006 Murmann & Frenken -- Summarize theory on Dominant Designs and integrate
(paper) Architectural/Modularity theory.
6.3 Industrial Evolution
"The desired dynamic characteristics of the management structure depend on the kind of markets, rate
of technological change, and the other characteristics of the industry. Different organizational forms
are seen to favor different classes of products. The management attitudes that work well in one
situation falter in another because the life cycle of the product is longer or shorter, the ratios of the
times needed to develop a product in comparison with the time for putting it into production are
different, or the market is more sensitive to certain of its characteristics and less sensitive to
others. "879
The final construct shown in Figure 250, the industry life-cycle (or S-curve)880 has its theoretical
underpinnings in the following literatures: the management of technology (Utterback, 1994),
evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1991), organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989)
and strategic management theory (Porter, 1980). 81 It is used to help describe and understand the
longitudinal, evolutionary nature of the forces driving the dynamics of industrial evolution.
Figure 250: Industrial/Ecosystem Evolutionary Dynamics
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Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argued that the amount of uncertainty, and the rate of change88 2 of
an environment impacts the development of the internal structure of the organization. From the
879 Forrester, J. (1961), pg. 329.
880 Also known mathematically as the "logistic" function based on the Lotka-Volterra model.
88' As described in Agarwal, Sarkar, and Echambadi, R., 2002.
"2 Note that 'rates of change" can refer to the industry quantitatively (i.e. amount of industrial output and
qualitatively (type of industrial output).
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stylized S-curve of industrial output, it can be seen that rates of change in quantitative output
increase up to the dominant design, and diminish thereafter. Uncertainty, however in the
qualitative output (i.e. when will the dominant design emerge, and what will it be? or when will
the discontinuity emerge, and what will it be?) decrease up to the dominant design and increase
thereafter.
"To cope with these various environments, organizations.., have differing structural
features... including planning time horizon.' 3
While the dynamics of industrial consolidation or shakeout can arise from a number of
exogenous sources including technological, regulatory and geographic discontinuities, this
research focuses on the traditional Schumpeterian technological discontinuity as the primary
driving force behind industrial shakeout.
While the population ecologists have theorized and demonstrated that the success rate of new
entrants diminishes as the industry matures along its life-cycle, and the total number of firms
diminishes during a "shake-out", this theory suggests a nuanced observation:
Heuristic 3c:
While the success rate of new entrants into a post-dominant design industry may be diminished,
it is likely that these new entrants possess the modular enterprise architectures of the incumbents.
Those few who survive are likely to have an integral enterprise architecture, which will
significantly challenge the incumbent modular architectures. Therefore incumbent inertia, once
thought to be a strength in selection, is now a potential weakness.8"
"Rumours of the death of the old-style big businesses are greatly exaggerated...big old businesses
have great staying power. '88'
"Very often the individual companies in an industry are similar. The conspicuous manifestations are
those of the industry as a whole rather than those uniquely marking one company. Other industries
are characterized by the evident differences between the companies, but this is more apt to be in the
earlier parts of the life cycle of an industry. In the older more mature industries we often find
similarity of companies, a rather highly competitive environment, and often a marked degree of
industry instability. ,86
883 Scott, R. (2002), pg. 89.
884 It is important to note that due to "survivor bias", the number of integral enterprises born pre-dominant product
design is unknown, due to their hypothesized early mortality.
8 5 Whittington and Mayer (2000), pg. 49.
886 Forrester, J. (1961), pp. 340.
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6.3.1 Industry Maturity Assessment Metrics
Recall that population ecologists have long identified multiple "dimensions" for characterization
of the environment (e.g. Aldrich, 1979, pp. 63-74), the most common of which include:
* Environmental Capacity
* Environmental Homogeneity-Heterogeneity
* Environmental Stability-Instability
* Environmental Concentration-Dispersion
* Domain Consensus- Dissensus
* Turbulence
6.3.1.1 Environmental Capacity
"... those firms that possess more skill and/or luck in anticipating changes in demand and technology
will be able to earn above average profits (Kirzner, 1973). 87
When characterizing the evolutionary state of the industry, this research will adopt multiple
dimensions, in an effort to ensure greater internal validity. Two exogenous variables will be
discussed herein: the ecosystem carrying capacities in terms of quantity (e.g. demand or
population size of consumers) and quality (e.g. ability of consumers to absorb technological
innovation. The existencs of these exogenous variables, define logistic growth functions or S-
curves which define the growth trajectories of the industry life-cycle summarized in Figure 251
below.
More importantly, the rates of change of these two S-curves will be demonstrated to define key
dynamics in the evolution of business ecosystems.
Figure 251: Dual S-Curves (tight-coupling assumption)
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The depiction of the above figure may imply that as industries evolve, their quantity and quality
grow and mature at identical rates, i.e. that there is tight-coupling between these two
environmental variables relating to carrying capacity. However, in order to present a more
generalizable framework, one must allow the two sub-dimensions to uncouple as is summarized
in Figure 252 below, which is characteristic of mature commodities.
Figure 252: Dual S-Curves (loose-coupling) Quality precedes Quantity
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Another example of such loose-coupling of the quantity-quality space is illustrated in Figure 253
below, where the quantity diverges before full-exploitation of the quality space, due to say, the
invasion of a disruptive new innovation.
Figure 253: Dual S-Curves (loose-coupling) Quantity precedes Quality
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6.3.1.1.1 Quantity of Output
By way of example from the airline industry, empirical data shown in Figure 254 below shows
the state of maturity in quantity space by plotting global available seat kilometers (ASK's) over
time.
Figure 254: Carrying Capacity of the Global Airline Industry
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As can be seen, the carrying capacity is clearly growing, but what is not evident is the rate of
change of growth. For this, we need either the first derivative of the underlying growth, or the
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) to determine if growth is speeding up or slowing down.
Again from Figure 255 below, we can see that the industry is growing but at a decreasing rate,
apparently converging toward a long-term growth rate in global GDP.
888 Note, the significant increase in global ASK CAGR that occurred in the late 1960's is due to the extremely high
production of new jet aircraft, relative to the small stock of jets in existence at the time. In other words, the
temporary technological emergence of the "jet age."
Figure 255: Rate of Change of Carrying Capacity of the Global Airline Industry
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6.3.1.1.2 Quality of Output
Although the quality of output tends to grow as industries evolve, the rate of change of output
quality tends to go from fast to slow, which can be modeled as logistic growth.
"Sahal (1981, pg. 32) noted that... once a branch of industry is established, the core technology on
which it was jbounded remains largely unchanged. Modifications that are made tend to be, fiom a
design standpoint, only incremental, even if thay are highly significant improvements from a cost
standpoint. Sahal cites as examples the farm tractor, airplane, and electric motor industries, all of
which rely on core technologies introduced over a half century ago. These technologies have
undergone a great deal of cost improvements since then, but such progress has occurred only through
a gradual refinement of essentially invariant patterns of design. Moreover, as Kuznets (1930) and
others have noted, gradual modifications and improvements in a given basic form of technology can
only go so far. The marginal returns of further innovative advances inevitably decrease as their
marginal costs increase. The development of a technology eventually reaches certain dead ends, with
little prospect for firther advances in its capability. "889
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6.4 Evolution of Population Density: Firm Entry and Exit
From the previous section, growth rates (in both quantity and quality) are deemed to be
important in defining the state of the environment. There is also considerable empirical
evidcence to suggest that such variables are important in defining firm entry and exit, as well as
their inherent birth and death rates.
"Industry profitability does not seem to have any significant effect on entry and exit, which are
instead positively correlated with industry growth. ',890
Figure 256 below illustrates the population density in the large commercial airplane industry.
Note that Airbus, entered the market long after the consolidation process began.
Figure 256: Population Density in the Large Commercial Airplane Industry
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89m Dosi, G., Malerba, F., Marsili, O., Orsenigo, L. (1997), pp. 7-8.
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Figure 257 below illustrates the population density in the automotive industry. Note that Toyota,
entered the market long after the consolidation process began.
Figure 257: Population Density in the Automotive Industry
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Figure 258 below illustrates the population density in the automotive industry. Note that
Southwest, entered the market long after the consolidation process began.
Figure 258: Population Density in the US Airline Industry
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Much empirical data from population ecologists demonstrate that late entrants have high
mortality rates. The research in this dissertation empirically demonstrates that late entrants of a
different species not only have low mortality rates, but they go on to dominate the market. These
K-strategists enter late into maturing environments, having lower rates of growth in market and
technology space. In this sense this research is not about population ecology, but about
community ecology, as shown in Figure 259 below.
Figure 259: Conceptual Population Densities
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Finally, by applying the theoretical framework, we can compare the environmental maturity in
quanitiy and quality space with population densities, mass densities as shown in Figure 260
below.
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6.5 Evolution of "Landscapes"
Fitness landscapes evolve over time from rugged, multi-peak to smooth, single-peak, and back to
rugged, multi-peak. Due to the complex interdependencies associated with integral architectures,
these correspond to integral, modular and integral enterprise architectures.
Figure 261 below shows the two-phase equivalent, whereby landscape smoothness is increasing
with each time-step in the first phase, and subsequently landscape smoothness is decreasing with
each time-step in the second phase.
Figure 261: Evolution of Landscapes
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6.6 Evolution of Dominant Factor of Production
As can be seen in Figure 262 below, the environment defines the dominant factor of production
in the extended enterprise. In the growth phase of the industrial evolution, the capital markets
are the dominant factor of production where the focus is on quickly building capacity.
Conversely, in the maturity phase, the labor markets are the dominant factor of production,
where the focus is on slowly growing capability.
It is important to note that this implies that the firm objective function or "teleological pull"
changes, with dramatic implications on enterprise form, structure and behavior.
Figure 262: Evolution of Dominant Factor ofProduction
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6.6.1 Traditional capitalism
"This period [the 1980s] also corresponded to the growing numbers and power of institutional
investors and the declining numbers and power of trade unions. Capital became more important
than labor, whether in the public mind or the productivity equation. "891
"Practically speaking, the change in climate for American corporate executives started in the mid-
1980s, due to an extraordinaty wave of hostile take-over bids, in which profitable companies, such as
Gillette and Disney, were targeted by raiders who thought that these companies could be even more
profitable in their hands (Ward, 1997). The message to corporate executives was stunningly clear:
'Your days of satisficing are over; from now on, you must maximize. If you don't we will.' At the
same time, institutional investors held larger shares of major companies (Useem, 1996), and these
powerful owners exerted more pressure for financial performance. "
6.6.2 Human capitalism
"A growing body of scholarly research shows the relationship between profitability and the good
treatment of employees and customers or between financial success over time and an emphasis on all
stakeholders. "8"
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891 Kanter, R.M. (2005), pg. 94.
892 Hambrick, D.C. (2005), pg. 106.
893 Kanter, R.M. (2005), pg. 95.
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6.7 Evolution of Dominant Production Strategy
Researchers (Poire and Sabel, 1984; Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990) have posited the evolution
of dominant production strategies: ranging from craft to mass to lean production. This can be
mapped onto the industrial S-curve as shown in Figure 263 below in order to posit that rates of
growth enable and constrain certain production technologies.
Figure 263: Evolution of Dominant Production Strategy
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6.7.1 Craft production
Here product innovation is important which requires experimentation and close collaboration
with manufacturing. As innovation is best served by integral organizational structures, one
would expect to see integral internal design-produce functions as well as integral enterprise
architectures.
6.7.2 Mass production
"Mass production is, in fact, a system ideally suited to the survival of large enterprises in a highly
cyclical economy. Both workers and suppliers are considered variable costs. The problem with the
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American pattern is that it is extremely corrosive to the vital personal relationships at the core of any
production process. "894
Here rapidly ramping up production capacity in order to access mass markets is important. This
requires economies of scale in production, and a clear division of labor internally between the
design-produce functions as well as modular enterprise architectures.
6.7.3 Lean production
Here process innovation is important which requires experimentation and close collaboration
with manufacturing (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990). Like craft production, as innovation is
best served by integral organizational structures, one would expect to see integral internal
design-produce functions as well as integral enterprise architectures.
894 Womack, Jones and Roos (1990), pp. 247-248.
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6.8 Evolution of Dominant Product Strategy (Position)
Miles and Snow's (1978) classic typology identified four different configurations which could
theoretically be equally successful in different environments: defenders, prospectors, analyzers
and reactors. Subsequent researchers, however have identified that different environmental
conditions produce different successful configuration types. Hambrick (1983a) for example
found that defenders consistently outperformed prospectors on profitability and cash flow
metrics in all markets, while prospectors performed better than defenders in market share change
in markets with high product innovation.
Researchers Kim and Lim (1988) found that high-performing differentiators and high-
performing cost-leaders were more likely to compete in different environments. More explicitly,
Miller (1988) found that successful firms pursuing a strategy of differentiation were more likely
to compete in unstable environments, while successful firms pursuing a strategy of cost-
leadership were more likely to compete in stable environments.
As shown in Figure 264 below, this research finding, coupled with the proposition that enterprise
architectures are built to excel at different tasks, helps to explain how firms having different
enterprise architectures will fare in different environmental settings.
Figure 264: Evolution of Dominant Product Strategy
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6.9 Evolution of Dominant Economic Offering
Once a competitive landscape matures, often another is born. Typically, these can take the form
of either complements or substitutes to the original competitive landscape as is shown in Figure
265 below.
Figure 265: Evolution of Complements and Substitutes
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6.9.1 Co-Existence of Complements
Once an S-curve has begun to end, and an existing industry is beginning to decline, a new
growth opportunity exists in the form of complementary products or services. For example,
going from agriculture to manufacturing; or going from manufacturing to services, etc.
6.9.2 Co-Existence of Substitutes
Once an S-curve has begun to end, and an existing industry is beginning to decline, a new form
of competition - substitutes - emerges that does not directly challenge the old (Porter, 1980).
Substitutes exist as competition on a higher level of abstraction. For example, when rail travel
reached market saturation, it was overtaken by another form of indirect competition,
automobiles.
539
6.10 Evolution of Dominant Levels of Cognitive Inertia
As was discussed in essay #2, each form of enterprise architecture is driven by a different level
of managerial cognitive inertia. As shown in
Figure 266 below, it is posited that the state of environmental evolution - i.e. the rate of
environmental change - drives the dominant level of cognitive inertia. Specifically, when the
environment is speeding up, managers must think and act quickly, that is they must have low
cognitive inertia. Conversely, when the environment is slowing down, managers must think and
act more slowly, that is they must have higher levels of cognitive inertia.
Figure 266: Evolution of Dominant Levels of Cognitive Inertia
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6.11 Evolution of Dominant Growth Strategy
"Jensen (1988) suggests that the growth-oriented goals of managers during phases of industry
growth are compatible with shareholder goals because the opportunities in the industry
simultaneously addres shareholder wealth maximization and revenue maximization (the latter is one
of the more important managerial motives). However, in the decline phase of the industry, these goals
are not compatible. Managers would still like to enlarge the firm or reduce risk through
diversification, whereas shareholders would rather let the firm shrink so that they can reinvest the
capital in better opportunities Hence, managers may be biased in favor of diversification-oriented
acquisitions in the decline and mature stages of a business because such acquisitions represent a
feasible path toward growth in such environments. "89i
Here, we examine which species grows organically, when and why. We also examine which
species grows inorganically, when and why.
6.11.1 Organic Growth
Late-entrant integral enterprise enterprise architectures (e.g. Toyota, Southwest and Airbus)
appear to grow organically in their own niche. When they approach the carrying capacity of
their own markets, they largely appear to diversify organically (i.e. without significant M&A
activity). For example, Toyota's current market dominance in the automotive industry comes
after a successful (organic) diversification from another manufacturing sector, textiles (Sako,
2006, pg. 94).
6.11.2 Inorganic Growth (M&A)
We note that moduar enterprise architectures tend to grow inorganically, either to diversify or to
consolidate. The success of these two strategies is dependent upond the maturity of the
environment (Anand and Singh, 1997).
"Our results indicate that consolidation-oriented acquisitions outperform diversification-oriented
acquisitions in the decline phase of their industries in terms of both ex ante (stock market based) and
ex post (operating) performance measures.8'"
When facing a maturing or declining market, a firm and its enterprise is faced with a dilemma:
should it stay (and fight), or should it exit (and take flight) towards an existing market with
higher rates of growth and more favorable competitive dynamics, or even create a new market.
This decision is particularly problematic if a clear integral competitor has begun to grow.
Different enterprise architectures will face this maturing market in different ways. The modular
enterprise (which is built for rapid short-term growth), is faced with the dilemma: is it easier to
change oneself (i.e. re-architect the enterprise architecture towards more integrality) or to change
the environment (i.e. create the next discontinuity)?
'" Anand, J. and Singh, H. (1997), pg. 101.
896 Anand, J. and Singh, H. (1997), pg. 99.
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If the modular enterprise architecture remains in tact with its demands for high short-term growth
rates from the investor stakeholder group, it often grows inorganically via mergers and
acquisitions. 897 As was discussed earlier, agency theory predicts the further "disintegration" of
the relationship between shareholders and managers (principals and agents). The question then
becomes, if growth is to come via acquisition, should one have a strategy of consolidation or
diversification? Consolidation can be thought of as being a proxy for "fighting" (i.e. staying,
maintaining focus on existing markets, attempting re-architecture with stakeholders to enable
long-term focus on cost and productivity, etc.). Diversification can be thought of as being a
proxy for "taking flight" (i.e. maintaining the modular architecture and exiting a low-growth
environment).
As a mature or declining market will tend to have overcapacity, it is necessary for the industry to
extract some competitors. The natural inclination of the ecosystem is to consolidate (as verified
by data from population ecologists who have noted the number of firms fall after the emergence
of a dominant design). One would therefore postulate that modular architectures that "go with
the forces of the ecosystem" and acquire for consolidation in a maturing industry would perform
better than those who do not or even who try to diversify out. In fact, one would expect that
firms attempting to grow via consolidation acquisitions while the industry is pre-dominant
design, while the number of firms entering the industry is still growing would perform worse
than those that do not or that diversify in the hopes of securing what will ultimately be the
dominant design.
"Although firms in declining industries may not have good prospects within their own industry, they
cannot enhance their value by diversifying to escape the unattractiveness of their own industry. "898
These propositions can be summarized as follows and as shown in Figure 267 below.
Heuristic 3d:
In growing industries, modular firms that grow via diversification acquisitions will perform
better than firms who do not, or firms who grow via consolidation acquisitions.
In maturing/declining industries, modular firms that grow via consolidation acquisitions (i.e.
who stay and fight) will perform better than firms who do not, or firms who grow via
diversification acquisitions (i.e. who take flight).
897 The strategic management literature on the value/performance of acquisitions is rich, led by Rumelt (1974).
898 Anand, J. and Singh, H. (1997), pg. 113.
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Figure 267: Diversification and Consolidation Strategies and the Industrial Evolution
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Recent and rare empirical research on strategies in declining industries by Anand
(1997) indicate that for industries in the US defense sector between 1981-1992,
propositions appear to be valid.899
and Singh
the above
In a twenty year study of acquisition policies in a representative declining industry - the US
defense sector between 1978-1996 - Anand and Singh (1997) noted that consolidation oriented
acquisitions outperformed diversification oriented acquisitions, both in terms of ex ante stock
market valuations and ex post operating performance metrics.
This lends some credence to the "fight" stance in the question of "fight or flight" strategies of
incumbent modular architectures that find themselves in harsh environments for which they are
not suited.900
899 It is interesting to note their "inverted" findings: namely given that a firm wants to consolidate, it will be more
successful doing so in a mature/declining industry; while given that a firm wants to diversify, it will also be more
successful in a mature/declining industry, but consolidating will be even more successful in a mature/declining
industry.
900 Hambrick and Schecter (1983) highlight similar findings for "mature industrial-product business units".
543
. ................................ 
6.12 Evolution of Dominant Intra-firm Structure
6.12.1 Mechanistic vs. Organic structure
Much work in contingency theory deals with intra-firm structures which only have indirect
references to a theory of evolution which focuses on continuity, as opposed to discontinuity.
Burns and Stalker (1961) predicated their version of contingency theory not based on a natural
continuous logistic growth model of the technical and commercial environments, but rather on a
model of discontinuous change, which for their empirical dataset arose when the "stable"
environment of World War II supported mechanistic organizational structures, was displaced by
the "unstable" discontinuity of the war ending, producing an organic organizational structure.
As a precursor to the much later organization ecologists (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977), Burns
& Stalker observed that transition of organizational structures between ideal types is difficult:
"The first question is why some concerns - indeed most of those which took part in the studies - did
not change their management system from mechanistic to organic as the general context, technical
and commercial, of their operations changed from relative stability to fairly rapid change. ,,901
In fact, like the entropy proposition generated in this research, in which all enterprise
architectures tend toward dis-integration, Burns & Stalker observed a similar trend:
"A mechanistic system is more economical of the individual's effort. Commitments to the working
organization are more prescribed the closer the approximation to mechanistic form. The tendency is
fobr most individuals to oppose extending such commitments and to try to reduce them, and thus to
exert pressure towards a mechanistic system If conditions are stable, this means that overall
economy in human resources may be effected. If conditions are unstable, a mechanistic system
becomes extravagant in numbers of persons employed each with his limited commitment to the
working organization. "902
6.12.2 Functional vs. Project structure
At approximately the same time, another systems scientist, Jay Forrester made similar claims
regarding the difficulty in organizational change from one form to another.
"[In the functional subdivision], the stress is on efficiency within each of the separate functional
specialties. It is an organizational form having advantages in a very slowly changing product
situation. The functional organization runs into difficulty as the product life cycle becomes short. In
the project organization, top management takes a view that is longer than the individual project. The
dynamics of the long-term evolution of management structure are interesting in that most small new
companies begin with the project form. As they grow, they break into the functional subdivision
driven by a desire to achieve an apparent gain in effectiveness. This gain may be short-term, lasting
but a few years. The functional organization provides a poor training ground for the type of man
necessary Jbr project or top-management leadership, so that the transition back [to project
organization] becomes less and less possible as the organization ceases to regenerate the kind of
wide-ranging leaders necessary for perceiving the interactions of all facets of an enterprise. "903
901 Burns, T. and Stalker, M. (1961), pgs. xi and 6.
902 Burns, T. and Stalker, M. (1961), pg. 210.
903 Forrester, J.W. (1961), pp. 329-331.
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6.13 Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures
The notion of a "dominant design" is well-established in the field of product and technological
innovation (Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), and their effects on both
technological and organizational evolution have been noted.
Dominant designs have been demonstrated to end periods of radical change (ferment) and initiate
periods of incremental change. Tushman and Murman (1998) observe that dominant designs
have been linked by various researchers to: shifts in innovation types, product and firm
performance, firm entry and exit rates, organizational fate, shifting industry structures, and
industrial and organizational evolution.
What this research aims to discover is that there are dominant designs at the inter-firm
organizational level or enterprise level.904 The definition of the dominant design of enterprise
architectures will be discussed within the context of industry and technology cycles. Recent
researchers (Sigouris, 2007, pg. 334) have called this "the Piepenbrock Hypothesis."
This research posits that there are "dominant designs" in enterprise architectures which arise at
different times and for different reasons. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the modular
enterprise architecture is the dominant design when the industry is going through its rapid
growth phase, while the integral enterprise architecture is the dominant design when the industry
is going through its maturing phase (i.e. when the rates of growth are diminishing over time). As
shown in Figure 268 Utterback and Suarez (1993), postulate the existence of a new dominant
design in organizations which centers on value chain integration.
Figure 268: Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures
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904 The field of Organizational Design has historically tended to focus on "intra-firm" design. This research however
focuses on enterprise or "inter-firm" design. Prof. Michael Tushman, specialist in organization design, exclaimed at
a June 2005 lecture at the London Business School, "Design died 20 years ago...the last great work on design was
Thompson (1967)."
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"New patterns of behavior that emerge fall within recognizable categories - they are similar to but
never the same as previous patterns of behavior. In this sense, history repeats itself but things are
never the same. "90
A number of researchers have recently hypothesized the oscillatory dynamic evolution of
product and supply chain architectures from integral to modular and back to integral (Schilling,
2000). Fine (1998) refers to this as the "double helix", Chesbrough (2003) alludes to "a cyclical
model" of the dynamics of modularity, and finally Christensen et al. (2004) develop the theory of
"Value Chain Evolution".
"Product architectures are dynamic and unstable as they continually migrate toward or away from
increased modularity. Given the evolutionary nature of the relationships between technologies,
firms and industries, changes in product architectures are both driven by and have significant
repercussions on organizational and industry structures. "906
From system dynamics theory, this primary mode of architectural oscillation implies that there is
a dominant mode consisting of negative or balancing goal-seeking behavior with delays.
euristic 3e.
The enterprise architectural forms (modular vs. integral) will evolve over time from integral to
modular (i.e. the process of disintegration). The dominant architectural form from an industry
population perspective will evolve over time from integral, to modular and back to integral - i.e.
re-integration occurs at a population level, not at firm level.
"Speciation is a property of populations (organisms do not speciate), while extinction [a sorting process] is
often a simple concatenation ofdeaths among organisms. ",907
The capability of a firm to evolve (through strategic choice or environmental determinism) the
architecture of its extended enterprise under competitive pressures from rival enterprises is
governed by the amount of structural inertia it possesses.
"It should not be taken as given that the strategic shifts required to compete successfully in a
maturing industry should be attempted at all, in view of the substantial and perhaps new types of skill
that may be required. "908
The debate on whether or not it is possible for an enterprise's architecture to evolve is joined by
the normative question of whether or not firm leaders should attempt the evolution.
"Industry leaders may or may not be in the best position to make the adjustments required by
transition if they have substantial inertia built into their strategies and strong ties to the strategic
requirements of the growth phase of the industry's development...a new firm entering the industry
during the transition phase, possessing financial and other resources but no ties to the past, is often
able to establish a strong position. "9 9
905 Stacey, R.D. (1995), pg. 483.
906 Eytan Lasry (University of Toronto, working paper).
907 Gould, S.J. (1989), pg. 122.
908 Porter. M.E. (1980), pg. 246.
909 Porter. M.E. (1980), pp. 246-247.
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Figure 269 below illustrates the co-evolutionary feedback dynamics defined by the theory. 910
Note how the enterprise architecture drives the enterprise structure, which drives the firm
performance, which shapes the evolution of the industrial environment. Also note how the
feedback switches from integral to modular and back to integral again. This will be discussed
further in subsequent sections.
Figure 269: Co-Evolutionary Feedback Dynamics of the "Double Helix"
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910 Kunc, M. and Morecroft, J. (2004).
6.14 Evolution of Ecosystem Entropy ("The Architect's Dilemma")
"A social system left to itself gravitates toward equilibrium - maximum entropy so to speak. All
efforts to avoid this death must aim at lowering the barriers that impede communication between the
discipline-oriented and the [customer]-oriented wings of the [organization]. "911
As shown in Figure 270 below, there appears to be a natural drift toward disintegration of
enterprise forms, that is a trajectory from integral to modular forms as it is hard to maintain
centripetal forces in the face of centrifugal forces. This drift towards disintegration marks the
process of creative destruction (Foster and Kaplan, 2001). This inevitable and steady
deterioration of a system is not unlike the concept of entropy.
Figure 270: The Evolutionary Trajectories of Architectures
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Enterprise architectures are not static, but rather dynamic or more precisely evolutionary
constructs. In this sense, the enterprise architecture can be seen as a DNA coding specific to a
species. The "species' that grows in emerging markets can be thought of as the initiator species.
It begins with an integral architecture and over time begins to disintegrate, or become more
modular.
Through the processes of variation, selection and retention, the environment selects an enterprise
form that has the DNA of the species that initiated the industry, but which is now too "efficient"
to begin to bring innovation in processes. The environment again selects an integral enterprise
form that grows in maturing markets and can be thought of as the terminator species.
"Scope, permeability and modularity are the crucial factors for success. By judiciously adjusting
them over time, a business can remain competitive even as its industry matures. ,912
911 H. Simon (1967).
912 From "The Make-or-Buy Question in Mature Industries," Sloan Management Review, Spring 2008, pg. 6. This
references Santos, Abrunhosa and Costa (2006).
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6.14.1 Example: Commercial Airplane Industry
The following example shown in Figure 271 below, chronicles the phased trajectories of dis-
integration of Boeing and Airbus in the large commercial airplane industry. Key events or
phases are summarized chronologically for each enterprise in the subsections below, with
particular attention paid on the effects on the enterprise architectures.
Figure 271: Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures in the
Airplane Industry
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6.14.1.1 Boeing (1916): Founding
On July 15, 1916, founder Bill Boeing incorporated the Pacific Aero Products Company, which
would subsequently be changed to the Boeing Airplane Company with the US Navy as Boeing's
first customer as a result of World War I. As will be discussed in the following subsection, the
US government would also be the first customer for Boeing's imminent commercial business.
The Navy contract for 50 Model C airplanes, was worth $575,000. Prior to winning its first
contract, Boeing had invested its own money building and testing a total of seven airplanes.
6.14.1.2 Boeing (1925-27): Airplanes/Airlines (forward integration)
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Less than a decade after Boeing was founded, the U.S. Post Office required a new mail plane, for
which Boeing built its first commercial airplane, the Models 40 and 40A. Congress subsequently
passed the Contract Air Mail Act (a.k.a. the Kelly Act) in 1925, which privatized airmail. That
Boeing 's first commercial customer was the US government would begin a long and symbiotic
relationship.
The Boeing Airplane Company (BAC) forward-integrated into airlines by establishing a
subsidiary, Boeing Air Transport (BAT) on February 17, 1927 that purchased Boeing 40A
airplanes from its BAC parent.
Soon thereafter, Boeing purchased a competitor to BAT, named Pacific Air Transport (PAT).
By the end of 1928, BAT was carrying 30 percent of the US's mail and passenger traffic
(Sterling, 1992, pg. 16).
6.14.1.3 Boeing (1928): Public Flotation (owner-manager dis-integration)
On November 1, 1928, Boeing became listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The capital
raised allowed expansion via acquisitions and the formation of a holding company a few months
later.
6.14.1.4 Boeing (1928-31): Vertical Acquisitions (value chain integration)
A holding company, United Aircraft and Transport Corporation (UATC) was founded on
February 1, 1929 with the merger of engine manufacturer, Pratt and Whitney (who themselves
had bought out two propeller companies: Hamilton and Standard Steel), and Chance Vought, a
manufacturer of naval aircraft.
UATC then went on to acquire Stearman Aircraft, which made light biplanes, Northrop Aircraft,
which made military trainer aircraft, and Sikorsky, which made amphibian aircraft.
Between 1929 and 1931, UTAC increased its purchases of airlines, including: Varney, Stout
Airlines, and National Air Transport, combining them into a subsidiary called United Air Lines,
Inc.
In addition, UATC established the Boeing School of Aeronautics to train pilots and mechanics,
Boeing of Canada to build aircraft, and an aircraft export subsidiary.
6.14.1.5 Boeing (1934-35): Government Break-up (value chain dis-integration)
Amidst charges that the high profits of the largest US carriers were an abuse of public funds, the
US Congress passed the Air Mail Act (a.k.a. the Black-McKellar Act) On September 28, 1934
which dis-integrated the aviation industry into airplane manufacturers and airlines (Lawrence
and Thornton, 2005, pp. 15-16).
6.14.1.6 Boeing (1936-48): Labor Unions Established (labor dis-integration)
Boeing recognized its firs union in 1936, the Local Lodge 751 of the International Association of
Machinists (IAM).
In 1948, the IAM initiated a strike over seniority rights which lasted 140 days and which also
resulted in the creation of a union for engineers, called the Seattle Professional Engineering
Employees Assiciation (SPEEA).
Since its first strike in 1948, the IAM has staged six strikes approcimately every ten years over
the past 60 years. The strikes occurred at or slightly after the bottom of the ten-year airplane
delivery cycle, precisely at the time when labor was in a strong political position, facing large
impending production schedules.
6.14.1.7 Boeing (1970): Patient Finance (customer integration)
6.14.1.8 Boeing (1987): Hostile Takeover Bid (investment horizon shortened)
"Throughout the 1980s, the giants of American industiy had been cut to shreds by aggressive young
investment bankers and junk bond merchants of Wall Street who had taken it upon themselves to
revitalize what they considered the tired, struggling dinosaurs of the country's commercial
establishment... 'Some Wall Street executives say Boeing's characteristics make it a particularly good
candidate for recapitalization that could yield a bonanza for shareholders, ' reported the Wall Street
Journal. To the stockbrokers the argument was simple: Boeing was sitting on a pile of cash - about
$3 billion - which it had set aside for developing new planes. "
In 1987, Boeing (like much of corporate America in the mid-1980s) was beginning to feel the
pressures of another quality of stakeholder in the capital markets, one optimized in the name of
efficiency to very narrow boundaries of stakeholder space and time, an outlier on the spectrum of
impatient capital, known generally as the "corporate raider" and in this particular case, as T.
Boone Pickens. Having identified a cash reserve on Boeing's balance sheet, which - given his
assumptions of stakeholder space and time - was logically and rationally computed to be
inefficient, Pickens allegedly launched a hostile takeover bid. Instead of responding to this new
stakeholder in Boeing's enterprise with a narrow and constrained solution space (i.e. focusing
exclusively on financial strategies), Boeing responded by more degrees of freedom in
stakeholder space and time.
"[Washington] State lawmakers, meeting in emergency session, overwhelmingly approved anti-
takeover legislation today to help the Boeing Company fend off unwanted suitors such as T. Boone
Pickens.... The legislation [was] sought by the aerospace giant, the state's leading employer. The
majority brushed aside critics who called the measure unconstitutional and against free enterprise.
Sponsors called it a wise step to protect the 85,000 Boeing jobs in the state. 'The company is very,
very appreciative, ' said Boeing's chief lobbyist, Forrest Coffrey. "9'4
In response to the unfriendly takeover bid, senior managers at Boeing co-opted a broad
stakeholder group including state and federal government (i.e. political markets) as well as labor
markets. Although a modular enterprise architecture exchanges with its environment, it tends to
do so in an emergency, short-term, ad-hoc way. An integral enterprise architecture conversely
913 Lynn, M. (1997), pp. 184-187.
914 "State Passes Bill for Boeing," The New York Times, August 11, 1987.
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interacts with its relevant environment in a sustained, longer-term and systematic way. Through
Boeing's "architectural" actions with it's stakeholders, it chose the quality of capital that it
wanted in its enterprise, and in the process it defined the goals and objectives of the enterprise.
In system dynamics parlance, the system chose stability over growth, or more precisely stable
growth over unstable growth.
"But even without a Pickens bid, the Texan had done them [Airbus] a valuable service. The Boeing
management was looking nervously over its shoulders before it made a decision, and could only
become more cautious and more financially conservative... The takeover scare died, but the challenge
from A irbus did not, and Boeing was now in a weaker position from which to fight. "915
This non-sustained integration episode would have longer term implications for the future
disintegration of Boeing's enterprise architecture, as it seeks alternate ways to finance
investments for growth (i.e. without having cash sitting idle to attract impatient investors), like
"risk-sharing" partnerships with suppliers.
6.14.1.9 Boeing (1997): Horizontal Acquisition (inorganic growth)
In 1997, Boeing merged/acquired one of its long time competitors, McDonnell Douglas, and in
doing so, brought the large commercial airplane industry down to a global duopoly with Airbus.
Unlike the major vertical acquisitions of customer (i.e. airline) and supplier (i.e. engine
manufacturer) that took place 70 years earlier to create a vertically integrated company with
diversified market power in a rapidly growing an uncertain environment, this major horizontal
acquisition of its competitor was done in a maturing industry, primarily (on the commercial side)
for consolidation reasons.
The merger could be argued both on the grounds of consolidation in a maturing (commercial
aircraft) industry, or diversification in a growing/changing (defense) industry, as McDonnell
Douglas had both commercial and defense businesses, for which empirical research
demonstrates different success outcomes (Anand and Singh, 1997).
6.14.1.10 Boeing (2005): Risk-sharing Partners (value chain dis-integration)
"Hearing in June 2005 that Boeing has just announced another 10 million US$2. 7bn share buy back
scheme does not square with the requirement for major product investment. As the aerospace analyst
Scott Hamilton notes, the money Boeing has spent buying back its own stock - more than US$9 billion
since December 2000 - could easily have funded an entirely new airplane. " 17
As shown in Figure 272 below, Boeing has begun to outsource more to the supply base in recent
years for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the access to investment capital from
915 Lynn, M. (1997), pg. 187.
916 Note, Southwest Airlines' more integral enterprise architecture has by definition a more sustained dialogue with
key stakeholders, allowing it to have carry more debt to manage in difficult times (e.g. cyclical downturns). See
Hoffer-Gittell (2003), pp. 244-247.917 Lawrence and Thornton (2005), pg. 151.
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their suppliers. This has been pursued under the strategy rubric of "large-scale systems
integration".
Figure 272: Value Chain Disintegration (for "Risk-Sharing")
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"Remember, we're all on the same system. So we understand the design parameters and design specifics
on a real-time basis as well with our partners as we do in our own engineering shops. So we are very
agile and very quick in terms of being able to go back and put resources on some of that. Other things
we're doing, there has been some production process help we've given a couple of suppliers as they're
setting up new facilities and needed some boundary-less kind of collaboration between our production
people and theirs to move it along a little faster. It's all the kinds of thing we anticipated It's all the kinds
of things that you do when you share a supply chain with people who have a lot of skin in the game with
you. But the good news about a lot of skin in the game is we are both incented to get it done. It is not us
pointing at them and them pointing at us. It's us getting together...'"t 18
Three years later as Boeing's vision for its new supply-chain model was beginning to take shape,
comments from suppliers began to reveal how modular this intendedly integral architecture
really was:
"As a supplier to the 787program, I see a problem that hasn't gotten a lot ofpress. The partner model is
seriously flawed In the perfect world, each parner performs their tasks in lockstep with the others -
analogous to a rowing team. The reality is that each partner is lashed to its own suppliers in a sort of
three legged race against the other partners. The problem is that no one wants to win - everyone wants
to come in second to last Losing, or being the one holding up the schedule, draws international
embarrassment, so no one wants to lose But, completing the assigned task more than a week or so
before the slowest partner means holding very expensive ($millions) inventory. This has created a stage
for all sorts of theatrics, The partners can see, often more easily than Boeing managers, who is going to
be holing up the program (keeping in mind that this race is like the Tour de France, where there are
dozens of race segments.) But no partner is going to tell Boeing, 'We aren't going to hit our promise
918 Jim McNerney, CEO, The Boeing Company. Q3 2006 Earnings Call.
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dates because we know that the spoilers will be late' Instead, they brick wall over a 'spec change ' Or,
they tacitly conspire to tangle fastener procurement to the point of non-functionality (FUBAR might be
better used here.) Or, they find a Boeing selected single source supplier in their ranks and hobble that
supplier so that a delay in the partner schedule is traceable back to Boeing. (The way they do it is like a
kid tripping his little brother every time mom looks away and then claiming the little brother can't walk)
Boeing managers have dismissed the theory because they do not believe that the partners are sufficiently
clever to perpetrate such schemes. But the partners had schedules requiring them to build hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of assemblies yet they knew they wouldn't be paid for months, even years. The
partners had to figure a way out of that trap. The partners resorted to all sorts of shinanigans at the
level of the minute details with the ultimate effect of deliberately misleading Boeing at all levels. The
latest side body join problem may be entirely encompassed by Boeing's internal communication loop. But,
the entire program has been rife with deceptions vigorously advanced from low levels at the partners to
low levels at Boeing over small details. This creates context for senior partner managers to rationalize
delays to senior Boeing managers. The delays appear fixable to Boeing management because they are
presented as quantifiable technical or commercial problems. Boeing still hasn't realized that those
problems were created and have been nurtured as the partners means of controlling the schedule and
thus, their cash flow. The problems won't get solved until the partners decide to let them be solved (or
Boeing decides to take and pay for each deliverable on each partner's schedule) The thing about
airplanes is that they don'tfly until the last bolt is torqued down and the last i is dotted The devil really
is in the details. Boeing's internal communications are based almost exclusively, because of the partner
model, on communications from the partners. Who knows? Boeing may not be able to avoid making
garbage out of good information. I do know that Boeing is not clever enough to make good information
of the garbage that is coming in. '"9
6.14.1.11 Boeing (2005-2009) 787: "The Game-Changer"
6.14.1.12 Boeing (2008) Departure of "The Red Queen"
"It takes all the running you can do, to keep in the samne place. "92o
The vice-president and general manager of airplane programs at Boeing Commerical Airplanes,
until her retirement in December 2008, was was Carolyn Corvi. She was acknowledged as
fundamental in leading Boeing's "lean" efforts, resulting in significant productivity gains over
the years. Her passion for executive learning in general, and her sponsorship of this research
project (commonly referred to at Boeing as "Red-Blue", short for Integral-Modular) in particular,
lead to her reputation within Boeing Commercial Airplanes as "The Red Queen."
Her rather abrupt departure (giving two weeks notice) was announced on Dec. 11, 2008, on the
day that Boeing announced its fourth delay to its 787. Although a "retirement" she was only 58.
As the leader of Boeing's Integral Enterprise Architect, her departure can be interpreted as a
further disintegration of Boeing's Enterprise Architecture.
919 Blog posted by "Mel", on Flightblogger, 10 July 2009 in "Commentary: Its Time for Boeing to Talk. To Itself"
(Jon Ostrower).
920 Quote from "The Red Queen" in Carroll, L. (1871).
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6.14.1.13 Airbus (1970): Founding (enterprise co-option and integration)
"American industry spills out across the world primarily because of the energy released by the
American corporation. [This is a] highly organized economic system based on large units, financed
and guided by national governments. Most striking of all is the strategic character of American
industrial penetration. One by one, U.S. corporations capture those sectors of the economy with the
highest growth rates. "921
European sentiment in the late 1960's was driven to emulate what it assessed as the driving
success behind American industrial dominance: integrated corporate and national interests
(Servan-Schreiber, 1967), or portions of an integrated enterprise architecture. It was in this spirit
that Airbus Industrie was formally founded in December, 1970.
"Airbus was a 'groupement d'intr~rt 9conomique' a form of commercial partnership established in
French law in the mid-1960's, which was mainly intended to help wine growers. A GIE, as it is
known, is a flexible and user-fiendly form of corporate structure, although it tends to baffle Anglo-
Saxons and Americans in particular used to the rigid structure of the limited company. A GIE is
not a company, and escapes many of the obligations of a company. For example, it does not have to
pay taxes, unless it chooses to do so. It simply pools the capital contributed by its members, and its
results are taken out of the books of its member companies in proportion to their share of the
enterprise. "9
Airbus Industrie was initially founded as a "groupement d'int6rt 6onomique" (GIE), a flexible
"corporate" structure that co-opts the stakeholder environment (Selznick, 1948). One of the key
architectural features of this enterprise was the function-sharing of the stakeholders: e.g. the
governments (i.e. political markets) served as investors (i.e. capital providers). The suppliers
also served as the capital markets as well as securing access to customer markets.
"Beteille [CEO] was serious in his desire to widen the Airbus consortium...it was crucial to get as
many of the European powers involved with Airbus as possible. Only as a strong, united European
force could the consortium be a success. A sure way of increasing sales was to rope more countries
into the consortium. Negotiations with the Spanish in 1971 showed how fruitful this could be. "923
6.14.1.14 Airbus (1974-77): Strategy (low cost & financing, stable production)
"The A300 was not a very innovative plane in terms of aeronautical engineering, and was never
intended to be; in terms offinancial engineering, however (like all subsequent Airbus planes), it was
one of the most innovative machines ever built. It was competing mainly against the DC-10 and the
Lockheed L-I01I Tristar, but it was much smaller than both, and cheaper. Boeing was too wrapped
up in the 747 to consider that section of the market, and Douglas too involved in the DC-O10, and both
thought it too small a market to be of much interest. "924
Airbus started out offering only a single product, the A300, aimed at a very narrow and relatively
unattractive niche in the market. Competing against the other modular enterprise architectures of
Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed, which offered "higher-faster-farther" products,
92' From Servan-Schreiber (1967), quoted in Lynn, M. (1997), pg. 103.
922 Lynn, M. (1997), pg. 113.
923Lynn, M. (1997), pp. 111 and 115-116.
924 Lynn, M. (1997), pp. 110, 115 and 121.
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Airbus offered a "better-faster-cheaper" product to over-served customers like Eastern Airlines.
In addition, Airbus offered innovative low risk, low cost financing. And finally, Airbus kept
long-term stable production in the absence of short-term demand.
"The months wore on without any new orders. And planes were still being produced It was during
that year that the term "whitetails" became part of the industry jargon. "925
6.14.1.15 Airbus (2000-01): Public Flotation (owner-manager dis-integration)
"The German [industrial] side accepted the large French [state] shareholding very reluctantly. In
announcing the agreement at the time [2000], the other EADS co-chairman, Manfred Bischoff who
was also chief executive at DASA, described the concession to the French [state] as 'the toad that we
had to swallow' to create EADS. ,926
The creation of Airbus's parent organization, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space
Company (EADS) as a publicly listed company in 2000 was the product of industrial and
political compromise between French, German and Spanish business and governments. The
decomposition of ownership of EADS was as follows:
" Dutch Law "Contractual Partnership" (65.5% stake in EADS)
o 30% by the French holding company, SOGEADE
* 15% by the Lagardare Group
* original owner of Matra, now the merged Aerospatiale Matra
* 15% by the French state
* former owner of Adrospatiale
o 30% by German "interests"
* 30% by the German company, DaimlerChrysler
* owner of DASA Aerospace division
o 5.5% by the Spanish state holding company, SEPI
* owner of Construcciones Aeronduticas, CASA
* European Stock Markets free float (34.5% stake in EADS)
"'Some people consider today [2006] that this pact doesn 't give enough power to the [French] state
because I remind you that in this pact, concluded in 2000, it was the industrial shareholders,
Lagardre and DaimlerChrysler, who assumed operational control,' Mr. Breton [the French finance
minister] said. 'The state was there to only validate strategic options. ',927
"'Tolbday, the French state only has an advisory role,' he [a spokesman for Lagardere, Jean-Pierre
Joulin] said. "928
925 Lynn, M. (1997), pg. 118.
926 Clark, N. "France Seeks More Control of Airbus Parent," International Herald Tribune, June 20, 2006.
927 Clark, N. "France Seeks More Control of Airbus Parent," International Herald Tribune, June 20, 2006.
928 Clark, N. "France Seeks More Control of Airbus Parent," International Herald Tribune, June 20, 2006.
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Soon after the formation of EADS in 2000, Airbus became a single fully integrated company in
2001, incorporated under French law as a simplified joint stock company or Socidt6 par Actions
Simplifi6e (S.A.S.). Its relatively concentrated ownership had the following composition, which
is summarized in Figure 273 below:
EADS (80% stake in Airbus)
BAE Systems (20% stake in Airbus)
Figure 273: Airbus' "ownership" in 2001
Airbus
6.14.1.16 Airbus (2001): Shareholders and the Response to 9-11
Just as Airbus had dis-integrated its capital stakeholder, a severe exogenous shock placed
demands on the new enterprise. One might conjecture that having myopic shareholders would
drive Airbus to make significant downsizings to reflect the downturn in the airline industry as a
result of 9-11. However, unlike Boeing which did downsize immediately after 9-11, Airbus did
not. This may serve as an indication of the relative patience of the capital-providers of Airbus vis
a vis Boeing.
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6.14.1.17 Airbus (2006): Evolutionary Diffusion of "Ownership"
Six years after the creation of EADS in 2000 and the public flotation of Airbus in 2001, the
ownership of Airbus began to become slightly more diffuse, with sell-offs both from EADS and
from BAE Systems.
6.14.1.17.1 Russian State Banks buy EADS shares
In September 2006, the Russian state-controlled bank, Vneshtorgbank (VTB) purchased a 5%
stake in EADS from the available free float. Although it did not get a seat on the board of
directors, it did seek to formalize industrial partnerships, for example the conversion of A320
passenger aircraft into cargo planes. 929
Over one year later, after VTB was privatized, its investors began to complain that the EADS
shares were losing value.930 In response, VTB sold its shares to another state-owned bank,
Russia's Bank ofDevelopment.
6.14.1.17.2 BAE Systems sells shares to EADS
On October 13, 2006, BAE Systems sold off its 20% stake in Airbus to EADS, giving EADS
100% ownership of Airbus. The reason that BAE Systems gave for its sale of Airbus, was that it
wanted to focus on it core business of defense, particularly on future potnential acquisitions in
the US defense market. It is noteworthy that BAE Systems only received an estimated 50% of the
value of their stake due to short-medium term valuation reductions due to problems with the
A380.
"'The fact that BAE is selling its stake should not come as a suprise' Gustav Humbert, the chief
executive of Airbus, said last week. 'This is a business decision, not an industrial one. ' Its departure
could be transformational for Airbus, which is seeing its ownership - and decision making -
structure evolve. "93
The architectural differences in Airbus' two shareholders (EADS and BAE Systems) is evident,
and these differences transcend national boundaries, where the UK's BAE Systems took a
relatively short-term, arm's length approach to Airbus, while the French/German/Spanish EADS
took a relatively long-term, collaborative approach to investment in Airbus UK. It was EADS of
continental Europe which invested over the long term in developing UK capabilities, not the
UK's BAE Systems:
"[Roger Berry]: 'Do you think that BAE Systems sold out on the future of UK civil aerospace?' [lain
Gray, Managing Director, Airbus UK]: 'BAE Systems had a strategy which was progressively to move
out of civil aerospace... They were an arm's length shareholder. Over the last five years we have
929Approximately one year later, VTB explored selling its stake ("Russian Bank Exploring Sell of EADS Stake",
International Hearald Tribune, July 11, 2007).
930 Robertson, D. "VTB Sells EADS Stake to Another Russian Bank," The Times, December 28, 2007.
931 Clark, N. "BAE Turns Toward U.S. as it Ends Airbus Ties," International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2006.
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seen significant investments coming into Filton and Broughton [UK| through EADS's commitment
to Airbus. '""932
"[Lindsay Hoyle]: 'Do you think the [EADS] board would allow a [future] partnership with BAE in
composite technology?' [lain Gray, Managing Director, Airbus UK]: 'I would not envisage that being
the outcome. I do acknowledge that BAE Systems are a supplier to Airbus. '"
6.14.1.17.3 Dubai International buys EADS shares
Dubai Internaional Capital LLC bought 3.12% of EADS' free float shares on July 5, 2007. The
move could be interpreted as a form of backward integration, as Dubai International owns
Emirates Airlines, the largest customer for Airbus' A380. They, however have no plans to take a
board seat or an active role at EADS.
"'They clearly have their interpretation of where the business is going, 'said Harry Breach, an analyst
with JP Morgan in London. 'They see material upside in the long term.'" 934
6.14.1.17.4 Future Posssible Diversification
6.14.1.17.4.1 German Bank, KfWto buy half of Daimler/Chrysler's stake
When Daimler/Chrysler sells half of its stake, the German government (initially through its
development bank KfW, or even through the Hamburg city government) is rumored to purchase
it.
6.14.1.17.4.2 French Government to buy half of Lagardere stake
When Lagardbre sells half of its stake, the French government is rumored to purchase it, leaving
the following owernship structure in place.
"'EADS is starting to go from being a minority floated company to a majority floated company,
Aboulafia said. 'That ultimately changes your comportment."' 9 5
932 "Recent Developments with Airbus," Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence to be published as HC427-i, UK
Parliament, House of Commons, Trade and Industry Committee, March 27, 2007.
933 Gray, I. (Managing Director, Airbus UK), "Recent Developments with Airbus," Uncorrected transcript of oral
evidence to be published as HC427-i, UK Parliament, House of Commons, Trade and Industry Committee, March
27, 2007.
934 McSheehy, W. and Oliver, E. "Dubai International Buys 3.1% ofAirbus Parent EADS," Bloomberg.com, July 5,
2007.
93 Clark, N. "BAE Turns Toward U.S. as it Ends Airbus Ties," International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2006.
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* Dutch Law "Contractual Partnership" (reduced to 50.5% stake in EADS)
o 22.5% (reduced by 7.5%) by the French holding company, SOGEADE
* 7.5% by the Lagardire Group (sells 7.5%)
* original owner of Matra, now the merged Adrospatiale Matra
* 15% by the French state
* former owner of Adrospatiale
o 22.5% (reduced by 7.5%) by German "interests"
0 15% by the German company, DaimlerChrysler (sells 7.5%)
* owner of DASA Aerospace division
* 7.5% by the German bank, KJW (buys 7.5% from DaimlerChrysler?)
o 5.5% (unchanged) by the Spanish state holding company, SEPI
* owner of Construcciones Aeronduticas, CASA
* European Stock Markets free float (49.5% stake in EADS)
o 5% by Russian State Bank, VTB (then to the Russian Development Bank)
o 3.1% by Dubai International Capital LLC
This new ownership structure is summarized in Figure 274 below.
Figure 274: Airbus' "ownership" in 2007
Airbus
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6.14.1.18 Airbus (2006): CEO transitions
In the wake of announced production delays on the A380 in the summer of 2006, Airbus CEO
Noel Forgeard resigned. Christian Humbert, the first German Airbus CEO took over, and
resigned one year later in July 2006.
Christian Streiff took over and proposed significant structural changes to Airbus within his first
few months in control, which included a rebalancing of work and power within the delicately-
balanced political consortium. The EADS board did not support his recommendations and after
only 100 days on the job, he resigned.
"I progressively came to the conviction that the governance of Airbus did not allow my plan to
succeed. "936
Streiff was succeeded as Airbus CEO by EADS co-chair, Louis Gallois who occupied both jobs.
Gallois is a Frenchman with significant experience in French aerospace industry (formerly with
both Aerospatiale and SNECMA).
Streiff apparently tried to use conventional firm-bounded logic to transition Airbus away from its
core strength as a world-class political-economic enterprise into a "rational" profit-maximizing
firm. His stakeholder ecosystem apparently rejected his efforts to "rationalize" or narrow down
the boundaries of the enterprise too much too soon. In our parlance, Airbus's integral enterprise
architecture (with its strong enterprise stability) resisted attempts to dis-integrate too rapidly, and
rejected its "modularizing" architect.
The theory predicts that enterprises disintegrate over time (which Airbus and Boeing both appear
to be doing). The point of question seems to be the rate at which this will happen for Airbus.
The data seems to continue to support the view that Airbus' disintegration will continue at a
slower rate than would be expected by a modular incumbent. Does Airbus have (short-term)
efficiency problems? Certainly. Are they abandoning their (long-term) effectiveness platform to
solve these problems? Apparently not. Gallois appears to be a more natural integral architect,
and his dual-appointment as CEO of both Airbus and EADS appears to be a return to the
integrality that made Airbus successful.
Certain elements of the popular business press were beginning to observe the differences
between Streiff and Gallois as "architects", and the resulting success.
"Considering that Airbus, before its latest difficulties, managed to become number one in the industry
suggests that there is nothing wrong with the model. If anything, it has become a template for success. In
short, obr such a model to work, you need a skilful architect who has all the plans in his head, knows what
needs to be done, and can keep politics and meddling shareholders out of the factory. "
In July 2007, EADS ended the bi-national management structure that it began with at its
inception: dual French and German CEOs as well as chairmen, in an effort to streamline
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936 Reuters, Monday, October 9, 2006.
97 Financial Times, October 12, 2006.
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decision making. Frenchman, Lois Gallois went from being EADS co-CEO (with German,
Thomas Enders) and Airbus CEO, to EADS' sole CEO, while Enders gave up his EADS co-
CEO job to become the sole Airbus CEO. Finally, German Ruediger Grube became the sole
EADS chairman.
6.14.1.19 Airbus (2007): Supply Chain Restructuring
The new CEO, Louis Gallois moved to restructure Airbus' production facilities in order to
improve cost-competitiveness in the "Power 8" program. This included the proposed sale of a
number of internal factories, "layoffs" (or hiring freezes) and the increase in risk-sharing
partnerships. The proposal resulted in "tensions" between France and Germany as well as
between management and labor. Former Airbus chief Jean Pierson expressed his concerns as
well as his confidence in this new architect:
"This system cannot continue. EADS is a company which is up against the wall. I cannot see who will
agree to make concessions. This Franco-German rivalry cannot continue, this environment is noxious and
the system ungovernable... '" am not familiar with the current cost cutting plan, but I know [Airbus chief
executive] Louis Gallois. I do not doubt that this plan will be both serious and reasonable in industrial
and social terms and that it will also be balanced ",L3
In response to Gallois' balanced proposal, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French
President Jacques Chirac came to an agreement:
"The competitiveness of Airbus is the most important factor in the company's restructuring, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Friday. 'The competitiveness of the company is the top priority for
,S 939US.
While such measures appear to be a drastic dis-integration or modularization of the firm-supplier
link, closer inspection reveals a much more slow and modest dis-integration. The announced
"layoffs" were in reality more akin to "announced attrition" - something unheard of in Liberal
Market Economies. The "strikes", while new to Airbus, were different in both quantity and
quality to those experienced in modular enterprise architectures like Boeing. Instead of lasting
continuously for weeks or months, they were organized as a series of one-hour walkouts staged
every few weeks. The integral nature of labor and capital was exercised with "voice" used over
"exit" (Hirshman, 1970).
Similarly, capital remained "patient", with major partner investors sharing negative "rents" with
the ecosystem:
"Lagardere recently reported a 57% drop in 2006 profit, due largely to the poor performance of its 7.5%
stake in EADS. Chief executive Arnauld Lagardre, who also co-chairs EADS, also ruled out the sale of
the company's stake in EADS when announcing his annual results. 'I will play my role and I want to
carry on being part of EADS's growth, ' he told Le Monde. So concerned was Lagarddre that he vowed to
return any upcoming dividend back to the company. 'The Airbus situation has affected everyone, the
938 Former Airbus chief, Jean Pierson, in Les Echos, Thursday 22 February 2007.
939 Reuters, February 23, 2007.
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employees above all, but also the shareholders and the small investors who have suffered from the drop in
shares, 'he said. "940
Finally, with regards to outsourcing major work to "risk-sharing" partners as Boeing had
"pioneered" on its new 787 program, Airbus began to pursue a similar strategy, albeit at a
much more measured pace:
"It is not exactly Boeing but it is radically different. It's about halfway to Boeing and that is pretty
radical for Airbus. ". "94'
Although EADS looked to sell some of its assets to the US's Spirit Aerosystems, it decided at
the last minute to sell UK plants to GKN, a UK firm; German plants to OHB Technology
Aerospace, a German firm; and French plants to Latecoere, a French firm.
"In the end, we just couldn't close a business case that met both our customer requirements and our
shareholder requirements. ,942
"The three partners had better offers commercially and technically, were more aggressive than Spirit in
the last round of negotiations. Politics had no influence. "943
940 Forbes, March 14, 2007.
941 Flightglobal.com, March 30, 2007.
942 Wichita Eagle, December, 20, 2007
943 Wichita Eagle, December, 20, 2007.
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6.14.2 Example: Automotive Industry
Figure 275 below, illustrates the evolution of dominant designs in enterprise architectues in the
automobile industry.
Figure 275: Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures in the
Industry
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6.14.2.1 General Motors (1916): Incorporation
The General Motors Corporation was incorporated in 1916, succeeding the General Motors
Company.
6.14.2.2 General Motors (1926): Vertical Integration of Fisher Body
The classic textbook case study for vertical integration to reduce opportunistic "hold-up" is
General Motor's 1926 acquisition of one of its auto body suppliers, Fisher Body (Klein,
Crawford and Alchian, 1978).
The case has created alternate viewpoints, however in that vertical integration can in fact create,
not reduce, hold-up (Freeland, 2000); and that vertical integration was simply done to improve
coordination, not reduce opportunism (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000).
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6.14.2.3 General Motors (1999): Vertical Dis-integration of Delphi
In 1999, General Motors spun off its internal parts manufacturer, Delphi, which is GM's chief
supplier, and the largest U.S. auto parts supplier. Delphi struggled since it was spun off and
ultimately filed for bankruptcy less than six years later in 2005.
In a related move, Ford spun off its internal parts manufacturer, Visteon in 2000. It, too
struggled on its own, with Ford still accounting for 70% of its business, it filed for bankruptcy in
2005.
6.14.2.4 General Motors (2005): Vertical "Re-integration" of Delphi
As both GM and Ford struggled to revive their critical parts suppliers which included important
contract renegotiations from the United Auto Workers labor unions, Ford's CFO clearly stated
the resolve of the modular enterprise architecture:
"Our goal is to approach a true arms-length relationship with Visteon. "944
Recent data suggests that investors are interested in taking over these former internal suppliers
from public to private equity settings.
6.14.2.5 Daimler & BMW(1994-2007): Acquitision & Divestiture of Rivals
In addition to the above examples of the divestiture of internal divisions from modular enterprise
architectures, there is also evidence of acquisition and immediate divestiture of rival OEMs in
the cases of Daimler-Chrysler and BMW-Rover.
"Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, experienced a serious cash shortage in 1999 following the
disastrous acquisition of the British carmaker Rover Group Ltd. five years earlier... CEO Joachim
Milberg responded to the crisis by selling off the loss-making Rover and Land Rover units and
refocusing the company 's core business ofproducing and marketing premium cars. ,945
"DaimlerChrysler moved to undo the most expensive and one of the least successful mergers in auto
industry history Monday as it agreed to essentially pay to dump the money-losing Chrysler unit which
it paid $37 billion jor nine years ago. A private investment firm like Cerberus will provide
management with the opportunity to focus on their long-term plans rather than the pressures of short-
term earnings expectations. 946
6.14.2.6 General Motors (2008-9): Becomes No. 2 & Bankruptcy Protection
After approximately 90 years dominating the global automobile market, General Motors finally
ceded its number one position to the late entrant Toyota.
944 "Ford to Take Back 24 Ailing Visteon Plants", Dee-Ann Durbin, Associated Press, May 26, 2005.
945 Raisch and Krogh (2007), pg. 69.
46 CNN.com May 14, 2007, "Daimler pays to dump Chrysler".
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Soon thereafter, General Motors found it very difficult to weather the global financial crisis of
2008-2009 and sought bankruptcy protection. In an effort to save the company from bankruptcy,
the highly modular and disintegrating enterprise architecture attempted a radical attempt at "re-
integration" when two unlikely shareholders, the US Government and the United Auto Workers
union became some of the largest investors.947 While the structure of this move may appear to
be a move toward integrality, the function of this new stakeholder set re-configuration may not
necessarily be integral or long-term, trust-based.
6.14.2.7 Toyota (1937): Founding through Organic Diversification
In August, 1937 Toyota Motor Co. Ltd. was established as an internal or organic diversification
away from Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, Ltd.
6.14.2.8 Toyota (1949): Spin-off of Nippondenso (value chain dis-integration)
While GMand Ford spun-off their largest internal parts divisions (a.k.a. Delphi and Visteon) in
1999, Toyota made a similar move literally 50 years earlier, by spinning-off Nippondenso (now
Denso) in 1949.
"Denso began life as a spin-off division of Toyota in 1949. and over time grew into one of the largest
auto-parts manufacturers in the world. "9
Toyota however, maintained a significant equity stake in Denso, which in 1999 it was 25%.
6.14.2.9 Toyota (1950): Recession, Lay-offs, Strikes, Bankruptcy & Bailout
"The resulting recession, however, led many large firms to reduce their work force and produced
bitter labor confrontations. The three dominant truck producers Toyota, Nissan, and Isuzu all
underwent strikes. Toyota faced bankruptcy due to inventory mismanagement, until it was bailed out
by Bank of Japan. " 949
In 1950, after the post-war recession, Toyota Motor Corporation Ltd. fired approximately one
quarter of its workforce. The resulting strikes, led to near-bankruptcy and a bank bail-out. A
precondition of this bail-out was the separation of sales from its production operations, by
creating the Toyota Motor Sales Co. Ltd.
6.14.2.10 Toyota (1982): Reintegration of Sales and Operations Companies
In 1982, after 32 years of forced separation between sales and production functions, Toyota
reintegrated these companies into the new Toyota Motor Corporation.
6.14.2.11 Toyota (1988): Vertical Integration in Auto Electronics
947 I am indebted to Charlie Fine, for pointing out this fact.
948 Smitka, M.J. (1990), pg. 165..
949 Smitka, M.J. (1990), pg. 165..
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Having apparently vertically disintegrated in automotive electronics in 1949, by spinning off
Nippondenso, Toyota reintegrated in auto electronics in 1988, not by inorganically repurchasing
the world-leading Denso, but by organically opening its Hirose plant, which is the location of
four electrical engineering divisions.
At a time when GM and Ford were disintegrating or considering selling off it internal parts
divisions, Toyota appeared to be on the opposite trajectory. Researchers have posited theoretical
explanations for this architectural move, by synthesizing governance-based transaction cost
economics explanations with learning based explanations (Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001).
6.14.2.12 Toyota (1995-99): Vertical Integration with Daihatsu
In 1995, Toyota increased its equity stake in Daihatsu from 17% to 33%, and again in 1999 to
50%, making it a legal subsidiary (Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001).
6.14.2.13 Toyota (2008): First Annual Loss
In 2009, Toyota recorded it first annual loss for 2008 in 71 years amid the global financial crisis.
Note that this exogenous event, which affected all auto manufacturers seemed to negatively
impact Toyota 's modular competitors (e.g. General Motors and Chrysler) more severely as they
not only reported massive losses, they were forced to seek bankruptcy protection and/or merger
possibilities. 950
950 Fiat proposed a takeover of Chrysler as well as the purchase of General Motor 's European brands.
6.14.3 Example: Airline Industry
The following chronicles the evolutionary trajectories of two enterprise architectures: an
incumbent, United Airlines951 , and a challenger, Southwest Airlines952, as shown in Figure 276
below.
Figure 276: Evolution of Dominant Designs in Enterprise Architectures in the US Airline
Industry
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6.14.3.1 United Airlines (1928-30): Pre-founding (value chain integration)
In 1928, Boeing Airplane - Transport Corporation (BATC) is incorporated in Delaware and
acquires Boeing Air Transport (BAT), Pacific Air Transport (PAT), and the Boeing Airplane
Company (BAC) as subsidiaries.
In 1929, BATC subsequently changes its name to United Aircraft and Transport Corporation
(UATC), and it acquires other subsidiaries, including Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Hamilton
Standard Propeller Company. and Chance Vought Corporation.
951 Much historical information on UnitedAirlines was obtained from its website: www.united.com.
952 Much historical information on Southwest Airlines was obtained from its website: www.southwest.com.
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In 1930, UATC acquires National Air Transport (NAT) and Varney Airlines.
6.14.3.2 United Airlines (1931): Founding (value chain dis-integration)
United Air Lines Incorporated (UAL) is incorporated as a management corporation to coordinate
operations of UATCs airline subsidiaries.
6.14.3.3 United Airlines (1931): Formation of Labor Unions
A few days after the official incorporation of UAL, pilots organize the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), which affiliates with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The airline
industry's first labor agreement with pilots is signed Oct. 8, 1940.
6.14.3.4 United Airlines (1975-85): Labor Strikes (labor dis-integration)
In 1975, IAM-affiliated mechanics and related crafts employees stage 16-day strike at United.
Four years later, in 1979, the same organizations stage a 58-day strike at United.
In 1985, members of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) stage a 29-day (six-week) strike at
United. Members of the Association ofFlight Attendants (AFA) stage a sympathy walkout.
6.14.3.5 United Airlines (1994): ESOP (attempted re-integration)
(Lowenstein, 2002).
6.14.3.6 United Airlines (2001): Bankruptcy (dis-integration)
6.14.3.7 United Airlines (2003): Launch of Ted (inorganic diversification)
In an attempt to compete with Southwest Airline's low cost model, United Airlines created a low
cost airline, Ted within it corporate boundaries. While it attempted to mimic many of
Southwest's features, it did not replicate Southwest's underlying integral enterprise architecture,
and was unsustainable.
6.14.3.8 Southwest Airlines (1971): Founding
6.14.3.9 Southwest Airlines (2001): Response to 9-11
6.14.3.10 Southwest Airlines (2008): Quarterly Losses
6.15 Evolution of Architecting Processes
"A pure top-down process cannot succeed in the early phases of a technology or industry. Thus as
technologies mature, the active choices are pushed lower and lower, ultinmately to the component
level. "953
The process of system architecting evolves over time to suit the demands of the
environment. As shown in Figure 277 below, the process switches from a bottom-up
process in the early phases of an industry to a top-down process in the middle phases of an
industry, and finally back to a bottom-up process, or more explicitly whereby the top-down
architecting enables bottom-up process.
Figure 277: Evolution of Architecting Processes
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6.15.1 Enterprise Architectural States (Fit) and Paths (Change)
6.15.1.1 Enterprise Architectural Fit54
"The ultimate object of design isform. The form is the solution to the problem; the context defines the
problem. Fitness of the system is the degree to which the system and its context are 'mutually
acceptable'. '"5
From this construct, the co-evolution of firm and industry architectural dynamics can be
developed. It is here that the framework closes the feedback loop whereby the dynamics of the
enterprise architecture can be seen to have "fit" with the environmental dynamics. This
architectural notion of enterprise-environmental fit is well understood in classical architectural
theory (Alexander, 1964).
In addition, this notion of fit is seen to be a source of competitive advantage (Powell, 1992), as
was made influential by the organizational contingency theorists (Burns and Stalker, 1961;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The consonance hypothesis is stated as follows:
"Those organizations that have structures that more closely match the requirements of the
environment are more effective than those that do not. 9 56
In fact, as Stinchcombe (1965) famously observed, there are long-term, path-dependent, lock-in
effects associated with the firm's "birth". The environmental imprint on the firm at the time of
its founding encodes a form of DNA that has a lasting influence on the structure of the firm.
This begins to explain the structural inertia associated with firms in the evolution of industries.
It is in this way that architectural fit can be seen as a meta-strategic framework which mediates
between the external competitive positioning view of strategy and its counterpart, the internal
resource-based view of strategy.
Heristic 3f:
The enterprise architectural forms will grow and prosper in different industrial competitive
regimes, where they have better growth-fit characteristics. Modular enterprise architectures will
grow and prosper in pre-dominant design regimes, where competition is based on discontinuous
radical product innovation (a.k.a. "higher, faster, farther" regime). Integral enterprise
architectures will grow and prosper in post-dominant design regimes, (populated by shake-out
survivor modular architectures) where competition is now based on continuous incremental
process innovation (a.k.a. "better, faster, cheaper" regime).
"In the later developing states there was, often, a much readier sponsorship accorded to approved
associations who were thereafter co-optated, in the case of labour unions, brought into the corporate
structure of the sector or firm (Loveridge, 1983). Thus what is seen as the more tightly socially
954 In Organizational Behavior, the notion of "fit" has surfaced primarily in structural contingency theory and
complexity theory (e.g. "fitness" landscapes).
955 Alexander, C. (1964), pp. 15 and 19.
956 Pfeffer (1982). pg. 148.
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integrated systemsn of later developing national business systems has much to do with the management
of the process of institutionalization.
Heuristic 3g (advanced refinement):
The enterprise architectural forms will grow and prosper in different industrial competitive
regimes, where they have better growth-fit characteristics. Integral enterprise architectures will
grow and prosper where industry rates of growth are relatively slow and stable, where
competitive capabilities center on exploration and competition is based on innovation in product
(and ultimately process). On the contrary, modular enterprise architectures will grow and
prosper where industry rates of growth are relatively fast and unstable, where competitive
capabilities center on exploitation.
Heuristic 3h:
The two types of technological change which facilitate the conditions for integral enterprise
architectures are: the emergence of a discontinuous technological change in which integrality is
needed for product innovation, and the emergence of a dominant product design in which
integrality is needed forprocess innovation.
Heuristic 3i:
The successful birth rate of integral architectures post-dominant design is dependent on the
clockspeed of the industrial development. As integral architectures tend to take existing markets
in a low-cost, high quality world, via a strategy based upon human capitalism, based on stability
in order to deliver continuous improvement, some industries may evolve too quickly to allow for
stability to be a viable mechanism. In other words, Schumpeter's "winds of creative destruction"
may be too rapid and frequent for human capitalism to take hold.
Heuristic 3i:
There is an optimum rate of firm growth that is contingent upon where in the industrial evolution
cycle the firm operates. The optimum growth rate is governed either by the competitive
dynamics associated with building of capacity or the growing of capability. For the pre-
dominant design regime, the optimum rate of growth is near the fastest possible, while for the
post-dominant design regime, the optimum rate of growth is significantly slower than the
maximum possible.
"As to what is the maximum efPicient rate... a too rapid expansion will introduce so many
disharmonious elements that efficiency will be destroyed. "9
"Virtually all natural systems including organizations have intrinsically optimal rates of growth,
which is far less than the fastest possible. ",
"The Toyota Production System can be realized only when all the workers become tortoises. Speed is
meaningless without continuity. Just remember the tortoise and the hare".9 60
957 Loveridge, R. (2003).
958 Robinson (1932).
959 Senge, P. (1990), pg. 62.
960 Ohno, T. (1978), pg. 63
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Heuristic 3k:
The enterprise's structural dynamics (growth vs. stability), judged within the context of the
environment or industry's structural dynamics will contribute to the mechanism defining long-
term financial performance of the firm.
"Perhaps the most ubiquitous force leading to structural change is a change in the long-run industry
growth rate. Industry growth is a key variable in determining the intensity of rivalry in the industry
and it sets the pace of expansion required to maintain share, thereby influencing the supply and
demand balance and the inducement the industry offers new entrants. "
"In a high-growth period, productivity can be raised by anyone. But how many can attain it during
the more difficult circumstances induced by low-growth rate? This is the deciding factor in the
success or failure of an enterprise." 962
Finally, it is worth noting that some research exists to challenge the notion of contingent fit
as a source of organizational efficiency. Nickerson and Zenger (2002), for example
observe that "being efficiently fickle" via modulation between centralization and de-
centralization, can in some instances lead to higher efficiencies - independent of what the
environment dictates. The logic of such apparent oscillatory "fickleness" appears to lie in
the physics of control theory, namely the presence of a balancing loop with delays.
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961 Porter, M.E. (1980), pg. 164.
962 Ohno, T. (1978), pg. 114.
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6.15.1.2 Enterprise Architectural Change
There are two distinct mechanisms for architectural change in the face of environmental change:
managerial adaptation or environmental selection. The degree to which each mechanism
governs the change process is defined by the amount of architectural inertia within the
organization or enterprise. Each change process will be discussed in turn.
"Theories typically placed in the adaptational camp include contingency theory (Woodward 1965,
Lawrence & Lorsch 1967), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, Burt 1983, 1992),
institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan 1977, DiMaggio & Powell 1983), and transaction cost
economics (Williamson 1975, 1985). Theories residing in [the selection camp] include
organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman 1977, 1989) and, on occasion, evolutionary economics
(Nelson & Winter 1982). " 963
6.15.1.2.1 (Managerial) Adaptation
As the enterprise architecture both enables and constrains but does not determine action, there is
room for both the mechanisms of managerial adaptation as well as environmental selection. This
research intends to present a balanced explanation for which mechanisms govern and when.
Managerial adaptation is underpinned by the notions of free-will (Burrell and Morgan, 1979),
strategic choice and strategic renewal (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The change process theories
that underpin it are those that are predictive, e.g. life-cycle and teleological (van de Ven, 1992).
"I agree with the main content of your research. My difficulty has more to do with the slightly fatalist
tone of the work. I understand what you are trying to do, but it is hard for me to accept the
determinism of the blue-red duality. Then again, my perspective is tainted with the engineering
mindset of being able to fix anything if you try hard enough. Yes, you have to make tough decisions,
and you have to approach the problem from a systems perspective on many fronts at the same time,
you have to dismantle old value systems, and attack cultural problems, and realign incentives, and
have an integrated strategy that considers all major stakeholders and you need a good plan to
implement it, but I still think you can do it. It is very difficult, but I don't think it is impossible. Maybe
I'm being overly optimistic... " 964
Throughout the process of creating the grounded theory in this proposed framework, constructive
criticism frequently came back from the knowledge co-creators that (some presentations of) the
framework came across as too fatalistic and deterministic, that it understated the power of
management. These viewpoints were very valuable in the creation of the theory, and the
proponents tended to have similar backgrounds: relative inexperience with leading in large,
complex enterprises, and relatively little exposure to the theories of structural inertia of the
environmental schools.
This framework does not intend to understate the power of human agency, but in fact to do the
opposite; that is to state that such adaptation, while rare is very possible, but it requires a very
special and rare type of leadership - architectural leadership.
-93 Barnett and Carroll, 1995, g. 218.
964 Critique of framework from MIT PhD student. Received via email on 18 May 2006.
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6.15.1.2.1.1Re-integration to Fight or for Flight?
When faced with a maturing industry, is it easier/better for an incumbent to stay and fight by re-
integrating itself around process innovation in order to fit more with the new evolving demands
of the environment or is it easier/better to take flight by re-integrating itself around new product
innovation? An example of the former might be Chrysler in the early 1990's under the direction
of Thomas Stallkamp in which re-integrated supplier networks around quality, cost and delivery
metrics brought new success (Dyer, 2000), while an example of the latter might be IBM in the
1990's under the direction of Lou Gerstner in which a re-integration around services took place
(Gerstner, 2002). 965
In either case, re-integration of a modular (and dis-integrating) enterprise is not straightforward,
as it often appears to require the re-building of trust with existing stakeholders, which is often
harder than new integral enterprise starting from scratch.
6.15.1.2.1.2Dis-integration to Fight or for Flight?
Finally, is it easier/better for a modular incumbent in a maturing industry to continue to dis-
integrate and either: stay and fight by "integrating" competitors via consolidation or is it
easier/better to take flight by continuing to exploit and "diversify" and re-deploy capital (i.e. to
exit)? As was discussed earlier, post-dominant design dis-integrating enterprises are successful
when they consolidate as opposed to diversify.
6.15.1.2.2 (Environmental) Selection
Environmental selection is underpinned by the notions of determinism (Burrell and Morgan,
1979). The change process theories that underpin it are those that are explanatory, e.g. dialectic
and evolutionary (van de Ven, 1992).
965 1 am indebted to Prof. Charlie Fine for suggesting these to me, and for his own development of these hypotheses
in his own research.
6.15.1.3 Enterprise Inertia Part II: Architectural Inertia
"Grant me the serenity to accept the thns I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can,
and the wisdom to know the difference.
"Wisdom is the ability to see the long-run consequences of current actions, the willingness to sacrifice
short-run gains for long-run benefits, and the ability to control what is controllable and not to fret
over what is not. Therefore the essence of wisdom is the concern for the future. It is not the type of
concern with the future that the fortune teller has; he only tries to predict it. The wise man tries to
control it. ,967
The notion of organizational inertia is well-established in the fields of sociology and
organizational behavior (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). It accounts for the reason that there is a
time delay in an organization's ability to adapt to environmental change. For this reason, the
framework adopted herein refers to architectural inertia.
As shown in Figure 278 below, architectural inertia, as asserted by the population ecologists is a
function of a number of organization attributes, including: age, size and reproducible structure
(which is derived from institutionalization and standardized routines). 968
Figure 278: Sources of Architectural Inertia969
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Although the notion of inertia was derived over 300 years ago in the physical sciences, in that
setting, mass or inertia was typically seen as a constant in most problems of physics. In an
organizational setting, inertia is a function of organization age (as shown above), and is therefore
not a constant but variable with respect to time. This makes the dynamic equations of motion
coupled and therefore nonlinear.
Architectural inertia constrains timely evolution of enterprises in response to environmental
shifts. As shown in Figure 279 below, architectural inertia presents difficulty for modular
enterprises which are post-dominant design and competing with integral enterprises; as well as
for integral enterprises which face the discontinuity of creative destruction.
9 Attributed to Boethius, 5' century Roman philosopher.
967 Ackoff, R. (1999). pg. 99.
968 Kelly and Amburgy (1991).
969 Kelly and Amburgy (1991).
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Architectural inertia impacts the nature and importance of strategy as the firm evolves over time.
In other words, is architectural inertia low enough that strategic choice is possible, or is it high
enough that environmental pressures dominate?
Haeuristic 31:
Dominant designs in enterprise architectures grow unchallenged for most of the industry
lifecycle, acquiring architectural inertia, before a new architectural form emerges, making it very
difficult to change its form.
As each enterprise architectural form typifies the initiation of a particular competitive regime
(e.g. modular architectures initiate discontinuities and dominate until the establishment of a
dominant product design, while integral architectures dominate once the dominant design is
established until the next discontinuity is created970), it will have a significant amount of time to
age (i.e. approximately half the duration of the industry S-curve) to grow architectural inertia,
making it very difficult to change when a new enterprise architecture is created.
Figure 279: Strategic Renewal
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Heuristic 3m:
Enterprise architectures that become out-of-fit with their environments, do not rapidly adjust and
can continue to exist (albeit in a less competitive state) long after the emergence of a dominant
design or a technological discontinuity due to architectural inertia.
970 At this stage, the discussion assumes a two-stage modular-integral evolution, as opposed to the three-stage form
discussed later.
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Architectural inertia, while seemingly a function of organization age and size, have different sub-
determinants depending upon whether they are modular or integral.
Modular enterprise architectures are highly flexible and adaptable to environmental change due
to their modular "plug-and-play" interfaces with stakeholders. However architectural inertia
grows over time due to their age, size and routine development.
Heuristic 3u:
Modular enterprise architectures develop architectural inertia over time due to age, size and
routine development, in spite of their inherent flexible, adaptable design.
Integral enterprise architectures are highly inflexible to environmental change due to their high
commitment to stakeholders around a specific environmental regime (e.g. a stable, saturated
market). From architectural design theory, integral architecture forms are highly optimized to
minimize risk and uncertainty in the external environment.
Heuristic 3o:
Integral enterprise architectures also develop architectural inertia over time due to age, size and
routine development, which supplements their inherent inflexible environment-specific form,
"Integrated structures reduce a system 'sflexibility and ability to adapt to environmental changes thus
increasing architectural inertia. "
Heuristic 3v:
As the nature of technological discontinuities tends to consist of large, rare, discrete step-
changes, the "loading function" on the enterprise tends to be a pulse, in the spirit of Shumpete's
"creative destruction."97
Finally, using the theory developed thus far, one can begin to explain why change often does not
occur, even long after the environment has begun to change. Do managers not see the
environmental change? Do they see it, but the inertia is too high making change very slow?
If modular enterprise architectures are built to thrive in growing environments, and integral
enterprise architectures are built to thrive in a less munificent environments, why do modular
architectures continue to pursue their strategies long after the inflection of the environment? The
answer may lie (at least for dynamically complex industries, which exhibit significant "boom and
bust" cycles) in the fact that although the underlying "signal" of the S-curve has long saturated,
there is a second mode "boom and bust" oscillation that is superimposed on the saturated market
(i.e. "noise").
In other words, even though the commercial airplane market (with its current 10-year "boom and
bust" cycle) may have started to saturate fifty years ago, Boeing is still modular because every
five years there is a tremendous growth opportunity. Modular architectures built for rapid
971 Eytan Lasry (University of Toronto, working paper).
972 The enterprise response spectra therefore tend to be shock spectra, Piepenbrock, T. (2004).
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growth stay modular, because rapid growth opportunities still exist as shown schematically in
Figure 280 below.
Figure 280: Cyclical Growth Spurts in a Maturing Industry Inhibit Architectural Change
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6.15.1.4 Punctuated Architectural Change: Exploration and Exploitation
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) argued that punctuated organizational change will occur if the
following three conditions are present:
* The pressure to change is high (i.e. poor performance).
* The ability to change is high (i.e. low structural inertia).
* Environmental misfit is perceived (i.e. visionary leadership).
Sastry (1997) developed a formal system dynamics model of these punctuated change processes
which has been modified as shown in Figure 281 below to adapt to the framework.
Figure 281: Exploit-Explore Dynamics of Architectural Change
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From this figure, one can see the competing dynamics of change in the face of poor performance
as being either:
Execute faster and harder (bottom reinforcing loop).
Realign to achieve environmental fit (top balancing loop).
58(0
.............;;;;;;;;;~~**I **~~I X~
When not facing poor performance, these mechanisms can translate into the well-known
mechanisms of exploitation and exploration.
As can be seen, time spent executing builds inertia, which prevents future change if/when the
environment changes. Therefore, the best way to "dissolve" the inertia or at least keep the
effects of inertia at bay is to continuously take frequent but incremental forays up into the top
balancing loop (mapping out a figure eight around the causal loops) to ensure fit and/or to
explore. This appears to be what Toyota has done well. This may also explain how modular
enterprise architectures which tend toward short-term exploitation, grow significant structural
inertia, making the infrequent attempts at architectural change less successful.
In addition, if there are time delays in determining and implementing architectural change in
response to environmental change, this will result in a worse-before-better tradeoff and
oscillation due to the existence of delays on a balancing loop, which again is a problem
associated with modular enterprise architectures.
6.15.2 Profiles in Courage: Why Re-Integration is Difficult
"This book is about that most admirable of human virtues - courage. 'Grace under pressure, ' Ernest
Hemmingway defined it. And these are the stories of the pressures experienced by eight United States
Senators and the grace with which they endured them - the risks to their careers, the unpopularity of
their courses, the defamation of their characters, and sometimes, but sadly only sometimes, the
vindication of their reputations and their principles.
These problems do not even concern politics alone - for the same basic choice of courage or
compliance continually faces us all, whether we fear the anger of constituents, friends, a board of
directors or our union, whenever we stand against the flow of opinion on strongly contested issues.
A man does what he must - in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and dangers and
pressures - and that is the basis of all human morality.
To be courageous, these stories make clear, requires no exceptional qualifications, no magic
formula, no special combination of time, place and circumstance. The stories of past courage can
define that ingredient - they can teach, they can offer hope, thay can provide inspiration. But they can
not supply courage itself For this each man must look into his own soul. "'97
"Few men are willing to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the
wrath of their society. Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great
intelligence. Yet it is the one essential, vital quality for those who seek to change a world which yields
most pain/fidly to change. ",94
Based on thousand of hours of interviews and ethnographic observation with the top
management teams in the primary case study, one of the striking constructs which emerged from
coding and analysis of the data, is that of "courage."
"If Iunderstand what you are speaking about, you are likely to find [in your research] that the key to
our transformation is courage -which is a rare commodity [in our company] these days- and I wish
you the best of luck. "95
"How dare you insult me - of course we know this [research] is correct! The reason we don't
implement it is that we don't have the courage to!" 976
"Between the idea and the reality, between the conception and the creation, falls the shadow. This is
the way the world ends; This is the way the world ends; This is the way the world ends; Not with a
bang but a whimper. "977
There are many examples in the theoretical sample of unsustained re-integration attempts. In the
automotive industry: the establishment of Saturn with General Motors; Thomas Stallkamp's re-
integration of supplier relationships at Chrysler (Dyer, 2000). In the airline industry, the
Employee Stock Ownership Program at United Airlines (Lowensiten, 2002). In the commercial
airplanes industry, Carolyn Corvi's re-integration of Boeing Commercial Airplanes.
973 Kennedy, J.F. (1955), pp. 1, 224-225.
974 Kennedy, R.F. (1966), speech.
97' Anonymous executive, Jan, 2002.
976 Anonymous executive, Summer, 2006.
977 Elliot, T.S. (1925).
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6.16 Chapter Summary
This chapter was the third of three essays which forms an integrated framework which attempts
to explain long-term firm performance. In this chapter, we defined the construct of industrial
evolution, and how it co-evolves with the performance of firms.
The context for this construct within the framework is shown below in Figure 282. Going back
to Essay #1, we can now begin to see how different enterprise architectures are born or created in
different states of the environment or industrial evolution.
Industry
Output
Stable Markets
(Ecromies of rscope)
Growing Markets
(Economies of Scale)
Industrial
Dynamic
Evolution
1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
Figure 282: Enterprise - Environment Evolution and Co-Evolution within Framework
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Part III: INTEGRATING THE THEORY
Mathematical Model and Numerical Simulation
Equations of Motion. The evolution of business ecosystems will be expressed formally by a
system of coupled simultaneous nonlinear differential equations,978 where the state variables, Xn
are stocks which accumulate net flows (dXn/dt) over time.
dXl/dt = fi(X 1, X 2, ... , Xn)
dX 2/dt = f 2 (XI, X 2 , ... , Xn)
dXn/dt = fn(X 1, X 2 , ... , Xn)
Note that such equations form a feedback system that generates system dynamics endogenously,
via information from the various state variables, which feed back to influence their own rates of
change. 979 When formulating these equations of motion, we aim for parsimony, i.e. the least
amount of causal structure to explain the most salient features of the dynamic behavior of the
evolution of business ecosystems. 98 0 Clearly more detailed models can (and eventually
hopefully will) add more precise insights into this dynamic phenomena.
Conceptual Formulation. The combined model represents a predator-prey interaction, with two
firm "predators" in interspecies competition for a market "prey" evolving into two niches. The
organization-environment ecosystem model will consist of four primary state variables. The
market environment K will be represented in the two dimensions of quantity (i.e. the state of
diffusion) and quality (i.e. the state of commoditization). The competitive environment will be
represented in two dimensions representing species archetypes of early entrant "market-maker"
X and later entrant "market-taker" Y. The basic ecological interactions between organization
and environment are shown in Figure 283 below.
Figure 283: Constituent Elements of Conceptual Model
Supply & Demand + Competition " Combined
Model Model Model
-
--- 
-
-
--- - --
978 In the traditions of the general system theory (e.g. Von Bertalanffy, 1950), cybernetics (e.g. Ashby, 1952),
system dynamics (e.g. Forrester, 1961); as well as organizational ecology (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
System dynamics has been used for many years to model firm competition - See Appendix G for a brief
summary. Most formulations are made with operational managerial decisions, while this research uses a higher-
level ecological system formulation.
. ......................... -- -- - - -- -- -- -- --- -- ---- --
Chapter 7
First, we present a model of supply and demand interaction. Most theories of the firm are
unsurprisingly firm-centric and take the product/service offering as representing "supply" to a
market of customers representing "demand". This ecosystem model focuses its lens on the
carrying capacity of the market as representing "supply" of revenues to a market of competing
firms representing "demand" for that revenue. Crucially, by allowing the market K to vary over
time in terms of amount and type of product/service demanded/supplied, we lay the theoretical
foundations for the emergence of heterogeneous competing organizational species X and Y. Note
that the market K size (a stock) positively affects the growth rates (flows) of the competitors.
Second, we present a model of inter-species competition. Here we note simply that in a market
of finite carrying capacity, one firm's amount of market, say X (a stock), negatively impacts or
reduces the growth rate of its competitor's (a flow), in what is known in the ecological sciences
as "exploitation" (as opposed to) "interference" competition. This simple formulation
endogenously links the competitor organizations with their environment in closed-loop feedback.
Unlike the classic Lotka-Volterra predator-prey equations in which the closed loop is negative or
balancing generating oscillations, here the feedback is positive or reinforcing, resulting in the
unstable "principle of competitive exclusion." We seek however, a nonlinear parametization of
the model which will enable the inter-species dominance-switching observed empirically.
Model Build-Up. In the following sections, the model will be constructed progressively, each
time adding a higher level of sophistication in order to more clearly understand the underlying
assumptions, parameters, structure and behavior of the model at each stage of complexity. 98 1
The following partial models will be analyzed and discussed sequentially:
Constant (Unchanging) Market
Intra-species Competition in a Constant Market
Inter-species Competition in a Constant Market
Diffusing Market (Quantity)
Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
Commoditizing Market (Quality)
Intra-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
Inter-species "Competition" in a Commoditizing Market
Diffusing, Commoditizing Market (Quantity and Quality)
Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
Advanced Topics
Firm-sector Topics
Market-sector Topics
Section 7.1
Section 7.2
Section 7.3
Section 7.4
Section 7.5
980 Although the mathematical notation used in this chapter is slightly modified from that used in the Executive
Summary at the beginning of this document, the underlying structure and dynamics remain unchanged.
981 1 would like to thank Ventana Systems Inc., for the generous use of their dyamic simulation software, Vensim,
7.1 Competition in a Constant (Unchanging) Market Environment
7.1.1 Single Firm Growth in an Infinite Market
First, we assume a monopolist operating under increasing returns to scale. This assumption
captures a variety of business phenomena including economies of scale, learning curve effects,
etc. Under this reinforcing feedback, the more market the firm accumulates, the faster it
continues to be accumulated.
Second, we assume initially that the firm exists in a market of unlimited growth potential -
unlimited carrying capacity. The firm then is able to grow at its maximum fractional rate, r
which is assumed to be constant and is determined by a number of goals and constraints which
might include the rate of return on residual cash flows promised to risk bearers. 98 2
Most models in organizational ecology focus on population size or density - expressed as number
of organizations - as the primary state variable, which accumulates net flows of organizational
entries and exits (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Population size is of lower importance in
these formulations. This paper however focuses instead on organizational size as approximated
by the amount of environmental resources an organization accumulates, or more specifically in
the case of business ecosystems, the amount of a market a firm possesses. In this way, a
population could consist of a spectrum of organizations ranging from a large number of equally
sized firms, each possessing the same percentage of the total market; to a single firm operating as
a monopolist possessing the entire market. We will derive equations of motion for a firm
accumulating market, X over time.983
The following differential equation captures this simple reinforcing feedback:
dX/dt = ARx = rxX (1)
Where:
* X = firm X's acquired market
* dX/dt = the rate of change of firm X's market acquisition
* ARx = firm X's acquisition rate of market (the inflow into X)
* rx = firm X's maximum fractional acquisition rate of market
Constants. The model has one active "constant", rx which is undoubtedly a time-dependent
variable. This will be enforced in the next formulation.
982 This is actually the fractional net growth rate, and has the units of percent of market growth per unit of time.
983 For the present discussion, we assume that the firm converts demand into supply instantaneously or without any
delays associated with order backlogs, inventory backlogs etc. Such delays in a balancing loop can account for
cyclical oscillatory behavior. As the time horizon of interest in this evolutionary research is measured in centuries,
the oscillations which manifest themselves over timeframes of decades are of secondary importance.
Figure 284 below illustrates the causal structure98' of this linear first-order formulation, which
results in unrestrained exponential growth of the firm's market acquisition.
Figure 284: Model Structure of Single Firm Growth in an Infinite Market
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Figure 285 below shows the relationship between the firm's Fractional Acquisition Rate, rx and
the amount of the available market that it has taken. In this simple model of the firm, rx is
assumed to be constant and independent of the market availability.
Figure 285: Fractional Acquisition Rate of Firm in an Infinite Market
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Organisms and organizations which maintain a constant rx are known as "opportunist" species or
r-strategists (Brittain and Freeman, 1980) that build - or take - ecosystems at high rates of
growth and then exit them once the underlying growth opportunities diminish to find new
opportunities in other ecosystems.
984 In the diagrammatic representations of the differential equations, the "box" variables represent stocks or
accumulations, while the variables below the "valves" represent rates or flows in and out of the stocks.
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A firm starting out in a new ecosystem or market with constant rx exists in an unstable
equilibrium and exhibits unsustainable exponential growth that ultimately exceeds the carrying
capacity of the ecosystem. The dynamic behaviour of such a firm is illustrated in Figure 286
below.
Figure 286: Dynamic Behavior of a Single Firm in an Infinite Market
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One can either view this formulation as firm growth in an unlimited market, or as the early
growth of a firm in a finite market, when its accumulated quantity of market, X is far from the
carrying capacity of the market. What happens to this firm as it approaches the carrying capacity
of the ecosystem will be covered in the subsequent section.
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7.1.2 Single Firm Growth in a Constant, Finfite Market
As no firm exists in an infinitely rich resource environment, we next constrain the model by
imposing finite but constant market carrying capacity, K, which might represent the size of
population of potential customers or sales. The model now needs another feedback, this time a
balancing loop which enables the firm growth to begin to slow down as it approaches the
ecosystem's carrying capacity.
We therefore extend the previous differential equations to capture the mode-switching from
reinforcing to balancing feedback as the firm approaches the carrying capacity of the market.
This new logistic equation is shown below:985
dX/dt = ARx = rxX (1 - X/K.) (2)
= rxX - rxX2/1,k
Where:
* K = the market carrying capacity of the ecosystem 986
Constants. The model has two "constants", K and rx which are undoubtedly time-dependent
variables. For example, exogenous factors influencing the market carrying capacity K are
consumer population size and wealth per capita, both time-dependent variables. A firm's
maximum fractional acquisition rate rx is also influenced by exogenous factors like stakeholder
goals, resourse access, etc. each of which may also be time-dependent variables.
Figure 287 below illustrates the causal structure of this linear first-order formulation, which
results in logistic growth of the firm's market acquisision. Note that since there is only in inflow
to the stock of Acquired market X (which is controlled by both reinforcing and balancing loops)
the value of the stock can only ever increase.
Figure 287: Model Structure of Single Firm Growth in a Constant Market
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985 This was first formulated in social systems by Verhulst (1838) in his logistic population growth model.
Figure 288 below shows the relationship between the firm's Fractional Acquisition Rate, rx and
the amount of the available market that it has taken. In this simple model of the firm, rx is
assumed to vary linearly with the the market availability. The assumption here is that, as the firm
acquires more of the finite market, K, the rate of firm growth, rx begins to reduce linearly987 ,
making the organization's rate of growth dependent upon the proportion of the carrying capacity
that remains unexploited""988 .
Figure 288: Fractional Acquisition Rate of Firm in a Constant Market98 9
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Organisms and organizations which vary their underlying growth rate rx in response to the
market carrying capacity, K are known as "equilibrium" species or K-strategists (Brittain and
Freeman, 1980) that build - or take - ecosystems at slower rates of growth and then await for
other ecosystems to be built by r-strategists before they move into that new market.
A firm starting out in a new ecosystem or market with linearly declining rx exists in an unstable
equilibrium and exhibits logistic growth towards the carrying capacity of the ecosystem.
Figure 289 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of this nonlinear first-order formulation,
which results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth of the firm's market capture.
986 Note: K need not be constant nor homogeneous. We will explore each in subsequent sections.
987 This linear relationship, which produces logistic growth, will be relaxed in subsequent sections which explore
interspecies competition.
988 This is called "mass dependence" in the organizational ecology literature.
989 Note that the two axes of this figure represent the two exogenous factors in the model structure: the Maximum
Fractional Acquisition Rate (vertical axis) and the amount of available market remaining (horizontal axis).
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Figure 289: Dynamic Behavior of a Single Firm in a Constant Market
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7.1.3 Intra-species Competition in a Constant Market99°
In most markets, no firm exists without competition; we therefore need to next introduce
competition between firms for customers in a common market. At this point, we assume two
identical isomorphic competitors, X1 and X2 having homogeneous enterprise architectures
occupying the same mathematical point niche. We therefore extend the previous differential
equation (2) to account for the simple fact that the addition of sales to either competitor
decreases the rate of growth of the other competitor. 99" Both competitors are now connected via
a reinforcing loop that amplifies differences in market share resulting in an unstable
equilibrium.992 The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown below:993
dX1/dt = ARx, = rxiXi (1 - XI/K - X2 al 2/K) (3a)
= rxiX1 - rxiXi2/K- rxlXX2 CtlE/K
dX2/dt = ARx2 = rX2X2 (1 - X2/K - Xi a21/K) (3b)
= r2X2 - rx2X22/K- rX2X 2Xla 21/K
Where:
* al12 = firm Xi's competition coefficient
* a21 = firm X2's competition coefficient
The competition coefficient defines the intensity of competition. If firm X 1 competes directly in
the same market or niche as firm X2, then its competition coefficient a12 = 1. This is the implicit
assumption of the model formulation at this point. Later, we will explore the opposite case,
where the competition coefficient a = 0, that is competition in heterogeneous (commoditizing)
market environments, in which niches develop that are suited to different species of organiztions.
Figure 290 below illustrates the causal structure of this nonlinear second-order formulation,
which results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth of each competitor's market capture. Provided that
both firms have identical forms and occupy the same market niche, no two-firm (or more
generally, two-population) equilibrium can be stable - any exogenous shock to the system will
result in the elimination of one of the firms (or populations).994
990 By definition, in intra-species competition each stock represents a firm (or collection of firms having similar
growth rate characteristics) but not an entire species.
1 In ecology, this is called "exploitation" (vs. "interference") competition (Brian, 1956). Other dynamic models
formulate competition using more operational variables (Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker and Newman, 2007).
992 This severe "winner-takes-all" competitive assumption is akin to Bertrand (price) competition, rather than the
weaker form of Cournot (quantity) competition where the market is shared in proportion to relative firm growth
rates. Under this assumption, the "competition coefficients", al 2 and a21 equal 1.
993 This system of equations formed the basis for modeling competition within the seminal organizational ecology
framework (Hannan and Freeman, 1977: 942). It is based on the classic Lotka-Volterra equations for competing
populations, after Lotka (1925) and Volterra (1931). Note that this is different from the classic Lotka-Volterra
equations forpredator-prey populations which generate chaotic oscillation due to a central balancing loop.
994 This is known in ecosystem theory as the "principle of competitive exclusion" (Gause, 1934).
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Figure 290: Model Structure of Intra-species Competition in a Constant Market995
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Figure 291 below shows the relationship between the competing firms' Fractional Acquisition
Rates, rxi and rx2 and the amount of the available market that they have collectively taken.
Figure 291: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Competing Firms in a Constant Market
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995 Note that the only exogenous variables are the maximum growth rates,
factors, as will be discussed in subsequent sections.
These are a function of a variety of
Figure 292 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of intra-species competition between
homogeneous firms in a constant market. In this case, both firms unsurprisingly split the market
50%-50%. Their peak acquisition rates are also unsurprisingly half the acquisition rate of a
monopolist. What might be surprising is that the peak aqusition rates of the competitors occurs
before that of a single monopolist, due to the fact that each acquisition impacts both the firm and
its competitor, i.e. the reinforcing loop that now links competitors.
Figure 292: Dynamic Behavior of Intra-species Competition in a Constant Market
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7.1.3.1 Parametric Study: Initial Conditions
Figure 293 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of intra-species competition between two
firms having differing initial acquired markets - one firm having twice the initial acquired
market than the other. This formulation assumes that both firms are equally efficient, however
one firm has greater luck or initial endowments.
Here, a simple linear relationship exists between the initial endowment of a firm (as expressed by
its initial acquired market) and its success. Specifically, a doubling of the initial fraction of
acquired market, results in a doubling of the acquired market - here a 67% to 33% split of the
acquired market.
Figure 293: Dynamic Behavior of of Competing Initial Acquired Markets
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7.1.3.2 Parametric Study: Fractional Acquisition Rates
Next, we explore intra-species competition between two firms having different efficiencies,
which is reflected in their maximum fractional acquisition rate, capturing the relative
attractiveness of a firm's products and services (see for example, Paich & Sterman, 1993).
Although not explicitly part of the model presented herein, a number of operational factors can
impact a firm's efficiency or maximum fractional acquisition rate, including its investment in
R&D in product innovation, process innovation, or its investment in marketing/advertising as
illustrated in Figure 294 below.
Figure 294: Model Structure of Relative Attractiveness of a Firm's Products/Services
The relationship between competing firm's fractional acquisition rates and their acquired market
relative to the market carrying capacity is illustrated in Figure 295 below.
Figure 295: Fractional Acquistion Rates of Firms in Intra-species Competition
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Figure 296 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of intra-species competition between two
firms having differing fractional acquisition rates - one firm having twice the factional
acquisition rate than the other. This formulation simply assumes that one firm is more efficient
than the other.
Here, the principle of competitive exclusion operates, namely that a nonlinear relationship exists
between the efficiency of a firm (as expressed by its maximum fractional acquisition rate) and its
success. Specifically, a doubling of the maximum fractional acquisition rate, results in a greater
than doubling of the acquired market - here a 95% to 5% split of the acquired market. What is
slightly counter-intuitive, is that the slower, less-competitive firm peaks sooner than the faster,
more-competitive firm.
Figure 296: Dynamic Behavior of Competing Fractional Acquisition Rates
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7.1.4 Inter-species Competition in a Constant Market
We will next cover the case of inter-species competition in a constant, unchanging environment.
This case is weak theoretically because significant sustained environmental variation is required
in order to produce and sustain significant variation in organizational species. Inter-species
competition in a constant market could be a special parametric study when exploring inter-
species competition in a logistic growth market, in which the market diffusion rate is much
greater than the competitor growth rates.
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
dX/dt = ARx = rxX (1 - X/K - Yaxv/K) (4a)
= rxX - rxX2/K- rxXYaxy/K
dY/dt = ARy = rvY (1 -Y/K - X avx/K) (4b)
= ryY - ryY2/K- ryYXavyx/K
The incumbent species, X which builds the market is known in bio-ecology as an r-strategist,
and the late-entrant challenger species, Y which takes the market is known as a K-strategist
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). The primary difference between this formulation and the
previous, is that each competitor's fractional net growth rates are no longer linearly density-
dependent, with the (Modular) r-strategist growing faster when the environment is experiencing
rapid growth, and the (Integral) K-strategist growing faster when the environment's rate of
growth is slowing down, as shown in Figure 297 below.
rx > ry when (X+Y) < K/2 (4c)
rx < ry when (X+Y) > K/2 (4d)
Figure 297: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Firms in Inter-species Competition
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Figure 298 below illustrates the causal structure of this nonlinear second-order formulation,
which results in non-sigmoid S-shaped growth of each competitor's market capture.
Figure 298: Model Structure of Inter-species Competition in a Constant Market
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Figure 299 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of inter-species competition between
heterogeneous firms in a constant market. First, note that the non-linear fractional acquisition
rates result in non-logistic growth in the stocks and asymmetric flow diagrams. Second, note that
their peak acquisition rates occur at different times, with X occurring before and Y occurring
after the case of intra-species competition. Third, note that in spite of the fact that the maximum
flow rates are different and occur at different times, the areas under the respective rate curves
are similar, meaning that both firms ultimately split the market 50%-50%. Finally, note that X's
factional acquisition rate time history is a single reverse S-curve which is steeper than the intra-
species case, and that Y's factional acquisition rate time history is a double reverse S-curve.
Figure 299: Dynamic Behavior of Inter-species Competition in a Constant Market
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7.2 Competition in a Diffusing Market (Quantity)
7.2.1 Diffusing Market (Quantity)
Next, we relax the assumption of a constant carrying capacity of the market or resource
environment, K (Brittain, 1994). Instead, we permit sigmoid growth as it approaches its own
inherent carrying capacity. 996 This assumption captures the scenario of a new product/service
that either:
1) diffuses logistically throughout a constant population of potential consumers (Bass,
1969), or
2) diffuses instantaneously through a logistically-growing population of potential
consumers (Verhulst, 1838), or
3) some combination of the two.
7.2.1.1 First-Order Two-Stock Logistic Growth
Previously, we modeled a firm's logistic growth with one stock and two loops, reinforcing and
balancing. We now demonstrate that this structure can be represented more intuitively for a
market as a two-stock, two-loop structure by introducing a complementary variable, the potential
market, P.
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown in its most simple form below:
dP/dt = - DR = - rdA (1 - A/K) (5a)
noting P = K - A = - rdPA/K
dA/dt= DR= rdA (1 - A/K) (5b)
noting P = K-A = rdPA/K
Where:
* P = potential market
* A = adopted market
* dP/dt = the rate of change of the potential market
* dA/dt = the rate of change of the adopted market
* DR = diffusion rate of market (the inflow into A, outflow from P)
* rd = maximum fractional diffusion rate of the market
The equivalence of these two market growth model structures is shown in Figure 300 below.997
996 For simplicity, we model a linear relationship between the diffusion rate and available carrying capacity, which
results in logistic growth.
997 Note this model structure is the same as modeling chronic infectious diseases, where the susceptible population
all eventually becomes infected - also known as the SI model. See Sterman (2000), pp. 300-301.
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Figure 300: Equivalence of Logistic Market Growth Model Structures
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7.2.1.2 Bass Industry Diffusion Model
Although the above model captures the basic diffusion of a technology, product or service into a
market, it suffers from a subtle modeling problem, namely how does the dis-equilirium
momentum get started? A simple way around the problem is to give the Adopted market A stock
an initial positive value, which is shown above as the "Initial Adopted market A Fraction" and is
formalized as a small fraction of the Carrying Capacity, K. While this mathematically solves the
"start-up" problem, it implies that at time zero, there was already an existing diffused market, no
matter how small.
A more appealing formal model of the start-up problem was used by Bass (1969), in which an
additional balancing loop is used on the outflow from the Potential market P to initiate the model
momentum. Bass conceived this operationally as an advertising function which generated
market or product awareness. We add this additional structure to the model, with the new,
coupled system of differential equations is shown in its most simple form below:
dP/dt= - DR = - rdA (1 - A/K) + rdsP (5c)
noting P = K - A = - (rdPA/K + rdsP)
dA/dt = DR = rdA (1 - A/K) + rdsP (5d)
noting P = K - A = rdPA/K+ rdsP
Where:
* rds = maximum fractional start-up rate of the diffusing market
The Bass diffusion model formulation is shown in Figure 301 below and compared with the
previous diffusion model.
.............;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
Figure 301: Comparing the Structures of Diffusion Models
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Figure 302: The Dynamic Behavior of a Bass Industry Diffusion Model
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7.2.1.3 Bass Industry Diffusion Model with Replacements
The above industry diffusion model assumes that once a unit of market is captured, it remains
captured (or adopted) forever. This implies that the market consists of durable goods, with an
infinite product life.
In order to make the model more generalizable or more applicable to a wider range of products
and services covering a continuum of average product lives, we introduce the notion of
replacements to the Bass industry diffusion model.
The new structure of the model requires a new outflow from the Adopted market A back towards
the Potential market P, in which a new balancing loop on the outflow which controls the
replacement rate.999 The resulting behavior of this local structure is exponential decay.
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown in its most simple form below:
noting P = K- A
noting P = K- A
dP/dt = - DR = A/L - (rdA (1 - A/K) + rdsP)
= A/L - (rdPA/K + rdsP)
dA/dt = DR - = (rdA (1 - A/K) + rdsP) - A/L
= (rdPA/K+ rdsP) - A/L
Where:
* RR = replacement rate of market (the inflow into P, outflow from A)
* L = Average product life
The industry diffusion model with replacements is shown in Figure 303 below.
Figure 303: Bass Industry Diffusion Model with Replacements
Average
Product Life L
Diffusion Start-up Rate rds Diffusion Rate rd
999Note, the primary model structure (two flows, three loops: balancing, reinforcing & balancing) is similar to the
modeling of acute infectious diseases, where the susceptible population (Potential market P) can move to an infected
state (Adopted market A) before they move towards a recovered state (Potential market P) - also known as the SIR
model. See Sterman (2000), pg. 303.
(5e)
(5f)
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Figure 304 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of the stocks in this nonlinear first-order
formulation. The results of a parametric study of durability of offering (decreasing from left to
right) indicate sigmoid or S-shaped growth for the resource environment, albeit with inflection
and peaking occurring later with decreasing durability. This occurs because the lower the
durability, the more time spent producing replacement market (and the higher percentage of the
Potential market P, that remains potential).
Figure 304: Dynamic Behavior of Stocks
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The results of a parametric analysis of the rates in a diffusing market are presented in Figure 305
below. As the derivative (slope) of the stocks, equals the value of the rates, it is clear that the
peak rates of change in the stocks decline as the durability decreases.
Dissecting the rate of change of Available market A (i.e. dA/dt) into its constituent flows of
diffusion and replacement rates, reveals that: 1) the replacement rates grow logistically and
increasingly as durability decreases, 2) the diffusion rates maintain their peaks, but these peaks
are delayed with decreasing durability, and the shape moves from bell-shaped to S-shaped; 3) the
diffusion and replacement rates approach each other as durability decreases - the definition of a
service.
Figure 305: Dynamic Behavior of Changes in Stocks and Constituent Flows
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The results of a parametric analysis of the accumulated diffusion in market with replacements are
presented in Figure 306 below. When the diffusion rates and replacement rates eventually meet
in equilibrium, the accumulated diffusion continues to grow at that constant equilibrium rate.
Finaly, while durable product industries may diffuse relatively fast, their total market size is
smaller than service industries, which diffuse relatively slowly, but which have larger total
markets.
Figure 306: Dynamic Behavior of Diffusion Rates and Accumulated Diffusion
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Finally, coming full circle, the results of a parametric analysis of the accumulated diffusion in
market with replacements are presented in Figure 307 below. For a durable product,
accumulated diffusion is the same as the Adopted market A, as there are no retirements.
decreasing durability, the meaning of the Adopted market A loses some relevance.
Figure 307: Dynamic Behavior of Accumulated Diffusion & Stocks
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7.2.1.4 Industry Studies of Diffusing Markets
This section demonstrates how the diffusing market model can be applied conceptually to a
series of industries.'oo Figure 308 below demonstrates how the diffusing market model is
applied to the commercial airplane industry.
Figure 308: Diffusing Market in the Commercial Airplane Industry
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Figure 309 below demonstrates how the diffusing market model is applied to the global airline
industry.
Figure 309: Diffusing Market in the Global Airline Industry
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Finally, when comparing the dynamics of a value chain, Figure 310 below demonstrates how the
diffusing market model is applied to the global airline and commercial airplane industry.
Figure 310: Diffusing Market in the Global Passenger Air Transport Value Chain
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Intuitively, one may think of airplanes (having 30 year product lives) as being relatively durable
goods. But from the previous figures, their annual production rates do not exhibit the classic
"bell-shaped curve" associated with the first derivative of an S-shaped stock. What this
demonstrates, however, is that the notion of product "durability" is relative to the diffusion rate
of the industry. For example, if we kept the product life of an airplane as 30 years, but had the
the diffusion of air transport increase say four-fold, we would begin to see the classic "bell-
shaped curve" as shown in Figure 311 below.
.............................
Figure 311: Comparing Product Durability vs. Market Diffusion Rate
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7.2.1.5 Market Diffusion & Obsolescence
Having produced a model of how a market "grows" or diffuses, we will explore how a market
"dies" or becomes overtaken by a substitute market. Instead of discussing this here, it will be
treated as a special case covered in section 7.5 under "Advanced Topics."
(annual airplane deliveries)
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7.2.2 Single Firm Growth in a Diffusing Market
Next, we study how a single firm grows in a diffusing market, before we proceed to investigate
competition in a diffusing market. The model structure is shown in Figure 312 below.
Figure 312: Model Structure of Single Firm Growth in a Diffusing Market
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The Fractional Acquisition Rate of a Single Firm X is assumed to be a linear function of the
carrying capacity of the market A, as shown in figure Figure 313 below. We will relax this
assumption later, when we investigate inter-species competition.
Figure 313: Fractional Acquisition Rate of a Single Firm in a Diffusing Market
Unstable
Equilibrium
L
< rx/2
LL
0
0.5
XIA
Stable
Equilibrium
The dynamic behavior of a single firm in a diffusing market is summarized in Figure 314 below.
From left to right, we explore the effects of increasing maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates.
Figure 314: Dynamic Behavior of Single Firm in a Diffusing Market
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As can be seen, when the firm grows at the market diffusion rate (left column), there is a
considerable time lag before it penetrates the market fully. However, when the firm grows at
twice the market diffusion rate (center column), the time lag is greatly reduced and the firm
begins to follow the market diffusion. Finally, when the firm grows very fast relative to the
market diffusion rate (right column), it essentiall tracks the market diffusion.
0015
7.2.3 Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
Next, we reintroduce two members of the same species, competing for the logistically growing
market. The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown in its most simple form
below:
dX,/dt = ARxl = rxlX1 - rX1iX 2/K- rXIXIX2 (E12/K
dX 2/dt = ARx2 = rx2X2 - rx2X 22/K- rX2X 2Xla 2 1/K
dP/dt = - DR = A/L - (rdPA/K + rdsP)
dA/dt = DR - = (rdPA/K + rdsP) - A/L
(6a)
(6b)
(6c)
(6d)
Figure 315 below illustrates the causal structure of this nonlinear third-order formulation, which
again results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth for both the resource environment and the dominant
firm (or population of firms) that created it.
Figure 315: Model Structure of Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
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Although this refinement of Hannan and Freeman's (1977) classic does not itself add new
insights into the behavior of competing organizations or populations, it is a necessary building
block for the next step of the formulation of the evolution of business ecosystems, namely, it
establishes the condition necessary for the establishment of interspecies competition, resulting in
an extension of the theory of competitive exclusion (Gause, 1934).
Figure 316 below illustrates the fractional acquisition rates rx as a function of the available
carrying capacity of two homogeneous competitors (i.e. both are equally efficient) engaged in
intra-species competition.
Figure 316: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Homogeneous Firms in Intra-species Competition
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The previous dynamic behavior of a single firm in a diffusing market is compared (on the left)
with intra-species competition in a diffusing market (on the right) in Figure 317 below. As can
be seen, a single firm having a maximum Fractional Acqusition Rate of 0.14 exhibits the same
behavior at two identical competitors (splitting the market) and each having a maximum
Fractional Acqusition Rate of 0.14.
. .. ... ...... ..........
Figure 317: Dynamic Behavior of a Single Firm and Intra-species Compeition in a Difusing
Market
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Figure 318 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of intra-species competition between
homogeneous firms in a logistically diffusing market, having identical but increasing maximum
fractional acquisition rates, rx. First in looking at the stocks, note that identical competitors
continue to split the market 50%-50%. Next in looking at the stocks and flows, note that a phase
lag develops between demand and supply, i.e. the Adopted market A, and the sum of the
competitors' Acquired markets X, when the firms' maximum fractional acquisition rates are
relatively low. Finally note that when firms' Fractional Acquisition Rates are very high (i.e.
1.0), the FARs initially drop very fast, because initially the firms are growing much faster than
the market is diffusing, in order to make up for the initial gap made by the finite A at time 0 (a
start-up problem).
Figure 318: Dynamic Behavior of Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market (with
Increasing Homogeneous Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates)
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Figure 319 below illustrates the fractional acquisition rates rx as a function of the available
carrying capacity of two heterogeneous competitors (i.e. one is more efficient than the other)
engaged in intra-species competition.
Figure 319: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Heterogeneous Firms in Intra-species Competition
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Figure 320 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of intra-species competition between
homogenous firms in a logistically diffusing market, having heterogeneous maximum fractional
acquisition rates, rx. Here, when the firms have heterogeneous Maximum Fractional Acquisition
Rates, the principle of Competitive Exclusion again occurs.
I
Figure 320: Dynamic Behavior of Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing Market (with
Heterogeneous Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates)
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7.2.4 Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
Since in the previous stage, we have allowed the environment to grow logistically, we can now
acknowledge the possibility of variation in organizational forms as a consequence of variation in
environmental rates of growth. This gives rise to the potential for dominance switching: i.e. the
late entry of a new species of organization, and the associated early exit of the incumbent
species. The two types of competing organizational species modeled therefore reflect either
increasing rates or decreasing rates of environmental growth.
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
rx > ry when (X+Y) < K/2 dX/dt = rxX - rxX2/K - rxXYxy/K (7a)
rx < ry when (X+Y) > K/2 dY/dt = rvY - ryY2/K- ryXYayx/K (7b)
dP/dt = - DR = A/L - (rdPA/K + rdsP) (7c)
dA/dt = DR - = (rdPA/K + rdsP) - A/L (7d)
The incumbent species, X which builds the market is known in bio-ecology as an r-strategist,
and the late-entrant challenger species, Y which takes the market is known as a K-strategist
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). The primary difference between this formulation and the
previous, is that each competitor's fractional net growth rates are no longer linearly density-
dependent, with the (Modular) r-strategist growing faster when the environment is experiencing
rapid growth, and the (Integral) K-strategist growing faster when the environment's rate of
growth is slowing down, as shown in Figure 321 below.
Figure 321: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Competing Firms in a Difusing Maket
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Figure 322 below summarizes the causal structure of this nonlinear third-order formulation
which results in S-shaped (but no longer logistic) growth for the competitor's state variables.
Crucially note that the r-strategist tends to exit when the growth rate of the market begins to drop
below its own growth objectives. Environmental variance therefore produces variance in the
architectures of the organizational sets, which creates symbiotic inter-species competition, with a
more complex theory of competitive exclusion.
Figure 322: Model Structure of Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing Market
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Figure 323 below compares the dynamic behavior of inter-species competition between
heterogeneous firms in constant and diffusing markets.
Figure 323: Dynamic Behavior Comparing Inter-species competition in Constant & Diffusing
Markets
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Figure 324 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of of inter-species competition between
heterogeneous firms in a diffusing market, in which both competitors have the same maximum
fractional net growth rates.
Figure 324: Dynamic Behavior Comparing Inter-species competition in a Diffusing Market
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7.3 Competition in a Commoditizing Market (Quality)
7.3.1 Commoditizing Market (Quality)
Having permitted the carrying capacity of the market, K to grow logistically, we now go back to
a constant market assumption, but instead allow the quality of the market customer preferences
to diffuse (or commoditize) from high-performance differentiated products and services towards
low-cost products and services (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Christensen, 1997). This in
effect allows market niches to evolve, which has the potential to shape the entry and exit of
different species of organizational sets or enterprise architectures.
In the model of market diffusion discussed previously, the potential market is assumed to decay
logistically (and the associated adopted market is assumed to grow logistically). This makes
some intuitive sense, as market growth initially builds slowly with increasing speed, as the
customers become more aware of the product/service, and as the suppliers build
capacity/capabilities on an increasing returns basis. These increasing rates of growth eventually
give way to slowing rates of growth due the approach of the finite carrying capacity of the
market. Such causal structure generates logistic behavior.
A legitimate question arises however regarding the commoditization in a market, namely does
the supply/demand for high-performance differentiated goods/services decay exponentially, or
logistically (like quantity growth). Do the rates of commoditization initially begin at their
maximum, or is there initially a slow period of commoditization (caused by entrepreneurially
innovative inertia) before the onset of commoditization?
In order to build a model of such commoditization, we begin with a simple, single-loop
(balancing) producing exponential decay of the differentiated products niche, before we move
onto a more complex double-loop (balancing and reinforcing) producting logistic decay of the
differentiated products niche. The governing causal logic will ultimately be determined via
careful longitudinal empirical data collection and analysis.
7.3.1.1 Single-Loop Exponential Decay
The differential equations defining exponential decay are shown below:
dD/dt = - CR = - rcD (8a)
dC/dt = CR = rcD (8b)
Where:
* D = the market for differentiated products & services
* C = the market for cost-leadership in products & services
* dD/dt = the rate of change of the market for differentiated products & services
* dC/dt = the rate of change of the market for cost-leadership in products & services
* CR = commoditization of market (the outflow from D, the inflow into C)
* r, = maximum fractional commoditization rate of the market
. .................................................. ------ -- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - -
The basic single-loop commoditization model is shown in Figure 325 below. Note that the
carrying capacity of the adopted market, A plays no role here, with the fractional
commoditization rate r, not being reduced.
Figure 325: The Structure of a Commoditizing Market (with Exponential Decay)
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The dynamic behavior of a commoditizing market with exponential decay of the original
differentiation niche is shown in Figure 326 below.
Figure 326: Dynamic Behavior of a Commoditing Market (with Exponential Decay)
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7.3.1.2 Double-Loop Logistic Decay
Next, we add a reinforcing loop on the inflow to the cost market. The differential equations
defining logistic decay are shown below:
noting D = A- C
noting D = A- C
dD/dt = - CR = - rcC (1 - C/A)
= - rDC/A
dC/dt= CR= rC (1 - C/A)
= rcDC/A
(8c)
(8d)
The double-loop commoditization model is shown in Figure 327 below.
Figure 327: The Structure of a Commoditizing Market (with Logistic Decay)
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Initial Cost market
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The dynamic behavior of a commoditizing market with logistic decay of the original
differentiation niche is shown in Figure 328 below. The behavior of this nonlinear first-order
formulation, again results in sigmoid or S-shaped growth for the transforming resource
environment.'o l ' Note, the addition of a reinforcing loop acts to slow down the commoditization,
by reducing the fractional commoditization rate, re as the cost market, C approaches the carrying
capacity of the adopted market, A.
1001 Again, as in the characterization of the diffusing market, the commoditizing market's sigmoid growth is
assumed to proceed logistically, for analytical simplicity.
Figure 328: Dynamic Behavior of a Commoditizing Market (with Logistic Decay)
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7.3.1.3 Bass Industry Commoditization Model
Finally, in order to avoid the start-up problem, as we did in the formulation of the industry
diffusion model, we add another balancing loop which captures the effects of awareness. The
two model structures are compared in Figure 329 below.
Figure 329: Comparing the Structures of Commoditizing Models
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7.3.2 Single Firm Growth in a Commoditizing Market
Next, we study how a single firm grows in a commoditizing market, before we proceed to
investigate competition in a commoditizing market. The model structure is shown in Figure 330
below.
Figure 330: Model Structure of Single Firm Growth in a Commoditizing Market
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The Fractional Acquisition Rates of Firm X are assumed to be a linear function of the carrying
capacities of the two market niches D and C, as shown in Figure 330 below. We will relax this
assumption later, when we investigate inter-species competition.
Figure 331: Fractional Acquisition Rate of a Single Firm in a Commoditizing Market
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The dynamic behavior of a single firm in a commoditizing market is summarized in Figure 332
below, where the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates for market niches D and C are assumed
to be identical (i.e. the firm is equally efficient in acquiring Differentiated niches as it is in
acquiring Cost niches). From left to right, we explore the effects of increasing pairs of maximum
Fractional Acquisition Rates.
Figure 332: Dynamic Behavior of Single Firm in a Commoditizing Market
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As can be seen, when the firm grows slower than the commoditization rate (left column), the
stock of X market acquired begins to approximate a single logistic curve, as it expands into the
Cost market C.
Conversely, when the firm grows faster than the commoditization rate (right column), the stock
of X market acquired begins to approximate double logistic curves, as it expands rapidly first
into D, and then rapidly into the Cost market C (after it develops).
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The dynamic behavior of a single firm in a commoditizing market having differing abilities to
acqhire a Differentiated market D is summarized in Figure 333 below. From left to right, we
explore the effects of increasing maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates for the Differentiated
market, D, while holding the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates for the Cost market, C
constant.
Figure 333: Parametric Study of FARs on Differentiation Market
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As can be seen, when the firm grows slower than the diffusion rate (left column), the stock of X
market acquired is shifted initially to the right of the Cost market C.
Conversely, when the firm grows faster than the diffusion rate (right column), the stock of X
market acquired is shifted initially to the left of the Cost market C.
The dynamic behavior of a single firm in a commoditizing market having differing abilities to
acqhire a Cost market C is summarized in Figure 334 below. From left to right, we explore the
effects of increasing maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates for the Cost market, C, while
holding the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates for the Differentiated market, D constant.
Figure 334: Parametric Study of FARs on Cost Market
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Here the effects are most clearly seen in the stock of X market acquired after the market has
developed a stock of Cost market C, (i.e. in the second half of the industry lifecycle).
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7.3.3 Intra-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
In the previous stage, the resource environment was characterized as existing in one dimension:
the rate of change of market growth, dK/dt. This formulation extends the model to include a
second dimension: the rate of change of technology commoditization, dC/dt. This captures the
construct of a dominant design in the product offering (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), which
marks the shift in market demand from increasing rates of change of improvement in product
performance, where competition is based on product innovation, to increasing rates of change of
improvement in product cost, where competition is based on process innovation.
1002 In order to
control for the previous effects of market growth, we hold the market size, K constant. 1003 The
new coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
dXj/dt = rxiXi - rxlX12/D- rxiXIX 2 12/(D + C)
dX2/dt = rx2X2 - rx2X22 /C - rx2X2Xiua21/(D + C)
dD/dt = - rcC (1 - C/A)
dC/dt = rcC (1 - C/A)
(9a)
(9b)
(9c)
(9d)
Figure 335 below illustrates the fractional acquisition rates rxl and rx2 as a function of the
available carrying capacity of the two competitiors engaged in intra-species competition.
Figure 335: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Homogeneous Firms in Intra-species Competition
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1002 Although a "dominant design" is often seen as a discrete event, the market is modeled as a continuously
evolving.
1003 This control will relaxed in the next section, where both market size, K and type, C will grow logistically.
...... . .... ...........................................
Figure 336 below summarizes the causal structure of this nonlinear third order formulation 00 4
which results in sigmoid or S-shaped transition from a market dominated by sales of
products/services based on differentiation, D to a market dominated by sales of products/services
based on cost, C. This this formulation represents direct competition between organizations
within the environment. Note the two system-wide reinforcing loops operating on each
niche.' 005
Figure 336: Model Structure of Intra-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
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Acqlured market X2
Figure 337 below illustrates the previous dynamic behavior of a single firm in a commoditizing
market (on the left) with intra-species competition in a commoditizing market (on the right). As
can be seen on the right, although Xl and X2 separately grow at the commoditization rate of
0.07 (traking the red Cost market C curve), together they grow faster than the red curve taking
the market at a rate of 0.14.
1004 The addition of two state variables is only a first-order addition as one is completely determined by the other.
1005 Note that the causal arrows representing competition are drawn from stocks X1 and X2 to the respective
competitor's available market quotient. Although this is a different visual formulation from previous pages (where
the causal arrows linked available market quotient to available market quotient), the mathematics are the same.
......................................---- ---- ---- ~ -
Figure 337: Dynamic Behavior of a Single Firm and Intra-species Competiton in a
Commoditizing Market
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Next, we compare the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates of Xi and X2 in intra-species
competition, as can be seen in Figure 338 below. On the left, both competitors are identical and
therefore split the market 50-50, while on the right, XI is more efficient than X2 in all market
niches, leading to competitive exclusion.
Figure 338: Parametric Study of FARs in Intra-species Competition in Commoditizing Markets
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7.3.4 Inter-species "Competition" in a Commoditizing Market
In the previous stage, both competitors were assumed to be of the same species, and therefore
broadly able to compete in both the differentiation-based and cost-based niches (i.e. the
competition coefficients a were at or near 1) - for example both intra-species competitors, GM
and Ford can transition from a differentiated product focus towards a cost focus. However, the
emergence of a new species, having an integral enterprise architecture (like Toyota) is much
better suited towards cost-leadership, making their competition coefficient a approach zero. In
this extreme case of inter-species competition, each species focuses on the niche that they are
best suited to, and "competition" takes on a symbiotic nature, due to the presence of architectural
inertia and its impact on the enterprise's efficiency frontiers.100 6 The new coupled system of
differential equations is shown below:
dX/dt = rxX - rxX 2/D
dY/dt = ryY - rvY2/C
dD/dt = rcD (1 - D/A)
dC/dt = rcC (1 - C/A)
(10a)
(10b)
(10c)
(10d)
Figure 339 below illustrates the fractional acquisition rates rx and ry as a function of the
available carrying capacity of the two competitiors engaged in inter-species competition.
Figure 339: Fraction Acquisition Rates of Heterogeneous Firms in Inter-species Competition
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1006 Although in inter-species competition in quantity space, where we had nonlinear FAR functions with respect to
available carrying capacities, here we revert back to linear FAR functions, and differentiate inter-species
competition in quality spcae as niche-specific only. The combination of quantity and quality interspecies
competition will be covered later.
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Figure 340 below summarizes the causal structure of this nonlinear third order formulation
0 7
which results in sigmoid or S-shaped transition from a market dominated by sales of
products/services based on differentiation, D to a market dominated by sales of products/services
based on cost, C. Note that in the limit, when the competition coefficients go to 0 - that is, one
species is far superior than the other in a particular niche, this formulation represents indirect
competition between organizations occupying different niches within the environment,
Figure 340: Model Structure of Inter-species "Competition" in a Commoditizing Market
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1007 The addition of two state variables is only a first-order addition as one is completely determined by the other.
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Figure 341 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of inter-species competition in a
commoditizing market.'0 0 8
Figure 341: Dynamic Behavior of Inter-species Competition in a Commoditizing Market
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1008 The Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates, rx = 0.06 and ry 0.34 were chosen to approximate production rates
of Boeing and Airbus in the commercial airplanes duopoly. Note that these prarameter choices also generate 25%
and 75% final market shares respectively.
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Note that X's Acquired market plateaus before it reaches the Differentiation market D. This is
because Y's Acquired market has begun to take some of the commoditized Cost market C, thus
reducting the Adopted market A for both X and Y. We can see that when X+Y hits D, then X
plateaus, and later when X+Y hits C, then Y plateaus.
By observing the Fractional Acquisition Rate time histories (at the bottom of the figure), we can
see that X's FAR remains relatively unchanged for the first 80 years, until D rapidly falls toward
X, coupled with Y's growth in taking C (which also reduces A for both). The resulting FAR
time history is only half of the classic "reverse S-shape".
Conversely, Y's FAR does not start with a classic flat plateau, but instead starts at 0 and begins
to build up towards it Maximum FAR of 0.34. Y's FAR starts at 0 because X, Y and C begin at
0, making X+Y/C = 1, the stable equilibrium. As C grows faster, earlier than X and Y, X+Y/C
approaches 0, the unstable equilibrium. After 80 years, Y's FAR time history begins to look like
the classic "reverse S-shape."'
009
1009 Note: under extreme conditions tests (Sterman, 2000, pg. 869), if X is parameterized to grow faster than C, then
X+Y/C > 1, which is past the stable equilibrium, where Y's FAR would become negative under linear assumptions
(which is unrealistic). Therefore, in order to ensure that Y remains non-negative, we introduce a bi-linear
relationship with a MIN function. Similar logic applies to X.
7.4 Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market (Quantity and Quality)
7.4.1 Diffusing, Commoditizing Market (Quantity and Quality)
We now combine the previous two descriptions of the market environment, where the quantity of
the market, K grows logistically (Bass, 1969), while simultaneously, the quality of the market
customer preferences diffuses from high-performance differentiated products and services
towards low-cost products and services (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). This allows the entry
and exit of different species of organizational sets for two reasons: the rate of change in market
quantity and the rate of change in technological quality enable market niches to evolve.
7.4.1.1 Comparing Single- vs. Double-loop Diffusing, Commoditizing Models
The new, coupled system of differential equations is shown below:
dP/dt = - rdA (1 - A/K) (11a)
dA/dt= rdA(1 - A/K) ( lb)
dD/dt = - rcC (1 - C/A) (1 lc)
dC/dt rcC (1 - C/A) (11d)
Figure 342 below compares the two different causal structures of this nonlinear second-order
formulation, developed previously.
Figure 342: Comparing Model Structures of Diffusing, Commoditizing Markets
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The dynamic behavior of a diffusing, commoditizing market is illustrated below in Figure 343.
Figure 343: Comparing the Dynamic Behavior of Diffusing, Commoditizing Markets
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Note that in the 3-loop model (on the left), without a reinforcing loop on C, D exponentially
decays, which has the effect of increasing commoditization. Metaphorically, this is like a cold
bathtub warming to room temperature.
Conversely, in the 4-loop model (on the right), with a reinforcing loop on C, D logistically
decays, which has the effect of decreasing commoditization. Metaphorically, this is likee a cold
bathtub with ice warming to room temperature. The extra reinforcing loop represents the power
of entrepreneurially innovative supply markets.
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7.4.1.2 Comparing Diffusion vs. Commoditization Rates
Figure 344 below illustrates the model structure comparing the relative effects of diffusion, vs.
commoditization rates.
Figure 344: Model Structure Comparing Market Diffusion vs. Commoditization Rates
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Figure 345 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of a parametric study comparing the relative
effects of diffusion vs. commoditization rates.
Figure 345: Dynamic Behavior of Diffusion vs. Commoditization Rates
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Although the Adopted market, A results in logistic sigmoid or S-shaped growth, niche D rises
and falls, while niche C rises in S-shaped growth to eventually characterize the entire market.
The Cost market C is a double logistic, i.e. it is logistic growth into a logistically diffusing
market A. Note, however that if the maximum fractional diffusion rate, rd >> than the maximum
fractional commoditization rate, rc, then the behavior approaches that in a commoditization-only
market.
It is important to remember when looking at the flow diagrams (at the bottom), that these are not
annual firm production curves (which obviously could not become negative). But in the case of
D market, which goes negative, it merely illustrates the shifting preference of the market. For
example when looking at the stocks (across the top) at time = 100 years, we can see that on the
left, of the say 50 people who want widgets, everyone wants Differentiated or high-performance
widgets; in the middle, of the say 50 people who want widgets, 25 people want Differentiated or
high-performance widgets, while 25 people want to buy based on Cost; on the right, of the say
50 people who want widgets, 5 people want Differentiated or high-performance widgets, while
45 people want to buy based on Cost.
7.4.1.3 Parametric Study: Product Durability
Figure 346 below illustrates the model structure examining product durability in a diffusing,
commoditizing market.
Figure 346: Model Structure of Product Durability in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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Figure 347 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of parameterized study investigating product
durability in a diffusing, commoditizing market.
Figure 347: Dynamic Behavior of a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market with Varying Product
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7.4.2 Single Firm Growth in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
Next, we study how a single firm grows in a diffusing, commoditizing market, before we
proceed to investigate competition in a diffusing, commoditizing market. The model structure is
shown in Figure 348 below.
Figure 348: Model Structure of Single Firm Growth in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
The Fractional Acquisition Rates of Firm X are assumed to be a linear function of the carrying
capacities of the two market niches D and C, as shown Figure 349 below. We will relax this
assumption later, when we investigate inter-species competition.
Figure 349: Fractional Acquisition Rate of a Single Firm in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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The dynamic behavior of a single firm in a diffusing, commoditizing maket is summarized in
Figure 350 below, where the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates for market niches D and C
are assumed to be identical (i.e. the firm is equally efficient in acquiring Differentiated niches as
it is in acquiring Cost niches). We compare the behavior of a single firm in only a
commoditizing market (from before) to the behavior in a diffusing, commoditizing market.
Figure 350: Dynamic Behavior of a Single Firm in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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As can be seen by comparing the stocks (top graphs), the Differentiation market, D now grows
and shrinks, making X's acquisition rate lower (middle graphs). Also, as X is not acquiring D
early, X's FAR for C is much higher, much earlier (lower graphs).
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7.4.3 Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
The model now has two different ways of defining the state of evolutionary maturity of the
environment: quantity and quality - that is, how much product is produced/consumed, and what
type of product is produced/consumed. This section therefore combines these two
characterizations of the market environment into one model, where two firms of the same species
(characterized by the architectures of their respective extended enterprises) compete. The extent
of competitive intensity is defined by the ability of each firm to overcome architectural inertia
and transition from niche D to niche C as the market evolves. A summary of the coupled system
of differential equations is shown below.
dX,/dt = rxjiX - rxlXi 2/D- rxlXIX2 12/K - rxXIX2 al 2/(D + C) (12a)
dX2/dt = rX2X2 - rx2X2 2/C - rx 2XlX2 X2 1/K - rx 2X 2XI 21/(D + C) (12b)
dK/dt = rdK (1 - K/CC) (12c)
dD/dt = -rcD (1 - D/K) (12d)
dC/dt = rcC (1 - C/K) (12e)
The Fractional Acquisition Rates as a function of the available carrying capacies of the two
market niches D and C are illustrated in Figure 351 below.
Figure 351: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Homogenous Intra-species Competitors in a
Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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The causal structure of this nonlinear fourth-order formulation is summarized in Figure 352
below.
Figure 352: Model Structure of Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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Figure 353 below compares the dynamic behavior of a single firm
species competition (on the right) in a diffusing, commodizing market.
(on the left) with intra-
Figure 353: Dynamic Behavior of a Single Firm and Intra-species Competition in a Diffusing,
Commoditizing Market
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Note how the behavior of a single firm X (top left graph) is the same as the sum of two
competitors X, and X2 who split the market 50%-50% (top right graph), with the X's FAR's
(middle, left graph) being twice that of the FAR's of X 1 and X2.
.. ........................
Next, we compare the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates of Xi and X2 in intra-species
competition, as can be seen in Figure 354 below. On the left, both competitors are identical and
therefore split the market 50%-50%, while on the right, X1 is more efficient than X2 in all the
market niches, leading to competitive exclusion.
Figure 354: Parametric Study of FARs in Intra-species
Markets
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7.4.4 Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
The model now has two different ways of defining the state of evolutionary maturity of the
environment: quantity and quality - that is, how much product is produced/consumed, and what
type of product is produced/consumed. This final section therefore combines these two
characterizations of the market environment into one model, where two different species of firms
(characterized by the architectures of their respective extended enterprises) compete. The extent
of competitive intensity is defined by the ability of each firm to overcome architectural inertia
and transition from niche D to niche C as the market evolves. A summary of the coupled system
of differential equations is shown below.
rx>ry when (X+Y)<K/2 dX/dt = rxX - rxX2/D - rxXYaxy/K (13a)
rx<ry when (X+Y)>K/2 dY/dt = ryY - ryY 2/C - ryXYaux/K (13b)
dK/dt = rdK (1 - K/CC) (13c)
dD/dt = -rcD (1 - D/K) (13d)
dC/dt = rcC (1 - C/K) (13e)
The Fractional Acquisition Rates as a function of the available carrying capacities of the two
market niches D and C are illustrated in Figure 355 below.
Figure 355: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Inter-species Competitiors in a Diffusing,
Commoditizing Market
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The causal structure of this nonlinear fourth-order formulation is shown in Figure 356 below.
Note, we have added a nonlinear relationship between Fractional Acquisition Rates and
Available Market, which is represented by the variables: "Effect of D (or C) on Fractional
Acquisition Rate r"
1010
Figure 356: Model Structure of Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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1010 In Vensim, the system dynamics modeling software, this is known as a "look-up table".
Figure 357 below compares the dynamic behavior of inter-species competition in a
commoditizing market with that in a diffusing, commoditizing market (with diffusion
suppressed).
Figure 357: Comparing Dynamic Behavior of Inter-species Competition in a Commoditizing
Market and a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market (with Diffusion suppressed)
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We test the inter-species competition model in a diffusing, commoditizing market (right
column), by first ensuring that it generates similar results as for the simpler commoditizing
market (left column). We do this by imposing extremely rapid diffusion (on the right column),
and note that by slightly modifying parameters, one can generate similar behaviors in both
scenarios, with X taking 25% of the market, and Y taking 75% of the market.
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Next, we compare both models of inter-species competition having identical parameters in
commoditizing-only market and diffusing, commoditizing markets, (so that diffusion is no
longer suppressed) as is shown in Figure 358 below.
Comparing Dynamic Behavior of Inter-species Competition in a Commoditizing
Market and a Diffusing, Commoditizing Market
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As can be seen, when we let the Adopted market A diffuse (in the right column of figures), the D
market no longer starts out large, and in fact is too small (given the parameters) for X to grow.
Competitor Y no longer takes 75% of the market (left), now it takes 100% of the market.
Figure 358:
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Next, we compare a case where two identical "intra-species" competitiors in a diffusing,
commoditizing market with to subtly different inter-species" competitors, having different
growth capabilities in different niches, as shown in Figure 359 below. Again note, that even
subtle differences in parameters can cause late "entry" and early "exit".
Figure 359: Comparing Dynamic Behavior of Intra-species and Inter-species Competition in a
Difusing, Commoditizing Market
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Finally, we explore the more general condition of inter-species competition in diffusing,
commoditizing markets, where the Fractional Acquisition Rates can be a nonlinear function of
the available market as is shown in Figure 360 below. In fact, in this exploration, we do not
restrict X growth to niche D only, nor do we restrict Y growth to niche C only.
Figure 360: Fractional Acquisition Rates of Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing,
Commoditizing Market
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First we compare homogeneous intra-species competition in a diffusing, commoditizing market
having identical linear Fractional Acquisition Rate functions, with inter-spacies competition
having identical maximum FARs in each niche, however, having different shaped functions. The
dynamic behavior is shown in Figure 361 below.
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Figure 361: Comparing the Dynamic Behavior of Intra-species Competition and Inter-species
Competition in Diffusing, Commoditing Markets
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As can be seen on the left, identical intra-species competitors split the diffusing, commoditing
market equally, as is to be expected. However, just by changing the growth profiles of each
competitor, without changing the maximum Fractional Acquisition Rates, results in late-entry of
Y, and early exit of X, with Y taking 75% of the market.
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Finally, when we compare inter-species competition on the basis of varying Maximum FARs
only with inter-species competition on the basis of varying Maximum FARs plus nonlinear,
"mass-dependent" FARs, we see an even more exaggerated difference in dynamic behavior as
illustrated in Figure 362 below.
Figure 362: Comparing Dynamic Behavior of of Inter-species Competition (having linear vs.
nonlinear FAR functions) in Diffusing, Commoditing Markets
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7.5 Advanced Topics
7.5.1 Firm-sector Topics
7.5.1.1 Oscillation: Demand and Supply Lags
Until now, we have considered only the acquiring of market, which implies the winning of sales
or orders. This quantity may be considered to equate to a firm's production output, assuming
that there are no time delays or lags between market demand and firm supply (or conversely firm
demand for revenues and market supply of revenues). A new causal structure is now required
which explicitly captures the equilibrating of demand and supply - a balancing loop. If such
delays do exist and are large enough relative to the dynamics under consideration, they can result
in an oscillation mode of behavior which is superimposed onto the underlying growth modes that
we have already discussed. In addition, additional reinforcing feedbacks may exist between the
markets of demand and supply which can act to amplify any oscillatory behavior. Figure 363
below illustrates the conceptual model of oscillation.'lo
Figure 363: Conceptual Model Structure of a Single Firm Growth and Oscillation
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1011 Based on Sterman (2000).
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7.5.1.1.1 Single Firm Experiencing Undamped Oscillation
Figure 364 below illustrates the causal structure of this linear second-order formulation, which
results in undamped oscillation of the firm's production output.
Figure 364: Model Structure of a Single Firm Undamped Oscillation
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As can be seen, the causal structure forms a closed-loop structure, with balancing feedback. The
presence of an second stock accumulating time delays causes oscillation of the system.
In the following sections, to better understand the model, we will explore the dynamic behavior
of this model via parametric analyses of Goal Setting (of desire inventory) and of Asset
Productivity.
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7.5.1.1.1.1 Parametric Study of Goal-Setting
Next we exlopre the effects of goal-setting. The specific part of the model structure which we
will investigate is the desired inventory as shown in Figure 365 below.
Figure 365: Model Structure of the Goal-Setting Parametric Study
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The dynamic behavior is shown in Figure 366 below. As can be seen, decreasing the goal
(moving down the figures) decreases the amplitude of oscillation of both stocks of inventory (left
hand column) and assets (right hand column), without changing its period or damping. Note that
the two stocks of Inventory and Assets are out of phase, not unlike displacement and velocity in
a pendulumn.
Figure 366: Dynamic Behavior of the Goal-Setting Parametric Study
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7.5.1.1.1.2 Parametric Study of Productivity
Next we exlopre the effects of productivity. The specific part of the model structure which we
will investigate is the asset productivity as shown in Figure 367 below.
Figure 367: Model Structure of the Productivity Parametric Study
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The dynamic behavior is shown in Figure 368 below. Note that if the asset productivity
increases (going downward through the figures), then firm X can product the same amount (i.e.
Stock of Inventory Backlog in the left hand column) with fewer assets (right hand column).
Again, note that the two stocks of Inventory and Assets are out of phase, not unlike displacement
and velocity in a pendulumn.
Changing the asset productivity does not affect the period or damping, just the amplitude of the
stock of assets.
Figure 368: Dynamic Behavior of the Productivity Parametric Study
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7.5.1.1.2 Single Firm Experiencing Damped Oscillation
Figure 369 below illustrates the causal structure of this linear second-order formulation, which
results in damped oscillation of the firm's production output.
Figure 369: Model Structure of a Single Firm Damped Oscillation
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Previoiusly, we saw that a balancing loop with a delay resulted in oscillation. Here the
additional outflow on the stock of assets, acts to potentially remove energy from the system, via
damping. The more patient the enterprise architecture, the shorter the time to remove Assets, the
larger the outflow. This effectively turns off the demand-supply balancing loop so that Sales
Rate = Production Rate.
The dynamic behavior of this causal structure is shown in Figure 370 below, where we compare
a range of responses from undamped (top) to highly damped (bottom).
Figure 370: Dynamic Behavior of Damping in an Oscillating System
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7.5.1.1.3 Single Firm Experiencing Growth and Damped Oscillation
Figure 371 below illustrates the causal structure of this linear second-order formulation, which
results in logistic growth of the firm's market acquisition and oscillation of the firm's production
output. In the firm growth portion of the model, the presence of only an inflow on the stock of
acquired market (which is controlled by both reinforcing and balancing loops) results in firm
growth only. In the oscillation portion of the model, however inflows and outflows on the stocks
of both the assets and inventory results in a balancing loop with a delay - the structure
responsible for producing the behavior or oscillation.
Figure 371: Model Structure of a Single Firm Growth and Oscillation
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Finally, we compare the dynamic behavior of firms experiencing long term (e.g. 100 year)
market growth, which serve that demand with medium term (e.g. 10 year) oscillatory cycles, as
shown in Figure 372 below.
Figure 372: Comparing Damping in Firm Growth with Oscillation
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7.5.2 Market-sector Topics
7.5.2.1 Market Diffusion and Obsolescence
Having described earlier how markets grow in the model of market diffusion, we now begin to
describe how markets "die" or are substituted for by new technologies in a model of market
obsolescence. Clearly, this an ambitious task, as the origins of radical innovation are generally
seen to be random at best, the causes are undoubtedly exogenous to our current parsimonious
model, and the resulting dynamic behavior described as "discontinuity". Given this, we will
begin to lay the foundations for such a model by building from the endogenous model presented
thus far.
Figure 373 below illustrates the conceptual model, whereby one market K1 (which is supplied by
the species X 1 and Y1) gives way to a subsequent market K2 (which is supplied by the species X2
and Y2).
Figure 373: Conceptual Model of Market Diffusion and Obsolescence
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K1 
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We will now focus however on how market KI diffuses and is subsequently rendered obsolete by
market K2. Previously in the diffusion model, the Potential market P diffused into the Adopted
market A in a logistic manner, controlled by both a balancing and reinforcing loop. Now, we
add another stock, L representing the Lost market. In this way we have now gone from a two-
stock model where the entire Potential market P eventually becomes Adopted market A (which is
akin to the SI model of chronic infectious diseases, where the entire population eventually gets
infected) to a three-stock model where the Adopted market A may not realize its full potential P
(which is akin to the SIR model of acute infectious diseases, where the entire population may not
become infected).
Next, we must define the causal structure that controls the obsolescence rate from Adopted
market A to Lost market L. Here we could model a single balancing loop on the outflow of
Adopted market A, which would generate exponential deacay in A, with rapid initial losses (i.e.
it does not take time for the new market to gain momentum). Or conversely, we could model
balancing and reinforcing loops as was modeled in the P-A diffusion model, which would
generate logistic decay in A (i.e. it takes time for the new market to gain momentum).
7.5.2.1.1 Three-loop Representation (S-I-R)
First, we represent obsolescence as a simple balancing loop on the outflow of the Adopted
market, A. This formulation is similar to the S-I-R model of acute infectious diseases. Figure
374 below compares the model structures and dynamic behaviors of the two-stock diffusion and
three stock, one-loop diffusion-obsolescence models. As we can see, the behavior of the stock of
Adopted market, A is not symmetric. As we will see when we compare this model to one in
which an additional reinforcing loop is added, this formulation represents a rather severe
exodous from the Adopted market, A as there is no feedback reducing the fractional substitution
rate, rs.
Figure 374: Market Diffusion & (Three-loop) Diffustion-Obsolescence
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In Figure 375 below, we present a parametric study of the relative effects of maximum fractional
diffusion rates rd and maximum fractional substitution rates rs. As can be seen, there exists a
"tipping point", or a critical ratio of maximum fractional diffusion rate rd to maximum fractional
substitution rate rs, where the balacing loops dominate the reinforcing loop, which acts to inhibit
the development of the Adopted market, A.
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Figure 375: Parametric Analysis comparing Diffusion and Substitution Rates
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7.5.2.1.2 Four-loop Representation (Single Bass)
Next, we represent obsolescence as a balancing loop on the outflow of the Adopted market, A
plus a reinforcing loop on the Lost market, L. (Note, however that we do not avoid the "start-up
problem" with a Bass formulation, this will be demonstrated in the following section.) Figure
376 below compares the model structures and dynamic behaviors of the two-stock diffusion and
three stock, two-loop diffusion-obsolescence models. As we saw when we compared this model
to one without the additional reinforcing loop, this formulation represents a less severe exodous
from the Adopted market, A as there is now feedback reducing the fractional substitution rate, rs.
Figure 376: Market Diffusion & (Four-loop) Diffustion-Obsolescence
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In Figure 377 below, we present a parametric study of the relative effects of maximum fractional
diffusion rates rd and maximum fractional substitution rates rs. Note, the maximum fractional
substitution rates rs are an order of magnitude faster than presented in the one-loop model. Note
that as the maximum fractional substitution rates rs increases, the peak Adopted market, A
reduces and occurs earlier in time.
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Figure 377: Parametric Analysis comparing Diffusion and Substitution Rates
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7.5.2.1.3 Four-loop Representation (Double Bass)
Finally, we represent obsolescence as a balancing loop on the outflow of the Adopted market, A
plus a reinforcing loop on the Lost market, L. Now, however that we avoid the "start-up
problem" with a Bass formulation. Figure 378 below compares the model structures and dynamic
behaviors of the two-stock diffusion and three stock, two-loop (Bass) diffusion-obsolescence
models. Again, as we saw when we compared this model to one without the additional
reinforcing loop, this formulation represents a less severe exodous from the Adopted market, A
as there is now feedback reducing the fractional substitution rate, rs.
Figure 378: Market Diffusion & (Four-loop) Diffustion-Obsolescence
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In Figure 379 below, we present a parametric study of the relative effects of maximum fractional
diffusion rates rd and maximum fractional substitution rates rs. Again note, the maximum
fractional substitution rates rs are an order of magnitude faster than presented in the one-loop
model. Note that as the maximum fractional substitution rates rs increases, the peak Adopted
market, A reduces and occurs earlier in time. As expected, there are no significant differences in
the dynamic behavior of the models with or without a Bass start-up, there is merely a difference
in theorical justification.
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Figure 379: Parametric Analysis comparing Diffusion and Substitution Rates
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7.5.2.1.4 Summary of Parametric Study
Finally, Figure 380 below summarizes the comparison of the three causal structures of market
diffusion and obsolescence that we presented previously.
Figure 380: Summary of Model Structures of Market Diffusion and Obsolescence
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Figure 381 below illustrates the dynamic behavior of the model structures under the parameters
of varying fractional diffusion and obsolescence rates. As can be seen, the two loop
obsolescence structure begins to limit the peak size of the Adopted market A (relative to the P-A
model), while the balancing loop only obsolescence structure is much more severe on A, as it can
prevent A's emergence entirely.
Figure 381: Dynamic Behaviors of Market Diffusion and Obsolescence
Maximum Fractional
Diffusion Rate. rd = 0. 1
Maximum Fractional
Obsolescence Rate, r, = 0.01
, fp
o 05 /
o 0 f p 4 t W 1 N! I0 m ixo
PaEnl, p Coo
.sl.a d . l rA - . ..
P-A-L Market
(2 oops on
obsolescence)
o
0 20 40 W $0 10m 120 14o I 19o 213
F%-A -k. rP C-nLost unmt : Cmc
0 7
P-A-L Market '
(1 Imp on
obsolescence) 0,2-
Lost - o A ('*-
L--k,-,L C-
Maximum Fractional
Diffusion Rate, r, = 0. 1
Maximum Fractional
Obsolescence Rate, r, = 0. 1
0 /
2A 4.4 60 MO IO 12(t 140 IN)4 1000
P-1 -k.r P
I -
A00 0 * 1 60 SO 1, 14 R 2Sr5P-1 r P r
t- -I., L Cr-
Maximum Fractional
Diffusion Rate, rd = 0.1
Maximum Fractional
Obsolescence Rate, r, = 1.0
,I00*  04 "1 o 12 P4 I AO 9TO- Y-;)
N-j P C--iF~n c
Adlrnf td-k1 C-
n i
o..-
A 20 4o W So 100 , W I-o IM 2007-,- (Yl':I~
Pol-al - P C
Adq.,,,l t A C-.
P-A Market
I
I
i
i
j
7.5.2.2 Overshoot and Collapse: 200-year Global Market
Previously, in the market diffusion model, we assumed the scenario of a new product/service that
either:
1) diffuses logistically throughout a constant population of potential consumers (Bass,
1969), or
2) diffuses instantaneously through a logistically-growing population of potential
consumers (Verhulst, 1838), or
3) some combination of the two.
Since the world population of potential adopters for a specific global product produced by global
suppliers (e.g. commercial airplanes or automobiles) is not constant over the evolutionary times
scales of interest (e.g. 1900-2100), we need to capture the growth (and possible decay) of this
population. One can then combine a bass diffusion of a technology into a population of
consumers, which itself is diffusion into its own environment (the earth) having its own
ecosystem carrying capacity. Figure 382 Below illustrates the dynamic behavior of two
scenarios of complex system dynamics model (Meadows et al., 1972, 1992, 2004) which
illustrates the population and industrial growth from 1900-2100.
Figure 382: Global Carrying Capacity into which Global Technologies Diffuse
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7.5.3 Summary
Having defined various firm and market (organization and environment) interaction sector
models, we can now summarize the model as shown in Figure 383 below.
Figure 383: Full Model Structure of Inter-species Competition in a Diffusing, Commoditizing
Market (with Supply-Demand Lags)
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Chapter 8 Summary and Conclusions
8.1 Framework Summary
Chapters three to six described the four constructs and potential linking propositions, which form
the basis of the theoretical framework. Chapter seven attempted to bring mathematical clarity to
the expression of the framework, with quantitative modeling to demonstrate how evolution of
business ecosystems might work. This chapter is a qualitative summary of the theoretical
framework.
The theoretical framework endogenously traces the evolution from its system properties of fit,
form and function (or ecology, morphology and physiology) using the evolutionary processes of
variation, selection and retention as shown in Figure 384 below.
Figure 384: Summary of the Theoretical Framework as Evolutionary Ecology
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The framework decomposes and characterizes the evolution of business ecosystems along two
dimensions: market quantity (what type), and technological quality (what type), as shown in
Figure 385 below.
Figure 385: Summary of Theoretical Framework in Quantitiy and Quality Space
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We now show each loop separately, with quantity in Figure 386 and quality in Figure 387 below.
Figure 386: Theoretical Framework in Quantity Space
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Figure 387: Theoretical Framework in Quality Space
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In Figure 388 below, the path of evolution is traced longitudinally, mapping out the first half of
the "double helix" corresponding to the growth phase of an industry's development.
Figure 388: Growth Phase of the Industry-Firm Evolution
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In Figure 389 below, the path of evolution is traced longitudinally, mapping out the second half
of the "double helix" corresponding to the maturity phase of an industry's development.
Figure 389: Maturity Phase of the Industry-Firm Evolution
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The previous two figures can be
shown in Figure 390 below. 10 12
combined into one figure, which traces out a "double helix" as
1012 The notion of "double helix" is borrowed from Fine, C.H. (1998).
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Figure 390: The Two-Phase Framework as a "Double Helix"
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Again, returning the design theory metaphor in the design of an enterprise to win a motor sport
race, one can see how the two-phase framework produces a double helix as shown in Figure 391
below. At first, exponentially-growing markets are those whose rate of change of output (i.e.
speed) are increasing each time period. This is like a fast, smooth racetrack. The architectural
form is therefore simply an enterprise that has high speed and low torque, like a racehorse (or
hare, to use a literary metaphor). The actual execution of this concept takes the reality of a
racecar - well-suited to the racetrack. In order to win in this environment, to capture the most of
rapidly-growing markets, one must design, build and operate a system or enterprise that can
move fast.
Subsequently, after much racing, the racetrack begins to slow down, either endogenously as the
competing cars wear down the surface and deposit tire debris, or exogenously as the rain and
other elements outside the control of the competitors begin to turn the racetrack into a mud bog.
This will create the second half of the industrial S-curve, in which the market is no longer
exponentially-growing, but is now saturating. The rate of change of output (i.e. speed) is now
decreasing with each time period. The architectural form best suited to this environment is
simply an enterprise that has low (short-term) speed and high torque, like an ox (or tortoise, to
use the literary metaphor). The actual execution of this concept takes the reality of a tractor. In
order to win in this environment, to capture the most of saturating markets, one must design,
build and operate a system or enterprise that can move slowly but powerfully.
Figure 391: Conceptualization of the Two-Phase Framework as a "Double Helix"
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Fine (1998) put forth an interesting and compeling causal mechanism - known as the "double
helix" - relating how industries evolve (or integrate and disintegrate) over time. The research
herein complements Fine's original work, in focusing the research lens not on a collection of
industries or value chain, but rather on a single industry as firms enter and exit.
...............
8.2 Theory Evaluation
Phil Rosenzweig (2007) offers a compelling list of nine "business delusions" which not only
plague managers, but research in management. The following is a brief description of each
followed by a brief explanation of how the theory presented herein attempted to mitigate the
delusions.
8.2.1 The Halo Effect
The halo effect refers to the tendency to make inferences about specific traits on the basis of a
general impression. For example, when a company appears to be successful, most, if not all of
its attributes (e.g. leadership, culture, strategy, operations) are deemed to be successful as well -
it can do no wrong.
In order to counter this, the logic of this research endogenously builds and destroys "halos" over
long time horizons. Not every aspect of a successful firm needs to be successful, and the firms
success raises and falls over time, endogenously, without changing theories to explain both
phenomena.
8.2.2 The Delusion of Correlation and Causality
Correlation is relatively easy to demonstrate, while causality is rather more difficult, especially,
when in most complex systems the causality is bi-directional.
In order to counter this, this research uses circular, closed-loop feedback logic, with co-evolution
of the organization and its environment.
8.2.3 The Delusion of Single Explanations
Most theories emphasize one causal link, whereas in most complex phenomena, multiple,
concurrent causes are interacting and equally important.
In order to counter this, this research uses multiple, concurrent causality, highlighting the two
broad dimensions of quantity and quality in the characterization of the envirionment and the
organizations within it.
8.2.4 The Delusion of Connecting the Winning Dots
Searching for what a group of successful companies have in common, will not yield compelling
causal mechanisms unless they are compared with less successful companies.
In order to counter this, this research compares pairs of successful and unsuccessful companies
over time. Clusters of incumbent (now modular) companies are compared with clusters of their
challenger (now integral) companies over time.
8.2.5 The Delusion of Rigorous Research
Low quality data, no matter how high the quantity will yield low quality theories.
In order to counter this, this research uses multiple methods and triangulates over stakeholder
space and time to secure high quality data.
8.2.6 The Delusion of Lasting Success
Almost all high-performing outliers regress to the mean over time.
In order to counter this, this research explains the rise and fall of high-performing companies.
8.2.7 The Delusion of Absolute Performance
Company performance is relative to its rivals, not absolute.
In order to counter this, this reseach explains why high-performing companies both can improve
and simultaneously lose relative to their rivals.
8.2.8 The Delusion of the Wrong End of the Stick
Noting that focused or committed companies outperform flexible companies, does not factor in
the relatively high risk of these strategies. When numbers of firms in each category are included,
a different conclusion may be drawn.
In order to counter this, this research explains how a large number of Foxes (or r-strategists) and
a small number of Hedgehogs (or K-strategists) can dominate an industry at different phases of
its evolution.
8.2.9 The Delusion of Organizational Physics
Business organizations are so complex, that their performance can't be predicted with the
certainty of deterministic physics.
In order to counter this, this research is a theory of chaos: deterministic order within stochastic
"orbits."
............................;;;;;;
8.3 Further Research
"Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the
beginning. " 10 13
8.3.1 Past Empirical Case Studies
Few empirical studies have attempted to define and measure enterprise architectures, and none
have done so longitudinally. One notable exception is Schilling and Steensma (2001), which
tests previous theory of organizational modularity Schilling (2000). Schilling and Steensma first
define modular organizational forms as those which empirically possess greater contract
manufacturing, alternative work arrangements and alliances. They then demonstrate that in a
wide range manufacturing industries, modular organizational forms flourish when supply and
demand are heterogeneous, particularly in the presence of industry standards, technological
change and competitive intensity.
"In many industries, integrated hierarchical organizations have been replaced by nonhierarchical
entities that are permeable, interconnected and modular. Other industries, however, maintain
relatively high levels of integration. We use the logic of general systems modularity to explain why in
some industries there is greater use of modular organizational forms, including contract
manufacturing, alternative work arrangements, and alliances, than in other industries. This model
was tested using data from 330 U.S. manufacturing industries. 1o1
Their description of modular organizational forms as: "nonhierarchical entities that are
permeable, interconnected" as well as their chosen measures of: greater contract manufacturing,
alternative work arrangements and alliances might ironically refer to what we describe herein as
late entrant integral enterprise architectures. Their paper seems to describe how incumbent
integral enterprise architectures disintegrate towards more modular enterprise architectures.
The following is a brief critique of Schilling and Steensma (2001) relative to our research efforts.
1) It is one of the few papers that attempts define and measure "organizational modularity"
empirically.
2) It deomonstrates which industries (as specified by their heterogeneity of supply and
demand) are likely to have more modular organizations.
3) It is not explicitly longitudinal, and therefore does not demonstrate "disintegration" or
"modularization". It only infers such disintegration in that "integrated hierarchical
organizations have been replaced by entities that are modular". By replace do they imply
disintegration or replacement through changing mortality and founding rates?
4) It doesn't have firm performance as a dependent variable. Therefore although it attempts
to explain the conditions under which modular organizations exist, it doesn't explicitlyly
demonstrate whether or not they are the high or low performing firms. For example, a
late entrant integral enterprise architecture like Toyota Motors or Southwest Airlines
could be outperforming the population of modular competitors.
10 13 Winston Churchill, speech (1942).
1014 Schilling and Steensma. (2001), pg. 1149.
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8.3.2 Future Empirical Case Studies
While the present study has been confined to three pairs of incumbent-challenger companies in
as many industries (GM-Toyota, United-Southwest, Boeing-Airbus), future research on industries
representing extremes of the enterprise architecture typology may include those shown in Figure
392 below, where enterprise architectural differences may account for more variance in long-
term firm performance than merely that associated with differences in strategy or operations.
Figure 392: Future Empirical Case Studies
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Examples of existing research which can be used to test, refine and extend this framework
include:
* Fiat and Alpha Romeo. Locke, RM. (1992).
* Microsoft. Cusumano & Selby (1995)
* Honda and Nissan. Sako, M. and Helper, S. (1998).
* Chrysler. Dyer, J. (2000).
* Lufthansa and British Airways. Lehrer, M. (2001).
* Singapore Airlines. Heracleous, L., Wirtz, J., and Pangarkar, N. (2005).
* John Deere, William J. Holstein, (Strategy+Business) Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., (2008).
Examples of companies include:
Automotive Industry:
* BMW & Porsche: early entrant (to the automobile industry) integral explorers, moving
from niche to niche.
Airline Industry:
* People Express: a late entrant r-strategist (with initial aspirations for integral enterprise
architecture, but rapidly disintegrating / modularizing)
* British Airways vs. Singapore/Virgin Atlantic: late entrants
* RyanAir: a late entrant r-strategist, modular exploiter focused on the mass market).
Airplane Engine Industry:
* General Electric: An early entrant integral-turned-modular exploiter moving from niche
to niche and from field to field. Now possibly attempting re-integration? Note that
GE/Snecma appears to be late-entrant integral.
Computer Industry:
* Apple: an early entrant (to the PC hardware & software industry) integral explorer
focused on niches.
* Dell: a late entrant (to the PC hardware industry) modular exploiter focused on the mass
market.
* Microsoft: an early entrant (to the PC software industry) integral explorer-turning
modular exploiter focusing on the mass market. Cusumano notes that Microsoft has
much in common with Toyota's process, not product innovation, etc. This may refer to
their genotypic integral forms.
* Intel: an early entrant (to the semiconductor industry) integral-turning-modular exploiter
focusing on the mass market.
US steel industry:
* US Steel (1901) modular vs. Nucor (1940) integral
Global steel industry:' °15
* Mittal: a late entrant (to the steel industry) modular exploiter focused on the mass market.
10 15 Thanks to Aksat Mathur, MIT SDM student.
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8.4 Toward a Theory of the Evolution of Research Ecosystems
"While your research project represents the raison d 'tre of our school - and of all business schools in
general - the architecture of our enterprise, to use your lexicon - does not enable, and in fact constrains us
to not solve the fundamental problems that are at the core of our disciplines. We have become too
disintegrated, too functionally specialized, to short-term.. What we will need is an entirely new integral
organizalform, lead by a bold, ambitious vision... ,,o1016
Although the theory presented herein is focused on the evolution of business ecosystems, it can
be reflexively applied to a theory of the evolution of research ecosystems, which study business
ecosystems. As the intellectual environment of strategic management is in a rather mature state,
populated by once integral research organizations (business and management schools) that are
now modularized into functional or discipline-based silos, incented toward short-term goals,
under contractual arrangements, there are opportunites for new integral organizational forms of
research enterprises which are multi-disciplinary, long-term relationally-based, and possess the
possibility of radically transforming the competitive landscape in terms of knowledge-
development and dissemination, as illustrated in Figure 393 below. I have been privileged to
have been a part of such an integral enterprise architecture, in a mature environment.
Figure 393: Toward a Theory of the Evolution of Research Ecosystems
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8.5 Conclusions
"Our hope and intention has not been to state eternal truths, but to focus theoretical and empirical
attention on organizational action by stating as forcibly as possible the need to study organizations in
toto and, for that purpose, the significance of the open system approach and the certainty/uncertainty
dimension. "'"'7
The research set out to address the origins and mechanisms of competitive advantage and long-
term firm performance from both economic and sociological perspectives, attempting to resolve
the micro-macro debates within both fields. The economic questions centered on explanation for
firm performance residing within the firm or its environment, while the sociological questions
centered on explanation of strategic choice as resident within the firm (free-will) or the
environment (determinism).
In the process, a meta-theoretical framework has been constructed which attempts to link the
firm and its environment in a co-evolutionary way, using dual meso-level constructs of
enterprise architecture coupled with structuration theory.
The answer to the above debates appears not to lie either in macro- or micro- explanations, but in
an explanation which covers both at different times and for different reasons. In fact, the one
place the answer does not reside, is in the middle of the extremes (see Figure 394 below).'0 18
Figure 394: Resolving the Central Debates
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This however does not point to a compromise centrist solution. Unlike traditional linear, static,
positivist, reductionist thinking which collapses complexity into a neat weighted average
"centroid", the framework presented herein takes a nonlinear, dynamic, interpretivist, holistic
thinking approach.
1017 Thompson, J.D. (1967), pg. 163.
1018 This fact is not evident in the figure, as time is not represented.
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This dissertation attempted to contribute toward the building of a theory of the evolution of
business ecosystems. In the process, it addressed a question that has been posed by evolutionary
theorists in the economics and sociology literatures for decades: "Why do firms in the same
industry vary systematically in performance over time?" Seeking a systematic explanation of a
longitudinal phenomenon inevitably required characterizing the evolution of the industrial
ecosystem, as both the organization (firm) and its environment (industry, markets and
institutions) are co-evolving. This question was therefore explored via a theoretical sample in
three industrial ecosystems covering manufacturing and service sectors, with competitors from
the US, Europe and Japan: commercial airplanes, motor vehicles and airlines. The research was
based primarily on an in-depth seven-year, multi-level, multi-method, field-based case study of
both firms in the large commercial airplanes industry mixed duopoly as well as the key
stakeholders in their extended enterprises (i.e. customers, suppliers, investors and employees).
This field work was supplemented with historical comparative analysis in all three industries, as
well as nonlinear dynamic simulation models developed to capture the essential mechanisms
governing the evolution of business ecosystems.
A theoretical framework was developed which endogenously traces the co-evolution of firms
and their industrial environments using their highest-level system properties of form, function
and fitness (as reflected in the system sciences of morphology, physiology and ecology), and
which embraced the evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention. The
framework captures the path-dependent evolution of heterogeneous populations of enterprise
architectures engaged in symbiotic inter-species competition and posits the evolution of
dominant designs in enterprise architectures that oscillate deterministically and chaotically
between modular and integral states throughout an industry's life-cycle. Architectural
innovation - at the extended enterprise level - is demonstrated to contribute to the failure of
established firms, with causal mechanisms developed to explain tipping points.
This research lies at the intersection of the intellectual domains of strategic management,
organization science and complex systems theory. It aimed to contribute to fundamental debates
in these fields regarding the sources of superior long-term performance. Specifically, do the
sources reside within the firm or in the firm's environment (i.e. industry structure)? What are the
roles of managerial adaptation and environmental selection in the creation and sustainment of
such performance? Furthermore, how does this shape our understanding of strategic leadership?
Our empirical findings suggest that sources of superior firm performance lie neither exclusively
within the firm, nor in its industrial environment, but in how the firm interacts with its
environment - i.e. in the network architecture of the firm's extended enterprise. It appears that
these enterprise architectures, which both enable and constrain managerial agency and adaptation
through spatially and temporally bounded rationality, give rise to architectural inertia and the
power of environmental selection, as shown in Figure 395 below. Finally, the data suggest that
the qualities of strategic leadership, which maximize firm performance over the industry's
evolution, are architectural: namely the definition and maintenance of enterprise objective
functions, boundaries and interfaces.
Figure 395: Framework Summary and Contributions to the Literatures
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B. Sources of Profitability: Industry vs. Firm
A number of recent empirical studies have attempted to quantify the sources of firm profitability
(Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; McGrahan
and Porter, 1997; Hawawini et al., 2003). These are summarized in Figure 396 below:
Figure 396: Sources of Firm Profitability: Empirical Studies
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C. Placement of Research within the Strategic Management Field
The following table highlights those works (in bold) of the 50 most cited publications in strategic
management (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) that have had the greatest impact on
this dissertation.
Of the thirteen most influential works highlighted, four represent the field of economics, and in
particular two schools of the resource-based tradition: the "dynamic" school (Penrose, 1959;
Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and the evolutionary school (Nelson & Winter, 1982)
The remaining nine represent the field of sociology, particularly the contingency theorist (Burns
and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) and population ecologists
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984).
Table 20: Most Influential Research (of the 50 most influential publications in Strategy)
No. Authors Date Title Journal Field Sub-field
1 Porter 1980 Competitive Strategy - Econ. IO
2 Rumelt 1974 Strat., Struct. & Econ. Perf - Econ. Div.
3 Porter 1985 Competitive Advantage - Econ. IO
4 Chandler 1962 Strategy & Structure - Econ. Div.
5 Williamson 1975 Markets & Hierarchies - Econ. TCE
6 Nelson & Winter 1982 EvoL Theory of Econ. Change - Econ. ET
7 Pfeffer & Salancik 1978 Resource Dependence - Socio. RD
8 Miles & Snow 1978 Org. Strat., Struct. & Process - Socio. Cnfg.
9 Cyert & March 1963 Behavioral Theory of the Firm - Psych. Beh.
10 Thompson 1967 Organizations in Action - Socio. CT
11 Hofer & Schendel 1978 Strategy Formulation - Socio.
12 Wernerfelt 1984 "Resource-Based View" SMJ Econ. RBV
13 Barney 1991 "Firm Resources" JOM Econ. RBV
14 Lawrence & Lorsch 1967 Org. & Env.: Differ. & Integr. - Socio. CT
15 Andrews 1971 Concept of Corporate Strategy - Socio.
16 Penrose 1959 Theory of Growth of the Firm - Econ. RBV
17 Ansoff 1965 Corporate Strategy - Econ.
18 Williamson 1985 Relational Contracting - Econ. TCE
19 Scherer 1980 Industrial Market Structure - Econ. IO
20 Quinn 1980 Change: Incrementalism - Psych.
21 Prahalad & Hamel 1990 "Core Competence of Corp." HBR Econ. RBV
22 Dierickx & Cool 1989 "Asset Stock Accumulation" MS Econ. RBV
23 Jensen & Meckling 1976 "Agency Costs & Ownership" JFE Econ. AT
24 Weick 1969 Social Psych. of Organizing Socio.
25 March & Simon 1958 Organizations Socio.
26 Mintzberg 1978 "Strategy Formulation" MS Psych.
27 Bower 1970 Resource Allocation Socio.
28 Child 1972 "Role of Strategic Choice" JBSA Socio.
29 Aldrich 1979 Organizations & Environments Socio. PE
30 Barney 1986 "Strategic Factor Markets" MS Econ. RBV
31 Hannan & Freeman 1984 "Structural Inertia" ASR Socio. PE
32 Lippman & Rumelt 1982 "Uncertain Imitability" BJE Econ. RBV
33 Mintzberg et al. 1976 "Struct. & Unstruct Decision" ASQ Socio.
34 Burns & Stalker 1961 Management of Innovadtion - Socio. CT
35 Cohen & Levinthal 1990 "Absorptive Capacity: Learning" ASQ Econ. RBV
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37 Rumelt 1984 "Toward Strat. Theory of Firm" in book Econ. RBV
38 Buzzell et al. 1975 "Market-share: a Key to Profit." HBR Econ.
39 Tushman & Anderson 1986 "Tech. Discon. & Org. Env." ASQ Socio.
40 Hannan & Freeman 1977 "Population Ecology of Orgs." AJS Socio. PE
41 Schendel & Hofer 1979 Strat. Mgmt.: A New View - Socio.
42 Palepu 1985 "Diversification Strategy" SMJ Econ. Div.
43 Rumelt 1991 "Does Industry Matter?" SMJ Econ.
44 Christensen & Montgomery 1981 "Diversification vs Mkt. Struct." SMJ Econ. Div.
45 Wrigley 1970 Divis. Auton. & Diversification - (PhD) Econ. Div.
46 Peteraf 1993 "Resource-based View" SMJ Econ. RBV
47 Porter 1987 "Comp. Adv. to Corp. Strat." HBR Econ. Div.
48 Rumelt 1982 "Diversification Strategy" SMJ Econ. Div.
49 Teece 1982 "Theory of Multiproduct Firm" JEBO Econ. RBV
50 Caves & Porter 1977 "Mobility Barriers" QJE Econ. IO
Table 21: Empirical Bases (of the 50 most influential publications in Strategy)
No. Authors Date Title Data
1 Porter 1980 Competitive Strategy
2 Rumelt 1974 Strat., Struct. & Econ. Perf
3 Porter 1985 Competitive Advantage
4 Chandler 1962 Strategy & Structure 4 firms
5 Williamson 1975 Markets & Hierarchies
6 Nelson & Winter 1982 Evol Theory of Econ. Change
7 Pfeffer & Salancik 1978 Resource Dependence
8 Miles & Snow 1978 Org. Strat., Struct & Process
9 Cyert & March 1963 Behavioral Theory of the Firm
10 Thompson 1967 Organizations in Action
11 Hofer & Schendel 1978 Strategy Formulation
12 Wernerfelt 1984 "Resource-Based View"
13 Barney 1991 "Firm Resources"
14 Lawrence & Lorsch 1967 Org. & Env.: Differ. & Integr. 6 firms (3 pairs)
15 Andrews 1971 Concept of Corporate Strategy
16 Penrose 1959 Theory of Growth of the Firm 1 firm
17 Ansoff 1965 Corporate Strategy
18 Williamson 1985 Relational Contracting
19 Scherer 1980 Industrial Market Structure
20 Quinn 1980 Change: Incrementalism
21 Prahalad & Hamel 1990 "Core Competence of Corp."
22 Dierickx & Cool 1989 "Asset Stock Accumulation"
23 Jensen & Meckling 1976 "Agency Costs & Ownership"
24 Weick 1969 Social Psych. of Organizing
25 March & Simon 1958 Organizations
26 Mintzberg 1978 "Strategy Formulation"
27 Bower 1970 Resource Allocation
28 Child 1972 "Role of Strategic Choice"
29 Aldrich 1979 Organizations & Environments
30 Barney 1986 "Strategic Factor Markets"
31 Hannan & Freeman 1984 "Structural Inertia"
32 Lippman & Rumelt 1982 "Uncertain Imitability"
33 Mintzberg et al. 1976 "Struct. & Unstruct Decision"
34 Burns & Stalker 1961 Management of Innovation
35 Cohen & Levinthal 1990 "Absorptive Capacity: Learning"
36 Hambrick & Mason 1984 "Org. as Reflect. of Top Mgrs."
37 Rumelt 1984 "Toward Strat. Theory of Firm"
38 Buzzell et al. 1975 "Market-share: a Key to Profit."
39 Tushman & Anderson 1986 "Tech. Discon. & Org. Env." 3 industries
40 Hannan & Freeman 1977 "Population Ecology of Orgs."
41 Schendel & Hofer 1979 Strat. Mgmt.: A New View
42 Palepu 1985 "Diversification Strategy"
43 Rumelt 1991 "Does Industry Matter?"
44 Christensen & Montgomery 1981 "Diversification vs Mkt. Struct."
45 Wrigley 1970 Divis. Auton. & Diversification
46 Peteraf 1993 "Resource-based View"
47 Porter 1987 "Comp. Adv. to Corp. Strat."
48 Rumelt 1982 "Diversification Strategy"
49 Teece 1982 "Theory of Multiproduct Firm"
50 Caves & Porter 1977 "Mobility Barriers"
D. Literature Review of Mixed Duopoly Economics
The literature on firms with an objective function other than the classical "profit-maximizing"
(PM) is recent and sparse, namely 'labor-managed" (LM). Much of it comes from recent work
on comparing "mixed" duopoly studies which are summarized in Table 22 below:
Table 22: Literature Review of Mixed Duopoly Economics
1983 Law & "Stackelberg Duopoly with an Illyrian & Cournot-
Stewart PM Firm." Stackelberg
1989 Mai & "Export Subsidies & Oligopolistic ?
Hwang Rivalry Between LM & Capitalist
Economies."
1991 Horowitz "On the Effects of Cournot Rivalry Cournot
Between Entrepreneurial & Cooperative
Firms."
1991 Stewart "Strategic Entry Interactions Involving ?
PM and LM Firms."
1991 Stewart "Management Objectives and Strategic ?
Interactions among Capitalist and LM
Firms."
1992 Cremer & "Duopoly with Employee-controlled & Cournot &
Cremer PM Firms: Bertrand & Cournot Bertrand
Competition."
1994 Futagami & "Strategic Investment: the LM Firm & ?
Okamura the PM Firm."
1995 Delbono & "Upward-Sloping Reaction Functions Cournot LM dissuades PM from
Scarpa Under Quantity Competition in Mixed increasing output by matching -
Oligopolies." making prices fall.
1995 Lambertini "Are LM Firms Really Able to Survive Cournot LM can't survive competition
& Rossini Competition with PM Firms?" with PM when starting from
scratch. It won't enter.
1996 Neary & "Strategic Investment & the Co- ? PM profitability implies LM
Ulph existence of LM and PM Firms." profitability; not conversely.
1995 Lambertini "Cournot vs. Stackelberg Equilibria with Cournot- PM's lead & LM's follow in
Enterpreneurial and LM Firms." Stackelberg Cournot competition. Both
& Bertrand follow in Bertrand competit.
1998 Lambertini "Capital Commitment & Cournot Cournot PM firm under-invests while LM
& Rossini Competition with LM and PM firms." firm over-invests.
2002 De Fraja & "Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Cournot & LM firms can increase social
Delbono Oligopoly." Bertrand welfare for governments.
----- - ------ -  .............................. I- - - - --
E. Literature Review of System Dynamics Modeling of Firm Competition
System Dynamics has been developed and used over the past 50 years to model complex
feedback dynamics in social and socio-technical systems. Many of the early seminal works
considered the performance of firms and industries (Forrester, 1961, 1966), however the
treatment of competition between finns was not captured explicitly and endogenously. More
recent research has begun to explicitly model competition between firms explicitly and
endogenously, and of importance to this research dissertation, has begun to model firm
heterogeneity. Table 23 below summarizes some of the key research efforts in this area.
Table 23: Literature Review of System Dynamics Modeling of Firm Competition
SD Model Competition Market- Insights /
Industry Types How Modeled clearing Summary
Structure (heterogeneity) mechanisms
Industrial Many Homogeneous Not Oscillation between
Dynamics competitors, (Het. discussed) value chain firms
Forrester, 1961 small feedbacks (pg. 336-37, 340-
41)
Market Many Homogeneous Implicitly / Delivery Growth failure, even
Growth competitors, Exogenously delay in unlimited market
Forrester, 1968 small feedbacks via benchmark
Sys. Pathology of Many Homogeneous Implicitly / Growth failure, even
Organizatns. competitors, Exogenously in unlimited market
Hall, 1976 small feedbacks via benchmark
Corporate Many Homogeneous Implicitly / Production,
Planning competitors, Exogenously Availability
Lyneis, 1980 small feedbacks via benchmark & Price
B&B Enterprises Duopoly, Heterogeneous? Explicitly / Price & Market dynamic
Paich & Sterman, large feedbacks Endogenously Availability? complexity defines
1993 successful strategy
Duopoly Duopoly, Homogeneous Explicitly / Product Faster reactions lead
Competition large feedbacks (pg. 116) Endogenously quality to limit cycles &
Sice & Mosekilde, chaos
2000
Dyn. of Comp.
Industries
Kunc &
Morecroft, 2004
Evolution of Heterogeneous?
Industries (Differentiated
Kunc, 2004 or Low Cost)
Dyn. of lnnov. Competition is
Industries among firms &
Weil & Utterback, technologies.
2005 Includes firm entry
& exit
Getting Big Too Duopoly, Heterogeneous? Explicitly / Price & Market dynamic
Fast large feedbacks (Aggressive or Endogenously Availability? complexity defines
Sterman & Conservative) (pg. 9) successful strategy
Henderson, 2007
F. Mathematical Equations of Numerical Model (Vensim)
P-A-L Diffusing Market Sector
Market Carrying Capacity K=
1
Market [0,20000,1000]
N is the total population in the community
Potential market P= INTEG (
Replacememt Rate-Diffusion Rate,
Market Carrying Capacity K-Initial Adopted market A Fraction*Market Carrying
Capacity K\
Market
Adopted market A= INTEG (
Diffusion Rate-Replacememt Rate-Substitution Rate,
Initial Adopted market A Fraction*Market Carrying Capacity K)
Market
Initial Adopted market A Fraction=
0.001
~ Market [0,1,0.0001]
Diffusion Rate=
(Potential market P*Maximum Fractional Diffusion Rate rd)*Adopted market A/Market
Carrying Capacity K
Market/Year
Maximum Fractional Diffusion Rate rd=
0.07
1/Year [0,10,0.01]
Replacememt Rate=
Adopted market A/Average Product Life L
Average Product Life L=
2000
S [0,2000,1]
Lost market L= INTEG (
Substitution Rate,
Initial Lost market L Fraction*Market Carrying Capacity K)
- ------- -------------------------------------
Initial Lost market L Fraction =
0.001
Substitution Rate =
(Adopted market A*Maximum Fractional Substitution Rate rs)*Lost market L/Market
Carrying Capacity K
Maximum Fractional Substitution Rate rs=
0
S [0,1,0.01]
D-C Commoditizing Market Sector
Cost market C= INTEG (
Commoditization Rate,
Initial Cost market C Fraction*Adopted market A)
Market
Initial Cost market C Fraction=
0.001
Market [0,10,0.5]
Differentiation market D=
Adopted market A-Cost market C
Market
Commoditization Rate=
(Differentiation market D*Maximum Fractional Commoditization Rate rc)*Cost market
CA/\
Adopted market A
Market/Year
Maximum Fractional Commoditization Rate rc=
0.14
1/Year [0.1,0.01]
Competitor X Growth Sector
Acquired market X= INTEG (
Acquisition Rate XC+Acquisition Rate XD,
Initial Fraction of Acquired market X * Adopted market A)
Market
Initial Fraction of Acquired market X=
0.001
S Dimensionless [-1,1,0.001]
Acquisition Rate XD=
Fractional Acquisition Rate rXD * Acquired market X
Market/Year
Fractional Acquisition Rate rXD=
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rXD*Effect of D on Fractional Acquisition Rate
rXD
1/Period
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rXD =
0.14
- 1/Period [0,1,0.01]
Acquisition Rate XC=
Fractional Acquisition Rate rXC*Acquired market X
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rXC=
0.14
[0,1,0.01]
Fractional Acquisition Rate rXC=
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rXC*Effect of C on Fractional Acquisition Rate
rXC
Effect of C on Fractional Acquisition Rate rXC= WITH LOOKUP (
"(X+Y)/C",
([(0,0)-
(1,1 )],(0,1 ),(0.25,0.9375),(0.33,0.9125),(0.385,0.875),(0.425,0.82),(0.45,0.75\
),(0.5,0.5),(0.55,0.25),(0.575,0.18),(0.615,0.125),(0.67,0.0875),(0.75,0.0625),(1,0\) ))
Effect of D on Fractional Acquisition Rate rXD= WITH LOOKUP (
"(X+Y)/D",
([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.25,0.9375),(0.33,0.9125),(0.385,0.875),(0.425,0.82),(0.45,0.75\
-*i*--- - ----------------------------------~ I
),(0.5,0.5),(0.55,0.25),(0.575,0.18),(0.615,0.125),(0.67,0.0875),(0.75,0.0625),(1,0\
) ))
)/C"=
MIN((Acquired market X+Acquired market Y)/Cost market C, 1)
)/D"I=
MIN((Acquired market X+Acquired market Y)/Differentiation market D, 1)
Competitor Y Growth Sector
Acquired market Y= INTEG (
Acquisition Rate YC+Acquisition Rate YD,
Initial Fraction of Acquired market Y * Adopted market A)
Market
Initial Fraction of Acquired market Y=
0.001
- Dimensionless [-1,1,0.001]
The initial population as a fraction of the carrying capacity.
Acquisition Rate YC=
Fractional Acquisition Rate rYC*Acquired market Y
Market/Year
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rYC =
0.14
~ 1/Period [0,1,0.01]
Fractional Acquisition Rate rYC=
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rYC*Effect of C on Fractional Acquisition Rate
rYC
1/Period
The fractional net growth rate is a linearly declining function of the \
market relative to available market (carrying capacity). This generates \
logistic growth.
Acquisition Rate YD =
Fractional Acquisition Rate rYD*Acquired market Y
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rYD=
0.14
- [0,1,0.01]
Fractional Acquisition Rate rYD=
Maximum Fractional Acquisition Rate rYD*Effect of D on Fractional Acquisition Rate
rYD
Effect of C on Fractional Acquisition Rate rYC= WITH LOOKUP (
"(Y+X)/C",
([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0, 1),(0.0625,0.75),(0.0875,0.67),(0.125,0.615),(0.18,0.575),(0.25,0.55\
),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.45),(0.82,0.425),(0.875,0.385),(0.9125,0.33),(0.9375,0.25),( 1,0\
) ))
~*i*"
Effect of D on Fractional Acquisition Rate rYD = WITH LOOKUP (
([(0,0)-
(1,1)1,(0,1 ),(0.0625,0.75),(0.0875,0.67),(0.125,0.615),(0.18,0.575),(0.25,0.55\
),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.45),(0.82,0.425),(0.875,0.385),(0.9125,0.33),(0.9375,0.25),(1,0\
) ))
MIN((Acquired market Y+Acquired market X)/Cost market C, 1)
)/D"=
MIN((Acquired market Y+Acquired market X)/Differentiation market D, 1)
rq
Competitor X's Demand-Supply Sector
Initial Assets X=
0
S Assets [0,100,1]
"Time to Close X Gap (Urgency)"=
1
Years [0,100,1]
Production Rate X=
Assets X*Asset X Productivity
Market/Year
Desired Inventory X=
10
S Widgets [0,100,1]
Initial X Inventory Backlog =
0
S [0,1000,1]
Asset X Removal Rate=
Assets X/"Time to Remove Assets X (Impatience)"
Assets/Year
Time to Adjust Assets X=
2.5
~ Years [0,100,1]
Net Change in Assets X=
Amount of Assets X Needed/Time to Adjust Assets X
"Time to Remove Assets X (Impatience)"=
1000
S Years [0,1000,1]
Amount of Assets X Needed=
X Production Needed to Close Gap/Asset X Productivity
Assets
Asset X Productivity =
1
Sales Rate X=
Total Acquisition Rate X
~ ~i**i*-- - i*---i** - -- ----------------------------------- I
Market/Year
Assets X= INTEG (
Net Change in Assets X-Asset X Removal Rate,
Initial Assets X)
X Inventory Backlog = INTEG (
Production Rate X-Sales Rate X,
Initial X Inventory Backlog)
X Production Needed to Close Gap=
X Gap/"Time to Close X Gap
Widgets/Year
(Urgency)"
X Gap=
Desired Inventory X-X Inventory Backlog
Total Acquisition Rate X=
Acquisition Rate XD+Acquisition Rate XC
Competitor Y's Demand-Supply Sector
Total Acquisition Rate Y=
Acquisition Rate YD+Acquisition Rate YC
Y Production Needed to Close Gap=
Y Gap/"Time to Close Y Gap (Urgency)"
Widgets/Year
"Time to Remove Assets Y (Impatience)"=
1000
S Years [0,1000,1]
Sales Rate Y=
Total Acquisition Rate Y
Market/Year
Initial Y Inventory Backlog =
0
~ [0,1000,1]
Desired Inventory Y=
10
~ Widgets [0,100,1]
Time to Adjust Assets Y=
2.5
~ Years [0,100,1]
Asset Y Removal Rate=
Assets Y/"Time to Remove Assets Y (Impatience)"
Assets/Year
"Time to Close Y Gap (Urgency)"=
1
Years [0,100,1]
Assets Y= INTEG (
Asset Y Removal Rate-Net Change in Assets Y,
Initial Assets Y)
Production Rate Y=
Assets Y*Asset Y Productivity
Market/Year
Amount of Assets Y Needed=
....... .....
Y Production Needed to Close Gap/Asset Y Productivity
Assets
Y Gap=
Desired Inventory Y-Y Inventory Backlog
Y Inventory Backlog= INTEG (
Sales Rate Y-Production Rate Y,
Initial Y Inventory Backlog)
Asset Y Productivity=
1
Net Change in Assets Y=
Amount of Assets Y Needed/Time to Adjust Assets Y
Assets/Year
Initial Assets Y=
0
S Assets [0,100,1]
k~osl~
.Control
Simulation Control Parameters
FINAL TIME = 200
Year
The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
Year
The initial time for the simulation.
SAVEPER =
TIME STEP
Year
The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.0078125
S Year
The time step for the simulation.
G. Interview Participants
The Boeinz Company
The Boeing Company served as the most encouraging and supportive learning laboratory that one
could hope for. I am indebted to those at Boeing with whom I have had the privilege to learn
along side with. They are listed below alphabetically, grouped according to their informal
networks or formal corporate divisions:
* World Headquarters / Corporate Offices
o Mike Cave (EVP, Strategy and Business Developent), Paul Gray (Board of
Directors), Shephard Hill (EVP, Strategy and Business Development).
* Boeing Commercial Airplanes Leadership Team
o Mike Bair (VP, Business Strategy and Marketing), Dan Becker (VP,
Manufacturing; VP Twin Aisle Programs), Scott Carson (VP, Sales; President &
CEO), Mike Cave (VP, Airplane Programs; VP, Business Strategy and
Marketing), Ray Conner (VP, Sales), Carolyn Corvi (VP 737 Program; VP,
Airplane Programs), Jan Fisher (VP, Boeing International), Karen Freeman (VP),
Doug Kight (VP, Human Resources), Jim Jamieson (VP, Airplane Programs;
COO), Fred Kiga (VP, Government Relations), Jim Morris (VP, Supplier
Management), Rob Pasterick (VP, Finance), Nicole Piasecki (VP, Business
Strategy and Marketing), Clay Richmond (VP), Jim Schlueter (VP,
Communications), Scott Shearer (VP).
* Commercial Airplane Programs Leadership Team
o Jerry Allyne (VP, Finance), Dan Becker (VP, Manufacturing; VP Twin Aisle
Programs), Ross Bogue (VP, 757 Program; VP, Fabrication; VP 747 Program),
Carolyn Brandsema, Mike Cave (VP, Airplane Programs), Wade Cornelius (VP,
Global Strategy), Carolyn Corvi (VP 737 Program; VP, Airplane Programs), Kris
Fellrath (VP, Program Management Office), Jim Jamieson (VP, Airplane
Programs), Paula Janson, (VP, Human Resources), Mark Jenkins (VP, 737
Program), Jacki Konesky, David Leonhardi, Larry Loftis (VP, 777 Program), Pat
McKenna (VP, 717 Program; VP Fabrication), David Moore (VP, Information
Technology), Mike Olszewski, Laura Peterson, (VP, Global Strategy), Sandy
Postel (VP, Propulsion Systems; VP Lean Enterprise Office), Steve Schaffer (VP,
Supplier Management) Richard Wynne, Bev Wyse (VP, 767 Program), Russ
Young (VP, Comunications).
* Airplane Production
o Carolyn Corvi, Bill Cogswell, Steve Connelly, Saundra Cope, Wade Cornelius,
Rich DeLappe, Lindsey Douglas, Diane Easley, Bruce Florsheim, Debbie Gavin,
Jon Geiger, Rick Gross, Mike Hersher, Scott Hoge, Kay Lui, George Maffeo,
Craig Martin, Carleton Mason, Dave Moore, Sandy Postel, Jennifer Sumner,
Steve Thorson
o 747/767/777
* Dan Becker, Ross Bogue, Stephen Connelly, Michael Delaney, Debby
Kinsley, Jeff Klemann, George Maffeo, Dwight Miller, Atsuo Miyake,
Larry Loftis, Dan Mooney, David Moore, Don Morgan, Paul Nuyen, John
Quinlivan, Jeff Piece, Bev Wyse
o 737/757
* Mark Jenkins, Jerry Allyne, Lindsay Anderson, Bill Cogswell, Mike
Delaney, Peter Doman, Kris Fellrath, Valerie Jensen, Larry Loftis,
Candace Lydston, Scott Peiper, Castel Pittman, Marie Western
o 717
* Pat McKenna
* Fabrication Division
o Ross Bogue, Gary Bomhoff, Tony Carolan, John Cornish, Scott Cruikshank,
Doug Dahl, Deborah Dustman, Tim Ferris, Jim Frankland, Jon Geiger, Lew
Hustead, Pat McKenna, Andy Moskowitz, Liz Otis, Mick Norris, Dave Pickering,
Jenette Ramos, Mark Ross, Owen Sakima, Jim Paige, Rielda Savage, Jon Self,
Kim Smith, Drea Stoner
* Propulsion Systems Division
o Mo Yahyavi, Sandy Postal, Karyl Bartlett
* Supplier Management
o Steve Schaffer, Valery Feliberti, Jeff Luckey, Gary Mesick, Ren Nanstad
* Wichita Division (now Spirit Aerosystems)
o Jeff Turner, Ron Brunton, Don Blake, Dennis Dietz, Tom Greenwood, Carolyn
Harms, Marci Johnson, Randy Kysar, John Pilla, Kip Schmidt, Bob Waner, Dan
Wheeler
* Engineering /Manufacturing
o Jim Morris, Dan Mooney, Mark Jenks
* Commercial Aviation Services
o Tim Copes
* Sales
o Marty Bentrott, Scott Carson, Ray Connor.
* Human Resources
o Susan Abbott, Susan Andrews, Curt Brusto, Jeannie Denbo, Joelle Denney,
Becky Evans, Mel Fortson, Bill Hartman, Rich Hartnett, Terri Hoge, Bruce
Jackson, Paula Janson, Doug Kight, Carey McFarlane, BV McGrue, Duane
Shireman, Darlene Thomas, Chris Villiers, Teresa Yoneyama.
* Marketing & Business Strategy
o Fariba Alamdari, Rik Anderson, Tony Arvish, Mike, Bair, Lynda Beaumont,
Leyla Beyaz, Jim Billing, Debra Blount, Gretchen Bodine, Silke Boettger, Sherry
Carbary, Mike Cave, Nina Clancy, Allison Cook, Larry Coughlin, Deb Dollard,
Rasheed El-Moslimany, Blake Emery, Bill Epler, Pradeep Fernandes, Uli Fischer,
Kent Fisher, Jennifer Haaginson, Devin Harmala, Ralph Heinze, Joel Hennig,
DeAnn Henny, Scott Hilton, Mike Hurd, Andy Hutchison, Janice Imrich, Adam
Kohorn, Kay Le, Drew Magill, Mitch Mann, Gregory Mars, Rachel
Martin/Portillo, Miko Masters, Tim Meskill, George Metcalf, James Mitchell,
Dennis Morden, David Nestvold, Brian Norwood, Daniel O'Neill, Brian Pearson,
Chresten Petersen, Nicole Piasecki, Anthony Ponton, Andy Price, Sandy Randles,
Lora Rennie, Dustin Robinson, Linsey Rubenstein, Ken Sain, Sean Schwinn, John
Shen, Wendy Sowers, David Suguro, Tiim Swanson, Tracey Talbott, Rhodri
Thomas, Beth Thompson, Brad Till, Jeff VerWey, Mike Wargel, Dave Wenndt,
Gary Wicks, David Williams, David Wirth, Mike Woodward.
* Phantom Works
o Mark Augustyniewicz
* Lean+ /Lean Enterprise Office
o Mike Hersher, Sandy Postal
* The Boeing MIT-Leaders For Manufacturing (LFM) Alumni:
o Dan Allison, Michelle Bernson, Laura Bogusch, Timothy Copes, Larry Coughlin,
Valerie Feliberti, Victoria Gastelum, Tom Greenwood, Steve Herren, Charlie Hix,
Keith Jackson, Mark Jenks, Eric Kittleson, Adam Kohorn, Steve Llorente,
Rasheed El-Moslimani, Erik Nelson, Dan Park, Linsey Rubenstein, Sharon
Rykels, Roland Sargent, Mike VanderWel, Dan Wheeler.
* The Boeing Career Foundation Program (BCFP):
o Kate Beale, Annie Beck, Gretchen Bodine, Kirsten Bowen, Alexa Bums, Michael
Cram, Mark Cypher, Leann Decker, Carla Deutsch, Meghan Fiore, Mackenzie
Fisher, April Garza, Lauren Henriksen, Rae Kang, Art Livermore, Robert Long,
Abbey Louie, Rachel Martin, Josh McDonald, Keely McIlwain, Michelle
Mulcahy, Chresten Petersen, Lindsay Petersen, Herb Portillo, Dustin Robinson,
Ryan Rubenstein.
* Alteon
o Sherry Carbary, President
* Shared Services Group
o Tim Copes, President
Spirit Aerosystems
* Board of Directors
Ike Evans, Operating Partner of Thayer Capital; Richard Gephardt, former congressman
from Missouri; Robert Johnson, Chariman of Honeywell Aerospace; Ronald T. Kadish,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Department of Defense; Jeff Turner, President & Chief
Executive Officer, Spirit Aerosystems; Nigel S. Wright, Onex Corporation; Paul
Fulchino, Prseident and Chief Executive Officer, Aviall, Inc.; Charles L. Chadwell,
retired Vice President and General Manager, GE Aircraft Engines; Francis Raborn, Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer, United Defense; James L. Welch, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Yellow Transportation.
* Executive Council
Jeff Turner, President & Chief Executive Officer; Ron Brunton, Executive Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer; Rick Schmidt, Executive Vice President & Chief Financial
Officer; John Pilla, Senior Vice President & Chief Technology Officer; David Walker,
Senior Vice President, Sales & Marketing; Gloria Flentje, Senior Vice President,
Corporate Administration and Human Resources; J.A. Greenberg, Senior Vice President,
General Counsel and Secretary; Buch Buchannan, Senior Vice President / General
Manager, Fuselage Segment; Mike King, Senior Vice President / General Manager,
Propulsion Segment; John Lewelling, Senior Vice President / General Manager, Wing
Segment; D. Carlisle; Vice President / General Manager, Tulsa; N. McManus, Vice
President / Managing Director, Spirit Europe Ltd.; Carolyn Harms, Vice President /
General Manager, Aftermarket; Dan Wheeler, Director A350; Tom Greenwood, Director,
Strategic Initiatives.
BAE Systems
* October 2006:
James Baker, Director of Technology and Engineering Services - Shared Services; Sean
Bond, Vice-President Aerospace; Chris Clarkson, Technical Director, Future Systems &
FOAS - Air Systems; Geoff Grant, Business Unit Vice-President and Program Manager;
Steve Greenbank, Supply Chain and Procurement Director, Air Systems; Jim Imrie,
Managing Director, Type 45 Destroyer - Naval Ships; John Jarman, Vice-President and
Deputy General Manager; Bob Kearley, Policy Manager; William Lenz, Vice-President
Engineering; Tony McCarthy, Business Improvement Director, CS&S; Ian McNeeney,
Business Director, Support Programmes; Craig Murray, Human Resources Director -
Insyte; Paul Perera, Support Services Director - CS&S; Nigel Philpott, Programmes
Director - Insyte; Matthew Riddle, Director Survivability; Jim Schoppenhorst, Program
Director DDX; Steve Rowbotham, Managing Director, Munitions; Mike Scrimgeour,
Legal Director - Operations; Trevor Spearpoint, Vice-President, Mission Success; Andy
Start, Managing Director, IFS Defence - CS&S; Mike Thomas, Commercial Director -
Insyte; Phil Thomber, Comm. and Proc. Director - CS&S; Alan Tough, Finance Director
- Naval Ships; Nigel Ward, Operations Director - Submarines.
* October 2007:
Matt Anderson, Head of Manufacturing Engineering; Nigel Blenkinsop, Director of
Integrated Manufacturing - Samlesbury and Warton; Jayne Bryant, Engineering Director
- NA Platform Solutions; Dominic Carr, Head of Commerical - Naval Ships; Michael
Christie, Prorgramme Director - Training Solutions; Glyn Cragg, CVF Project Director -
Submarine Solutions; Jenny Cridland, Head of HR - Business Improvement; Hamish
Davidson, Senior Vice-President; Steve Dowdell, ACA Mission System Director -
Insyte; Alan Farnworth, Chief Technical Officer - Insyte; Bob Fewings, Project Director
FRES SOSI - Strategic Business Development; Stuart Forsyth, Vice-President Tranche
1/MDC - Air Systems; Ed Gelsthorpe, Senior Legal Advisor; Ronald Herzog, Finance
Director - North America; Bradley Jacobs, Vice-President, Finance - North America;
Sean McGovern, Operations Director - Regional Aircraft; Walt Mueller, C31
Engineering Director; Graeme Ormiston, Finance Director Type 45 - Surface Fleet
Solutions; John Osterholz, Vice-President Global Communications & Advanced
Networks - Network Systems; Steve Ripp, General Manager, M/S 01-23LL; Jan Robjohn,
Business Development Director - Insyte; Amy Shevlin, Director, HR - North America;
Jim Unterseher, Vice-President, Programs - North America; John Wall, Vice-President
and General Manager, Flight Systems - Sensor Systems; Gregory White, Vice-President
Business Management - North America.
* October 2008:
Richard Ashooh, Vice-President, Government Relations, E&S; Charlie Blakemore,
Managing Director - Land Systems; Mark Bowers, Director of Human Resources Insyte;
Chris Chambers, Sub Vice-President - Sales & Marketing; Jeremy Charmak, Director of
Commercial & Procurement; Sam Cole, Vice-President; Malcom Dare, Director of
Supply Chain & IT Services - Submarine Solutions; Jim Garceau, Director, US Fixed
Wing Programs; James Geraghty, Senior Director - Programs; Dan Gobel, Vice-
President and General Manager - Advanced Platform Electronic Warefare Systems; Neil
Graham, Director of Engineering Capability and Performance; Iain Green, Managing
Director - IFS Defence; David Herr, Vice-President and General Manager - Commercial
Avionics; Brendan Hindle, Head of Machine Shop Operations; Mark Keeler, Vice-
President of Operations; John Kesser, Director - Program I; Rusty Kollmorgen, Director
- Program II; Martha LaCrosse, Chief of Staff, Chairman's Office; Paul McDonald,
Director of Insurable Risk Services; Paul Nash, Head of Supply Chain; Annie O'Connor,
Director of Human Resources Integration; Andrew Price, Chief Counsel - Insyte; Mark
Ritson, Director of Communications - Insyte; Gary Slack, Chief Financial Officer - Land
& Armaments OG; John Steckel, Vice-President of Business Development; Mark Taylor,
Director of Strategy & Business Development - Regional Aircraft; Stephen Trichka,
Vice-President & Chief Counsel - Platform Solutions; Mark Turner, General Manager -
RAF Marham; Candace Vassella, Vice-President, Government Relations; Tony Williams,
Production Director - Govan; Steve Worsnip, Assistant Director - Typhoon Support
Programmes; Simon Wright, Head of Engineering.
H. Selected Sample of Qualitative Data for Discourse & Textual Analysis
In Table 24 below is a selected sample of qualitative data gathered from publically available
sources for firms in both the primary and secondary samples. This data complements the
qualitative data collected via interviews and direct observation. The data are arranged
chronologically, and are categorized by stakeholder interaction and coded for concepts embodied
in the theoretical framework developed herein: fit, form, function, performance. Bold font has
been added to highlight the more relevant coding information.
As social "reality" is an enacted phenomena rooted in interactions between entities (i.e.
individuals or organizations) which are behaviorally complex (i.e. they possess a wide variety of
"intentions", including among other complex properties, "deception"), constructing grounded
theory systematically and scientifically is an extremely challenging task for a researcher of
political organizational phenomena (who also possess their own set of intentions) where power is
the central organizational construct.
As has been demonstrated in numerous research studies on organizations since the classic
Hawthorne studies (Mayo, 1949), when one measures social phenomena, it can move precisely
because it is aware that it is being measured. Capturing "the truth" or high-fidelity data in
power-laden levels of complex organizations, requires the building relationships with the actors
(individuals and organizations), the establishment of trust through the advancement (and not
harm) of their interests, recognizing that these are often in conflict within a firm and between the
participants in its extended enterprise.
High fidelity data comes from multiple sources triangulated both within and between
stakeholders and longitudinally over time. Such sustained access for the research requires high
degrees of emotional intelligence and special skills of empathy and trust-building. It requires the
ability to appear to the research participants to "go native" (the bane of ethnographers), while
maintaining objective detachment.
The quotations presented in the table below, therefore are not randomly gathered to obtain
statistical precision, but to demonstate trends in the qualitative data. The fidelity of any such
dataset, whether collected as a random or theoretical sample, will have significant variance, and
is a function of the observer and the observed and the quality of their interaction.
Table 24: Selected Sample of Qualitative Data for Discourse & Textual Analysis
Date Source Person Stake- Fi Key Data Con-
/ Title holder r cepts
(Categ m
ory)
1919 FT Henry Firm- a ".. to do as much good as we can, everywhere, for On the
Magazi Ford, Investo everybody concerned...and incidentally to make money." plural
ne, 11 CEO, rs objectiv
June Ford e
2005, Motor function
....................... _ , , , , ,
issue Compa of an
no. 109, ny integral
pg. 22. enterprs
ei
architec
ture,
express
ed by
the
CEO,
when he
was
defendi
ng
himself
from a
lawsuit
by
sharehol
ders for
suspend
ing
dividen
d
paymen
ts.
Jan. FT Owen Firm- a "If you will pardon me for being personal, it makes a On the
1929 Magazi D. Investo great difference in my attitude towards my job as an plural
ne, 11 Young rs executive officer of the General Electric Company objectiv
June , whether I am a trustee of the institution or an attorney e
2005, Preside for the investor. If I am a trustee, who are the function
issue nt and beneficiaries of the trust? To whom do I owe my of an
no. 109, Chair obligations? integral
pg. 22. man, enterprs
Gener My conception of it is this: That there are three groups ei
al of people who have an interest in that institution. One architec
Electri is the group of fifty-odd thousand people who have put ture,
c their capital in the company, namely, its stockholders. express
Compa Another is a group of well toward one hundred thousand ed by
ny people who are putting their labor and their lives into the
the business of the company. The third group is of CEO.
customers and the general public.
Customers have a right to demand that a concern so
large shall not only do its business honestly and
properly, but, further, that it shall meet its public
obligations and perform its public duties - in a word,
vast as it is, that it should be a good citizen."
15 United Frederi Firm- a "United Aircraft & Transport Corporation is a holding On a
Mar. Aircraft ck B. Investo company controlling, through stock ownership, various disinteg
1930 and Rentsc rs subsidiary companies of outstanding importance in rating
Transpo hler, aviation. It occupies a unique and possibly the integral
rt Preside strongest position in the aeronautical field of any enterpri
Corpor nt, company in the world. Among its subsidiaries are se
ation, United airplane, aircraft engine and propeller manufacturers, architec
First Aircraf as well as companies engaged in the operation of air ture.
Annual t & transport lines, aeronautical schools, airports,
Report Transp experimental laboratories, etc. Almost fifty percent of
to ort the total volume of 1929 aeronautical exports from the
Stockho Corpor United States, consisted of products of United Aircraft.
Iders, ation Commercial transport operations more than doubled
1929 in mileage in 1929 over 1928. "
1961 Boeing Willia Firm- a "In view of the heavy demands for funds for On the
Annual m Investo investment in facilities and new programs forseen for relative
Report Allen, rs the coming years, your management continues to integrali
Preside believe it desirable to maintain a conservative policy ty of the
nt, with respect to the percentage of earnings retained for currentl
Boeing reinvestment in the company's operations." y
modular
"Research and development, from the company's enterpri
earliest days, have been the foundation which Boeing's se
pioneering achievements have been built." architec
ture.
"The company's basic and applied research programs
are directed toward keeping abreast of many facets of
the rapidly advancing technology of the aerospace
age."
1961 Boeing Willia Firm- a "Boeing is faced with very strong competition both On a
Annual m Investo from British and French firms with governmental modular
Report Allen, rs backing. This is especially important in the short-to- enterpri
Preside medium range field were French and Engligs aircraft are se
nt, directly competitive with the 727." architec
Boeing ture's
"Still another factor with respect to our commercial views of
program is foreign competition which is becoming more the
intense. Certain foreign companies have developed stakhold
competence in our fields, and are in active competition er of
with us. These companies are government-owned or govern
government-supported, and operate at wage levels ment.
substantially below ours."
1961 Boeing Willia Firm- a "Finally, the company's most valuable asset is the On the
Annual m Emplo people of Boeing. It is our belief that our employees have relative
Report Allen, yees a competence and a dedication without parallel in the integrali
Preside industry." ty of the
nt, currentl
Boeing y
modular
enterpri
se
architec
ture.
1964 Boeing Firm- a "The company can sustain its position in the On
Annual Custo commercial aircraft market only by the timely perceive
Report mers introduction of improvements in aircraft design. This d
can be achieved only by the maintenance of a high market
degree of technological capability and a thorough niche of
understanding of airline requirements." a
modular
enterpri
se
b -----------~ ~ ---------------------------------------- I***~;;;;;;;;;;;~; ........................................
architec
ture.
1965 Boeing Firm a "On Julyl5, 1966 The Boeing Company will observe its On
Annual fiftieth anniversary. It is difficult to conceive any other perceive
Report half century in man's history more stimulating, d
challenging and more rewarding than the span from market
1916 to 1966. In those fifty years man's scientific and niche of
technological progress has surpassed the total of such a
advancement in all previous history, and Boeing is modular
proud to have played a leading role in that fantastic enterpri
acceleration. There is a moment now for a proud glance se
at the past and a rededication to the next fifty years, and architec
the next, and the next..." ture.
1978 Toyota Taiichi Firm 13 "Slow growth is scary." On an
Product Ohno, Integral
ion "Fathe "During a high period of economic growth, any Enterpri
System: r" of manufacturer can achieve lower costs with higher se
Beyond the production. But in today's low growth period, to Archite
Large Toyota achieve any form of cost reduction is difficult." cture's
Scale Produc design
Product tion "In a high-growth period, productivity can be raised for slow
ion (pp. System by anyone. But how many can attain it during the growth
2, 9, , more difficult circumstances induced by low-growth environ
114- Toyota rate? This is the deciding factor in the success or ments.
115) Motors failure of an enterprise."
"There must be hundreds of people aroud the world
who can improve productivity and efficiency by
increasing production quantity. We, too, have such
foremen at Toyota. But few people in the world can
raise productivity when production quantities
decrease. With even one such person, the character of
a business operation will be that much stronger.
People prefer working with large quantities, however.
It is easier than having to work hard and learn from
producing small quantities. I think it is more
worthwhile in a company to work in the area where
there are problems due to dwindling sales than in an
area where sales are rising."
1978 Toyota Taiichi Firm 13 "The Tortoise and the Hare: The slower but consistent On an
Product Ohno, tortoise causes less waste and is much more desirable Integral
ion "Fathe than the speed hare who races and then stops Enterpri
System: r" of occasionally to doze. The Toyota production system se
Beyond the can be realized only when all the workers become Archite
Large Toyota tortoises. Speed is meaningless without continuity. cture's
Scale Produc Just remember the toroise and the hare." design
Product tion for slow
ion (pp. System growth
62-63) , environ
Toyota ments,
Motors requirin
g slow
action
by
employ
~PXI ~~-* * *~ ........... "~
ees.
1978 Toyota Taiichi Firm B "Mountains should be low and valleys should be On an
Product Ohno, shallow." Integral
ion "Fathe Enterpri
System: r" of se
Beyond the Archite
Large Toyota cture's
Scale Produc quest
Product tion for
ion (pg. System stability
36)
Toyota
Motors
1978 Toyota Taiichi Firm B "Cost Reduction is the Goal: At Toyota, as in all On an
Product Ohno, manufacturing industries, profit can be obtained only by Integral
ion "Fathe reducing costs. Cost reduction must be the goal of Enterpri
System: r" of consumer products manufacturers trying to survive in se
Beyond the today's marketplace." Archite
Large Toyota cture's
Scale Produc "The goal, as I have often said is cost reduction." focus on
Product tion cost-
ion (pp. System "..cost reduction, the most critical condition for a leaders
8-9, 53, , business' survival and growth... the criterion of all hip.
62) Toyota decisions is whether cost reduction can be achieved."
Motors
1978 Toyota Taiichi Firm B "In the Toyota Production system, we think of economy in On an
Product Ohno, therms of manpower reduction and cost reduction. The Integral
ion "Fathe relationship between these two elements is clearer if we Enterpri
System: r" of consider a manpower reduction policy as a means of se
Beyond the realizing cost reduction, the most critical condition for Archite
Large Toyota a business' survival and growth. Manpower reduction cture's
Scale Produc at Toyota is a company-wide activity whose purpose is treatme
Product tion cost reduction. Therefore all considerations and nt of
ion (pp. System improvement ideas, when boiled down, must be tied to employ
53) , cost reduction. Saying this in reverse, the criterion of all ment
Toyota decisions is whether cost reduction can be achieved." stability
Motors in the
service
of cost-
leaders
hip.
1988 MIT The Firm a "First and foremost, management needs to stabilize the On an
Sloan Boeing organization. Successful strategy implementation lies in integral
Fellows Compa adherence to long-term strategies, not short-term goals enterpri
SM ny or revenue targets. Achievement of short-term goals, se
Thesis, often overrides the strategic direction established at top architec
Carolyn levels for the organization. There is less incentive for t's
Corvi, executive management to stick to the strategy, but rather assessm
The more incentive to manage 'by the numbers'. The result ent of a
Boeing is that tactics become more important than strategy. The modular
Compan bottom line and profitability become more important enterpri
y than establishing market presence, etc." se
architec
ture.
2000 EADS Firm [ "When we set up 30 years ago, Airbus' goal was to pool On an
I I I 1 111
Annual European capabilities and technological resources to build integral
Report an aircraft that would reliably and cost-effectively carry enterpri
(pp. 21- passengers in true wide-body comfort. The name Airbus se
22) is synonymous with lower operating costs for airlines. architec
Airbus has continually increased its market share. Why? ture's
Operational efficiency is the first and last word in market
analyzing Airbus's unique market success. This niche.
performance highlights Airbus's ability to meet
sustained growth targets by steadily increasing
production output."
2001 Richar Firm- a "'A potent combination of over-investment in recent On
d Custo years and a well-founded concern about profitability tempora
Aboula mers may well lead airlines to defer many orders,' wrote 1
fia, Aboulafia in a monthly letter to clients. Given that, inconsis
analyst Aboulafia said, the order backlog isn't all that secure. 'All tencies
, Teal told, about half the backlog is less than firm,' Aboulafia in
Group said. 'And even the truly firm orders can be deferred, analysts
with no real cost to the buyer."' of
modular
enterpri
se
architec
tures.
(Compa
re with
same
analyst'
S
stateme
nts in
March
2008
and 17
Dec.
2008.)
3 Seattle Caroly Firm a "At a time when airplane orders are down and deliveries of On an
Aug. Post- n new planes are expected to follow, The Boeing Co. is integral
2001 Ingellig Corvi, about to do something it has never done before...the 737 architec
encer VP/G production rate will reach 28 planes a month... At first t trying
M, glance, it might seem odd that Boeing is increasing the to
Boeing production rate of its 737 to record levels during a severe manage
Comm downturn in the airline industry, when many analysts stably
ercial predict that orders for single-aisle jets such as the 737 will within a
Airpla be down substantially over the next couple of years. Last modular
nes year, Boeing won 391 orders for the 737. So far this year, enterpri
customers have placed only 83 firm orders... And the se
more airplanes Boeing can turn out a month, the greater architec
the opportunity to capitalize on the many cost-savings that ture.
have been made in the production of the world's most
frequently flown jetliner. 'The more airplanes that go
outthe factory door, the better the benefits,' Corvi said...
We always want to avoid jerking rates up or down,'
Corvi said. 'That's's not only counterproductive but
expensive. As we work to manage our production system,
one of the things we always look at is how do we
manage the rates in such a way that allows us to support
the demand from the market and at the same time allows
us to manage our production so that it's not costing us
a fortune to build the airplane.'
20 ATI Philipp Firm 1 "We've always been more careful about production On an
Sept. e rates. We do see peaks and troughs but we've always Integral
2001 Camus managed to limit the highs and lows better than they Enterpri
& do in the USA." se
Rainer Archite
Hertric cture's
h, relativel
EADS y more
Co- stable
Chair producti
men on.
21 Financi Rainer Firm B "'We do not need to fire people, and it is not the On an
Sept. al Times Hertric European way,' declared Hertrich." Integral
2001 h, Entprise
EADS Archite
Co- cture's
Chair view of
man labor
stability
21 AFX Noel Firm B "'I am always a bit surprised by the speed with which On an
Sept. News Forgea Americans take decisions: that in three days (after the Integral
2001 rd, attacks) they announce 25,000 layoffs at Boeing seems to Enterpri
Airbus me totally stupefying,' Forgeard said. Forgeard said his se
CEO company's situation is different 'because Airbus has a Archite
bigger order book than Boeing and growing market cture's
share."' relativel
y slower
decision
making
and its
concern
for
protecti
ng other
stakehol
ders
(e.g.
labor).
24 Aviation Alan Firm "Boeing quickly moved last week to cut commercial On a
Sept. Week Mulall transport delivery estimates through 2002 by what could Modula
2001 y, more than 100 aircraft in an announcement that surprised r
Boeing even some veteran Boeing-watchers by its swiftness and Enterpri
Comm scope. At a hastily arranged news conference Sept. 18, se
ercial one week after the terrorist attacks in the U.S., the Archite
Airpla company said it could also lay off up to nearly one-third of cture's
nes its commercial aircraft workforce. The decision to reduce relativel
CEO the workforce by 20,000-30,000 jobs in the next 15 y faster
months results from plans by U.S. airlines to decrease decision
operational capacity by about 20% due to traffic making
.. .........................
and its
lack of
concern
for
protecti
ng other
stakehol
ders
(e.g.
labor).
2 Le Philipp Firm B "The respective reactions of Boeing and Airbus [to 9-11] On an
Oct. Figaro e are asymmetrical because we are starting from Integral
2001 Camus asymmetrical positions." Entprise
Archite
EADS cture's
Co- view of
Chair labor
man stability
26 Forbes Firm 6 "Airbus says holding on to employees is the right On an
Nov. strategy. 'This thing will turn around, and you can't integral
2001 risk losing skilled people when the upturn comes."' entprise
architec
ture's
view of
labor
stability
15 Radio Noel Firm B "Even with reductions, Airbus remains a company with a On an
Dec. Classiq Forgea lot fewer staff than Boeing, but... we cannot make too Integral
2001 ue rd, many comparisons, because we rely much more upon Entprise
Airbus sub-contractors." Archite
CEO cture's
differen
t make-
buy
boundar
y.
17 Times of Noel Firm B "'We are introducing massive cost savings based on On an
Dec. London Forgea measures that do not involve forced departures,' Integral
2001 rd, Forgeard said." Entprise
Airbus Archite
CEO cture's
view of
labor
stability
17 Aviation Rainer Firm 8 "'We want to protect our profitability and jobs at the On an
Dec. Week Hertric same time,' said Hertrich." Integral
2001 h, Entprise
EADS Archite
CEO cture's
reductions. Alan R. Mulally, Boeing president and CEO
of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said the layoffs would
begin during the last quarter of this year. 'When you order
airplanes today, depending on the model, the lead time is
anywhere from 10-14 months, so we need to make these
decisions for production next year as soon as possible.'
On Sept. 19, Mulally said no orders have been canceled to
date and denied that the company had been planning a
similar type of job action prior to the airlines' current
problems. A primary goal of the company is to keep the
market from becoming overloaded with new aircraft it
can't use, thereby worsening airlines' financial positions,
he added."
view of
labor
stability
18 Wall Noel Firm 6 "Forgeard said that because Airbus has long been On an
Jan. Street Forgea preparing for a slump in the highly cyclical business, it integral
2002 Journal rd, can avoid following the lead of Boeing."' enterpri
Airbus se
CEO architec
tur's
strategy
to
smooth
environ
mental
instabili
ty
17 New Richar Firm ac "On the evening of Sept. 10, negotiators for the C.E.O. of On the
Feb. York d & United Airlines, James Goodwin, huddled in Washington disinteg
2002 Times, Ferris, B with union officials representing United's 30,000 baggage ration
"Into CEO handlers, customer-service representatives and reservation and
Thin of agents. They were putting the finishing touches on an attempt
Air" United agreement for a hefty double-digit wage increase, and ed
(Roger Airline Goodwin, a tall, likable West Virginian who had been with reintegr
Lowens s; the company 34 years, was waiting for a call to give his ation of
tien) Stephe O.K. It didn't matter that United, which had lost $605 a
n million in the first half of 2001, was in a financial modular
Wolf, tailspin: when airline unions are due for a raise, they enterpri
CEO get one. If you don't understand why, then you don't se
of understand the airline business. As it happened, the talks architec
United dragged on, and at 5:30 on the morning of the 1 Ith, the ture in
Airline negotiators trudged off to get a few winks. Randy Canale, airline
s; a union negotiator, returned to his hotel, the Capital industry
Gerald Hilton, not far from the Pentagon, figuring they would
Green sign later that day. He awoke earlier than expected, to the
wald, sound of sirens. 'Boy, it sounds awful close,' Canale
CEO murmured. Someone was banging on his door, and puffs
of of smoke were visible from the hotel window. Two of
United United's jets were down, the wage hike was history and so
Airline was the 57-year-old Goodwin's career. Seven weeks later,
s; Jack he was dismissed by United's board. It hardly mattered
W. that United's directors would have approved the
Creigh agreement and were as much to blame as Goodwin.
ton Jr., They were letting him go for a way of doing business
CEO that has tormented United and the entire industry for
of decades.
United
Airline Since 1978, when commercial aviation was deregulated,
s; no fewer than 137 carriers have filed for bankruptcy
James protection. And from the end of World War II, when
Goodw aviation started to become big business, through 1994, the
in, sum of the industry's profits and losses was less than zero.
CEO Warren E. Buffett once remarked that it would have been a
of blessing for shareholders if someone had thought to shoot
United down Orville Wright at Kitty Hawk. This is the industry
Airline that Congress has rushed to save, and this is the record that
I I I I II
s; -- failing basic changes -- it will have helped to perpetuate.
Rick Indeed, even as it reels from last year's record $3.8 billion
Dubins operating loss, United is facing the possibility of a strike
ky, by its mechanics, pending a vote on a proposed 37 percent
head wage hike this past week. If this rings faintly of 'Alice in
of the Wonderland,' well, that is because airlines are not like
AirLin other businesses, where competition breeds variety and
e choice for consumers and profits for business. They are
Pilots more like flying utilities. As passengers, we demand
Associ quality service -- on-time takeoffs, edible food, plenty of
ation leg room -- and don't much care who provides it, as long
at as they make it cheap. That leaves the airlines with the
United dubious honor of competing to be the Ma Bell, the Con
Airline Ed, of the sky.
s
One reason the major airlines find themselves in this
predicament is that they use huge amounts of fixed
capital -- wide-body jets go for $100 million each and
can't be readily liquidated. They also depend on a
skilled labor force. The two problems exacerbate each
other. Since airlines cannot afford to let planes sit idle,
they can ill suffer strikes. That makes their unions
unusually powerful. Consider some other businesses for a
moment: Microsoft has highly skilled programmers but
little invested capital. Merrill Lynch has both, but its assets
-- stocks and bonds mostly -- could be liquidated
overnight. Steel has high fixed capital, but it can replace
its workers more easily. Airline pilots (and mechanics
too) are not so replaceable. Stringent safety codes
strengthen the unions further by introducing a stickiness
into the rules that govern hiring and firing. Any other
industry would compensate by raising fares, but air travel
is a commodity, so the temptation is always to cut fares to
fill seats. None of this was caused by the attack on the
World Trade Center. But until then, it was possible to
believe that airlines were turning a corner. Even though
they were losing money in 2001, they had recently enjoyed
some good years, thanks to genuine improvements in their
operations. They had learned to manage their fleets more
efficiently, they had structured their routes better and they
had cut overhead. United was emblematic of the
airlines' ephemeral prosperity. In the late 1990's, it
reported $4 billion in profits, and its route map,
stretching over four continents, was the envy of the
industry. Most strikingly, it had ventured a daring
solution to the industry's thorniest problem -- labor --
by selling a majority of its stock to its employees. But
despite this groundbreaking arrangement, United was
never able to fully align the interests of its employees,
particularly the pilots, with its own. Rick Dubinsky,
longtime head of the AirLine Pilots Association at
United, made this clear when he and Goodwin began a
recent wage negotiation. 'We don't wnt to kill the
golden goose,' Dubinsky told Goodwin. 'We just want
to choke it by the neck until it gives us every ast egg.'
On Sept. 11, the goose ran out of eggs. In five months,
II
United's traffic has shrunk by, on average, a quarter, fares
are down and two of its fleets lie mothballed in the middle
of the Mojave Desert. Meanwhile, it has been begging
senior pilots, who can earn close to $300,000 a year, to sit
home and collect a full 80 percent of their pay for doing
nothing; otherwise, they can remain on the premises,
though inactive, at full pay. This is why by the end of 2002
United stands to lose every penny it made in the previous
five years -- and why bankruptcy for one of the nation's
largest and most venerable airlines looms as a real
possibility.
United's modern history started in 1985, when Richard
Ferris, the C.E.O. at the time, boldly challenged his
pilots. The underlying issue -- then, and in every
subsequent dispute -- was management's desire to
break the contractual stranglehold inherited from
regulation. Before 1978, fares were set by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, which generally let carriers pass along
their costs. Such a cozy set-up naturally bred inefficiency
(banks were similarly slothful in the days of managed
interest rates), and airlines got used to rubber-stamping
union demands. Eventually, they approved a byzantine
system of work rules sought by pilots and other
employees. Come deregulation, competition intensified,
air fares dropped and more people started flying. But the
stifling work rules remained and so, of course, did safety
constraints and also antitrust concerns preventing mergers.
In effect, aviation became deregulated only on one side:
free competition for revenue; costs largely immovable.
Ferris tried to win points by befriending the pilots. He
started flying, got a license and took some union members
under his wing. For a while, it worked. Attacking a brazen
case of featherbedding, he got the union to agree to cut the
number of pilots in the cockpits of Boeing 737's from
three to two. But when he tried to impose a lower wage
scale for newly hired pilots -- as Robert Crandall had done
at American -- the pilots went on strike. The head of the
union's strike committee, Dubinsky, was nicknamed
Mad Dog. The son of a butcher, he was hired by United in
1965 at a measly $500 a month. He flew the tobacco route:
Winston-Salem, Raleigh-Durham, Chattanooga. In the
pilot culture of the day, captains were virtual gods and
young flight engineers like Dubinsky received barely more
respect than the stewardesses. Dubinsky, though, found a
vent for his aggressiveness. He started doing small chores
for the AirLine Pilots Association and then handling
grievances, and the union discovered that he was a badger.
By 1985, he was brimming with class-conscious fervor.
The pilots, despite their political conservatism and sense
of themselves as professional people, heeded him. Pilots
make good money but lack the free agency of other
professionals. If a United pilot moves to Delta or
American, he loses his seniority and most of his pay. That
makes him utterly dependent on the union -- and makes
the union a potent force. Ferris hired replacements to keep
~
United flying, and the pilots returned after 29 days, taking
the offer Ferris had on the table. The strike was over, but
permanent damage had been done. A certain culture,
an implacable Arab-Israeli-like hatred, took hold at the
airline, and nobody has been able to dislodge it since.
More significant, United's experience helped spread fear
through the industry. Airlines began to leapfrog one
another, granting successively better terms at each
negotiation -- anything to avoid a strike. Today, thanks to
generous vacations, sick-leave provisions and clauses that
fix minimums for days worked and trips flown, United
pilots get paid for 81 hours a month but actually fly, on
average, only 50 hours. Considering that a Boeing 747-400
captain gets a top rate of $302 an hour, you can see what a
drain this is. Though pilots spend many nights away from
home, a hardship that is worth some extra compensation,
they freely admit that flying, on most days, is hardly the
risky proposition it was when the first contracts were
penned. 'It's not a hard job for a guy that has been around,'
says one 40-year-old United pilot I talked to. 'Because of
advances in technology, we have great airplanes to fly.'
Their flexible schedules allow many pilots to carry on
second careers. By 1986, Ferris decided that United
couldn't make money just flying planes. So he stitched
together a hotel and car-rental conglomerate, aiming to use
the airline to feed the travel businesses -- synergy! He paid
a consultant $7 million to rename United's parent the
Allegis Corporation. Wall Street snickered. The pilots did
not. They feared that Ferris would divert capital into the
other divisions until the airline was a rump operation and
then start cutting jobs. The ALPA adviser was the
illustrious F. Lee Bailey, and he told them that their jobs
would never be safe unless they really took control -- a
message that the pilots, being pilots, were happy to hear.
Dubinsky and Bailey flew to Chicago to meet with a
leader of the International Association of Machinists and
dropped a proposal for an employee buyout into his lap.
The machinists didn't like it. Presciently, they saw the plan
as leaving workers to bargain with themselves, an obvious
conflict. But Dubinsky made his bid public. It was a
strange time on Wall Street, in which anybody could
seemingly acquire anyone else and companies were said
to be worth more dead than alive. Coniston Partners, a
hedge fund, bought a chunk of stock and agitated for a
breakup. The board, feeling pressured, sacked Ferris and
agreed to sell the travel assets. Stephen Wolf, a veteran of
two previous airline turnarounds, was named C.E.O. late
in 1987. After briefly joining with ALPA to attempt a
high-priced buyout (which, when it failed, set off the
stock-market crash of October 1989), Wolf embarked on
an expansion kick, snatching up international routes and
ordering $22 billion worth of equipment. His competitors
followed suit. Since wages rise sharply with experience,
airlines were desperate to hire younger crews. 'So how do
you get more new pilots?' says Harry C. Pinson, an
investment banker who worked with Wolf. 'You grow the
111
airline.' The logic was so compelling that airlines bought
many more planes than they needed. In aviation, such
capital mistakes don't go away. Equipment is so expensive
that once a plane is delivered it must be flown. Even
carriers that file for bankruptcy limp along for years,
usually operating at lower costs and undercutting the rest.
Wolf discovered this in 1990, when conflict in the Mideast
and a recession at home (sound familiar?) sent the industry
into a nose dive. Making matters worse, Southwest, then a
relative upstart, was tormenting the industry and, in
particular, stealing United's traffic in California. As losses
mounted, Wolf clamored for union givebacks. He and
Dubinsky began to shadowbox. When United ordered new
747's, a dispute with the pilots' union kept them parked on
a ramp. When United tried to start service to India, the
pilots delayed it by demanding private restrooms and
Western food. Dubinsky kept up the pressure, but his time
was running out. His term at ALPA expired. (He lost an
effort to rescind a term-limits clause and wrote an acid
farewell remembered within the union as "the Nixon
letter.") Wolf, a tall, aloof C.E.O. who arrived at United's
headquarters near O'Hare Airport at 6 each morning,
seized the opportunity. He sold off the flight kitchens,
which made the machinists fear that their jobs would be
next. Then, with their cooperation, Wolf and the pilots,
now led by Roger Hall, a less tempestuous chief, cobbled
together an audacious employee stock-ownership plan.
Similar ideas had been tried at Northwest and Eastern, but
never with workers in control -- that was what bred such
hope at United The pilots, machinists and nonunion
salaried employees (the flight attendants opted out) got
three board directors, various control provisions and,
critically, 55 percent of the stock. The pilots, the biggest
bloc, got 25 percent, in exchange for an equivalent
percentage cut in wages and benefits. A new era of
worker-management cooperation was born. Optimism
ran high. Robert Reich, the secretary of labor in the
Clinton administration, gushed that the employee-
ownership plan 'could change the face of the airline
industry.' But there was one devastating oversight: yes,
you could turn employees into owners, but could you
get them to act that way? Could you get them to place
the same value on their stock as on their weekly
paychecks? The difficulty, as Dubinsky would shrewdly
observe when he was back battling United management, is
that 'you can't eat stock' -- particularly when employees
were barred from selling their shares until retirement. In
any case, airlines had never generated value for their
stockholders. Donald Washburn, a former executive at
Northwest Airlines, has observed that airlines are merely
'cash accumulators for other constituencies' -- the
various government entities that tax it, the cartel that
sells it equipment and the industry's bankers. Its
hungriest constituent is labor, which gobbles up nearly
40 percent of operating expenses. The employee buyout
temporarily lowered wages, but it didn't change these
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dismal economics. Arguably, it weakened United. The
pilots had always sought control; now they could
pursue it from inside the boardroom. As owners, the
pilots could pick their own C.E.O., and they did: Gerald
Greenwald, famed for helping save Chrysler and fresh
from running a trucking concern in newly capitalist
Czechoslovakia. When Greenwald told his Czech
managers that he was leaving to take over the new worker-
owned United, one of them stared incredulously. 'We just
finished with all that,' he said. Greenwald figured that
with workers owning a stake, their interests would have
to shift. So he invited pilots and mechanics into
strategy sessions and consulted with Fortune to learn how
to qualify for the magazine's list of 100 most desirable
companies to work for. Many pilots caught the spirit.
Absenteeism declined. A captain in Chicago cleaned food
trays to shorten turnaround times. And miraculously the
good times started to roll. United's stock, $22 when the
ownership plan began, broke $90 three years later.
(Today it is $12.) Partly, airlines were the beneficiaries of
good fortune: fuel prices were low and the economy was
strong. But they also had learned to be more efficient,
eliminating frills, reducing commissions to travel agents,
reaping savings from automatic check-in. Unlike in the
previous decade, most avoided the trap of overexpanding.
Greenwald strengthened his hubs and eliminated
unprofitable, marginal routes. He also enhanced United's
unmatched network overseas. These were heady days for
the big airlines, as they finally capitalized on the promises
of deregulation. Except for one little thing. They still
could not keep wages under control. Through the 90's,
airline wages rose 43 percent, just slightly above inflation.
Not bad until you consider that air fares rose only 6
percent. This was, significantly, a time when other
industries were holding the line on every conceivable
employee benefit. Only the airline industry, shackled by
40-year traditions, continued to kneel to its unions. The
regional airlines are a perfect illustration. These carriers,
like American Eagle or United Express, fly under the
majors' flags and serve an essential role connecting
smaller cities to hubs. They also pay their pilots, most of
whom are represented by ALPA, significantly lower
wages. The business has grown smartly, thanks to a new
generation of high-performance jets, but the unions don't
like these smaller planes and the lower wages that go with
them, so they have successfully negotiated 'scope clauses'
that limit the size and number of regional jets that a major
can hire out. If it were up to the market, a new-generation,
50-seat Canadair might fly from New York to Chicago at
off hours, when there wasn't demand for a DC-9 or a
Boeing 737. Presumably, that would result in more
flexibility and choice for customers. But scope clauses, a
bit of protectionism that seems wildly out of place in the
21st century, make it extremely difficult. With their hands
tied on costs, airlines turned their attention to revenues. In
the 90's, they perfected the art of 'yield management,'
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exploiting computers to monitor bookings continuously
and adjust ticket prices according to availability. Yield
management is why you can pay $1,000 to fly coast to
coast and sit next to someone who paid $200. It is also
why so many people hate the airlines. It may seem unfair,
but to an airline economist, the passenger -- say a student
heading home for the holidays -- who books in advance
and the executive who sidles up to the counter without a
reservation are not buying the same 'product,' even if they
are on the same flight. One is buying a surplus seat, akin
to last year's sweater on the bargain rack. The other is
buying that sweater when it's hot. It is a good business
tactic, but the airlines overplayed it. During the late 90's,
they jacked up the premium for business fares as never
before. I.P.O. money rained on Wall Street, and plenty of
it got spent on plane tickets. United's San Francisco hub, a
gateway to Silicon Valley, became a gold mine. Airline
unions exploited the boom to demand higher wages, but
the good times for airlines -- flying utilities, remember? --
were never good enough. In one recent year, carriers filled
72.4 percent of their seats, just a tad more than their break-
even level of 70.4 percent. What this means is that on a
typical flight, the entire profit was generated by the last
three passengers. From 1995 to 1999, the industry's best
half-decade ever, airlines earned only 3 1/2 cents on every
dollar of sales, whereas American industry typically earns
6 cents. And through the full cycle -- that is, for all of the
1990's -- airlines made less than a pitiable penny for every
dollar of sales. If this were another industry, C.E.O.'s
would be forced to resign in disgrace, but airline execs
were buoyed. At United, Greenwald gave the pilots and
machinists consecutive 5 percent wage hikes, the
maximum allowed by the terms of the ownership plan.
Then the unions demanded a 'snap back' to take effect in
2000, restoring them to pre-ownership levels. Greenwald
consented and, remarkably, so did United's board. It may
be unkind to say the company lived in fear of upsetting
its employees, but everyone, especially at United, knew
what the unions were capable of doing. Meanwhile,
management's relations with the AirLine Pilots
Association deteriorated. As Greenwald neared
retirement from United in 1999, the union nixed his choice
of successor; instead, the pilots tapped Goodwin, a
company man that many deemed controllable. As
negotiations started for the first post-ownership contract,
the drumbeat rose for a more confrontational approach -
- rose, that is, for Dubinsky. The rank and file were mostly
unaware that while out of office, Dubinsky had been busy
suing his own union. He would soon collect a six-figure
settlement paid from his pilots' dues. No matter. With a
big negotiation looming, the union's 26-member governing
body voted him in. United's pilots were counting on a
contract by April 2000, when the ownership plan expired.
The deadline was unrealistic, and it gave Dubinsky a
cudgel to wield against the company. Goodwin
compounded his problem when, late in 1999, he and Wolf
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-- who was now running US Airways -- began to plot a
merger. The timing was suicidal. Dubinsky, as a board
member, was informed of the talks but could not disclose
them to the rank and file. He certainly knew the pilots
would oppose a merger, because many would lose
seniority to US Airways pilots. Thus, Dubinsky had every
reason not to conclude a contract until the merger was
announced. By early 2000, wage negotiations, predictably,
had stalled, and United's increasingly impatient pilots were
getting stickers from the union reading, 'On Top/On
Time.' They put them on flight bags, in the cockpit,
everywhere. As the deadline neared, Dubinsky reminded
his pilots that they weren't obligated to fly overtime, as
they normally did, and that they should fly '[to the letter of
our agreement' -- a euphemism for going slow. Late
flights began to mount. Passengers went nuts. Goodwin
was living a nightmare. In May, he announced the merger,
and the war with the pilots reignited. The nasty labor
sore, bandaged but never healed, oozed with all the
ugliness of the past. The pilots refused to fly overtime;
some of them taxied at 3 knots instead of 15; others flew
low, to burn more fuel, or opened landing gear
prematurely, adding to wear and tear. Delays and
cancellations soared; United, notably, suffered a fourfold
increase in delays caused by pilots insisting on repairing
inconsequential items, like a broken coffee maker or a
burned-out reading light. A pilot in California walked off
a full 747, claiming nerves. An executive from a
competing airline tells the story of a United flight from
Los Angeles to J.F.K. when the captain announced that
because of 'low clouds' he wanted to recheck his
instruments. They sat for three hours. The pilots were
sabotaging their own company. They did have reason to
be upset. United, having grown more quickly than US
Airways, had far more newer hires. Pilots feared for
their careers and were infuriated that their counterparts at a
weaker airline might supplant them -- especially since,
they reckoned, management was paying for the deal with
the very money it had saved on pilot wages. Their anger
was, of course, given a significant push from ALPA. Geoff
Garrett, a United pilot from Seattle, says, 'I never received
an order to slow down.' However, he admits, there was
peer pressure. Pilots who flew overtime would see their
names tacked to a bulletin board, and those who arrived on
time got flack for 'not flying safe.' Mysteriously, an
unsigned publication, The Gardener, began to turn up in
cockpits, often in pilots' sun visors. The Gardener was a
colored sheet written in country vernacular, reminding
pilots to 'fly safe' and so forth. Many pilots think it was
produced by the Industrial Relations Committee, a
secretive wing of ALPA formed by Dubinsky during the
strike. I asked Dubinsky about United's dismal summer
-- 20,000 flights were canceled and on-time
performance fell to 40 percent, disruptions that cost
the airline $700 million. He said: 'The company was
short on manpower; we told them that. And the
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weather was terrible. Also, our pilots decided to not fly
overtime.' Does that mean there was no coordinated
effort? 'That's what I'm telling you. If there had been,
they could have taken us to federal court.' In fact,
United's management had hotly debated whether to do
that. Many were in favor, but Goodwin, who had the
longest tenure and remembered the 1985 strike vividly,
was unwilling to further antagonize the pilots. And so in
August, Goodwin agreed to an immediate pay raise of 22
to 28 percent and to additional 4.5 percent raises in each
successive year through 2004. This pace-setting and lavish
package stunned United's competitors, who had, of course,
been guilty of no less in their turn. Then the bottom
dropped out. By 2001, high tech had gone bust, and big
corporations like Hewlett-Packard, Cisco and Accenture
were taking a hatchet to travel budgets. "'We aren't talking
about single-digit cuts,"' notes Jake Brace, United's chief
financial officer. 'Some of them reduced their flying by 25
to 50 percent.' These two grim developments were capped
by a third misfortune when, last spring, the department of
transportation blocked United's merger with US Airways.
Thus, in the space of a year, United had suffered punishing
blows from labor, the government and the economy -- a
modest summary of the industry's troubles since
deregulation. All that was before Sept. 11.
After the tragedy, Goodwin eliminated 20,000 jobs, but a
cruel twist of businesses with high fixed capital, like
aviation, is that cutbacks often worsen the problem.
Though United saved 23 percent in expenses, it lost a
whopping 39 percent in revenue. One reason is that union
rules dictate that each pilot be able to bid for a better
assignment (the bigger the plane, the higher the pay)
whenever a vacancy opens. So while United furloughed
591 of its 10,500 pilots, it was also forced to retrain
hundreds for new assignments, an enormous waste. 'Now
you have a ton of people being paid and not flying,' notes
Herb Hunter, an ALPA spokesman. 'When they talk
about laying off, you get to a point of diminishing
returns.' This is why airlines cannot cut their way to
solvency; needing cash to service debt on those $100
million jets, they must keep selling assets, a downward
spiral charted by the dearly departed Pan American.
Realizing this, Goodwin warned that without concessions
from labor, United could 'perish.' The unions demanded
his head. Over the years, major airlines have improved
just enough for most to survive -- to limp from crisis to
crisis, to turn a small profit occasionally -- but not to
build lasting equity. And increasingly they are haunted
by Southwest, haunted because they can never match it.
Southwest is in a different business from United, and its
model is infuriatingly simple: it flies a single aircraft
type, greatly reducing the cost of training pilots and
mechanics, with no frills or first class, mostly on point-to-
point routes and usually from secondary, less congested
airports. Its Boeing 737's land and take off in only 20
minutes -- unthinkable for planes connecting through hubs
-- and its pilots usually fly more than 70 hours a month, far
more than at American, Delta and United The traditional
carriers, whose systems are built around hubs, can't do
this. United's Chicago hub, for instance, draws customers
from all over the Midwest, including people in smaller
cities connecting to the coasts. Like the old phone
company, this fulfills a vital need, but it is much more
costly. Jack W. Creighton Jr., United's new C.E.O., has
become the latest chief to demand concessions from each
employee group. He faces heavy sledding because
United's mechanics, as well as its baggage personnel and
ticket agents, are still working at pre-ownership-plan
(1994) wages. They want a raise, like the pilots got, before
they think about concessions. If the mechanics do not
accept Creighton's offer and vote to strike, Congress, with
the White House's authorization, could impose a
settlement. And the White House has been signaling that it
will tolerate fewer airline strikes in the future. So is
government the answer to shareholders' prayers? Not
exactly. Federal arbitration boards tend to resolve disputes
by slicing down the middle, generally pleasing nobody.
But they do force both sides to talk. And Creighton has
held serious discussions with the AirLine Pilots
Association. For now, they are talking only wage
concessions -- not the work rule amendments that would
be needed for United (and Delta, American, et al.) to join
the rest of the 21st century. But the talks raise the germ of
a possibility. ALPA is demanding something in return for
wage cuts. Since the value of the employees' stock from
the ownership plan has crashed from $5 billion to about
$750 million, they certainly won't take more of that. But
Creighton and the union have talked about linking wage
cuts, in some fashion, to United's profits or revenues. This
brings to mind something Dubinsky -- at year-end, when
he was retiring -- told me over vodkas in a restaurant near
O'Hare. People say the pilots are self-destructive, he
acknowledged, 'but we aren't crazy.' Meaning even
pilots will ultimately do what is in their interest.
That is what's so interesting about Southwest, which
has been able to co-opt its workers (who also are
unionized) into behaving like owners. For sure,
relationships with unions are multifaceted, but one
difference at Southwest stands out, which is that workers
get much of their annual profit sharing in cash. Maybe
you can't eat stock, but you can eat cash. And if wages
were to vary with performance, not only would United's
labor costs stay tuned to the business cycle but its
workers -- just maybe -- would also start to think
differently about their employer. Over time, they, and
potentially workers at other carriers as well, might be
willing to fly more hours, to let the market determine the
schedule for regional jets, to let airlines design their
networks with profits as the main consideration. It sounds
rather radical -- downright subversive in this industry -
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- but it is no more than what deregulation was supposed to
accomplish almost 25 years ago."
20 Busines Phil Firm- a "On Dec.11, 1996 the directors of defense giant On the
May s Week, Condit Investo McDonnell Douglas Corp. agreed to a merger [with corporat
2002 "Boeing , rs Boeing]. In the weeks after the merger announcement, e HQ of
's Chair parts shortages and overtime approached all-time highs. a
Secret" man & Facing an unprecedented surge in orders because of a modular
(Stanley CEO, booming economy, workers were toiling around the clock, enterpri
Holmes The pushing the assembly line to the breaking point. A special se
& Mike Boeing team formed to study the crisis in May 1997, issued a architec
France) Compa report with a blunt conclusion: 'Our production system is ture's
ny broken.' If investors had understood the scope of the inability
problems, the stock would probably have tumbled and the to deal
McDonnell deal - a stock swap that hinged on Boeing's with
ability to maintain a lofty share price - would have been dynami
jeopardized. But shareholders never got the full picture c and
until well after the merger was completed on Aug. 1, behavio
1997. Top executives 'were hoping against hope that none ral
of the problems would bubble up before they got the deal comple
done,' says a top Boeing ex-official. On Oct. 8, former xity.
McDonnell CEO Harry C. Stonecipher, by then Boeing's
president and chief operating officer, shot an e-mail to
Condit [Boeing's Chariman and CEO]. 'We do know for
certain that there is a big surprise coming, and I thingk we
owe the Street a heads-up. We have an unmitigated
disaster on our hands and need some very candid
damage control.' Condit, responded that the disclosure
should be delayed. 'My bias is to soften the third-quarter
hit with some warning,' he wrote. 'Assuing the scale of
the problem remains, use the fourth quarter to prepare the
Street to take the real hit then.' On Oct. 22, Condit made
the bombshell announcement: The company's massive
production problems would force it to write off $2.6
billion - by far the biggest charge in Boeing's history.
Overnight, shares fell 8%, wiping out about $4.3 billion in
value. As investors digested the scope of the mess, the
company lost years of hard-earned credibility and the
stock fell a further 12% by Oct. 27.
The tale provides a sobering view of how easily
managemnt can keep investors in the dark. 'Program
Aaccounting', a controversial system that many analysts
criticize for its lack of transparency, continues to give
Boeing broad leeway to goose earnings - and to make it
one of the toughest companies in America to evaluate.
Boeing settled a private securities-fraud suit over the
1997 episode for $92.5 million. The company did not
admit guilt. New details supplied by several inside
witnesses indicate that Boeing did more than simply fail to
tell investors about its production disaster. 'Boeing
basically decided in the short-run that Imanaging
earnings] was a lesser evil than losing the merger,' adds
Debra A. Smith, a onetime accounting professor.
The aerospace giant was a widely held blue chip that had a
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huge short-term incentive to prop up its stock price.
Taking advantage of an investment community willing
to tolerate the company's opaque reporting system,
executives managed to conceal fundamental
operational problems for nearly a year - which raises
the question of how swiftly they would let investors
know if a similar problem arose today. As is often the
case, none of the outside watchdoge ever barked. The
board never forced Condit to come clean about the
company's production problems. Stock analysts and
business journalists underestimated them. An although
the company's auditor Deloitte & Touche, raised red
flags about Boeing's troubles, it doesn't seem to have put
much pressure on its big client to share this information
with investors. As a result, Boeing's financial reporting in
early 1997 bore little relationship to its business reality.
When the company finally disclosed its problems, 'I was
stunned,' recalls Richard J. Glasebrook II, managing
director of Oppenheimer Capital, owner of 5% of
McDonnell at the time. 'I thought that Boeing had the
building of commercial aircraft down cold.'
The [production] problem was compounded in late 1994
when Boeing realized that rival Airbus Industrie, the
European Consortium, was undercutting it on price,
thanks to lower manufacturing costs, and government
subsidies. By that year, Airbus had grabbed 30% of the
global jet-plane market - up from less than 3% two
decades earlier. It was a potentially devastating
development, since lost customers in the airliner
industry are hard to win back after they've spent a
fortune training pilots and mechanics on rivals' equipment.
Boeing was forced to knock down costs across the
board. It made early retirement offers to 9,500 workers in
1995, slashing its staff of veteran mechanics and
engineers. Execs. Also rolled out a bug-ridden new
computer system for tracking parts. As a consultant
pointed out in a report to factory execs. in the summer of
1997, the proposed doubling of production rates in the
face of such change was like attempting a 'four-and-a-
half somersault off a 50-foot board into a pail of
water.' By early 1997, warning signs were everywhere
that Boeing's overheated factories were boiling over. One
manager concluded that 'we have a real financial crisis
on our hands' with 'no relief' in sight. Talking to
reporters after the company's annual meeting in April,
1997, Condit said that the ramp-up in demand 'has
resulted in near-term decline in productivity at
company facilities and some supplier locations.' With
characteristic confidence, he said that the first
quarter's inefficiencies 'would not be repeated during
the remaining quarters of the year' and that the
company was not having 'systematic' assembly-line
malfunctions.
'The problem with program accounting is that it is
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virtually impossible to audit,' says Lynn E. Turner,
former chief accountant at the SEC. 'No one really knows
whether the company will produce as many planes as [are]
needed to recover the costs.' To mitigate this problem, the
rules require companies to take an immediate charge as
soon as they have evidence that a line's long-term profit
margin will disappear - or, in industry lingo, that the
program will be in a 'forward-loss' position. And that's
just what appears to have been happening to the 777 line
in early 1997. It had a development budget of $5 billion
to $7 billion for initial design, production tooling, and
flight-testing. By 1995, it had quietly overrun this
budget by nearly 100%, according to two former high-
ranking Boeing managers. The prospect of a forward
loss in the 777 was galling to Boeing, since it was the
newest model - the plane that boasted the most
advanced technology, that was to drive the company's
performance in the next decade, and that carried
Condit's reputation. Downgrading the 777's forecast
would have been not only an embarrassment but also a
threat to the merger. To avoid this humiliation, the
company allegedly started to shift monetary revenues
from healthier aircraft programs to keep the 777 on
budget, according to the complaint and two former high-
ranking executives. Another method Boeing allegedly
used to stave off a 777 write-off was exaggerating the
effectiveness of some of the cost-savings initiatives it
had launched in the mid-1990s. Under the flexible rules of
program accounting, plane makers are permitted to make
projections about efficiency efforts and start tabulating the
benefits immediately. But this practice can run afoul of
the law. According to the plaintiffs complaint, Boeing
'arbitrarily manipulate[d] cost-savings figures upwards in
order to keep the 777 gross profit estimates from falling
into a [forward-] loss position' during the second quarter
of 1997. The complaint quotes a Deloitte working paper
that says Boeing's managers admitted the second-quarter
cost-reduction figures were 'a plug' to keep the 777
profit margins on target. Boeing's efforts paid off: the
company never declared a forward loss on the 777 in 1997
- and has not done so at any time since. Does that mean
that the line met the original profitability targets? Not
necessarily. As a result of this situation, investors need to
be able to place an unusually high degree of faith in the
company's managers.
'You cannot reduce the cost of a wing if you don't know
where you are starting,' Stonecipher complained in an
April, 1999, interview with CFO magazine. 'You can
drive a truck through what's GAAP in aircraft
manufacturing,' says Heidi Wood, an aerospace analyst at
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. 'I think everybody
has grown weary of program accounting for a while.' At a
time when investors are seeking the maximum in
transparency, Boeing is note even close to that
standard.
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"There is no trust for Crandall. He is nasty, mean. He's
irascible, he points his finger, he's boiling inside.
Crandall is not loyal to his employees. He has no respect
for employees. We're not going to be loyal to the
company or each other. When there is no love for the
company, it translates to how you treat each
other... People do what they can get away with."
"'I don't' want to take advantage of the situation, but
we have to do what is right for the company,' Gangwal
said in a conference call with analysts. 'And events of
September 11 have opened certain doors for the company
that were pretty much closed before."'
"[Herb Kelleher and Colleen Barrett] have both got
credibility. It's taken them a while to get to that point.
They've created this level of honesty with us. If it's bad,
they tell you its bad."
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and 8) expanded, we slowly drifted away from that simple but ture's
effective strategy. Today the GM product revolution unwillin
again is strengthening our brands, with more gness /
innovative marketing that better understands the inability
customer." to
change.
19 Kellogg James Firm a "Touching on the recent spate of corporate scandals, On a
June School McNer McNerney advised graduates to fight to make sure the modular
2004 of ney, values you bring to work are the ones you use at work. enterpri
Manage Chair The tragedy is that some of today's leaders are se
ment man & fundamentally good people who can't stand the architec
CEO pressure.' McNerney also spoke about the importance of ture's
of 3M cultivating a good work ethic. 'Have the courage to lead leadersh
and the courage to fail,' he said." ip style
28 Busines Carol Firm- a "Now that Boeing was faced with telling jurors why its On a
June sWeek Jensen, Emplo own internal documents seemingly contradicted its legal modular
2004 "Coveru Boeing yee theory, the company suddenly became accommodating. enterpri
p at emplo The documents reviewed by Business Week suggest that se
Boeing? yee Boeing's efforts to suppress evidence were far more architec
" filing elaborate. The company's tactics in the pay- ture's
(Stanley class- discrimination lawsuit, Beck v. Boeing, also raise broader lack of
Holmes action questions about the health of Boeing's corporate culture. trust.
& Mike suit Last year, the U.S. Air Force penalized the company for
France) against possessing 37,000 pages of sensitive competitive
Boeing documents some of its employees had stolen from rival
Lockheed Martin Corp. Before Boeing eventually
acknowledged the theft, it denied any wrongdoing, then
misled Lockheed for nearly a year about the amount of
material stolen, according to the Air Force. 'We have felt
extremely uneasy about the scandals that have plagued
Boeing and led to the departure of its CEO,' wrote Lehman
Brothers Inc. analyst Joseph Campbell Jr. in a June 7
report. "We have felt there has been a pattern of less
than frank communication with the investment
community, and more importantly with itself. But the
culture started changing after its merger with the more
aggressive McDonnell Douglas in 1997.
'These pay disparities were caused by their own
practices,' Helgren says. 'None of this was by chance.
And they continued for years and years to avoid the
problem.'
Among [Jensen's] nine children, she currently 'wouldn't
let any of them work at Boeing.' The pay gap there may
disappear one day. But one thing Boeing will never be
able to erase is its long history of underpaying women."
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21 Busines Firm a "Boeing's board presented the ouster [of CEO On a
Mar. s Week Stonecipher] as evidence of a company so committed to modular
2005 "Why ethical purity that under current circumstances it enterpri
Boeing' wouldn't tolerate even a consensual sexual relationship se
s between the CEO and a female exec. Insiders tell another architec
Culture story. They describe an ongoing culture of unrestrained ture's
Breeds excess. The lack of restraint also led to rampant political low-
Turmoil infighting among senior managers. The board, trust
" meanwhile, seemed oblivious to the turmoil. 'We are environ
(Stanley committed to strong ethical leadership, and we have ment.
Holmes fought hard to restore our reputation.' Executive
) shenanigans and infighting are hardly unknown in
Corporate America, but the degree to which they
pervade Boeing is rare.
In the midst of this turmoil, commercial division head
Alan R. Mulally held court at a party in Kirkland, Wash.,
attended by 100 managers and employees three days
before the Stonecipher bombshell. According to several
attendees, Mulally talked openly about who would replace
Stonecipher, calling it a two-horse race between himself
and Jamse McNerney, who is the CEO of 3M, a Boeing
director, and a former top General Electric Co. exec.
Those same people quote Mulally as saying: 'It's down to
the GE guy or me. It's a fight to the death, and if it's
him, I'm outta here.'
Mulally wasn't the only exec plotting his ascent in recent
years. In fact, one of his most serious rivals may have
taken his machinations to such an extreme that they led
him to unlawful conduct. Former CFO Michael Sears
was sentenced to four months in prison for his role in the
illegal job negotiations with Air Force procurement officer
Darleen Druyen. Insiders say the controversy was part of
his attempt to amass a power base at his rivals' expense.
'It was clear to everybody Ithat] Sears was anxious to
be the successor to Phil to the point that it got pretty
disgusting,' said a Boeing board member. 'You got tired
of him acting like the heir apparent.' Sears also took
control of Boeing's famed in-house leadership center in
St. Louis.
Sears's stock rose in the summer of 2003. While he was
still in charge of PR, there were leaks to the media
implying that [internal Boeing rival] Albaugh withheld
imformation about a $1.2 billion charge. 'If Mike [Sears]
is intent on discrediting me, he does a disservice not only
to me but to the company.'
The back-stabbing was widespread among the top brass.
'It was everybody in the suite gunning for [Boeing
CEO] Phil's job,' said a former senior Boeing executive
I I
with direct knowledge of the situation. 'It was pretty
destructive.'
An unhealthy focus on internal politics wasn't Boeing's
only culture problem. In March 2004, Boeing agreed to
pay $70 million to settle a sprawling class action
alleging widespread sexual discrimination. Sexual
misconduct by executives was a frequent topic of
conversation among employees. As BusinessWeek
reported in December, 2003, Condit settled at least one
wrongful termination lawsuit brought by on a female
employee with whom he had a relationship.
One of Stonecipher's top goals when he was brought out
of retirement as CEO was to put ethics front and center.
He created an internal governance office that reported to
him and required every employee to sign an ethics
statement. 'Without integrity you cannot conduct
business successfully,' he wrote in June, 2004. 'Firing
people who lack integrity is good business.' Words to
live by."
April Boeing Scott "Our products bring better value to our customers, On a
2005 Frontier Carson and our pricing reflects that value. We also have a modular
s , VP responsibility to our shareholders, and that means pricing enterpri
Sales, that allows us to make our financial goals. At the same se
Boeing time we have to be competitive in the marketplace. And architct
Comm we have to realize that our customers face great financial ure's
ercial pressures, and price is a key factor in their decision- strategy
Airpla making. But it is only one factor, and it is critically of
nes important that we communicate to our customers on those different
other factors. Do I think that we will ever be the lower- iation
price option? No. Do I think that should keep us from (as
gaining more than 50 percent market share? I answer opposed
"no" to that as well. But let me say one more thing that to cost-
is absolutely essential to our success in the marketplace. leaders
We simply must continue to lower the cost of making our hip)
products so we can offer the lowest possible prices to our
customers. We must improve our productivity every day,
every month, every year, forever. It's essential, it's a fact of
life, and we all have a role to play."
18 Busines James Firm a "For McNerney, cleaning up Boeing's toxic culture is Job On a
July sWeek McNer One. Insiders say a bureaucracy that stifles innovation, possibly
2005 "I Like ney, resists change, and tolerates rule bending remains more
a Chair largely intact. Adds Lehman Brothers aerospace analyst integral
Challen man & Joseph F. Campbell Jr.: "this is the Boeing that tolerated architec
ge - CEO, behavior that led to sexual harassment suits; debarment, t than a
And The and criminal prosecution." modular
I've Got Boeing enterpri
One" Compa "McNerney says he isn't a big fan of buying for growth, se is
(Stanley ny blaming Boeing's recent troubles in part on "banging accusto
Holmes together a lot of acquisitions." med.
Oct. The Suppli a "Boeing spokeswoman Yvonne Leach said its one of 'the On
18, Seattle er & ironies of life' in the new global manufacturing market." Boeing'
2005 Times P s
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Oct. Busines Suppli a "Boeing spokeswoman Yvonne Leach did not see the On
19, s Ticker er & contract award as surprising. She said Boeing's Hawker competi
2005 I de Havilland unit in Australia supplies some parts to tors as
Airbus. part of
each
other's
enterpri
se
(supply
chain)
architec
tures.
31 The Doug Firm a "Good morning. Jim McNerney asked me to give you On
Jan. Seattle Bain, kind of a candid assessment of our major scandals and ethics
2006 Times, Senior how we got there. As I walked up here, I think I heard within a
Transcri Vice [Boeing Chariman and CEO] Jim McNerney mutter, 'Here modular
pt of Preside comes Dr. Death.' My overall message is fairly simple: enterpri
Speech nt and We as the leaders of The Boeing Company get to choose se
by Genera what kind of culture we are going to have. And we architec
Boeing' I make these choices every day by what we do and frankly ture.
s Doug Couns what we choose not to do. I want to talk about these
Bain el, The scandals not so much from the perspective of how we have
Boeing tried to argue them or spin them, but from the perspective
Compa of the prosecutors and what they have told us. The
ny recurring message we have gotten from the prosecutors
and frankly everybody else we deal with is nne of shock
and surprise. They say, 'You guys are The Boeing
Company. You build things that are larger than life. You
do things that are larger than life. You're not a sleazy
company. How did this happen?' And the question
that they always ask: Where was the leadership?
Evolved Expendale Launch Vehicle: We did a poor job
of the investigation, did a poor job of disclosing it to the
government. Why was there two and a half years of
silence? Why didn't somebody say something? Was
I I I I
there a culture of win at any cost? Was there a culture
of silence? Where was management throughtout this?
So what are the consequences? We lost $1 billion of
launches. Lockheed sued us for anywhere between $1
billion to $2 billion. And I'll get to the criminal and
civil issue in a minute. And we have a truly burdensome
administrative agreement that Bonnie [Soodnik, senior
vice president of Boeing's Office of Internal
Governance]'s organization is in charge of implementing.
Sears/Druyun: On October 17, 2002, Mike Sears [then
chief financial officer of Boeing] met Darleen Druyun
[then chief acquisitions officer for the Air Force] and
offered her a job. The next day, Mike sent an e-mail that
said 'I had a 'non-meeting' with Darleen Druyun.' So,
the cultural questions: How come nobody said to Mike,
'What in the hell do you mean by a non-meeting?'
How come in the year 2000 nobody said, 'Should we
really be hiring the relatives of our chief procurement
officer for the largest customer we have on the defense
side.' It also raises the question, Do we have a culture
of silence - don't ask the tough questions. We have
been trying to resolve these things. We have not been
successful yet. But there are some within the prosecutors'
offices that believe that Boeing is rotten to the core.
They talk to us about pervasive misconduct and they
describe it in geographic terms of spanning Cape
Canaveral to Huntington Beach, to Orlando, to St. Louis to
Chicago. They talk about it in terms of levels within
the company that go from non-management engineers
to the chief financial officer. The State Department's
view of Boeing is that we just don't get it. There are
too many violations.
The numbers at the top [apparently referring to a chart] are
the number of formal ethics cases of Ethics and Business
Conduct opened in 2004 and 2005. What is astounding
to me, of course, is that if you look at 2005, 900 of them
were found to have substantiation. So is the problem
the rank and file? Or is the problem us? We
participated in a survey conducted by the Defense Industry
Initiatives, and they surveyed our employees. Of the
employees surveyed, 26 percent said they had observed
abusive or intimidating behavior by management. I
also went back and counted the number of vice
presidents who have been separated from the company
for ethics violations over the last few years. The total is
15. I found that to be an astronomically high number.
While only two of the 15 were separated for
committing crimes, among the other issues we've had
are expense-account fraud, travel abuse, violating our
procedures for hiring consultants, abusive behavior,
surfing the Net for porn, sexual harassment and
retaliation. But the question is, if you were not
surprised that somebody did something, the next
question to ask is how did they get there? How did we
...................;;;; ;;;
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tolerate their conduct for this long?"
Mar. Aerospa Alison Investo I "Where do you see the values in your businesses; would On the
2006 ce Wood, r you agree these are no longer in producing pieces of mental
America BAE aircraft but in integration and net-centric solutions? 'For models
System BAE Systems, we see four value strings... The fourth value of a
"Conver s, level is Airbus, where we have a 20% investment. We modular
sations Group have the tremendous success of Airbus in the owner
with Strateg marketplace, with the A380 coming on line and the of an
Alison ic A350 developments.' integral
Wood" Develo enterpri
(Phillip pment Would you agree that in the future it's going to be harder se
Butterw Direct to maintain the transatlantic balance that BAE has been architec
orth- or able to achieve, especially when you look at issues such as ture.
Hayes) China- which is both a threat and an opportunity?
Which do you think it is? 'One thing to be clear about up-
front is that, with the U.S. business having the role it does
in the portfolio, we will not be doing defense business in
China. Our U.S. business is important to us, and we would
not destabilize that. It is very clear that within the U.S.,
China is seen as a military threat. But the question is valid
because China is as much an economic as a military threat
and opportunity. For Airbus, China is a tremendous
opportunity. But for BAE Systems-with a U.S.
portfolio- there is natural question: At what expense
do you ignore China?'
Are you under any pressure to sell your 20% share in
Airbus? Could you lose your Airbus wing work to other
Airbus companies? 'I am sure this is going to be the hot
topic for the next 18 months, especially among bankers.
Airbus constitutes a very successful business and
contributes to our earnings, therefore the group always
looks at that as a successful contribution to the
portfolio. But probably long term we don't see
ourselves as owners of the business. We haven't said we
want to be out by any particular date, and it's not an issue
of derisking the business; it's a question of choice about
where we put the money. The fundamental
competitiveness of the wing work in the U.K. is based
on competency and capability, and that goes back to
earlier points about the competitive environment in the
U.K. If the U.K. ceases to be competitive and trails its
other European colleagues in areas such as R&D grants
and launch aid, then the Airbus management team, putting
politics aside, will make a decision about where is best to
put the work. At the moment our colleagues in Airbus
U.K. are tremendously capable and have the
competency. Both Airbus and Boeing are using more
global supply chains. If you look at the sourcing of
aerostructures components, they are both looking to Asia
and elsewhere. That's going to change the structure of the
supply chain.
But they keep the value. They will outsource the
component work but keep the value of the overall
project in-house, so what is the value to you of that
.... ... .....    .. .............I I
Airbus work? 'We don't do it. We have transferred
that work to Airbus U.K., to stop that becoming an
issue. The only return BAESystems takes out of Airbus
is the dividend we take from the Airbus businesses. By
having a return from the Airbus business as a whole
you do empower the Airbus management team to run
that business in the same way as Boeing. As a U.K.
citizen I want to see [the Airbus U.K.] Filton plant remain
at its current level of competitiveness. But as an Airbus
shareholder I want to see Airbus be competitive, and
that means if work has to move out of Munich, filton,
or Toulouse, because that's what makes sense in the
marketplace, that's the right decision."
13 Busines James Firm ac "McNerney said that 'management had gotten carried On an
Mar. sWeek, McNer away with itself,' that too many executives had become architec
2006 "Cleani ney, used to 'hiding in the bureaucracy, 'that the company had t re-
ng Up Chair failed to 'develop the best leadership. ' 'I think the culture integrati
Boeing" man & had morphed in dysfunctional ways in some places,' the ng the
(Stanley CEO, polished, soft-spoken McNerney said in a recent low-
Holmes The conversation with BusinessWeek, his first extensive trust
) Boeing interview since taking the job. 'There are elements of our environ
Compa culture that I think we all would like to change.' ment of
ny McNerney believes that internal rivalry... is at the root of a
the company's ethical scandals. His prescription includes modular
encouraging managers to talk more openly about enterpri
Boeing's severe ethical lapses. 'I want to try to make it se
O.K. to have that dialogue,' says McNerney. 'If we can architec
get the values lined up with performance, then this is an ture
absolutely unbeatable company, 'says McNerney. Insiders
say that McNerney is trying to lead by example. He wins
praise from co-workers for... not embarrassing
underlings in public. 'Jim is more interested in the
human side. He is interested in how to ... create a culture
where people speak up and take the risk and stop a
production line because something is wrong. McNerney
is reform[ing] Boeing's culture, [by] promoting integrity
and avoiding abusive behavior. "
"McNerney introduced General Council, Douglas G.
Bain, who really lowered the boom, railing against
Boeing's pervasive 'culture of silence.' Bain warned the
audience that many prosecutors 'believe that Boeing is
rotten to the core. "'
26 Thomso James Firm- a James Bell (The Boeing Comnanv): On a
April n Bell, Investo "Thank you, Dave, and good morning. As Dave said, I modular
2006 Reuters CFO, r will briefly review our first quarter results and discuss our Enterpri
Researc The outlook, then we'll take your questions. Now, beginning se
h, Boeing this year we have moved to a split of duties between Archite
excerpt Compa our CEO, Jim McNerney, and myself on our earnings cture's
from ny call. Jim will participate in the calls at mid-year and at defense
"The year-end and other calls on a selected basis. Of course, I of its
Boeing will continue to be on all of Boeing's quarterly earnings fminanaic
Compan calls. Let's begin by turning to the first slide. Boeing is al
y, Q1 off to a very good start this year. During the first quarter, perform
2006 we grew revenues, net income, earnings per share, and ance
Earning cash flow at strong double-digit rates. Productivity
s Call improvements we continue to make across the company
Transcri and the significant increase in commercial airplane
pt" deliveries generated the strong performance this quarter.
Our balanced cash deployment strategy continues to
deliver value to customers and shareholders by investing
in our growth and returning capital to investors. Boeing's
businesses continue to be well positioned in their markets.
We expect the Commercial Airplane business will drive
strong enterprise growth over the guidance period. Our
total backlog grew to a record level of $213 billion, largely
driven by the strong demand for our market-leading
commercial airplane products, especially the 787
Dreamliner. Coincidentally, today is the two-year
anniversary of the 787 launch. The 787 has been the
most successful commercial airplane launch in Boeing's
history. Today, we have 26 customers from around the
globe that have placed firm orders for 350
Dreamliners. We also continue to make good progress
on the development of the 787. As on all new airplane
programs at this stage of development, we are working
weight and schedule challenges, and we're making steady
progress in these areas. We remain confident that we'll
meet our customer commitments. We are on track to
begin flight testing next year, followed by entry into
service in 2008. Last quarter we highlighted the four
growth and productivity initiatives we are deploying
company wide to help drive us to financial performance
that matches the quality of our people and our technology.
While we're still early in this process, the implementation
of those initiatives is going well. The initiatives are the
tools we will use to drive growth and productivity to new
levels. They are long term. Combined with our focus on
leadership development, they are important keys to
Boeing's future performance. Now let's take a look at
the numbers. Our operations are running well and
gaining momentum. Now let's review the performance of
our businesses. Next slide. Our Commercial Airplane
business is benefiting from a product strategy that's
keenly focused on our customers, and on our
commitment to continuous productivity improvement.
Clearly Boeing Commercial Airplanes is performing
very well in a strong demand environment. Next slide.
Connexion by Boeing continues to demonstrate the
potential of its satellite-based broadband service.
Connexion service is now available on more than 180
daily flights. In addition to 500 orders and options
from airline customers, we recently completed the first
installations of Connexion service in the commercial
shipping industry. Also during the quarter, we
repurchased 5.5 million Boeing shares, paid a 20%
higher dividend, and continue to invest in our growth
program, all consistent with our balanced cash deployment
strategy."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanlef):
"All right. You weren't that active on the share
repurchase front this quarter. Can you talk a little bit
about your cash deployment strategies for the rest of the
year? Do you plan on being more aggressive through the
balance of the year?"
James Bell:
"Well, we plan on continuing to implement our balanced
strategy. We will continue to buy back shares. Clearly
we have about 18 million or 19 million shares to go under
our current authorization. The plan will be to go back to
the Board and ask for an additional authorization. We will
buy accordingly, as long as the stock is undervalued as
it is, we will continue to have a pretty active buyback
program."
Steve Binder (Bear Stearns):
"All right. Then with respect to pricing in the commercial
aircraft market today, and you look at 787, 777, especially
the 300ER and the 737 NextGen, if you're looking at deals
that you've been doing here in the last three or four
months, for the '08 - '09 time period -- depending on the
model type, maybe 787's further out -- if you isolate the
escalator factor, how would you characterize the pricing
environment, what you've seen in the last three or four
months?"
James Bell:
"Well, clearly it's a competitive environment, but we're
really pleased with the kinds of deals we're signing. We
believe we have embedded in those deals a real
opportunity to create real value going forward, Steve,
so we're not having fire sales."
Steve Binder (Bear Stearns):
"No, I'm actually wondering, are you starting to see better
pricing than your normal escalators would show?"
James Bell:
"Well, we're seeing good pricing. I think it's stabilizing,
and one of the reasons is that we have differentiated
products, and we think we're getting good pricing, good
value in the market space. That, coupled with what we're
doing from a productivity perspective, we think we're
going to be able to deliver good value on this order book."
Steve Binder (Bear Stearns):
"Lastly, with respect to potential replacements for the 737
NextGen, I know there's been a lot of ideas. Is there any
firm sense of whether BCAG down the road would go
with a single aisle configuration or a twin aisle
configuration to potentially that overall narrow body
market?"
James Bell:
"Well, no, we're clearly not there yet. We will continually
be working with our customers, because that's where a
............
product development decision is going to start and end,
trying to make sure that we're going to provide to them a
product, and invest in that product based on what they
believe their needs will be going forward. Right now,
Steve, we're just enjoying the success of the 737. As I
mentioned earlier, we've delivered the 5,000th aircraft.
That model is doing extremely well. It's the most popular
airplane in the world. We've got over 6,000 of them on
order. We'd just like to deliver on that order book, but
obviously we will continue to work closely with our
customers so we make the right product development
decisions and we make investments according to what
we think our customers want, as we've done on the 787.
You've seen the benefit of that."
Ron Epstein (Merrill Lynch):
"Good morning. Just following up on Steve's question
about product development. As you guys walk through
more of the 787 program, what milestones should we
keep an eye out for, so as outsiders looking in, we have a
good idea that things are indeed on track?"
James Bell:
"Well, I think that clearly the fact that we've gotten
through firm configuration, which we did complete,
we've been able to manufacture and successfully join
some of the composite barrels. We powered up the
auxiliary power unit. We've had the engine runs at
both GE and Rolls. Now we've started, and our supply
chain has started, building their plants, their factories
where they can start the fabrication of the other
component parts. I think there's been a number of
milestones that you can look at now and get a good
sense that this development program is on track, and
then those others, particularly as our supply chain
starts to stand up their factories and start to work on
their detail parts, I think that would be something I
would watch. Obviously, we're preparing to go into
flight testing at the end of next year, or the second
quarter of next year -- excuse me, in the second half,
not quarter -- the second half of next year so that we'll
be prepared to have this thing introduced in 2008. We
do believe we're on track to make that happen."
David Strauss (UBS)
"Good morning. James, could you talk about what impact
a potential Alcoa strike could have on the business, and
what precautions you have taken, as well as maybe what
you're seeing out of some of your suppliers?"
James Bell:
"Well, I think we have tried to be sure that we have
multiple sources, and we'll work pretty closely with our
supply chain and see what we need to do in order to deal
with it, but obviously it's a challenge. We always have
contingencies, so I think we'd be able to see our way
- -- - ---------------
through it."
Joe Nadol (JP Moran):
"Thanks, good morning, James. I was wondering, you've
already given us a little bit of color on the supply chain
and how things went well in the quarter. Now that you're
up to your sort of 100 aircraft per quarter delivery rate, it
would seem that you have a pretty good handle on things.
I was wondering if you could give a little bit more color
on, I guess if there are any necks of the toothpaste tube,
where are they, and how you feel about it, relative to
maybe three months ago or six months ago?"
James Bell:
"Well, clearly that remains a watch item for us and we
work it hard every day. We have our teams both from
BCA and IDS really working very, very closely with the
supply chain to make sure that we're able to get what we
need when we need it. So that's why, as we talk about
raising production rates, why it's a long-term, well thought
through, disciplined process that we have to integrate with
our supply chain. So clearly, we're feeling I think
relatively more comfortable as we see progress,
particularly on the 787, with our supply chain. Clearly
that has not been without it's challenges, and we've been
able to work closely with our suppliers to offset any of the
issues we've seen to date. We will continue doing that
going forward. Overall, we're feeling pretty
comfortable about it. That's not to say that the supply
chain isn't a watch item for us. It's not to say that there are
no risks in it, but I think the way we're working together
in an integrated fashion is allowing us to have a high
degree of confidence that it's not going to cause us an
issue as we work our way and harvest this up-cycle."
Robert Toomey (GT Reillv Advisors):
"Hi, good morning. Thanks very much. I'm just
wondering, James, with respect to the progress you've
made on improving your productivity, clearly it's really
starting to show through in your margins. Do you believe
that based on what you know now, the potential for
margins on the 787 could be higher than your other
products? In addition to that, there has been some talk
about the duration of this cycle being longer. You said
earlier this is a different sort of a cycle. Can you just
comment on how long you see this commercial cycle
extending? Could it go out beyond '08 or '09? Thank you."
James Bell:
"Well, clearly the way we're building the 787 is
different than the way we built the other product, and
so we're pretty comfortable with the business case on
that product that we're going to deliver good margins.
As to whether it will ultimately be higher than the
margins on other airplanes, that's yet to be seen. I
think the thing that is clear is we're expecting to deliver
a tremendous amount of value to our shareholders as it
relates to the 787 program. What was the second part of
that question?"
Robert Toomey (GT Reilly Advisors):
"Just the duration of the cycle."
James Bell:
"Well, clearly what typically you'd see in the cycle is a
peak order year, and then that order for the next
several years would drop off pretty dramatically.
Although we've seen a moderation of orders this year,
particularly given the 176 orders we got in the first
quarter, it does look like they will level off and stabilize, is
what we're thinking over the next couple of years, at least.
So that's somewhat of a different experience than we've
had in the past. Then when you couple with that the
traditional domestic customers, or domestic carriers, and
the European carriers are not back in the market at a
significant level yet, gives us some early indication that
this cycle really may go longer, and may be a little
more protracted and be a little different. Maybe the
peak is not as high as it would've been. We peaked at
over 1,000 orders last year. We don't anticipate that this
year, but we do anticipate getting more orders than
deliveries, and we anticipate that over the guidance period,
and perhaps it will be a little longer. We'll have to see
when the domestic carriers and the European, the
traditional carriers there, get back into the marketplace."
Lynn Lunsford ( Wall St. Journal):
"Good morning, James. This is just a housekeeping kind
of question, but when was the last time commercial
airplanes had a 10% profit margin?"
James Bell:
"You know, we were just trying to figure that out
ourselves, and I'm really not sure. I'm not sure that they
have, but maybe way back in the early '90's. I don't
know, but I'm sure glad they got it now."
Stanley Holmes (Business Week):
"Good morning, James. Could you be more specific on
some of the challenges you see with the 787 in terms of
production and putting the plane together? Where do
you see the biggest challenges to date? You can just start
with that."
James Bell:
"Well, Stanley, I don't see that we have a whole lot of
major issues on this program yet to date, but obviously
where the challenges will be is in our supply chain as
some of our global partners are trying to do this for the
first time. So that's what we're monitoring very, very
closely, and making sure we're there. We're having them in
our shop to make sure they know how to do the processes
.~;;;;;~;;;~
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that are necessary to make the material, and to actually
perform the operations to develop the major components
that they're responsible for. So our team, our technical
team in BCA, is working very, very closely with the
supply chain to make sure that they can get that done.
So I wouldn't necessarily call those challenges, as I would
say that we've gone through and looked at this
development program. We've identified where the risks
would be relative to the way we're building the aircraft,
and we are making sure we have the right process in place
to work through those and mitigate them so they don't
materialize."
Stanley Holmes (Business Week):
"Okay, what about on the cost side? There seems to be
some issues and concerns about costs from suppliers.
Where would you assess your suppliers' and Boeing's
ability to maintain the entire cost of building a 787
within the parameters that you set out early in the
program?"
James Bell:
"Well, I've got to tell you, as I go through and look at the
program, and I've been through a lot of development
programs, because I grew up on the government side of
the house, so you always are worried about the
unexpected things happening that would drive you to over-
run your budget. We are well downstream on this
development program. We're well within the budget,
well within the business case, and it really does look
good. Stanley, all I can tell you is that right now, this
looks like the best-run development program rve ever
seen, but it is a development program. So clearly, we are
mindful of that and making sure that we have the right
resources embedded in our business case to help if
something should happen. So right now, that something
hasn't happened, and we'll just have to wait and see."
Peter Pae (LA Times):
"Good morning. If I was an airline and I ordered a 787
today, when can I expect a delivery?"
James Bell:
"I think we're sold out in the first few years, so it would be
in the 2010, 2011."
Peter Pae (LA Times):
"A follow-up to that, considering that this is a new way
of developing or making the aircraft, how difficult
would it be to ramp up production, or what kind of
challenges would you have?"
James Bell:
"Well, a ramp up is complex and difficult, whether it's a
new model or an old model, but we're always studying
that. We have a global supply chain that has to be taken
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into consideration. They're not sitting around just waiting
for us to up production. They do have other work and
other requirements. So we'd have to work our way through
in an integrated fashion. It is a very complex, detailed
study that has to take place, and generally, once you get
through that, the implementation of it is in the future. It's
not something that you can turn on immediately."
27 Boeing James Firm at "We thought we'd done all the right things; we had an On the
April Confere McNer ethics leader, ethics advisors assigned around the chief
2006 nce ney, company, and an anonymous ethics-line to report architec
Board, Chair suspected violations. It wasn't enough. So then we had to t of a
as man & ask ourselves some really tough questions: Were these modular
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The studies concluded that, certain cultural weaknesses behavio
had permitted the people (including leadership) who r with
suspected a problem to, in effect (although they didn't regards
regard it this way) look the other way. In other words: to
Too many people who thought something 'didn't feel leadersh
right' failed to raise a red flag for a variety of reasons: ip
They wanted to win a contract, they feared retaliation,
they just didn't want to rock the boat, or they lacked the
courage to speak up in a command-and-control culture.
We also found that just about every part of our
organization responsible for guiding, investigating and
enforcing ethics and compliance worked pretty much in
isolation - they didn't necessarily share information with
each other.
Once we had the facts, Boeing faced a whole new set of
challenges: Do we hunker down, fall back on 'process'
and make everybody dot every 'i' and cross every 't'? Or
do we go for the gold and drive a real shift in how we
operate and the culture we operate in? Boeing chose to
take the big step. We concluded that we had to make three
major changes:
1. Get committed, and get aligned
2. Open up the culture
3. Drive ethics and compliance through our core
leadership model, not off to the side of other
things we're doing every day.
To open up the culture, we are creating an environment
that encourages our people to speak up about their
concerns and feel safe in doing so. We drive home the
principle that the only way to be profitable and to operate
long-term is to conduct our work ethically and
compliantly. There are significant consequences for
believing that it's okay to ostracize someone who raises
an ethical concern. I strongly believe this, and that's
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why, at Boeing, we stress that there can be no tradeoff
between values and performance. They go together, and
we can't stray from our values or principles as we strive
for better performance. Something done unethically will
only undermine our ability to perform.
I know... and you know... that one of the absolute
prerequisites for success in ethics and compliance is the
belief that it is OK for people to question what happens
around them. You have to be absolutely honest and
candid in talking about those things. Openness and
candor have to start at the top. People mustn't be
allowed to think that they can hide in the corporate
bureaucracy or wink at the misconduct of fellow
workers, or even their leaders - especially their leaders.
We also realize it all starts with leadership. If an
organization's leaders don't model, encourage, expect
and reward the right behaviors, why should anyone else
in that organization exhibit those behaviors? This must
be... and must be seen to be... a central part of the whole
system or training and developing leaders and of the
whole process of evaluating and promoting people. This
is the key. At the end of the day, the ethos or character of
an organization... its culture... comes down to the
behavior of its leaders; leaders get the behavior they
exhibit and tolerate. What really makes the difference
between one company and another? More than anything
else, it's people and how they view themselves and their
jobs. Do they feel they can speak their mind freely... or do
they have to be wheedled and cajoled into giving an
opinion?
One of the most important aspects of my job is leadership
development. This is where I can have the most
significant important impact - not just today but well into
the future.
We are asking how well our leaders at all levels do in
modeling each of the six leadership attributes. And
frankly speaking, if certain people are able to measure up
well on 'delivers results,' they will soon find that they
have no future with Boeing. In short, we are molding the
kind of leadership that we want to take into the future.
And part of that is getting rid of abusive leaders anyone
who thinks it is better to lead through fear and
intimidation than it is through the ability to include and
inspire people.
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"It's a good opportunity for a United States company to
get some business in China on 787, so it's great."
"EADS stock closed down 26%, the lowest since the stock
debuted in July 2000 and on par with some of the biggest
one-day plunges in corporate history. Enron shares, for
example, fell by 23% on Nov. 20, 2001, after the company
restated earnings a second time."
Jim
Melvin
,VP&
GM
14 Bloomb Investo ac "The problem isn't a delay of a few months, its that we On the
June erg.com rs & no longer have confidence in what EADS says," said fluidity
2006 t3 Xavier Debeugny, a fund manager at Paris-based of
brokerage Oddo & Cie. 's private banking unit, which capital
oversees some of France's wealthiest individuals. He said among
he sold most of his EADS shares three months ago in favor competi
of rival Boeing's stock." tors.
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Piloting points in their history, grew a little inward and parts of
Boeing' the culture got a little stale. In all cases, there was a
s New big leadership challenge to retap into the capability of
Course. the company and the people and the leadership."'
" (J.
Lynn
Lunsfor
5 MSN Firm a "Investors admired the ambition, complexity, profitability On a
July Money, and market dominance of industry leaders Fannie Mae and systemi
2006 "Boeing Intel all the way up to the point when their earnings c
Shares forecasts were proven wildly over-optimistic and blew up. understa
Could Could the same now happen at Boeing? The parallels are nding of
Fail eerie, if not at all perfect. Boeing -- the third-best gainer modular
From in the Dow Jones industrials over the past year -- is enterpri
The priced for perfection, much as the techs and banks se
Sky: were in 2000. And perfection, as we know all too well architec
Optimis by now, is rarely attained. Investors in the European ture.
tic consortium behind Airbus found that out all too well last
Investor month when executives had to backtrack from laughable
s are assurances that production of their new super-sized A380
Treating commercial aircraft was on track. The bad news sent the
Orders consortium's shares down 25% in a week. Boeing
like investors celebrated the Europeans' bad news, figuring
Revenu it meant new business from frustrated Airbus
es. customers. But really, they should have taken it as a
Given warning, for it is very hard to believe that the U.S.
the aircraft maker will manage to escape a similar fate
Comple with the construction of its own new plane, the 787
xities of 'Dreamliner.'
Produci
ng the Sky-high optimism
New Boeing rarely built a new aircraft on time when the planes
Dreamli were built start to finish in the greater Seattle area. But
ner, somehow it has managed to persuade investors that
Boeing this time -- when much of the plane is being built
May be overseas from hard-to-get materials and organized
in for a with a glitchy new software system -- Boeing can not
Hard only keep production on schedule but actually build
Landing planes at a record clip. A couple of analysts have been
." (Jon sounding the alarm, but have not made much of a dent
Markma yet with Boeing bulls. One bearish analyst, David E.
n) Strauss at Swiss-based brokerage UBS, has told clients
that the Dreamliner is even more likely to blow
deadline than the Airbus A380. 'Risk to the 787
production schedule will continue to increase from
here as the program heads toward first flight in late
summer 2007,' he wrote. If shares of Boeing do go into
a nosedive over production delays, as I believe they
will, bitter holders will shake their heads over the
nosebleed altitude to which valuation has ascended this
year. On a trailing basis, over the past 10 years
Boeing's price-to-sales multiple has run from 0.69 to
1.1. It's now well above the top end of the scale.
Boeing's price-to-book multiple has run from 3.5 to 5
over the past 10 years. It's now almost 6. Investors pay
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a premium for an industrial company's shares when
they believe it is halfway through a business up-cycle
and recent earnings growth will extend at least three
years into the future. They pay absolute top dollar
when they think a company whose growth has been
cyclical in the past has found a way to smooth out its
ups and downs and bring in steadier cash flows
through diversification efforts. So what are investors
thinking? Forgetting the risk of production delays and the
loss of face that would entail, steady cash flows could
hardly describe Boeing, which is now, and will forever
be, tied to the ups and downs of the worldwide demand
for commercial and, to a lesser extent, military airplanes.
With energy costs persistently high, global stock markets
reeling, worldwide economic growth flattening and the
threat of pandemic hanging over travel, the airline
business does not look like an ideal place for
investment capital at this time -- and that goes double
for companies that provide capital equipment, like
Boeing. The case for Boeing shares over the past three
years has rested on its brilliant campaign to best its only
major rival, Airbus, in obtaining orders for next-
generation commercial aircraft. Airbus made a big bet
on offering a gigantic new double-decker, wide-body jet
that would transport up to 800 people at a time; Boeing
made its own big bet on the 787, a more fuel-efficient
aircraft that proposes to save airlines money. So far,
Boeing has won the race for new orders by a handsome
margin.
A source of concern
But orders are one thing, and producing the darn thing
is quite another. And this is where we get deeper into
the intersection of ambition, complexity and risk. For if
the plane misses its 2008 delivery deadline and fails to
perform as Boeing's salesmen-engineers promise, then
dreamy investors can kiss many of those orders
goodbye before the first plane ever takes off. In its
marketing material, the Dreamliner has been sold as a
plane that achieves its fuel efficiency and streamlined
manufacturing costs through an unprecedented reliance on
large quantities of titanium, aluminum and carbon-fiber
composites, and on a global supply chain held together by
a new software system. Boeing has said that its suppliers
and software are performing up to par and that it has
not encountered any difficulty in securing enough
specialty metals. Yet persistent rumors have surfaced
over the past six months, denied by the company, that
the 787 schedule has been plagued with technical,
production and supply hitches. Fear of the loss of a
ready source of titanium was in large part behind the
company's stunning pledge to spend $27 billion over the
next three decades on engineering and raw materials in
Russia, an economically and politically unstable
country that happens to house most of the world's supply
of the key metal. Two weeks ago, Business Week
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reported that the passenger seating section of the 787
fuselage has failed in testing. The company blamed the
problem on faulty quality controls, but denied that
construction problems at Asian or European airframe
contractors would force it to bring more of the work
back to the United States.
Cancellations coming?
Citigroup aviation analyst George Shapiro notes that
historically, Boeing shares have not performed well
during development cycles and adds that their recent
success 'reflect(s) a lack of concern about problems
developing' with the 787 and its outsourced research
and development efforts. Shapiro also warns that the
787 production cycle may be shorter than normal as
airline profitability has not recovered enough to
support the order surge. He expects a wave of order
cancellations, even if delivery schedules are met.
Why so glum? Shapiro says new planes containing
significant technological innovations inevitably encounter
manufacturing problems. Already, Boeing has
acknowledged that the 787 is overweight, and with a
big advance in electronic complexity, my guess is that
some variation of the wiring snafus that have tripped
Airbus are virtually a lock to appear. It's precisely due
to manufacturing crises that Boeing shares have typically
underperformed during development cycles and
outperformed once planes are finally delivered. The
company ultimately fixes the problems, of course, but
the solution comes at the price of higher research costs
that depress profit margins. Meanwhile, investors are
treating orders as if they were booked revenue, even
though past cycles have seen up to a third of orders
canceled. Although some 787 orders are still coming in,
many were made in an environment of much lower oil
prices and interest rates, and stronger economic
growth.
Tech echoes
You may recall that, in early 2000, tech companies
boasted that tremendous order backlogs would lead to
fantastic earnings growth, only to learn later that
buyers had speculatively double and triple ordered.
Jets also are ordered by companies that speculate on
traffic boosts that never materialize. Citigroup notes
that the Indian market is seeing air traffic grow by 20%,
while capacity is expected to grow by 30% -- an imbalance
that increases the likelihood that price wars will sap profits
and lead to cancelled orders. If cracks appear in Boeing
shares' uptrend, the stock could come in for a hard
landing. So what are the shares really worth, considering
the risk? Boeing has historically traded at anywhere
from a 50% discount to a 50% premium to the S&P
500 aggregate price-earnings multiple. Since the index
multiple is around 16 and Boeing's multiple is at 25, it's
now trading at a 55% premium. Were the multiple to
II
contract to parity with the broad market and earnings were
to come in at consensus 2006 estimates, shares would be
worth $56, or 35% less than the current quote. And if
the schedule slips and the company disappoints on
earnings, well, sky-high is not the word that would be
used for either the multiple or the price. Personally, I'll
take an aisle seat in coach."
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2006 Reuters ney, r business during the quarter. We used our cash to invest Enterpri
Researc Chari in our organic growth programs and add capabilities to se
h, man our services businesses. We also improved our liquidity Archite
excerpt and position, reduced debt and returned capital to our cture's
from CEO; shareholders through our dividend and share-repurchase defense
"The James programs. Our strong cash generation was driven in of its
Boeing Bell, part by the outstanding sales success we continue to finanaic
Compan CFO, achieve in our commercial airplanes unit, which has al
y, Q2 The expanded our total company backlog to another record perform
2006 Boeing level of $220 billion. Overall, we continue to be well- ance
Earning Compa positioned in healthy markets. Our commercial airplanes
s Call ny business remains our growth catalyst, thanks to an
Transcri expanding market and airline customers who
pt" increasingly prefer Boeing's value-creating products.
Business execution is of paramount importance to us. It
is our main focus. Before I turn it over to James to
provide more detail on our financial results and our
updated outlook, I would like to say a few more words
about the global settlement we reached with the U.S.
government during the quarter and our decision not to
seek tax deductibility for any of the charge associated
with it. A few years ago, certain Boeing employees did
some things that were wrong. We accepted
responsibility for their actions and, through the
settlement, we sought to put the past behind us and
move toward a new era where ethics and compliance
would become a competitive advantage for Boeing. We
have made substantial changes in our ethics and
compliance programs and are embedding ethics and
compliance in everything we do, at all levels in the
organization. We have been advised that the bulk of
the settlement is in fact tax-deductible and that similar
deductions have been allowed in the past. Without
question, the short-term financial impact of the
taxability issue is significant. However, the long-term
value of Boeing's reputation is even more significant.
Accordingly, I feel strongly that the right thing for
Boeing to do is not to seek tax deductibility for the
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settlement charges. This should be a signal to our
employees, customers, suppliers and our shareholders
of our willingness to acknowledge responsibility, accept
accountability and to move forward in a manner
reflective of the great legacy of our company and its
employees. Simply speaking, my intent is to focus on
the future and put this unfortunate part of our past
behind us. As we move forward, operating with
integrity will differentiate Boeing just as much as our
technology, our talented people, and our attention to
customers."
James A. Bell (The Boeing Conmanv):
"Commercial airplanes is benefiting from a product
strategy that is keenly focused on our customers and our
commitment to continuous productivity improvement.
Revenues for the quarter rose 10%, and BCA's operating
margins expanded to 10.1%, driven by a 14% increase in
deliveries. We are on track to deliver 395 airplanes this
year, a 36% increase over last year's total. These numbers
reflect our success in working with our global partner
network to efficiently increase production rates across
the entire supply chain, while at the same time manage
for profitability. We are increasing our R&D
investment in BCA primarily to reduce risks on 787
program goals related to weight and schedule. The
program remains on track to meet its performance
commitments and entry into service. We captured 311
airplane orders during the quarter with our industry-
leading product line. Our success has enabled us to grow
our very large commercial airplane backlog, which has
now reached a record $142 billion. The strong order
environment and the market demand for Boeing products
drove our order total for the first six months of 2006 to
487 airplanes. As of today, we have won net orders for
510 airplanes. We continue to make progress on the 787.
We began manufacturing and major assembly during the
quarter. We also added to the large backlog of 787 orders
in the period. Since program launch, we have captured 364
firm orders from 25 customers from around the world. We
expanded our large service businesses during the quarter
by completing the Carmen Systems purchase and
announcing an agreement to acquire Aviall. These focused
acquisitions, combined with double-digit organic growth
in our service businesses at both BCA and IDS, will help
us deliver enhanced capability to our customers and
additional value to our shareholders. We also achieved
key milestones during the quarter, including the roll-out of
our first 737-900 extended range aircraft. Clearly Boeing
Commercial Airplanes is performing very well in a
strong market, and we are raising our guidance for BCA
revenue and earnings in both 2006 and 2007. Next slide,
please. Turning to our balance sheet on slide 7, we
continue enjoying outstanding balance sheet strength and
liquidity. We ended the second quarter with $10.6 billion
in cash and liquid investments. Our total debt levels
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decreased about $500 million in the quarter, as BCC paid
down maturing debt consistent with its reduced portfolio
size. Financial strength and solid credit quality
remains priorities for us, and we are pleased to have the
highest credit rating in the industry. Also during the
quarter, we repurchased 6.3 million shares, paid a
dividend, purchased Carmen Systems with cash, and
continued to invest in our growth program such as the 787
and the new 747-8 -- all of which is consistent with our
balanced deployment strategy."
W. James McNerney:
"Thank you, James. As James said, our outlook continues
to strengthen. Our businesses are strong. Our products
are valued. They are building upon our customer
relationships and we are focused simultaneously on
growth and productivity. Throughout the organization, we
are committed to coansistent execution, avoiding past
"Goistkes amorning.d delivering onhave a questionitment for you. NoWe are
keein youly aware that bu siness dexecutids on is aprov maing
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Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley Dean Wilier):
"Good morning. Jim, I have a question for you. Now that
you have been CEO at Boeing for a year and you said
in your comments that business execution is a main
focus, can you give us some specifics about how you are
addressing the risk mitigation efforts through the
company, so the issues come to you earlier and the
charges are smaller?"
W. James McNerney:
"I think, Heidi, part of the increased focus on risk
management and program execution has been to service
some issues over the last year. I think that is part of the
result of this focus. Having said that, we have had more
things to deal with than I would have liked. That is not
a perfect answer for you, but maybe by way of explanation
that helps a bit."
Douglas Harned (Sanford C. Bernstein & Conmanv.
Inc):
"Good morning. I would like to get your reaction to
Airbus' wide-body approach coming out of Farnborough.
First, there are a lot more details that need to come out on
the A350, but the focus of the initial airplane is at the
large-end of the 787 and the low-end of the 777. Not
surprisingly, they are claiming better performance. In
addition, we are seeing Airbus pricing very aggressively
to get more A330's in the market at the same time.
When you look at all of this, how do you see Airbus' A350
launch and approach to the A330 impacting BCA's
performance and product strategy?"
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W. James McNerney:
"First of all, we did not expect them to do nothing. They
have introduced a product that, on the face of it, and since
we really do not have a clear definition of what the
product is beyond the concept that has been discussed, it is
hard to react to the specifics with regard to performance
versus our airplanes. I will say that it seems they are
trying to cover two of our airplane families with oue
airplane, which is a tough putt. You are right, it has some
elements of competitiveness with the low-end of the 777
line, if they can execute along the lines of the concept they
put out. We do not see it as a plane that can compete
very well with our 787 line. It is a little big and a little
heavy to do the mission the 787 can do. In summary,
you have a single airplane trying to cover two of the
most successful families of airplanes we have ever had.
Knowing a little bit about engine technology associated
with these kinds of planes, which is part of the value
package as well as the plane itself, it is an ambitious
program. Now, will it be a good airplane? Yes. Will it fit
some missions well? Yes. Will they try to, while they
gear up production -- which will take them two to three
years longer than us getting the 787, we have already
had the 777 out for I 0-plus years -- will they aggressively
price old technology to bridge some customers? I
would be tempted to do that, and that is the A330
story. What they are doing makes sense, but will it be
enough is the question."
Douglas Harned (Sanford C. Bernstein & Company,
"You are not seeing any real change in the way you are
looking at them, at the market based on this?"
W. James McNerney:
"I do not think so. We expected competition in our
business plans, obviously, and I think the revamped 350
concept that we are seeing I do not think fundamentally
changes what we are doing. We have two pretty good-
sized book-ends on either side of their airplane.
Robert Stallard (Banc of America Securities):
"Good morning. Jim, I wanted to ask you a question about
the 787. There has been a lot of talk you may be
considering an extra production line on this aircraft.
Can you walk us through your thought process there and
why you would be willing to take on potentially extra risks
to produce more aircraft?"
W. James McNerney:
"That is a good question. There is no doubt that BCA is
experiencing more demand -- unprecedented demand -- for
this airplane. In a perfect world, we would like to be able
to produce as many of these things as people have interest
in. But of course, we have to balance orders with supply
chain, with development considerations, and yes, there is
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upward pressure on our current production plans. Alan
Mulally and his team are sifting through alternatives,
which range from increased productivity in their current
facilities, or currently being developed facilities, as well as
potentially some additional facilitation. We have not made
a call there, but you are right -- the demand for this
airplane, the unprecedented demand for this airplane is
forcing us to ask the question. There are worse questions
to ask and answer, and over the next year or so, we will
come up with a final answer there."
Robert Stallard (Banc of America Securities):
"So this plane is essentially sold out until 2010? Is that the
current situation?"
W. James McNerney:
"Beyond that -- pretty much through -- it eats into '11
pretty far too."
Byron Callan (Prudential Equity Group, LLC.):
"This is really just a follow-up on Heidi's question -- how
satisfied are you that the focus on execution is such that
Boeing has gotten to the bottom of the barrel on some
of the issues of that have vexed earnings lately? Are
you satisfied that you have the risk reduction
disciplines, and even the culture in place that we are
not going to see some of these surprises in the future?"
W. James McNerney:
"No, I am not totally satisfied -- none of us are. As I
answered Heidi's question, I try to portray a situation
where the increased focus itself is surfacing some things.
But I think what this company does are things that no
other company does and as a result, we can push the
envelope a little bit. We have to be more careful, not
only in execution, but on things we choose to do. We are
spending a lot of time focused on it. We have a lot of our
initiatives focused on it. I would see every quarter, every
year, an improvement. But I am not satisfied with where
we are and I probably never will be totally satisfied,
because that is a little bit of the nature of the business, but
we are going to improve."
Steve Binder (Bear, Stearns & Co.):
"How should we look at the margin guidance for BCAG
for '06 and '07? You did not change margin guidance,
but you did increase the R&D expense. Should we look
at it as just block extensions? Is it lower expected costs on
programs? Is it rate changes in the outlook? What are the
factors offsetting the R&D build?"
James A. Bell:
"Actually, we did have a block extension for the 777 -- it
was off 50 this quarter, and that is why you will see that
the deferred production costs went up slightly. But no, it
is a combination of things. We are working our
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productivity initiatives. We are harvesting the benefit
of that. That is being somewhat offset by raw material
costs, so we are dealing with that. Clearly the R&D that
we have, that we guided you to that is going up, is really
there to make sure that we can get through some of the
issues you normally would encounter at this phase of a
development program, while raising the level of insurance
that we will be able to meet our customers commitment
and our in-service date schedule. That is why you are
seeing the balance in terms of margin guidance, both this
year and next at BCA.
Cai von Rumohr (SG Cowen & Co.):
"Thank you. For the second quarter, BCA has done 10%
margin. Could you comment first on some of the color on
that? For example, the difference between program and
unit cost narrowed. What did the impact of the 777 block
extension do? Secondly, while you have increased R&D,
essentially it looks it is going to be relatively flat next
year, and the volume at BCA now is going up. Explain to
us again why those margins do not go up, or in fact, if
there is a chance they could go up, what should we look
for to tell whether they might?"
James A. Bell:
"In '06, as you look at where we are this first part of the
year, in the second-half of the year, we are going to have
less contributions by our supply chain to our R&D. That is
some of the impact. We are having higher R&D costs this
half of the year, and then we have timing on some of our
expenses, primarily our selling expense. That is what you
are looking at and how it would moderate. In fact, if you
took the contribution out of the second quarter, we would
be closer to what the run-rate is that we guided you to. So
we think we are pretty comfortable this year that that is
about the right number. Going to next year, again Cai, it is
-- clearly we are going to increase the R&D spend rate.
We are also going to be careful with what is going to
happen with raw material costs and our productivity
initiatives. We are doing very, very well on the single
[L]. Clearly we are still challenged on how to get that
out of the wide bodies. There are more special features
associated with the 777 and the 4-7 as a custom-built
airplane, but we are optimistic we are going to get it.
Nonetheless, you could say we are being what I would
consider conservative at the right level."
Ronald Estein (Merrill Lynch):
"Good morning. A question for Jim -- in the release and
the on the call, you guys mentioned how you are
increasing R&D spend to mitigate risks I guess in
weight on the 787 program. Can you give us any further
color on that? Sort of as outsiders looking in, so we can
feel more comfortable with the development of this new
airplane?"
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W. James McNerney:
"The weight issues on a program like this are not unusual.
As a matter of fact, I cannot remember an aircraft program
that did not have a weight issue of one form or another at
this stage in the program. I would characterize the
weight issue we have here as more normal than
abnormal. Having said that, we have aggressive
commitments from certification and for entry into service,
and we want to mitigate any risk associated with not
meeting those commitments. I think we are attacking the
weight issues aggressively and the associated schedule
issues, we still, as we project where we are going to be, we
still see the plane delivered on time, within the
performance commitments we have made to our
customers. These programs are never easy. As you design
and build the 4 million parts that go into these aircraft,
there are always going to be issues. We are paranoid
every day about them and trying to attack them and
leave no stone unturned at this stage. I would rather be
paranoid now than deeply disappointed later."
Ronald EDstein (Merrill Lynch):
"So we are still looking at first flight at the end of next
year?"
W. James McNernev
"Yes, first flight -- '07 and next year. It is third quarter
and then similar timing '08 for EIS, entry into service."
David Strauss (UBS):
"Good morning, thank you. Jim, could you just give us
your current view on the status of the overall supply
chain? Incrementally, have you seen any improvement or
has your confidence increased over the course of the last
three to six months? If any problem areas, if you could just
give us some examples."
W. James McNerneyv:
"We knew at the beginning that there would be issues that
cropped up in the supply chain, particularly as we relied
on people for higher level components, and we tried to
anticipate this by our use of IT, common engineering
tools, real-time visibility across the globe in our labs
and their labs simultaneously. We try to anticipate it by
the way we manned and worked together our site and their
site -- all toward the end of seeing problems early, dealing
with them aggressively. We have had a couple of
instances where we have moved work, but that was all part
of the contingency plan, where we had built extra
engineering capacity in the event that someone ran into an
issue on completing work and we had engineering
capability and facilities ready, and that has happened once
or twice. Again, anticipated, planned for, and we are
dealing with it, but I would not characterize any of it as
unanticipated or earth-shaking. We are right at the stage
now where the transition from engineering to development
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is happening and we are monitoring it every day."
Joseph Nadol (JPMorgan Chase & Co.):
"Thank you, good morning. I have one more on the 787
R&D. Over the two years, your R&D guidance has gone
up $0.5 billion. It sounds like it is more than that for
Commercial, and I guess specifically for the 787. I am just
wondering if you could be a little more specific as to
where that money is going. Are you hiring more
engineers? Are you paying overtime? Any more color
on that, and then, as an adjunct to that, are your suppliers
also seeing increased costs across the board or anywhere
particularly?"
W. James McNerney:
"I think the backdrop to my answer, and the quick answer
is more engineers and more overtime to execute these
risk mitigation programs. But the perspective you have to
have here is that this will be the most efficiently developed
airplane that we have ever done. The strategy of working
together with our partners and our suppliers where
they are shouldering some of the development work in
concert with us is producing a cash model for this
airplane, even with some risk mitigation activities, that
promises to be superior to anything we have ever done.
Having said that, yes, more engineers and overtime, and
not all unanticipated."
Joseph Nadol (JPMorgan Chase & Co.):
"Are your suppliers participating in the higher costs,
or are you picking up most of the slack?"
W. James McNerney:
"They have skin in this game to, so the extent to which
we [achievel together, that they are falling behind in
some area or where the weight is an issue in another,
yes, it is their resources that they are applying. That is
part of our agreement with them."
Myles Walton (CIBC World Markets):
"Thank you. A question on pension. For '06, you have
lowered that number by $200 million, left '07 intact.
Given current year adjustments tend to be a little stickier,
can you just give us background on how that '06 number
changed? Also, given the rising interest rates, it looks like
maybe 75 basis points higher next year, why you left your
'07 $1 billion intact? Then, as an adjunct, is most of that
pension expense still flowing through BCAG?"
James A. Bell
"Well, that was about six questions, Myles, but let me
see if I can remember them all and answer them.
First of all, the overall pension cost for the year is the
same. It is about $1 billion. What you are seeing is what
actually flows through earnings for this year, and that is
the differential between what goes to inventory and what
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actually flows to expense. In our model, we had to modify
the method for making that determination, and it turned
out that it gave us [inaudible] for this year, because the
way the thing works is that which is inventoried last year
gets expensed this year, and then a portion of this year's
cost gets expensed this year. That is what you are seeing in
'06. In '07, the pension cost as you know is determined
well in advance of what you would see in changes in
interest rates. The change in this year does not have a
significant effect on '07. Nonetheless, that method, what
you see, what we think will happen in '07 stays about the
same based on what we have just done. It is a one-time
adjustment in '06."
Myles Walton (CIBC World Markets)
"Most of that is flowing through BCAG?"
James A. Bell:
"The pension cost is allocated -- the cash piece is probably
going through, most of it is going through BCA, but then
what you are looking at a lot of too is the adjustment that
flows from it stays on the corporate books, the fast-cash
adjustment."
Joseph San Pietro (Wachovia Securities):
"Good morning. Circling back to the Connexion issue, the
company has stated in the past it has justified its
investment in the program not necessarily from the
revenues that can be derived from the back of the plan but
more importantly from what is going on up-front. My
understanding is that part of the lower operating cost
of future programs, specifically the 787, are tied to the
efficiencies that can be gained from using the
Connexion system. If you guys keep it or sell it to
someone, I get that, but if you decide to shut it down,
exactly how does that affect the operating costs for the
outlook for new aircraft programs?"
W. James McNerney:
"Not significantly is the quick answer, but you are right.
The program is largely justified by the back of the plane --
so I differ with you a little bit there -- but also in part
justified by facilitating operations of the airplane and some
service elements. The facts are that our business model
is not being met. We are taking a good swing at this
business and we are falling short of where we want to be,
which is why we are asking a series of fundamental
questions now on a going-forward basis -- restructure,
terminate, affiliate being the obvious options, but
continuing to operate as we are now is not an option. We
are taking the fundamental look. All elements of the
business model are falling short of the projections and
impact on a major restructure or terminate would not
significantly impact the economics. There are other ways
to do what you are describing."
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Joseph San Pietro (Wachovia Securities):
"What has been the response from your customers,
specifically? The system seems to be working, I mean,
Lufthansa seems to be relatively pleased. It is a drag that
you guys had the U.S. carriers back out due to your
financial situation, but at some point they come back. You
guys were not the only ones that invested in this, so what
are your partners saying?"
W. James McNernev:
"We are talking to them right now, including Lufthansa, as
you point out. We are trying to sort through the issues.
Eventually, if the business model does not work at all for
us, it is not going to work at all for them either. We are
trying to find out, through discussions and sharing with
them the reality of our situation, and you are right -- the
technology is performing reasonably well. The airlines
as a group have not aggressively adopted this service to
anywhere near the extent that we had hoped."
David Gremmels (Thomas Weisel Partners):
"Good morning. I just wanted to ask, maybe you could
provide some additional color on the BCA environment?
Given your competitor's issues lately, it is possible to
imagine them being more aggressive with pricing to try
to hold on to market share, so are you seeing any
changes in that environment?"
W. James McNerney:
"The answer is yes, we have seen very aggressive
pricing from our competition, in part because old
technology is fighting new technology. As a matter of
fact, now that they have some new technology, at least
planned, I do not want to say the pricing is going to abate
because as a question surfaced earlier, the A330 could be
kind of a fighter transition model. But you know, I think
pricing has been pretty aggressive in both the twin area
and in the A340 versus 777 area. I would not see it getting
worse, necessarily. It has been pretty bad, and now Airbus
promises, hopefully by the end of the year, to have a new
defined, and when they do, they may want to value for
that, so we will have to see."
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
"Hello, a question for Jim McNerney. Jim, at
Farnborough, you in an interview brought up some issues
on the tanker program and the unfairness of the
regulatory environment for Boeing versus EADS. You
brought up specifically the ITAR and Foreign Practices
Act and how those apply to you versus them. I note that
afterwards, Northrop Grumman, which is the lead
contractor in the rival tanker proposal, reacted quite
sharply to that and issued a statement saying you have
your facts wrong. I am wondering, is Boeing going to
pursue either of those questions, either of those specific
acts on the tanker thing? I think in Farnborough, one of
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the IDS people mentioned that they wanted the ITAR out
of the tanker proposal, they wanted to insert that back in
there. Will Boeing pursue these and what is your reaction
to the Northrop Grumman statement?"
W. James McNernev:
"As I pointed out, Dominic, we are just seeking a level
playing field here, equally applied regulatory environment
for both. This issue was raised as we discussed in
Farnborough really by the legislature in terms of
discussions they have had and resolutions that have been
put forward to ensure this level playing field. I think our
customer and the legislature behind it are probably the
ones that should push for this rather than us. We are a self-
interested party. We are a competitor here. We just want
to make sure it is a level playing field. I saw your
interview with Mr. Crosby. You know, for all I know, they
are taking steps to respond to these things that I am
unaware of. That is where we stand."
Molly McMillen (The Wichita Eagle):
"Good morning. My question is for Mr. McNerney. I saw
comments from Alan Mulally out of Farnborough
about a plan for the 737 replacement, that that plane
would be more composite. My question is, what kind of
impact do you anticipate that could have on Spirit
AeroSystems here, which certainly has a huge portion of
the current 737? What do they need to be doing in the
meantime?"
W. James McNerney:
"Listen, first of all, I do not think Alan meant to say,
and I do not think he did say that there was a clearly
defined next-next generation 737. You probably did not
imply that in your question. We are studying where to go
and obviously composites are one of the technologies that
could flow from the 787 down into the narrow body. The
value of the composites, obviously strength,
maintainability and weight. I think Spirit is doing a good
job on the composite side. They are a very valued
partner, so I think whatever plane we define for the
future aero body -- which will not be for a number of
years, keep in mind -- we would hope that Spirit would
remain a very important partner for The Boeing
Company going forward. Based on the capabilities I
see there, I think that is going to happen."
Molly McMillen (The Wichita Eagle):
"So you would anticipate them getting a bigger chunk than
they have of the current 787?"
W. James McNerney:
"No, that is not what I said. That is not what I said.
What I said is that they will remain a very important
partner. It is hard to have a work statement until you have
an airplane defined. I see the capabilities that have
................--- ---
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developed there, the quality of the people developed
there, I see them holding on to a big chunk of it, and we
want them to hold on to a big chunk of it, consistent
with competing for the business. I think they are going
to be very competitive."
Amik Sacheet (Chicago Tribune):
"Good morning. I wanted to ask you, with Airbus likely to
seek new launch aid for the A350, how that might affect
any potential settlement of the trade disputes?"
W. James McNernev:
"Well, I do not think it would be helpful. I think if they
seek launch aid on the same terms that they have had it
historically, I think our government would view that as
a step backwards, a significant step backwards in the
negotiating process. As I said before, I hope we can find a
way to negotiate something, our government and the
European governments, but that specific step, would not
be helpful, in my opinion."
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financial officer of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, where
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was the first president of Connexion by Boeing. 'I am
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productivity strategies, and meeting our commitments to
our customers.' Carson will continue to lead the
Commercial Airplanes sales team until a successor is
named.
Jamieson is a 30-year company veteran steeped in
commercial airplane engineering, design and
production. In his current position, he worked to
strengthen engineering and operations functions across the
company, and provided leadership to the Boeing
technology and information technology organizations. He
served previously as senior vice president of airplane
programs for Commercial Airplanes, where he was
responsible for the design and production of all Boeing
commercial airplanes. Other roles he has held include head
of Boeing's single-aisle commercial airplane programs,
chief project engineer for the 757, and chief of customer
engineering for the 747 and 767 programs."
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2006 Reuters ney, r revenues and core earnings per share growing at Enterpri
Researc Chari double-digit rates. In August, our Board approved a new se
h, man $3-billion share repurchase program, an important Archite
excerpt and element of our balanced cash deployment strategy. cture's
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"The James customers and to shareholders by investing in our of its
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2006 Boeing "Our commercial airplane business is benefiting from a ance
Earning Compa product strategy that's keenly focused on our
s Call ny customers as well as a commitment to continuous
Transcri productivity improvement. Revenues for the third quarter
pt" rose 45%. and BCA's operating margins expanded to
9.7%, despite higher R&D expense. We delivered 100
airplanes in the quarter, a 61% increase over the same
period last year, which was affected by the strike. These
numbers reflect our success in working with our global
partner network to efficiently increase production rates
across the entire value chain, while at the same time
managing for profitability. The 787 program continues
to experience pressure with respect to weights and
supplier implementation. We are raising our R&D
forecast to reflect these increasing pressures. The increase
in total company R&D reflected in our new guidance is
expected to be offset by performance improvements at our
other businesses. We continue to expect that the 787 and
the 747-A will be delivered on time and in accordance
with our contractual obligations. We expect BCA
margins to moderate in the fourth quarter due to the timing
of costs and the absence of supplier participation payments
to offset R&D expense. Despite lower margins in Q4, we
expect BCA's full year margin to exceed 9%, which is
consistent with our current guidance. And we also expect
BCA margins next year to exceed 10%. Clearly, our
commercial airplane business is performing very well in a
strong demand environment. During the quarter, we
announced that we would discontinue our Connexion
service by year end and take charges totaling
approximately $320 million in the second half of 2006.
Now, turning to our balance sheet on slide 7. We continue
to enjoy outstanding balance sheet strength and
liquidity. We ended the third quarter with over $8 billion
in cash and liquid investments. So moving on to cash flow
on slide 8. Our cash flow generation remains very strong.
Also during the quarter, we repurchased 8 million
Boeing shares."
Byron Callan (Prudential Equity Group):
"Yes. Good morning, gentlemen. I am wondering if you
can address the specific changes in R&D guidance. What
changed since last July?"
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Jim McNerney:
"I think I would characterize what we're doing here as
pretty aggressive contingency planning. We are at that
point in the development program where weight remains
a dogged issue. We know what we have to do. Suppliers
occasionally need help, and what I am trying to do along
with the BCA team is put a contingency plan in place.
Just to give you some context, we have got eight
contingency plans that we're looking at. We've funded
one right now. We're trying to get out ahead of it just in
case. This program has been characterized from the very
beginning as a program that cuts across all boundaries
within our company and across our company and to other
companies that are our partners. We have one database,
common tools and processes. We see everything, and
what we're trying to do is as we go through this, just be as
conservative as we can be; and there is a fair amount of
conservatism built into this. We know how to build this
airplane. This plane will be done on time and will be
done within contractual commitments."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"Good morning, gentlemen. I am wondering if you can
provide us a bandwidth of kind of the high, low range
where as you see now R&D's possible variance could go
versus the '07 guidance you're giving us of the 3.2 to 3.4? I
mean, obviously, that's a single-figure number, but how
much risk do you see to that being up over the next couple
of quarters? I mean $100 million to $200 million a quarter
through '07?"
Jim McNernev:
"As we see it now, that's a pretty conservative number,
Heidi, as was consistent with the answer I gave Byron. We
are trying to witch-hunt the issues in this program
right now, and we do have some weight issues as I have
said. We do have some supplier implementation issues.
We are addressing all of them with aggressive recovery
plans, and we've planned on more, should additional issues
crop up. So I would characterize this from where we sit
today against the delivery commitments and the
contractual commitments we've made, a pretty
conservative number."
James Bell:
"And let me add to that. What you're seeing as the
spending profile is still well within the business case,
well, actually well under the business case for the
current spending that had us to launch this program.
As you can see by the number of orders today, it is
obviously a lot more successful than we ever envisioned
at this point in the program."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"This is sort of a question for both of you, because it's both
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a strategic as well as a financial question. But your
current market outlook pegs the 787 market niche size
at around 3,600 aircraft and assuming a 50% share,
that's 1,800 planes. But at the 432 bookings, you're at
25% there before the first delivery. So the business case
you guys talked about presumed an Airbus response, but
now it's looking like the A350 XWB isn't going to deliver
until the 2014 or 2015 timeframe, which gives you sole
positioning in the mid-size wide-body niche for a good
seven or eight years. Does the A350 looks like it's more
positioning itself to more than fully take on the 787? I am
wondering if you guys can talk to us about how you think
about the trade-off in production rates and pricing, given
that it appears either your market share or the size of your
market assumptions have been conservative?"
Jim McNerney:
"No. I'd say the 50% looks pretty good, and there is
upward pressure in our planning on production rates."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"Would you need to spend additional capital, Jim, to get
there, though?"
Jim McNerney:
"Not anywhere near the size of the opportunity"
Cai van Rumohr (Cowen):
"Thank you, gentlemen. Could you give us more color on
the supply issue and the weight issues on the 787 and
perhaps answer the more important question: you have
increased the R&D here in '06 and '07, but do you still
feel as comfortable about the potential for this
program to be solidly profitable as we get out to the
2008 and 2010 timeframe?"
Jim McNerney:
"Cai, this program's projected economics are
significantly better than any airplane program I have
been involved with and that's because of the structure
of the supply chain, both in its participation and
recurring and nonrecurring costs. I think you know the
business model. So the structure of it combined with
unprecedented market acceptance leads you to a pretty
good conclusion about the concept and the strategy. As
James pointed out a few minutes ago, even
notwithstanding some upward pressure on research
and development here in the short and medium term,
we are well within the business case. Our internal
targets are significantly within the business case
because that's the way we like to run our business. This
pressure hasn't really changed that outlook, so I don't
see a fundamental change in an outstanding business
case because of what we're talking about here today, at
all."
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Cai van Rumohr (Cowen):
"And to the issue of supplier issues and weight issues?"
Jim McNernev:
"Just more color you mentioned. Yes, I would say that we
have a significant amount of engineering resources. Now
that we've largely completed the engineering release
process, there are some places we're going back to get
weight out. So the good news is that we completed the
majority of the engineering releases within the timeframe
we hoped to and we have time to go back with a team. We
have a weight reduction team that is going back both on
parts that we designed and parts that others have designed.
Remember, we're all on the same system. So we
understand the design parameters and design specifics
on a real-time basis as well with our partners as we do
in our own engineering shops. So we are very agile and
very quick in terms of being able to go back and put
resources on some of that. Other things we're doing, there
has been some production process help we've given a
couple of suppliers as they're setting up new facilities and
needed some boundary-less kind of collaboration
between our production people and theirs to move it along
a little faster. It's all the kinds of thing we anticipated. It's
all the kinds of things that you do when you share a
supply chain with people who have a lot of skin in the
game with you. But the good news about a lot of skin
in the game is we are both incented to get it done. It is
not us pointing at them and them pointing at us. It's us
getting together and so it's a mix of weight reduction and
production process facilitation, I would say."
Joe Campbell (Lehman Brothers):
"Hi, guys. Good morning, all. I would like to go back to
the second part of Heidi's question, which is when looking
at the stock, it is a bit upset because it looks like people
are assuming over runs in R&D are for sure, and
estimates that it will do better in the future on the
operating performance are maybe. I am wondering
whether or not implicit in the numbers that are the 2007
guidance, or if that will do even better? It looks to me like
what you've got is a forecast of the second half of 2006
performance forecast into 2007. And if it is true that the
R&D is really only contingency, it would seem that we
might not be so heavy on the R&D, but we could be better
on the operating side while the market seems to be
worried that the R&D is for sure, and we might not
make the operating profit gains they're going to offset
the R&D. So I wondered if you could talk with what
you've assumed, in terms of getting better versus I know
your hopes are that you will do better.
Jim McNerney:
"We feel good about the underlying operating plan.
You know the ramp up, which will continue next year
in a number of our airplane programs, has gone well. I
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think we have confidence that the underlying operating
margins for R&D will be delivered. The R&D I would
characterize as a conservative number, one that
anticipates contingency actions that could happen.
We'll be ready for them if they happen. Could there be
an upside? Perhaps, but I think planning on an upside
is not the way to run a business. James, do you have any
other comments here?"
James Bell:
Yes. And I think the other thing, Joe, if you look at what
we're projecting and normalize our earnings this year that
we're projecting to potential charges, I think we're still
going to have 30% earnings growth year-over-year.
Although we have the ability to see the way the program is
being managed, see the risk early and make a decision to
make available resources to have contingency plans to
offset those risks, should the risks hit the beach; I don't
want us to lose sight that we've had a significant
number of recent accomplishments on this program
that are hitting right on schedule. For instance, we have
begun major assembly of the center wing section. We
started fabrication of the landing gear, the APU integration
facility is up and running, we completed the first test of the
engine pylon. We've unveiled the wing test box. We're
opening the new production propulsion integration center.
We've had the first major partner-to-partner delivery, and
that was the keel assembly and the pressure deck. We
completed the 787 integration test vehicle, and we're now
testing the large cargo freighter. I mean those things
have been hitting right on point. The fact of the matter
is, Jim and I are going to run this business from a
conservative perspective, and we're going to make sure
that we have in place plans early enough that we can
implement, so that we can hold to schedule and meet
our customer obligations, and I think that's what
you're seeing in this increase in R&D."
Doue Harned (Sanford Bernstein):
"Good morning. Over the last two quarters as you've
taken up your estimates for R&D, you've kept your
guidance the same in commercial. I am interested in
understanding, I mean that's better than a 1.5 points in
margin. I am interested in understanding where that
benefit is coming from? I know you have had a number
of initiatives on the operations side, also on the
corporate side. Could you talk about what you see that
you've captured, where it has come from and how you
get comfortable about those savings?"
Jim McNernev:
"Well, I think the two places we've had pressure are R&D
and some sourcing pricing inflation on some key raw
materials. I think that's well known in the industry and
well known as discussed by us. Where we are offsetting
that is in conversion productivity. There is a lot of
innovative work going on in the PCA factories,
whether it is moving lines in Renton, the beginning of
moving lines in Everett which is a revolution in the way
airplanes are converted; whether it is volume-related
leverage as we take up our rates a bit; whether it is
labor productivity. There is a lot of great work being
done on conversion productivity, which is by in large,
along with volume, offsetting these pressures. That's
the business model we run under. I mean when we talk
about growth in productivity simultaneously, we mean it.
The reason we drive productivity so hard in the Company
is to make sure we have resources available to properly
fund these huge opportunities we've got. When you look
a t the 787 which we've talked a fair amount about
here this morning. This is one of the most competitive
airplanes when both measured against the planes it is
replacing and against the planes that the marketplace
is offering as an alternative as you will ever see. We
don't want to you lose sight of that as we have these
candid discussions about how we're managing R&D
and managing risk as we develop the airplanes. We
want to be up front with you. We want to be up front
with ourselves as we march through this program."
Doug Harned (Sanford Bernstein):
"That's good. I am trying to understand, though, on the
cost side, what's allowing you to get the better margin?
If you put R&D aside, is it also the overhead type
initiatives that you have let out of corporate?"
Jim McNerney:
"There is some of that. The answer is yes. I mean, we have
reduced some of what you would call corporate and
SG&A costs as a percentage of sales. But I think the hard
work has been on conversion productivity in our factories
and with the way we're working with our suppliers. I think
that is leaving aside price inflation on some commodities
as a separate issue, as a pressure. I think that is a bigger
part of it, and there is more to go on both by the way.
There is more to go on conversion productivity, and there
is more to go on G&A and corporate costs. We do have, as
you point out initiatives in place to address both. A lean
plus initiative, our corporate services reduction initiatives
as well as our development process excellence initiative
which gets at some costs. So we are going to be
relentlessly focused on these things."
Steve Binder (Bear Stearns):
"And the same question was about pricing. You know,
we have no clue what you're assuming not just for
escalators, but for pricing on your model types,
especially since you have a compromised competitor.
That's why I was wondering have you seen any revision in
those estimates, variables."
James Bell:
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"Well, our pricing has stabilized, we think. Clearly, we are
expecting more growth going out, we will give you more
guidance on that obviously in the fourth quarter as it
relates to '08. But we are assuming we're going to get
the productivity as we go forward And in fact we've
demonstrated it. We've demonstrated we've been able to
move up in rate in all the current models and do that
effectively and do that profitably. We anticipate to do that
going forward, and also to get additional leverage."
Robert SDingarn (Credit Suisse):
"Good morning. You know, Jim, as a follow-up to what
Steve just mentioned on the 747-81, could you give us a
little bit more color on where you are on that program?
Clearly, you have the R&D ramp. It looks like from macro
perspective, you may have more opportunity here lately to
capture some share just based on some instability perhaps
in the marketplace right now, vis-A-vis a competitor. If you
could give us more color there."
Jim McNerney:
"Yeah. I mean I think you have to back off a little bit
and get some altitude on it. First of all, this is a
derivative program, and the amount of money we're
spending on this reflects that. I mean this is taking an
airplane we know how to make, we've made for years,
one of the world's most successful airplanes and we're
modifying it. So as we adjust and tweak to meet
specific market requirements, we have to keep the
context that it is not a huge development program for
us. Now, having said that, I think the requirements have
settled down on that airplane now. We've had a lot of
dialogue with not only the legacy carriers in Europe that
Steve referred to, but a lot of other people. We've made
some modifications. We know what we have to do. We
understand the engineering of the airplane, and we
know how to do it and we have time to do it. So I think
we're in pretty good shape, with the requirements having
settled down."
George ShaDiro (Citigroup):
"I wanted to pursue the R&D a little bit more. I mean
effectively, you've raised R&D pretty substantially now
two quarters in a row. When do you think the period of
greatest risk in this program is? Or you can't say until
we get to say the initial flight test program?"
James Bell:
"Well, I think we're in it. We're in a period of
considerable risk, and I think we've identified them early.
Obviously, we want to get the contingency plan in place in
time and have them resourced in case we need to call on
them, George. Obviously, you'll have a different set of
risks once you get into the flight test. But I guess the real
point I want to make on this is that we think we
understand how to build this airplane. I mean we think
--rxr
we've gone through it. We understand the systems we
need to go deal with and how to do them. We don't
have the complexity on our airplane that the A380 is,
we have a fifth of the electrical wiring in it. So I think if
some of the concern is being driven by what you see out
there in other places, then I think you have to
understand there's some distinct differences in what
we're doing here.
What you're seeing here is early risk mitigation. I think
we're there in terms of our ability to go look forward
and see where those risks might hit the beach and where
we can put contingency plans in place and hopefully
mitigate it."
George Shapiro (Cititroup):
"But if something incrementally worse didn't happen in
the third quarter, why wouldn't you have raised the R&D
by a bigger amount in the second quarter? I guess I am
looking for what did you incrementally see in the third
quarter that you didn't in the second quarter?"
James Bell:
"Well, again, if you remember in the third quarter half of
this increase is associated with the 747-A. The other piece
that's associated with the 787 is to look at those other
contingency plans that we had on the table and we
understood in the second quarter, but we now have another
quarter of history or time has passed and so we wanted to
make sure we had the resources available. So, quite
frankly if we were going to focus on something big
happening, it would be something that would be totally
unexpected like somebody dropping a big piece of
hardware or a big piece of tooling or something having
a major failure. But right now in terms of the technical
things that need to be done, we think we understand
them pretty well and we just want to get the weight out
of it and then make sure we hold the schedule."
Jim McNernev:
"There has been no dramatic or qualitative change in
the risks we're managing one quarter to the next. I
think it's a matter of as James said, being at that point in
the program where, as the risks exist, you want to get out
ahead of them and more than get out ahead of them. I
think that's what you're seeing here."
Ronald EDstein:
And then a product placement or product development
question for you. Lately I think the BCA guys have been
out talking in industry conferences and have been a little
bit more vocal about Boeing being involved with a small
plane, something maybe around 100 seats. Jim, I was
wondering if you can speak to that, how seriously Boeing
is considering that and any color you can add on a smaller
narrow bodied jet."
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Jim McNerne:
"I don't think, Ron, that we have a crystal clear view
yet of what the narrow body market of the future is
going to look like. Certainly there is a lot of discussion
around the 100 packs, and there is a lot of discussion
around a bigger version of a narrow body, you know, the
200-plus size as well as the core of the market, the 150 to
180. A lot of discussion, a lot of debate, different camps
within our company. Meanwhile, we're just focused on
maturing the technologies that we know will fit into
any of those versions as that clarifies. But I hesitate to
tell you I know exactly what that market is going to
look like eight, nine years from now. Over the next year
it's going to get a lot clearer."
Joe Nadol (JP Moran):
"Thanks. Good morning. I was wondering if you could
comment just a little bit more on your current production
at BCA. You've been running the past couple quarters
with unit costs accounting, profits higher than program
and this quarter that slipped around. So I was
wondering what caused that."
James Bell:
"Joe on the unit margins it's just we've had the impact of
the increased material costs they had a more dramatic
impact on unit margins early, and it doesn't have the
ability to have the production improvement that we have
over time in programs. So again, with the problem with
unit margins, I know you all like them, but they're
volatile, because they can be affected by near-term
things and doesn't take a program picture into effect.
But it's a data point."
Joe Nadol (JP Morgan):
"So you characterize the issues you're facing more as just
raw material inflation rather than getting the stuff in the
door."
James Bell:
"Exactly. And for the quarter there was a big difference in
terms of delivered units which have a pricing impact."
Peter Jacobs (Wells Fargo):
"Good morning, gentlemen. James, could you just
highlight again specifically where you're seeing some of
the weight issues on the 787-A program and any kind of
additional color you can give there?"
Jim McNerney:
"No, I don't want to name names. But in general what we
have is the airplane is pretty much designed and as you
start laying out the components, there are weight
opportunities, and obviously the bigger the component,
the more generally the opportunity is. So we're trying to
attack those that have the highest payback and that we
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could do within the timeframe necessary to meet our
delivery dates and still meet all of our contractual
obligations, and so that's the focus."
Gary Liebowitz (Wachovia Securities):
"I am going to kick the R&D dead horse one more time.
Jim, in the beginning of the conference call you were
speaking that there were eight contingency plans, one of
which you had funded. Are you saying that there is
potentially seven more contingency plans to be
funded?"
Jim McNernev:
"What I meant by that was that we have around eight, last
time I reviewed it, contingency plans in place if we need
them. The R&D level that we are talking to you about
assumes we fund all of them and more. We've only
triggered funding, we've only needed to trigger funding
on one of them. I was trying to point out a specific with
regard to the conservative posture we have with our
R&D. So is that clear? In other words, if we fund them
all, we still won't be pressuring the number I gave
you."
Lynn Lunsford (The Wall Street Journal):
"Good morning. Just one little question and I think it's
more looking at nuance than anything else. Up until now
you have pretty well said that you expected entry into
service for the 787 to be mid-2008. I noticed in your
press release that in the graph where you talk about
that you just say during 2008. Does that mean you're
slipping that or is that just a word?"
Jim McNerney:
"Not at all. I mean that's wording. I believe it's August
'08. It has always been late August, early September has
always been the timing and still is the timing. That was
advertent, Lynn."
James Wallace (Seattle Newspaper):
"Yeah. Good morning, Jim. I had a question and in
previous interviews that Mike Bair has done with me and
others, he has mentioned 2% has been the overweight
issue, plus or minus something. Has the weight
increased recently or are you just trying to tackle the
same weight that he's been talking about?"
Jim McNerney:
"I think it's within the range of what he is talking about. I
don't know when you last talked to him, but I would say
the weight pressures have increased slightly, but also
the opportunities to reduce them have increased. So we're
working it, but it's within that range sort of low single-
digits."
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
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"Good morning a couple of things. I wondered, Jim, if you
could give us any idea of what the one contingency plan
that you have had to fund, what that was exactly?"
Jim McNerney:
"There will be some work that is going to be brought to
Seattle. That was going to be done by a couple of our
suppliers that is more efficiently done in Seattle, and so
we've made an adjustment there, and that's the one we
have triggered."
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
"Is it major work?"
Jim McNerney:
"Well, I don't know what you would categorize as major
work. I mean it is systems installation work, that is
systems that are going to be installed in the airplane."
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
"Thanks for letting me back in. I just wanted to go back to
one answer that Jim McNerney gave earlier. I was a little
surprised when you told Lynn Lunsford that the first
deliveries of the 87 would be in late August of '08,
because I certainly understood it was going to be
earlier that summer. One of the reasons for that was
the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese airlines that have
ordered the 87 wanted it for the Olympics. Isn't that going
to be too late if you're delivering it in late August? The
first one goes to Japan, not China.
Jim McNernev:
"Dominic, you're right. I may be confusing when we're
shipping an airplane to somebody versus when they are
implementing it. Our date for delivery to the Japanese
and Chinese airlines have changed. If I have confused
the date, I apologize. We'll reaffirm that with you. I am
not trying to signal any change at all."
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Transcri commenced major assembly of the first 787 airplanes, and
pt" we made strides in our technology development and
weight reduction programs. Looking ahead to 2007, our
key milestone targets include... flying of 787 engines on
their airplane test beds in the first quarter; arrival of major
assemblies in Everett, Washington, also during the first
quarter; final assembly of the 787 in Everett during the
second quarter; 787 rollout in July and first flight of
the 787 which is targeted for the end of August. These
areas represent the bulk of our R&D spending at this point,
and we're making progress on all fronts. On weight we
have identified a number of areas where we are taking
weight out of the airplane. We've redesigned numerous
parts and changed some materials. And we feel
confident we'll get where we need to be. To mitigate
schedule risk, we've continued to provide engineering and
manufacturing support to our partners, many of whom I
have personally visited over the last twelve months. We
continue to make good strides there as well. We continue
our process of robust contingency planning which
keeps us looking forward at risks we may encounter
and mitigation actions we may need to implement. We
have committed resources for these plans as we need
to, and retired plans no longer required. To help you
track our progress on the 787, we plan to update you at
least twice a quarter, once during our earnings call and
once by Mike Bair, our 787 program head during his
quarterly call with media and investors. So, while mindful
of the inherent challenges and risks that lie ahead on a
program like this, we are pleased nonetheless with the
progress we are making on the 787 and with the
airplane's performance, which we expect will exceed
the overall performance levels we committed to
customers when we launched. We continued to invest in
developmental programs like 787 and the 747-8, both of
which will be major growth programs for this
Company for a long time to come. While we improve
the value and performance of our business, we further
enhance the value we provide to shareholders by
increasing our dividend 17% and authorizing a new $3
billion share repurchase program. We see more potential
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to return capital to owners through share repurchase
and dividends as our financial performance improves.
You have heard me say that we are committed to
delivering financial results that match the quality of
our people and our technology with our momentum and
continued focus on growth and productivity we have a
great opportunity to do just that."
James Bell (The Boeing Company):
"Now turning to our segment guidance. BCA airplane
deliveries are forecast to grow to between 440 and 445
airplanes in 2007. Deliveries in 2008 are expected to be
approximately 515 to 520 airplanes, driven by higher
production rates and the introduction of the 787
Dreamliners. Looking further out, we expect airplane
deliveries in 2009 to be higher than those in 2008.
Commercial Airplane revenue guidance for 2007 is
between $32.5 and $33 billion. And it's expected to grow
to between $39 and $40 billion in 2008. We expect 2007
operating margins for Commercial Airplanes to be
above 10%, reflecting higher deliveries and continued
productivity. For 2008 we expect BCA margins will
continue to expand to approximately I 1%. Now, in terms
of airplane orders, we expect the strong demand for our
products will keep our book-to-bill ratio above 1 for 2007,
resulting in a further increase in our backlog."
Jim McNernev:
"Thank you, James. Well, this is the second time I have
addressed you to discuss our year-end performance and the
road ahead. Last year I told you we had embarked on a
new course based on a new management model,
dedicated to the simultaneous pursuit, growth and
productivity and founded on the principles of
leadership development. Our results show we are
making very good progress on this new course. I also
told you last year we moved to put some of the ethics
and business problems from our past, put them behind
us, and we have succeeded there as well. I personally
believe that we will look back on 2006 and see it as a
pivotal year in the history of the Boeing Company. We
will heighten our focus on growth in productivity. We
will expand our leadership development, and we will
redouble our efforts to meet commitments while living
the Boeing values. We want to remain the world's
strongest, best integrated aerospace company, and we
want to make sure our stakeholders see us that way,
too."
Doug Harned (Sanford Bernstein):
"On the 787, there have obviously have been a lot of
rumors out there particularly related to suppliers, and
when we were back in the last quarter you talked about the
eight contingency plans, and that you were working on
one of them at that time. Could you describe where you
are today? Are you exercising more of those contingency
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plans, and are you still on track for the 112 deliveries
that you have described for '08 and '09?"
Jim McNerney:
"This is Jim. I will answer the question, Doug. The answer
is the specific answer on the contingency plans is we had
outlined eight, I think we had said that we had activated
one, and we were prepared to activate the rest as we
needed them. The facts are, we sort of activated a
couple other ones, and they had to do with work generally
being done in different places or preparing for the
contingency of that happening, I guess is a better way of
saying it, and hiring some people and having them hot
ready to go in the event that that happens. It doesn't
involve much money, it doesn't involve that many people,
but it does anticipate worst case kind of scenarios for some
traveled work. We retired one of the contingency plans,
the interface control data, because we made better progress
on getting that systems level work done, and so we're
about where we thought we'd be. We sort of activated
half of them, and ready to go, and I think your second
question on the deliveries in '08 and '09 as we look at it
today, we feel comfortable with that anticipation."
Doug Harned -(Sanford Bernstein):
"And when you talk about the contingency plans and some
of the challenges here, do you see them more in the
structures area, the systems or are they more general
weight reduction type issues?"
Jim McNerney:
"The weight reduction program is a major program that we
kicked off in the second half of last year. We're making
very good progress on that. That is a core engineering
activity, and that we turned the gain up on as the plane,
like all planes, started to come in a little heavy. I am
feeling pretty comfortable about the progress on that
weight reduction program and getting the plane down to
where we need to be to meet the commitments to our
customers, so I feel good there. I think the kinds of things
I am talking about with contingency plans are having
stand-by capability to make some tubes, clips and brackets
in the state of Washington in case they don't show up in
some of the components that have been stuffed before they
get there. I mean, it is things like that that I am talking
about. The weight reduction thing is a major effort, and I
am feeling good about the progress there."
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen and Company):
"Thank you. Like to follow up on Heidi's question. Even
if the 787 were at 0 profit given you're going to be down
150 to 200 bips in R&D, and also you're going to get a
positive swing in pension, it looks like your margin
before R&D is down, is that pricing? Is it
conservatism? What is it, because basically the
numbers don't add up."
James Bell:
"We're conservative, Cai."
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen and Companv):
"Okay. Thank you."
James Bell:
"You got me."
Howard Rubel (Jefferies & Company):
"The dilemma that you sort of talked about, Jim, is that
things are so good, how do you make them better, might
very well be characterized with one of your challenges,
and one of them is that your backlog stretches so far that,
how do you keep your sales force motivated to continue to
sell airplanes? And are -- have we -- if we look at what we
see in the way of rate schedules, there have to be at least
one or maybe two more rate increases planned beyond
what you've announced. Is that fair?"
Jim McNerney:
"I think we have to get a little more visibility longer term
before we consider -- we just raised -- we are just getting
there now, and listen. I don't want to argue with you,
because your big point is right which is that with this kind
of demand we are always looking at rate increases, but we
always want to do them prudently, so because as you
know, companies like ours get in trouble when they
chase rate without the proper supply chain
management. And so you're going to see us raise rates
prudently, and I think the -- I think our sales force, by the
way, they have a lot to do out there as they work with
airlines and work with other customers and the
infrastructure that supports them to make sure we get the
current technology that's moving out installed properly and
supported properly, and they're not taking Wednesdays
off."
Joseph Campbell (Lehman Brothers):
"Good morning. I wanted to ask again about production
rates. You were careful in 2006 to make sure that you
raised the production rates. I can't remember your exact
phrase, but it had to do with profitably ramping up rather
than just ramping up, and you had a strike and gave us
rather conservative numbers about the time it would take
to you get whole, and you've now raised the production
rates in '03 for the existing products. You've given us a
range, something like 3 a month '08 over '07, and I
wondered whether we should look at the '08 rates which
you've talked about as being limited still by your ability to
ramp up as they were in '06, and I presume in '07 as well,
or whether you now have got your production rates as
what you think are prudent given the level of demand that
you see out there. Thanks very much."
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Jim McNerney:
"Yes. I think the short answer to your question is that we
see a good fit between demand and our rates in '08. Could
we sell another airplane or two if we scrambled to ramp up
another few airplanes in the year? Maybe. Is it worth the
risk? Absolutely not. I think we've got clear visibility on
how to raise the rates to the level that we're talking about
in '08. By the way, to do that we had to start working with
many of our suppliers a year ago. I mean this is a long-
cycle activity, and as a result, to chase speculative
demand with rate is not the way to run this business.
We got a good match in '08. We're in good shape."
Lynn Lunsford (Wall Street Journal):
"I am trying to -- this is sort of a larger philosophical kind
of question, but over the last several weeks the Boeing
stock has been pretty volatile, and it seems like --
several days ago whenever one of the analysts came out
and declared the top of the order peak that is started
going down. I guess the question is, is by focusing on
book-to-bill and the order peak, are people keeping
their eye on the wrong ball? Is there something else
that investors should look at when watching how
Boeing performs?"
Jim McNernev:
"Well, I think, obviously, book-to-bill is a factor to
consider when you're looking at any company, but I
think when you're looking at a backlog the size and the
diversity and the balance that we've got across the
Company, the backlog is many, many multiples of the
yearly revenue of our Company. I think looking at the
backlog and our progress on executing against it, when it
is as big as it is, is probably a better measure of-- in terms
of visibility that you want to project, particularly when
you've got a -- the biggest part of the backlog, Commercial
Airplanes, with a cycle that doesn't look like it is slowing
down right now. We talked about the legacy carriers in
'07 and '08 getting back into the game, and so I think you
add it all up, and I think I would pay a little more
attention to the backlog right now than book-to-bill. If
the backlog were a lot smaller, I think book-to-bill
would be a more relevant -- something you would
worry about a little bit more."
Lynn Lunsford (Wall Street Journal):
"You said also that one of the key things with this ramp-up
is, can you raise your rates and maintain increasing
profitability. Are you pleased with where that's going
so far?"
Jim McNernev:
"Yes. The short answer is yes, I am pleased with where
that's going so far. We have had a number of rate
increases, and there is some here in the planning period
that we have discussed, and I think Scott Carson and Jim
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Jamison and the team there are bound and determined
to do this in a disciplined way, and I am certainly
philosophically aligned with that. And so the steady
increase in margin expansion that you're seeing
combined with the on-time delivery of our planned rate
increases with suppliers who are committed to working
with us, is working so far, and we're just going to keep
doing it that way."
Dominic Gates (Seattle Weekly):
"I would like to go back to the 787 supply chain and the
various glitches there. Two parts. You said three or four
partners are having some difficulties. Are those all
structures people or are the systems partners working and
are you having to help any of them out as well. And then
second part, with regard to the structures work that
traveled from Japan to South Carolina, could you talk
about how that, the new business model for the 787 may,
perhaps, be creating a much more complicated
situation than in the past. Where if work had traveled
Boeing would just have done it in Everett. Now you've
got global aeronatica having to cope with work traveling
to them, and so are they asking for more money as a result,
and are you in effect having to renegotiate contracts with
the Japanese and global aeronatica as a result of work
traveling that way?"
Jim McNerney:
"Your first question, Dominique, the three or four partners
we've been working with over the last few months have --
it has centered on the structures side of the business as
we're trying to share learning across all of them and us to
make sure we get it right, and there has been a lot of
cooperation going there. As to the traveled work
question, I see it a little differently. I think because the
fundamental work is spread out a little bit, because
there is an interim step in South Carolina on the way to
Seattle, there is a little more flex in the system to
handle traveled work, quite frankly, than in the days
where everything showed up in Washington and there
was a huge geographically centered "Oh my God" that
where the number of people and the amount of work
all came together at one time, and there is a little more
opportunity the way we're doing it now to handle it
within a more flexible environment. As to the last part
of your question, as you know, many of the contracts --
most of the contracts with our supplier partners do leave
room for accommodation when more or less work happens
than was anticipated, and there are often times robust
discussions with our -- and this has happened in every
airplane program we've ever had, robust discussions with
these partners as to price and the amount of the end result
of the financial accommodation, and, yes, we're having
those discussions, and occasionally they last more than a
minute."
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Feb. s Week, er & one thing: mass layoffs. So it comes as quite a surprise spun-off
2007 "Soarin ( that, after buying Boeing Co.'s Wichita aircraft plant, the "integra
g Where Toronto private investment firm Onex Corp. kept on most I"
Boeing of the 4,000 employees. Of course, the Machinists union division
Struggle wasn't happy that more than 800 people lost their jobs. But of a
d: How the new owners helped ease the pain by giving the modular
Spin-off remaining workers $246 million in cash and stock options. enterpri
Spirit The money was a reward for helping the company, now se
Aerosys named Spirit AeroSystems, cut costs and pull off a architec
tems successful initial public offering. 'I can't tell you what a ture,
Built a thrill it is to give our organized workforce nearly $250 becomi
new million,' says Seth M. Mersky, an Onex managing ng more
Model director. The comity between Spirit management and integral.
for the International Association of Machinist &
Worker- Aerospace Workers is partly a sign of the times. The
Manage commercial plane business is booming, which is why
ment Spirit expects to post a 2007 profit of $260 million on
Coopera projected revenues of $4.1 billion, up from about $3.2
tion" billion in 2006. That won't last forever. But for now the
(Stanley unusual deal is being widely praised as a promising
Holmes new labor model. No one is more bullish than the man
) who helped put it all together, former Democratic
House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt of
Missouri. 'It is what we are going to have to do in a lot
of our industries to be globally competitive,' says
Gephardt, who is a consultant with Goldman, Sachs & Co.
'It aligns [workers] with the company and gives them a
fair reward for their contribution.' This improbable
story began several years ago, when Boeing, in a bid to
shed weak assets and outsource more of its
manufacturing work, decided to sell its uncompetitive
Wichita plant. Although it was Boeing's biggest internal
supplier, cranking out fuselages and nose cones, it suffered
from inflexible work rules, high wages, and testy labor
relations. Enter Mersky and fellow Onex Managing
Director Nigel S. Wright. Where Boeing executives saw
lemons, the two turnaround specialists saw lemonade.
They reasoned that if they could cut costs, make the plant
more productive, and start working for Airbus, defense
contractors, and regional jetmakers, the Wichita plant
could become profitable. But first Onex had to get costs
under control. The firm saved $40 million annually by
slashing corporate overhead costs inherited from
Boeing. It negotiated price reductions from Spirit's
suppliers and simplified the procurement process. It
managed to reduce the complexity of work rules,
reducing 160 job classifications to 13. Finally, it asked
the unions for a 10% wage cut to better reflect the
prevailing wages in the area and told them it would reduce
the workforce by 15%.
SHARING THE PAIN
Onex, which sought the union's support, lost the first vote
with the Machinists. Many workers came from third- and
fourth-generation Boeing families and wanted to stay with
the giant. 'It was tough on people,' said Ron Eldridge, the
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Machinists' aerospace coordinator for Wichita. 'It was like
an ugly divorce.' The managing directors approached R.
Thomas Buffenbarger, international president of the union.
'They asked: 'What's it going to take?" Buffenbarger
recalls. 'I said, 'If you want to share some of the pain,
then give us a stake in the enterprise.' They warmed to
it quickly.' A new deal was negotiated: For the wage and
job cuts, Onex offered union members a 10% equity stake
in an eventual IPO. The new owners sketched out a
scenario where workers could earn some $30,000 in stock
and cash over five years as long as the IPO was successful.
Now, 18 months later, the bargain has exceeded
everyone's wildest dreams. An IPO on Nov. 21 raised $1.4
billion. Each Machinist is about to receive $61,440 in cash
and stock. Given Boeing's backlog of orders, plus a surge
of defense-related spending, analysts figure Spirit's stock
will do well in the next few years. That should buy the
company goodwill for when the industry hits the
skids."
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Mar. Forbes. Arnaul Shareh I3 "Lagardere recently reported a 57% drop in 2006 profit, On
14, comrn d olders due largely to the poor performance of its 7.5% stake in "patient
2007 (Parmy Lagard EADS. Chief executive Arnauld Lagardere, who also co- capital"
Olson) &re, chairs EADS, also ruled out the sale of the company's in an
Co- stake in EADS when announcing his annual results. 'I will integrat
chair play my role and I want to carry on being part o ed
of EADS's growth,' he told Le Monde. He added that he enterpri
EADS saw no need for a capital increase at EADS, presumably in se
lieu of politicians who wish to take a bigger role in Airbus. architec
So concerned was Lagardere about EADS' future that ture.
he vowed to return any upcoming dividend back to the
company. 'The Airbus situation has affected everyone,
the employees above all, but also the shareholders and
notably the small investors who have suffered from the
drop in shares,' he said. "
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Compan CFO, While we make progress on our financial goals and grow al
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2007 Boeing our major development programs, including the 787 ance
Earning Compa Dreamliner. Scott Carson and Mike Bair gave you a
s Call ny detailed 787 update last month, and as you've seen as soon
Transcri as yesterday with the Virgin and Air Canada
pt" announcements, demand for the Dreamliner continues
unabated. We are also making progress toward our
development milestones for this year and next. Let's
review just a few of those. During the first quarter, we
surpassed 500 orders for the Dreamliner, which is an
unprecedented achievement by the BCA team. We now
have 544 firm orders from 44 customers, which is the
highest tally ever achieved by a commercial jet program
within three years of its launch. We are now in the process
of bringing the 787 to life. Major structural elements of the
first airplane are being assembled, and in some areas we
are already working parts and assemblies for airplane
#5. Fuselage sections from Japan, Italy, South
Carolina, and Wichita, are coming along well, as is the
wing box from NHI. Second special 747 Freighter or
Dreamlifter has taken its first flight and delivered its first
components. And we have a third Dreamlifter at the Mod
Center and a fourth one heading there. Our engine
partners are making good progress on their flying test
beds. And work on the systems side is moving ahead as we
enter integration testing of these major elements. In
Everett, the upgrade of the final assembly day is going
well and we have started receiving components there. The
horizontal stabilizer arrived just very recently and other
major components will be arriving in the next few weeks.
We will rollout the first 787 out of our Everett factory
on July 8th, an event we will webcast so all of you can
see the airplane. As you know, we are targeting a first
flight in late August, which will kick off our flight test
program. We will remain on-track for first delivery to
ANA in May of 2008. As we have said before, we are
working late, scheduled, and supplier challenges, as we
strive to meet our milestones. These areas represent the
bulk of our R&D spending at this point and we are making
strides in each area. We are moving into the very critical
final assembly and systems integration phases of our
program, and as you can imagine the entire 787 team is
working very hard to achieve our milestones. So, mindful
of the inherent challenges and risks that lie ahead,
particularly in the latter stages of major airplane
development programs, we are nonetheless pleased with
the progress we are making on the 787. We are also
pleased with the airplane's performance, which we
expect will exceed the overall performance levels we
committed to customers when we launched this
program. We will continue to update you on the 787 as
we move through our key milestones.
So, let me wrap up my opening comments by saying that
we have reaffirmed our financial guidance for 2007
and 2008. Our record backlog, increasing productivity
and the progress of our development programs have us on
track to achieve our growth and productivity objectives."
James Bell (Boeing):
"R&D spending for the quarter was on track at $788
million. We expect BCA's R&D to begin declining in
the second half of this year which along with
productivity improvements will drive margin expansion
consistent with our guidance. Program margins
exceeded unit margins this quarter due to new
customer introduction costs and pricing mix that
reflects airplanes sold two to three years ago in a
tougher pricing environment. We captured 109 gross
orders in the first quarter which lifted BCA's backlog to
another record of $188 billion which is 6 times current
BCA revenues. Now Jim has already talked about the
tremendous success of the 787 as enjoyed in the market
and the progress we are making in its development.
We continued our balance cash deployment strategy as we
invested in organic growth programs, repurchased 4
million shares for $360 million, and contribute to our
pension plans, as well as, paying a 17% higher
dividend to shareholders."
Jim McNerney:
Thank you, James. You can see from the outlook James
just discussed, that we have some ambitious goals for
this year and next. We are confident we can meet those
goals. Our businesses are executing well, and all of us
are focused on executing even better. We are in
healthy markets pursuing prudent growth strategies and
seeking to boost productivity in each of our factories and
our offices. Meeting the financial commitments we make
to you is as important as meeting the performance
commitments we make to our customers. We are
determined to deliver on both. We want to remain the
world's strongest, best integrated aerospace company."
Byron Callan (Prudential Equitv Grouip:
"Jim, you have been at the helm for almost two years. I am
just curious where do you think you have made the most
progress with things you want to change at Boeing. What
are you most keenly focused on today? And are there areas
you are disappointed with or frustrated with that you
think the company can do better at? Thanks."
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Jim McNerney:
"Yeah, sure. Listen this was certainly not a broken
company when I took the helm a couple of years ago. It
was a company that was doing a lot of things right and had
some good strategies in both its businesses. I think though
we are emerging from era of management turmoil, some
uncertainty with regard to priorities and I thought, just to
use a term, some of the software the company needed
addressing in terms of leadership development,
management needed to be infused with a little more
accountability in some cases. So, it was more around
the leadership. A refocus helped the company regain its
confidence in itself, because the strategies were good and
the products were by and large good, also focused a lot
more on international I would say and some of that effort
is beginning to bear fruit."
Byron Callan (Prudential Equitv Group):
"Okay. And areas that you think you could still do better
out here?"
Jim McNerney:
"Well, I don't want to give the bullish answer which is
there is nothing we can do better, because there is a lot of
things we can do better. But I think with $260 billion plus
backlog, the issue is obviously around execution, because
the markets and our customers are accepting our
technology, and the backlog represents to all of us at
Boeing, both a huge opportunity and a big burden to get it
done properly. And so we are focused on a lot of things
that you don't see, which have to do with new ounces of
making sure priorities are right, making sure people
are aligned and accountable, making sure that we have
balanced work across the enterprise and make sure
that people feel like they are growing and are excited
about what they are doing. Those are the kinds of things
we are focused on now."
Howard Rubel (Jefferies & Company):
"Thank you very much. I want to kind of go from the
broad to a little bit more narrow, two things are sort of
notable, one is that if you exclude the Research and
Development spending from your operating profits, it
looks like you are about 19.8% versus 17.5% year ago
Jim. And that would sort of indicate to me that there is
some real change in the way you are addressing
productivity and profitability, where do you take up
from here, and as we look out this could imply maybe as
much as 15% operating margins in commercial, is that
a fair way to think about it?"
James Bell:
"Well, first of all Howard your math is impeccable. Yes,
it's not bad at all. And I think you are seeing the fact
that we really are starting to harvest a lot of benefit not
only from lean but our other productivity initiatives
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that we implemented a year ago, and we would expect
there is more opportunity as we get the volume from our
higher production rates and the lower order traffic. And as
Jim mentioned earlier, as we have the opportunity to
convert this record level backlog and convert that to value.
So, we will continue to be working that to see how we get
these pre-R&D margins up."
Jim McNernev:
"And I think you said it James, I think we are going to
continue to face into a competitive environment though,
every dollar of improvement that we get may not flow to
the bottom line because we have customers that need to be
productive, and we have competitors that aren't going
to sit still and let us take easily as much of the market
forever as we are taking now. So, how that exactly gets
expressed in terms of progress towards a 15% operating
margin or whatever target will sort of unfold, but we are
determined to be ready to make any necessary competitive
responses, any kinds of investments we need to making
customers and grow our margins as we move along."
Steve Binder (Bear Stearns):
"Just wanted to follow-up on Howard's question, because
James you touched on a difference between unit and
program in your introductory comments and you did
touch on pricing on the unit costs so I bet it's reflecting
deliveries at a less favorable pricing and you changing
your program method. So, I am just wondering the reason
for that increase in the pre-R&D margin to 19.8 from the
low 18% range in the fourth quarter of '06. is that really
just cost system or visions or is it also reflecting a better
pricing environment that's built in to your blocks?"
James Bell:
"It's both I would tell you its productivity and better
pricing going forward. The planes which you are seeing in
the unit margins and the impact of that is two or three
years ago we really were faced with a much more
competitive pricing environment and also a phase we are
trying to have pricing that bridge us to new market
particularly for the 747-8 and then also we saw a more
robust market in this time period for the 777 two or three
years ago and we needed to make sure we got there along
with the single arm. So, I think you are seeing a
combination of both the better pricing as it stabilizes
today and then also our productivity efforts."
Heidi Wood (Morfan Stanlevy):
"James and Jim, I want to also hark on the margin outlook
for commercial and make sure I have got through the right
puzzle pieces as we think this is true. If you look at our
guidance in '07 versus '08, you are talking about 20%
uptick in volume and over 13% decline in overall R&D,
which means that commercial R&D is going down more,
and yet only a 10% increase in BCA margins year-over-
.................
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year. So, again just what are some of the key assumptions
that would help offset that mix of productivity and mix in
R&D tailwind?"
James Bell:
"Are you talking going forward, Heidi?"
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"Yeah, I am just trying to think what keeps us from
thinking about 15% margins by 2010."
James Bell:
"Well, principally, what's going to keep us from that by
2010 is the fact that we are going to have dilution from
the 787 margins. Obviously, it's the beginning of a new
program, and although it will start out more probable
than any new program, any new product introduced at
least in our history. It will still dilute the margins that
we experienced on our mature programs. And so
clearly to the 2010 timeframe that's going to have an
impact particularly since we expect to deliver over 100
airplanes in the first two years and then that will grow
in the third year."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"And that more than overpowers the increase in volume
and decrease in R&D?"
James Bell:
"I won't say that it more than overpower. I am just saying
to you that we are going to have that dilutive impact and
we will have to wait and see as we get closer if we are able
to get more productivity as we ramp up on the 87 because
that dilution is real. And remember just what we have
been talking about 18% or 19% in these years for our
pre-R&D margins on our mature program. Obviously,
it's going to take us some time to get to that same level
on the 787."
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen & Conmany):
"Yes, thanks a lot. If I go back to the commercial margin
issue, your R&D commercial was 10.4% of sales. Even if
you come in at the absolute tippy-top of your R&D
estimate $3.4 billion, I mean it's got to be down at least
$200 million to $250 million and unless a program
accounting margin pre-R&D go down from that 19.8%,
it's kind of hard for me to see how the margins for the
year won't be above 11%?"
Jim McNerney:
"Well, I think I got your question there Cai. Look, I think
is there opportunity to expand our margins? Yes. Are there
other things we are wrestling with to make sure they are
put in the box before we revise anything? Yes. But the
opportunity to continue to improve our margins in BCA
certainly lies in front of us and the head set of ScottI I I I
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Carson and his team supported by me and James is to do
just that."
James Bell:
"And Cai we do feel comfortable. We will hit our
guidance at greater than 10."
Robert Stallard (Banc of America Securities):
"But these are very distance dates, is that leaving to
airlines encouraging you to raise rates how aggressively
than you would like?"
Jim McNerney:
"Yes. We have been encouraged to raise rates. But I
have a fundamental belief, which is that the best
customer service is to deliver on your promises. And so
to raise rates and then later not be able to deliver
because the supply chain was not with you and the
planning was not done properly is a lesson that this
industry teaches itself every decade or so, and I am
bound and determined not to learn that lesson that way
while in this job. So, we want to raise rates because our
customers do need the airplane, and we as you noticed
were raising rates and we are doing it prudently and
we are going to keep looking at raising rates because
we do want to satisfy these customers. But it will be
done when we can do them."
Robert Toomey (ElK. Riley Investments):
"There has been a lot of news lately about China entering
the commercial jet market, and I am wondering if you
could make some comment on your observations on what
China maybe doing here in the near-term, I guess, in your
industry in the next five years? And then also if you could
make a comment on your assessment of the airline, on
behalf of your major customer, the airline industry? Thank
you."
Jim McNernev:
"Yes, I think there is no doubt that the Chinese will be
someday in the commercial airplane business. There is lots
of speculation on how long it will take them. It will
probably take them a considerable period of time to get
there, but they have a large internal market. They have
technical capability, and they have the resources to do it.
So, I think whether its 10-years or 20-years, I think, we
will see somebody probably in the narrow-body segment
from China competing there. Listen, it is a huge market for
us, we have many partnerships over there. I am one of
these people who believes that partnering with people
who are potentially competitors is not necessarily a bad
thing. So I think we will have a headset of both competing
with them and partnering locally because we benefit from
it as a company, it strengthens our company. And they
will find us the top competitors and they would expect to.
It's close to what's probably a 10% to 12% of our sales
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over the last few years had been in China that will
moderate a bit as other parts of the world get back in the
game, but they will continue to be major customers, and
they have shown preference for our products, and we
continue to think they will, for a pretty long period of
time."
Stanley Homes (Business Week):
"Hey, I wanted to just ask you, or actually follow-up on
the contingency funds that you set aside for the 787?
Could you just wanted you to let us know how many again
you have triggered and have you triggered anymore since
the last time you talked about those funds and using them,
setting aside those funds for some of the production
issue?"
Jim McNerney:
"I think we are at roughly the same place we were the last
time we chatted with you. I mean we have got contingency
efforts in place for wiring, for tubes, for traveled work,
other forms of traveled work. These break down into three
teams, that we hope won't have a lot of work to do. But if
they need to, they are ready to go. And we are training
them and standing them up, and as we re-planned some
work as pieces come into Charleston and then to Seattle
and these guys will be ready to go. And I am always
asking the question, so as Scott, are these teams ready?
Are there enough of them in our worst case scenario?
And we feel very comfortable with where we are. So,
the specific answer to your question is, there is three teams
ready to go. We have retired one team actually, that was
whether we got in place to make sure we had any extra
composite work that needed to move around. But it turn
out, we didn't need that. All the partners did their
composite work that they promised they could do. So, that
team is sort of gone mute."
Stanley Homes (Business Week):
"Okay. So, you have retired a composite team and then
you have three teams that are for wiring, tubes and
traveled work. Those are the ones that are still sort of
setup, ready to go if you need them?"
Jim McNerney:
"Yeah, wiring and then the tubes, clips, brackets, those
kinds of thing."
Stanley Homes (Business Week):
"Alright, okay, yeah."
Jim McNerney:
"And then some other traveled work that we would have to
plan and that, as you know, when these kinds of things,
Stanley, those teams would need to be in place for their
first, usually 20 airplanes or so, just as it winds down
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and all the work settles in and where it's going to be."
Stanley Homes (Business Week):
"And then finally how are the Italians doing? And why
were they little slower than some of the others? What were
their issues? And I am assuming that they're pretty much
on track, is that correct?"
Jim McNernev:
"Yeah, I think in a word they're doing better. I think the
transition from prototype to production was not easy for
any of our partners, and it may have taken them a little
longer, but they are now flowing with the work, and so we
are feeling better about it. Still challenges in front of us,
still Boeing people working with them, but I would say we
are feeling incrementally better there."
Lynn Lunsford (Wall Street Journal):
"This is kind of a follow-up on that, is looking at the 787
program clearly there is a whole bunch of folks who
are sitting on the sideline and waiting for Boeing to
stand up and say oops! and so far you keep reiterating
that you are on track and on schedule. What is probably
the single biggest challenge that you still have to meet? Is
it making sure that all of the systems come together, and
where if you just have to kind of handicap your biggest
hurdle yet, what would it be?"
Jim McNerney:
"Well, I think, obviously the system's integration at this
stage in a program becomes very important and things can
happen that require re-work, re-looping work, and that
represents in our norm. So far that's going well, but it
represents a risk. I think when you add it all up Lynn,
whether the airplane flies at or around the time that our
milestone says it should, will be the time when everything
comes together. And if we hit that milestone on or within a
reasonable time around our target there and EIS is now
threatened, then I think you could look at that and say we
are in good shape. Now, the next risk is what you would
find out in flight test, and there could be some unknowns
there as well. But as we sit here today we think it's
going to come together, and we think we will be flying."
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CEO, someone's just going to take it away from you. Who are t's view
Contin the big losers? The employees lost the most with pensions on labor
ental and incomes. Well, don't let that happen again! The guy relation
Airline that overeats is the one that dies. Where there's a s
s management that says, 'Fine. We have to sign this
contract, that we know that if we do will put us at a very
non-competitive situation and will ultimately kill us'.
Don't sign it! 'If we don't sing it they're going to strike
and take the company out.' Well, take it! Shit, you're
going broke anyway! It might as well be them that
cause it and not you. How do you pull a band-aid off? If
you do it fast, do it quick. On hair at a time or get that
goddamn thing off- it's got to come off. Get it over with.
United, Delta; Northwest, and others were a victim of
compromise - another layer of fat, another deal they
shouldn't have signed, another concession."
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Think about it in two ways -- it will be profitable from
the first airplane, which is something that is different
than what we have experienced in the past, but on the
same token, it will not be as --
Joe Campbell:
You are saying it will be profitable on a unit cost basis
from the beginning?
James A. Bell:
I think it will be profitable on a program accounting
basis and it may also be slightly profitable on a unit
basis. We'll have to take a look at that but clearly it will be
dilutive to the mature margins we experienced on the
777 and the 737 today. So I think the way you think about
it is it is going to contribute but it is going to contribute
at a much lower margin rate than our other airplanes."
"We will decide when we are ready. Announcements will
only be made when Airbus has arrived - together with the
potential partners - at concrete terms and conditions for a
promising long-term partnership."
CNN
Money.c
om
On
Airbus'
picking
investor
compan
ies to
buy
some of
its
internal
manufa
cturing
facilitie
S.
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Boeing'
s
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off its
internal
Wichita
division
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24 Thomso Jim Firm- a "David E. Strauss (UBS Securities): On a
Oct. n McNer Investo Could you just address profitability on an initial batch of modular
2007 Reuters ney, r 787, I think in the past you talked about from a Enterpri
Researc Chari program accounting standpoint you expected it to be se
h, man possible. I think from a unit accounting standpoint you Archite
excerpt and also said it would be profitable. With the delay cture's
from CEO; obviously we are seeing the schedule with some of the defense
"The James penalty payments and I am note sure if you are of its
Boeing Bell, capitalizing any other cost, could you just address what fminanaic
Compan CFO, you are looking as far or thinking about in terms of al
y, Q3 The profitability on the initial batch? perform
2007 Boeing ance
Earning Compa James A. Bell (Boeing):
s Call ny We still think the initial units will be profitable. We
Transcri haven't gone through and completed our analysis yet on
pt" what the accounting quantity side will be and are they
still working all the cost estimates and then obviously we
have a pretty good feel on pricing because we have sold
so many of the airplanes but we haven't concluded
those... that analysis yet we are working through our
auditors and we will meet quite frankly, but we do know
and still feel that those initial units will be profitable,
but they will be diluted from a margin standpoint to our
marked mature material programs.
Beniamin Fidler (Deutsche Bank):
Question if I could, just to clarify a bit more on the 787.
Just in terms of how far through the supply
renegotiations and the discussions with your airline
customers you now are on the 787 and when you expect
to fully complete those?
James A. Bell (Boeing):
Well obviously we're on the supply chain as Jim
mentioned, the discussions around any changes associated
with the slide, any changes in statement of work
associated with the development program are pretty
mature and we believe we have the... what the ultimate
settlement position on that already taking care of both
in our R&D guidance, where would be the R&D
related and then our assumptions for booking rate on
the program of accounting the assumptions. So that
when we start to delivering in the next year, that is
already included."
29 Reuters, Firm- a "Boeing Co. said on Monday it would buy up to $7 billion On a
Oct. "Boeing Investo of its own stock, one of the planemaker's largest modular
2007 Sets $7 rs repurchase plans on record, but kept its cash dividend EA's
billion unchanged. The announcement comes amid a three- investm
Share month slide in Boeing shares, which have lost about 10 ent
Buybac percent of their value after hitting an all-time high in July, strategy
k" (Bill as production problems have delayed the company's new
.................. ................
*r r I
787 Dreamliner.
Boeing's shares added to gains shortly after the
announcement, and closed up 97 cents at $96.99 in
afternoon trading on the New York Stock Exchange.
The plan allows the repurchase of about 9 percent of
Boeing's outstanding shares at current prices. Boeing's
biggest plan on record authorized the repurchase of about
15% of outstanding shares in 1998, the year after it took
over rival McDonnell Douglas Corp. Boeing suspended
stock buybacks after the attacks of September I I and
resumed only in 2004. Since then, it has bought about $8
billion of its own stock. Its last repurchase authorization,
which is nearing completion, was for $3 billion worth of
stock, set in August 2006. The new authorization has no
specified time limit.
'Our strong financial performance allows us to return
value to our shareholders while continuing to invest in
growth and becoming more productive,' said Boeing Chief
Executive Jim McNerney, in a statement. "We are
executing a balanced cash deployment strategy that's
serving Boeing and its shareholders well."'
1 The Jim Firm a "My father talked about leadership in MBA-level classes. On the
Nov. Boeing McNer It's a whole lot tougher to be a leader than afollower, my chief
Compan ney, father would tell his students, because the leader aims to architec
2007 y Chair do the impossible - or what others regard as impossible. t of a
website: man & But then he would go on to say: 'don't overestimate the modular
"2007 CEO opposition. If you have the will and courage to lead, you enterpri
Speeche of The will gain a lot of support along the way.' se
s - Boeing architec
Univers Compa Now, let me turn to another mentor - Jack Welch at GE. ture,
ity of ny There were striking similarities between him and my dad. using
Washin One was having the foresight to see the need for change integral
gton when almost no one else did. Another was having the rhetoric
Busines courage to lead. Now the point I want to stress here is with
s that Jack didn't just chart the course; he stayed the regards
School' course, when that made him an unpopular and even to
s hated figure. leadersh
Busines ip
s To 'set high expectations' through bullying, duplicitous
Leaders or retaliatory behavior... without knowing how to 'inspire
hip others'... is to fall fatally short of being a leader.
Banquet Similarly, to 'deliver results'... while compromising your
company or organization through close-to-the-line or
unethical behavior..,. is to poison the well from which
everyone in the organization drinks. It is the exact
opposite of real leadership in any kind of positive - or
even practical - sense.
Part of living the Boeing values and doing the right thing
is being absolutely honest and candid with others in
evaluating their work and providing feedback on a
regular basis - all constructively done. For many people,
this is sometimes the most difficult - and the most painful
Rigby)
.............-;;;;--- -----'-';~ " " ' -I
- part of the job of being a leader. If you rate the
majority of employees as 'above average,' you under-
value the work of those who ought to be recognized for
truly superior performance.
An open culture cannot work without reality-based
communication - honest and respectful conversation.
That is why the candid, constructive, one-on-one
discussion between a manager and his or her direct
reports is an essential element in developing people and
achieving strong performance within an open culture.
Done well, it is that interaction, more than anything else
that engages people's hearts and minds, that excites them
and moves them forward.
As we're thinking of it here, leadership might seem to
consist of a series of paradoxes. To be a leader, you have
to be.
* Both tough and inspirational
* Far-seeing and results-oriented
* Unsparingly honest and strongly supportive
Well, that's a little daunting, isn't it? Just how do you do
it all? You don't want to go to work every morning,
desperately thinking to yourself 'What do I need to do
today to be seen to be both tough and inspirational?' In
my view, that is the wrong mindset. You will wind up
being both tough and inspirational if you give yourself a
chance to grow into leadership... thinking of it less as a
form of play-acting during dramatic, life-and-death
moments, and more as an organic, continuing part of
what must be done to help an organization or team
proceed toward a shared goal. As we all intuitively know,
it is when you are working for the larger good of others
that the courage to lead decisively can be found within
yourself Nonetheless, pushing someone hard, even in
their own eventual self-interest, is not easy.
That brings me back to leadership development, which I
regard as the single most important part of my job. We
have metrics for assessing every one of our managers and
executives on how well they perform against the six
leadership attributes. It is well understood within Boeing
that a leader's job consists - in large part - in helping
others to discover their own capacity for improvement.
As my own father - and mentor - would have said: Aim
high. And don't overestimate the competition. If you
have the will and courage to lead, you will gain valuable
support along the way. I wish you well in your future
endeavors."
1 Seattle Mike Firm- a "Mike Bair, former 787 boss, gave a pretty blunt talk On a
Nov. Post- Bair, Suppli about 787 suppliers on Wednesday to a group in Everett. modular
2007 Intellige VPMar er I was unable to attend, but check out my report, though enterpri
ncer, keting late, on what he had to say. Some of the highlights: se
Lllli- --- - ------------- .......I ~ - -
"Mike & 'Some of these guys we won't use again," Bair said. He architec
Bair's Strateg did not name names. Did Bair mean to include Boeing's ture's
'Remar y, top-tier partners in the U.S., Italy and Japan that are relation
kable' Boeing responsible for manufacturing the composite wings and ship
Speech" Comm fuselage sections of the new jet? I put that question to with its
(James ercial Boeing on Thursday. 'The suppliers you name and some supplier
Wallace Airpla of their subtiers,' a Boeing spokewoman said when asked s
) nes to clarify Bair's comments. Was Bair's speech reviewed
and approved ahead of time by his immediate boss, Scott
Carson, or by anyone else at Boeing? Bair did not have a
prepared speech, the spokeswoman told me. One industry
analyst called Bair's speech 'remarkable.' 'It's
remarkable that Boeing is saying publicly that some of
their world partners are falling down on the job and
that Boeing made a mistake and that they will do it
differently the next time,' said Scott Hamilton of
Leeham.net. For Boeing's next all-new jet program
after the 787, Bair said, it would be better to have a
central manufacturing site rather than the global
assembly method that is being used for the 787. He said
Boeing would put pressure on its suppliers the next
time to locate in the same area. On the 787 program,
Boeing gave some of the design work to suppliers, in
addition to manufacturing responsibilities. Bair said some
of that design work had to be done by Boeing when
suppliers could not. 'Some of them proved incapable of
doing it,' he said"
Posted by unregistered user at 11/2/07 3:29 a.m.
"Hmm, Mike Bair and rest of the top management at
Boeing must have felt, that after the Sonic Cruiser
boondoggle, the 7E7 would have to constitute a
technological leap forward, if they were to remain an
equal contender at the forefront in the civilian airliner
business. I would guess that the mandrel molding
production method must have looked like a simple and
elegant method to them, and not the least; a 'hi-tech'
way in which to leapfrog Airbus; however rushed their
design might be. Currently, Boeing does carry a lot of
weight as an Original Equipment Manufacturer, and based
on its past performance credentials, the company
obviously has a lot of clout with their customers.
However, past performance is not necessarily indicative on
how a future program will perform; and especially not
when the OEM does not follow industrial best-practice
recommendations that suggest new products should use
existing processes and tools, the existing organization and
demonstrated technologies. Well, guess what, Boeing
didn't follow any of the industrial best-practice
recommendations. It appears that they threw a Hail
Mary pass to try to "win" the fierce fight for market
share in the LCA business in the second decade of the
millenium."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/2/07 12:26 D.m.
"Ok, talking Barrel Mismatch From the 'unofficial
- -- --- --- - - --- -
I I _ _
photos'... One barrel was clearly overflush by approx
0.25" at one point, at no other point on the diameter was it
underflush, therefore the diameter of one barrel was
approx 0.25" greater than the other. The real problem is
that the circumference is therefore 0.75" longeron one
barrel when it should be much closer, so when you start
bolting up you either need a lot of spacers to distribute the
gap around the fuselage (prohibitively expensive and work
intensive), you make 'proper' matching barrels, or you do
what Boeing have done, make up some special joining
pieces down one side and whack in a load of filler. There
is no easy fix to this problem! Commentators such as
Leelaw were correct pillory the rollout, it was a
complete joke! This was a Boeing interface slip up!"
Posted by unregistered user at 11/2/07 2:20 p.m.
"It is important that these companies do take risks. That is
the point, if they played it safe they would have an
updated 767, what good would that have done. Risk and
failure is how companies grow provided two things - The
failure is not so immense it takes them down, and two they
learn from it. If the 787 turns into a 2 year delay
boondoggle then it may approach that immense failure.
If Boeing actually manages their way out the maze and
actually deliver 100+ planes by 2009 then all will be
well and the risk and failure will permanently move the
bar to a higher level. If they deliver 6 airplanes by
April of 2009 then they will be in serious serious
trouble. So it is to early to call the risk an abject
failure. We will now get to see how well Boeing
Executives can really manage. It will be interesting to see
how they do compared to EADS when they ran into
trouble."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/2/07 8:58 p.m.
"Bair used to say we 'hired them for their ability to the
job'. What an incredible screening process. Bair said, it
would be better to have a central manufacturing site rather
than the global assembly method that is being used for the
787. No kiddin, I don't believe it. That is radical. Real
engineers can look at the 787 and see that it is an
aluminum plane made out of graphite. Revolutionary? he,
he. Boeing Senior Managers, take a good look in the
mirror and you'll see who's at fault."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/3/07 10:29 a.m.
"When are Bloeing due to give the next 787 program
update? I'm looking forward to hearing about misaligned
barrels, phantom fasteners, software code issues,
overweight aircraft, underperforming GE engines,
etc..."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/4/07 1:06 a.m.
"When the photos of the mismatch were leaked Boeing
were livid. For such photos to get out showed serious
breaches in security not to mention confidentialityI I .
~-- ---------------------------------------- - -- -~I
issues from employees. Boeing have now clamped
dowm as they were mortally embarrassed by both the
photos and by the leak itself. You will not see a 0.25"
gap from 120 feet. The mismatch problem still exists. I
reckon they will now have spacer panels moulded up that
go 360 degrees around the joint. What this will do for
fatigue on the bolts is anyones guess, and it will have
added much weight and cost. This is one relatively minor
issue, I'd love to see what else is going on. The program
is an utter mess."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/4/07 6:16 a.m.
787-8 Specifications 2006:
OEW 240k
MZFW 340k
Payload 100k
MTOW 480k
2007:
OEW 252.5k
MZFW 345k
Payload 100k
MTOW 484k
It has a comparable weight to the A330-200 now. A
slightly lower max payload and a lower MTOW."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/5/07 9:55 a.m.
"What is it with this guy Bair?????? I don't
understand ,usually when you get kicked out of a job
for not doing your job properly you don't go and
publically admit it too!!!!!!"
Posted by unregistered user at 11/5/07 11:47 a.m.
"Hey 1/4" gap guy, and Boeing is a stupid job outsourcing
guy, answer a question for me. If Boeing has screwed the
pooch so bad how come their stock is still up above $90
and EADS is below 25 and headed down?"
Posted by TriplePac at 11/5/07 12:34 p.m.
"Seriously though, as one who grew up in the culture of
one of the suppliers AND customers, he should should be
shot for such a public flogging of them regardless of the
problems. Maybe that's a little insight into his day to
day management style. Counterproductive American
arrogance in a global economy; period. For Boeing's
case, they need to get rid of him. Boeing seems to be
exhibiting an alarming level of leadership. Keep it up
& they'll be worrying about Mitsubishi instead of
Airbus."
Posted by unregistered user at 11/5/07 1:14 p.m.
"Counterproductive American arrogance: Apparently
creating the greatest economic engine the world has ever
known is counter productive. 'The transformation of
EADS requires substantial efforts across the group.
I I I I I
Airbus in particular, requires an overhaul of the
original industrial set-up, a behavioural evolution and
more modesty....' This little gem came from EADS own
website, so who is the arrogant ones?"
Posted by Leelaw at 11/5/07 10:33 p.m.
"However, I find the 'Great Satan' Aboulafia's assessment
of Mr. Bair's recents remarks in his November Newsletter
far more interesting:
... Boeing has done extremely well with global sourcing so
far. The 767 and 777 were hugely successful with exactly
this kind of global supply chain. The top-tier 787
suppliers that Bair criticized, by the way, are valued
partners or suppliers on these aircraft. And the 787 looks
set to be the successful culmination of these global
trends. Geography has never been a problem for Boeing.
Outsourcing (in the US and abroad) works great for the
company. The real problem is that this time they trusted,
but didn't verify. In their zeal to maximize profit and
spread much of the financial risk, they offloaded most of
the airframe responsibilities without the due diligence
needed to ensure that their partners could do the design
and integration work. Boeing's unrealistic 787 program
schedule didn't help either. Even if it was the partners
that screwed up, it was ultimately Boeing's mistake-the
buck stops at the prime contractor. The supersite idea,
by contrast, sounds completely dysfunctional. Imagine the
labor consequences. In good times, you'd see hellish wage
inflation for engineers and manufacturing workers, with
Boeing and its contractors all poaching employees from
each other. In bad times, you'd have a regional
employment slowdown that would create armies of
workers scrambling to Mexico for maquiladora jobs. A
jetliner "bust" cycle would cripple an entire region.
Requiring foreign partners to relocate work and jobs to
the US would eliminate Japanese, Italian or other
government financial support for new programs (to his
credit, Bair made this last point in his speech). You'd see
fewer bidders vying to work with Boeing on the next plane.
Of course, the prospect of a supersite does serve as a ploy
to attract the mother of all incentive packages from state
and local governments... "
Posted by unregistered user at 11/6/07 9:35 a.m.
"Bair should just shut up and be thankful he still has a job.
Stop threatning the State of Washington to provide more
tax incentive for Boeing to stay. How is this difference
from Airbus subsidy. Boeing executives have known for
a very long time that there be delay. No one was honest
enough to share that so innocent shareholders
purchased Boeing stocks thinking of rosie future is now
suffering. Could a class action law suit be far away?"
8 Forbes. Moody Firm- P "Moody's cites strong government support as a reason On
Nov. com 's Gover for a stable outlook for EADS' rating." EADS
2007 (AFX Investo nment rating
News rs being
Ltd.) Servic unaffect
e ed by
Airbus'
A400M
delivery
delays.
16 Seattle Firm- a "Within its bowels, The Boeing Company holds volumes On a
Nov. Post- Emplo of proprietary information deemed so valuable that the modular
2007 Intellige yee company has entire teams dedicated to making sure that enterpri
ncer, private information stay private. One such team, dubbed se
"Boeing "enterprise" investigators, has permission to read the architec
Bosses private e-mails of employees, follow them and collect ture's
Spy on video footage or photos of them. Investigators can also low-
Worker secretly watch employee computer screens in real time trust
s" and reproduce every keystroke a worker makes. One environ
(Andrea company source said some employees have raised internal ment.
James) inquiries about whether their rights were violated.
Sometimes, instead of going to court over a grievance
on an investigation, Boeing and the employee reach a
financial settlement. The settlement almost always
requires people involved to sign non-disclosure
agreements, the source said. Boeing desires to keep
investigation details under wraps.
Recently, a Boeing investigator told a Puget Sound-area
employee that he was followed off company property to
a lunch spot, that investigators had footage of min
'coming and going' and that investigators had accessed
his personal Gmail account. The primary reason for the
2007 investigation, the employee said, was Boeing's
suspicion that he had spoken with a member of the media.
He has since been fired. 'I wasn't surprised, but more
just disappointed in them, that instead of looking at the
problems, instead of investigating that, they
investigated the people that were complaining and got
rid of them,' said the employee, who had been an
auditor in the company's Office of Internal
Governance and asked that he no be named.
The problem, Ed Mierzwinski [consumer program
director at the federation of Public Interest Research
Groups] said, is when companies use the surveillance
tactics available to them to root out whistle-blowers.
26 Financi Jim Firm- a "After Boeing publically assured investors in September On a
Nov. al Week McNer Investo that production glitches wouldn't delay delivery of the Modula
2007 "Boeing ney, r first plane, Mr. McNerney revealed a few weeks later that r
Chair it would be six months late. 'I think the reason we will Enterpri
Boeing man & be able to meet the new timetable is the detailed bottom- se
...Gone CEO, up planning we've done to assure that we can make it.' Archite
? The cture's
Stumble Boeing 'McNerney has to deliver. This is strike two and you're relation
Could Compa out," said Noel Tichy, a professor of management and ship
Cost ny organizations at the University of Michigan who worked with its
CEO" with Mr. McNerney at GE and in a forthcoming book, investor
(John lauds his handling of the ethics scandals. s.
rrr---------~ II
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Slowing down production for several months may be 'the
next shoe to drop,' J.P. Morgan Chase analyst Joseph
Nadol predicted in a report earlier this month, 'which may
be perceived as negative by the market but in fact
could be the first step on the road to recovery.' Mr.
Nadol, one fo the first analysts to predict serious 787
production delays, remains neutral on the stock, which is
off 7.3% since the delivery delay was announced Oct. 10,
after rising 56.8% in the preceding 27 months of Mr.
McNerney's tenure.
'McNerney needs to exercise more hands-on control so
he's got the straight poop,' said Scott Hamiltion, an
airline consultant at Leeham Co. 'People simply don't
buy their spin.'
'The last thing they want to do is what Airbus did:
announce a six-month delay, then come back and delay
it even further,' said Paul Nisbet, an analyst at JSA
Research.
5 The Ralph Firm t3 "If Airbus were to go ahead, 'its tantamount to Toyota On an
Dec. Seattle Crosby entering the U.S. auto market' with U.S. factories. 'Its integral
2007 Times, , North Toyota all over again,' he [a person close Airbus] said. enterpri
"Airbus Ameri 'We become Americans."' se
Producti can architec
on May executi ture's
Move to ve of organic
U.S." Airbus geograp
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7 Wall Scott Firm a "Rejecting the idea that Boeing might be better off On a
Dec. Street Carson increasing production more slowly, Mr. Carson says, 'I modular
2007 Journal,, couldn't stand the pain of telling a customer it's going to enterpri
"Jet Preside be worse off for them, just to make my life easier.'" se
Blues: nt & architec
Boeing CEO, ture's
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12 Aviation Heidi Firm- a "One of the biggest Boeing bulls on Wall Street is On the
Dec. Week's Wood, Investo having second thoughts. Morgan Stanley research valuatio
2007 Things analyst rs analyst Heidi Wood lowered her rating on the n ofa
with , company's stock to 'equal-weight' -- the equivalent of modular
Wings, Morga neutral -- following a yearend briefing on the 787's status enterpri
"Falling n by the program's new general manager, Pat Shanahan. se
Out of Stanley Shanahan maintained the program's recovery plan is architec
I I I
Love
with
Boeing"
(Joe
Anselm
o)
on track to deliver the first 787 by the end of next year.
But Wood, in a research note issued Wednesday
morning (Dec. 12), says the hurdles ahead are just too
risky to tell her clients to keep buying Boeing stock.
'We have a new level of concern the 787 risks are likely
to linger over the stock and not be retired as we had
earlier believed,' she writes. 'For the time being the
risk/reward trade-off is no longer sufficient to warrant
a [buy] rating.'
I ture.
Wood's downgrade is a sharp departure from her tone
in October, when she said investors had over-
reacted by selling off Boeing stock after the 787's first
delivery was delayed at least six months because of
problems with suppliers. At that time, she
predicted Boeing shares 'could soar in the 50%
vicinity' over the long run. Boeing's stock is down about
12% since the 787 delivery slip was disclosed in
October. Wood believes another six-month delay in the
787 could send Boeing shares tumbling an additional 18-
20%. The stock 'is apt to trade on event risk versus
valuation until the 787 risk perception meaningfully
clears,' she writes. Conversely, if Boeing is able to hold
the 787 to its new schedule without any major problems,
the stock could rise 35% to $120 a share, Wood
predicts. She also remains bullish that the commercial
aerospace upcycle won't peak until 2011 or 2012."
20 The Jeff Suppli a "In the end, we just couldn't close a business case that met On
Dec. Wichita Turner er & both our customer requirements and our shareholder Spirit
2007 Eagle , CEO, t requirements." Aerosys
Spirit tem 's
Aerosy losing
stems bid for
Airbus
plants.
20 The Stefan Firm I "The three partners had better offers commercially and On
Dec. Wichita Schaffr technically, were more aggressive than Spirit in the last Spirit
2007 Eagle ath, round of negotiations. Politics had no influence." Aerosys
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Dec. The Robert Investo a "[Credit Suisse] praised Spirit management for not On
20, Wichita Spinga r overpaying for the plants, particularly given the difficult Spirit
2007 Eagle rn, long-term governmental and labor climate in Europe." Aerosys
Analys temrn's
t, losing
Credit bid for
Suisse Airbus
Group plants.
Dec. Seattle Scott a "Boeing picked world-class partners, but then failed to On
20, Post- Carson provide adequate insight about what was happening with Boeing'
2007 Intellige , CEO, those partners. 'We looked into them, but it was more s
ncer Boeing from the outside in,' Carson said. 'When I talk about "Large-
Comm insight, its about having enough knowledge, enough sense scale
ercial of what's going on in their factory on a daily basis to Systems
Airpla identify issues that may bite them... so you can help Integrati
nes clarify and resolve those kinds of challenges. I think we on"
came too late to realizing we needed that insight. When I strategy
look back at this thing, the lesson I carry away is you have on the
to manage the production process as viorously when it is 787.
distributed as you do when it is centralized. And
frankly, shame on me for not recognizing that sooner."'
Jan. The Christi f3 "What has characterized most of Mr. Streiff's career is On the
26, Econom an boldness and a bullish impatience to get things done. Mr. manage
2008 ist Streiff, Streiff should have known that running Airbus would ment
Former require political skills of a high order. Describing his first qualities
CEO few days as 'vertical take-off' at 'full thrust', he threw of a
of himself into the job of saving Airbus, as he saw it, from failed
Airbus itself. The EADS board told him that his behaviour was modular
not acceptable. He claimed that his plan had been leader
undermined by the dysfunctional corporate governance in an
at Airbus. But the more emollient Louis Gallois who integral
succeeded him showed what could be done even in less enterpri
than ideal circumstances, and Mr. Steiff now admits he se.
could have been more diplomatic. There is certainly no
doubting Mr. Streiff's effectiveness when it comes to
managing down."
Jan. Reuters, Louis Firm "[Gallois] sees no sign of a downturn in the aviation On
29, James Gallois industry, despite global financial turbulence and does not characte
2008 Regan , CEO expect more major swings in demand after a record year rizing
of for orders in 2007. While in the past, planemakers had the
EADS suffered from a 'very brutal cycle with peaks and dampen
canyons', the emergence of an autonomous second market ing of
in the Middle East and Asia made the industry less the
susceptible to the current credit crisis and threat of a U.S. business
recession. 'We do not see that the second market is cycle.
suffering from the downturn for the time being. It's two
different markets, two different cycles. We could
expect not to have peaks and canyons, but more hills
and valleys."
30 Thomso Jim Firm- a "Steve Binder (Bear Stearns): On a
Jan. n McNer Investo Can you maybe just touch on the 08 BCA guidance as far modular
2008 Reuters ney, r as margins obviously is not, productivity is one of the Enterpri
Researc Chari drivers of the margin improvement, is it coming at all se
Iti
h, man from block changes or is that coming simply from Archite
excerpt and productivity improvement and maybe you can address cture's
from CEO; which lines it pertains to. defense
"The James I of its
Boeing Bell, James Bell (Boeing): finanaic
Compan CFO, It really is coming from productivity improvement al
y, Q4 The across the in-production airplane programs. We clearly are perform
2007 Boeing continuing to focus on driving our productivity initiatives ance
Earning Compa in the BCA and we are starting to bear those fruit and it is
s Call ny primarily what we are seeing of the 777 moving line as we
Transcri get into its implementation and we continue to harvest the
pt" kind of productivity we have seen in the past going
forward on the 737.
Steve Binder:
And if I can just follow up, you addressed the cycle to
some degree that growth and demand across the globe,
maybe if you can address, how do you believe the so-
called credit crunch we are seeing today both in rate
increases and availability of credit in the aviation industry
granted that is mainly tied to the US carriers, but certainly
it is affecting the ability of some leasing companies and
some lower grade airlines around the world to get
financing, how does that affect your decision on what the
rates, the 373 rates further number one, and two, how does
that affect you achieving your rates that you plan to get to
by the 2010 timeframe.
Jim McNernev:
I do not think the credit situation, while it has had an
impact in parts of the capital markets, I do not think it
has changed our thinking on the near-term, medium-
term opportunity in front of us. Most of our planes are
financed by non-capital market institutions that have
remained in pretty good shape throughout all of this
whether it is sovereign credits. The leasing companies
themselves have been doing reasonably well. I think the
capital markets, you have seen a risk premium built-in in
some of the faultier deals are not getting done, but we are
actually seeing a little bit of loosening up there as some
paper that was not being sold, maybe four or five months
ago is now being sold again in the capital markets albeit at
a higher premium, but I would characterize that as
marginal and not yet impacting nor do we see it
impacting, quite frankly our prospects for growth.
Doug Harned (Sanford Bernstein):
On the 787, now, we are looking at a delay of at least
nine months in delivery off of the original schedule and I
am just wondering if you could give a perspective on when
you look at the areas that we might see higher cost and
financial impact and I classify those as customer
penalties, supplier costs, for your own operational costs
as time stretches out, where do you see the greatest risk
financially?
--
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
The business case remains sound. Obviously, we are
very disappointed with the delay in terms of its impact on
our customers, but the backlog remains in place. The
profitability of the airplane could be marginally
impacted and will be marginally impacted by the delay
in terms of some increased cost in the supply chain and
some possible penalties on the customer side, but we do
not see those kinds of cost having a significant impact
over the huge volume base that we are fortunate to
have on this airplane, so this is a case where I think the
value of the plane to our customers as borne out by the
record order book is helping mitigate what are bound
to be some cost. In the meantime, James, do you have any
further comments there.
James Bell:
I think the other side of that equation is that the schedule
stretch out that we have experienced is going to allow us
to work harder on finding opportunities for productivity
that would also offset some of the cost we would
experience as a result of the delay, so we have not gotten
through the assessment yet to really know where things are
going to fall out, but I think, along with the risk, there will
be other opportunities that we have not foresaw
previously.
Doug Harned:
So I would assume particularly from your guidance at least
in the near term and even as you go out a couple of years,
I am looking at margin, it sounds like you are not
seeing anything that really changes your economic case
for the airplane even over the next couple of years
other than a push back.
Jim McNerney:
Absolutely not.
Howard Rubel (Jefferies & Co.):
I want to talk for a second on DFA certification process
that you are going through on the 78, I know you cannot
fly the airplane, but there is a whole bunch of things that
you can do in the process to get there. Could you sort of
touch on that and then again, Jim maybe talk about how
this delay has been able to have been insulated from
the core business which really showed terrific results.
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Well, you are right about your observation on the cert
process. About 70% of the certification effort
documentation does not have to come from the flight test
program. It can come from things we are doing today and
we have got about half of that done, and we have got a
clear plan with the FAA so we are feeling pretty good
about that. Obviously, the flight test program has its own
set of risks, but we are feeling pretty good about it and we
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are certainly working as well with the FAA on this
program as we have on any that I can remember.
Now, one of my jobs, I think is to work with Scott
Carson to make sure that when you have a program
that is struggling and in terms of schedule that you get
as much focused effort on that program as you can.
You get the best leadership and we have done a lot of
that over the last months and we have got our best of
Boeing team working on that program now on the 87
and a lot of folks from BCA obviously and with some
help from IDS depending on the task at hand, and at
the same time, we have got to make sure that that
effort does not impinge on the fundamental running of
the business. I mean, the 87 while a critically important
program for us is one of 300 programs we manage here
at Boeing and we have got to make sure that the
leadership understands that struggles are one part of
our company do not mean distraction, rather it means,
intense focus to make sure that we keep delivering the
results that the total corporation is aiming for. So that
is a leadership challenge and it is all about how we work
together and help lead and manage each other and that is
one of my tasks and I am very sensitive to it.
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
Just to follow up on your answer to that last question on
leadership and particularly on communication within
Boeing between Seattle and Chicago, between suppliers
in Seattle. How has your oversight and your
involvement in 787, recognizing it is one of many
programs, how has that evolved over the past six months
or so?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
As is typical in big corporations like what we are part of
here, there are days when Scott and his team probably
feel I am too involved and then there are days I wake
up and say to myself, 'why are you not more involved?'
But the fact is I think, we have a pretty good balance. I
mean there is a very good team out there. I am probably
more involved now, as you can imagine. I mean I think
part of my job is to get involved when help is needed. And
that has been the case on the 87 over the last few months
as we have all tried to understand together the issues. I try
to understand the right way forward and I think it is done
in the spirit of less of oversight and administration, more
in the spirit of all getting in the boat together, trying to
figure it out. So, yes, I am a little more deeply involved
now than I was, but that could be said about some other
programs that we are trying to manage to the success we
know they can have.
Robert Spingarn:
Would you say that you are involved to the point that you
are very comfortable that your R&D guidance of 3.2 toSI
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3.4 in '08 will not go up?
Jim McNerney:
Well look, I am comfortable with that guidance and
that is why we are giving it. But, are there some risks
inherent in research and development? The answer is yes,
but I feel comfortable with that guidance and we have
been through it pretty thoroughly and Scott and his
team are committed and I am in the boat with them.
Ronald EDstein (Merrill Lynch):
Just kind of going back to the 787 for a minute, when we
think about the compressed flight test schedule, Jim,
how do we get comfortable with that? You know, if you
compare it to previous aircraft, all the new stuff on this
airplane, it seems like getting the airplane out on this new
schedule is really contingent upon that Flight Test
schedule. You mentioned in the past, we are going to
run it like an airline. It is not so much as flying the
plane but it is crunching the data in dealing with the
issues when they arise.
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Yes well I think, it is a non-aggressive Flight Test
program. It is a little less aggressive than the Flight Test
program schedule we had earlier, but still aggressive and I
think one of the silver linings of the delay is we have had
more time to test systems, which are critical elements to
the Flight Test program, ensure software compatibility and
have a little more time with static and fatigue, which I
think all are giving us reassurance that some of the more
mundane things that can happen during a Flight Test
program would not happen, which still leaves us some of
the fundamental risks. But we think the program is
eminently doable, the head start we have got with the
FAA is helping us here and so, I think it is one airplane
type, it is not multiple airplane types, one-engine type, or
engine configuration I should say. So, I think there is less
complexity in this Flight Test program than there is in our
usual set of Flight Test programs. So, we are confident
we can do it.
Ronald Epstein:
And then one follow up, if I may, you have got roughly
$12 billion of cash on the balance sheet and you are
deploying it for share buybacks. What else are you
thinking about?
James Bell:
Well clearly, what you see is our fundamental basic
deployment strategy and obviously other things that we are
looking at, we could not talk about in any detail, but we
are always looking at better ways to provide value to our
share holders with that cash and that can include some
things like you have seen in the past, particularly with the
addition of AVO and how we can support our capabilities
in our support business and how we could look at our
strategy in terms of being horizontally versus vertically
integrated. We look at that as we always do and see if
there is opportunity there to create better value than
current cash deployment strategy will provide, but we are
looking at a lot of things.
Joe Campbell (Lehman Brothers):
Good morning, our aircrafts seems like firmly on the
weight of 40 narrow-body a month and with somewhere
between 250 and 300 on the FWB [XWB?] pushing
forward on that aircraft, targeted against the 777, I guess
with delivery in 2013 but Boeing thus far has narrow-body
only to 31 a month, apparently constrained by factory
production issues, your judgment for that, what would be
prudent in the ramp up and perhaps some apprehension
about the cycle and the sustainability. But it seems to
me that most of these concerns on the narrow-body have
been delayed but thus far, we have not seen any comments
from you on plans to at least put in place the option of
going higher with the 737 nor anything about the response
to the A-350. So I was just wondering, whether that
difference above, almost a hundred airplanes a year on the
narrow-body and the stretch from the 787 were seen as
serious and we will be seeing response in 08.
Jim McNerney (Boeinz):
I will take that one. First the A-350, I think that the model
that will compete for the long-range 777's if the plane has
the performance that Airbus thinks it can have is the 1000
and I think that that is not a 2013 airplane, I think it is
more 2015 or 2016, I am not sure. It is certainly later, it
could be seven or eight years from now. So, I think we
have time to assess that plane and we have time to assess
what we might need to do if anything with the long-range
777s. So that is one.
Joe Campbell:
Nothing in '08?
Jim McNerney:
In terms of what our R&D on the 777?
Joe Campbell:
With this response from you, in order to get ready for
whenever they are going to have their plane ready.
Jim McNernev:
Well I think my point is that we do not have to do
anything in 08, if I am getting the sense of your question.
Joe Campbell:
Yes that is right, I was thinking, so you are going to
wait until 09 or 10 to do something.
Jim McNerney:
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Well yes. I think we need to see what the performance of
the A-350 might be. We are not just sure. I know they
have designed goals, but I think they have, just like
anybody would, us included, seven or eight years ahead of
an introduction. There are a lot of unanswered questions
about the performance of the airplane and I do not think
we want to put too many wheels in motion although we
are obviously thinking through some contingencies and we
are doing some preliminary work in the normal course of
events, but I would not see a major program emerging
until after this year.
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanlev):
I am curious about your comment about another good
order year for BCA, can you define that for us a little bit
better. Kind of talk about where you are seeing
incremental demand coming from geographically and
perhaps where you are seeing demand may be exhausting
and what you are thinking also about 09 and 2010 in terms
of units and book to bill.
James Bell (Boeing):
Well, we think the traffic that we have seen in prior
years remain and so we think that is where we will
continue to get it. We also believe that it is going to
pick up domestically as Jim has mentioned and we have
talked about before that although the US carriers really
have it engaged heavily in the cycle that with the higher
oil prices and their needs at least we understand them.
They will have to get engaged soon. That is kind of where
we would expect to see the order traffic come from this
year and then going forward. I mean, there is a lot of aging
aircraft in the US that cannot be operated economically
and clearly can be competitive and allow them to create
value for their shareholders if they continue to operate
them in this current environment. And then that coupled
with all that is going on with green and the environment, I
just think that there is going to be a lot of pressure to
replace old airplanes and that is what we see.
Heidi Wood:
But do you see demand exhausting in the Middle East
and Asia Pacific where it has been inordinately robust
in the last couple of years. I mean, does that slow
down?
James Bell:
At some point, I think it will. We have not seen it yet,
but obviously at some point we are not sure exactly all that
drives their needs, we know a lot of it. An issue had been
the infrastructure, but we will see.
Troy Lahr (Stifel Nicolaus & Company, Inc):
James, I thought you talked about aircraft service work
and how it increased this year at a double digit rate,
can you maybe talk a little bit about what was driving that
E
and do you expect that growth rate to continue at a double
digit pace next year end of 2008?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
We do have good momentum. The base business there is
obviously sparse and some routine work, but more and
more we are getting our technology into play. The
drivers are convergence. There is a lot of passenger to
freighter convergence. That business is continuing to grow
and also some modification kind of work and then, supply
chain work where increasingly, our customers are looking
for folks like us to manage their supply chain for them
more productively on an outsourced basis, so those tend to
be drivers and we see it going and I would say on the
productivity side, we are beginning to share infrastructure
across the two sides of our services businesses, the defense
and commercial side that can give us a little more
productivity and best practices and things like that. We are
beginning to leverage all of Boeing to improve that overall
business.
Troy Lahr:
But the double digit growth rate, that should continue?
Jim McNernev:
Yes, low double digits is the plan.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morgan):
My question is on the 747-8 passenger variant. Just
wondering what your outlook is perhaps for this year for
demand. You have the one order from Lufthansa so far
and also the development program. How do you
characterize that as progressing and then stepping back
after that, what is your commitment to the aircraft if
your order outlook does not meet expectations?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
1 do not have the numbers right here in front of me,
somewhere between a hundred and hundred fifteen orders
for the two airplanes. We have got about 27 or 28 on the
PAX side. DLH with 20 as you pointed out and then we
have some other small orders, so the majority remains
freighters which are an extremely well received in the
marketplace. We have got about ten discussions going on
right now with folks for the PAX version. So we anticipate
success here. We do not anticipate failure. And so none
of our plans include an offer up here. All of our plans
include making this a success and it would not surprise me
in 08 if you saw a few of those customers shake loose and
we all felt a little differently about it a year from now.
Joseph Nadol:
Can you characterize the difference or the incremental and
definite requirement to do, the passenger in addition to the
freighter very qualitatively and maybe the commonality
between the two aircraft.
Jim McNerney:
As you can imagine, there is a lot of commonality in the
structure in the systems, without divulging the details of it,
I mean, there is enough unique investment on both sides of
the model so that you pay attention, but I think the overall
characterization would be tremendous energy that
affords you the opportunity to do both.
David Strauss (UBS):
Looking at your BCAG revenue forecast for 08, you are
forecasting about 40 additional deliveries, yet you are
only forecasting about a billion, a billion and a half
additional revenues. You have already talked about double
digit growth in services, so it just seems that that revenue
forecast would be a little bit light given what I assume is
better pricing coming through in 08.
James Bell (Boeinz):
I think it is about right the way we have done it and you
are going to see the bulk of the better pricing come
through at 09 and then there are some product mix in
there that would differentiate what we did relative to
revenue.
David Strauss:
And then, on 777 [787/?] can you just comment on the
status where you are with supplier negotiations, I guess,
where you were before the announcement of the latest
delay and are we back to square one here. How progress is
going there?
Jim McNerney:
Well, we are going through a process right now of
adjusting the schedule and as we mentioned at the end of
the first quarter, we will talk about the new schedule. It
obviously needs the cooperation and commitment of
our supply base who are cooperating and who are
committed given the tremendous market success of this
airplane, but there are discussions going on because there
is a new schedule and there are shifts in cash flows and
pain that has to be borne, but I would characterize those
discussions as constructive and heading toward a
conclusion which we will report on at the end of the
quarter.
Myles Walton (Oppenheimer and Company):
I guess this is kind of a follow up to that last question,
what kind of guidance are you giving in the interim three
months to the supply chain such that you will hopefully
dissuade them from making some independent
decisions that could potentially exacerbate the delay as
far as their procurement of raw material goes?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Which guidance are you talking about there?
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Myles Walton:
Production on the 787, obviously with the next three
months, you are establishing a new production plan. They
are making their own production decisions. How are you
communicating with them in an effort to make sure that
the line of communication is open.
Jim McNerne:
In all of our supplier partners, we have got between 50
and 130 Boeing employees working hand in hand,
minute by minute, hour by hour 24/7, so transparency
on each other's issues is not our problem here. It is
getting resolution. We are working very closely with
our suppliers and they have their people in our
facilities and so, it is a pretty seamless operation right
now as we all work hard to resolve the issues.
James Gonzales (Bloomberg News):
You mentioned that the amount of Boeing employees are
out in the facilities and working overtime, I was
wondering if you guys have got any feedback from STIA
or the machine expedient, I am inquiring further on what
the status of the program is and any kind of feedback from
them on the working conditions and what the overtime
hours that they are having to put in?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
Our union partnerships have been extremely
supportive here. We are all trying to focus on the success
of this airplane and the success with the company. So I
would characterize it as, overall, very supportive in
general.
James Gonzales:
And just one other question for you, with the deliveries
being revised for this year, this is for James because I
remember that you taught that 08 would be the year to
surpass Airbus on deliveries. Do you think that is still
the case?
James Bell:
I do not think I ever said that. That it would be the year
we would and I would know that until we get through the
year and deliver them. We are giving you our guidance
and I am not sure what their delivery guidance is for 08.
Jim McNernev:
I think there had been some analyst projections that said
that 08 would be the crossover year but quite frankly, I do
not think we ever characterize it one way or the other.
Julie Johnson (Chicago Tribune):
Okay on the 787 supply chain, could you just give us a
little bit of color on how you plan to drive greater
efficiency through the production process and could
I
that potentially mean dropping under performing
partners?
Jim McNernev:
Well, I think obviously the whole concept here, when
we get through the startup is to have an extremely
efficient production process where multiple
organizations are each focusing on their piece and
through the repetition become very good at a drive
down their own learning curves and when you add
them all up, it is better that we were all doing it, that is
the concept. What was the second part of your question
there?
Julie Johnson:
I was just wondering if potentially you-
Jim McNernev:
By enlarge, we have absolutely no plans to drop any
suppliers. When we qualified our partners early on, we
did it with our eyes wide open and they did it with their
eyes wide open. We have each put a lot of investment
into it, now I think from time to time, we shift work
around. We restructure relationships the way the work
flows in order to capitalize on things that emerge as
strengths, or things that emerge as weaknesses, but I
would characterize it more as fit and finish and that way
than ever thinking about dropping the supplier except
in some extreme circumstance, but we do not see that
here.
Sebastian Svanki (Book Review):
I would like to ask another question on the 787 production
partners, please. Has Boeing any intention to maybe
invest financially or organizationally in your
production partners in order to strengthen them and
maybe help them through the dire times when they do
not get the money back in time, and if you would today
have to decide about like a 737 follow on, would you do
the very same production set up or would there be
something different given the experience you have made
until today?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Two very good questions. I mean, I think the form of
financial support that we might contemplate in
extreme circumstances would be more jointly carrying
inventory or material together if we put an undue
hardship on somebody, rather than investing in their
own facilities, but we have a good feeling about the way
we are approaching this airplane despite the startup
difficulties, would we do it exactly the same? We might
do it a little bit differently, but the overall strategy
would be the same. I think we now have learning about
the relative strengths between ourselves and our
partners and I think we might draw some lines in
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different places, but we would not change the concept.
Lyn Munsford (Wall Street Journal):
This is kind of just a high level question here, but in the
last several months, it seems that your issues with having
to push off the schedule on the 787 have been kind of
the result of this voyage of discovery you have been on,
how do you feel right now, are you at a point now
where you can see to the bottom of the barrel to know
that you do not have any more surprises coming up or
when do you expect to be at that point?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
I think it is true that the projections we made earlier
when we did not have much experience with all the
work that traveled to our facilities unanticipated where
we did not have robust enough contingency plans when
you look backwards. It is true that we missed some
projections. Now, we are a lot closer today to
completing the first airplane now that we have
properly staffed the effort, we now more fully
understand the requirements as they came in from our
partners and work that we thought they were going to
do. And just by virtue of being closer to the end than to
the beginning and having had experience with working
with the engineering drawings of our partners, having
now rounded up the supply chain, a lot of the original
supply chain issues have gone away as we have gotten
our arms around inventory that was going to travel to
other places and things like that, so I think just by
virtue of having the experience of getting deep into the
first airplane and seeing the end of it gives us more
confidence in our projections. It is not much more
complicated than that.
Lyn Munsford:
Okay, thanks and just one other thing is, do you anticipate
as a result of some of the things you are seeing here that
you might ramp up a little more slowly than you
initially expected so that, when you do actually start
getting into the production of airplanes, it would not be
at a super aggressive rate and it will be more gradual?
Jim McNernev:
Well, that question has to be answered over the next
couple of months Lyn. We are very mindful of
committing to a ramp that we can execute. We are also
very mindful that we have already disappointed some
of our customers in terms of when we are getting them
the technology that they have faith in us to deliver. So,
that tension, I think will produce a realistic but
aggressive ramp."
22 The Ray Union a "The white collar engineering union at Boeing doesn't On
Feb. Seattle Gofort begin formal contract talks with management until later pending
2008 Times, h & this year, but its leaders are already talking war with the strike
Domini Cynthi company. Senior officials with the Society of negotiat
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c Gates a Cole, Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace ions
SPEE (SPEEA) told members... to start saving money to prepare (particul
A for the possibility of a strike. 'The company does seem arly on
Execut to be leading us down toward a crisis,' said SPEEA's the
ive new executive director, Ray Goforth. He sadid a strike is adverse
Dir. & 'a very realistic possibility.' SPEEA's leadership is relation
Preside angry over several matters: comments made to them in a s
nt private meeting this month by commercial-airplanes chief between
Scott Carson that they consider aggressively anti-union. labor
SPEEA President Cynthia Cole said she's advising and
members to set aside part of their 2007 incentive bonuses capital -
the company began to pay Wednesday, as well as a portion i.e.
of coming paychecks. 'I'm starting my strike fund,' she "Corpor
said. Boeing spokesman Tim Healy said the company is ate" -
'committed to continuing dialog with SPEEA,' but is not
concerned 'that these kind of statements are being made between
beore we even begin the formal negotiation process.' labor
Boeing engineers have had an extended strike only once and the
before. Eight years ago this month, the union began a 40- firm).
day strike that crippled Boeing and won what was
considered a landmark victory. Boeing can ill afford a
strike this time. It is grappling with serious technical
issues on its new 787 Dreamliner program...That situation
has contributed to an unusually amicable atmosphere
between Boeing and the Machinists union, which is
typically more strident than SPEEA. Machinsts district
President Tom Wroblewski has talked up the improved
relations with Boeing since Carson succeded Alan
Mulally. In the past year, Machinists negotiated
concessions giving back pay to rehired workers. In
contrast, Boeing has supported efforts to decertify smaller
SPEEA bargaining units at plants in California, Kansas and
Utah. SPEEA officials in Wichita also face a
decertification drive at the former Boeing parts plant, now
Spirit AeroSystems. Goforth believes that Boeing is
supporting that, too. 'Boeing is still coordinating things
with some of its major suppliers.' According to union
officials, an initial meeting Feb. 4 between Goforth and
Carson was very frank. Goforth said Carson made 'overt'
statements that 'the company will continue to support
efforts to get rid of the unions at Boeing.' Cole, who
was also present, said Boeing's top labor negoriator, Doug
Kight, expressed a 'desire to dismantle our pension plan
and our health-benefit plan. Things got a little heated,'
Cole said. That meeting came on Goforth's first day on
the job. 'It was somewhat disconcerting to see the
rhetoric and the tenor already in a bad place,' Goforth
said. 'It doesn't have to be that way. Members of the
union take pride in working for the Boeing Company.
They are somewhat bewildered by the provocative
stance.' Still, his assessment of Carson was not negative.
'I came away from that meeting liking the guy,' said
Goforth. 'I didn't like what he was saying, but I liked his
candor and I appreciated it.'
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2 Seattle Custo a "'There has been a gulf between Boeing and its Air Force On
Mar. Post- mer customer ever since the procurement scandal,' said Loren losing
2008 Intellige Thompson, a defense analyst with the Virginia-based the bid
ncer Lexington Institute. 'That has made it hard for Boeing to to
understand its customer the way it once did.' 'This is provide
such a stunning upset,' he said. 'It shows something the US
fundamental has gone wrong (in the relationship) with Air
their biggest military customer." Force
with a
tanker
replace
ment to
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p/EADS
3 Reuters Custo a "'This was not a close outcome in any sense of the On
Mar. mer term,' the analyst, Loren Thompson of the Lexington losing
2008 Institute, told Reuters. 'Northrop won decisively and the bid
completely, and Boeing simply was not competitive in to
the major measures.' Air Force reviewers pressed Boeing provide
to stretch out its aggressive development schedule for a the US
new version of its 767 jet, which in turn added cost. In Air
fact, the Boeing proposal was initially rated as 'high-risk' Force
because the reviewers were concerned that Boeing's with a
proposal to build a new version of the 767, using parts tanker
from other versions, would cost more than expected. replace
"Although some observers expected that the Northrop ment to
team would offer a better price, nobody expected that Northro
they would be better in every significant regard,' p/EADS
Thompson told Reuters. Buying the Boeing tanker would
have resulted in a much slower tanker replacement rate.
'The reviewers concluded that if they funded the Northrop
Grumman proposal, they could have 49 superior tankers
~ ;; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ;;;; ~
operating by 2013, whereas if they funded the Boeing
proposal, they would have only 19 considerably less
capable planes in the year,' Thompson said. Air Force
reviewers also had less confidence in Boeing's past
performance due to 'poor execution' in three relevant
programs, including long-delayed tanker deliveries to
Japan and Italy, Thompson said. Northrop got higher
ratings due to 'satisfactory' execution on six programs
deemed relevant to the tanker competition. Boeing had
expected to face tough competition from Northrop on cost,
but it compounded its problems by failing to adequately
explain its assumptions in calculating the cost of
developing a tanker, Thompson said. 'The resulting low
confidence in Boeing cost projections undercut its
claims of lower life-cycle costs,' he said."
11 The Louis Investo j "'EADS is gaining speed and altitude,' chief executive On
Mar. Press Gallois r Louis Gallois said. 'We are cautious by nature, but I feel EADS'
2008 Associat , CEO EADS is establishing a firm footing on a higher ground."' nature
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EADS setting
market
expectat
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12 The Senior Custo a "It would have been preferable for Boeing to have On
Mar. Seattle Execut mer announced one 18-month delay back in October, the over-
2008 Times ive, executive said. Boeing management would have 'looked promisi
Leasin liked heroes' if they had then delivered sooner. He said ng and
g customers have lost faith in Boeing because of the cascade under-
Compa of delays preceded by promises that everything is fine. deliveri
ny 'Boeing didn't learn anything from the A380."' ng.
17 The Ray Labor a "'Before I took this job, I'd been told that relations with On
Mar. Tacoma Gofort Union SPEEA and Boeing were pretty darned strained, and I pending
2008 News h, had hoped that could be fixed, but I learned that isn't going strike
Tribune SPEEA to happen easily. Mr. Carson explained that he wanted to negotiat
Execut get rid of all unions at Boeing and that he intended to ions
ive continue to support the efforts to bust the bargaining (particul
Direct units where they could. It was disappointing. I arly on
or appreciated the candor. It did supply some clarity on these the
problems. I went into this hoping that we could partner adverse
to solve these problems, but the answer was 'no'. They relation
shared their plans to eliminate the pension plan for all s
new hires and to make negative changes to the medical between
plan that will drastically shift costs onto the employees. labor
They seemed to be setting us up for what could be a and
cataclysmic conflict this fall. Their stance on the pension capital -
plan came after the news that Boeing's pension plan is i.e.
overfunded by $5 billion, and they are enjoying healthy "Corpor
profits so this is not like the auto industry where they're ate" -
facing some tough problems that call for some creative not
solutions. These aren't things they need to keep the between
business healthy. These are things that they simply labor
want. If I wanted to synthesize it, I'd have to say it is and the
bewilderment that the people who run the company are firm).
intent on running it into a ditch and won't listen to the
people that really do the work. My members are telling
me we're going to have even more delays. Within Boeing
- - ---- ---------
management there's an almost religious belief right now
that this offshoring is good, and when you point out the
problems, it's seen almost as a challenge to the
fundamental belief tenant rather than a discrete problem
to be fixed. Hopefully we will find solutions to these
problems that are peaceful and quiet and professional.
Thus far, Boeing corporate has found no interest in
finding solutions, so we've begun to prepare our
membership for very tough negotiations and possible
adverse labor actions."
19 The Steven Custo a "Boeing admitted on Wednesday that it would have to On a
Mar. Financi Udvar- mer redesign parts of its troubled 787 Dreamliner, raising the modular
2008 al Times Hazy, prospect of a third delay in recent months to delivery of the enterpri
Chair new aircraft. Mr. Hazy told a JPMorgan Chase se
man, conference that the state of the Dreamliner programme was architec
Interna 'not pretty'. He said first deliveries would be delayed for ture's
tional at least another six months because its centre wing box - overpro
Lease which holds the wings in place - needed to be redesigned. msing
Financ Boeing refused to comment on the specifics of the redesign and
e work but said Mr. Hazy was not painting an accurate underde
Corpor picture of the overall programme. 'We are doing some livering.
ation redesign work but things are more complex than what we
said,' said Yvonne Leach, for Boeing. Mr. Hazy said he
expected delivery of the jet to be delayed until the end of
the third quarter of next year. Boeing's most recent
guidance was that the Dreamliner would be ready in
'early' 2009. Boeing said it was sticking to its most
recent guidelines. A further delay would be hugely
embarrassing for the company. Last month ILFC said it
would seek compensation 'on a large scale' from Boeing
for the 787 delays. The 787 is Boeing's most successful
new aircraft, with 857 orders in place, worth about
$140 billion. But analysts are asking difficult questions
about how profitable the whole programme could be if
penalty payents are added to other cost concerns. 'The
large number of 787s sold at low prices, combined with
rising recurring costs, are steadily eating away at
programme margins and long-term programme
profitability,' wrote Joseph Nadol of JPMorgan in a
research note on Wednesday."
26 BBC Alan Firm a "Now, it is time for Ford to concentrate on... our plan to On a
Mar. News Mulall create a strong Ford Motor Company that delivers modular
2008 y, profitable growth for all." EA's
CEO particul
& ar
Pres., growth
Ford objectiv
Motor es
Co.
31 Seattle Mike Firm- a "Senior deputy prosecuter Scott Peterson on Monday On
Mar. Post- Bair, Emplo called his big gun witness: Former 787 program chief Firm-
2008 Intellige VP, yee; Mike Bair. Employ
ncer The Firm- ee and
"Boeing Boeing Custo Boeing Commercial Airplanes' senior leadership team is Firm-
Leaks Compa mer so cautious about information leaks that it meets in a Custom
'For the ny room without exterior windows, Bair said. The room is er
Greater also swept for recording devices, and wireless "Trust"
Good,' technology is not allowed. 'We were nervous that in a
Eastma somebody could intercept it in the parking lot,' Bair Modula
n said said. r
(Andrea Enterpri
James) Bair said the leaks to The Seattle Times were so se
disturbing that Boeing considered polygraph test of its Archite
leadership team. 'Initially, we thought the source of cture.
the leaks had to be one of the 10 or 12 people on the
leadership team, or two or three support people in
meetings during conversations,' Bair said. But
management scrapped the polygraph idea when it
'decided that would look bad when that leaked out,'
Bair said.
Boeing investigators questioned those privy to the
information, and checked phone and e-mail records.
Among the files confiscated from Eastman's home
computer, the biggest 'heart-stopper' concerned
airplane concessions, Bair said.
Concessions are the closely guarded difference between
the list price of an airplane and what Boeing actually
charges customers. 'This is as close to the jewels you
can get in terms of sensitive information,' Bair told the
jury. If an airline buys a jet and then finds out that its
competitor paid millions less for the same plane, 'We'd
have a social problem with that customer,' Bair said.
On cross-examination, Bair admitted that the concession
data never appeared in any media reports.
'Everyone knows we live in a duopoly with a
competitor that is heavily subsidized by the French,
German and U.K. governments,' Bair told the jury.
'And every day is intensely competitive with Airbus.'
One of the jurors upon seein Bair remembered that he used
to work for him. Bair still works at Boeing, but is no
longer 787 program chief. The juror works on the 787
program, and has worked as a finance estimator who
helped prepare the type of long-range business
planning documents that Eastman is accused of
leaking. Judge Monica Benton excused the juror and sent
him home, leaving 13 jurors including one alternate.
Jurors were let out early Monday because one juror had a
self-inflicted injury involving scissors."
4 Busines "Ben" Investo a "Boeing is in the same dream state that the US car On
April s Week r companies were for the last few decades. They have had a sharehol
2008 (online string of failures and clearly they have not learnt one bit. der in-
blog) As a Boeing shareholder I would like to see the whole activism
leadership team changed. Unfortunately the institutional
shareholders (like the pension funds) are not proactive
and will allow the current leadership team to run the
company into the ground. It is sad to see yet one more
I
I I i J American icon go down the tube."
Ross
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Comm
ercial
Airpla
nes VP
& GM
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8 Seattle Mike Firm- a "Boeing's investigations team searched for three years to On
April Post- Bair, Emplo find the source of the leaks, and even checked the emails Firm-
2008 Intellige VP, yee; and phone records of senior leadership." Employ
ncer The Firm- ee
"Mistria Boeing Custo "Trust"
I for ex- Compa mer in a
Boeing ny Modula
Inspecto r
r" Enterpri
(Andrea se
James) Archite
cture.
8 Bloomb Jon Investo a "The more they miss, the more I get the impression On how
April erg.com Kutler, r they don't even know what the problems are. It's going informa
2008 Head to take a whole lot to repair their credibility." tion is
of shared
Admir between
alty the firm
Partne and its
rs Inc. investor
s (after
the
announc
ement
of a
third
delay to
its 787
program
8 Bloomb Myles Investo a "'I don't think anyone will believe them.' The stock is On how
April erg.com Walton r 'kind of treading water."' informa
2008 . tion is
Analys shared
t, between
Oppen the firm
"Boeing now acknowledges that sticking to the 747-8
Freighter programme's original schedule could mean that
the aircraft is delivered slightly above nominal weight
targets. Part of the weight problem is caused by Boeing's
decision to keep deliveries for the 747-8 on schedule,
Bogue says. If deliveries were delayed, Boeing's
engineers would gain more time to optimize the design of
the aircraft to reduce weight. The 747-8 has faced
schedule pressure [due to a delay on] the 787
programme, [which] meant that engineers from that
programme could not be transferred to work on the next-
generation 747. Boeing solved the problem by
outsourcing engineering work to a variety of aerospace
firms abroad. The engineering workforce at Boeing IDS
also were loanded to the programme. Although this
strategy has helped to overcome the workforce shortfall for
the 747-8F, Boeing has also learned that the work was
distributed too broadly, Bogue says. "I would tell you
we spread the work too far on the Freighter,' he says.
On how
to make
architec
tural
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product
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8 Bloomb Cai Investo a "These guys had two preditions before and they've On how
April erg.com von r blown both of them. This time they'll want to reset the informa
2008 Rumoh schedule once so that they can hit it." tion is
r, shared
Analys between
t, the firm
Cowen and its
& Co. investor
s (after
the
announc
ement
of a
third
delay to
its 787
program
8 Bloomb Joseph Investo a "The enormous sales success of the program may have On how
April erg.com Nadol, r been more a curse than a blessing, as it locked Boeing informa
2008 Analys into the schedule that ultimately could not be tion is
t, J.P. executed." shared
Morga between
n the firm
and its
investor
s (after
the
announc
ement
of a
third
delay to
its 787
program
9 The Doug Industr a "This is a massive blow to Boeing's credibility because it On how
April Times McViti y is drip feeding bad news, which gives the impression it informa
2008 (UK) e, analyst does not have a handle on the problems." tion is
Manag shared
ing between
Direct the firm
or, and its
Arran investor
Aerosp s (after
ace the
announc
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of a
third
delay to
its 787
program
10 Speigel Handel Media a "The untried model of getting suppliers from across the On
April Online sblatt analyst world to take part in the financial risk has shown itself to critiquin
2008 (Germ s be a flop, and Boeing has lost control of the project... the g the
an company's credibility is tarnished." 787
busine "risk-
ss sharing"
daily partners
newsp hip
aper) model.
13 Emirate Jim Firm a "A couple of years ago Jim McNerney, the chief executive On
April s McNer of Boeing, was in London to persuade the world's airlines modular
2008 Busines ney, that they should purchase the 787 Dreamliner. Over lunch EA's
s 24/7, Chair at a Mayfair restaurant I asked McNerney whether he and inability
"Boeing man & Boeing had learned anything from the chaos that was to learn
Failed CEO, unfolding at Airbus.
to Learn The
from Boeing The European aircraft manufacturer was at that time doing
Airbus" Compa a swallow dive from the high board into concrete. Chief
(David ny executives were departing on a monthly basis...
Roberts
on) Without pausing for thought, McNerney said no. He felt
there was nothing to learn from Airbus. I thought at the
time that such arrogance was hubris and events since
have proved the foolishness of McNerney's words.
Boeing announced last week that the 787 Dreamliner, one
of the world's most important industrial projects, is now
running 18 months late."
17 Busines Greg Suppli P "To avoid production glitches, Airbus is giving contractors On
April s Week, Albert, er an unprecedented role in designing the A350. For months, Airbus'
2008 "What Honey engineers from aerospace companies such as Honeywell differen
Airbus well International and Thales Group have been working t
learned Vice- alongside Airbus staff, poring over the design and approac
from the Preside suggesting changes to simplify manufacturing. Boeing h in
Dreamli nt held similar consultations, 'but Airbus is taking it a step treating
ner" further,' says Greg Albert, a Honeywell vice-president supplier
who oversees its work with Airbus." s on the
A350
than
Boeing
did on
the 787.
18 The Ray Union a "Relations with the white-collar engineering union already On
April Seattle Gofort are so strained that the union's new executive director, Ray Boeing'
2008 Times, h and Goforth, talks openly about the potential for a strike. "We s
"Boeing Tom can absolutely do it,' Goforth said. 'I have every discussi
-- - -- - ----- ---------------------
Labor Wroble confidence members will stand up for themselves if ons with
Negotia wski, necessary. The union is pretty darn unified.' its
tior SPEEA unions
Wants Execut 'This is unbelievable,' said Wroblewski, district president about
Pension ive for the International Association of Machinists (IAM) changin
-lan Direct Local 751, on hearing of the idea from a reporter. g its
Change or, and Although Kight had previously informed engineering pension
for new IAM union leaders of the proposal, he hadn't mentioned it to plan for
Hires" district Wroblewski. Wroblewski said that in 2005, when Boeing new
Preside proposed daking away retiree medical benefits for new hires.
nt hires, 'it ended in a strike...This is unacceptable. I'm
sure our members will walk again.'
'We're going to have disagreements,' Kight said. 'The
key, as leaders, is how you respond.' The Machinists'
2008 negotiations slogan is 'It's our time this time!' Said
Kight, 'I wish we were half as good as the IAM at
crafting great slogans.'
'Past, present, future, it doesn't matter. We fight for
all our members. You're fighting for the unborn,'
Wroblewski said. 'Our members didn't fall for it in
2005. They won't fall for it this time.' The Machinists
have struck Boeing six times since 1948, including a 69-
day walkout in 1995 and a one-month strike in 2005.
That fighting stance followed an initial meeting with Kight
and Boeing Commercial Airplanes Chief Executive Scott
Carson. Goforth and the two other union officials present
insist that Carson told them candidly he'd prefer 'to get
rid of all the unions at Boeing' and intended to continue
to support efforts to do so. Kight, who was also at the
meeting, flatly denied that. 'He didn't say that,' Kight
said. 'He knows it would be a fool's errand to make a
statement like that.' Late last month, Carson himself
defended his remarks in the February meeting in a letter to
an employee. His version of what he said was: 'I wish
Boeing didn't have to work through a third party to
have discussions with employees. To say these
comments indicate that Boeing is anti-union is, in my
opinion, a mischaracterization.'
'I'm responding to a campaign of aggression against
the union. The company is essentially trying to put us
out of business,' Goforth said. 'If they attack us in one
place, they attack us all.' Kight said the efforts to unseat
the union in each place were employee-driven, and the
outcomes were determined by employee wishes. 'It's up
to the employees,' Kight said. 'We respect the choice.'
Clearly, well-paid white-collar workers do not strike
lightly. SPEEA has only had one strike that lasted
more than a day in 2000.
Goforth cited a survey of his members, the results of which
are still coming in. Of the almost 4,000 people who have
responded so far, three-quarters registered 'low
... .. . . . . . . . .
confidence' or 'no confidence' in Boeing corporate
management. 'This is setting us up for some pretty
tough negotiations,' Goforth said. 'My fear is that we
might find ourselves stumbling into a strike.' At this
point in the 787 program, that could be disastrous for
Boeing. 'All of us must continue to keep focused on
what we've got to do to meet customer commitments,'
Kight said. 'The last thing we can afford to do is slip up
on our promises to customers."
18 Seattle Ray Union a "The change is 'about attracting a new generation of On
April Post- Gofort employees that may not have the same appreciation for the Boeing'
2008 Intellige h and value of the traditional pension,' [Boeing spokesman Tim] s
ncer, Tom Healy said. 'The new generation may not be willing or discussi
"Boeing Wroble have a desire to stay at the same company for 30 years,' ons with
to ask wski, and would instead favor a more portable retirement plan. its
Unions SPEEA unions
to Drop Execut While Boeing said it has broached the subject with both about
Pension ive unions, comments made by top labor negotiator Doug changin
Plans Direct Kight and published in Seattle-area newspapers Friday g its
for New or, and seem to have taken both by surprise. 'They have never pension
Hires." IAM come out and said, it is our goal,' Tom Wroblewski, plan for
district president of Machinists Union Local 751, in an interview. new
Preside 'I'm pretty upset about it.' Wrobleswski said the hires.
nt company's plans would shrink new employees' retirement
savings and leave them more vulnerable to market
swings. 'If the employer wanted to restructure the
retirement package in a way that didn't take money
away from the employees, we're open to discussing
anything. But what they're trying to do is take money
away from employees and put it in their pockets,'
Goforth said."
21 Reuters, Anony Custo a "Boeing has also run a series of full-page advertisements in On
April "Boeing mous mer U.S. newspapers condemning the Air Force's handling of Boeing'
2008 official the deal as 'flawed by countless irregularities.' 'It's s
Northro , U.S. really gotten ugly,' said one Air Force official who spoke deterior
p CEOs Air on condition he note be identified. ating
met Force relation
with Air Defense analyst Loren Thompson, of the Virginia-based ship
Force Lexington Institute, said the meeting was clearly prompted with its
on by Air Force concerns about the tanker debate. 'The tone long-
Tanker" of the tanker debate has turned so negative the Air time
(Andrea Force leaders are concerned that it could damage their custome
Shalal- long-term relationship with Boeing,' he said. r.
Esa)
22 Reuters, Jim Firm c "Boeing Co.s chief executive has admitted that the On a
April "Boeing McNer company's ambitious plan to outsource most of the modular
2008 CEO ney, producion of its new 787 Dreamliner jet has not been Enterpri
Admits Chair completely successful and could lead to a re-evaluation se
787 man & for future programs. 'The global partnership model of Archite
Dreamli CEO, the 787 remains a fundamentally sound strategy,' said cture's
ner The Boeing CEO Jim McNerney in a memo circulated to emphasi
Errors" Boeing employees on Monday, 'but we may have gone a little too s on
(Bill Compa far too fast in a couple of areas.' executio
Rigby) ny n and
The plan, which offloads some of the financial risk of not
developing the plane to its main partners, was hailed as the strategy.
future of aircraft manufacturing by some, but dismissed as
mere cost-dutting by others. Naysayers felt that Boeing
may have given up too much control of the
manufacturing process.
23 Busines Jim Firm a "Analysts say that Boeing could face from $2 billion to $4 On a
April s Week, McNer billion in penalties to airline customers because of 787 modular
2008 "Boeing ney, delays, as well as reduced profit margins over the next Enterpri
's Chair decade. Chief Financial Officer James Bell said the se
McNern man & company won't book profits for the first 25 Archite
ey: CEO, Dreamliners, but added that the 787 will be profitable cture's
'Diggin The over the long haul. emphasi
g Out of Boeing s on
a Hole"' Compa Absentee CEO? McNerney has been barely visible executio
(Judith ny amid the questions about the 787 delays. 'I've neither n and
Crown) met him nor heard from him,' says Ray Goforth, executive not
director of the Society of Professional Engineering strategy.
Employees in Aerospace. Indeed his style has been to
ride herd on top managers, giving them tools they need
to do their jobs and then holding them accountable if they
don't deliver. 'Its O.K. to confess you're in trouble,
we'll get you help,' he said in a 2006 interview with
Chicago magazine. The question is whether that style
works as well when Wall Street is demanding constant
assurance about make-or-break programs. 'If you're not
out there leading, you are subject to other people's
interpretations, and you hold yourself hostage to the
stories that other people spin,' says Adam Galinsky, a
professor at the Kellogg School of Management at
Northwestern University.
McNerney inherited a 787 strategy that had been put in
place by Alan Mulally, Boeing's longtime head of
commercial operations, and program manager Michael
Bair. 'In hindsight, tMcNerney] wishes he would have
stepped in sooner,' says Noel Tichy, a professor at the
University of Michigan who worked with McNerney at GE
and has written about his management style. 'Otherwise,
he wouldn't be digging out of a hole.' Indeed, if there is
another 787 delay, the spotlight will intensify on
McNerney. 'With three strikes already, it would be
hard to retain confidence,' says Richard Aboulafia, the
Teal Group consultancy's vice-president for analysis."
23 Busines Jim Firm a "For me, two themes emerged from the 787 at this early On a
April s Week, McNer stage in its life. One centers around innovation, the other modular
2008 "From ney, around execution. We have gotten the innovation piece Enterpri
the Chair of it right (notwithstanding the ever-present potential of se
Boeing man & unknowns). The execution piece - with specific regard Archite
Cockpit CEO, to the business model and our oversight of the supply cture's
"(by The chain - has been much more of a challenge. emphasi
Jim Boeing s on
McNern Compa Fundamental, game-changing innovation like that we're executio
ey) ny pursuing on the 787 usually has a 'bleeding-edge' quality n and
to it - meaning it goes beyond 'leading edge' into a realm not
where both the risks and the potential returns are high. strategy,
and an
The global-partnership model of the 787 remains a eventual
.. ...................
fundamentally sound strategy. But we may have gone a reversio
little too far, too fast in a couple of areas. n
towards
The revised 787 plan reduces schedule risk and lays out Integral
a more gradual ramp-up." Enterpri
se
Archite
cture
principl
es.
23 Thomso Jim Firm- a "Steve Binder (Bear Stearns): On a
April n McNer Investo May be just about your '09 guidance, I think James you modular
2008 Reuters ney, r touched on, you are assuming the zero margin with 787 Enterpri
Researc Chari program, just assuming. Since you had not fully se
h, man scrubbed I guess supplier payments, renegotiation with Archite
excerpt and suppliers, as well as your kind of your new schedule as far cture's
from CEO; as your ramp cost with respect to a new production defense
"The James schedule. I am just wondering do you feel confident of its
Boeing Bell, would you characterize your cost estimates to be on the finanaic
Compan CFO, initial block size to be conservative, such that you want al
y, Q1 The to meet figure with forward charge? perform
2008 Boeing ance
Earning Compa James Bell (Boeing):
s Call ny Yes I would. I would say that its our best ability to
Transcri estimate, but a couple of things that we've high
pt" confidence in. One we've confidence that we have
almost 900 orders today which would help us relative
to set what the pricing is, relative to that. We've
negotiated quite a bit of the subcontractor cost and we
have pretty good idea of how we are going to finish in
negotiating as it relates to some of the impacts or some of
the changes we've experienced. The area obviously that is
less certainty is how do we settle all of the issues we
have with our customers. Although, we think we are
being relatively conservative by starting out with the
zero margin.
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen & Co.):
So what sort of impact does this assume, you are paying
Spirit per their 8-K, it looks like 350 million plus that
was not on the plan. You presumably have some
payment to airline at some point. What do though the
suppliers and airline compensation requirements due to
this cash flow?
James Bell (Boeing):
So, we are not going to get into the specifics of what we
have assumed, Cai, but believe that the impact of what we
believe based on what we know today cash that would be
extended out because of the payment flow coming from
customers as well as what we would have to pay for pay to
suppliers to be there and because of contract terms are
included in the guidance for both '08 and for '09.
Joe Campbell (Lehman Brothers):
I have a question about the performance of the commercial
.. ........................
company in the first quarter. The difference between the
program accounting and the unit accounting was some
$330 million, which is the largest number we have ever
seen I think in a single quarter and 71 million of it,
which is pretty much consistent with what we have been
seeing is related to the 777-300ER. I wondered if you
could sort of tell us what was going on because the actual
is so different from the assumed program performance?
James Bell (Boein):
Yeah, some of it was -- again we are still experiencing
the impact of the more aggressively priced airplanes
several years ago that we are delivering, which has a
more profound impact on unit margins than program. Then
coupling that with the mix that was delivered in the
quarter had the increase the gap a bit based on what's in
the accounting quantity relative to that mix and the pricing
associated with it, Joe.
Joe Campbell:
James, what was the mix difference. I didn't notice
anything especially different?
James Bell:
Well, there were more 777 in it today in the...
Joe Campbell:
777 wasn't the issue, it was only 71 million of the 330?
So the big number...
James Bell:
You are only talking about the difference in pricing on
777, there is a mix difference also that would be associated
with better priced airplanes out in the outyears, Joe.
Joe CamDbell:
But, I mean, you are showing us the difference between
actual and program assumptions on the 777 to be only $71
million. So is it not correct to assume that 330 minus 71 is
related to some airplanes other than the 777?
James Bell:
Well, there is. Yes, there is.
Joe CamDbell:
So, I am asking what that 200 million is, which is...
James Bell:
It's mostly the 777, but there would be some mix relative
to the 777s as well that's in the cost base that's beyond
which you are seeing in deferred production and it would
be quite frankly the mix between freighter and
passenger.
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
Jim when you, James I guess, when you go through and
~;;;;;;;~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~;;;;;~ ~. ---------------------------------------- a
analyze the range of possible additional costs on these
customer penalties and supplier support. In totality
what's the highest negative cost outcome that's
realistic. I mean does that number ever exceed 4
billion. We are really struggling on the outside to
conceptualize this. I mean if we can't think of it is 2 to 4
billion is that a reasonable bandwidth?
James Bell (Boeing):
Well Heidi, you know, the fact of the matter is we go
through and struggle with that same thing ourselves
and with the information we have to date, its hard to
set a number. And that's why we obviously have taken
the position that we are going to start off booking the
program at a zero margin to make sure we have
adequate reserve in order to deal with that. I can't
predict what the number will be. I just know that our
past history would suggest that we do a pretty good job
of mitigating that and not having and roll through to
be a significant impact to your financial performance.
Heidi Wood:
Alright. You gave us color on when you are going to make
the decision on the program block, but maybe can you
give us more transparency on the process of how will you
make the determination for the accounting block size for
earnings recognition. And when you look at all of this
backlog that you have, obviously the implications of
these higher non-recurring is very different if you use a
400 block or an 800 block. Can you walk us through the
process of that?
James Bell:
I can Heidi. Let me start with history. Typically when we
got to a point of delivering the first airplane we sell it
about a 100, this in raw numbers on our new airplane
models. And as you mentioned typically the block turned
out to be -- the initial block turns out to be and about
400 airplane range. So what that is beyond the long
orders you look at what the market potential is for the
airplane you look at a time period over which you can
estimate your cost and estimate you revenue. And so you
take those things in consideration and then you settle on
what the accounting quantity is and then what's your
booking margin ought to be on these airplane as you
deliver them. Well in the case of the 787 we are going to
have probably a 1000, so by the time we deliver it. So we
are going to be more constrained by which obviously,
gives us great opportunity over a time period to
product good earnings and value for both us and our
customers and it also gives you great capacity to deal
with unknowns that you don't understand you will
experience as you look back to today. But we will be more
constrained about is what we'll be able to estimate over a
time period and what we'll be able to produce in that time
period. So you can get the significant opportunity we are
........................ ....-- -- -- --- -- -- -- --- -- -- --
going to have on the initial opening quantity here. But
what we see today and what we understand based on what
our contracts have in them, based on N-SAR, our very
very preliminary discussion with our customers, it is hard
to estimate what the customer settlements will be but we
do believe that whatever the opening quantity will be
based on the price theory I just described, there will be
significant profitability in the program today to cover.
Heidi Wood:
Well that's interesting so basically in the scenarios on this
initial program block, you're saying that in every
scenario the costs are still less than the revenues?
James Bell:
That's correct.
Heidi Wood:
Okay, thank you. And then one last one, if you don't mind,
again a bit of a doubles [divagate] question for you. You
had one 747 order in Q1 and a great booking quarter of
289 planes. You had 25 747s in '07, yet you are raising
the R&D and raising the non-recurring on the 747.
You've gone from some 280 changes on the wings that
started of mildly to what looks like to a whole new wing
design which is kind of $3 billion to $4 billion. Help us
understand why is that the right answer? I mean, we
knew there is backing out the door to buy 787s and your
costs are rising on the plane, we can understand it but in
this situation your costs are rising and we're not
getting confirmation for higher customer demand. Can
you walk us through your rationale there?
Jim McNernev:
Well hi this is Jim. I think we've about 110 orders for both
the freighter and the passenger. And I think James just
talked historically about models we've introduced at about
that rate and so we're already aware and we're still over a
year late from introduction. Now having said that, I will be
rest in Canada, if I didn't tell you I wish we had more
intercontinental orders which is I think what you were
talking about, the passenger version.
Heidi Wood:
Yeah.
James Bell:
Well we've 26 orders....
Heidi Wood:
And only one major customer....
Jim McNernev:
Yeah and one major customer, although the minor
customer would not appreciate your characterization there
by the way, but we're in discussions with about 8 to 10,
--------------------------
serious discussions with 8 to 10 major carriers. It is
impossible for me to predict how many of those will order
but typically when we're at this stage, a large number of
them would. So, I think we are still basing our spending on
what we perceive to be the market and by the way we are
up to a pretty good start with a 110 orders worth over a
year to go before we have to set accounting quantities and
the like. But I also wish we had another couple major
intercontinental orders right now and the guys are really
working hard at it and I think there is a good chance we'll
have some soon.
Howard Rubel (Jefferies):
Thank you very much. I want to go back to the R&D. You
kind of I mean we all live in glass houses in form or
another and you've sort of had to go through this a
couple time and raise that. Is there any change in
process that Jim that you need to look at in terms of
helping you think about estimates for programs?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Well, we can be better. I think if you're looking for a root
cause, it would probably center on the 87 development.
As we've struggled with getting the supply chain in
place and the costs associated with recovering from
that. We've been forced to keep an experienced set of
engineers on that program that had been planned to go
on off to other programs. The 47-8 that increased costs
as we scrambled to find the engineering capacity we
need the trading, we need outside help supplementation
from time to time, little more costly, so. I think part of
what you are seeing is the scramble but having said
that I'm not happy and Scott Carson is not happy with
our inability to get our arms around predicting the
development cost. The business case for both airplanes
remains good but we need to do a better job there and
we are working hard to do that. And we do not a have
shortage of business reviews around the subject.
Ron Epstein (Merrill Lynch):
A boarder strategic question for you Jim. If the tanker
stays with EADS and Airbus ends up setting up a wide-
body production in North America. I mean how will that
change the strategic outlook for the industry. I mean
how do you have to consider them now if you get your
competitor here in a dollar cost structure putting together
wide-bodies?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Yeah, I mean I think it wouldn't change the nature of
their business and it wouldn't introduce another
competitor. But would change where they produce or
have the capacity to produce some things. So it ultimately
gets down to a dollar based production site. If they end up
wining this thing believe me that site will be pre-
occupied with modifying freighters made in France forI
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a long time. So I'm not sure they'd immediately convert
hat into something else. So it's more of a geographic
deployment. They've announced similar things in China,
US. They've got lots of dispersed production in Europe.
It will not be an in complicated supply chain for them
to manage by the way as you look at from managing
manufacturing operations it will tough.
Ron Epstein:
Okay and then just one follow on if I may, I think
everybody else did. When you look at your suppliers
everything from raw material down to your Tier-I's, Tier-
II's, on the legacy programs. I mean how's the supply
chain doing?
James Bell:
On through legacy programs, its doing fine. Not that it
doesn't labor from time to time. I think the team quite
frankly is doing an excellent job on the legacy programs.
We've go through periods where certain raw materials are
scarce, other periods where quality funds are found. But I
would categorize them as being well managed and less
difficult than you probably imagine. Most of our supply
chain issues have been centered over and found the 787
development and those are well chronicled. So I am trying
to paint a picture, when I managing at everyday we are but
we have had no major disruptions in our production and
with our fingers crossed we think we can keep that record
going.
Robert SDin2arn (Credit Suisse):
Jim you've already noted earlier in the call the prevailing
weakness in broad economy and Boeing's very impressive
backlog here, and you said many times and you alluded to
this earlier that you resist the temptation to over ramp at
BCA. So with that said, what kind of backlog erosion
could Boeing tolerate before 2009 and lets say 2010
production plans would be impacted?
Jim McNerney (BoeinR):
Let me answer your question by a array of siding another
stressful time and that would be the recession 2000 and
then closely followed by 9/11. I think when you looked
what happened there roughly 6 or 7% of our orders ended
up being cancelled and that was a very tough situation.
There where a number of reschedules, a push outs, and
number that the majority didn't change. But we managed
to work through with our customers we are facing difficult
headwinds to say the least of that time. And a lot of those
orders were US based carriers then. And as you heard me
earlier describe that's in contrast where we are today, we
are the vast majority of orders 80% plus are with
international carriers backed by Ex-Im financing. So we
are in a stronger backlog position, today all you can use is
data here, because you can't predict future. So if you had
exactly the same situation happened to you as happened to
Iri~ri~
a I I
you in 2001 same kind of pressures although differently
constructed you can end up with something like that. And
I think that given that we have constraints on most of our
product lines right now, we can get people airplanes right
now. And as you say we are sort of a biased to be
cautious on the rate increases even though we are
increasing, but you add that all up, the strong ability to
managing the past when we got lacked. We are in pretty
conservative position to go again and return we have more
order than we have production. And so could there be
some impact? Yes. Would it be a major thing?
Probable not.
Robert SDingarn:
Let me also understand because I think you just said that if
you had a 6 to 7% cancellation to fuel environment which
is the similar trend that we saw following 9/11 is that what
you said?
Jim McNerney:
No I am just saying no. Because there were other factors
that impacted our financial performance. I was only
dealing with the question of volume and I was simply
pointing out that at that time we had more than 6%
deferrals okay 6% cancellations is what I said.
Robert SDingarn:
Okay.
Jim McNerney:
We tend to assume that kind of cancellation rate as we put
together our business plans and our financial promises.
Robert SDingarn:
Okay. Because people are going to look to the ramp
down from the '01 production rate of over 500 to 240
or so two years later and I want to clarify that's that
not what you are talking about?
Jim McNerney:
No, you are right. I mean that's not what I am trying to
portray and I can see, why I confused you. What I am
trying to say is that 6% orders loss were in much more --
and a lot of that ramp down was a result to push outs.
But we are in a much stronger position today in that or
insulated from economic conditions with most of our
orders outside the United States Ex-Im Bank financing. So
you would see a lot less deferrals in my opinion this
time around.
Lynn Lunsford (Wall Street Journal):
This has to do a little bit more with the deliveries on 787
kind of in the out years; some of your customers that have
airplanes that are way at the end of the delivery line here,
are kind of expressing a little bit of concern that the
delays will cascade down through the chain. Do youI I I
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have any sense of how far down the airplanes maybe
delayed by the slower ramp up? Is there a scenario that
all 900 of them could be delivered later than people had
thought?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Lynn, this is Jim. We don't believe that the slide will
impact all 900. Having said that we're still working
through exactly what the impact will be. As you know, I
think we've told you what's going to happen in '09 that the
ramp-up will be slower after that and full rate production
in 2012. We're seeing if that could be pulled in. We don't
know and we're seeing what we can do to ramp-up beyond
that, after that, that both of those could significantly
improve the situation and when we've thought through
that, we'll be able to be more precise with everybody. But
we don't see a scenario where all 900 would be
delivered late.
Hal Weitzman (Financial Times):
You said earlier Jim that EADS, if they were to end up
wining the tanker contract would face a complicated
supply chain and I just wanted, given your own
experiences with the 787, what have you learned in
terms of supply-chain issues?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Well, we have learned a lot and have the scars to prove
it; I guess would be my summary on the 87. I think having
real time visibility of your partner's inventory as well
as their rep as they as they are assembling things so a
global understanding of how things are coming
together all the way down to Tier 3 and 4 would have
helped us a lot. So, IT visibility, like we had on the
engineering side and so there is some learning there for us.
We are already doing it differently. And whether Airbus
chooses to learn from that or not is something that, then at
last they will be confronted with similar challenges and I
think they know it will not be easy.
Hal Weitzman:
The next time around, you're going to do things
differently?
Jim McNerney:
No, our strategy will be the same. We believe that
global leverage is important both from a cost and risk
mitigation standpoint. We might draw some lines at
different places, now that we understand our own
capabilities; better understand the capabilities of our
partners. I think we all learned and I think it will be more
of an adjustment to the strategy than a change in strategy.
Dominic Gates (Seattle Times):
I just wanted to clarify if something Heidi Wood has asked
about. She characterized a change to the 747-8 program.
The wing -- the change to the wing was effectively a
new wing and put a price tag on it, total price tag I
think of 747-8 development of somewhere between 3
and $4 billion. So, is the characterization of more or less
the whole new wing accurate and what about that price
tag?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
The wing was an issue we had to wrestle through.
There was some redesign that had to happen there, it
took us longer than we thought, but I think we are
largely through it. We feel comfortable with it and it did
explain a lot of the non-recurring pressure that we had
particularly last year.
Dominic Gates:
And is that increasing the cost to about the levels Heidi
cited of 3 to $4 billion?
Jim McNerney:
Yeah, I don't think we talk about that publicly. It
obviously cost more than we thought it was going in,
but we remain very comfortable that this will be a
profitable program and the business case remains
strong.
Mike Mecham (Aviation Week):
Hi. A couple of weeks ago, Steve talked about some
weight issues in the 787 continue to had in the -10 as
you know isn't a particular program yet, but those
implications there as to how you might set the company
up to compete with the A350, the larger A350s that
would creep into your 777 programs as competitors? Is
there any thinking about a development effort on 777 to
position against the A350 or are you confident that what
you have got definitive 300-ER?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
That's a good question. Obviously, the A350-1000 as it
comes together, it comes together as Airbus has
characterized it will in terms of its performance would put
some pressure on our longer range 777 fleet and we would
have to answer the question what we would do about it. So
it's very much of a wide issue. I think the driver is what
were the real performance of the A350-1000 be and since
that probably won't be introduced until 16ish, I am
guessing here, but I think that's right, it's introduced after
the 800 and 900, we have plenty of time to make the
decision on what kind of modification might be needed if
the performance does threaten the bottom of our long
range part of our 777 fleet. But given the order rates that
we continue to have on 777s, I don't think the marketplace
is all really worried about it yet, but it will be an issue we
have to address.
Suzanne O'Halloran (Bloomber:_
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You mentioned company-wide part gains in your release
and I am just wondering if you could give some examples.
And then also since your plane deliveries, I guess they will
be flat next year if you strip out the 787, does that means
you have already achieved all the productivity gains
that helps you with this deliveries last quarter?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
The productivity gains are pretty much across the board in
our productions programs. If you looked at both on IDS
and on commercial airplanes, you look at the 737 the 777
and you look at F-18, F-15, C-17 you would see good
year-over-year productivity on all of our major product
lines. It is an article to face ["of faith?"I each year that
we will make progress there. So I think its in across the
board story. And your other question I couldn't quite hear
you.
Suzanne O'Halloran:
I just was wondering it looks like your commercial plane
deliveries will be flat next year, if you strip out the 787,
and so I am wondering that that means you have already
achieved all the productivity gains with this delivery last
quarter?
Jim McNerney:
Absolutely, not. And I think the example I would cite
there is our largest facility, our Edward [Everett?] facility,
James mentioned it earlier, there are productivity efforts
that are just gaining maturity up there on the 777 in
particular and on the 747 that will produce significant
productivity for us even at rate. And there is still
productivity approvals year-over-year planned for renting
[Renton?] as well. So like I said it's an article of fake
Sfaith?], we never get there."
23 The Alan Firm a "The firm isn't done cost-cutting. According to people On a
April Wall Mulall close to Mr. Mulally, he is looking at selling Volvo. modular
2008 Street y, Similarly, he hopes to shutter the ailing Mercury brand. Enterpri
Journal, CEO, se
"Ford Ford More job cuts may be coming. In Ford's most recent Archite
Eyes Motor buyout offer, only about 4,000 workers signed on, about ct's
More Compa half the desired total. Mr. Mulally will likely offer one approac
Cuts As ny more round, then could resort to layoffs. 'Clearly, we h.
Recover have lots of mechanisms to keep taking the fixed costs
y out,' Mr. Mulally says.
Advanc
es" 'This is a classic example of how one can shrink to
(Mike grow,' says Peter Nesvold, an analyst at Bear Stearns.
Spector) Mr. Mulally 'is making many difficult decisions during
a down cycle, which should benefit the company as they
enter the next upturn.'
Mr. Mulally came to Ford from Boeing, the aircraft maker,
where he had spent his entire career. Boeing twice passed
him up for the CEO's job despite his work rehabilitating
Boeing's once struggling commercial airplane division
....... ..................----------------- ~
by borrowing efficiency ideas from Toyota.
Mr. Mulally wanted Ford's market share to reach its
'natural level' - the volume where cars sell without big
discounts. 'I don't care what market-share level you
are,' Mr. Mulally says, the goal is to 'get back to
profitability.'"
24 Reuters, Jacque Firm f "Striking workers disrupted production at Airbus factories On the
April "Four- s in France for four hours on Thursday in a dispute over quality
2008 hour Rocca, restructuring. The strike was called afer Airbus dropped and
strike Direct plans to sell some of its factories in Germany to an outside quantity
hits or of investor but pressed ahead with plans to sell two of its of labor
Airbus Comm three factories in France. French Unions say French and strikes
France unicati German plants should be treated equally. Airbus declined in an
Producti on, to comment. 'We will let the strike speak for itself,' said Integral
on." Airbus Jacques Rocca, director of communication at Airbus Enterpri
(Nicolas France France." se
Fichot, Archite
Jessica cture
Mead)
25 Bloomb Alan Firm a "'The confidence in our plan is really increasing,' said On a
April erg, Mulall Mulally, 62 in a Bloomberg Television interview modular
2008 "Ford y, yesterday. 'We said we had to aggressively restructure Enterpri
Chief CEO, to meet real demand.' se
Mulally Ford Archite
May Do Motor At Boeing, Mulally slashed employment as head of the ct's
for Compa commercial airplane division by more than half, to about approac
Automa ny 50,000 in eight years. He sped production of a more fuel- h.
ker efficient jetliner, the 787, and helped lay the groundwork
What for record orders.
He Did
at In his current post, Mulally has eliminated 46,300 jobs in
Boeing" North America over the past two years as Ford has closed
(Bill or scheduled to close nine plants to match its shrinking
Koenig) manufacturing footprint.
The system is patterned after Toyota, the automaker
Mulally studied when he was at Boeing."
28 Seattle Jim Firm a "Boeing Chairman and Chief Executive Jim McNerney On how
April Post- McNer knows a thing to two about rough play... a
2008 Intellige ney, modular
ncer, Chair 'Our view is the (tanker selection) process chose the enterpri
"Boeing man & wrong tanker,' McNerney said. 'Which is why we are se
Won't CEO, protesting. And everything we learn as we move thorough architec
back The the protest makes us feel better about having protested that t solves
Down, Boeing process.' disputes
but Compa with its
Civility ny In a report issued Monday, Loren Thompson, a noted custome
is Key defense expert at the Lexington Institute, wrote, 'If you r
In want to understand hower former allies end up going to
Tanker war - or former lovers end up getting divorced - take a
Dispute look at how Boeing and the Air Force are treating each
)" other in their angry confrontation over the award of a
(James next generation tanker program to Northrop Grumman.'
Wallace Thompson said that Air Force leaders believe Boeing 'is
) willfully misstating the facts in a bid to obscure the
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inferion performance of the plane it proposed. A
marathon session of Air Force acquisition experts two
weeks ago concluded that none of the 200 issues raised by
Boeing in its complaint to the GAO was likely to be
upheld, and that whatever minor problems the
accountability office might uncover would be far from
sufficient to overturn a competitive outcome that service
says was not close.' Beyond the merits of Boeing's case,
Thompson wrote, 'Air Force officials are insulted by the
tone of the company's public statements,' which have used
phrases such as 'deeply flawed' and 'severely
prejudiced' to describe the tanker selection process.
'There is nothing I'd like better than to get that work
back into our company,' McNerney... told shareholders
at the company's annual meeting.
29 The Jim Firm a "Boeing, chided by the Air Force along with Northorp On how
April Seattle McNer Grumman for the tone of its military-contract dispute, will a
2008 Times ney, avoid throwing 'sharp elbows' without backing down modular
"Boeing Chair from the protest, Chief Ececutive Officer Jim McNerney enterpri
Won't man & said Monday. se
Throw CEO, architec
'Elbows The Boeing lost its first chance at the contract in 2003 after an t solves
' in Boeing ethical scandal sent a company executive and a former Air disputes
Dispute Compa Force official to jail. 'There is a certain amount of with its
" ny shamelessness about Boeing's current campaign to custome
(Susann overturn the awarding of the tanker contract to a different r, (and
a Ray) company,' shareholder Peter Flaherty, president of the the
National Legal and Policy Center, said at Monday's respons
meeting. e of one
of its
investor
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29 Reuters Tom Firm 3 "'I am currently conducting a major review of the ramp On an
April "Airbus Enders up plan,' Chief Executive Tom Enders told reporters in Integral
2008 in , CEO, the United Arab Emirates. 'This is a very steep ramp up Enterpri
'Major Airbus and this is something one always needs to be concerned se
Review' about,' he said, calling it a 'difficult subject.' Archite
ofA380 ct's
Deliveri Enders said the company had a limited ability to save manage
es" money by cutting jobs because it needs staff to meet its ment of
(James delivery obligations. Airbus has already announced plans 'wicked
Cordahi to slash 10,000 jobs and sell plants to restore its messes'
) competitiveness. 'At a time of ramp up, cutting jobs has (i.e.
its limits so we are thinking seriously about structural high
measures,' he said. Enders said it might consider dynami
offshoring 'major parts of the work in manufacturing as c and
well as engineering because the cost is a very serious behavio
problem for us with the dollar at $1.50 to $1.60 (against ral
the euro).' But the challenge to offshoring, he said, was comple
in finding 'high quality and trained personnel' to ensure xity)
standards are maintained. Enders also noted that meeting
its targets also required suppliers to come through.
'The industry has multiple supplier problems and stuff
like that obviouisly has been taken into consideration
as well,' he added. 'There will be no miracles."'
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29 Forbes / Tom Firm "Unions at the EADS unit had called on employees to stop On the
April Thomps Enders work for two hours Tuesday between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 quantity
2008 om , CEO, a.m., at all of Airbus' French plants. The work stoppage, and
Financi Airbus which follows a four-hour stoppage last Thursday, quality
al coincided with an extraordinary meeting of Airbus of an
News. France's works council, to be followed by a meeting Integral
"Airbus between unions and the head of Airbus France, Fabrice Enterpri
France Bergier. se
Worker Archite
s Stop While unions claimed a higher mobilization Tuesday than cture's
Work to last Thursday, Airbus management said 30 percent of all labor
Protest employees of the Toulouse plants had taken part in the strikes
Sale of work stoppage. Last Thursday, French union Force
Plants Ouvriere, the largest union in Airbus, said that the strike
in was followed by 80 percent of Toulouse employees
France, compared to management's estimate of 60 percent."
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8 Seattle Boeing Firm a "Although The Boeing Co. 's 787 Dreamliner may be only On a
May Post- 15 months or so behind schedule, delivery delays will be modular
2008 Intellige as much as twice as long for some customers... 24 to 30 enterpri
ncer, months late. se
"Some architec
Buyers Some industry analysts are forecasting that the 787 delays ture's
Will could end up costing Boeing as much as $4 billion or more backtrac
Get in penalty payments. king
787s 2- from
1/2 Boeing is drastically cutting 787 production... ramping modular
Years up production much more slowly than first planned. instabili
Late" 'We are still working through what the impact will be,' ty
(James McNerney said. 'But we don't see a scenario where all torward
Wallace 900 would be delivered late."' integral
) stability
8 Bloomb Tom Firm- a "Boeing Co.s' delayed 787 Dreamliner may give its two On a
May erg, Wrobl Labor main unions extra leverage in contract talks. 'Unions modular
2008 "Boeing ewski, have the upper hand now,' said Richard Aboulafia, an enterpri
Unions IAM analyst with Teal Group, an aviation consulting firm. se
May Preside 'They're determined to get their share of the good architec
Use 787 nt; Ray times.' 'The last two negotiations, we were at the mercy ture's
Delay Gofort of the company,' said Thomas Wroblewski, president of increasi
for h, the International Association of Machinists' Seattle-based ngly
Contrac SPEEA District 751. Boeing's Puget Sound-area machinists have short-
t executi gone on strike six times since the union was founded in term
Leverag ve 1935. With profit and demand rising, the union is in 'the relation
e" directo best position we've been in a long time,' Wroblewski ship
(Susann r; said. 'Its our time this time.' with
a Ray) James labor,
Bell, The Society of Professional Engineering Employees in
Boeing Aerospace has staged work stoppages twice, most
CFO recently for 40 days in 2000. 'We seem to be on a repeat
pattern this year with the same kinds of issues that
provoked our members the last time,' said Ray Goforth,
who took over as executive director. 'There could be some
serious conflict this fall. I'm hoping not, but it's looking
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pretty bad.'
'Outsourcing is obviously a concern for us,' Goforth said
in his Seattle office, where a poster with a picture of the
787 says, 'Bring back the work so it's done right.'
Boeing Chief Financial Officer James Bell said that the
company may do more production itself and have
back-up capacity at its own facory if a supplier gets
into trouble. 'In some cases we drew the line too far
and we ought to pull back a bit and retain some of the
work,' Bell said. 'But it wold only be a moderate bit.'
'We absolutely believe in this model,' Bell said. 'It is
the model you will see us using going forward."'
8 Seattle Doug Firm- a "Doug Kight, head of human resources and labor relations On a
May Post- Kight, Labor for Boeing's commercial airplanes unit, outlined some of modular
2008 Intellige VP the company's thinking. One of Boeing's key worries is enterpri
ncer, HR, that its growing obligation to fund its employee pension se
"Boeing Boeing plan could undercut its ability to maintain booming architec
Comm orders and a massive backlog. 'In a long-term business ture's
Machini ercial like Boeing, where you have long-term capital increasi
sts Airpla investment requirements to invest in your new ngly
Union nes products and the design of your next generation of short-
Open airplanes, a market downturn that all of a sudden term
Contrac obligates you to spend billions and billions to fund your relation
t pension is a real challenge,' Kight said. 'We've got to ship
Negotia have more stability and predictability so that we can have with
tions" some assurance that we've got the resources there to labor,
(Jessica invest in the product line.' (as well
Mintz) as its
The proposal, which the union opposes, is also designed to slightly
make Boeing more attractive with a younger generation inconsis
of workers who may not stay at the plane maker for tent
five years and want a retirement plan that's portable logic
and vests immediately, Kight said. Citing a 7 percent and
annual increase in health care costs, Kight said Boeing is focus on
asking the Machinists to accept a modest increase in what exogeno
workers pay for coverage and elimination of early retiree us
medical benefits for new hires who retire before age 65. events)
The union has threatened to strike ove the company's
pension demands. 'They're posturing to take away
benefits that we've fought hard for,' said Tom
Wroblewski, president of Machinists Union Local 751 in
Seattle, adding a jab about Boeing's much-delayed new
jetliner: 'That strategy is as flawed as their 787
production system.' Wroblewski said Boeing's
blockbuster earnings, most recently a 38 percent jump in
profit to $1.2 billion in the first three months of 2008,
should support more benefits for workers, not the cuts
and higher costs Boeing proposes. The union struck for
30 days over company demands to cut retiree medical
benefits, Wroblewski noted. 'I can't believe they would
come back again and want to talk about that again,' he
said. He also said the union wants higher pay for all levels
of workers, in addition to any productivity incentive
plan, [as] the company is also considering incentive plans
offering workers extra pay for improving productivity.
I ~
The Machinists will also try to regain control over jobs
lost to outsourcing, Wroblewski said. He would not give
any details about the union's proposals in that area.
Boeing spokesman Tim Healy said Boeing's outsourcing
of jobs and deals with suppliers around the world is in
response to customer demands and rapid growth.
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20 Forbes, Louis Firm 3 "EADS NV CEO Louis Gallois said there is 'no urgency' On an
May "EADS' Gallois in finding investors for the subsidiaries it is creating to integral
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'No CEO The priority is 'maintining the development rythym of architec
Urgenc the A350 XWB', the company's forthcoming wide-body ture's
y' to aircraft programme, due to enter service in 2013, Gallois time
Find said at a press briefing. horizon
Investor s.
s for Gallois said the company's cash position means finding
Airbus investors to take stakes in the subsidiaries is not urgent, but
Site we do not want the discussions 'prolonged for ever.'
Units"
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2008 "Boeing ney, er partners around the world to share the cost, risk and enterpri
Positive Chair potential profits of new airplanes, but it will change the se
Heading man way it manages the system with any new airplanes. The architec
Forward and company lost its line of sight deep into its global supply ture's
" CEO, chain and was surprised by some of the shortcomings that learning
(David The caused delays, McNerney said. 'We should be managing to
Griesin Boeing the supply chain as if corporate borders do not exist,' integrat
g) Compa McNerney said. Boeing did not have adequate systems e its
ny and people in place 'to see and manage as well as we supplier
could have,' he added. "We still believe that the global- relation
supply-chain model is the way to do this thing. We just ships.
didn't get it right the first time. We're on the bleeding
edge of taking a big, big step that was just a quarter
step too far.'
22 Chicago Pat Firm a "'In some aspects it will be a photo finish, but I'm highly On a
May Tribune, Shanih confident we will get power on in June,' Shanihan said. modular
2008 "Boeing an, enterpri
Positive head se
Heading of 787 architec
Forward progra ture's
" m, The over-
(David Boeing promise
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22 Flight Didier Firm f "The A350 fuselage's structural design comprises On an
~p II~;;;;;;~;~;~~~~~ I
May Internat Evrard carbonfibre panels and frames, together with metallic integral
2008 ional, , cross-beams - a departure for Airbus which has enterpri
"Airbus Airbus traditionally used aluminum for the bulk of the fuselage se
Set to A350 structure. 'We need to have a very mature technology architec
Roll progra both from the technical and the manufacturing point of ture's
Out mme view,' says A350 programme chief Didier Evrard. technol
Carbonf chief ogy
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23 Bloomb Louis Firm- t "Airbus SAS, the world's largest commercial aircraft On an
May erg, Gallois Investo maker, is valued at 'less than zero' after this year's 32% integral
2008 "Airbus , EADS r drip in the shares of parent EADS according to Lehman enterpri
at 'Less CEO Brothers Holdings Inc. analyst Joe Campbell. 'The se
Than market is viewing Airbus as a liability, rather than an architec
Zero' asset,' said Campbell, 62, who is based in New York and ture's
Value has ranked among the top five aerospace analysts for six overinv
Still consecutive years in an Institutional Investor magazine estment
Loses poll. (as a
Altitude mixed
'" EADS, on May 13 reported an additional three-month uopolist
(Andrea delay in deliveries of the A380 superjumbo jetliner, ) and
Rothma which was already two years behind schedule. Airbus is subsequ
n) also six months to a year late on the A400M military ent
transport. valuatio
n
The planemaker sought in part to shift investment for
new planes to subcontractors who would buy Airbus
plants. It chose local companies in France and Germany
that lacked the capital to shoulder the risk and the plan
fell apart.
Investors' low valuation of Airbus is 'a bizarre outcome
for a large company,' Campbell, whose firm is an
investment bank for EADS, said in an interview. 'It
reflects both the industrial challenges of engineering and
making big airplane programs, and particularly and
primarily, the euro trading at $1.50 or $1.60.' He rates
the shares 'equal weight.'
EADS's non-Airbus assets are worth 15 or 16 euros a
share, or about where the stock is trading, estimates
Campbell. Non-Airbus businesses contribute a third of the
company's sales, which totaled 39.1 billion euros in 2007.
Scott Babka and Rupinder Vig at Morgan Stanley in
London say EADS without Airbus is worth 13.5 euros a
share. Getting an aircraft maker for free might
provide a floor for the stock, according to Vig. In an
interview, [EADS CEO] Gallois agreed with Lehman's
Campbell about EADS's valuation. 'He's right,' Gallois
said. 'Either you're getting Airbus free or the other
activities are free. In any case, the shares don't
represent the company's value. Our shares are very
linked to the dollar - I'd say too much [linked to the
dollar]."'
When EADS was founded in 2000, management
promised 10 percent margins on earnings before
interest and taxes by 2003. The best so far was 7.3
percent in 2005. CEO Louis Gallois in March 2008
forecast margins on earnings before interest and tax at
Airbus 'in the mid-single digits' through about 2011.
'As long as Gallois and Enders and people at the top of
the company can't give guidance that EBIT margins
will go above 5 percent, there's not a lot of incentive to
buy the shares,' said Klaus Breil of Cominvest Asset
Management in Frankfurt.
28 Internat Richar Industr a "Aboulafia said he figured that the heaviest expenditures at On a
May ional d y & Airbus for the A350 - around 2013, when the plane is modular
2008 Herald Aboula Analys t scheduled to be introduced - would coincide with the low industry
Tribune, fia, t ebb in its production cycle. By then, he predicted, analysts
"WTO Teal Boeing will turn out 447 planes a year, compared with 296 '
Ruling Group for Airbus. systema
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28 Busines Jim Firm a "Boeing Chairman and CEO Jim McNerney has taken his On a
May sWeek, McNer share of hits lately. The ambitious 787 Dreamliner is modular
2008 "Faceti ney, about 15 months behind schedule, and in late March, enterpri
me with Chair Boeing lost out on a multi-billion dontract to build a fleet se
Boeing' man & of refueling tankers for the U.S. Air Force. Boeing's architec
s Jim CEO, stumbles have caught many by surprise, primarily t'sment
McNern The because McNerney, a disciple of former GE CEO Jack al
ey" Boeing Welch, is held in such high regard. models
(Maria Compa ofover-
Bartiro ny Boeing stock went from 100 to 75 because of delays with promise
mo) the Dreamliner, How did you allow that to happen? 'Well and
I would characterize the 787 as bleeding-edge under-
innovation, all right? The good news is we have market deliver
acceptance for this airplane that has been better than
any airplane ever marketed.'
.......... ;;;;;;;;;;;;
Do you have any regrets about the way you handled it?
Some people say: 'Look, he's a high-profile manager
and highly regarded. How come he was so low-profile
during such an important time for the company?' 'I
don't think the guys in Seattle would characterize me
as low-profile regarding my involvement with the 787.
Having said that, you can always look back on these
situations and say if I'd moved two months earlier here
or a month and a half earlier there... we probably
could be in slightly better shape... I can learn from
that.'
What kind of confidence do you have that the targets
you've got for the 787 will be met? 'We have a high level
of confidence. It's still the most successful introduction
in aviation history.'
I was talking with a money manager who has a position in
Boeing stock, and he said: 'The dollar has put enormous
pressure on Airbus, and yet they're outselling Boeing in
the smaller end of the market.' How is that possible?
Why haven't you been more successful there? 'The
fact is our sales levels are about the same in the
narrow-body segment... so I wouldn't characterie us as
losing out in the narrow-body side. But our competitor
has been doing a good job there.'
You've got roughly $12 billion in cash right now. A lot
of people might say: 'That's about $16 a share. We would
like a high dividend or more acquisitions.' Are there any
plans to use that case differently? 'We are mindful of
the employees first - in terms of pension plans and
health-care plans - and our investors. But you have to
remember, aerospace is a lumpy industry. I'm a pretty
conservative manager who likes to keep probably more
than enough cash around.'"
1 Seattel Scott Firm a "Although sky-high aviation fuel prices have thown a On a
June Post- Carson scare into the airline industry not since the horrendous 9/11 modular
2008 Intellige , downturn that resulted in massive layoffs at The Boeing enterpri
ncer, Preside Company, the leader of the compnay's jetliner business se
"Boeing nt & said that the aerospace giant will be able to manage its architec
Says It CEO, way through the current crisis without much impact - ture's
can Boeing at least for now. 'In terms of the impact on us, it is all ability
Handle Comm very manageable right now,' Scott Carson, president and to see
Airline ercial chief executive of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said in and
Fuel Airpla an interview. 'It is all consistent with patterns we have understa
Crisis- nes seen in the past and we have provided for those patterns,' nd
For added Carson. exogeno
Now" us
(James events.
Wallace
4 Spirit Rick Suppli at "Potential Headwinds for Margin Expansion: On the
June Aerosys Schmi er & * Lower margins on 787 first 500-unit block cost of
2008 tems dt, * Cyclical downturn in large commercial instabili
Investor CFO, deliveries." ty in a
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5 Seattle John Firm "'You don't bite off more than you can chew,' Leahy On an
June Post- Leahy, said in an interview. 'I think we learned that on the A380,' integral
2008 Intellige Airbus he added. 'It was a very painful tuition. We needed to enterpri
ncer, COO have a slower ramp-up, better program management se
"Airbus and better coordination of the supply chain. Boeing architec
says It didn't learn those lessons from us, and so it's repeating ture's
Won't the mistakes with the 787. We have been watching very approac
Repeat carefully.' h to
Errors, stability
Delays" Airbus plans a much less ambitious production ramp- , and the
(James up on the A350 than Boeing initially proposed for the modular
Wallace 787, Leahy said. Boeing recently revised [its original] enterpri
) target and will ramp up 787 production at a slower and se
more traditional pace. Leahy said he and others at architec
Airbus had believed for some time that Boeing would ture's
never be able to meet its initial 787 production targets. predisp
'We thought their ramp-up was way too ambitious,' he osition
said. 'Our people said they would not be able to match to
thant five years later on the A350, and it turned out 'over-
that maybe we were right.' He said Airbus has built promise
'cushions' into the A350 schedule to allow for the kinds and
of development and production issues that always crop up under-
on new airplane programs. 'It is always more difficult in deliver'.
reality than sitting around in meetings and deciding
how fast things can get done.' 'We will have a much
slower ramp-up than Boeing had with the 787, with
extra padding built in for our program based on our
experience with the A380 and what we learned from
(Boeing) on the 787,' Leahy said. 'I think we will be
right on time. I'm hoping even a bit early.' Leahy said
Boeing's delays on the 787 mean the competing A350-900
will be getting to market at almost the same time as the
787-9, and that's where the real battle between the
planes will be fought. Because of the delays, Boeing
recently said delivery of the bigger 787-9 has been pushed
back until 2012, or just one year before the A350 arrives.
The A350-900 will be the first version that Airbus
delivers, in 2013. The smaller A350-800 will come next,
followed by the biggest A350-1000 in 2015. Leahy long
maintained that Boeing made the 787-8 too small. 'The
787-8 is too small for a widebody plane,' Leahy said.
'I'm even discovering that my A350-800 might be a bit
small. Most airlines are pushing for bigger capacity.'
'Airbus has an A350-1000 that absolutely kills the 777-
300ER,' he said, 'and they know it."'
9 Reuters, Mike Firm a "Boeing Co. said on Monday its 787 Dreamliner would On a
June "Boeing Bair, make its first flight in the fourth quarter of 2008, repeating modular
2008 's 787 VP, the revised schedule for the new airplane's launch enterpri
Dreamli Busine announced in April. The company clarified its schedule se
ner First ss after Mike Bair, vice-president of business strategy and architec
I***~ ~t"i
Flight Strateg marketing at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said on ture's
On y & Sunday the plane would fly 'by the end of the summer.' tendenc
Schedul Market He did not say that the schedule had changed." y to
e," ing, overpro
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11 The Elmer Suppli a "Vought Chief Executive Elmer Doty said today that his On a
June Seattle Doty, er company pulled out of one part of Boeing's 787 modular
2008 Times CEO, Dreamliner program because it didn't have direct enterpri
"Vough Vought management control over other suppliers. Doty se
t Chief compared the complicated supply chain that must deliver architec
Elmer parts for a new jet to a relay race where each member of ture's
Doty the team must run in sequence. 'A year ago ago, dis-
Explain definitely we were at the back of the pack,' Doty said. integrati
s Why 'We've moved to the middle of the pack, and we're on.
Compan moving up. The thing about this race is, it only counts
y Pulled when everyone gets across the finish line.'
Out of
Part of Boeing did not disclose what it paid Vought for the
Boeing' ownership stake, which leaves Boeing and Alenia of Italy
s 787 as 50-50 partners in the joint venture. Tuesday in
Progra Charleston, Bob Noble, vice president in charge of
m," Boeing's 787 supply chain, insisted to skeptical
(Domini journalists that Boeing hadn't bought Vought out
c Gates) Global Aeronautica (GA) wasn't working well. 'It was
not performance-related,' said Noble.
Enzo Caiazzo, GA 's chairman and also chief operating
officer of Alenia North America, went further and insisted
that Vought's four-year participation in GA could not
be considered a failure because it had created a state-
of-the-art airplane manufacturing plant on a
previously empty site.
Speaking in a phone interview vrom Vought headquarters
in Dallas, Texas, Doty gave his take on why it happened.
Doty said Vought's role in the GA venture became
problematic when the supply chain broke down and
work supposed to have been completed at other major
suppliers traveled to Charleston for GA to finish. GA
takes large sections from Alenia as well as from Fuji and
Kawasaki in Japan and integrates them with a lot of
Boeing-furnished parts. The problem was that Vought
had no control over the procurement of those large
pieces, Doty said. Boeing, as the prime contractor, was
responsible for managing those major partners. To
manage the traveled work efficiently, you need that
responsibility,' Doty said. Though the half share in GA
accounted for less than 10 percent of Vought's 787
program revenue, he said, 'It was a huge distraction and
difficult to execute' because GA lacked that partner
oversight role. 'That is best done by the prime,' Doty
said. After discussions with the 787 leadership team,
~;;;;;;;;;~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~ Ith
Boeing agreed.
Initial customer payments won't begin to flow until at least
14 months later than originally planned and after that more
slowly than anticipated as Boeing holds down the new
jet's delivery rate. Boeing paid Vought a cash advance
of $122 million in March as partial restitution for that
loss of cash flow. Further payments are being
discussed. A person familiar with the negotiations said
Doty played hardball with Boeing, insisting that the
company wouldn't continue to build parts - grindin the
whole 787 supply chain relay race to a halt - unless
Vought got paid. In the interview today, Doty would say
only: 'It's a negotiation. Boeing is my biggest
customer.'
With sales of the Dreamliner sky high, the program
will likely deliver big profits in time. But with revenue
flow pushed out, for now all the suppliers are hurting
as they continue to spend big. Struggling financially,
Vought secured $200 million in loans in the first
quarter. 'Of course, it's a good idea to be on the
program,' Doty said. 'You're talking to someone who
just arranged to take out additional debt and worked
hard to find ways to finance this program.' The money
from the GA sale will help, too.
Longer term, private equity firm the Carlyle Group,
which owns Vought, is looking to sell the company.
Possible buyers include Spirit Aerosystems of Wichita,
Kan., or conceivably Boeing itself. Doty said he couldn't
comment on prospective buyers. 'We were for sale the
day 1 walked in,' said Doty, who became CEO in
February 2006. 'My job is to continue to build."'
12 The Firm a "The argument that U.S. jobs should factor into the On a
June Seattle contract decision goes against Boeing's long-standing modular
2008 Times, support of free trade and globalization. It's also enterpri
"Boeing contrary to the view of Boeing's major defense rivals - and se
's not only Northrop. architec
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13 The Terry Suppli a "Terry George, Spirit's 787 director of operations, On an
June Seattle George er attributed the success here to the company's Boeing integral
2008 Times," ,787 heritage, its familiarity with Boeings' tools and relation
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processes, and the expericnce that managers here,
including himself, gained in past stints in Everett. 'We
had a lot of Boeing DNA,' said George."
"Spirit is erecting a plant in Kinston, N.C., to build the
A350 fuselage-panels, but will assemble them in
Europe. Ron Brunton, executive vice president and chief
operating officer, said it isn't clear if Spirit will own that
assembly plant. Given that guarded response, it seems
possible Spirit workers may end up doing assembly at
an Airbus location."
"European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. Wednesday
said it is still working on a package of additional cost-
cutting measures for its commercial aircraft subsidiary
Airbus, and hinted it might miss its deadline of rolling
out the plan by the summer. The raft of additional
measures to supplement the Power8 cost-saving and
restructuring progam announced in early last year and
aimed at achieving cost savings of EUR 2.1 billion by
2010 'will be ready when it's ready,' EADS Chief
Executive Louis Gallois told a press luncheon. He added,
'I'm not going to let my calendar be influenced by
pressure from outside the company."'
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18 CNN, Louis Firm- 3 "Gallois said that once it has carved out two industrial On the
June "EADS Gallois Investo facilities in France into a separate subsidiary, Airbus will way an
2008 CEO - , EADS r have four tier-one suppliers of aerostructures in France: integral
New Chief EADS' subsidiary Socata, Sogerma, Latecorere SA and the enterpri
Airbus Execut Airbus entity that will initially be 100% owned by EADS. se
Cost ive 'Maybe in the future we will look for a solution architec
Saving involving a certain consolidation of theses tier-one ture
Plan suppliers. I think it's desirable,' the CEO said." restruct
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18 Chicago George Firm- ct "Orders are starting to slow for planemakers Boeing Co. On the
June Tribune, Shapir Custo & and Airbus SAS after three straight years of record- modular
2008 "Boeing o, mer B shattering sales. What's unclear is whether airlines are nature
, airbus analyst taking a breather after splurging on more than 7,300 of the
Jet , Citi new aircraft, or whether they are headed for a global global
Orders Invest shakeout that will force them to cancel or defer plane airline
Tailing ment orders on a large scale. industry
Off', Resear in
(Julie ch; Analyst George Shapiro of Citi Investment Research sees creating
Johnsso Randy early signs that a sharp downturn looms for the the
n) Tinset planemakers and the companies that supply them. The boom
h, VP aerospace sector to date has been largely unaffected by the and bust
Market twin forces squeezing airlines: an oil shock and slowing order
ing, economy. Shapiro predicted in a research note Tuesday and
Boeing that 'over the next several months, orders will fall off delivery
Comm sharply, cancellations and deferrals will increase.' He cycle;
ercial thinks the next downturn could be the steepest since the as well
Airpla 1989 market correction, when about one-third of as the
nes; Chicago-based Boeing's order backlog was canceled. modular
John Boeing and Airbus say they are closely monitoring oil's nature
Leahy, impact on global travel but believe they are protected by a of
COO, record backlog of orders that will keep production lines Boeing.
Airbus at both companies humming for the next seven years.
'This is going to create great strain on the airlines,' Randy
Tinseth, vice president for marketing with Boeing's
commercial airplane division, told the Tribune last week.
'We're watching it very closely.' Other analysts
downplay the risk to Airbus and Boeing. 'With such deep
backlogs, whether a particular customer receives delivery
of an aircraft next year or in three years is of little
consequence to the [manufacturers],' said Brian Studioso,
aerospace analyst with CreditSights Inc., in a report
Tuesday. Shapiro believes foreign carriers will widely
adopt the survival tactics that have taken hold in the U.S.:
price hikes, parked aircraft and cash preserved at all costs.
'Usually, airline profitability takes two years to go from
peak to a loss, but it will likely be only one year this
time, increasing the tisk of a sharp downturn,' Shapiro
wrote.
Most affected will be orders for smaller jets, known as
narrow-bodies, that carry passengers over short hops,
Shapiro said. Orders for larger aircraft have held up in
other industry downturns and this time will be buoyed by
late deliveries of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner and Airbus'
A380 superjumbo jets. While new narrow-body aircraft
are more fuel-efficient than older models, the savings
aren't great enough to offset the costs of financing the
new jets, said Vince Kolber, president of Residco, a
Chicago-based firm that invests in aircraft. Shapiro thinks
that cash-strapped carriers will do the math and decide
it is cheaper to stick with older planes, reducing the
volume of replacement orders at the manufacturers.
..............................
But Boeing isn't taking the current situation lightly. Its
managers meet weekly to match current and future
sales with production schedules, a practice it started
during the airline collapse following the Sept. 11 attacks.
'The important thing is that we actively manage our
production system,' Tinseth said. Airbus, too actively
manages its order book, Chief Operating Officer John
Leahy told the Tribune last week via e-mail. 'So far,
[Airbusl is handling the airline crisis well, but if the fuel
price bubble were to soar to $200 per barrel, then all
bets would be off,' he wrote.
19 Busines Gover a "'We're going to the mat,' vows Representative Norm On a
June s Week, nment Dicks (D-Wash.). Their quest: Round up enough modular
2008 "How congressional votes to stymie funding for the tankers enterpri
Big is unless Boeing gets the deal." se
Boeing' architec
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19 Forbes, Zafar Investo a "It was business as usual for European Aeronautic Defense On the
June "EADS Khan, rs & and Space share on Thursday, closing down - but in line market'
2008 Shares Analys B with the sector - after Boeing clawed back a victory over a s
Shrug t, disputed fuel-tanker congract with the United States Air relative
Off Societe Force. Shares in European Aeronautic Defense and Space valuatio
Boeing Gener fell 2.5%, or 34 euro cents (53 cents), to 13.21 euros n of a
Victory ale ($20.48), in Paris on Thursday. But this was not an modular
" isolated plummet: BAE Systems closed down 2.8%, in and an
(Lionel London, while component-supplier Meggitt lost 2.1%. integral
Laurent The European aerospace sector is squeezed on all sides by enterpri
) eye-wateringly high oil prices, a weak dollar and the se under
imminent prospect of a recession in the aviation sector. So a
it was not surprising th see EADS's stock perform in line commo
with its peers, despite fresh coubts over a U.S. Air Force n event.
contract awareded to EADS partner Northrop Grumman
that could now end up going to Boeing. 'In our view, this
is not the big issue in people's minds at the moment,' said
Zafar Khan, analyst with Societe Generale. 'Its more a
sentiment issue than hard numbers.'
Boeing's shares closed up 3.1%, to $76.95 in New York on
Thursday. Northrop Grumman, its chief competitor for the
fuel-tanker, was not far behind: its shares closed up 1.9%,
to $71.35."
19 Bloomb Louis Firm "Airbus, the world's largest maker of commercial planes, On an
June erg Gallois said it will continue increasing production even as integral
2008 News, , CEO, airlines under pressure from high oil prices may defer enterpri
"Airbus EADS or cancel aircraft orders. Airbus is ramping up se
Speedin production rates until it can turn out 40 single-aisle architec
g, Not planes and as many as 11 widebody airliners a month ture's
Slowing by the end of 2010, Louis Gallois, chief executive of need /
Airbus, said Wednesday. 'For now, we don't see any ability
Producti movement in that sense, but we're following the market to
............... ------------------ ~"
on" very closely,' Gallois said. 'At the last shareholder continu
(Andrea committee meeting of Airbus, we looked at the airlines, ally
Rothma one by one. And right now there's nothing that leads expand.
n) us to panic for airlines.' Airbus has a backlog of 3,655
planes, or more than six years of work. It delivered a
record 453 planes to airline customers last year and is
planning to deliver about 470 this year. At least 24 airlines
have quit operating or filed for bankruptcy protection this
year as record fuel prices eat into earnings and a global
tightening or credit slows economies. Airlines may report
combined losses of $6.1 billion this year, the worst since
2003, the International Air Transport Association said
earlier this month. Gallois also said that the European
Aeronautic Defence and Space Co., Airbus' parent, is still
grappling with the challenges of meeting production
schedules on the A380 superjumbo and the A400 military
transport. The company should get those issues under
control in 2008, he said."
19 Bloomb Louis Firm 3 "Gallois said Airbus job cuts in Germany have been On an
June erg Gallois slower in coming than in France, Spain and the U.K. integral
2008 News, , CEO, because labor laws make the process of letting people go enterpri
"Airbus EADS more cumbersome." se
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20 Aviation Scott Firm c "The 787-10, although not formally launched, would be a On a
June Week Carson double-stretch of the basic 787-8 and the top end of that modular
2008 "Boeing , aircraft family, But Boeing Commercial Airplanes enterpri
Reconsi Preside President Scott Carson says the paramount consideration se
ders nt & now is whether the double-stretch concept makes sense. architec
Plan for CEO, Carson, however, says the company is 'not threatened' ture's
787-10" Boeing by Airbus activities. inability
(Robert Comm to
Wall) ercial One of the challenges for the Seattle manufacturer will be perform
Airpla finding the industrial resources to birth the twin- long-
nes widebody in the same timeframe as the 737 term
replacement." product
strategy.
20 Aviation Robert Investo a "A new analysis finds that a quarter or more of the On a
June Week Stallar rs commercial aircraft backlog at Boeing Co. and Airbus modular
2008 "Analys d, could be at risk as high oil prices continue to batter enterpri
t: 25% directo airlines. The two aircraft builders have taken comfort that se
of r, the hardest-hit segment of the industry - U.S. airlines - architec
Aircraft Macqu accounts for just 12% of their backlogs. But Robert ture's
Ordersa arie Stallard, a director at Macquarie Capital, warns that inability
t Risk" Capita orders from undercapitalized startups in Asia and to see
(Joseph I Europe and carriers with overly aggressive growth long-
C. plans also are at risk. He believes 25-30% of the term
Anselm backlog of commercial aircraft orders could be trends
o) deferred or canceled. 'The question that has yet to be due to
~ii~~;;;;;;;~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~;;; -- ""i
answered is not whether there will be a downturn, but how its
bad it will be,' says Stallard. myopia.
There are two schools of thought on how to answer.
Optimists believe that with backlogs equal to seven
years worth of production, Boeing and Airbus can
afford to lose orders and still make it to the industry's
next up-cycle with minimal pain. They argue that
demand for air travel should continue to grow in places
like China and India, making up for declines in other
regions. Indeed, Boeing refuses to lower its 20-year
demand outlook, even though the forecase is based on
oil selling at a fairy tale price of $70-80 per barrel when
in reality it's closed ro $140. The second, more negative
answer is that a step change in global energy demand has
created a permanent era of high prices and sent the airline
industry into unchartered territory. While many of the
challenges of the last downturn - overcapacity,
inefficiency, labor costs -were within management's span
of control, this time there is no obvious remedy. As cash
reserves rapidly dwindle, all choices will have to be
draconian."
20 Boeing Pat Firm a "In completing the Power On sequence, we have verified On a
June website Shanah both that the electrical power distribution system is modular
2008 an, VP installed as designed and that it functions as intended." enterpri
787 se
Proga architec
m, ture' s
Boeing achieve
Comm ment of
ercial a
Airpla milesto
nes ne, 5
months
later
than
originall
y
planned.
23 ATW, Renee Firm a "Both [Airbus] Martin-Nagle and Boeing MD- On the
June "Airbus Martin & Environmental Strategy Billy Glover see a bright future for contrast
2008 , Boeing - I biofuels, although they differed somewhat on a timeline. ing rates
Commit Nagle, 'It's a long process,' Martin-Nagle said. 'We have to of
ted to Airbus move through a testing phase and then it has to be technol
Biofuels North proved. I'd say 8-10 years.' ogical
but Americ innovati
Differ a VP; Glover, by contrast, told attendees, 'I'm quite a bit more on
on Billy optimistic."' which
Target Glover underly
Date" , MD modular
(Sandra Enviro and
Arnoult nmenta integral
) 1 enterpri
Strateg se
y, architec
Boeing turs
23 Busines Tom Firm 3 "The French also say they are bearing the brunt of the so- On the
June s Week Enders called Power 8 restructuring plan to slash $7.5 billion in difficult
2008 "A ,CEO, operating costs bu 2010. As of March 31, Airbus's y of
Granco- Airbus German operations have achieved only 23% of the cost maintai
German reduction target, while the French operations had ning
Civil achieved 39%. 'The social climate is not good,' Airbus integrali
War at boss Tom Enders acknowledged in an interview published ty.
Airbus? June 23 in the French business newspaper La Tribune.
"(Carol 'It's impossible to change everything at the same time
Matlack and at the same speed. To have a total, permanent
) equilibrium, as some of our unions want, is absolutely
unrealistic,' Enders said. Enders told La Tribune that he
understood the concerns in Toulouse about the large
number of Germans working in the factory. 'I asked the
same thing when I arrived last year,' he said. 'But the sad
reality is, the lack of integration in Airbus, caused by an
organization of work along national lines as well as
different kinds of training and language problems,
forced us to bring a large number of Germans' to complete
the work that had been started in Germany. As for moving
some aircraft cabin work to Toulouse, Enders said, 'It was
a decision that went against the traditional division of
labor, and it proves that the management is reacy to
make pragmatic decisions if necessary.'"
24 Boeing Rick Firm - a "The Boeing Company is introducing a new retirement On a
June website Stephe Emplo benefit program for nonunion employees hired or rehired modular
2008 ns, yee on or after Jan. 1, 2009. 'We are changing our retirement enterpri
Senior program for nonunion new hires for several reasons,' said se
VP, Rick Stephens, senior vice president, Boeing Human architec
Human Resources and Administration. 'This new approach ture's
Resour addresses new employee preferences for retirement continu
ces programs that offer flexibility and portability and ed
and responds to market trends and practices of peer disinteg
Admin companies. At the same time, it allows us to better ration of
istratio manage our retirement plan expenses and reduce the
n, The financial risk.' " firm-
Boeing labor
Compa link.
25 Reuters, Richar Investo a "Boeing Co. shares fell to a two-year low on Wednesday On a
June "Boeing d r- Firm after Goldman Sachs cut its rating on the airplane maker modular
2008 Shares Safran, and defense company to 'sell' from 'neutral', reflecting enterpri
Plumme analyst falling orders, problems facing airlines and high fuel se
t After , prices. The stock fell 5.5 percent - its biggest one-day architec
Goldma Goldm drop in more than five years - to $70.68 on the New ture's
n Cut" an York Stock Exchange, its lowest point since February non-
(Esha Sachs 2006. The stock is down 34 percent from its all-time systemi
Dey) high of $107.80 last July, hurt by the delays on its 787 c, short-
Dreamliner program and general concern about high oil term
prices. 'We expect the weak macroeconomic backdrop view on
and record fuel prices to hurt airlines and translate to a valuatio
significant slowing in the order book,' said Goldman n
analyst, Richard Safran in a research note published on
Wednesday. He put a $60 price target on the stock for
the next 12 months, but said there was substantial risk
the stock could go lower. Safran, who downgraded the
whole commercial aerospace sector to 'cautious' from
'neutral,' expects orders for the sector to drop 50
percent in 2008 and another 50 percent in 2009 as
airlines focus on restoring profitability through aggressive
capacity cuts and price increases. 'Aerospace stocks are
off nearly 30 percent from October highs, but history
indicates the stocks could fall another 20 percent or
more as we think the market is not factoring in that the
combined effect of accelerated crude prices, a weak
economy and rapidly deteriorating airline fundamentals
could pose a worse problem for the aerospace group than
9/11 and SARS,' wrote Safran. He said there is more risk
to the 787 program than is priced in as the program
has yet to even enter flight test, where historically most
issues on development aircraft are found. Other
aerospace suppliers also fell sharply on Wednesday,
including Spirit Aerosystems Holdings Inc."
25 Wall Richar Investo a "Shares of aerospace giant Boeing Co. have been weak in On a
June Street d r- Firm the last few months, and they're getting weaker in early modular
2008 Journal, Safran, trading Wednesday, down 5% after Goldman Sachs put the enterpri
"Boeing analyst company on its 'conviction sell' list, a move that's hard se
to misconstrue. The stock is down 34% since a 52-week architec
Boeing, Goldm high of $107.83 and Goldman says the economic ture's
Gone" an environment is none-too-friendly for a maker of large non-
(David Sachs aircraft. 'We expect the weak macroeconomic backdrop systemi
Gaffen) and record fuel prices to hurt airlines and translate to a c, short-
significant slowing in the order book, driving further term
multiple compression,' writes analyst Richard Safran. He view on
adds that delivery rates and margin expansion will suffer, valuatio
and added that the Dreamliner 787 program contains n
more risk than 'is currently priced in as the program
has yet to even enter flight test."'
25 Wall Market Investo a "I am highly suspect of the motives of Goldman Sachs On a
June Street beat@ rs- report by Richard Safran." [Comment by John Hannahs]. modular
2008 Journal, wsi.co Firm- enterpri
"Boeing m Emplo "this is bs, just 3-days before boeing employies will get se
(blog) yees there share value, they analyst and boeing ceo give the ok architec
Boeing, to trash this stock. Ther is a big payoff going on ! but ture's
Gone" again not for co employies" [Comment by dave]. potentia
(David I zero-
Gaffen) "I would like to thank Mr. Safran @ Goldman Sachs for sum
his most timely downgrading of Boeing. Now my Boeing game,
Shared Value Trust award will be less. We had a June 30 due to
stock price that would set the amount of the award. allegati
Perhaps a little boeing birdy told him ons
hummmmmm??????" [Comment by satman]. from
unconfir
"Watch for another BA stock buy-back announcement med
around the time 2nd quarter earnings are released. BA employ
seems to drop in value before Share Value Trust ees.
payout and then the company announces a major buy-
back." [Comment by Former BA Analyst].
"Boeing had a record last quarter, record boeing
sales/backlog, dreamliner on track/power on, and GAO
vindication. Goldman Sachs downgrade is pathetic like
...............
the way they look after their own finances." [Comment by
Richard].
"Wall Street Gerbils and Goldman Sucks just put their
hands on the scales they must want to load up at $65 and
sell at $100 this fall." [Comment by Richard].
"Two years ago our last Share Value award was tanked
by a huge write down by Boeing the day before the
award. Now this? Maybe Mulder and Scully should
come to investigate this conspiracy theory." [Comment by
I Believe].
"Look out Ba at the next contrack." [Comment by nu
know].
26 The Investo a "Boeing shares slumped nearly 7 percent Wednesday to a On a
June Seattle rs- 30-month low - and even employees who don't buy modular
2008 Times, Firm- company stock may have lost some money as a result. enterpri
"Boeing Emplo After a Goldman Sachs analyst reduced his rating on the se
Stock yees stock from 'neutral' to 'sell,' Boeing shares closed down architec
Price $5.15, or 6.9 percent, to $69.64. The downgrade came as ture's
Slumps 80,000 Boeing current and former workers in Washington potentia
Days state await word on a company incentive program that 1 zero-
Before hinges on what the average share price will be on Monday. sum
Magic This time around, the trigger price is $54. If the average game,
Bonus share price on Monday is $70, the average payout would due to
Day" be about $1,493 in company stock, a Boeing spokesman allegati
(Domini said. Boeing's Share Value Trust pays nonexecutive ons
c Gates) employees once every two years, assuming the stock from
prices is above a predetermined threshold. Employees wha unconfir
worked the entire four years beginning July 1, 2004, med
qualify for the full amount. Those who worked less employ
receive a pro-rated amount. Companywide, about 196,000 ees.
people are eligible for incentive payments under the Share
Value Trust. Collectively they would receive about $309
million in Boeing stock, based on a $70-a-share price.
The trust payout in 2006 yielded Boeing workers an
average $5,231 before taxes. That was the result of a
much larger spread between the threshold share price of
$47 and the stock price on the final day of the period,
$82.29."
26 CNN, Tom Investo a "General Motors stock price fell almost 11% Thursday, to On a
June "GM Libby, rs- the lowest level in more than 33 years, as analysts modular
2008 Shares analyst Firm- reacted to a Goldman Sachs downgrade and continued enterpri
End at with Emplo concerns about the automaker's competitiveness. That se
33-Year Power yees was the lowest price for GM shares since Dec. 24, 1974, architec
Low" Inform when shares traded at $11.16. The price has been adjusted ture's
(Beth ation for splits and other price-affecting distributions. The non-
Braver Networ selloff followed a report issued Thursday by Goldman systemi
man) k, an Sachs downgrading the automaker to 'Sell' from 'Neutral.' c
autom Analysts lowered their six-month price target for GM to fiancial
otive $11 from $19. 'We expect GM shares to continue to under policy
researc perform as market fundamentals deteriorate which (e.g.
h exacerbates liquidity concerns,' the report states. 'We under-
compa think GM's automotive cash flow burn this year and investm
....................
ny; next is likely to lead it to look to raise capital, which we ent,
David believe could lead to significant shareholder dilution non-
Cole, and/or a cut to the company's dividend.' conserv
chairm ative
an of Tom Libby, an analyst with Power Information Network, balance
the an automotive research company said the automaker faced sheet),
Center increasing material and high labor costs, representing an as well
for additional hurdle when competing with Asian as
Autom manufacturers on price. "Their market share is under potentia
otive pressure now, and it will be for the rest of the year,' I zero-
Resear Libby added. sum
ch game
It will take over a year for GM to realize the cost between
savings of the recently negotiated contract with the factors
United Auto Workers Union, said David Cole, chairman of
of the Center for Automotive Research. 'The big question producti
sis whether they have enough cash to make it from here on.
to there,' Cole said. 'It is going to be tough, and it
depends on the economy. Once they start to realize
their labor savings, we may see profits increase like we
have never seen from GM."'
8 Flight Gordo Firm 3 "After a turbulent couple of years for the A350 XWB On an
July Internat n programme, Airbus finally finds itself in a relatively calm integral
2008 ional, McCo state. There are now more than 4,000 engineers working Enterpri
As nnell, on the A350, which McConnell [A350 chief engineer] says se
Airbus Airbus is a lot more than on previous aircraft for this stage of Archite
A350 A350 the programme. 'We've front-loaded the programme cture's
Takes chief deliberately because we want to have a very mature de-
Shape, engine aircraft when we go to flight test so we don't have many risked
Can it er changes,' he says. This should reduce the number of approac
Avoid changes required after certification to enable a faster h to
the ramp-up during the flight-test programme when new
A380's production of customer aircraft will be under way. 'We've product
Trouble also selected our suppliers earlier than on previous develop
s?" programmes.' The earlier supplier selection is part of ment.
(Max Airbus's strategy to follow the industry trend to involve
Kingsle companies in the design process sooner. 'Once we've
y-Jones) selected the supplers, we immediately put in place a
joint development phase and there are currently 21 JDPs
running with system suppliers,' says Francois Caudron,
vice-president A350 customer and business development.
Significantly, all contracts for the outsourced
aerostructures work are dollar rather than euro-based,
despite much of it staying in Europe. Much of the
fuselage work has in fact been allocated to existing Airbus
plants in France and Germany that will eventually be
divested, which are dubbed French and German 'newcos'
for the time being. 'The two 'newcos' will be created in
France and Germany and owned by EADS,' says
Caudron. 'The next step will be to open the capital of
the shareholding to the public to meet the divestment
target of Power8.'"'
14 Aviation Jim Firm a "There's been a lot of speculation about how the 787 On
July Week & McNer program got off track. What's your take? "I think it's a lessons
2008 Space ney, case of the bleeding edge of innovation. We did not do learned
Technol Chair a good job of exeution, and that's the bleeding edge part from the
ogy, man of the innovation. The last time we talked [in June 2006] architec
"Lesson and you identified supply chain as the big issue. It was a t of a
s CEO, prescient question, because that's the place where we modular
Learned The did not execute as well as we had planned and where we enterpri
'" Boeing have spent a lot of time fixing and refocusing. I don't se
(Anthon Compa think we had a joint industrial plan among all partners architec
y L. ny that was as effective as it could have been. Comnpanies ture.
Velocci like ours have to work as effectively with factories that (Note
and we don't own as those that we do. That's where we that the
Joseph stumbled.' modular
C. architec
Anselm Do you think those lessons have been assimilated? 'When t
o) you're in scramble mode like we've been, there's a lot of appears
learning and kluging together of things. It will be done to think
a lot better on the next program. I do believe in the that the
global model that leverages engineering and problem
manufacturing capability. But we drew the line too s are
aggressively on the 787, we bit off a little more than we fixed
could chew, and we've had to learn from that. So we going
have to figure out where to draw the line, who the forward,
strong partners are, the systems we need to have in and are
place, the right rhythm of work.' therefor
e non-
It's pretty clear that the date for a next-generation 737 has systemi
slipped. When can we expect to see it? '[Probably] closer c - e.g.
to the end of the next decade. We're just finding it harder going
to reach the goal that the airlines have given us. That is a from
big challenge on the 737, an airplane that essentially is 787 to
continually refreshed.' 747-8).
It seems that large, complex programs in this industry
almost invariably have execution problems. 'There's
always going to be bleeding edge kinds of issues. Having
said that, I think the industry has a tendency to
overpromise. Half the answer is more discipline at the
beginning about what you can and can't do, and what
risk is and isn't. You have to have the courage to lose a
program as well as the desire to win one. I think we
are more prepared today than we were 7-8 years ago to
say 'I don't see how we can do that. We're stretching
as hard as we can, and we can't do that.' I think that is
a better answer for both our customers and for us than the
answer that starts us down a cliff, into the ocean, to the
bottom of the ocean."'
16 The Tom Labor a "Girding for a fierce battle this fall, members of the On a
July Seattle Wrobl Machinists union who work at Boeing voted today to modular
2008 Times, ewski, authorize a strike if negotiations with the company break enterpri
"Machi Preside down. The margin of victory is not yet known but is se
nists nt of expected to be in the 90 percent range. Chants of 'strike' architec
Vote to IAM swept the fired-up crowd of an estimated 14,000 in ture's
Authori (Intern KeyArena. Union members and leaders said they would adversar
ze ational make big demands of Boeing and, unlike in recent ial
Strike at Associ negotiations, had the leverage to secure them. 'The fact relation
Boeing" ation is, it's no secret, we are in the strongest bargaining ship
(lasac of position we have been in years, and we intend to with
Arnsdor Machi leverage that position,' said Tom Wroblewski, president labor.
...............
f) nists) of the union's Washington district. In his 20-minute
speech, he repeated the event's catchphrase, 'It's our time
this time,' at least 21 times. Boeing is being pressured
by an order backlog of more than $340 billion and an
already delayed 787 delivery. The 787 Dreamliner's first
fight is scheduled before year-end. Union leaders are
hoping that on this tight production schedule, Boeing
won't be able to abide a strike, but, with soaring
profits, could stand to make some concessions to
workers. 'Hopefully, Boeing can't afford a strike,' said
material handler David Raines, who has weathered two
layoffs in his 20-year stint at Boeing. 'Not that I want to
strike,' he added, 'that's for sure.' 'We're the ones out
there building the planes, and we need to share more of
the profits that Boeing makes," said electrical technician
Dennis Bolestridge. Union members said whereas they
barely held their ground in the last contract, both
Boeing and the union are now on better footing. In the
last round of negotiations three years ago, 8,000
members were on layoff. Since then, the union has
added 6,000 members. Employees said they wanted a
larger slice of Boeing's soaring profit - $1.2 billion last
quarter. Topping their wish list are cost-of-living-
adjusted retirement benefits, expanded medical
coverage and a general wage increase."
17 Seattle Tom Labor- a "'It's payback time,' one union leader, Mark Blondin, On a
July Post- Wrobl Firm said to thunderous applause. He was president of Local modular
2008 Intellige ewski, 751 of the International Association of Machinists during enterpri
ncer, Preside contract talks in 2005 and 2002 and is now the national se
"Machi nt of union's aerospace coordinator. architec
nists IAM ture's
99% in (Intern 'We understand the historical practice of holding this vote adversar
Favor of ational and understand that it is largely procedural,' a Boeing ial
Strike" Associ spokesman said. 'But we are disappointed that the relation
(James ation union is holding it during the week and promoting ship
Wallace of other activities that keep employees away from work. with
) Machi We have production schedules to meet and delivery labor
nists); commitments to meet.'
Mark
Blondi 'Our members came despite management e-mails and
n, IAM intimidation in crew meetings to stay at work,' IAM
nationa District 751 President, tom Wroblewski said in a statement
I after the vote. 'Our members shut down airplane
aerosp manufacturing at the biggest aerospace company in the
ace world because without our members there are no
coordi Boeing airplanes.' 'It's our time this time for workers
nator. to get their fair share,' Wroblewski added. In an
interview, Blondin said the union will hold firm on
pensions and medical benefits and a good wage increase
for each year of the contract. 'We have the leverage
now that the company had in 2002 and 2005,' he said.
'And we are going to use it. They are going to have to
pay up to get an agreement from this membership... A
lot of our members have it in their gut that it's payback
time.'"
17 Forbes, Tom Labor- a "'We're in the strongest position we've been in in 10 On a
...........- --- --
July "Boeing Wrobl Firm years, and we intend to leverage that utility,' Districty modular
2008 Machini ewski, 751 President Tom Wroblewski told the crowd. 'The fact enterpri
sts Preside is, by the time you've had your second coffee break on se
Approb nt of your first day, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney has already architec
e Strike IAM made more than you will all year,' he said. District 751 ture's
Authori (Intern members haven't had a general wage increase since adversar
zation" ational 2004, but have had lump sum bonuses and cost of living ial
(Dan Associ adjustments, according to Boeing spokesman Tim Healy. relation
Catchpo ation Union members are still resentful over the past two ship
le) of contracts, in 2002 and 2005, Wroblewski said. In 2002, with
Machi the union accepted concessions due to the economic labor
nists); downturn after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. By
Mark 2005, machinists complained that the company had
Blondi brought them a bad contract when it was doing well.
n, AM 'It's payback time!' union official Mark Blondin told the
nationa crowd. Blondin was District 751 president in 2005 and
1 now oversees all IAM contract with Boeing.
aerosp
ace 'We need a contract that rewards employees but allows
coordi us to continue having that success,' Healy added. The
nator. average Boeing machinist has 17 years of experience and
makes $27 an hour or about $56,000 a year. The pay
scale ranges from $8.72 an hour to $35.13 an hour.
Robert Fowler, a seven-year Boeing veteran, wants better
health benefits, stronger job security and a general wage
increase. 'Typically if you look at the top 40 people at
the Boeing Co. they make 1,000 times what the
machinists make, and we're the backbone of the
company,' he said. Fowler doesn't want to strike, but
will if he thinks it is necessary. 'This meeting is a
sanction to use the baseball bat, and hopefully we won't
have to but we need the ability to use it if is necessary,'
he said.
17 Financi Scott Firm a "Tom Enders, Airbus chief executive, said that in spite of On the
July al Carson & concerns that the aircraft maker might face more differen
2008 Times, , CEO, B airlines seeking to defer or cancel deliveries the group ces in
"Airbus Boeing saw no reason to change its plan to increase production growth
Presses Comm rates. 'At this point we have no reason to question that. rate
Ahead ercial Of course we are watching the market and we will see between
with Airpla again after the peak summer season is over. Airbus's modular
Producti nes; determination to continue to raise production is in and
on Tom sharp contrast to the much more cautious stance integral
Boost" Enders adopted by Boeing. Scott Carson, chief executive of enterpri
(Kevin , CEO, Boeing's commercial aircraft division, said this week that se
Done) Airbus the group has no plan to increase output rate of its 737 architec
family of short-haul jets, its main volume product. Airbus tures
is increasing output of its A320 family of short-haul jets
from 34 now to 40 a month by 2010."
17 Forbes, John Firm P "'We are quite comfortable with the fact that we are On an
July "Airbus Leahy, going to have 50 percent of the world market,' [Airbus integral
2008 Orders Airbus COO, John Leahy] added, when asked if the company was enterpri
Top COO disappointed that Ethiad had split its order between the se
Boeing' two major plane makers. 'We have never had a goal to architec
s at do what they have done in the past years and dominate ture's
Farnbor the market with 80 percent or 90 percent."' apparen
...........
ough"(J t growth
ane ambitio
Wardell ns.
17 The Tom Firm B "'I knew this was not going to be a sprint, but a On the
July Econom Enders marathon,' says Thomas Enders as he looks back on his leadersh
2008 ist, , first years as chief executive of Airbus - the firm that, with ip
"Marath Airbus Boeing, holds a duopoly in the market for large civil qualities
on Man: CEO aircraft. The emphasis Mr. Enders puts on the long of an
Can haul is calculated. This week, at the biennial integral
Tom Farnborough Air Show, the aviation industry had the enterpri
Enders, chance to judge whether Mr. Enders has the right stuff to se
the give the planemaker the stability and strategic clarity it architec
Chief desperately needs. But Mr. Enders admits that much ture.
Executi more must be done if he is to turn the technologically
ve of brilliant but politically dysfunctional firm into what he
Airbus, calls a 'normal company'.
Turn the
Planem Plagued by power struggles within the core group of
aker EADS shareholders as well as it s bizarre governance,
into a Airbus suffered when it admitted that deliveries of its new
'Normal superjumbo, the A380, would be seriously delayed. Shares
in EADS tanked. The immediate cause was problems
Compan wiring up the huge aircraft, brought on by the use of
y?" incompatible software in the firm's French and German
factories. But the underlying reason for the mess was a
hopeless lack of integration within the company. A
month later, at the 2006 Farnborough Air Show, a new
chief executive, Christian Streiff, confirmed just how bad
things were... Mr. Streiff lasted a hundred days,
quitting after he concluded that the politicized EADS
board would interfere with his own radical cost-cutting
programme, known as Power8. After Mr. Streiff's
stormy exit, the sophisticated and emollient Mr. Gallois
held the fort for several months before Mr. Enders was
finally appointed. The Power 8 restructuring plan, which
included selling some factories in Europe to suppliers, was
proceeding slowly, but with less union resistance than
had been feared.
Mr. Enders is adamant that nothing will deflect him from
the task at hand, which is 'to drive the company as far
and as fast as possible in the direction of being a
normal company. Aerospace is a political and strategic
industry, but we need to make as much room as possible
for business thinking and entrepreneurial decisions.' In
practice, he says, that means both fixing the integration
woes that beset the A380 and internationalizing the
company. 'We will not survive as a non-integrated
political plaything, and we will not survive as a mainly
European company,' he adds. Paradoxically, Mr. Enders
is himself a product of the nexus between politics and
aerospace. Over his career he has moved seamlessly
between academia, high-powered research institutes,
politics and business. 'Politics is structured chaos,' he
says."
~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ""~~
17 The Philipp Firm I "Philippe Jarry, Head of Market Development at Airbus, On the
July Econom e Jarry, claims that airlines 'could get 15% efficiency gain leadersh
2008 ist, Airbus tomorrow' if they ended their 'frequency frenzy' by ip
"Crisis, Head operating fewer flights. 'We refuse to carry on our qualities
What of shoulders the misery of the industry,' he says." of an
Crisis? Market integral
The Develo enterpri
Airlines pment se
are architec
Sufferin ture.
g, but Custom
the ers are
Order but one
Books of many
of stakehol
Boeing ders.
and
Airbus
are
Bulging
18 The Jim Firm- a "Jim McNerney, the chief executive of Boeing, said this On a
July Times McNer Custo week that a bruising transatlantic battle with Airbus modular
2008 UKI ney, mer over a $35 billion Pentagon contract risked damaging his enterpri
"Boeing Chair company's relationship with the Federal Government. se
Tests man Boeing's decision to protest the contract, which is likely to architec
Pentago and become the largest ever Pentagon procurement project, is ture's
n over CEO, understood to have angered the United States Air Force adversar
Tanker The (USAF). The USAF has repeatedly said that it believes ial
Protest" Boeing the Airbus aircraft is the best suited to its needs and the relation
(David Compa recompetition will postpone a decision on the already ship
Roberts ny much-delayed tanker contract by at least six months. with its
on) Service personnel have privately expressed anger that key
Boeing has questioned their judgement in selecting the custome
Airbus plane and delayed the tanker still further. Mr r.
McNerney, who was attending the Farnborough Air Show,
said: "I realise that we took some risk with our
relationship when we protested. We were very
uncomfortable with that. We are very sensitive to our
relationship with our customer and only after a lot of
thought did we protest. We did take a risk.'"
23 Thomso Jim Firm- a "Ron Enstein (Merrill Lynch): On a
July n McNer Investo Yes, good morning. I just want to just talk a little bit about modular
2008 Reuters ney, r the commercial revenue. I think I was a bit surprised, Enterpri
Researc Chari and probably some other investors, with the weakness in se
h man the quarter in those revenues. When you kind of look at Archite
excerpt and the aircraft that you delivered and the customers that you cture's
from, CEO; delivered to, I think you delivered ten 737s to Continental, defense
"The James nine to ILFC, nine to Southwest. I mean the weakness we of its
Boeing Bell, saw in the quarter, I mean is that an indication of a trend finanaic
Compan CFO, or was it truly just a weak customer mix in terms of al
y, Q2 The pricing in the quarter? perform
2008 Boeing ance
Earning Compa Jim McNerney (Boeing):
s Call ny It's not a trend. I won't say it's a weak customer mix. I
Transcri would say that it is the difference in the customer mix that
............... ...................
pt" we expect to see in the second half, Ron, where we think
the pricing will be a little better on those delivered
airplanes. And then also we had a difference in the mix in
terms of we had more single aisle and fewer wide-body
delivered for this quarter, which also impacted the
revenue. Again, that's timing.
Ron EDstein:
Okay. Great and then one follow-up if I may, Continental
changed their outlook with regard to refunds in pre-
delivery deposits. They were expecting 8 million this
year. Now they're expecting 71 million, that would be 66
million additional dollars they're getting back from
you guys in pre-delivery deposits. Are we going to see
that from other airlines that have ordered the 787?
Jim McNerney:
I don't think you're going to see it from us, so I don't know
what you'll see from a, you know, I--that's news to me.
James Bell:
Yes, we're going to be refunding any deposits to
Continental.
Howard Rubel (Jefferies):
Mr. McNerney, you talk about, you know sustained
focus on productivity and an improvement and
execution and yet these results fall short of that. Could
you reconcile kind of the two? And then just related to
that, a lot of the, you know, initiatives that you talk about
or at least you hint at that you can do in the short term to
help you make the numbers seem hard to understand,
given the long-term nature of the business and just the way
in which the accounting system works and recognizes a lot
of your costs?
Jim McNerney:
Let me try it this way. The two, actually three major
headwinds we faced this quarter, two of which were
development programs, 87 push out and the AW&C, I
think the way we're trying to run the company is to have
an ongoing productivity program that assumes that when
we have stumbles in innovation, which those two
represent, that we can largely cover it with a strong
productivity program, which we do have here-and were
it not for a strong productivity program we would not be
able to reaffirm guidance this year. So I think that is the
philosophy behind it. Both IBS and BCA have got well-
funded, well-resourced programs, for example the
productivity program and Everett, the moving line, a
number of similar programs in St. Louis and Southern
California and Philadelphia-so when we have these
disappointments on the development side, we are ready to
cover them. Now, obviously we are very disappointed
with the development program issues that we are
facing, and we are working very hard to minimize
those. And I would say we are closer to the end than to
the beginning of working through a number of those
legacy development programs that have caused us
some pain.
Howard Rubel:
I mean, Jim, just to follow up, it is a 200 basis point slip in
commercial and some of that should have been recognized
at the time you moved the 787 schedule. And so I'm
struggling a little bit to understand how we are going to
get such strong performance in the back-half of the
year. Can you be a little bit more specific either in terms
of quantifying it, or lay out some of the initiatives?
Jim McNerney:
Yes, well let me just say one thing, and then James you
can talk about the booking. I mean, roughly half of the
running-rate issue that I think you are alluding to here is
timing, maybe a little more than half is related to timing of
revenues and costs, but there are significant productivity
program efforts that are underway now-that we are
not just dreaming up now, that are underway now that
we are counting on as we have counted on before. So
James, you want to talk about the booking?
James A. Bell:
Yes, Howard, I just wanted to also say that you are talking
about approximately $200 million short in earnings
overall. About half of that is related to the timing and
some of the product mix we experience, so we'll pick that
up when we deliver those airplanes during the second half.
The other part, though, partially is also timing of expenses.
We'd expect the expenses and cash to be lower in the
second half than they were in the first in terms of those
expenses incurred to provide infrastructure to support their
future growth requirement, and then we will start
seeing-as we gain more experience--more benefit out
of some of the productivity initiatives that have been in
place like the 777 moving line as we get more clarity
around the benefit of that and it continues to smooth
out, we expect to see more benefit there. And we have
asked the BCA team and they have accepted the challenge
and they're committed to going out to see what we can do
to reduce some of the other cost in the infrastructure to
moderate those as the base has diminished somewhat with
the flying of the 787. So we believe it's doable.
David Strauss (UBS):
Jim and James, can you give us some color with where
you are with 787 supplier and customer negotiations,
how much progress you made in the quarter, and on the
customer side, are you seeing airline customers opt for
cash, in terms of the damages, or are they looking for
additional lift to make up the GAAP [gap]?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
~ ~;;~;;
Well first of all, every customer is different in terms of
both the contractual obligations we may have with them or
they may have with us, and every customer situation is
different relative to the things that can be brought to bear
to resolve the discussion. So it is very hard to generalize.
We have gone through customer-by-customer. We do have
a view of the cost in cash that it will take to resolve it. It is
in our guidance. The majority of it is resolved within the
87 program, but there are some resolutions that impact
current numbers, and that's all taken into account in our
guidance.
Also, with the suppliers, our supplier partners, as I said, I
went out and visited all of them last month and I have a
great deal of confidence in their business progress and
while every financial discussion is not yet complete, most
are well along. And again-they're the typical issues
around scope, timing, execution that we have on every
program, and we're getting those resolved. And the
supplier discussions are probably ahead of the customer
discussions in terms of resolutions, but again, we tried to
capture all of the projected resolutions which we can
quantify in total, roughly, in a conservative way.
David Strauss:
Okay, and as a follow-up on the 787: What's left until the
plane is completely assembled at this point, and when do
you actually expect the plane to be completely assembled?
Jim McNernev:
Well, the plane will be flying in the fourth quarter, as
you know. We are on or slightly ahead of both the
assembly and the testing. The structural assembly of the
plane is largely complete. There are some systems
installations that have yet to be done, but the electronic
infrastructure and backbone, the structures itself, as
evidenced by the Power On test going very well and the
hydraulics and control surfaces tests going very well. You
need a largely assembled airplane to accomplish all those
things. So it's a matter of getting the final systems in and
then doing some ground testing and then flight testing, and
we're on schedule.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morran):
James, just on the program accounting versus unit
accounting margins in the quarter, I guess big picture,
trying to understand if there are any changes to your
either pricing or volume assumptions in the out-years
that might have impacted what you recognize this quarter?
Because program accounting earnings came down
sequentially a lot more than unit accounting did.
James A. Bell (Boeing):
There is, there was only an addition of 200 to the 737
accounting quantity and 25 to the 747. That was what
impacted it. I think what you are seeing is the GAAP
~;;;;;;;;;;;~ ........~~;,;. _.;,;,,,,,, ~ -----------~
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[gap?] is closing. The impact is really what we talked
about earlier, and that again is the mix of customer and
product that were delivered in the quarter that would affect
that difference. That's all it is.
Joseph Nadol:
At what point would we expect to see the lines cross?
Because program, in theory, is a smoothed version of
earnings and it should be more volatile. In good times
earnings should be higher than program, but how do we
think about -
James A. Bell:
I got you, but what you will see over the course of this
year is that GAAP Igap] is going to narrow and, we
think, narrow pretty significantly. It's hard to say
when it will really cross, because if we get new customer
introductions and we get new things that add to the cost
that we would inventory because the subsequent delivered
units would benefit from it. That could extend it, Joe, but
what I would say to look for is that, as we go through the
course of this year, the GAAP [gap] will definitely narrow.
Joseph Nadol:
And there are no changes in terms of your narrow-body
pricing assumptions?
James A. Bell:
No.
Robert SDingarn (Credit Suisse):
James, your guidance implies that BCA margins in the
back-end of the year, the second half has to be in the
low 12s, maybe 12.5% in order to hit that 11.5 for the full
year. And you talked a bit about reimbursed R&D et
cetera, but you're guiding to 11.5% for next year. So do
we have a decline in margin from the back-end of '08 into
'09? Is that attributable to some 787 next year? How
should we think about that, and the carry of this
infrastructure absorption for the next several quarters until
those aircraft are actually delivered?
James A. Bell (Boeing):
Well, you're right. We are expecting that they are going to
deliver higher margins in second quarter-and it's in the
range of the second half, in the range that you
mentioned-and that is going to be driven by the lower
R&D cost, including subcontractor contributions. But it's
also going to be the timing of some of the expenses will be
down again. The annual what we thought from a cost
standpoint will hold for the year. Now as we go into '09,
we will be better prepared and we would expect to see
good performance, but that good performance will be
impacted by the dilution of delivering the 787 that we
will start delivering in 789 [ph 00:43:10], in 2009. So that
will dilute the margin picture, and that's why we are
~nr"-;;;;;;;;;;~;;~ ;; q
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saying we're going to hold 11.5 year-over-year.
Robert SDingarn:
Okay, and then James or Jim, how do you think about that
R&D profile as we get into the out-years, when we have
to consider potentially a 777 refresh or the next-gen
platform, obviously at Farnborough Gene [ph 00:43:35]
talked about a new engine ready for 2016, and that sort of
thing. And you're spending, on the commercial, around
2.9 billion. We expect that to trend down over time.
Where do you think you'll trough on R&D and when?
Jim McNerney:
Well, this is Jim. Obviously we are projecting some of
the R&D coming down off the current program of
spends on the 87 and the Dash 8 that's going to begin
to come down significantly in the second half of this
year. We see it continuing into next year although we are
going to sustain some level of investment in R&D against
the two things you mentioned. And the 777--either a
refresh or a renovation, based on what we see with our
customers and what we see that the A350-1000 is or isn't,
and we'll have plenty of time to look at that. I think its
delivery is in the 15, 16 timeframe. And then obviously,
stay positioned to mature the technologies associated with
the narrow-body. And those are the two things that we
have to do, so when the actual program ramp-up of those
happens is to be determined. but we don't see the big
ramp-up happening within our guidance right now.
Robert Spin2arn:
It sounds like it might not even be by 2010, and so what is
the 9% R&D against commercial revenues can have by
then?
Jim McNernev:
Well, listen, the marketplace has changed. Competitive
environment's changed. Customer requirement's
changed. And when we get the 10 guidance, we'll discuss
that the best way we know how.
Doug Harned (Sanford Bernstein):
I wanted to go back to the BCA margins and just
understand. You talked about, in Q2 you had some period
expenses and then you had overhead absorption. Can you
mention how much is each, give an idea where the real
impact was? And then when you look at going forward the
next two quarters, there's the overhead absorption issue.
This added cost, does that stay with you at the same levels
it did in Q2?
James A. Bell (Boeing):
So, it's about half-and-half if you look at the timing versus
the increased spending. And some of the increased
spending, remember, is also timing-based in that we
expect lower spending particularly in cash in next quarter.
.....................  .... .. ~
Now the infrastructure absorption issue, the BCA team is
committed to go and look at what they can do to reduce
that during the second half of the year without doing
something that would reduce capability needed again
in 2009 as we get this 787 program on track from a
production-support perspective. That's how I would
look at it. It's about half-and-half and we absolutely
believe we have great plans in place with opportunities to
correct the cost growth that we experienced in the first
half, in the second half.
Douf Harned:
If I went back to Q1 and your guidance at that time-
and as you looked ahead at that point in time, did you
expect to have this level of overhead absorption to deal
with?
James A. Bell:
No, we did not. We did have an estimate in there, which
we obviously underestimated the disruption that would
be caused relative to these costs being allocated to
programs, and so we trued it up in second quarter.
Doug Harned:
So you're saying that the productivity-improvement
effort that you are doing now has to step up a little
more than you had expected back then to get to the
same margin level?
James A. Bell:
Well I think-we think-we have to continue to drive
good productivity and if it stepped up a little more than
the current levels, I wouldn't be disappointed, let's put
it that way.
Mvles Walton (Oppenheimer):
Just a quick question for you on R&D into '09. Your
guidance reflecting a $500 to 600 million tech decline,
James is that entirely within commercial, or is there also
some anticipated decline on defense as maybe the
international tanker winds down?
James A. Bell (Boeing):
It's primarily in commercial and it's primarily
representing, as we complete and finalize the design
effort on the747-8 freighter. The R&D is already starting
to come down on the 787 from prior year levels.
Mvles Walton:
Yes, I guess I was referring to when you raised the
guidance from 2.8 to 3.2 to 3.4, you said 50% of the
change was-
James A. Bell:
Yes, there was a little piece in there associated with
international tankers, and that's behind us. But the bulk of
~~**Now_
it was driven by 747 and increased spending on the A7
187?1.
Joe Campbell (Lehman Brothers):
Let me go back to our favorite margin target on DPA
[BCA?]. I'm still struggling a little bit to understand-
I'm trying to understand what was going on still, I know
you've told us three or four times on BCA, what these
margins were. So I'm trying to understand why the
disruptions of the 787 aren't just allocated to the 787,
and why they're spilling over to the production
programs. Or is it simply a difference that you assumed
you would be able to charge stuff to 87, because you
thought that you would deliver the planes that are not now
happening? And I wondered if you could also say
something about the after-market? Many of the suppliers
are saying that the after-market is weak, and I
wondered whether you could say something about how
Aviall and the rest of the affiliated BCA companies'
outlook has changed, or not-
James A. Bell (Boeing):
Okay, Joe, I'll take your first question and Jim will take
your second.
But essentially on the 787 issue, we planned on the old
schedule to have more 787 work in-house this year than
now the actuality, with the slide of the schedule, is actually
showing up. And so the cost that we're talking about here,
the heart of the very infrastructure costs are constant. And
it only can be allocated for the work that's in-house, and
so that's why we're seeing a shift of the 787 program onto
the other production programs because that's the work
that's currently in-house. Is that clear?
Joe Campbell:
Yes, so I guess it means that the overhead went up and
you were expecting it to be covered by 787. So why's
the overhead up?
James A. Bell:
The infrastructure cost remained constant. What we
assumed is we'd have more 787 work in-house than we
did after the schedule slide, so less of that constant cost
was allocated to 787 and more of it was allocated to the
production program-at 787's program was then allocated
to 787 program accounting and inventory. The remaining,
since the 787 work did not show up, that differential went
to the production programs and flowed through the
earnings.
Joe Campbell:
Okay, got it.
Jim McNernev:
. ..................----- ----- 
And then on the services, you know it is true Joe, we are
seeing a moderation in the spares rates and that makes
sense. As people are taking out older inefficient
aircraft, which tend to have slightly higher
maintenance rates, and some of the mod work is slowing
a bit too as planes are staying in service, not being
modified to freighter configuration-for example, because
of A380, 87 delays. Having said that, the other parts of our
business are doing well and the guys are achieving their
business plan although they're breathing a little harder
than they were a quarter ago.
Joe Campbell:
So but then you're still expecting to make their business
plans that you have in the '08 and '09 guidance? A lot
of other people are moderating their '09 business plans
and you haven't changed anything.
Jim McNerney:
Listen, we're not changing our overall guidance which
obviously has puts and takes in it, Joe, okay? And
obviously the services, the BCA business is a watch-item
for us and despite some softening, they're doing well. But
I think as we put together the specific plan for that specific
piece of the business, we'll have to see what the
environment and the competitive situation looks like. So
there are other places where we have less pressure and
other places we have upside, and that's what gives us the
confidence to give you the guidance. But to your earlier
point, we have seen a softening in spares and
conversions. We're dealing with it and we'll just have to
monitor the situation.
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen And Company):
Yes, to maybe understand a little bit better the [inaudible
00:54:31] costs, if infrastructure costs were shifted from
the 87 to other programs, does that mean that the other
programs profit-accrual rates have gone down and if
not, why not? And secondly, you mentioned period costs
in the second quarter, those presumably costs are expense
as incurred. How big were they in the second quarter and
how big are they likely to be for the entire year?
James A. Bell (Boeing):
On your first question on the infrastructure costs: The
infrastructure costs, as I said earlier, were constant and
then they're just allocated on the basis in-house, and what
was the second half of that question? [Interposing] What it
is is that the profit rates on the production program, before
allocation of those costs, would remain constant. Then it
would have taken up a bigger absorption of those costs
through the allocation process, if the work was there.
Cai von Rumohr:
True, but if that happens, their accrual-rate goes down and
the profit margin stays the same, how come?
.... . .. . ...  .................................. _ . - -
James A. Bell:
Exactly, their accrual rate was impacted this quarter as a
result of the allocation of those costs.
Cai von Rumohr:
Right, but I mean, presumably program is through the end
of the program, so if you have lower program accrual-rates
in this quarter, presumably you're looking forward and
that continues. And if so, given the guidance hasn't really
gone down that much, why not?
James A. Bell:
Because we plan on dealing with the increased cost we
experienced in the second quarter in the second half of
the year.
Cai von Rumohr:
Okay, and then the period cost that you mentioned that are
expensed as incurred, how big approximately were they in
the second quarter and how big would they be for the
year?
James A. Bell:
So if you're just talking to Delta, it would be about half of
the $200 million difference we saw, in what we anticipated
the earning rates to be versus what they were.
George Shapiro (Citigroup):
Good morning. James, is part of the issue with the
allocation happening this quarter because this was the
quarter that the 787 was supposed to be initially delivered?
James A. Bell (Boeinz):
It's because, George, we expected to have more 787 work
in our shop this quarter than it turns out we did because of
the schedule slide. It wasn't just because of deliveries. It's
more about the amount of work on the 787 program that
we originally anticipated having in the shop.
George ShaDiro:
Okay, and then if you could go forward, James, why
wouldn't I assume that you'll probably wind up being
short of your margin in commercial aircraft but you'll be
better on unallocated, because you only have 130 million
through six months and you're saying it will be $1 billion
for the year?
James A. Bell:
Well, we think we're going to make our plan in
commercial airplanes, but if we don't, we'll still make
our earnings per share expectations and the guidance
we provided you.
I I I I Troy Lahr (Stifel Nicolaus):
SI I I When you guys talk about 2010 deliveries up due to 787,
-;----------  --
does that mean legacy programs are going to be flat and all
the growth is coming from 787? And really, how are you
thinking about the supply-and-demand balance and
what your supply chain can keep up with versus airline
demand for new aircraft, specifically 737 line?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
Yes, I mean I think since we don't offer specific
guidance on rates, it depends until the beginning of '09,
we were just isolating the 87 as a known factor that will
for sure be an upper based on our current schedule, and
isolating that as something that would drive it higher. And
I guess the assumption behind it is that everything else
would stay the same, but that's something we'll work
through before we give our final guidance.
Troy Lahr:
And then how are you balancing supply chain with what
the supply chain can kind of keep up with versus
demand? Like if you look at the 737, how many do you
have in backlog? Where do you stand on that? Are you
more concerned with the supply chain or more
concerned with the customer demands on 737 line?
Jim McNerney:
Well, I think we have unprecedented customer demand on
the 37, and we also have got a well-established supply
chain through a program that has been in place for many,
many years. So while there are certainly challenges day-
to-day on the supply chain, we feel comfortable that the
unprecedented demand of that airplane can be met
with a robust supply chain."
27 The Scott Firm a "Before coming to Wichita, Strode was in charge of On a
July Wichita Strode, development and production of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner modular
2008 Eagle former program. The issues Boeing has run into on the 787 are enterpri
"Boeing ly in not unusual, he said. In hindsight, the right plan was in se
Wichita charge place. 'it's just a matter of executing it,' he said. So architec
Head of what could have been done differently? 'Some of the ture's
Prepare develo issues we could have recognized earlier,' he said. But non-
s for pment 'we were busy inventing an airplane, too.'" systemi
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30 The Mark Firm- a "The lead negotiator for the Machinists union said On a
July Seattle Blondi Labor Tuesday that contract talks with Boeing are 'in deep modular
2008 Times, n, lead trouble' and implied a strike in September is likely if enterpri
"Machi negotia the company's offer doesn't improve. The tough talk se
nists tor for from Mark Blondin, lead negotiator for the International architec
Say the Association of Machinists (IAM), came during a joint ture's
Contrac Interna teleconference with representatives of the white-collar adversar
. .. .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. ... ----
t Talks tional engineering union at Boeing. The two unions also ial
with Associ delivered a scathing critique of the state of the 787 relation
Boeing ation Dreamliner program and of the company's strategy of ship
"In of global outsourcing. The outsourcing of 787 work and the with
Deep Machi prospect of Boeing sending out more work on future jets labor
Trouble nists add tension to this year's labor negotiations, which climax
" (IAM); next month ahead of the new plane's expected first flight
(Domini in October. 'So far, all they are talking about is take-
c Gates) Doug aways,' Blondin said. 'If that continues over the next
Kight, couple of weeks, they are in deep trouble.' Blondin said
Boeing Boeing is 'acting right now like it is ni bankruptcy
Comm court, rather than where they are with a record
ercial backlog of orders and record profits.' 'There's enough
Airpla orders right now to sustain two or three bargaining
nes, cycles, and we know it,' he said. 'We're going to get
VP HR our share of those profits.'
Boeing's top labor negotiator, Doug Kight told employees
this month that the company will release full details of its
final offer by Labor Day weekend. Kight's message gave
no hint of an impasse in the talks. 'We're about three
weeks away from moving to the hotel for the final phase
of negotiations,' Kight wrote. 'I am pleased with our
progress.'
"I am very surprised Boeing has come out with the
same tactics in 2008,' said Blondin, who headed the
District 751 Machinists when they went on strike three
years ago. 'Our members didn't stand for those divisie
tactics last time. I don't see it happening this time.'"
Stan Sorscher, director of research for SPEEA, said the
union has argued for a long time that outsourcing
airplane design cannot work as it may for simpler
products, say sneakers. Building something as complex
as a plane requires a tight community of experienced
engineers and mechanics working together to overcome
the inevitable challenges, he said. 'We thought the 787
would be a test case for this,' Sorscher said. 'The
results are in.'
One rank-and-file member who requested anonymity said
only a strike will demonstrate to workers that they got the
very best deal. 'Negotiators need proof they drove the
best bargain they could, so a strike is almost a given,'
he said. 'The real debate is on its duration.'"
30 The Ray Firm- a "Boeing cannot afford a disruption by its skilled work On a
July Herald, Gofort Labor force,' david White, assistant director of strategic modular
2008 "Machi h, resources for the Inaternational Association of Machinists, enterpri
nists SPEE said in a conference call. 'We're a force to be reckoned se
and A with and to be respected,' said Mark Blondin, aerospace architec
Enginee Execut coordinator for the Machinists. 'We sacrificed during ture's
rs ive the lean times,' he said. 'Now it's time for Boeing to adversar
Questio Direct pay up.' ial
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Boeing' Mark The aerospace giant is adopting the 'exact wrong' ship
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s 787 Blondi strategy by relying more on foreign suppliers and with
Busines n, focusing less on retaining its skilled work force in this labor
s aerosp country, said Ray Goforth, executive director of the
Strategy ace Society of Professional Engineering Employees in
" coordi Aerospace. However, Boeing Chief Executive Jim
(Michel nator McNerney hasn't budged much on the company's
le for the global business model. 'We've learned a lot and have
Dunlop) Interna the scars to prive it,' McNerney said of the 787 in April.
tional 'I think it will be more of an adjustment in strategy
Associ rather than a change in strategy,' he added. 'We're
ation heading into these negotiations in a negative context,'
of Goforth said."
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31 The Firm- a "Boeing received a major boost from a House of On a
July Seattle Gover Representatives subcommittee Wednesday, which modular
2008 Times, nment proposed tight restrictions on the Pentagon as the enterpri
"Boeing Defense Department seeks new bids on a $40 billion se
Tanker contract for Air Force aerial-refuelling tankers. The architec
Bid language in the bill would require the Pentagon to seek ture's
Gets a medium-sized tanker like the one Boeing offered and intermit
Big it would prohibit extra credit for a larger tanker like tent
Boost" the one offered by Northrop-EADS." relation
(Les ship
Blumen with the
thal) stability
of
govern
ment
31 Seattle Rep. Firm- a "Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash., who has called on the On a
July Post- Norm Gover Pentagon to rerun the competition 'farily and modular
2008 Intellige Dicks, nment competitively,' said the tanker provision in the defense enterpri
ncer, D- bill 'just tries to create a level playing field.'" se
"Bill Wash. architec
Might ture's
Give intermit
Boeing tent
an Edge relation
in ship
Tanker with the
Bid" stability
(Jennife of
r A. govern
--- ------------
Dlnouhvy
- 7 r r
ment
1 Chicago Firm- a "The stock has 'certainly had a rough time' in recent On a
Aug. Busines Investo months, mostly because of delays related to the long- modular
2008 s, rs- awaited 787 jetliner and fears over high oil prices, JSA enterpri
"Boeing Emplo Research analyst Paul Nisbet said in an interview. se
Recover yees In a note to investors, Banc of America Securities analyst architec
ing Harry Nourse wrote of a 'looming' strike by union ture's
After machinists working for Boeing's commercial airplane valuatio
Hitting business. 'Following a recent conference call with n due to
a Three- union officials, we believe that there is a high chance overpro
year (greater than 70 percent) of a work stoppage at Boeing mising
Low" in the near future,' he wrote. A Boeing spokesman, Tim and
Healy, said the company had adopted a new approach that underde
entailed meeting early with union representatives and livering
discussing critical issues, such as wages and benefits. 'We as well
think it's going well... and we're driving toward an as its
agreement,' he said." adversar
ial
relation
ship
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28 Busines Firm "EADS would be able to assemble freighters at a plant it On an
Aug. s Week, intends to build in Mobile, Ala., thus shifting production integral
2008 "Boeing out of Europe and taking advantage of favorable enterpri
's exchange rates and lower labor costs. It could sell its se
Tanker commercial planes for less. By combining production architec
Challen of a commercial tanker based on the freighter, 'they ture's
ges would achieve economies of scale that would make a ability
Mount" commercial operation in Mobile even more attractive,' to make
(Keith says Lexington Institute defense analyst Loren Thompson. more
Epstien) 'The workforce, the overhead, and the supply comple
challenge is diminished if you build planes for both x cross-
military and commercial customers off the same platfor
airframe design.' Adds Thompson: 'Boeing is at least as m trade-
worried about their key commercial customers in the offs.
U.S. market as they are about the tanker franchise.
Once EADS sets up a commercial operation in the U.S.
market, Boeing loses a lot of its national advantage in
terms of competing for congressional support, protests
from the IU.S. trade Representativel, and so on.' 'They
don't want to have a domestic competitor' for
commercial aircraft, says Jacques Gansler, a former top
U.S. military acquisition official.
'Yes, we've been making some changes,' an EADS
source tells Business Week. 'We're looking at potential
business opportunities and therefore examining our
business structures. It's part of our strategy. We're
looking down the road."'
29 USA Toyota Firm "Now, about 2,000 permanent employees draw a On an
Aug. Today, Motors paycheck from a plant that doesn't produce anything. integral
2008 "Toyota Corpor They perform maintenance, talk about ways to improve enterpri
's ation quality, and relearn tasks as basic as the best way to drive se
Plunge a bolt. They're luckier than the plant's 200 temporary architec
Into Big workers who work as needed and an army of ture's
~ilsr. ~.. ~ ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; I
Pickups employees at its parts suppliers, who have been ability
Veers furloughed. Opened with great fanfare only a couple of to
Into A years ago, the plant halted poduction on Aug. 8 after absorb
Texas- demand collapsed for its Tundra full-size pickups, amid econom
size sky-high fuel prices and free-falling home values. ic
Ravine" Production won't restart until at least November. It's a downtur
(Chris blow to San Antonio residents, who nevertheless are ns.
Woodya grateful the company has kept so many workers on the
rd) payroll. The San Antonio plant's month-long closure is
testing how Toyota, one of the world's most respected and
savvy companies, handles a miscalculation.
The decision to jump into making full-size pickups now
is eating into the Japanese automaker's bottom line and
raising questions about why it, too, was suckered by the
same siren call of profitable big trucks that's now
sapping Detroit's Big Three. It's humbling for an
automaker noted in the past for being able to grab
market share when its American counterparts
stumbled. Toyota got into full-size trucks with 'a little
bit of hubris and pride, thinking, 'We conquered all
these other segments, and here is an opportunity to put
the Marlboro Man out of a Ford and into a Toyota,'
says James Womack, chairman of the Lean Entreprise
Institute, and educational group that fosters steamlined
productions systems such as Toyota's. The lesson:
'Toyota's crystal ball doesn't work any better than
anyone else's.' 'The lure was money,' Womack says.
'It would have taken a lot of discipline to stay out of
this thing.'
"We're a full-line manufacturer,' Bob Carter, U.S. sales
chief for Toyota's cars and trucks, said in a recent
conference call. 'Certainly the market has been
surprised in the truck area, but we have full confidence
it's going to return in the future.'
Toyota, flush with cash, 'is a long-term player,' says
Michael Robinet, vice president of auto market forecaster
CSM Worldwide. 'The Asian culture thinks in years
and decades, not months and quarters.'
Toyota archival Honda, by contrast resisted the
temptation of full-size trucks and has been rewareded.
'They were smart,' Robinet says of Honda. 'This is a
company that said, 'We're not going into the truck
market. We're going to stick to out knitting.'
Mostly non-union Toyota is continuing the Japanese
tradition of lifetime employment policies for
permanent hires. Breaking with that practice could
lead to consequences at other global Toyota facilities.
'If they laid off San Antonio workers for three months,
that would be the shot heard 'round the world,' says
Jeffrey Liker, a University of Michigan professor whose
The Toyota Way and other books on Toyota's production
.... . ..
system hasve become business best sellers.
If the training program for the San Antonio plant stoppage
works, the result could be workers with higher skills and
more loyalty, lowering the plant's costs in the future.
It is also building a reservoir of local good will. 'If I
were in Texas, I think any sane person would say, 'the
market is awful, and this crazy company is actually
keeping people employed,' Liker says.
Texans express gratitude toward Toyota for continuing
paychecks, and say they believe Toyota will continue to
invest in the plant. 'Toyota is still the top,' says Judge
Nelson Wolff, the Bexar County executive who took a
leading role in trying to lure Toyota here. 'They are there
for the long term.' Former Texas state legislator John
Longoria said the Japanese 'plan 10, 30, 40 years ahead
of time, and they didn't forsee this.' As Wolff, the city's
former mayor, points out in his book Transforming San
Antonio, if Toyota hadn't taken extra steps to protect
workers during the shutdown, 'It could force closer
scrutiny of Toyota's agreement that led to creation of
the plant.'
Stephen Carter, a physician in the Toyota Family Health
Center outside the complex's south perimeter, says
workers are confident they'll get through this rough
patch."
29 The Firm- a "'I'm as against it as I possibly can be,' said Joe On a
Aug. Seattle Labor Albanese, a parts expediter on the 777 program in Everett modular
2009 Times, who's concerned the pact would permit Boeing to enterpri
"Some continue outsourcing of parts delivery. 'I don't care se
Machini about the money,' he said. "If they don't give me job architec
sts Jeer security, it doesn't matter.' A colleague, Ron Seelye, ture's
Boeing' said he, too, is ready to strike. 'I've done it so many views of
s 'Final' times before, I can do it again,' he said. 'They've got to compro
Contrac share their profits.' One Everett Machinst, a relatively mise.
t Offer" new hire, said 'I have home improvement projects to
(Domini last through September, and money enough to stay out
c Gates) for six months.'
One affirmitavie voice was a Machinist who works at the
spares distribution center in SeaTac, who said he and a
dozen workmates were inclined to accept the deal. He
added, however, he had heard the mood was different in
side the bigger plants in Evertt and Renton. 'We're
afraid that our leaders will drag this out for an
unnecessary strike,' said the worker, who asked for
anonymity. 'It seams no reasonable offer will be good
enough.'
29 Forbes, Richar Firm- a "Richard Aboulafia, an industry analyst with the Teal On the
Aug. "Boeing d Labor Group, said Boeing had used a 'smart tactic' by making prevaili
2009 Machini Aboula its latest offer 'sweet enough to stop the most strident ng
sts to fia, an union elements' from persuing a strike. 'The question views of
Respon industr is, 'Are there enough people who really believe in the how a
d to y idea of job security?' he said. 'No employer in America modular
....................
Propose analyst is willing to talk about job security. That just doesn't enterpri
d with happen in today's economy.'" se
Contrac the architec
t" Teal ture
(Daniel Group operates
Loverin within a
g) Liberal
Market
Econom
y.
29 Bloomb Richar Firm- a "The IAM also filed unfair-labor practice charges On a
Aug. erg, d Labor against Boeing with the National Labor Relationsh Board modular
2008 "Boeing Aboula for 'direct dealing with our members,' spokeswoman enterpri
Union fia, an Connie Kelliher said today near Seattle, the company's se
Urges industr manufacturing hub. Managers met one-on-one with architec
Worker y workers 'to enhance their own bargaining position, ture's
s to analyst undermine the union and intimidate our members.' zero-
Reject with sum
Offer the The union's members in Washington state, Oregon and competi
and Teal Kansas have followed leaders' voting recommendation tion
Strike" Group in three of the last four negotiations, stopping work over between
(Susann two of them to gain contract improvements, labor
a Ray) and the
The plan would preserve the way Boeing uses firm.
contractors, rejecting changes the IAM sought and had
warned it would be willing to strike over. 'Boeing is
gambling that their concessions are appealing to
enough of the workforce to keep a strike from
happening, but job security is a sticking point for a lot
of them,' Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with Teal Group
in Fairfax, Virginia, said today. 'There is no question
that union management feels as though the company is
working around them.'
Lead company negotiator, Doug Kight said, 'As leaders it
is not only our right but our obligation to talk to
employees, owners of the company, about our business."
29 Busines Firm- a "By the time Boeing puts its first new 787 into the air this On a
Aug. sWeek, Labor fall, after delaying the so-called Dreamliner for more than modular
2008 "The a year, the company will have racked up extra costs enterpri
Dreamli that may top $2 billion. That hit comes with deferred se
ner's sales worth at least $3.5 billion, and a roughly 40% slide architec
Cost to in its stock market value. Such dismal numbers-and the ture's
Boeing" possibility of even further delay-pressured Boeing at non-
(Joseph the contract bargaining table since it can ill afford a systemi
Weber) work disruption. Fears of rising costs spurred by c labor
additional Dreamliner delays make Boeing executives policies
especially wary of a strike. The $2 billion-plus estimate, impacti
toted up by American Technology Research analyst ng
Peter Arment, is twice the figure analysts broached last producti
fall when Boeing announced its first six-month delay. on
The company followed that delay in January with a three- schedul
month holdup and another six-month delay last April. 'It's es and
been a strain financially and from a credibility product
standpoint,' says Arment. The tab includes penalties launche
Boeing owes customers for delayed orders and s.
_.;,,,,,,,,,, ~ -------------------------------------~
additional research charges, as well as payments to
suppliers. 'This is an enormously complex program
and that comes with a lot of risks,' says Arment.
'They've spent more than four years modeling and
testing and developing the systems for this aircraft, but
this is still an all-new composite frame and all-new
electronic system architecture. There are many
different systems."'
30 Market Ray Firm- a "The Boeing Company's public acknowledgement that On a
Aug. Watch, Gofort Labor outsourcing is causing problems with the 787 program modular
2008 "Boeing h, is lip service until action is taken to correct problems enterpri
Risks executi created by a global network of suppliers and se
787 by ve inexperienced workers, according to the Society of architec
Refusin directo Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace ture's
g to r of (SPEEA), IFPTE Local 2001. Officials at SPEEA and disinteg
Deal SPEEA other unions, including the Internaiontal Aerospace ration of
with Machinists (IAM), repeatedly warned the aerospace its
Outsour giant that it was a mistake to part out highly complex supply
cing aerospace products to inexperienced workers around and
Problem the world. More than one year after a ceremonial 'roll labor
s, Says out' of a 787 shell, the same aircraft remains in the modules
SPEEA factory incomplete and missing parts from suppliers. , and its
" 'Continued statements that everything is fine with the inability
787 global supply network just doesn't fly,' said Ray to
Goforth, executive director of SPEEA. Last week, the reveal
company announced plans to place full-time Boeing the true
inspectors at key suppliers to reduce flaws and status of
maintain quality. The announcement, reported by the progress
Puget Sound Business Journal, said Boeing will first target
about one dozen problem companies. SPEEA's Goforth
said more inspectors at suppliers escalates cost and
avoid the real problem - Boeing's great experiment to
outsource large parts of the engineering and
manufacturing of the next major leap in air travel
failed. 'It's time for Boeing to stop the lip service and
take real action,' Goforth said. 'Face the fact that the
global network is a failure and bring back the critical
work back so the experienced employees can get the
787 back on track.'
Boeing needs more than paid advertising and internal
campaigns to regain the trust of customers and
employees. The most recent Rittenhouse Ranking
Survey of corporate candor ranked Boeing 9 8 th, six
spots below Exxon Mobil. The annual survey evaluated
100 Fortune 500 companies and CEOs for fair, open
and sincere communications.
'Instead of thanking and rewarding employees for
correcting the errors of suppliers and management,
Boeing is banking profits and shifting costs onto
employees,' Goforth said.
30 Bloomb Tom Firm- a "Boeing believes that its offer, which is actually quite On a
Aug. erg, Wrobl Labor good would appeal to workers if only presented to modular
2008 "Boeing ewski, them directly,' said Gary Chaison, a labor-relations enterpri
Commu preside professor at Clark University in Worchester, se
........................
nication nt of Massachusetts. 'The company seems to have confused architec
s the public relations with collective bargaining,' usurping ture's
Strategy IAM's union leaders' role in communicating with members. power
May Distric Tom Wroblewski, president of the IAM's District 751 in struggle
Goad t 751 Seattle, in an earlier interview, said the company had with
Machini in 'shot itself in the foot' with its tactics. labor.
sts Into Seattle
Strike"
(Susann
a Ray)
31 Reuters, Richar Firm a "Richard Aboulafia, aerospace analyst at the Teal Group, On a
Aug. "Boeing d said Boeing's latest offer has not eased the union's modular
2008 Machini Aboula concerns about job security and he put the chances of a enterpri
sts fia, strike at around 60 percent. 'Boeing and most se
Union aerosp manufacturing companies have shown zero willingness architec
Says ace to compromise on that,' said Aboulafia." ture's
Member analyst zero-
s at the sum
Should Teal view of
Stike" Group job
(Kyle security.
Peterso
n et al.)
1 Financi Firm- a "Boeing aims to fly the 787 for the first time by December On a
Sept. al Labor and to start making deliveries to customers by the third modular
2008 Times, quarter of 2009, at least 14 months behind schedule. enterpri
"Boeing Another delay to that timetable would be a headache for se
787 the company, which is facing demands from customers for architec
Dreamli compensation. Boeing has already said it is assuming all ture's
ner 787 deliveries it expects to make next year will not continu
Threate generate profit because of compensation payments. ed lack
ned by of trust
Strike" During the union negotiations, Boeing opted for a between
(Hal strategy of appealing directly to workers over the firm and
Weitzm heads of union leaders. The aircraft-maker posted its labor.
an) offer on the internet, rather than allowing union
leaders to present the details to their members first. It
stopped bargaining last week in order to give workers time
to study the final offer before voting. As the company
attempted to secure the support of one-third of union
members it needs to avoid a strike, Boeing also held one-
on-one meetings with machinists. The company says the
meetings were merely intended to get feedback on the
negotiations. However, the union filed an unfair labour
practice complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board, alleging that Boeing violated US laws
prohibiting such 'direct dealing'. 'The disrespect they
have shown for the negotiation process is exactly the
same way our members have felt and why they have
been marching in the factories at lunchtime for the
past weeks,' said Tom Wroblewski, president of the
union's district 751 in Seattle."
1 Puget Firm- a "It seems clear from the decision of the Machinists Union Percepti
Sept. Sound, Labor leadership to support a strike against Boeing that they have ons on
2008 "Boeing learned nothing of the lessons of how the modern the
Machini economy has evolved in the last quarter century. In the inevitab
. ............
Firm
sts:
Penny
Wise
and
Pound
Foolish
" (Eric
Earling)
"Boeing (NYSE: BA), the listed, Chicago, Illinois-based
aerospace systems integrator, could be seeking defense
acquisitions abroad, several sources told mergermarket.
Possible reasons for acquisitions abroad include a target-
poor environment in the US. [An] analyst said that
Boeing has strength in the commercial side with its 787
project. However, the company could look to acquire
some of its smaller suppliers, like its March stake
purchase in Global Aeronautica, on that project to help
shape things up."
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2 Bloggin Firm- a "Boeing (NYSE: BA) can't take a strike. It has too On a
Sept. g Investo much depending on the launch of its new Dreamliner. more
2008 Stocks, r That launch has been delayed three times and carriers are integral
"A already asking for compensation for their costs due to the assessm
Strike at fuel-efficient plane being behind schedule. Boeing has ent ofa
Boeing, been going at it with its large machinists union and it looks modular
A like the two sides have made no progress. Boeing's logic enterpri
Mistake is that it does not want to face high costs in the future se
by when its revenue may be lower. But that logic is deeply architec
Manage flawed, and the union knows it. Boeing has a heavy ture's
ment' delivery schedule that goes out at least five years for pending
(Dougla the Dreamliner and other planes. The company also strike.
2
Sept.
2008
next quarter century they'll likely have the declining jobs
for their members to prove it.
Boeing gave in on initial proposals to phase out retiree
health care and traditional pensions - though those issues
remain serious concerns for a company trying to avoid
crippling legacy costs.
Clearly, Boeing doesn't want to see a strike given the
volume of cash being thrown at the Machinists and the
number of other concessions the company has made.
Nevertheless, the union says the deal isn't rich enough,
including ongoing rank-and-file complaints about a lack
of "job security."
Sadly, no one seems to have told the union and its
members that the era of a single job with one
corporation for life is well nigh over. More
importantly, it is obvious the lessons of the domestic
auto, airline, and steel industries have been utterly
missed by these guys."
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s says that deliveries over the next two decades will be
McIntyr strong due largely to demand in Asia. Boeing
e) management is making a tactical error and
shareholders will pay for it. The stock is at $65, but the
strike will send it to $50."
3 The Firm- ac "'I think Boeing is calculating that a strike is not On a
Aug. Street.c Investo necessarily the worst scenario,' says Bill Swelbar, a modular
2008 om r research engineer in MIT's International Center for Air enterpri
"Boeing Transportation, and a labor consultant. 'They have said se
Strike 'Here's my final offer, this is what I can live with, architec
Would figure out if you can live with it.' The tactic may reflect uture's
Hurt, a new approach to collective bargaining, one that increasi
But follows on the bankruptcy strategy -- utilized in recent ngly
How years by airlines -- that left little room for negotiating, dis-
Much?" Swelbar says. At US Airways, for example, unions were integrat
(Ted told that they could either accept contract offers, or ed way
Reed) potentially be forced to accept even harsher terms likely to to
be approved by a bankruptcy judge. 'This could be a point "negotia
where pattern bargaining changes,' Swelbar says. 'Boeing te" with
is saying that the traditional form of labor leverage is labor.
not going to produce anything better than what they
are offering.'
Swelbar says Boeing's primary concerns include a
comparison of its costs with costs at Airbus, its only major
competitor. Several months ago, Airbus suffered as the
dollar weakened against the Euro, but more recently the
dollar has been strengthening. 'Ultimately, their costs
converge,' Swelbar says. 'From an lairlinel customer
relations standpoint, you wouldn't want to strike, but
financially, Boeing can take a strike,' Hamilton says. As
for Wall Street, he says, 'small investors will see their
shares fall and might be unhappy, but analysts might
rally behind management.'
As a company that has recorded $13 billion in after-tax
profits over the past five years, Boeing recognizes it
cannot stand pat on salary. It has offered 11% over three
years, plus a series of sweeteners, and says the average
worker would gain $34,000 over three years. The union is
seeking a 13% increase. Health care, pensions and other
items also separate the two sides. Outsourcing remains a
key issue. For years, Boeing has been increasing the
amount of outsourcing in its aircraft. Today, about 70% of
the work on Boeing aircraft is done by outside employees.
'Boeing never has made 100% of the airplanes it builds,'
says Boeing spokesman Marc Birtel. 'Sourcing from
suppliers domestically and internationally has always been
part of the Boeing business model and any other aerospace
manufacturer's model.' As outsourcing has increased, he
notes, 'a number of our legacy airplane programs [e.g. the
airplanes other than the 787] are now comparable to the
make/buy percentages for the 787, predominantly resulting
from the sale of several former Boeing-owned operations.'
The IAM says it is determined to protect the jobs it still
has."
3 DW- Firm- P "After the failed sale of its three plants in the German On an
Aug. World, Suppli cities of Augsburg, Nordenheim and Varel, Airbus parent integral
2008 "EADS er European Aeronautical Defense and Space NV (EADS) is enterpri
Unveils whipping the sites into shape. According to a company se
Investm spokesman, some 360 million euros ($518 million) will be architec
ent invested in the Augsburg and Nordenham plants. A new tur's
Plans 180 million-euro plant will be built in the southern "reversa
for German city of Augsburg. According to the Augsburg 1" of its
Plants plant manager Hans Lonsinger, it will be the most modern prior
in of its type, producing fuselages for Airbus A350 long- outsour
German distance aircraft. Another 180 million euros will be cing
y" invested in Nordenham, on the North Sea. Originally decision
EADS wanted to get rid of the plants in order to
minimize the A350 development risks. The planned
sale fell through at the end of March, however, due to
the falling dollar and the turbulence in the
international financial market. Despite the failed sale,
EADS still wants to form a new subsidiary called
Premium Aerotec that will group together the two
plants in Augsburg, along with the plants in
Nordenham and Varel, said the spokesman. 'We can't
just lay our hands in our laps and wait and see what
happens,' he said. One of the main goals of the factory
will be changing the material used in the fuselages
from aluminum to carbon fiber."
3 Bloomb Firm- c "Boeing's refusal to go along with changes the union On a
Sept. erg, Labor sought on using outside vendors was enough to modular
2008 "Boeing convince 23- year machinist Art Schilling to vote to enterpri
Bets on strike. 'We're not asking for the moon; what we're se
a Third asking for is a fair shake,' Schilling said today after architec
of casting his ballot at the union hall outside Boeing's ture's
Machini Renton, Washington, factory, where 737s are built. approac
sts to Hundreds of machinists marched together from Boeing's h to
Avert factories to vote at union halls on their breaks, some labor.
Strike" carrying signs saying, 'Out the gate 2008' and 'Go fly
(Susann this, Kight,' referring to Doug Kight, Boeing's lead
a Ray) negotiator.
One wildcard is a change in the union's demographics
since the last contract in 2005, when more than 18,000
workers walked out. Back then, 37 machinists were
under age 30. Now there are 2,300 -- about 10 percent
of the IAM membership in Boeing's main Seattle
manufacturing hub -- because Boeing has recalled laid-off
workers and hired new employees. 'The determining
factor is going to be the new hires,' Tim Limestall, who's
also worked for Boeing for 23 years, said after voting to
strike at the Renton union hall. 'They're younger and a
lot of them come from non-union shops.' Boeing's
hiring spree since the last contract has cut the average
age of machinists to 46 from 49. The average wage fell
in the past year by $1 an hour to $26. 'This is to a
certain extent a test for the machinists to see how good
a job they've done socializing the younger workers into
the IAM,' said John Budd, a professor of industrial
relations at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis.
- - - A, ___ _ .... ....................... 
The question is whether they 'are willing to fight for
pension benefits and retiree medical coverage and
those types of issues, or whether they're more focused
on salary and job- security issues.'
Tom Wroblewski, president of the IAM's District 751 in
Seattle, said the younger workers seem to be united with
older machinists and 'more resolved than we'd
anticipated' to strike."
3 Seattle Firm- a "'When we go out on strike, the price goes up,' Tom On a
Sept. Post Labor Wroblewski, president of local District lodge 751 of the modular
2008 Intellige International Association of Machinists and Aerospace enterpri
ncer, Workers, said as he stood on a side walk down the street se
"Boeing from the plant gate and slapped hands with many of the architec
Waits Machinists as they marched by toward the union hall and ture's
on the all-important vote. 'They miscalculated,' approac
Machini Wroblewski said of Boeing. As the Machinists marched, h to
sts they chanted, 'Union power! Union power!' 'It would labor.
Vote" surprise me if we came back before the first of
(James November," said one longtime Boeing machinists who
Wallace did not want to be quoted by name. 'The company is dug
in and so are we."'
3 The Firm- a "'We can't afford to go on strike, but we can't afford On the
Sept. Seattle Labor this contract,' said Lindsey Good, who has been an zero-
2008 Times, interior mechanic for six months. 'They want to stuff sum
"Machi money in this pocket while taking money out of this relation
nists one,' said Good. Philip Conklin, another Machinist of six ship
Turn months, voted against the contract even though it offers a between
Out to raise that would give him better pay than some people who the firm
Vote on have worked there longer. 'My uncle has been here and
Boeing more than 20 years,' Conklin said. 'If I sat down at the labor in
Contrac dinner table with him on Sunday and said, 'Yeah, a
t" that's a great contract for me,' we wouldn't see eye-to- modular
(Domini eye.' For Jimmy Le, who has worked at the company enterpri
c Gates) since 1986, it will be unusual if there is no strike. 'Only se
one time was there no strike,' he recalled. An electronic architec
technician on airplane interiors, Le said that as long as ture.
Boeing's top executives receive big pay increases, so
should the Machinists. 'They make good money, and
the last two contracts they didn't give up anything,' Le
said. Alicia Winkler, 24, who distributes and inventories
tools for mechanics, sported pierced lips and eyebrows.
She said she feels threatened by Boeing's lack of
movement on the issue of subcontracting parts and tools
delivery work. 'Mostly I'm concerned about
outsourcing. I don't want to lose my job to someone
else," said Winkler. "We need to stick together as
Americans." The older generation of Machinists was for
the most part equally supportive of the union leadership.
'I've been through three strikes,' said Patrick Ferguson, 48.
'I'm well-prepared.' Some Machinists indicated their
willingness not only to strike but to stay out for a long
time by wearing a black T-shirt with the slogan 'Walk the
Line till '09.' The marchers from the factory carried signs
leaving no doubt how most of them will vote. 'The best
and final offer is when WE decide,' read one sign.
-
'Look out, Ford. Here comes McNerney," read
another, referring to Boeing Chief Executive Jim
McNerney and the fact that former commercial
airplanes boss Alan Mulally left Boeing since the last
strike in 2005 to become CEO at Ford.
'There's a few things in the medical plan I don't like,
but the way times are, it's a fair contract,' said Tom
Yardy, 40, who assembles doors on the 767 and has been
with Boeing 20 years. 'I really don't want to go on
strike.' Yardy seemed to be in a minority, but he pointed
out that some who plan to vote yes will not advertise it but
do so quietly.
3 Bloomb Bomba Firm a "Bombardier Inc., the world's third- largest commercial- On
Sept. erg, rdier aircraft maker, may widen its share performance gap over contradi
2008 "Bomba Boeing Co. with turboprop planes. The higher fuel prices ctory
rdier that hurt sales of Boeing's biggest jetliners are spurring claims
Beats orders for Bombardier's 74-seat passenger planes and between
Boeing commuter-rail equipment, sending the two companies' competi
Returns shares in opposite directions. Bombardier has gained 41 ng
in percent in Toronto trading this year as Boeing has dropped modular
Turbopr 24 percent in New York. 'The higher the fuel price gets, enterpri
op the more attractive a turboprop is, so it just feeds into se
Revival the advantage of a turboprop market," Drew Hall, architec
" (Hugo Bombardier's director of commercial aircraft product tures
Miller) planning, said in an interview. Turboprops were fading about
into commercial-aviation history a few years ago. They how
owe their revival to a doubling of fuel prices since high
January 2007 and 30 percent greater efficiency than fuel
jets. The shares are valued at 15 times this year's prices
estimated profit, higher than Embraer's 14 and Chicago- increase
based Boeing's 11, according to Bloomberg data." demand
for
their
product
S.
4 Washin Firm- a 'People feel that in a time of record profits, the On the
Sept. gton Labor company should not come with any takeaways,' said zero-
2008 Post, Connie Kelliher, a union spokeswoman. 'When times sum
"Boeing were bad, workers went for years without a salary game
Waits increase. But now things are good.' Boeing officials between
on have said that to offer more than it has already would the firm
Count hamstring the company with unsustainable labor costs. and
of 'Our best and final offer rewards employees for the labor in
Strike company's success and allows us to remain competitive,' a
Vote" Boeing said in a statement. modular
(Michae enterpri
1 'Without a question, the company has drawn a line in se
Fletcher the sand,' said Harley Shaiken, a professor at the architec
) University of California at Berkeley who specializes in ture.
labor issues. 'But it is a risky gamble given the stakes.
High labor and benefit costs can be a burden, but if
there is a strike, the company could be doing more
damage to itself if it disrupts production and progress
on the 787 Dreamliner.' 'Any further delay will have
both a tangible and intangible effect,' said Howard
Rubel, an aerospace analyst at Jefferies & Co. 'The
tangible will be that the planes are even later. The
intangible is, 'When do we regain the trust of this
company?"
4 Bloomb Firm- a "Eighty percent of the voters opposed the three-year On the
Sept. erg, Labor contract and 87 percent supported a walkout, the zero-
2008 "Boeing International Association of Machinists and Aerospace sum
Union Workers said tonight in Seattle. Union leaders Mark game
Rejects Blondin and Tom Wroblewski were shouted off the between
Contrac stage by workers, many already holding 'On Strike' signs, the firm
t; who wanted to walk off the job tonight. 'It was our job and
Leaders to negotiate a contract that's acceptable to you, not to labor in
Delay negotiate a strike,' Wroblewski told the crowd. a
Strike modular
(Susann Chicago-based Boeing's lead negotiator, Doug Kight, said enterpri
a Ray) he was 'disappointed' by the vote. 'Our job at this point se
is to listen to the union; we put the last contract offer architec
on the table,' he said a press conference. 'We will seek to ture.
understand and then make an assessment to see if there
is a path forward.'
Boeing agreed to federal mediators' request to negotiate
another 48 hours, Kight said, adding that he's willing to
hear out the union on the 'critical-few issues."'
4 Washin Firm- a "'The disrespect they have shown for the negotiation On the
Sept. gton Labor process is exactly the same way our members have felt zero-
2008 Post, and why they have been marching in the factories at sum
"Boeing lunchtime for the past weeks,' the union said in a game
Machini statement posted on its Web site early this morning." between
sts Vote the firm
to Strike and
(Michae labor in
1 a
Fletcher modular
) enterpri
se
architec
ture.
4 The Firm- a "One thing that must worry Boeing management now is On the
Sept. Seattle Labor that a new generation of workers is learning about zero-
2008 Times, union power and joining older employees in the long sum
"Machi history of bad blood between the IAM and the game
nists at company. Brett Baehm, 20, is one of the thousands of between
Boeing younger workers hired since 2004. He was hired in June to the firm
Reject work on the 777. The Boeing offer would have given and
Contrac Baehm an immediate wage increase that looks good to labor in
t; Strike him. Yet he said he still voted to strike. At an Everett a
on Hold factory march on Wednesday morning, he reveled in the modular
for 48 brotherly solidarity. 'For me, it's a decent contract. enterpri
Hours But if it's bad for everybody in general, I won't accept se
as it,' Baehm said. 'Everybody is looking out for each architec
Mediato other right now.' ture.
r Steps
In" The threat of a lengthy strike is high. During these
(Domini contract negotiations, Machinists seemed determined to
c Gates) use their leverage when the company is flush with
profits and has a seven-year production backlog. Before
the vote, Boeing was firm that its offer was final. 'If we
go out one day, it'll be at least 30,' said Robert Fullerton,
a lead mechanic on the 777 and 30-year Boeing veteran.
'This is the best time for our union to get what we
need.'
One big stumbling block is outsourcing. For future
airplanes, the union wanted to stop the subcontracting
of parts-delivery work forced upon it in the 2002
contract and now a reality on the 787. But Boeing has
always refused union demands to give up its ability to
outsource. 'Our jobs in parts receiving and kitting are
jeopardized,' said Judy Simpson, 66, a Machinist for nine
years whose son and daughter also work at Boeing. 'They
can bring anybody in there and lay us off.'
Boeing also appears to have miscalculated the appeal of
the economic aspects of its contract offer to both the
younger, newer hires and the more senior machinists at
the top of the pay scale. One older Machinist, who asked
for anonymity so as to avoid company retaliation, outlined
the perspective of longtime workers in an e-mail message.
"I have to foremost think of myself and my wife's future,"
he wrote. "We do get paid well, but we are more
concerned with our health and retirement plans." Boeing's
offer increased the basic monthly retirement pension from
$70 to $80 per year of service. Machinists wanted the
company to do better, given $13 billion in net profits over
the last five years, half of those profits from the
commercial airplane unit. Soon after the initial offer from
Boeing last week, Machinists started forwarding around e-
mails from a 2006 Boeing filing with the Securities
Exchange Commission showing that at that time low-level
executives got monthly pensions of $400 per year of
service and top executives got $4,000 for each year of
service.
Jayleen Roman, who was hired 18 months ago as an
electrician on the 787 line, was incensed that new hires
will earn the same rate as her. 'We've been working one-
a-half years for what?' she asked. Roman said her family
has a long Boeing tradition. Her dad has been there 28
years and her brother 11 years. She knew to save for a
strike. 'When you apply to Boeing, you learn to expect
this,' she said."
4 24/7 Investo a "The aircraft firm's executives have not been terribly On a
Sept. Wall St., rs- adroit at making a case that they cannot give the modular
2008 "Boeing Firm- unions more. Boeing's recent news releases are filled enterpri
A Labor with announcements of sales of its new Dreamliner, se
Strike and its older but popular 777. Boeing has also been architec
the bullish on its prospects over the next two decades, in ture's
Compan part due to expected sales in China. oversell
y Can't ing to
Afford" The reasoning behind Boeing's statement that it has investor
51
(Dougla given the union all it can is that higher labor costs s, which
s could hurt future earnings. That would be especially gives
McIntyr true if the company hit a sales downturn. By Boeing's bargaini
e) own admission, it has a multi-year backlog of aircraft ng
orders, so the argument is a bit thin. leverage
to labor.
Boeing's management has not done anyone a favor by
holding out.
Firm "'Our negotiations team worked very hard to reach a
contract agreement that handsomely rewarded a vital
group of employees, ensured continued strong support of
our customer commitments, and maintained our long-
term competitiveness against a strengthening and
growing list of commercial and military competitors,'
McNerney said. He added:
'Clearly, we are committed to doing our best to prevent a
work stoppage and the disruption it would cause inside
and outside our company. But we will do so ever mindful
of our responsibilities to protect our long-term
competitiveness, maintain our ability to best serve our
customers, and to ensure fairness and equity for all
employee groups."
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Sept. Tribune, wing 'until well into December, if this year,' said a systemi
2008 "Boeing senior executive of a major Boeing supplier. 'Officially, c
Laborin they're not saying that, but through the grapevine it consequ
g over seems like things may be slipping a little bit,' said ences of
787 Michael Derchin, aerospace analyst for FTN Midwest over-
Dreamli Securities Corp. 'Instead of the first half of the fourth promisi
ner" quarter, Ithe first flightl may be in the last half of the ng and
(Julie quarter.' A strike 'obviously would be a blow to that,' under-
Johnsso he added. deliveri
n) ng
The company missed an internal deadline to wrap up
work on the first aircraft by Aug. 31 and isn't likely to
complete the tasks needed to make the airplane
airworthy before October, according to Flightblogger, a
site that closely tracks Dreamliner production. 'While
things are moving within the schedule, we're still on
track to fly in the fourth quarter,' said Yvonne Leach, a
Boeing spokeswoman."
5 The Firm a "While [Jetstar] the Quantas offshoot is yet to be advised On a
Sept. Aurstral of any changes in the program, sources in Seattle told The modular
2008 ian, Australian that the first flight of the 787 would be at the enterpri
"Boeing earliest in late December or, more likely, January. se
Delays architec
Deliver Boeing has come in for considerable criticism over the ture's
y of 778 past year, for not being more proactive with updates on general
Again the delays with the 787, with industry media becoming tendenc
(Geoffr the leading source of information on the status of the y to
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5 Market Ray Firm- a "The Society of Professional Engineering Employees in On a
Sept. Watch, Gofort Labor- Aerospace (SPEEA), IFPTE Local 2001, supports fellow modular
2008 "SPEE h, Investo union members at Boeing and congratulates them on enterpri
A executi rs the resounding defeat of the company's veiled se
Support ve substandard contract offer. 'This is a failure of Boeing architec
s IAM directo management," said Ray Goforth, executive director of ture's
751 r of SPEEA. "By forcing this strike vote, Boeing zero-
Efforts SPEE management has again failed its customers, employees sum
to A and its shareholders.' SPEEA is distributing 'I Support game
Secure a IAM' signs for employees to display in vehicles and at against
New work. 'The company has bulging coffers, plane orders labor.
Contrac to the horizon and was faced with reasonable union
t from demands, Goforth said. 'Instead of sharing the success
Boeing" of The Boeing Conmpany with the employees who made
it successful, Boeing is trying to force employees to
accept takeaways.'
'There is no reason a strike should happen,' Goforth
added. 'Shareholders should hold Boeing executives
accountable."'
9 Busines Firm- Ot "Take two companies-let's call them A and B- Compar
Sept. sWeek, Labor & competing head-to-head in the same business. Rank-and- ing the
2008 "Boeing f file worker salaries at both are roughly comparable. But modular
's On Company A is struggling financially. Most employees got and
Strike, a 1.5% raise this year, and management has announced integral
So Why plans to eliminate about one in five jobs. Company B, enterpri
Isn't though, is in pretty good shape. Management recently se
Airbus? offered workers an 11% pay raise over the next three architec
" years, along with bonuses of more than $5,000 and a 14% tures:
(Carol boost in company payments into their pension plan. So, zero-
Matlack guess which company's employees are out on strike? OK, sum
) so the headline gave it away: Airbus is Company A, and competi
Boeing Co. is B. On Sept. 6, members of Boeing's biggest tion vs.
union walked off the job, halting production and throwing positive
the timetable for the already late-to-market 787 -sum
Dreamliner into confusion. Contrast that with Airbus, coopera
based in Toulouse, France. It has suffered only minor tion.
labor protests as it moves to eliminate 5,000 jobs over
the next two years as part of its so-called Power 8
restructuring plan. Union leaders also agreed to that 1.5%
pay raise, well below France's 2.5% inflation rate in 2007.
What happened to those famously militant French labor
unions? At Airbus, most of the rank-and-file is
represented by the Force Ouvribre, or Worker Power
union, one of the country's most hardcore labor groups.
Sounds ominous--but the truth is, private-sector strikes
in France are exceedingly rare. Transit workers,
teachers, even doctors, frequently walk off the job, but
factory workers almost never do. At Airbus, union
leaders may realize that a strike could aggravate an
already precarious situation. The company has posted
operating losses for the past two years as production
delays on the A380 mega jet knocked billions off the
bottom line. The euro's rise against the dollar has seriously
dented its competitive edge against Boeing. And, it must
be said, Airbus is still a pretty good place to work.
Starting pay for the least-skilled production workers is
about $15 an hour, and experienced machinists make $26
or $27 an hour--roughly the same as the average machinist
salary at Boeing, though it's difficult to make direct
comparisons because French workers get more-
generous benefits than Americans. Among other things,
they pay practically nothing out-of-pocket for health care,
and under French labor law, most can expect nice
severance packages if they're laid off. Moreoever, Airbus
isn't laying anyone off: The job cuts are being made
through attrition and early-retirement buyouts. To the
unions' relief, Airbus also has scrapped plans to sell some
of its French and German factories, a move that had
sparked fears that the new owners would shift jobs to
lower-cost countries. Airbus abandoned the idea after it
I_
was unable to find buyers. 'We were afraid of
outsourcing, but things have calmed down,' says
Matthieu de Georges, a Force Ouvrire representative. For
the moment, he says union members have no major
complaints about Airbus. 'Of course if they say they
aren't happy, we'll act.' Asked if Force Ouvri&e would
care to comment on the Boeing strike, de Georges politely
demurs. But it's hard to avoid the conclusion that Airbus
stands to benefit if Boeing's unions stage a long and
crippling strike, or if they win concessions from
management that significantly drive up production
costs.
NEWS FLASH: Those Airbus union members now have a
new reason to protest. Louis Gallois, the CEO of parent
company European Aeronautics Defence & Space, tells
French newspaper Le Monde in an interview September 9
that Airbus will begin producing some aircraft components
in Tunisia to cut costs and reduce its exposure to the
strong euro. Stay tuned!"
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11 Wired, Firm "Airbus announced yesterday that starting in 2010, it will On an
Sept. "Airbus offer a higher gross weight version of its popular A330- integral
2008 Kicks 200. Airbus hopes that'll position the plane as a viable enterpri
Boeing alternative to Boeing's much hyped and much delayed se
While next-gen mega-jet, the 787 Dreamliner." architec
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12 "Respec Gary Firm- a On September 3, when the 27,000 production workers at On a
Sept. t and Chaiso Labor Boeing walked off their jobs in a strike, most observers modular
2008 the n, began the usual searching for the underlying cause. enterpri
Strike at Profess After all, the parties were fairly close in their offers and se
Boeing" or of demands (the union--the International Association of architec
Industr Machinists--asked for a 13 percent wage increase over ture's
ial three years and the company offered 11 percent as well as adversar
Relatio a signing bonus of $2500). Substantial wage increases are ial style,
ns, not common in manufacturing. The conventional wisdom as
Clark seemed to be that the strike was over Boeing's opposed
I
Univer insistence on its right to outsource work done by the to the
sity union members. While this is certainly one of the substan
contributing factors, I feel that primary reason for the ce of its
strike can be found in bargaining style, not bargaining poor
issues. Quite simply, Boeing was disrespectful. It didn't offer, as
treat the Machinists as the rightful bargaining agent. the
When the Machinists announced the results of the strike reason
vote (87 percent of the workers for it) and the rejection of for a
Boeing's proposed contract (80 percent against it), the strike.
union emphasized how the company had behaved
disrespectfully. There is ample evidence of this. First,
Boeing attempted an 'end run' around the union
bargaining committee by appealing directly to the
workers--something that is never done in mature
bargaining. Boeing widely advertised that its contract
proposal was available on the company web page. Second,
it offered the workers a signing bonus if they approved
the contract. I see this as a bribe for going against the
union's recommendation that the contract be rejected.
Finally, Boeing told the workers know that the proposal
was its 'best and final offer'. When they used this phrase,
the company was declaring that as far as it was
concerned, bargaining was over. Boeing was mistaken
in it's belief that it could sell a collective bargaining
agreement to its workers. It confused public relations
with collective bargaining, assuming that it could be so
persuasive that the workers would vote against a strike,
against their union, and for the contract. But it forgot that
the role of the union is to act as a bargaining agent by
standing between the workers and the company. The
workers knew that if they accepted Boeing's proposal and
rejected a strike it would be a vote of 'no confidence' in
their union and they weren't about to do this. Boeing
doesn't have to like the Machinists and it doesn't have
to like the process of collective bargaining, but it has to
respect the Machinist's role as an equal at the
bargaining table. The strike will be over when, and
only when, the company understands that if must first
persuade the union's bargaining team to accept the
terms of the new contract, and then let them to
recommend that the members' accept it."
12 Busines Jim Firm - a "Just how Boeing and its workers went off the cliff yet On a
Sept. s Week McNer Labor again, may be an object lesson in how tough it can be to modular
2008 "Boeing ney, bridge the gap between labor and management in a enterpri
Strike: Chair globally competitive, old-line business. If Chief se
No End man & Executive W. James McNerney Jr. wanted to use this go- archtect
in CEO, round to break a nearly 60-year cycle of acrimonious ure's
Sight" The relations between Boeing and the International ideologi
(Joseph Boeing Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAM), cal
Weber) Compa he certainly hasn't succeeded. And if the IAM leaders belief
ny figured this was the time when they could humble that
management and right the wrongs they felt done to outsour
them in prior contracts, they seem to have badly cing is
misjudged the determination of the CEO and his the
managers. best/onl
y way
I
Certainly, McNerney & Co. sought to set a different tone to
from 2005, when the IAM last went on strike. Then, the maintai
machinists shut down commercial planemaking at n
Boeing for 28 days. This time a fresh team of Boeing competi
negotiators, trying to iron out differences well in tiveness
advance, began last May to sound out the union leadership
on what contract terms might fly and what would be dead
on arrival. The effort was part of a drive to 'listen very
carefully to our employees,' chief management negotiator
Doug Kight said. The company, he argued, wanted to
share its success with the workers even while making sure
it could stay competitive. In a May memo, Kight said the
early talks were a chance 'to have open and respectful
conversations.' For the union leaders, however, the early
start did little more than raise suspicions. Boeing, they
figured, just wanted more time to sell its least palatable
plans to the workers. Among them: proposals to eliminate
medical benefits for some retirees and to kill off a
traditional pension program for new hires while giving
them a 401(k)-like retirement plan instead. Though
skeptical, union chief negotiator Mark Blondin went along
with the early start to talks. Now, he says, 'I sensed a PR
thing coming, and sure enough that's what happened.'
Just how much listening really took place is far from clear.
By July, the union leaders didn't think they were making
much headway. The proposed "givebacks" on medical and
pension benefits, which the union leaders had warned were
sure strike-starters, remained on the table. So the leaders
told their members to start saving for another strike, which
would be the seventh launched by the IAM against
Boeing since World War II. Sure that a walkout was
inevitable, some longtime workers canceled summer
vacations and set aside enough cash so they could get by
on the $150 a week in strike benefits.
Despite the early start, no real movement took place until
the end of August. With a Sept. 3 strike vote looming,
management caved in on the plan to end medical benefits
for some retirees. They decided to stick with traditional
pensions even hiking the amounts the company would
contribute. Kight and his team made a best-and-final offer
on the Thursday before Labor Day, offering raises of 5%
in the first year of a new contract and 3% each for the two
years afterward. To pry any doubters loose, they
sweetened the pot by offering more than $6,000 in
bonuses, some $2,500 of which depended on getting a fast
majority vote for the deal. The offer was, CEO McNerney
told employees in a memo, 'the best contract in the
aerospace industry.' But the take-it-or-leave-it tack,
which barred further talks before the vote, proved to
be a dud. Boeing blitzed the Seattle radio waves with ads
making the case for the deal and urged workers to read the
details about its offer on the company Web site. But such
tactics, union leaders charged, amounted to improperly
going over the heads of the union bargainers. The
communications, they bristled, were nothing more than a
bid to bargain directly with workers-an approach that
seemed quickly to backfire as the leaders condemned
"givebacks" that offended them. The workers,
meanwhile, were furious. Angered by proposals the
company was floating, they had been staging marches
around the factories. The distractions made it impossible
to get work done, some workers say.
The union pored over the offer and pounced on terms it
found objectionable. Trims in health-care benefits loomed
large, even though Boeing officials insist the changes on
balance would be neutral, with higher co-pays offset, for
instance, by cuts in premiums. Even more problematic,
however, is the company's power to subcontract work,
to let suppliers from around the U.S. and in other countries
provide parts and have nonunion outsiders deliver such
goods to the assembly lines in Washington. The union
fears that such outsourcing, which it says has been on the
upswing, will ultimately kill off jobs. Management
contends that globalization requires it be able to have work
done around the world-especially in countries where that
might help it sell more planes. McNerney 'wants the
flexibility to do what's right for the business,' says Noel
Tichy, a management professor at the University of
Michigan who has known McNerney since he was a rising
star at General Electric (GE) in the 1980s. It's an issue,
Tichy says, on which the CEO can't compromise.
'Can you together work out a reasonable compromise?
Yes,' says the professor. 'But I think it's [McNerney's]
position that there are some things that he does
consider non-negotiable, and the other side is saying
the same thing.' Part of the problem is union officials
have long memories. Some are still troubled that the
outsourcing power was put in place in a nettlesome
contract in 2002. That contract went into force only
because the union fell short of getting a two-thirds vote for
a strike, even though most members opposed the contract.
Then the union was unable to get the language pulled in
2005. "It puts our members' jobs at risk," says negotiator
Blondin.
By Sept. 3, when 87% of the workers backed a walkout, it
was clear the union had long been spoiling for a fight.
Sporting T-shirts emblazoned with the slogan 'It's Our
Time This Time,' the workers paraded to the union polls
led by motorcycle-riding colleagues. Many were angry
when the union leaders agreed to delay the strike for 48
hours, until late Sept. 5, to see if any common ground
could be found.
Some machinists argue that Boeing, which has been
blessed with record profits and its biggest backlog of
plane orders ever, can well afford to scrap all
"givebacks" and to "bargain up," as a union
spokeswoman said. Gutting the outsourcing language is a
I II I I II ~
key part of what the union hopes to gain. Its leaders figure
that concerns about further delays for the new 787
Dreamliner on Wall Street and in the Boeing executive
suite, give workers leverage. It's really anyone's guess
just how drawn out and costly this fight will ultimately be.
Analyst Cai von Rumohr of Cowen & Co. figures a strike
could last between 29 and 65 days, pushing a conclusion
into mid-November at the latest. He figures the end of
health-care coverage, at the opening of October, will put
the first bit of serious pressure on workers, while in
November the approach of the holidays steps it up. The
union went on strike at Boeing for 69 days in 1995.
Von Rumohr estimates Boeing could lose as much as $2.3
billion in revenues this quarter. Some of that, of course,
could include deferred rather than lost sales, but company
officials do fret that demand for planes could slip over
time, especially as the global economy slows. Some
workers say they'd love to see a change in the
contentious relationship between the company and the
union that flares anew with every contract round. 'My
family and I are completely exhausted with going through
a financial disaster or potential disaster every three years,'
says one 21-year veteran worker. On the other hand, he
looks on the IAM as one of the last strong unions able to
hold the line on hard-fought gains, while other industrial
labor groups have folded.
For the company's part, when Kight began the talks with
the union back in May, he seemed to do so with the best
intentions. 'Boeing's goal is to create an open and honest
environment by communicating frequently and having
robust discussions,' he told managers back then in an e-
mail message. But when the differences-and distrust-
are deep, honesty may do little to bridge the gap.
Instead, it boils down to which side can stand the pain
of a strike long enough to claim victory."
12 The Firm - a "Triumph Composite Systems Inc., which produces air Comari
Sept. Wall Suppli & ducts and composite floors for Boeing, said it would lay ng how
2008 Street er - B off at least 220 of the 550 workers at is Spokane, Wash., integral
Journal, Labor plant. The company said it would be forced to lay off and
"Boeing another 15% to 20% of its work force if the strike runs modular
Strike past Sept. 21. supplier
Rattles s
Key Spirit AeroSystems Inc, which builds every Boeing 737 respone
Supplier fuselage as well as the flight decks and nose sections for a d to an
s" (J. variety of other models, said it was cutting production exogeno
Lynn immediately and reduced its workweek to three days us
Lunsfor for many employees in an effort to avoid layoffs at its shock
d & facilities in Wichita, Kan. (i.e. a
Daniel labor
Michael Although many suppliers say they hope Boeing's labor strike at
s) dispute is resolved quickly, some are also privately its main
rooting for Boeing to hold strong. They know that any custome
concessions Boeing makes will likely surface in their own r).
labor negotiations down the road. 'It's a global industry in
~ ~
more ways than one,' said an executive at a supplier."
14 Fobes, Jim Firm - a "Boeing Co. chief executive Jim McNerney is betting his On a
Sept. "Boeing McNer Labor career that the world's biggest-selling plane maker can modular
2008 CEO ney, survive a strike by its assembly workers and emerge enterpri
McNern Chair stronger by holding firm on its right to outsource work se
ey man & on its aircraft. The decision to play hardball with the architct
Gamble CEO, company's biggest union is a gamble for McNerney, 59, ure's
s on The a star baseball pitcher at Yale, where he was a classmate logic
Strike" Boeing of U.S. President Bush. The outcome will dictate the which
(Bill Compa direction of the most famous name in aerospace and one of assumes
Rigby) ny the biggest U.S. exporters. 'If it's a choice between modular
getting it (the strike) stopped quickly, or doing what is vs.
good for the company in the long run, he's going to modular
choose the second,' said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace competi
analyst at research firm Teal Group, based in Fairfax, tion.
Virginia. 'To a certain extent, he has no choice. (This
Compromising on the company's competitiveness is a logic is
losing game.' Simply put, Boeing wants to design and orthogo
assemble planes, but leave the labor-intensive nal
manufacturing to others. Its new 787 Dreamliner is being when
built by other companies in Japan, Italy, South Carolina competi
and elsewhere, and only assembled by Boeing in the ng
Seattle area. The machinists' union sees this as an attempt against
to destroy local jobs. But McNerney is committed to the an
new way of working and is calculating that the long- integral
term benefits of outsourcing will outweigh the bad will, enterpri
cost and delay caused by a strike. A week into the se
stoppage, he still has the support of Wall Street. The architec
company's share price is holding steady around its 12- ture.)
month low, but most analysts expect a jump when the
strike ends. 'Things could turn around here after the
strike has been resolved,' said Paul Nisbet at aerospace
equity specialists JSA Research, based in Newport, Rhode
Island. 'I would expect things to start moving pretty
favorably in the company's direction.'
The International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM), sensing the upper hand as
Boeing reaps record profits, is holding out for a hefty
pay rise and removal of contract wording giving Boeing
almost unfettered power to use outside suppliers. The
company came close to meeting pay demands, but is
refusing to budge on outsourcing with no further talks
planned. Resolving the strike, which is costing Boeing
$100 million a day in revenue, looks to be the biggest
challenge in the CEO's career. Walter James McNerney
Jr., who prefers to be called Jim, worked his way quietly
into one of the most important positions in U.S. business.
He came to Boeing after four and a half years at the helm
of manufacturer 3M Co. and a 19-year career at General
Electric Co. where he lost out to Jeff Immelt in the race to
take over from Jack Welch. His time in charge at Boeing
has been relatively calm, after the company lost two
CEOs in dubious circumstances. Philip M. Condit
resigned in December 2003 after it emerged that Boeing
had improperly offered a high-paying job to the U.S. Air
I ~
Force's No. 2 acquisition official. The successor, Harry C.
Stonecipher, resigned in March 2005 when it was revealed
he was having an affair with a Boeing executive.
After taking over in July 2005, McNerney moved quickly
to clean up Boeing's legal and ethical problems, settling
long- running federal investigations into its procurement
practices and illegal appropriation of Lockheed Martin
Corp. rocket program documents. His leadership has
coincided with a three-year boom in commercial plane
sales and steady growth in U.S. defense spending. Last
year, Boeing had a banner year, crushing rival Airbus
with an industry record 1,413 plane orders and its
highest-ever annual profit of $4.1 billion. Despite those
successes, Boeing's shares have plunged about 36
percent in the past 12 months, compared with a 15
percent drop in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, hit by
the credit crisis sell-off, spiking oil prices, and
worrisome delays on the 787. 'He's not coming out
smelling too much like a rose at this point, with
problems on the 787 and not being able to reach an
agreement with the workers,' said Nisbet. 'But they
(Boeing) are definitely right. They could be leading the
aerospace industry down the same path of the airline
industry and the auto industry if they didn't take a
stand.'"
15 Financi Firm- t "Around 1,500 employees, 25 per cent of the workforce On an
Sept. al Investo at Filton, will transfer from Airbus to GKN. Tom Enders, integral
2008 Times, r- Airbus chief executive, said the group's remaining wing, enterpri
"GKN Suppli landing gear and fuel systems design and engineering se
Pays er business at Filton was core to its role of being an aircraft architec
£136m 'architect and integrator.' It would retain a workforce ture's
for of around 5,000 at Filton including for the assembly and method
Airbus equipping of the composite wings for the A400M military of
Plant" transport aircraft." divestin
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17 The Alan Firm- t "Alan R. Mulally, the chief executive of Ford, was even On a
Sept. New R. Gover more upbeat. 'It was a great day,' he said. When a modular
2008 York Mulall nment reporter asked what Mr. Mulally might say to people who enterpri
Times, y, the viewed the loan guarantees as a bailout, he replied in a se
"Federa chief chipper voice, 'I would characterize it as an enabler.'" architec
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18 Bloomb Ray Firm - t "'Things are looking worse,' Ray Goforth, executive On a
Sept. erg, Gofort Labor director of the Society of Professional Engineering modular
2008 "Boeing h, Employees in Aerospace, said in an interview after a enterpri
Enginee Execut meeting with Boeing's negotiating team yesterday. 'These se
rs' ive negotiations will end up in the same train wreck as they architec
Union Direct did with the machinists if they don't change how ture's
Says or, they're approaching us.' method
Talks SPEEA to
Many The engineers are demanding the return of some work compete
End in the company gave suppliers to help control costs while in "Cost
'Train developing and building planes like the new 787 Leaders
Wreck' Dreamliner. In its first response to the union, Chicago- hip"
" based Boeing said yesterday it's sticking to its
(Susana outsourcing strategy. The current contract expires Dec. 1.
Ray)
'We won't give up the flexibility that we have, but
we're willing to talk about other ways to increase
productivity or other initiatives like that,' Karen
Fincutter, a Boeing spokeswoman in Seattle, said in an
interview.
Boeing says its business plan counts on external
suppliers and it needs to make sure it keeps costs low
enough to stay competitive. Boeing proposed a contract
longer than the current three years. 'What they
proposed today was full of take-aways, so even if we
were to accept such a terrible contract, why would we
lock that in for longer?' Goforth said. 'They were
completely unsympathetic to our concerns' about
outsourcing."
19 Financi John Firm ( "Airbus is sticking with plans to raise commercial On an
Sept. al Leahy, aircraft production by almost a third in the four years to integral
2008 Times, Airbus 2010, in spite of the rapid deterioration in the financial enterpri
"Airbus COO, state of the airline industry. John Leahy, Airbus se
Sticks Custo commercial director, said the European aircraft maker had architec
with mers reviewed its production plans this week and remained "on ture's
Producti track" to raise output of its single-aisle A320 short-haul producti
on jets from a current level of between 34 and 36 a month to on at
Increase 40 a month by early 2010. Output of its wide-body, long- sustaina
Goal" haul jets, chiefly the A330, was being raised from eight to ble
(Kevin between 10 and 11 a month by 2010, he said. 'We are still rates.
Done) seeing demand and we still have some overbooking [in the
production schedule] for 2009 to 2011' for the A320
aircraft. 'You know someone will not turn up, but you
don't know who.' The level of overbooking had fallen
from a year ago, however, and the higher production
schedule was being maintained 'with fingers crossed'. Mr
Leahy said Airbus was 'increasing somewhat' the
amount of 'back-stop' financing it was providing to
airline customers facing difficulties in securing finance
for new aircraft deliveries."
20 Hearld Firm- a "Even as its Machinists strike enters its third week, the On a
Sept. Net, Labor Boeing Co. continues to hire new production workers -- modular
2008 "Boeing who then go on strike. Most of the new workers report to enterpri
's New picket duty rather than to Boeing's commercial jet se
Hires factories, which have been silenced since 27,000 architec
I I I I
Go Machinists went on strike Sept. 6. 'It doesn't make sense ture's
Right to turn off the system,' said Boeing spokesman Tim non-
on Healy. Boeing's hiring process takes several weeks of systemi
Strike" screening and preliminary tests, including some unpaid c
(Michel time. Newly hired workers are informed of the ongoing approac
le strike and most opt to participate in it. Since Sept. 5, h.
Dunlop) the company has hired about 130 new Machinists, said
Connie Kelliher, spokeswoman for the union. That's not an
uncommon practice during a labor strike, she added.
Since 2005, Boeing has been on a hiring spree, bringing
on as many as 200 Machinists in a week to handle a big
backlog of orders. But that trend has slowed, according to
the latest Snohomish County job numbers reported by
Employment Security Department this week."
22 ATW, Firm- a "One worker who said he'd rather not be striking cynically On a
Sept. "Boeing Labor observed that the Seattle area's great late summer modular
2008 Machini weather was contributing to the strike. Indeed, picket enterpri
sts lines observed by this website were quite small. The se
Strike disgruntled IAM member noted that Washington State's architec
Enters hunting season for deer and game birds started Sept. 1 ture's
Third while elk season kicked off Sept. 8. Two other strikers "boom
Week" said the work action would give them a welcome break. 'I & bust"
(Geoffr want to spend more time with my family,' said one." approac
ey h to
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24 Forbes, Jim Firm a "Analysts have warned that 25 percent of the sales On the
Sept. "Boeing McNer backlog at Boeing and European rival Airbus, a unit of leader
2008 CEO ney, EADS, could be imperiled as a result of the economic of a
Says Chair slowdown. But McNerney said history suggests the modular
Talks man effects would not be that severe. 'We've examined past enterpri
with and economic downturns like we're experiencing now and se
Unions CEO, it tends to be that the risk is in the 5 to 10 percent architec
at The range,' McNerney said. 'Could be a little worse, could ture
'Standst Boeing be better than that. We'll have to monitor the situation."' being
ill"' Compa unconse
(Scott ny rvative
Malone) in
represen
tation of
data.
24 Bloomb Jim Firm- a "Boeing's plane factories have been shut since 27,000 On the
Sept. erg, McNer Labor machinists walked off the job Sept. 6, demanding more job leader
2008 "Boeing ney, security and better wages and benefits. Its 21,000 of a
's Chair engineers, whose contract expires Dec. 1, also are insisting modular
McNern man on a greater share of work now given to suppliers to help enterpri
ey Sees and Boeing control costs on planes such as the 787 Dreamliner. se
Financi CEO, architec
ng The McNerney today characterized Boeing's outsourcing ture
Demand Boeing strategy as a 'management-rights' issue. Both sides describi
Compa have been 'unable to find the common ground that we ng the
Backlog ny need to find to have the discussion we need to have to zero-
Risk" solve the problem,' he said." sum,
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24 Internat John Firm- a "Ten thousand job cuts are expected. Entire plants are Compar
Sept. ional Leahy, Labor & being sold or split off. Union members are getting a pay ing
2008 Herald Airbus (3 rise of only 1.5 percent for this year, and managers are modular
Tribune, COO, working to send more jobs abroad. Yet European workers and
"Airbss Custo at Airbus are not out on the picket lines. They are integral
Making mers working round the clock to rewire at least 6 A380 approac
Headwa superjumbos by hand to meet a target for completing 12 of hes to
y as them this year. Meanwhile, in developments that turn labor.
Boeing national stereotypes on their head, American workers
Sits at Boeing, worried about job security, have been on
Idle, strike for almost three weeks, despite an offer of an 11
(Carolin percent pay increase over three years. The strike is
e further delaying production and costing the company $100
Brother million a day in lost revenue.
s)
There is little rejoicing over Boeing's problems at Airbus,
which has been through plenty troubles of its own over the
past two years. But managers at the Airbus headquarters in
Toulouse say their work force seems to agree on the
urgency for change, at least for now. 'We have pretty
good working relations with the unions, which are not
nearly as adversarial as in Seattle,' John Leahy, the top
salesman at Airbus, said Friday during an interview in
Toulouse as Qantas received its first A380 here. 'We have
more of a partnership here, and whether you are on
the assembly line or an engineer you can understand
the euro-dollar problem, and see the foreign exchange
rate going in the wrong direction.'
Airbus has not been without labor problems as it tries to
recover from its own stumbles, mostly related to A380
production, while adapting to tough market conditions.
Work on Airbus assembly lines was disrupted three
times in as many weeks in February and March of 2007
as more than 33,000 demonstrators protested
thousands of planned job cuts. Smaller job actions
continue sporadically. On Friday, as many as 300 workers
from one small union walked off the job for two hours in
Toulouse to protest the restructuring. But the hand-over
ceremony to Qantas was not disrupted.
Analysts say strikes at Airbus tend to be shorter than
those at Boeing partly because there is greater and
more frequent communication between the two sides in
Europe in regular forums like works councils. At
Boeing, by contrast, unions tend to face off with
management every three years to negotiate a big
collective contract, so there is much more at stake.
Boeing and Airbus are operating in the same
constrained environment, however, trying to sell new
models to an industry stricken by soaring oil prices,
slowing economies, and a major shakeout among the Wall
Street institutions that finance aviation companies. Both
. . ...................  ..  ..........
companies are battling to cut costs, and both are
outsourcing supplies and parts of the assembly process.
Airbus is especially feeling pressure to shift production out
of the euro zone and into lower-cost regions, including the
United States. That is mostly because aircraft are priced in
dollars, and Airbus has the disadvantage of bearing the
bulk of its costs - labor and supplies - in euros. The strong
euro also means that the discounts manufacturers usually
give to win big orders cut deeper into Airbus revenue.
'Airbus has less margin to maneuver,' said Howard
Wheeldon, senior strategist BGC Partners, a brokerage
firm in London. 'It gives discounts that it can ill afford to
give.' Thus, most of the recent expansion has been outside
the euro zone and toward growth markets. Airbus is about
to start assembling some A320 planes in China, a fast-
growing market. The company gets half of the doors for
the A320 from Hindustan Aeronautics, an Indian
company. Airbus also had big plans to start building the
cargo version of its A330 in Mobile, Alabama, until its
U.S. Air Force contract to produce refueling tankers, based
on the A330, was thrown into jeopardy this year. Still, the
company is moving ahead with plans to ship some of its
production in France to Tunisia. Thomas Enders, the
Airbus chief executive, said last Friday that 30 percent of
the airframe of the Qantas A380 had been outsourced, half
from suppliers in the United States. The level of airframe
outsourcing on the wide-body A350 will be 50 percent,
Enders said. Though Airbus employees have not walked
off the job en masse, that does not mean they are
unconcerned about greater amounts of production
being done outside the company and outside Europe.
Workers fear that Airbus will make itself more
vulnerable to delays if it loses control of core
competencies, especially on new technologies like the
lighter composite materials that will replace the aluminum
and alloy fuselage on the new A350. This plane is the
intended competitor to the Dreamliner 787, which has
slipped behind Boeing's original production plan and may
have been further delayed by the strike. Airbus said in
May that Spirit AeroSystems, a former Boeing subsidiary
based in Wichita, Kansas, would design and produce part
of the central fuselage of the A350 at a new factory in
North Carolina. An Airbus union official who had taken
part in recent talks with managers expressed concerns
about working with outsiders. 'With the A380, we didn't
master all the production inside the group, and we are
even more anxious with partners we don't know and
who don't know our processes,' he said, speaking on the
condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of
relations with management. 'Airbus was solid enough to
support the cost of the A380, but we are not sure it can
support the A350 if it is delayed.' Enders said Friday
that the fear of losing control of its critical operations
was a legitimate concern. 'That would be a danger if
we didn't know what our core competencies were,' he
said. 'But we've done studies into what should be core
and what noncore. There are risks to this concept, but
I'm optimistic we can manage it.'
Geoff Dixon, the chief executive of Qantas, who had
waited two years and two months for its first A380 and
who had expected to have 8 to 12 by now, said Friday that
he was not especially concerned about potential delays.
Dixon said that Qantas had ordered 20 of the superjumbos,
with options for 4 more, and that he intended to exceed
number on order. 'Both Boeing and Airbus have
outsourced,' he said. 'We can be critical if they don't
meet deadlines. But with airlines also trying to find
more efficient ways to run their business, we can
understand it."'
2008 Boeing Firm C "Over the past 20 years, air travel grew by an average of On a
"Curre 4.8 percent each year. This was despite two major modular
nt world recessions, terrorist acts, the Asian financial enterpri
Market crisis of 1997, the severe acute respiratory syndrome se
Outlook (SARS) outbreak in 2003 and two Gulf wars. During 40 architec
2008- years of producing the Current Market Outlook, we have ture
2027" learned that the resilience of air transport growth comes being
from its intrinsic importance to the livelihood of people unconse
around the world. rvative
in
On average over the next 20 years, passenger travel will represen
grow at 5.0 percent and cargo at 5.8 percent. The fastest tation of
growing economies will lead the transformation into a data.
more geographically balanced market. More productive,
new airplanes will play a greater role, and there will be Ignores
relentless pursuit of further environmental progress." the fact
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global
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28 Bloggin Firm- ct "It is hard to do business, make sales, and drive profits Contrast
Sept. g Investo & when your company is shut down by a strike. It also aids ing
2008 Stocks, rs- |3 the competition. modular
"Airbus Labor Boeing Co. is finding that out the hard way. According to and
Gets a Bloomberg, 'Airbus SAS, starting its first aircraft assembly integral
Leg Up today outside Europe, said it may buy up to $1 billion of approac
on components from China by 2020, as the world's most hes to
Boeing" populous nation may need 3,000 planes in the next 20 labor &
(Dougla years.' By putting a plant inside China and offering to put investor
s A. money into the economy, Airbus is making best friends s.
McIntyr with the central government, a move that is almost
e) certain to garner significant orders from the nation's
commercial airlines.
Boeing management made a huge mistake by allowing
its machinists to go out on strike instead of improving
their compensation packages enough to keep the
company operating. Boeing said that its margins could
be hurt by the size of the deal the union wanted. The
machinists knew better. They could see the size of the
Boeing back-orders for products like the new Dreamliner
going out for years and year driving higher and higher
sales.
Each day that the strike goes on, Boeing risks losing more
customers to Airbus. Management has not done the
shareholders any favors."
29 The Firm- ct "With the aviation business teetering on the edge of a Manage
Sept. Seattle Labor major downturn, however, Boeing management remains ment of
2008 Times, adamant the company must rein in long-term costs and Modlua
"Simme cannot offer concessions on job security. Boeing also r
ring knows that making big concessions increases the chance Enterpri
Boeing of another strike in 2011. And sooner than that, any se
Strike job-guarantee commitment to the IAM invites Archite
Scorchi matching demands from the Society of Professional cures
ng Both Engineering Employees in Aerospace, the engineering views
Sides" union that has just begun contract negotiations. job-
(Domini security
c Gates) Most Machinists display a firm resolve to stay out, while as a
handling the strike in individual ways. On Thursday, long-
Jayleen Roman, a younger machinist on the 787 program, term
began a 10-day Hawaiian vacation with her parents. Her cost,
dad is a 28-year veteran machinist. They had long planned without
and saved for both the vacation and the strike. 'We're seeing it
ready to stay out as long as it takes,' said Roman. a a
Stephen Watkins, an electrician on the 777 program, has source
been building a fence for his brother-in-law while on of long-
strike, and will move on to do some work for his father-in- term
law. Like many veterans, Michael Spears, a team leader producti
on the 777 jet program in Everett, has borrowed from his vity
401(k) retirement funds and set aside money for his increase
mortgage payments through January. If the strike lasts a s, and
month or two, he expects to repay the loan from a signing therefor
bonus typically part of any IAM strike settlement. If it's e a
more drawn out, he said he'll plan to work until 57 route
instead of retiring at 55. For now, Spears is enjoying the towards
break from the heavy noise and vibration of his workplace. reining-
'For the past 18 months I've been working 10-hour in long-
days, seven days a week, sometimes a month straight. term
My body is appreciating the downtime.' costs.
Blondin says the possibility of a downturn in aviation
- with the potential for layoffs at Boeing - makes the
union demand for an end to outsourcing 'that much
more important to fight for now. 'We need to get that
job-security stuff solved first and the rest is doable,' he
said. Kight counters that the option to outsource work
or slow production in a downturn is key. Boeing, he
said, must be able to 'react nimbly to what can be very
sudden and dramatic changes in our marketplace.'
29 The Firm- a "A Seattle Times analysis using the company's online On the
Sept. Seattle Labor wage and benefit calculator shows that the current offer non-
2008 Times, over three years gives the average Machinist systemi
"Simme approximately an extra $22,000 over the 2008 c hidden
ring compensation level. (The company has said the contract costs
Boeing adds $34,000 but it acknowledges that figure ignores behind a
Strike substantial extras included in 2008 pay, including a lump- strike in
Scorchi sum bonus.) Average pay with overtime and bonuses, all a
ng Both totaling $68,000 in 2008, will rise to $80,000 in 2011, said modular
Sides" Boeing spokesman Tim Healy. Based on those averages, enterpri
(Domini the company offer would increase Boeing's total annual se
c Gates) cost for its IAM work force by some $550 million, from architec
$2.43 billion this year to about $3 billion in 2011. ture.
Boeing must weigh its goal of capping those future costs
against the reality of profits drained away in the present.
After the 2005 Machinists strike, which lasted 28 days,
Boeing's regulatory filings pegged the hit to its profits at
up to $300 million for that year. However, those filings
do not reflect the full financial impact because Boeing
spreads its program costs over hundreds of airplanes and
about four years of production. 'Boeing's accounting
disclosures don't reveal the true cost of the strike,' said
an analyst at a Wall Street firm that doesn't allow him to
be quoted. A solid estimate for the real cost of the 2005
strike is revealed in an internal Boeing document obtained
by The Seattle Times. It was prepared for then-Chief
Executive Alan Mulally and his senior management team
in October 2005, soon after the Machinists went back to
work. The document projected that over a four-year
period through the end of 2009, the net loss of profits due
to the 2005 strike would be just over $700 million. That
figure included profits deferred from the planes not
delivered during those four years, as well as more than
$200 million in "abnormal costs" including penalties
paid to suppliers. The implication of the projection is
that three years after the 2005 strike - and in the first
month of a new IAM strike - Boeing has still to make
up that $700 million in missed profits. After the strike
ended in 2005, Boeing decided not to catch up on
deliveries by ramping up production beyond its long-range
plan. Instead, it simply pushed the entire delivery schedule
out one month, so that the financial impact flows right
through to today. Extrapolating from the 2005 projection,
based on today's much higher production rates and profit
margins, the Wall Street analyst estimated that the total
hit to profits for a one-month strike now would be at
least $1.3 billion. Balancing that, Boeing has plenty of
money in reserve: more than $10 billion at last report,
compared with $8 billion three years ago. 'The company
is in a strong financial position should ... this situation get
extended,' said Kight."
29 Washin Firm- a "Then there's the 15-month delay of introducing Boeing's On a
Sept. gton Investo much touted fuel-efficient jet, the 787 Dreamliner. The modular
2008 Post, r program has been delayed four times. Should the strike enterpri
"Clearer continue for more than a few weeks, delivery of the se
Skies Dreamliner could be pushed to 2010. Delays architec
May Be notwithstanding, the Dreamliner's potential is huge. ture's
Ahead 'Long-term,' says Fletcher Perkins, an analyst with understa
for Hillman Capital Management, 'it will turn into a very nding of
Boeing" good profit source for Boeing.' comple
(Klana xity.
Polyak)
8 Bloomb Firm- a "Boeing Chief Executive Officer Jim McNerney told On a
Oct. erg Labor employees in an Oct. 6 memo that the 'ongoing turmoil in modular
2008 "Boeing the financial markets' shows why it's important for the enterpri
, Union company to be able to react quickly and not restrict its se
Say competitive moves through job promises. architec
Crisis ture's
Won't 'Decisions on where to place work, to whom, when, inability
Break must be owned by the company; that is a boundary to
Stike that we're not going to cross," Kight said in an interview acknowl
Resolve yesterday at Boeing's commercial-plane headquarters near edge
" Seattle. 'We are also not in a position, nor is any other how
(Susann employer, particularly when you look at what's going integral
a Ray) on in the world today, to guarantee employment."' enterpri
se
architec
tures
guarant
ee
lifetime
employ
ment, in
the face
of
challeng
ing
exogeno
us
events.
9 Forbes Firm a "Paul Nisbet of JSA Research beleives the recent global On
Oct. "The financial turmoil has brought added pressure on union commo
2008 Upside members to start working again. 'I'm sure many of them nality
of have lost money in the market and in pension plans, Nisbet between
Downsi said, 'and as the situation has changed there are quite a modular
de for few minds that have changed as well.' Although Nisbet enterpri
Boeing" believes Boeing will give in to some extent on higher se
(Carl wages, better provisions for health care and pensions, he architec
C I I I I I Irr
Gutierre expects the company to be steadfast in its stance on its ture's
z) ability to outsource. 'I think Boeing's view on views
outsourcing is if it does give in it will lead the aerospace across
industry down the same path as the auto and airline the
industries have seen,' Nisbet said." aerospa
ce,
airline
and
automot
ive
industri
es (the
three
industri
es of the
theoreti
cal
sample
in this
research
9 Seattle Firm- a "'We don't want subcontractors in our workplace setting On a
Oct. Post Labor up parts distribution centers. That's our work," [IAM union's
2008 Intellige Preseident] Blondin said. more
ncer 'We will work with the company on lean activities and integral
"Strikin process improvements, but the IAM has to be a partner approac
g in that,' he added. 'But we are not going to have h in
Machin suppliers come in while our members are being laid off. working
sts That's really what it is all about. That's part of job with a
Rally security.' Boeing knows the union's position, so the fact modular
Around the company is willing to start talking again is an enterpri
Union encouraging sign it may be willing "to move" on this se
Leaders issue, Blondin said. 'I hope they are not wasting our time.' architec
Before The other big issue that could prove difficult to reach ture.
Talks agreement on involves outsourcing. The union wants more
Resume opportunity to compete for work that Boeing is contracting
f" out. 'We are not looking to shut them (Boeing) down
(James globally,' Blondin said. But what the union will insist on
Wallace in any new offer, he said, is the right to bid on future work
) that Boeing wants to outsource. 'We don't get a look at the
work that goes out the door day to day throughout the
country, much less the overseas stuff,' Blondin said. 'We
get a very narrow slice to look at. If the company
determines that it is emergent or temporary, we don't
get to look at it. What we are saying is that 'emergent'
is not work that goes out for a year. And 'temporary' is
not work that goes out for a year. If you are going to
call it emergent or temporary it better be short term.'
He said the union wants language in the contract that
allows it to bid on that work. 'We want to be able to
compete with all things considered, including material
costs, labor costs, delivery costs and rework costs. The
whole works,' Blondin said.
Thursday's union rally included pilots from Alaska,
United and Horizon airlines, as well as flight attendants
i 11I I -r
and mechanics from those carriers. They came to show
support for the Boeing strikers."
10 Forbes Firm a "Goldman Sachs analyst Richard Safran lowered delivery On a
Oct. " forecasts for the Chicago-based airplane maker to 462 modular
2008 Boeing aircraft in 2009, down from an earlier estimate of 489, and enterpri
Shares 392 in 2010, down from 524. 'We believe that the se
Sink As inability to obtain financing will cause customers to defer architec
Analyst or cancel orders,' he wrote in an investor note. 'As a ture's
Cuts result, we believe (Boeing) will lower production use of
Projecti rates."' "exogen
ons" ous"
events
to drive
growth/
contract
ion
plans.
10 Seattle Firm- a "Here is part of what David Strauss of UBS Investment On the
Oct. Post Labor Research said in his report Friday: true
2008 Intellige effect of
ncer, 'Watching flights into Paine Field in Everett: We are a strike
"Analys tracking movements of Boeing's modified 747 on the
t: 787 'Dreamlifter' fleet to gauge the progress of 787 delay of
Won't production. Specifically, we are monitoring Dreamlifter the 787.
Deliver flights into Snohomish County Paine Field Airport
Until (KPAE) in Everett WA, adjacent to 787 production, to
2010" gauge the pace of shipments from the major structural
(James suppliers. Major structural components are delivered via
Wallace the Dreamlifter fleet to Boeing in Everett and include the
) wings from Japan, aft fuselage from Charleston SC, center
fuselage from Italy (via Charleston), and forward fuselage
from Wichita KS. Strike halts already slow-paced
structural deliveries: We did not track any Dreamlifter
flights into Everett in September as Boeing has apparently
halted all 787 deliveries from its suppliers given the
ongoing Machinists strike. We continued to track some
center fuselage deliveries to Charleston. Flight test
program now unlikely to complete prior to early 2010:
Even prior to the Machinists strike that began in
September, the slow pace of structural deliveries had
led us to believe that Boeing was highly unlikely to hit
its revised 787 flight test schedule. Boeing has now
missed the scheduled assembly complete dates for the first
three flight test aircraft and we believe the flight test
program is unlikely to complete prior to early 2010."'
20 Busines Katsua Firm f "After taking over as Toyota (TM) president in June 2005, On how
Oct. s Week ki Katsuaki Watanabe regularly warned of the dangers of an
2008 "How Watan complacency creeping in at the Japanese automaker integral
Toyota abe, (BusinessWeek, 3/5/07). But until recently, it was a tough enterpri
Plans to Preside message to get across. The company was doing too well: se
Beat the nt of In the year through March 2008, Toyota sold 8.9 million architec
Downtu Toyota vehicles, an increase of 32% over five years, while its net ture
rn" (Ian Motors profits rose 53%, to $17 billion. This year it will likely manage
Rowley overtake GM (GM) to become the world's largest s in a
) carmaker. These days, though, Watanabe need only point low-
to Toyota's stock price to keep employees' feet on the growth
...... ..............................
21 The Ray Firm- a "As Boeing and its engineering union prepare to sit down On a
Oct. Seattle Gofort Labor next Tuesday for intensive contract talks, the perennially modular
2008 times h, contentious issue of outsourcing looms alongside the enterpri
"Boeing executi bread-and-butter questions of pay and benefits. Boeing's se
ground. Since the beginning of the year, Toyota's shares environ
have fallen 37%. While roughly in line with Japan's ment.
benchmark stock index, the performance isn't much
better than troubled GM, whose stock is down 39%.
And Toyota's recent sales, though not nearly as bad the
Big Three's, hardly instill confidence. Some analysts are
sounding the alarm. In an Oct. 10 note to investors,
NikkoCitigroup auto analyst Noriyuki Matsushima
predicted 'a sudden and substantial earnings decline' for
Toyota. 'We believe Toyota needs to draft a new
strategy that changes its existing course and includes
initiatives to secure appropriate sales volumes,' he
wrote. Lowering his projections for the current fiscal year,
Matsushima expects Toyota to post operating earnings of
$11 billion, a 50% decline compared with the year that
ended Mar. 31, and $5 billion less than the company's
projection. Time for investors to bail out? Not exactly.
Even if Toyota's earnings drop by half this year, the
company's operating profits are still likely to exceed
$10 billion. And with a solid balance sheet, more than
$20 billion in cash, and a slew of new car initiatives,
Toyota is better placed than most automakers to
weather economic uncertainty. 'Once Toyota
executives] have made the decision to do something,
they can get on and do it without having to arrange
financing,' says Andrew Phillips, an analyst at KBC
Securities in Tokyo. For now Toyota's problems seem
minor compared with the Big Three's
(BusinessWeek.com, 10/7/08)-and it's moving to keep
it that way. Toyota's bulging coffers will help it most in
the U.S. There, it's using the cash-$3 billion at its U.S.
financing unit, as of the end of June-to plug falling sales.
Facing an increasingly severe slowdown and growing
inventory, Toyota on Oct. 3 began offering for one month
interest-free financing on 11 models, including the
Corolla, Camry, and Tundra full-size pickup. The risk, say
critics, is that 0% financing could undermine car-resale
values and hurt the brand if the company decides to extend
the offer. Toyota is also taking radical steps at its North
American factories. After opening a plant for big Tundra
pickup trucks in San Antonio in 2006, the company has
since curtailed production. It also has suspended
production at three U.S. plants for three months in August
to retool them so there's more emphasis on smaller, fuel-
efficient models. (It's not letting go of the 4,500
workers, though; they're keeping busy by doing
everything from training programs to filling in at
assembly lines elsewhere or volunteering in local
communities.) And for the first time, its hot-selling Prius
gas-electric hybrid will be built in the U.S., at a plant in
Mississippi-a move that will help it meet a target of
selling 1 million hybrids a year early in the next decade."
-- - -- --
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ve technical work force, much like the striking Machinists, is architec
SPEEA directo anxious over the global-partner strategy used on the ture's
will r of the 787 Dreamliner as well as the hiring of thousands of non- agency
Tussle Societ Boeing engineering contractors for in-house work. Ray issues
over y of Goforth, executive director of the Society of Professional between
Outsour Profess Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), says the manage
cing" ional 787 outsourcing has produced program delays ment
(Domini Engine unprecedented in Boeing history and has fueled and
c Gates) ering 'disdain for corporate management.' 'We want to labor.
Emplo make sure they never make this disastrous decision
yees in again,' said Goforth, 'We would like the professional and
Aerosp technical community to have a serious say in how future
ace production systems are set up.' Across from Goforth
(SPEE when main-table talks begin next week at the SeaTac
A); Doubletree Hotel will be Mike Denton, vice president of
Mike engineering for Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Denton
Denton won't promise the union a say in organizing future
, vice programs but says Boeing will address the errors it's
preside made in the Dreamliner's design and production. On
nt of its next plane after the 787, Denton said, Boeing plans
engine to keep in-house some of the major work. Ahead of the
ering talks, the two negotiators have opposite perceptions of
for the mood of the technical work force. The Machinist
Boeing union has been on strike against Boeing for more than six
Comm weeks. And the looming recession must give pause to
ercial anyone who contemplates forgoing a paycheck. Yet
Airpla Goforth puts the chance of avoiding a white-collar strike
nes at no better than 50-50. He says preliminary talks in
the past few months have gone badly. Goforth
complains Boeing officials have not engaged in genuine
discussion, instead rejecting union proposals out of
hand, which he said will infuriate his members. 'If
Imanagement] don't understand that, they are fools.
They know nothing about collective bargaining,' said
Goforth. 'And they will lead this membership to a
strike that is absolutely unnecessary.' But Denton sees
an engineering work force with restored morale and a
renewed faith in the company. He says that in 2000 -
when the union had its first and only extended strike -
many employees feared Boeing was on its way out of
the commercial-jet business. 'Today, people don't
doubt that we have a future,' said Denton. Denton said
that in meetings with his engineers he doesn't detect the
heightened anxiety he hears from Goforth and other
SPEEA officials. 'I truly hope they are wrong.' Boeing
engineers earn on average almost $89,000 a year in base
salary, and technical staff average about $67,000,
according to SPEEA. Overtime and incentive pay increase
those averages to $108,000 and $82,000, respectively,
according to Boeing.
Goforth, 40, has a youthful vigor and charisma. With a
rakish twinkle in his eye, he rattles off energetic threats
to Boeing with machine-gun delivery. The first in his
family to go to college, Goforth grew up 'working poor' in
Los Angeles, built an early career in social services, then
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went to law school. He worked his way up to a job in
Seattle as strategic adviser with a local government
employees union. Goforth took the top staff job at SPEEA
at the start of this year. A month later, he signaled a
startling new SPEEA militancy when he warned union
members they should begin to save for a possible
strike. At that stage, preliminary talks had barely begun.
He says technical workers' frustration with Boeing's
executive leadership is 'the culmination of years of
being ignored, of having their experience discounted
and of having to clean up the messes.' The design work
done by Boeing's partners on the 787 or by Russian
engineers at Boeing's design center in Moscow often
'comes back all screwed up,' he said, and his members
must work constant overtime to fix the problems. And
he says Boeing's use of a few thousand nonunion
contractors to do in-house engineering work will leave
the company ill-equipped to recover on future jet
projects. 'What happens when the next program runs into
development problems? They won't have the internal
capacity to dip into to fix it,' said Goforth. SPEEA is
proposing restrictions on Boeing's use of contractors to do
engineering work. And Goforth will push the broader
demand for more say in how future airplanes are designed
and built, even though it's unclear how exactly that might
be incorporated into the contract.
Denton, 53, a 31-year technical veteran of Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, was a SPEEA member before
joining the management ranks in 1988. Now Boeing's
chief liaison between the executive leadership and the
technical staff, he says, 'I think of the engineers as my
team.' His father flew Air Force bombers in World War II
and the Korean War, and was briefly a pilot for United,
says Denton, so 'aviation is sort of in my blood.' Denton
said Boeing has hired so many contract engineers to
avoid pitching union members into a roller-coaster
'hire-and-fire cycle.' When the 787, the 747-8 and the
777 freighter all finally start production, there'll likely be a
lag of some years when fewer design engineers are
needed. Boeing can let the contractors go and keep its core
technical team, he said. And he believes work-force
morale is far better than at the time of the SPEEA strike in
2000. Denton recalled the 'depressing environment' at
Boeing then: Executives had halted several new
airplane developent programs, and then-company
President Harry Stonecipher hit a nerve when he
pushed for a profit-driven approach to replace what he
called Boeing's 'family' culture. Today, Denton said, 'a
lot of those wounds are healed,' because Boeing has
combined 'the good of Harry's message with the good of
the traditional Boeing culture.' 'I'm not shy of talking
about family,' he says, but 'you have to recognize, too,
that you are in business.' He concedes the outsourcing
of the detailed design of major parts of the 787 -
Mitsubishi of Japan does the wing, for example - has
Ic~
become a major issue for the technical work force as the
program has faced major delays. 'Some would have
preferred doing that design work,' said Denton. 'The fact
that they are having to fix it later is doubly irritating.'
But Denton said that as a result of the lessons learned on
the 787, Boeing is likely to keep in-house 'some part of
major production' on the next airplane. 'We want to
be on the leading edge of technology,' he said. 'Whether
it's all of a wing, or all of the fuselage, or some lother]
part of production - all of that is to be figured out.
But that's the general direction we will go."'
21 Busines Firm- a "Indeed, the union contends it has been willing to On a
Oct. s Week, Labor compromise, particularly around the sensitive issue of modular
2008 "Pressur outsourcing. In the recent talks, for instance, the IAM enterpri
e Builds suggested it would let suppliers enter factories and deliver se
for parts to receiving areas near assembly lines, where the architec
Boeing parts would then be transported further by IAM members. ture's
and The arrangement could protect some 2,000 jobs, the union mis-
Machin says. But the company argues it needs more flexibility aligned
sts to than that, including the ability to cut jobs if needed. objectiv
Settle" 'They want to put a bubble around these 2,000 jobs,' es
(Joseph says Boeing spokesman Tim Healy. 'There's no way, between
Weber) especially in this economy, we can agree to preserve the manage
jobs in perpetuity."' ment
and
labor.
Fall MIT MIT Firms a "Southwest's model is a difficult model [to copy] because On the
2008 Sloan Sloan & in some respects it's a bit anti-American." differen
Manage Prof. 3 ces in
ment Thoma "The two most financially successful airlines in the how
Review, s A. world are Ryanair Holdings plc, in Europe, and modular
"The Kocha Southwest, headquartered in Texas. Both emphasize low and
Manage n unit costs. That is, providing a service at low cost. The intergral
ment fundamental difference is that Ryanair get there by enterpri
Lessons minimizing labor costs, by squeezing employees, by se
of a adopting very harsh working donditions, by high levels architec
Beleagu of turnover so that costs don't build over time. tures
ered Whereas Southwest gets to low cost by emphasizing pursue
Industry improved productivity land] loyalty on the part of "cost
" employees so they stay a long time and use their skills leadersh
(Michae and knowledge to build a successful airline that meets ip" in
1 S. customer service needs land] that is designed with a the
Hopkins work system that miximizes employee ideas and airline
) discretion for solving problems and achieving their industry
financial objectives. So you have two highly successful - i.e.
airlines in financial terms but, on the one hand, Southwest via
does it by engaging employees, and Ryanair does it by flexibilit
squeezing employees, by having constant fights with their y and
work force and by maying minimal benefits and wages. commit
ment
Southwest employees are among the highest paid. respecti
They've moved to that position as the legacy carriers have vely.
either gone into bankruptcy and lowered their wages or cut
wages through concessions outside of bankruptcy.
Ryanair has taken some of those same attributes from
L~~~ rtl
Southwest, but said, 'All right, we're going to do this but
we're going to do it bare bones and make sure we don't
get unions.' Ryanair has certainly been successful in
keeping their costs down, just in a very different way from
Southwest. Southwest said, 'Look, we're in the airline
industry, just about everyone is unionized, we need to get
off the ground, we need political support, we don't want
to have theses battles.'
Southwest is a low-fare competitor, and they've had
high-quality jobs. They make sure they hold their
employees accountable for providing the productivity
that warrants a higher wage.
If you look at evidence across industries, we see
productivity differences between 20% and 35% among
companies that have high-quality employee-
management relationships and those that have
standard labor-management relationships. That's an
enormous number."
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h, man it's about the Boeing commercial margins in the quarter. Archite
excerpt and In the last quarter, we saw some issues related to cture's
from CEO; overhead absorption related to the 787, and I suppose defense
"The James there is some extra block [ph] pressures from the strike of its
Boeing Bell, that will be recorded in the margins going forward. finanaic
Compan CFO, And I wondered what was going on with the margin al
y, Q3 The before R&D, at the program level not the unit level perform
2008 Boeing where we will see the strike, and whether these margins ance
Earning Compa reflect their estimate of the impact of the strike, the
s Call ny ongoing strike, the recovery, the extra cost, as well as
Transcri whatever is left over from that absorption issue?
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James Bell (Boeing):
Yes, Joe, it is. We were making really good progress and
we were really encouraged by what we saw in BCA
relative to overcoming the infrastructure cost impact
related to the 787 slide and the move to the C14 [ph]
schedule we announced in April. And obviously, it has
been overcome by the addition of infrastructure costs
associated with the strike. But if you look at the margins,
we do have the strike impact in there, as well as the
improvement we saw over the second quarter and the
efforts that has been performed by BCA to offset that,
which was related only to the move of the 787 schedule.
So we will continue to work that hard, but yes both for and
also the improvement event [ph].
Joe Campbell:
But in other words, we had the better - whatever we had,
the better priced airplanes, because we have talked about
having the program margins, which are not reflective of
the current period of the strike but of your estimate of the
. ... ......................................... ....... .........
full block for the production airplanes. So I'm struck by
how much the margins went down. So apparently, I
mean I know you're not giving '09 guidance but unless
something changes, your current estimate to complete
the blocks is significantly lower than it used to be.
James Bell:
No, I think the available margins - the margins that are on
the airplanes, particularly those that slid out both due to
the strike and the galleys, these issues are pretty, and so
the impact on earnings this quarter is more significant as a
result of that. In terms of the difference between what we
would expect versus what we recorded, because as you
know on the galleys, it is mostly the white [wide?] bodies
that moved out, Joe.
Joe Campbell:
But I'm still confused James with that, and we can do it
offline if you want, but I mean if the program is coming, it
would reflect the difference between unit and program,
it would cause that thing to be really big and talk about the
program margins [ph].
James Bell:
Yes, the difference between unit and programs are
large.
Joe Campbell:
Yes, I know. That's what I say, but I don't understand
why that would affect the program margins, unless you
had made some big adjustments about what the future
costs would be.
James Bell:
Well, we did not make, we actually put the strike impact in
there as well but if we excluded the strike impact and if
we excluded the slide out, the program margins would
have been 11%, about 11.1% in the operating. So and the
pre-R&D margin would have been in the range we've
always talked about around 30%.
Robert Spinearn (Credit Suisse):
Jim, you referenced two cancellations and 80 deferrals
this year and talked about offsetting demand for those
slots, but a little more color please. Are these generally
front-ended in the backlog and has the pace of these types
of discussions changed recently, and how should we think
about strike deferred airplane supporting rates next year
and in 2010?
Jim McNernev (Boeinj):
Well, first of all, the cancellations and deferrals are pretty
much in line with what we've experienced over the last
three or four years, and we still have a - I would say, a
significant overhang of demand, people who'd like to
move their positions forward if other want to move them
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out. Now, I would say the discussion slightly more, but I
would not say step function more discussion along those
line. So we're monitoring it very closely. But I think it
does speak to the fact that a lot of our backlog is in
economically strong parts of the world. I think that speak -
and that our airplanes are relatively productive compared
to their fleets that things were hanging in, but we're
monitoring it very closely.
In terms of the impact on production rates, again, the - we
have steadily increased production rates in a measured
way over the last few years, as you know. We have tried
hard to meet demand without getting beyond our
headlights, so to speak and I think that's serving us well
now, because I - we'll provide guidance going forward
once we understand exactly where we are post strike. But
we're feeling good about our production rates over the
next couple of years. But we want to make sure we
understand the impact of - any impact of the strike before
we give you a definitive answer to that question.
Howard Rubel (Jefferies):
I want to go back to an operational question and sort of use
the 747-8 as the paradigm. I mean, you have again that
looks like a charge or additional costs associated with
that program. And if we kind of look, there's been -
whether it's been the AWACS or the airborne early
warning control or even the 787, you had just a series of
what I call development misses relative to what
normally Boeing is able to do. So, what are you doing to
go back and look at program management or
operational management to not have these misses?
Jim McNernev (Boeina):
On the BCA side, I think the 87, we're trying to learn
from that. I think, in retrospect, we bit off more than
we could chew. New composites, new design tools, new
production process, global responsibility for design as
well as production. I think there is a lot to learn from
how we did that. There's a lot of good and there's some
bad, obviously, that we are committed to learn from
and hopefully, you'll see that reflected in some of our
newer programs. On the -8, we're not particularly
proud of how that is sorting out but we'll get that
program done. And it's one that - it's suffered from a
few mis-assumptions that we've caught up on now, and
we're going to get fixed.
Howard Rubel:
And so when we look at some of this, there's - I mean, I
don't think it's systemic. I mean, it just - I mean, what
you've done to solve the problem, I mean, it's just not
costing. I mean, it's process as well and I mean, could you
just elaborate for one more moment on what sort of
process changes you've done to help me feel more
comfortable looking forward?
. ............
Jim McNernev:
Sure, but on the defense side, okay, you will not see big
fixed price development programs, okay? So that's one
thing that if you add up the challenges we've had over the
last three or four years, that would explain more than half
of them, okay? So that's one process fixed. I think the
other one is learning how to manage this global supply
chain that is at the center of the 87, and it has to do
with IT. It has to do with design responsibility. It has to
do with visibility on supply and production through
these IT environments, as well as visibility in design
which we did do well. And so, it is like many in other
industries before us, we did not have the kind of
controls that we now know we have to have both
management and IT to manage globally remote activity
and it's - we are fixing it.
David Strauss (UBS):
Could you just give us an update on negotiations with
your 787 customers? It looks like you've now settled up
with some of your early Japanese customers. And in light
of what you're seeing there along with what looks like an
additional delay on the 787, are you still comfortable with
the zero margin assumption, program margin
assumption for 787?
James Bell (Boeing):
Well, let me talk about how they're going with the
customer settlements on the initial delays. We're off to a
good start. We have settled some and we did better than
what we anticipated in those settlements, and so not to say
that we have a trend yet. We still have an awful lot of
other ones to get through yet, but we do think we have a
very disciplined robust process that appears to be working
that's both satisfying our customer needs and also
protecting our corporation. And so, we're really pleased
with the start we're off to. The second part of your
question again was - what was it?
David Strauss:
Based on what you're seeing there with your customer
negotiations along with what looks like an additional delay
on the 87, does the zero program margin still hold?
James Bell:
So again, the zero margin was solving - we were solving
for whether or not today we felt we had a forward reach
and the leading to the zero margin is just that's where we
are in terms of firming up the costs that are incurred
that we are looking at relative to our cost accounting base
and for the program margin assumptions. That will
mature over time and by the time we deliver the first
airplane, we'll have a lot more definition around those
cost categories, and we'll be much better able to tell
you what the right margin will be on the delivery of
this airplane.
~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~;;; ~-------------~ I
David Strauss:
Yes, I guess what I was getting at was are you
approaching a position where you think you might
have to take a forward loss?
James Bell:
No, that's why we're saying that there is none.
Lynn Lunsford (Wall Street Journal):
Thanks. I wanted to ask a question regarding the strike
and the situation where both sides of this dispute seemed
to be pretty well dug in on the issue of - well for the
union, it's job security and I think you and Jim had said it
was management rights. But, I guess the thing that I'm
trying to get a sense of this do you think there is a
compromise in that area that would be possible without
one side or the other completely capitulating?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Yes. I think there's a way forward, Lynn, to be honest with
you. I think the management rights issue is one that leaves
us with the ability to manage our business. I think having
said that, I think there's a way to work with the union to
meet some of their goals and in fact I think discussions
that are starting up again tomorrow - the federal mediated
discussions that are starting up again tomorrow, although
it is impossible to predict success or lack of success, I
think both sides are approaching it with a constructive
headset. So maybe we can find a way forward here.
Lynn Lunsford:
Do you plan to get involved in these at some point?
Jim McNerney:
I'm involved in the strike on a day-to-day basis and so I
think Scott will be the lead - Scott and Doug Kite will be
the lead negotiator as they always have been but I'll be
involved 24/7.
Tim Klass (Associated Press):
The last three Boeing strikes, both of the machinists and
with the engineers' union have been settled only with the
Boeing CEO and the President of each parent union
getting together to reach a final agreement. Do you plan to
be at the table or are you ready to be at the table directly in
these talks that are resuming tomorrow?
Jim McNernev (Boeinf):
Well, like I say, your first statement wasn't true. I mean
we've resolved strikes with a variety of people at the table,
usually led by the commercial airplanes business leader
who runs a $37 billion business for whom the striking
employees work. So like I say, I'm involved deeply. I've
had a number of conversations with the union
leadership, and I am open to be a constructive force in
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this thing any way I can be, while also leading the
company in a way that I think is best.
Tim Klass:
Can you elaborate on the conversations you've had with
the union leadership?
Jim McNerney:
Not particular. I mean, I think the nature of these things
are private constructive discussions and I think both of us
would just assume they stay that way.
Susanna Ray (Bloomberg News):
You mentioned the possibility of having to send some
workers home. Was that the engineers or who were you
talking about? You mentioned the possibility of having to
send some workers home, and I'm wondering if you're
referring to the engineers or to whom?
James Bell (Boeing):
Listen, what I was talking about that as the strike goes on,
if it goes longer, we would have to looking at more
significant action to manage the ongoing costs that would,
if in fact it went longer enough, could include sending
people home. Right now, there are no plans to do that.
James Wallace (Seattle P-I Newspaper):
Yes, Jim, in a couple of your messages to your employees
since the strike began, you've commented about how
disruptive this continual labor problems are. When it
comes time to find a site for your next all-new airplane
after the 787, how much consideration or how much of
a factor will these strikes and labor unrest be in
deciding where to build that new airplane?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
Well, it's far too early to figure out where we're going to
build a plane that we haven't designed yet. But listen, the
workers, not withstanding the strike and not withstanding
the frustration on behalf of our customers that I have about
interrupting their lives on a pretty regular basis, I think
we're - I'm a human being, I think we're all human
beings who are frustrated by that. Not withstanding all
that, the workers on Puget Sound, represented by the IAM,
are very fine workers. And they do a good job and I'm
anxious to get them back to doing a good job, and they can
compete for any work that we've got.
James Wallace:
If I could follow up, Jim, when Alan Mulally and Mike
Bear came to Chicago to make the presentation for the
787 to be built in Everett, you were on the board. Were
you considering at that time that a possible labor strike like
this one was going to disrupt production of the 787 just as
you got started?
Jim McNernev:
I don't think that that was a front and center consideration,
to be honest with you, back then. I mean, I think we were
trying to find the best production structure. Alan, at that
time, was trying to find the best production structure and
the best place to build the airplane. And I think that issue
gets front and center during a time like this when you're
making an investment decision. It probably wasn't a
huge factor.
Andrea Rothman (Bloomberg News):
Yes, hello. A question for Mr. McNerney. Can you tell
me, do you have a threshold for order members on the
747 AC before actually committing to build that plane?
I know you have (inaudible). I'm not even sure if Eric has
actually signed firm for the four that they announced in
(inaudible).
Jim McNerney (Boeinr):
Now, we have committed to build the plane.
Andrea Rothman:
Okay. So even if you only had 30 or so orders, you will
still move forward with it?
Jim McNerney:
Yes. I mean we have - I think the combined orders are
somewhere in the neighborhood of about 100 and I110 or
so which is, I would say, about average in terms of this
stage in a program development. So we - while we're
frustrated by the incremental cost we're seeing, that
doesn't change our mind about getting this done for our
customers. There is good demand for this plane.
Andrea Rothman:
Okay, can I just follow up to get a clarification from Mr.
Bell? There's a question about who you would send home
if you - if you had to send workers home, you said we
might have to send people home. Who would those people
be? I mean is it engineers or ... ?
James Bell:
We don't know. We'd have to get to there and see.
Andrea Rothman:
So you don't...? Okay.
James Bell:
No, we're not planning on sending anyone and we have no
plan yet. I'm just saying it was a hypothetical discussion
around if the strike continued longer, would you have to
make different decisions and the answer to that is, yes,
including what we would do to manage and conserve our
resources both here and with our supply team and
collectively we will figure out what's the right thing to do.
In order to that including -
IM
Jim McNerney:
Cost reduction.
James Bell:
- and that would drive cost down until we got them back
to work."
23 The Firm c "The quarterly results Boeing announced Wednesday On a
Oct. Seattle revealed big problems with jet production beyond the modular
2008 Times, Machinists strike. Boeing profit dropped 38 percent in enterpri
"Boeing the third quarter, hit not only by the strike that began se
Profits Sept. 6 but also by a major supply-chain glitch: German architec
Dive; supplier Sell was unable to deliver onboard galleys so ture's
Execs that five to 10 wide-bodies couldn't have been delivered systema
Admit from Everett anyhow. And on a teleconference to discuss tic
Strike the earnings, Chief Executive Jim McNerney also revealed problem
Isn't the that another major airplane program besides the 787 s.
Only Dreamliner is in trouble: the 747-8 update to Boeing's
Producti iconic jumbo jet is costing more than expected and the
on delivery schedule is under pressure.
Problem
" The results also show Boeing's cash and liquid assets
(Domini slashed by $3 billion for the quarter, due to the strike,
c Gates) 787 costs related to delays before the strike, and
spending on several defense acquisitions. Company
spokesman Todd Blecher said the hit to Boeing's cash
position that can be directly attributed to the strike's
impact during September is slightly less than $1 billion.
Boeing ended the quarter with $7.2 billion in cash.
The galley glitch was responsible for 25 cents a share or
about $185 million in net corporate profits and reduced
the commercial unit's pre-tax reduction operating profits
by about $250 million. Boeing said that its supplier Sell is
now "making good progress" and the galley problem
should be under control after the strike ends. Had the
galley problem not existed, those wide-body jets would
not have been delivered anyway due to the strike. So
arguably the full strike impact on profit would have been
$445 million in net earnings (or $600 million to pre-tax
operating earnings).
On the 747-8, McNerney said 'We're not particularly
proud of how that is sorting out, but we'll get that
program done. ... It suffered from a few
misassumptions that we've caught up on now and
we're going to get fixed.'
In July, Boeing said it would conduct test flights of the
plane in the fourth quarter. But Wednesday it said it would
offer no further details on the plane's schedule until the
strike ends."
23 The Jim Firm- a "As The Boeing Co. and its striking Machinists union On a
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2008 Post ney, Chairman and Chief Executive Jim McNerney said there enterpri
Intellige Chair is room for compromise. 'There's a way to work with se
ncer, man the union to meet some of their goals,' McNerney said architec
"Boeing and Wednesday during a conference call to discuss the ture's
's CEO CEO, company's third-quarter earnings, which were severely systema
Sees The affected by the strike. Profits declined by 38 percent from tic
Room Boeing a year ago and revenue dropped 7 percent. Boeing problem
to Compa delivered 35 fewer planes in the quarter because of the s.
Negotia ny; strike and a supplier issue.
te" Tom
(James Buffen McNerney sounded somewhat optimistic that the strike,
Wallace barger, which began Sept. 6, could be resolved during the
) nationa upcoming talks in Washington, D.C., with a federal
1 mediator. But Tom Buffenbarger, national president of the
preside International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
nt of Workers, told The Associated Press after the Boeing
the earnings call that he had not spoken with McNerney and
Interna he was 'not optimistic' about a quick settlement, in
tional part because he was told McNerney would not be part
Associ of the talks. McNerney said there have been
ation 'constructive' discussions behind the scenes since the
of last face-to-face talks abruptly broke off after only two
Machi days on Oct. 13. Since then, both sides have continued to
nists talk with the federal mediator. He decided earlier this
and week to call the parties back to try to end the strike by
Aerosp about 27,000 Machinists in three states. The major issue
ace has been job security and the company's use of outside
Worke vendors to deliver parts directly to planes in its plants --
rs work traditionally done by Machinists. The union has said
it must protect those jobs. McNerney was asked if there
were room for compromise. 'Yes,' he said, adding,
'There is a way to work with the union to meet some of
their goals.' He said both sides are approaching
Thursday's talks 'with a constructive (mind set), so
maybe we can find a way forward.' Although McNerney
is not expected at the talks, Scott Carson, chief executive
of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, will likely be there.
Buffenbarger of the Machinists may also join the talks at
some point. His office is in Washington, D.C. Boeing
believes there is a better chance of resolving the strike
with Buffenbarger part of the talks, sources said. But
Buffenbarger, who indicated he thought McNerney
should be at the talks, was quoted as saying, 'I'm not
going to make a deal until McNerney signs off on that.'
'I'm involved, deeply,' McNerney said. 'I've had a
number of conversations with union leadership and
I'm open to be a constructive force in this thing any
way I can be.' But, he said, Carson and the company's
labor chief, Doug Kight, are leading the negotiations
for Boeing. The strike will be in its 48th day Thursday,
which will match the third-longest strike by the union
against Boeing, in 1989. James Bell, Boeing chief
financial officer, said it might have to lay off workers
who are not on strike, if the work stoppage lasts a lot
longer, and some suppliers might have to shut down.
'Right now,' he said, 'there are no plans to do that.'
The consequences of the strike have been significant.
Boeing lost about $250 million in profits during September
because of the strike, or 35 cents a share, Bell said,
while supplier issues were responsible for another hit
of about 25 cents a share. Until the strike ends, Boeing
said, it will not provide financial guidance or outlooks.
The strike has also delayed Boeing's 787 Dreamliner,
which was about 14 months late even before the strike.
Each day the strike lasts results in at least a day's delay in
all Boeing airplane programs, including the 787,
McNerney said. But even when the strike is over, it will
take some time to get the company's production system
and its supply chain back up to speed, McNerney said.
That will add to the delays caused by the strike. The
longer the strike goes, the longer it will take to get the
production system back to where it was before the
strike, McNerney said. Boeing will update the status of
the 787 program and its other airplane programs and
delivery schedules once the strike is over.
The biggest supplier issue involves a German company,
Sell, whose galleys for Boeing widebody jets have been
late. According to a striking Machinist on the Everett
flight line, at the time of the strike about a dozen
completed 777s were awaiting arrival of Sell galleys.
McNerney said the galley problem has been pretty much
resolved and should not be an issue after the strike.
Airbus recently said that because of the financial crisis,
it will not boost production rates as expected. But
McNerney said Boeing production rates in place before
the strike 'look good' for the near term."
23 Flight Jim Firm a "Higher costs reported by the 747-8 development On a
Oct. Internat McNer program in the third quarter are causing frustration with Modula
2008 ional, ney, Boeing's corporate executives, but the widebody is r
"Cost Chair continuing to make design progress despite the strike. Enterpri
Jump man Boeing's third quarter earnings statement released se
for 747 and yesterday contains two references to 'additional 747 Archite
Frustrat CEO, program costs', but does not elaborate. Jim cture's
es The McNerney, Boeing chairman, president and CEO, systema
Boeing" Boeing noted executives are 'frustrated by the incremental tic
(Stephe Compa cost we're seeing' on the 747-8 during a conference call "conspir
n ny with reporters. Boeing spokesmen declined to detail acy of
Trimble neither the amount of nor the causes for the cost optimis
) increases. 'We don't provide specific details on the m"
issues the program is having from a cost perspective,' a
spokesman tells ATI. Boeing Commercial Airplanes
reported overall research and development costs at $2.1
billion for the first nine months of 2008. The third quarter
outlay amounted to $705 million, or about 7% higher than
the same period a year ago.
As a derivative aimed at a 'niche' long-haul market,
the 747-8 may be more sensitive to cost pressure than
Boeing's new-build development programmes."
29 Seattle Ray Firm- a "Some 14 months late and still not flying, The Boeing On a
Oct. Post Gofort Labor Co.'s 787 Dreamliner will serve as a symbolic backdrop at modular
2008 Intellige h, the bargaining table starting Wednesday when the enterpri
--
ncer, SPEE company and its 'other' big union start their final talks on se
"Boeing A a new labor accord. Boeing's engineers and technical architec
Faces Execut workers in the Puget Sound area say the oft-delayed 787 ture's
Talks ive represents everything that's wrong with outsourcing -- adversar
With Direct one of the key issues that will be on the table, just as it was ial
Second or; for the Machinists union. The Machinists, who have been relation
Unhapp Mike on strike for 53 days as of Tuesday, will vote on a new ship
y Denton contract Saturday. If a majority approve Boeing's latest with its
Union" , vice offer, which was announced Monday, the strike will be unions.
(James preside over and 27,000 Machinists could be back to building
Wallace nt of airplanes starting Sunday night. Regardless of what
) engine happens with that vote, Boeing now must try to make
ering peace with its white-collar union known as SPEEA, which
for represents about 21,000 workers, mostly in the Puget
Boeing Sound area. The union, which has had only one walkout
Comm of any length in its history, has not been shy in recent
ercial weeks about throwing around the 'strike' word. Its
Airpla contract with Boeing ends Dec. 1. Talks with Boeing
nes during various committee meetings since March have not
gone well, according to SPEEA. 'I'm flabbergasted by
how badly Boeing has bungled these negotiations so
far,' said Ray Goforth, executive director of the Society of
Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace. While
a SPEEA strike wouldn't shut down jet-making operations
like the Machinists strike, it would disrupt plane
deliveries, Goforth said, because engineers must sign off
on those planes when they leave the factory. And, given
the amount of engineering work needed to get the 787
ready to fly, that program would 'grind to a halt' if
engineers and techs walk out. To be sure, bread and
butter issues such as wages, pensions and medical will
take center stage during the talks. But what has happened
on the 787 program, and the 747-8 program,
underscores the union's growing frustration, Goforth
said. 'We want some kind of say in these future
decisions (around outsourcing),' Goforth said in a recent
interview. 'The company ignored the advice of its
engineering and technical work force in establishing
the 787 model. And every single disaster that has
befallen that program was predicted by SPEEA. We
are not saying we told you so, but if you listen to your
professional work force upfront you can avoid these
problems.'
Mike Denton, vice president of engineering for Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, will be among the company's
negotiators during the so-called 'main table' talks with
SPEEA at the SeaTac DoubleTree Hotel. The company
wants to present the union with its best and final offer
Nov. 11. Denton, a former SPEEA member,
acknowledged in an interview that Boeing made
mistakes with the 787 business model and will make
changes when it's time to develop the next all-new
airplane. Boeing engineers will have more of the
detailed design work and more oversight of
engineering work done by partners, and Boeing will do
-- -- I
more of the manufacturing, he said. Jim McNerney,
Boeing's chairman and CEO, has said the company went
too far in awarding global partners so much
responsibility for the 787. On past programs, Boeing
took the lead in manufacturing. But for the 787, Boeing's
partners in Japan, Italy, Kansas and South Carolina
produce the large composite structures and Boeing
workers assemble them in Everett. Boeing argues this
business model will significantly reduce the cost of
making airplanes. But its partners quickly fell behind
with the untested manufacturing and production system,
and Boeing engineers and Machinists have been forced to
play catch-up during final assembly of the first 787s. As a
result, the Dreamliner's maiden flight has slipped from
August 2007 until late this year. The Machinists strike has
probably delayed that until early 2009. Some customers
have been told their planes will be up to three years late.
Denton said he understands SPEEA members'
frustration about the 787 partner model. But Denton
and Goforth see the mood of the SPEEA work force
differently as the two head into the final round of talks.
Goforth said the engineers and tech people are fed up,
especially with Chicago, Boeing's corporate home.
'There is a sense that Chicago is ruining this company,'
he said. 'They actually want to get to a place where
Boeing doesn't manufacture anything anymore. We
only assemble parts created around the world and then
they slap the Boeing logo on and call it a Boeing
airplane. One side is celebrating this as the future; the
other side is mourning it as the loss of one of the
greatest manufacturing companies in the history of the
United States.' Goforth said he has no doubt the union
membership is prepared to strike. Denton, however, is
not so sure the picture is as bad as Goforth likes to
paint. 'There is a part of me that thinks Ray is just
wrong and that he is exaggerating things to the
advantage of the union,' he said. 'I get the sense of
some anxiousness around the whole idea and prospects
of a strike. ... For me in this process, the most
important thing is that I want the engineers and
technical staff to feel we respect them and we value
them and that as a management team we have learned
lessons from the things that have caused us some
problems over the last couple of years.' Unlike the
blue-collar Machinists union, which has struck Boeing
seven times since 1948, SPEEA has been much more
mild- mannered. The union struck Boeing for 40 days in
2000. The union's only other walkout, for a day, was
largely symbolic. Goforth said the mood today is similar
to 2000. 'A strike is a real possibility and for the very
same reasons it happened in 2000,' he said. 'It was a
sense that Boeing corporate was not listening to them,
was not respecting them, was making decisions that
were bad for the company.' But Denton said much has
changed since 2000, when there was even speculation
by outsiders that Boeing might exit the jet-making
-- I
business. 'Despite the challenges today, there is a huge
future for Boeing Commercial Airplanes,' he said. 'It's
not a question of if we build another new airplane after
the 787. It's just a question of when.' Boeing's
engineering and technical work force is bigger today than
at any point in the last three decades, Denton said. The
14,000 or so SPEEA engineers and other professional
workers earn an average of about $83,000 a year.
Overtime and incentive pay can push that well above
$100,000. The nearly 7,000 technical workers earn about
$68,000 a year on average. With overtime and incentive
pay, the average is about $82,000. SPEEA isn't asking for
a specific percentage pay raise. Goforth said it wants
'market leading' wages, and Boeing is offering 'market
average' wages. Another big issue for SPEEA is Boeing's
use of contract engineers. Denton put the number at
around 2,300 in Puget Sound. Goforth points to the 747-
8 as an example of the problems of relying too much on
non-Boeing engineers. 'That program is falling apart,'
he said. Last week, during a conference call to discuss
Boeing's third-quarter earnings, McNerney
acknowledged cost and schedule pressure on the
program. Goforth said he talked recently with a 747-8
engineer, and she had not had a day off in six months.
She's been too busy fixing mistakes made by Russian
engineers, he said. Denton said Boeing ran into
problems because it had to keep many of its top
engineers on the 787 and could not shift them to the
747-8. He defended the use of contract engineers. They
allow Boeing to have a more stable work force, he said.
In the past, Boeing has had to lay off thousands of
engineers after major programs have ended and
during down cycles. He also noted that Boeing has had a
difficult time hiring seasoned aerospace engineers. There
are too few for market demand, he said. 'To find
experience we have had to turn more to contract engineers
and even then it has been very competitive,' Denton said.
But Denton is optimistic. 'We have tried to underscore
their (engineers and technical staff) importance to our
long-term competitiveness and success as a company,'
he said. Goforth has a different feeling about the talks.
'This is not that hard. It's not like building airplanes.
It's not that complex. But they (Boeing) are not doing
the basic things you need to do to advance this
process.'"
30 Seeking Firm- a "The market is celebrating the likely end of Boeing's strike On a
Oct. Alpha, Investo by ramping up its share price from a low of $40 to modular
2008 "Boeing r yesterday's closing price of $49.80. Unfortunately, for enterpri
Heading Boeing, the bad news has just begun. Boeing's dismal se
the Way Q3 earnings only captured the first three weeks of the architec
of strike. That leaves all of October without commercial ture's
GM?" aircraft work, a loss that is estimated to cost $100 million under-
(Stephe in revenue every day. This amounts to another $3 billion investm
n in lost revenues over October. If the proposed contract is ent.
Rosenm ratified, machinists reap large pay increases, a promise
an. of job security, and no relief for Boeing's burgeoning
%li-
Disclos health care costs. Moreover, Boeing still faces difficult
ure: negotiations with its engineering and technician union.
Author The company, already burned for a two month strike, is in
holds a a tough spot. Another strike would be devastating. The
short engineering union is in the driver's seat. Expect significant
position concessions which will hit Boeing's bottom line. Boeing's
in BA) balance sheet in Q3 did not look robust. Its $56 billion
in assets includes $3.5 billion in goodwill (nothing of use),
$2.2 billion in intangibles (ditto), and $6.5 billion in
pension plan over funding (not a good fall back). Take
away those and you get $44 billion. Meanwhile, their
very real $46 billion in liabilities should get steeper.
Remember that they didn't solve their cost problems -
health care costs, payroll - those get worse. At the same
time, they bled cash this October. It's a very good thing
that Q3 did not end October 31. I suspect a great deal of
their $4 billion stash reported on their Q3 balance sheet is
gone. Before the strike, the financial community was
worried about Boeing. Those problems still exist. The
only change is that Boeing is in a worse position. The
787 is further delayed (2009? who knows). Every country
is in crisis mode. Airlines may cancel orders or negotiate
lower plane prices. How badly will Boeing suppliers be
disrupted by the strike and delays? A new administration
probably will cut their military orders. Boeing, like GM
and Ford, has been torched by its unions. Much as has
happened to Ford and GM, Boeing is going down the
path of increased payroll costs in the face of a
deflationary economy. Boeing's balance sheet is
eroding. While nowhere near as bad as those of Ford and
GM, it's starting to look weak. Boeing's Q4 balance sheet
should show further deterioration both on the asset
and liability side, not a good thing to be going into a
worldwide slowdown."
31 US Firm- a "For the three fiscal years from 2004 through 2006, On a
Oct. District Emplo Boeing failed its internal Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) audits for modular
2008 Court yee effective controls of its computer network nand software enterpri
Western systems. If it failed the internal audits in 2007, Boeing se
District risked being required to report a material weakness in its architec
of annual audit as required by SOX section 404. To avoid ture's
Washin this possibility, Boeing hired Price WaterhouseCoopers (alleged
gton, (PWC) to supervise Boeing's independent internal auditors ) low-
Compla to ensure that Boeing's internal auditors did not report trust
int for deficiencies sufficient to constitute a material weakness. and
Retaliat PWC did no compl with internal auditing standards. confront
ory ational
Dischar Although the right to speak to the press when relation
ge of a management fails to correct potentially illegal conduct ship
Whistle is protected activity under the law, Boeing fired Tides. with
blower, employ
Nichola Plaintiff Tides attempted to report this inappropriate ees.
s P. activity directly to Boeing's Audit Committee on an
Tides, anonymous basis using the Company's online form on
Plaintiff or about July 5, 2007. Even though SOX requires
Boeing to make this type of reporting available, the
function was not working. Vince Workman of Boeing's
Ethics Office confirmed Boeing knew the anonymous
reporting did not function and said Boeing should look
into fixing it someday.
In mid-February of 2007, Boeing Vice President in charge
of corporate audit, Robert Jouret, presented a PowerPoint
to the entire corporate audit staff. In response to a
question why Boeing only had 10 IT SOX auditors, Mr.
Jouret said in essence, 'Mr. McNerney believes SOX will
be repealed and so we are using PWC temporary
auditors rather than permanent Boeing employees.'
'PWC is in charge. Stop complaining. SOXis being
repealed and you will be lucky to keep your jobs. He
said he was expressing the viewpoint of CEO James
McNerney.'
On or about May 31, 2007, Plaintiff Tides was required to
attend a mandatory meeting with Diane Kallunki, Boeing
Director of Human Resources. At the meeting, Ms.
Kallunki told Plaintiff Tides, 'We'd appreciate it if you'd
just shut up."'
31 Seattle Firm- a "A fired Boeing employee struck back at his former On a
Oct. Post- Emplo employer Friday with a federal lawsuit leveling serious modular
2008 Intellige yee charges against the Chicago-based aerospace firm. enterpri
ncer, Among other things, the lawsuit filued in the U.S. District se
"Fired Court in Seattle charges that Boeing was disingenuous in architec
Employ its efforts to comply with the federal Sarbanes-Oxley ture's
ee Sues Act of 2002. In mid-2007, former Boeing information (alleged
Boeing technology auditor Nicholas Tides raised concerns to ) low-
in several managers about 'potentially illegal conduct.' trust
Whistle Boeing's director of human resources told him, 'We'd and
-Blower appreciate it if you'd just shut up,' the lawsuit says. confront
Case" Such a comment would contradict The Boeing Co.'s ational
(Andrea public assurances that the company welcomes relation
James) employees to raise ethics concerns. 'Instead of ship
deciding to compy with SOx (the law) and avoid with
retaliation against employees who had engaged in employ
protected activity, Boeing decided to huntdown ees.
employees who had assisted the P-I,' the lawsuit charges.
Boeing attempted to coerce plaintiff Tides into keeping
silent by creating a hostile work environment including
discipline and hostile interrogations,' the lawsuit also
says. 'Boeing caused plaintiff Tides to be followed to
intimidate him.
The lawsuit seeks 'exemplary damages as permitted by
law in an amount sufficient to deter Boeing from future
violations of law.
The P-I spoke with dozens of employees. Many of them
said they feared losing their jobs, buth they believed
than Boeing's information technology department was
mishandling its Sarbanes-Oxley compliance effort. The
lawsuit charges that, 'Boeing intentionally ignored audit
results, fabricated audit results and harassed auditors
in order to avoid' publicly disclosing problems to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates
companies such as Boeing that trade on the stock
market. To escape paying damages, Boeing has to
prove that it fired Tides for a nonretaliatory reason,
[Tides' Seattle lawyer John Tollefsen] said."
7 Seattle James Firm- Q "Here is the message from McNerney: On a
Nov. Post- McNer Labor modular
2008 Intellige ney, 'I applaud the work done by the union and company enterpri
ncer, Chari negotiating teams to finally hammer out a deal both sides se
'James man & could live with. However, the fact that it took 58 days to architec
Wallace CEO, resolve the dispute-let alone the fact that we had a t's ex-
on The strike at all-reflects the failure of a process that post
Aerospa Boeing company leaders and union leaders alike need to discussi
ce: Compa seriously address. The path to an agreement was longer on of a
McNern any and more torturous than any of us wanted. In strike
ey's retrospect, we all wish the differences closed at the end
Messag could have been closed much sooner. And none of us
e to the want to go through this again next time around.
Troops"
(James Beyond the internal side of the strike, there's no doubt
Wallace in my mind-and there should be none in yours-that this
) experience was nothing but a big disappointment to
both our commercial and military customers. It also
created hardships for our suppliers and our
communities. While it may sound cliche, no side ever
wins a strike, despite the efforts of analysts and the
media to determine otherwise after the fact. The costs
are more than just economic, and the reputations of all
parties suffer significantly. For the sake of our
customers, our company and our employees, we have
to find a better way.
Speaking of those times, the global economic realities that
have emerged since the strike began pose significant new
challenges for everyone, and they put particular pressure
on us to achieve additional productivity improvements
that will keep costs to our customers down and pay for
our investment in growth programs. I know there are
many efforts underway throughout the company to
address these challenges, and we should leave no stone
unturned as we seek new and better ways of doing our
work.
Thanks again for your efforts to make Boeing stronger and
more successful each and every day.
Jim"
10 Wall # 32 Firm a "As one of Boeing Co.'s top-ranking female executives, On an
Nov. Street Caroly Carolyn Corvi is known around the aerospace company as intgral
2008 Journal n the Queen of Lean. Lean manufacturing, that is. The 57- enterpri
"The 50 Corvi, year-old executive is widely credited with adapting se
Women VP Toyota Motor Co.'s techniques for turning out large architec
to and numbers of high-quality cars to the production of t within
Watch GM of extremely complex airplanes. Former Boeing an
2008" Airpla Commercial Airplanes President Alan Mullally said during modular
(J. Lynn ne an interview in 2005 that much of Ms. Corvi's early enterpri
-II
Lunsfor Progra success in Boeing's plants was accomplished se
d) ms, 'sometimes through sheer willpower alone' as she architec
Boeing challenged reluctant managers and machinists to learn ture.
Comm new ways. She led the move to convert Boeing's 737
ercial factory into a moving production line, where as many as
Airpla six of the twin-engine jetliners roll nose-to-tail through the
nes plant in an aluminum conga line. Not only has Boeing cut
the time it takes to turn out a 737 by more than half-- from
22 days in 1999 to 10 days in 2008 -- the company has
generated record profits while simultaneously investing
billions of dollars in new products such as the 787
Dreamliner. Now in charge of Boeing's overall
production, Ms. Corvi has the challenge of duplicating
her 737 success on much larger jetliners, such as the
widebody 777 and 747. The results so far have been
mixed while engineers invent ergonomically friendly ways
to do away with heavy tooling that holds these 200-ton
behemoths in place while they are being pieced together.
Because Boeing relies increasingly on suppliers to build
larger sections of its airplanes, Ms. Corvi must also find
ways to get them to buy into Boeing's successful
manufacturing techniques. In an interview last year, Ms.
Corvi said the one thing she liked about her job is that
it's never finished. 'No matter how efficient you are
today, you can always do better,' she said."
14 Seattle Firm a "Back in 1995, The Boeing Co. delivered its first 777 on On a
Nov. Post- time - to the very day it was promised, in fact - to United modular
2008 Intellige Airlines. Those were the days. Today, some customers enterpri
ncer won't get Boeing's promised 787 Dreamliner for up to se
"Custo three years after they were supposed to. It is not the only architec
mers new Boeing airplane in trouble. Boeing announced Friday ture's
Waiting that the first new 747-8 will be up to a year late. That's systema
for not all. First delivery of Boeing's new 777 freighter will tic
Boeing be delayed about two months because of the recently problem
to ended 57-day Machinists strike. Boeing also has a s.
Deliver problem with its popular 737. Before any more planes can
" be delivered from the Renton plant, workers must replace
(James hundreds of fasteners in completed fuselage assemblies
Wallace because they don't comply with specs.
'1 don't know if it's resources or poor execution or
processes, but they have a problem, and they have to
turn this around,' said Richard Aboulafia, vice president
of analysis for the Teal Group, a consulting business in
Fairfax, Va. 'And it's spread to their military
programs, too,' he added, noting a series of problems
with Boeing's satellite programs. 'It could be a mix of
things, from bad planning to lack of engineering
resources,' he said. 'But it's something thay have to
work on. They either have to spend mor or change the
way they develop their products. There is some hubris
involved, too. Boeing has overpromised. They had a
very aggressive 787 schedule from the start.'"
17 Bloggin Firm- a "What Boeing will not be able to do is avoid a On a
Nov. g Investo decidedly downward revision in company and stock modular
2008 Stocks, rs performance expectations, so says Stock Analyst C. enterpri
-- II
"With Leonard Bauer. Bauer, not one to wax philosophic, se
787, nevertheless takes a historian's like view of Boeing's architec
747-8 actions - and the actions of numerous other companies - ture's
Roll- in recent years. 'It's as if we decided as a nation to non-
outs place all of the most idiotic, self-defeating, and systemi
Delayed economically-damaging business decisions in one c
decade,' Bauer said. 'Its as if the whole business approac
Runway community attended the wrong business school.' h; as
Getting Boeing may ultimately end up representing the most well as
Bumpy tragic figure, Bauer says, if lower sales ensue for the a
for commercial aviation giant. 'The Boeing case can drive systema
Boeing" you up a wall. They had no serious competition, on a tic mis-
(Joseph product and price basis, just Airbus, which had understa
Lazzaro suffered repeated delays in key programs and nding of
) numerous cost overruns. And Boeing had a weak the
dollar against a strong euro to make its products more differen
price-competitive. All they had to do was deliver the 787 ces with
Dreamliner on time and cost-effectively roll-out the 747- an
8,' Bauer said. 'So what happens? First contractor parts integral
delays, then design delays for the 787, a twomonth enterpri
machinists strike, then roll-out dlays for the 747-8. se
They're squandering any advantage they had.' So far, architec
order delays and cancellations have not piled up, but if ture (i.e.
they do, Bauer said Boeing 'will not have to look very a focus
far to identify who to blame.' on
executio
n and
not on
enterpri
se
architec
ture).
18 Testimo Rick Firm a "Mr. Chairman, I do not agree with those who say we are On a
Nov. ny to Wagon not doing enough to position GM for success. What modular
2008 U.S. er, exposes us to failure now is not our product lineup, or enterpri
Congres CEO, our business plan, or our long-term strategy. What se
s Gener exposes us to failure now is the global financial crisis, architec
al which has severely restricted credit availability, and ture's
Motors reduced industry sales to the lowest per-capita level since focus on
World War II. Our industry, needs a bridge to span the exogeno
financial chasm that has opened before us." us
explanat
ions for
poor
perform
ance
and its
inability
to
change
at an
architec
tural
level.
18 CNN, Firm- a "The case for a bailout of U.S. automakers came under On
Nov. "Heated Gover sharp scrutiny on Tuesday at a congressional hearing that modular
2008 Debate nment- portrayed the Big Three as both short-sighted in their enterpri
Over Investo business strategies and central to the economy. 'Their se
uto rs board rooms in my view have been devoid of vision,' architec
Bailout said Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn. 'We have little ture's
" (Steve evidence this $25 billion will do anything to promote sporadic
Hargrea long-term success,' Sen. Michael Enzi, R-Wyoming, said. relation
ves) 'Why should we believe your firms are capable of ship
restructuring now when you weren't able to do it with
under more benign conditions?' Republican Senator govern
Richard Shelby of Alabama asked. ment
and
general
myopia.
19 CNN, Firm- a "The top executives of General Motors, Ford and On
Nov. "Motor Gover Chrysler appeared in front of Congress for the second day modular
2008 Bosses nment- in a row Tuesday, to make their case for an emergency enterpri
Arrive Investo government loan. The three CEOs have said they don't se
for rs have the cash to operate next year without help and architec
Bailout warned that the faulure of the industry would have dire ture's
Talks - consequences for the U.S. economy. And yet GM CEO inability
on Rick Waggoner, Ford CEO Alan Mulally and Chrysler to
Private chief Bob Nardelli arrived for these historic hearings empatha
Jets" on pivate jets! That's right: The men at the helm of an size
industry so crippled that it has to ask for taxpayer with the
money to survive flew on private jets. And they needs of
wonder why the American public is so angry about other
these bailouts. Their choice of transportation dominated stakehol
Wednesday's hearing. Representative Gary Ackerman, a ders.
Democrat from New York said: '...there is a message
here - couldn't you all have downgraded to first class
or jet -pooled to get here? It would have at least sent a
message that you do get it. If you're gonna streamline
your companies, where does it start? And it would
seem to me as the chief executive officer of those
companies you can't set the standard of what that
future is going to look like, that you are really going to
be competitive, that your are going to trim the fat, that
you don't need all the luxuries and bells and whistles...
it causes us to wonder."'
20 Seattle Scott Firm a "The Boeing Co. said 'nothing structural' is to blame On the
Nov. Post- Carson for production delays caused by a Machinists strike, non-
2008 Intellige , plane design changes and problems with suppliers. 'It systemi
ncer, Preside sometimes feels you can wake up snake-bitten, and the c
"Boeing nt & last four or five months have felt that way to us,' Scott thinking
CEO, Carson, the head of Boeing's commercial aircraft uint, said of a
'Nothin Boeing Wednesday in a Webcast presentation from a Credit Suisse leader
g Comm conference. 'There isn't anything fundamentally of a
Structur ercial broken,' and the company has 'made huge strides' by modular
al' Airpla expanding profit margins amid the problems, he said. enterpri
Caused nes Boeing has been beset by delays since announcing the se
Delays' third setback to the 787 Dreamliner in April. The architec
" problems - parts shortages, suppliers not completing their ture.
(Susann work and a redesign - trickled down, forcing to postpone
a Ray) the new 747-8 last week.
Carson said the 'rather dramatic economic uncertainty
111
around the globe' hasn't altered the company's 20-year
groth forecast."
21 Wall Tom Firm- a "Airbus says it benefited from a recent strike by factory at On a
Nov. Street Willia Labor- & rival Boeing Co. - not by stealing jetliner orders, but by modular
2008 Journal inms, Suppli I getting aircraft suppliers to work harder for the enterpri
"Rival's Execut er European plane maker. During the 58-day walkout at se
Strike ive Boeing, which ended earlier this month, overstretched architec
Benefits Vice suppliers that work for both companies were able to focus ture's
Airbus Preside more on equipment for Airbus, wuch as galleys, seats and
(Daniel nt for other cabin features. That relieved some pressure at
Michael Progra Airbus, which in August warned that delays in receiving
s) ms, such equipent were holding up jetliner deliveries and
Airbus risked reducing the number of planes completed this year.
Boeing missed its second-quarter earnings projections
in July partly because three big wide-body jetliners
awaiting interior equipment couldn't be delivered on time.
At Airbus, the tight supply pressure has abated, said its
top production manager, Tom Williams, executive vice
president for programs."
25 Wall Thoma Firm J "European commercial aircraft maker Airbus isn't ruling On an
Nov. Street s our the possibility it will have to slow production if the integral
2008 Journal, Enders economic situation continues to deteriorate, Chief enterpri
"Airbus , CEO, Executive Thomas Enders said. Mr. Enders called on se
May Airbus European governments to encourage their export agencies architec
Cut to privde more guarantees for Airbus's aircraft contracts ture's
Producti and improve financing conditions. Governments should views of
on also provide funding for critical aerospace suppliers that stability
Levels" are caught in the credit squeeze. Airbus decided a few
(David weeks ago to freeze a planned ramp-up of its aircraft
Pearson production rate 'at least temporarily' in view of the
) quickly deteriorating outlook for economic activity, credit
availability and airline profitability. The plane maker
'simply cannot exclude at this point' a possible cut in
production levels, Mr. Enders said. 'Anything else would
be irresponsible or not credible. But obviously the freeze
that we have enacted right now is not enough,' he said.
Speaking to French aerospace journalists late Monday, Mr.
Enders stressed that the move to freeze the production
ramp-up was a protective measure. If the situation
changes for the better, he said, the company can reverse
the move next year. But if it continues to deteriorate, he
said, 'Certainly we would not exclude that we have to take
further action.' Airbus has seen industry downturns in
the past, he noted. 'We know how to cope with it. We
know what our flexibility is,' he said. Airbus is in the
middle of a cost-cutting program that will reduce its work
force by 10,000, and Mr. Enders said the company has
flexibility to slim down further by trimming temporary
employees. 'That gives us some breathing space in a
downturn scenario,' he said.
'It has turned out to be an annus horribilis, but we'll
have more order intake than we predicted,' he said.
'I'd call that not a bad year,' he added. Mr. Enders
indicated that Airbus will probably have to provide more
financing to customer airlines that are having difficulty in
s~
obtaining credit from traditional sources. He noted,
however, that the company's exposure to customer
financing at the end of September was at the lowest
level in more than 20 years: $1.2 billion, compared
with $6.1 billion in 1998 and $4.8 billion in 2003, 'so we
still have some margin' to increase.
Reflecting its Franco-German origins, EADS has two
headquarters: in Paris and in Munich. Mr. Enders said he
favors the creation of a single headquarters, preferably in
Toulouse, France, where Airbus is based."
25 Flight Firm a "Dealing with the latent issues created by last year's On a
Nov. Internat schedule reshuffling was only one of the causes for the modular
2008 ional, recent delay announcement. As the 787-8 production enterpri
"Boeing crisis came to light from September 2007 to March 2008, se
's senior Boeing executives consistently maintained that architec
Enginee the company had enough engineering resources to ture's
ring solve that problem as well as keep other development systemi
Resourc efforts, such as the 747-8, on track. 'There's obviously c
es Are engineering resources that have shown up late on the - problem
Stretche 8, but we found ways to work around that by accessing s
d Too engineers throughout the company and external
Thin" resources,' Boeing chairman and chief executive Jim
(Stephe McNerney said on 24 October 2007. That statement has
n been contradicted by more recent remarks from Boeing
Trimble executives. For example, vice-president Randy Tinseth
) wrote on 14 November: 'The 1747-81 programme has
also been affected by limited engineering resources
within Boeing.' As the 787-8 kept commercial aircraft
engineers busy longer than expected last year, Boeing
assigned engineers from its military aircraft division to the
747-8F. The process of releasing engineering drawings for
the 747-81 is only now getting started. The company also
signed deals with engineering firms in Asia, Europe and
Russia and the USA to make up for the shortfall on the
747-8F. But it did not take long for Boeing to realise
that the distributed engineering strategy had partly
backfired. It became a difficult chore for Boeing simply
to keep track of all the work. In April, Ross Bogue,
Boeing's new vice-president and general manager for the
747-8 and Everett site leader, said the company would
change its approach for the 747-81 variant. It would use as
many external engineers, but they would be concentrated
in a few key hubs rather scattered all over the globe, he
said. Driving demand for more engineering resources
were persistent and self-perpetuating design changes
caused by the new, super-efficient airfoil.
To meet Boeing's original performance targets for the 747-
8, Boeing has had to move the centre of gravity on the
airfoil from the aft section of the wing forward, but this
has caused a variety of new problems. 'When we changed
the wing airfoil and ultimately changed the centre of
gravity, this fundamentally shifted how the whole aircraft
balances loads', Michael Teal, the 747's chief engineer
says. 'As the loads shifted back on the wing the tail is the
balancing load. So we changed more parts in the tail. But
then the loads in the aftbody changed, so we have to
change the aft body.' While the engineers struggled to
make their sums add up, the 747-8 supply chain was
left waiting to adjust tooling and place long-lead orders
for new materials. 'We knew which suppliers were going
to make what so getting that through is the same,' Teal
says. 'It's just a matter of estimating the amount of time
required to get all the change in their factories.'
25 The Scott Firm- a "The Boeing Co.'s widebody jets, except the 787, need to On a
Nov. Daily Carson Suppli be inspected for faulty parts similar to the problem the modular
2008 Herald, , er jetmaker recently had with its single-aisle 737. Boeing enterpri
"Boeing preside partner Spirit AeroSystems discovered that nutplates from se
Finds nt of one of its three suppliers lacked an anti- corrosive coating. architec
Faulty Boeing Boeing disclosed earlier this month that the nutplates, tur'e
Parts on Comm which work like fasteners, had affected its Renton-built systemi
747, ercial 737 jet. The company confirmed Tuesday that its c
767 and Airpla widebody jets -- the 747, 767 and 777 -- also were problem
777 nes affected by faulty plates. 'There's a potential that s.
Jets" every plane built since September 2007 could be
(Michel affected, including all the planes in production,'
le Boeing's Bev Holland said. Boeing has delivered 19 747
Dunlop) jets, 12 767s and 82 of its 777 aircraft since September
2007.
Earlier this month, Scott Carson, president of Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, said that Spirit addressed the
problem appropriately, bringing it to Boeing's attention.
'It shows the system is working,' Carson said. Boeing
has seen several setbacks recently, including delaying the
first deliveries of its 777 Freighter and 747-8 jumbo jet.
The company also pushed back the first flight of its
delayed 787 Dreamliner following the Machinist strike.
But Carson dismissed speculation of a larger structural
problem at Boeing. 'There isn't anything
fundamentally broken, he said.
Company spokesman Tim Healy declined on Tuesday to
specify which airplane lines will remain open over the
holidays for the extra work by volunteers. Boeing
Machinists receive what amounts to triple time for each
day worked during the holiday period. Work over the
holidays is on a volunteer basis only, Healy said. The
company is encouraging employees to take two out of the
three major upcoming holidays off work, he added.
'Employees should be able to take the time off,' Healy
said. Boeing engineers have been working a
'tremendous' amount of overtime, particularly in
Everett, said Bill Dugovich, communications director for
the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in
Aerospace. About 23 percent of SPEEA engineers have
been logging in more than 144 hours of overtime per
quarter. With delays on the 787, 747-8 and 777 Freighter,
'I would expect that to be the case during the holidays,'
Dugovich said."
2 Financi Louis Firm "Last month, Louis Gallois, EADS chief executive, On an
Dec. al Gallois suggested it was perhaps time to scrap the European integral
2008 Times, , EADS aerospace group's dual headquarters in Paris and enterpri
"EADS Chief Munich. Far better to concentrate decision-making in se
Rearran Execut one spot, and the obvious place was Toulouse - the architec
ges ive Airbus headquarters. Mr Gallois is now going further. ture's
Deckch Officer He thinks it would be a good idea to rename EADS propose
airs simply Airbus. After all, Airbus is not only the group's d
Ahead flagship and biggest revenue earner, but the name has "rationa
of become a globally recognised brand, far better known than lization
Gatheri the cumbersome EADS acronym - short for European "
ng Aeronautic Defence and Space company. He also wants to
Storm" reduce the number of divisions from five to three to
(Paul rationalise its activities. Indeed, many believe Mr Gallois
Betts) would ultimately like to cut EADS down to two divisions
- civil and defence. This would transform its structure
into a mirror image of its main rival, Boeing, but
without the US group's more even balance between civil
and defence activities. For this reason, Mr Gallois is still
keen to expand EADS's exposure to the defence sector to
reduce his overall dependence on Airbus. But the old
Franco-German frictions that have dogged EADS from
the beginning are again likely to frustrate Mr Gallois.
Integrating defence and space activities into a single unit is
likely to be blocked by both his German and Spanish
partners. The Spaniards are keen to gain a greater share of
business and are expected to resist losing their role in the
A400M military transport operations. The Germans would
find it difficult to agree to a French executive running a
new integrated defence division given that EADS is part of
the Eurofighter programme competing with the French
Dassault Rafale. And the French are bound to insist on
leadership in the defence unit for strategic reasons, not
least the highly sensitive role of some of these activities in
the country's nuclear arsenal. It is hard to see Mr Gallois
persuading his French and German political masters to
agree to such a reorganisation. In any case, industry
analysts seem to consider these proposals a side issue. The
real challenge facing the group is preparing for what
many expect will be the deepest crisis that Airbus has
faced in its 30-year history. As one expert warned: "It
is a bit like rearranging the deckchairs when the
Titanic is heading for the iceberg." The big issue is how
Airbus will weather the storm ahead. It still needs to sort
out problems in its A380 jumbo. Its future A350 project
seems to be going nowhere fast. The A400M has been
delayed by about two years largely because of engine
problems."
2 Seattle Firm a "Another former Boeing employee has filed a federal On a
Dec. Post- whistle-blower complaint against the firm, charging that modular
2008 Intellige he was fired in retaliation for reporting ethics enterpri
ncer "A violations. It is the second lawsuit of its type in less than se
2nd two months. In a complaint filed Tuesday with the U.S. architec
Former District Court in Seattle, former Boeing internal auditor tur's
Boeing Matthew Neumann charges that company managers systema
Employ ignored his warnings about violations of auditing tic
ee Files standards. Neumann was an internal auditor on the control
Whistle company's Sarbanes-Oxley compliance team, which was of
-blower created after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of systemi
Compla 2002. Neumann had worked for The Boeing Co. for 10 c
int" years until being fired late last year. He lives in informa
(Andrea Washington state and holds an engineering degree from tion.
James) the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the complaint
says. In August 2007, after complaining to several
managers that Boeing was ignoring audit results,
fabricating audit results and harassing auditors, a
Boeing human resources director asked Neumann about
his working conditions. Neumann says in the lawsuit that
he told the director about potential law violations. The
director 'pointed to a pillow in her office embroidered
with the phrase, 'Get Over It," the lawsuit says."
3 Flight Steven Custo a "ILFC boss urges Airbus and Boeing to remove 150
Dec. Internat Udvar- mer & narrowbodies from 2009/10 deliveries Airbus and Boeing
2008 ional, Hazy, [3 should cut single-aisle production by around 10 units a
"Cut Chair month next year to avoid a glut of airliners on the market,
Single- man, warns International Lease Finance chairman Steven
Aisle Interna Udvar-Hazy, who says the airframers are 'starting to
Producti tional listen' to his pleas to reduce output. 'We are putting a lot
on by Lease of pressure on them to do something on production rates,'
10 Financ he told Flight's Airline Business Daily at the Latin Airline
Aircraft e Leaders Forum in Cancun in November. 'From the June
a Month Corpor 2009 to June 2010 period, if they knock out 120-150
Next ation single-aisle aircraft [from the totall it would not hurt
Year: the industry,' says Hazy. 'This is only a total of five a
Hazy" month on each side. If they do nothing there's going to
(Niall be a surplus.'
O'Keeff Although ILFC has relatively low aircraft delivery
e) commitments for the next two years, it is likely that there
will be distressed airlines that are unable to fulfil their
aircraft orders. 'There could be opportunistic transactions
for us to pick up some new and young used aircraft,' says
Hazy.
Airbus executive vice-president of programmes Tom
Williams, who predicts that the airframer will achieve a
net order total of 800 aircraft in 2008, says that while the
Airbus order backlog is 'significant' at 3,700 aircraft, he is
'under no illusions' that the financial crisis will cause
some of this to 'disappear'. A review of the business
situation conducted in September concluded that there was
some softening in the 'outer years' of the backlog, says
Williams, and that it was 'prudent to have a pause in the
production ramp-up'. Airbus chief executive Tom
Enders told the International Herald Tribune last week the
airframer does 'not exclude further action if the situation
deteriorates'. Williams describes recent the fuel price
decline as 'a doubled-edged sword' as airlines could be
tempted to 'hang on to older aircraft for longer'. This
contrasts with the situation that existed back in July at the
Farnborough air show when Williams noted that although
financing was a problem, the tendency to defer new
aircraft and retire older, less-efficient types had been
dampened by spiralling fuel prices. Now the trends in the
finance market and fuel prices are incentivising deferrals,
. ..................... 
but Williams is confident that vacated delivery slots will
be snapped up quickly, citing the interest in Skybus' recent
cancellations. There is still demand for fuel-efficient
aircraft with lower maintenance costs, he says.
While Airbus single-aisle production will rise from 34 a
month to 36 by December, a plan to increase it to 38 in
spring 2009 and 40 by the end of December has been
deemed too aggressive, as it would stretch the supply
chain. Boeing 737 output had been averaging 30 a month
in the period immediately before the machinists' strike in
September."
3 Flightbl "Boein Firm- a "PRODUCTION ISSUES On a
Dec. ogger g 787 Suppli & Among the 'lessons learnt' by the European airframer, modular
2008 "Exclus Lesson er- 3 Airbus cites Boeing's challenges with beginning 787 enterpri
ive: s Compe production across the whole of its supply chain. Airbus se
Airbus Learnt. titor believes Boeing's early production issues fundamentally architec
Dreamli " originated in a lack of oversight on both design and ture's
ner Docum assembly integration for the high level of outsourcing. low
Dossier ent All of this was further exacerbated, according to Airbus, trust
Reveale was by 'low-wage, trained-on-the-job workers that had no with
d" (Jon compil previous aerospace experience' working at supplier employ
Ostrowe ed by partners. Airbus believes 'inadequate supplier ees and
r) Airbus capability in design' contributed further, citing as an supplier
Head example that 'Vought had no engineering department s,
of when selected' by Boeing. Combined with an revealin
Engine 'insufficient supply of frame, clips brackets and floor g the
ering beams' the result was a 'loss of configuration' control systemi
Intellig stemming from production records on 'deferred work c nature
ence, that were found to be incomplete or lost in transfer.' In of the
Burkha addition, parts that did arrive complete to final strategic
rd assembly were 'found to be completed incorrectly' errors.
Domke requiring additional rework in Everett. In addition,
and Airbus cites a quality assurance cycle time that was not
was in line with the production rate demand, as well as a
present 'lack of qualified non-destructive inspection / quality
ed assurance personnel (NDI/QA) and equipment at Tier-
interna 2 and -3 suppliers.' With the pressure to expedite pre-
Ily on assembly growing, Airbus believes Boeing and its
20 partners chose to defer 'non-destructive inspection
Octobe from its Tier-2 and -3 suppliers to Tier-1 partners.'
r 2008 The situation was only made more complicated by the
additional deferral of NDI from its tier-I partners
directly to Everett to rush major assembly. A shortage
of fasteners has been a highly publicized challenge to the
Dreamliner, yet Airbus delves deeper into the cause. The
shortage, Airbus believes, was driven by a late redesign
of a sleeved fastener for lightning strike protection that
primarily impacted Mitsubishi's wing production. As a
result, Alcoa, Boeing's fastener supplier was unable to
meet demand in time. Airbus says that at the time the
redesign was completed, production lead-time was
approximately 60 weeks, leading to 'limited availability
of tailored-length fasteners.' As a result, fasteners
were installed with stacks of washers as a work around
for the improper length, forcing Boeing to publicly
concede that thousands had to be removed and
replaced to incorporate the proper design. Airbus also
believes that Boeing's fastener solution 'infringes a BAE
patent owned by Airbus,' though it is not known if Airbus
has acted upon this alleged breach of intellectual property.
WEIGHT GAIN & PERFORMANCE
Boeing has publicly acknowledged that the Dreamliner
is over its initial targeted weight, but the airframer has
never specified the extent of the weight issue. An
intensive weight reduction program is underway to
minimize the impact on aircraft performance. Using a
Boeing proprietary chart with additional labelling, Airbus
believes Dreamliner One has gained 21,050 lbs since
firm configuration, which came in September 2005,
three months later than initially planned. According to
the chart, which appears to originate from a Boeing
Commercial Airplanes update that took place in April of
2008, the significant weight growth originates from
fuselage detail sizing and design, accounting for 4,300 lbs,
as well as wiring and installation, accounting for 3,250 lbs.
Based on its April 2008 assessment, Airbus expects the
initial production 787s to have a maximum empty
weight of 4.5 tonnes higher than the original firm
configuration of 95.5 tonnes. As a result, Airbus
estimates early 787 performance to be 6,370 nm with
248 passengers in a two-class configuration,
significantly less than the 7,650 - 8,000 nm advertised
by Boeing. Based on these Airbus estimates, this would
impact launch customer All Nippon Airways and Chinese
airlines primarily. In September, Airbus announced it
would offer an A330-200 with a MTOW of 238 tonnes, an
increase in five tonnes, to blunt the record 787 sales by
offering an A330 with comparable range to the initial 787
deliveries. At the time, Derek Davies, Investor Marketing
Director for Airbus, defined 'initial deliveries' as the first
20 787s that complete final assembly with a MTOW of
219.5 tonnes. Davies appeared to be quoting information
used to create this intelligence briefing. Airbus speculates
that a 227.9 tonne MTOW 787-8 variant will be
introduced beginning with LN20. The report cites a
photocopied Boeing proprietary document from a 'Boeing
source dated August 2008' that shows 'a revised airframe
supporting this weight increase. This includes
strengthening of the outboard wing, the center wing box,
the wing leading edges, the MLG wheel well, and the
center fuselage as well as enhancing manoeuvre load
alleviation.' Though Airbus speculates that the increased
MTOW 'might also conceal a major impact of the center
wing issue.' In addition, Airbus believes that both the
General Electric GEnx-IB and Rolls-Royce Trent 1000
engines are rumoured to have missed specific fuel
consumption targets by 2-3% and 3-4% respectively.
'We've continued to make tweaks to the engine and we
will make fuel spec when we reach entry into service,' GE
said. Rolls-Royce did not return calls seeking comment.
Airbus speculates that a rumoured design change to the
II I 1 1118,
Trent 1000 low-pressure turbine could require Dreamliner
One to switch to GEnx engines. Though, a 787 programme
source confirms that Rolls-Royce compatible pylons had
been recently reinstalled on Dreamliner One.
RAMPUP FORECAST
As far back as May 2003, Airbus had at its disposal the
internal 787 (then 7E7) production guidance, when,
according to the document, Boeing anticipated a peak
production rate of seven 787s per month by 2010.
However, by October 2005, with the order book
swelling, Boeing shifted to a more aggressive ramp up
with greater than 10 787s being produced per month
by 2011. According to Airbus, Boeing upped its
production guidance again in February 2007 as the 787
order book climbed towards 500 to meet a rate of 10
787s per month by the start of 2010. With the 787
delays taking a toll on the projected ramp up, Boeing
scaled back its delivery guidance in April 2008 to
achieve rate 10 by 2012, two years later than planned.
Airbus' own estimate, dated September 2008, of 787
production does not have Boeing reaching rate 10 until
2015. Airbus also cites one airline source that was,
'Advised by Boeing that the production ramp-up would be
patterned after what was achieved with the 777 program.
This would mean that only a rate of 7 would be achieved
in 2012.' Airbus cites the supply chain as the central
constraint to achieving a higher production rate, even
as Boeing is being encouraged by customers to build a
second final assembly line. Airbus believes partners
Kawasaki, Alenia and Hawker de Havilland are
investing in new production equipment to support the
ramp up, while Spirit AeroSystems, Vought and Global
Aeronautica are preparing for a more gradual ramp
up. Also detailed in the report is Boeing's relationship
with wing producer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which
Airbus believes has only committed to rate 7 for wing
shipments with a factory sized for rate 10. The report
adds that, 'Any plan to increase to rate 10 put on hold
due to differences with Boeing over financing' and that
'MHI did have a preliminary order for additional
tooling which was cancelled' with 'no intention to
invest in production beyond rate 10.' Airbus speculates
privately on the future of Boeing's San Antonio facility
intended for refurbishment of the first 20 787s,
pointing out that the 'Site is on seven year lease, what
for?' Within this supply chain constraint is a central
question of the fundamental material choices Boeing
selected for the 787. The monolithic carbon fibre fuselage
barrels are produced by tightly wrapping, or laying-down,
uni-directional carbon tape around a mold. Airbus believes
the tape lay-down rates are a central pacing item to a
robust production ramp up. Airbus analyzed a public
lecture given on 13 November 2007 by Al Miller, 787
Director of Technology Integration, regarding the
Dreamliner at University of Washington. Airbus recreated
~8aP"
a graph by Mr. Miller detailing the material lay-down
rates. His chart assumed material could be laid-down with
a 2006 demonstrated rate of 80 Ibs/hour with a single-
head machine. However, Airbus competitive intelligence
tells a different story. Airbus believes that Boeing
suppliers were actually only able to lay-down 8-9 lbs/hour
at the time production began in 2007 and had gradually
increased to 19 lbs/hour. Airbus expects the rate to
increase to 30 lbs/hour once a dual-head machine arrives,
well below the initial goal of 100 lbs/hour with a single-
head machine. Airbus cites Spirit, a tier-one structural
partner on the 787, as the source of this actual lay-down
rate data. Spirit is a major structural partner on the A350
XWB programme, responsible for the fabrication of
Section 15, the central fuselage composite structure, at a
new facility being built in Kinston, North Carolina. The
A350 XWB competes directly with Boeing's 787 and 777
aircraft. When approached for comment, Spirit says it is
unsure of how Airbus obtained this information and added
that the company 'takes great measures to protect the
intellectual property of our customers.' For the composite
A350 XWB, Airbus selected a composite panel design
rather than the 787s monolithic design for its fuselage
sections.
LOOKING AHEAD TO 787-9
Airbus completes its analysis of the 787 programme with a
look at the future of the Dreamliner in the 787-9. The
airframer examines the larger 787-9 variant that will
follow the 787-8 with an entry into service in 2012. Airbus
believes Boeing will design significant performance
improvements into the -9 that will then be incorporated
into a major block point change around LN100 for the -
8.
Airbus cites two BOEING PROPRIETARY presentation
slides titled 787-9 Configuration Features which claims
that a revised aft-body join, new floor beams, seat
tracks, composite wing ribs and structural fuel vent
stringers, as well as a 'revised structural architecture'
for the horizontal stabilizer will all find their way into
the 787-8 and -9. The combination of supply chain
woes, design changes and production forecasts are all
central to what Airbus believes is the 'conundrum' for
Boeing's 787 programme: 'Either wait for the 787-9
design spin-offs to limit number of low-value 'wave one
aircraft'...or ramp up fast to recover delay in deliveries
to customers.' Yet, almost paradoxically, Airbus
concedes that the '787-9 design [isl on hold pending
availability of 787-8 ground and flight test data.'
Adding, 'ground and flight loads data essential to
calibrate ifinite element methodl models' and
'aero[dynamicl and engine performance data essential
to determine need for additional weight savings.'"
3 Wired" Firm- a "European aviation giant Airbus has compiled a On a
Dec. Airbus Suppli & surprisingly comprehensive dossier detailing every aspect modular
: '110
2008 Dossier er- I of archrival Boeing's work on the 787 Dreamliner, using enterpri
Dishes Compe information gleaned from Boeing's own suppliers and se
Dirt on titor proprietary documentation to assemble a candid critique architec
Boeing of the ambitious but troubled aircraft. The 46-page ture's
787 document titled Boeing 787 Lessons Learnt examines low
Progra every part of the aircraft's development, including key trust
m " design, certification and production issues, to a degree with
(David rarely seen and calls into question the European aerospace supplier
Demerji consortium's intelligence gathering methods. There's no s, and
an) question the document compiled by Burkhard Domke, the
head of engineering intelligence at Airbus, and presented media's
internally on Oct. 20 digs deeply into Boeing's percepti
development process. It examines nearly every aspect of on of
the 787 program, including the design of the aircraft's the 787.
wings, fuselage and engines. It provides succinct
summaries of the program's parts shortages, fastener
issues, quality control concerns and other production
woes. Even seemingly mundane issues like the plane's in
flight entertainment system are chewed over.
Flightblogger broke the story this afternoon after writer
Jon Ostrower, who has made a name for himself
reporting on the inner workings of Boeing, obtained a
copy of the report from a source he declined to identify.
Ostrower told us shortly after posting the dossier that it is
unprecedented in scope. 'To my knowledge, there has
never been a comprehensive analysis of an airliner like
this,' he said. 'It looks at every angle of the program,
and analyzes it on a very granular level.' What makes
the breadth of the report so impressive is the fact Boeing is
still developing the 787. How did Airbus get its hands on
so much data about a plane relatively few have seen and
no one's flown. Ostrower says Airbus obtained
proprietary data and quizzed sources throughout
Boeing's global supply chain. 'One page explicitly cites
Spirit Aerosystems, which makes the 787 nose, as the
source of information about material laydown rates,'
Ostrower told us, adding that Spirit claims to have no idea
how Airbus got its hands on the information. Ostrower is
even more intrigued by what appear to be seven slides
marked 'Boeing Proprietary" and written in a format used
in Boeing's internal presentations. 'How did they get
those?' he asks. "That's a big deal."
Boeing is keeping mum until it sees the Airbus dossier,
Ostrower writes in his post, and Airbus told him the
presentation and its intelligence gathering methods are
perfectly legal. Ostrower says the Airbus report will
force Boeing to take a hard look at the non-disclosure
agreements it has with suppliers and examine the
security of its information networks. But in the grand
scheme of things, he says, the Airbus report is good
news for Boeing. 'Sure, short term there are going to be
some questions about how the information was obtained,'
he told us. 'But take a look at the document. Nowhere
does it say that the program isn't going to work or that
the plane isn't going to fly. At the end of the day, the
report is a vindication of the program."
4 Reuters, Firm aE "The Boeing Company is expected to announce further On a
Dec. "Boeing delays to its new 787 Dreamliner next week, or shortly modular
2008 Set to after, when it takes into account the damage of a two- enterpri
Announ month strike by its machinists and a number of se
ce New production problems nagging at the program. The U.S. architec
787 plane maker has already said the first 787 test flight won't ture's
Delays" happen until 2009, missing its end-of-year target, and most systema
(Bill industry-watchers think first deliveries of the carbon- tic over-
Rigby) composite plane won't take place until well into 2010, promois
about two years after the original target. The latest e and
delay will be the fourth major schedule slip on the under-
airplane, severely testing the goodwill of Boeing's deliver.
customers and the faith of Wall Street analysts, both of
which championed the fuel-efficient plane early in its
development. But the main risk for Boeing is that a
further delay will also seriously upset customer airlines,
leading to deferrals of orders or outright cancellations. A
number of problems have beset the program, from
shortages of bolts to hold the plane together, to
software glitches and shoddy work from suppliers. But
the real issue, according to industry experts, is that
Boeing's plan to outsource almost all production of the
plane's structure and components has backfired
because suppliers without Boeing's long engineering
experience simply could not do the job well enough,
and rushed to meet deadlines. 'It was over-ambition
from the word go,' said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at
consulting firm Teal Group. 'The problem with an
unrealistic schedule is that it keeps creating its own
horrible ripples.' Boeing will likely blame the next delay
partly on the strike by its machinists -- which recently
shut down its Seattle area plants for 58 days -- and to
continuing problems with suppliers, which seem to have
multiplied. 'The more suppliers rush to meet an
unrealistic schedule, the more difficult the remedial
action needs to be to get things right,' said Aboulafia.
The plane is also heavier than it was designed to be,
which poses a problem for Boeing hitting the market-
changing range and fuel-efficiency promises it made to
customers, and could presage further delays. 'There
remains a feeling among some within that Boeing still
doesn't have its arms around the 787 program,' said
industry consultant Scott Hamilton in a recent commentary
on the issue. Boeing said at the end of the machinists'
strike in early November that it would update all its
delivery schedules, but it hasn't said when that would
happen. 'We are currently conducting an assessment of
our program schedule and when it is complete, we will
communicate it,' said the Boeing spokeswoman for the
787 program."
4 Crosscu Firm a "This is a new Boeing, modeled less after the old On a
Dec. t.com, Boeing, which played for the long term and thus modular
2008 "Boeing outlasted most of its rivals, than on the GE model, enterpri
is where you can build anything anywhere - and se
Going! everything but short-term profit be damned. architec
111 1 I I
Boeing Production is mobile; workers are irrelevant. The ture's
is problem with this model is that it is not truly very goal of
Going!! efficient. Workers are not interchangeable parts; they exit.
" (T.M. have knowledge and skills that can create new
Sell) products, solve problems, and go to the wall for you
when you need it. It's no accident that most of GE's
actual profit comes from its credit operations, not its
manufacturing work. But the GE model prevails at
Boeing, which means that worrying over short-term
costs trumps building for long-term survival. Had
previous CEO Harry Stonecipher been able to follow
his own ethics rules, Boeing would now be a dying
company. He once bragged to me that he had made
McDonnell-Douglas profitable without selling any
airplanes. Not actually selling any of your product isn't a
strategy, unless your goal is to go out of business.
Stonecipher has been replaced by another GE disciple,
James McNerney, who does at least seem to realize that
you have to sell the product to stay in business. He may
not value his current employees any more than Boeing
ever has, however. Boeing argues that it has to
outsource work in order to sell planes, which doesn't
actually explain sending work to South Carolina. At
the same time, the company effectively doesn't let its
own workers bid on those jobs, and then often spends a
lot of money paying its workers to fix others' mistakes.
This isn't a new phenomena, and Boeing engineers'
mistakes on 787 fasteners show its persistence.
Machinists' strikes routinely cost the company more
money than simply meeting the Machinists' demands
would have cost. But unions force companies to
actually manage, and too many executives dislike
having to treat their employees like something more
than automatons. The same is true with layoffs. The
production write-downs in the mid-1990s cost the
company far more than laying off fewer workers in the
early 1990s would have cost them, since having more
experienced workers on hand likely would have
negated the production problems."
4 The Firm- c "Boeing is the most worrisome stock in the Dow right On a
Dec. Street.c Investo now. I thing they have nothing cooking over there, I stock
2008 om, rs say sell, sell, sell." market
"'Mad analyst'
Money s late
Lightni percepti
ng ons of
Round': Boeing'
Down s
on problem
Boeing" s
(Jim
Cramer)
5 247Wall Firm- a "Boeing (BA) is moving up the list of worst managed On a
Dec. St.com, Investo US companies at lightning speed. It went through a nice stock
2008 "A rs- long strike with its machinists, which it settled after two market
Good Labor months. Then it began to have labor trouble with other analyst'
.. .. .. ............ ................. 
Time to groups of its employees. All this worker trouble is s late
Dump extraordinary because Boeing has a huge backlog of percepti
Boeing aircraft orders. It might have given a little more to the ons of
Manage union to avoid delaying the delivery of those planes and Boeing'
ment" the customer discontent which accompanies it. Boeing s
(Dougla management took to the ramparts and fought the problem
s A. machinists. It may have saved some money over the s
McIntyr three-year contract it cut, but it now seems certain that
e) the incident and problems with parts will delay the
delivery of its 787 Dreamliner again. This may push the
launch of the first plane out another six months. The
project had been delayed three times. Now, that will move
up to four.
According to The Wall Street Journal, In a recent
interview, Virgin Atlantic Airways Chief Executive Steve
Ridgeway voiced customers' growing frustration.
'We're pretty fed up,' he said. 'We've got no clarity
from Boeing.' The 787 trouble could well force some of
Boeing's revenue into later quarters, undermining its
financial results. It could certainly put customers in a
position to ask for very large penalties for the late
deliveries. Flying their older planes costs them more in
fuel and the opportunity to more efficiently configure their
fleets. Boeing's shares have dropped from a 52-week high
of over $93 to $39. That means they have fallen by over
55% during a period that the DJIA is off 35%. Almost
all of the plunge has been caused by poor labor
relations and bad sourcing and controls of components.
In other words, particularly poor management. Under
most circumstances, trouble at these levels causes a
board to make changes. At Boeing, now would be a
good time."
11 Bloomb Firm a "Boeing Co., whose 787 Dreamliner has already been On a
Dec. erg delayed three times, may postpone deliveries by a further modular
2008 "Boeing six months as it struggles with production woes and the enterpri
's 787 legacy of a strike, Japan Airlines Corp. said. se
May architec
Suffer 'It's like deja vu, all these things coming back to haunt ture's
Further us -- fasteners, flight-testing concerns and further systemi
Delay, delivery delays,' Rob Stallard, an analyst at Macquarie c
Japan Research Equities in New York, said in an interview problem
Air yesterday. The first Dreamliner was rolled out of the s
Says" hangar in July 2007 and should have had its first flight
(Susann a month later. Boeing has said all its programs will face
a Ray at least a day-for-day delay from the eight-week
and machinists' strike that ended Nov. 2 and kept the 787 from
Chris flying for the first time this quarter under a schedule
Cooper) revised after earlier delays.
While Airbus has also suffered program delays, the
Toulouse, France-based company's 525-seat A380
superjumbo successfully completed a test flight three
months after its roll-out and encountered problems
only once it entered production.
.....................................................
Boeing is using new carbon composites instead of
aluminum in much of the 787, adding complications to a
new manufacturing process. Suppliers in the U.S., Italy
and Japan are supposed to build 70 percent of the plane
and to ship completed sections to Boeing's Everett,
Washington, factory for final assembly. The different
languages and time zones involved hampered
communication and stymied Boeing's ability to fix
problems that cropped up, Joseph Campbell, an analyst
with Barclay's Plc in New York, said in an interview
yesterday. 'This program now has reached a level of
delays and things going wrong that are really
frustrating and beyond expectations' for both observers
and long-time Boeing engineers, said Campbell, who has
analyzed the company since the early 1980s. 'It's out of
character for Boeing. Normally Boeing prides itself on
being on- time and will overrun its budget in order to
be on time."'
11 Bloomb Firm a "The jet won't fly for the first time until next year's On a
Dec. erg second quarter, in part because factories were idled for modular
2008 "Boeing eight weeks by a machinists' strike and some fasteners had enterpri
Delays to be replaced, Chicago-based Boeing said today. The se
Dreamli company also shifted managers and created a new architec
ner to position to monitor operations by suppliers, who were ture's
2010, blamed for previous delays. systemi
Shuffles c
Manage 'Not only is the timeline realistic, but the new problem
rs" organizational structure makes a lot of sense,' said s
(Susann Howard Rubel, a New York-based analyst with Jefferies &
a Ray) Co. who has a 'buy' rating on the stock. 'It's a little
better than the worst case, and I think they know
there's no more 'control-alt- deletes' allowed.'
'It's like deja vu, all these things coming back to haunt us
-- fasteners, flight-testing concerns and further delivery
delays,' Rob Stallard, an analyst at Macquarie Research
Equities in New York, said in an interview. His research
note today was titled the '7 Late 7.'"
11 Market Firm a "Boeing Co. restructured its commercial-airplanes division On a
Dec. Watch on Thursday, following an announcement that it would modular
2008 "Boeing have to postpone the launch of its flagship 787 Dreamliner enterpri
Again for a fifth time because of problems within its supply se
Delays chain and the recent machinists' strike. In November, the architec
787 Chicago manufacturer also announced delays in its ure's
Shakes 747-8 deliveries for the same reasons. On her way out systemi
up Jet was Carolyn Corvi, 57, in charge of airplane programs c
Divisio and responsible for streamlining the commercial problem
n" division's supply chain. Boeing said the 34-year veteran s, and
(Christo will retire at the end of the year. apparen
pher t blame
Hinton) Effective immediately, Boeing said that commercial attribute
airplanes-supplier management, fabrication and propulsion d to an
systems, as well as the manufacturing and quality groups integral
will be part of a new organization, called supply-chain enterpri
management and operations. Ray Conner, 53, who se
recently was vice president of commercial sales, will lead architec
the new group. Further, all current production and t.
development programs will be brought under a new
airplane-programs organization, headed by Pat Shanahan.
The new group includes the 787 program, previously run
by Shanahan. That looks like a well-deserved
promotion for Shanahan, 46, who they credit for
making progress with the 787's technical execution,
analysts said. Shanahan brought to the program
supply-chain management skills it needed, honed
during his tenure at the company's missile defense unit.
'The steps we are taking today will sharpen our
management focus and bring our organizational structure
to bear to improve execution in our supply chain, as well
as on our development programs,' Scott Carson, president
and chief executive of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said
in a statement. The shakeup did little for Boeing's
stock, however. At last check it was down 1.3% to
$41.14. Year to date, Boeing stock is down more than
50%, pummeled by concerns over the troubled financial
markets, slowing air traffic, a loss of defense revenue, the
machinists' strike, and delays in its 787 program. Boeing
said separately Thursday that the first deliveries for its 787
Dreamliner would now occur in the first quarter of 2010,
postponed from its most recent target of third-quarter 2009
-- about two years behind its original schedule. Industry
analysts have been highly critical of the 787 delays,
accusing the company of allowing sales and marketing
for the aircraft run too far ahead of its development
and technical execution, raising expectations it is now
struggling to meet. Further, it has tarnished the
company's reputation, raising comparisons to its rival
Airbus, which wrestled for years with delivery delays of
jumbo jetliner, the A380. The development of any new
aircraft can run into delays, said Jon Kutler, an industry
analyst and chief executive of Admiralty Partners. 'But
the A380 delays were so damaging to Airbus'
reputation that you'd think Boeing would have taken
every opportunity to do things differently,' he said.
Thursday's announcement marks the program's fifth delay
and raises concern that customers will demand more
penalty compensation, or even back out of their orders
entirely, at a time with air traffic is weakening. But to date,
only one order has been canceled due to the
postponements. 'I don't expect airline customers to cancel
their 787 orders,' Macquarie Research equities analyst
Rob Stallard said in an interview. 'The soft demand
environment at the moment is probably a helpful
coincidence in some cases, though I suspect that the
airlines would rather be making this decision on deferred
capacity themselves, rather than it coming from Boeing.'
Stallard added that some of Boeing's early customers
already have maxed out their contractual
compensation, and more recent customers are most likely
to seek compensation in the form of an interim aircraft,
such as a cheap 767. Boeing said it wasn't company policy
to discuss the compensation. Douglas Harned, an
--
aerospace analyst with Bernstein Research, lowered his
rating for Boeing on Thursday to market perform from
outperform on anticipation that the delay could be pushed
out to beyond mid-2010. 'Management has set several
timelines that have broken, and we do not yet see
evidence that the next one will hold,' Harned wrote to
investors. 'We are concerned that there is no longer a
clear bound on program risk.' Speculation that the 787
would see its fifth delay began soon after the machinists'
strike came to an end in October, with customers and
suppliers saying they didn't think a first delivery could
possibly happen on time."
11 Internal Scott Firm a "Restructuring and leadership changes: On a
Dec. Boeing Carson modular
2008 Email , CEO As you know, we currently have a record jetliner enterpri
Boeing backlog, while at the same time we have encountered se
Comm challenges in our airplane development programs and architec
ercial within our supply chain. The current economic slump is t's loss
Airpla further compounding difficulties for our customers, who of its
nes urgently need the newest and most efficient jetliners to integral
help them succeed in today's dynamic and competitive architec
environment. Today we are announcing a series of t.
leadership changes and a restructuring to better align
resources across development programs and
strengthen our oversight of the global supply chain.
Carolyn Corvi, who previously led Airplane
Programs, has decided to retire at the end of December
after a 34-year Boeing career. Carolyn has been a driving
force behind the company's successful implementation
of lean production techniques. On behalf of everyone at
Commercial Airplanes and the entire Boeing enterprise, I
want to thank Carolyn for her outstanding vision and
leadership in transforming our production system and
dramatically improving our productivity throughout
her career.
Ray Conner is named vice president and general
manager of a new organization, Supply Chain
Management and Operations. Ray reports directly to
me, and his new organization combines Supplier
Management, Fabrication, Propulsion Systems and the
Manufacturing and Quality functional organization.
Ray brings years of experience in sales, program
management, manufacturing and supply chain
management.
Pat Shanahan is named vice president and general
manager of a restructured Airplane Programs
organization. Pat reports directly to me, and his
organization is responsible for all current commercial
airplane production and development programs,
including the 787 and 747-8. Pat has an excellent track
record as a program management executive in both
Commercial Airplanes and Integrated Defense Systems.
~-~------------~ ~---- I
The new Airplane Programs and Supply Chain
Management and Operations organizations will work
together closely to drive lean initiatives, productivity
and execution throughout the entire global value chain.
The ultimate goal is to deliver value to our customers and
protect our competitiveness in this challenging market
environment. In addition, we're announcing the following
leadership changes:
Scott Fancher, who previously was vice president
and general manager of IDS Missile Defense Systems, is
named vice president and general manager of the 787
program, reporting directly to Pat Shanahan. Scott brings
demonstrated leadership in program management, systems
integration and technology development to the 787
program.
Marlin Dailey is named vice president of Sales for
Commercial Airplanes, replacing Ray Conner. Marlin,
who most recently led the Commercial Airplanes Sales
efforts in Europe, Russia and Central Asia, reports
directly to me.
All of these appointments reflect great depth and
strength in our management team and position us for
continued success. I look forward to the leadership of
these individuals, and I'm counting on your support as we
face the challenges and opportunities in the year ahead.
Scott."
12 Bloomb Firm a "Boeing Co. 's latest delay means the 787 Dreamliner will On a
Dec. erg take almost as long to develop as the planemaker's modular
2008 "Boeing original model that ushered the U.S. into the Jet Age enterpri
's '7- more than a half-century ago. The schedule Boeing se
Late-7' announced yesterday would start 787 shipments to airlines architec
Dreamli in 2010, almost six years after the first order. That's ure's
ner about two years more than the average for other systemi
Takes Boeing planes and rivals the six years and two months c
As spent on the 707 in the 1950s. That aircraft, which problem
Long started out as the Dash 80, was the forerunner of the more s
As than 16,000 commercial jets the company has built since.
Pioneeri Punsters have had their way with the 787 Dreamliner
ng 707" amid the four delays since October 2007: It's the '7-
(Susann Late-7' and the 'Lateliner' in reports by Rob Stallard, an
a Ray) analyst in New York with Macquarie Research Equities.
Newspapers including London's Daily Telegraph quipped
about the Dreamliner turning into a nightmare. Chicago-
based Boeing has lost 60 percent of its market value
since the first delay. 'The 787 has seriously
undermined the confidence that all stakeholders
previously had in Boeing,' Stallard said in an e- mail
interview. 'We think it will take a very long time to
overcome the erosion to goodwill that has occurred.'
The Dreamliner 'will be a phenomenal leap, but not
without its problems,' said spokeswoman Liz Verdier in
Seattle, where Boeing has built commercial aircraft for
almost a century. The Dash 80 made its first flight from
Renton Field, south of Seattle, just two months after it
rolled from the factory in 1954. The Dreamliner, in
contrast, now isn't expected to have its first test flight until
next year's second quarter, almost two years after it was
unveiled to the public.
Airbus has also suffered program delays, with its 525-seat
A380 needing almost seven years before its first
delivery last year. The superjumbo jet completed a test
flight just three months after its roll-out, however, and
encountered setbacks only once it entered production.
'The Dreamliner delays are likely to be as bad as the
A380, or as some people called it, the A-3-Turkey,' said
Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with aviation consulting
firm Teal Group in Fairfax, Virginia. 'But it entered
service successfully, and so will the 787."'
12 The Firm- a "Boeing Co. confirmed Thursday that its first 787 On a
Dec. Chicago Custo Dreamliner is again off course and won't be delivered to modular
2008 Tribune mer launch customer All Nippon Airways until the first quarter enterpri
"More of 2010, nearly two years later than planned. But some in se
787 aviation circles question whether Boeing is setting itself architec
Headac up for even more delays. Chicago-based Boeing said the ture's
hes for largely composite commercial jet won't make its first systemi
Boeing" flight until the second quarter of 2009, a timetable that c
(Julie leaves it just nine months to complete flight-testing. One problem
Johnsso major 787 supplier told the Tribune that Boeing is s.
n) more likely to need 12 months to gain certification for
the all-new jet and to fix any problems unearthed
during the flight-test program. Boeing's last new line of
jets, the 777, required 11 months of test flights. 'It's
going to take at least a year between first flight and
first delivery,' said Richard Aboulafia, aerospace analyst
with Teal Group, a Virginia-based consulting and market
research firm. 'Of course, the production ramp-up
schedule is going to suffer.' Boeing spokeswoman
Yvonne Leach said the flight plan 'is aggressive,' but
added that Boeing planned to operate flights around the
clock, employing a platoon of more than 34 pilots. Boeing
also has been extensively testing the aircraft and its
components as the first planes wind through production.
The string of delays is turning the Dreamliner into a
nightmare for customers like Japan-based ANA, which had
been counting on the aircraft to spur growth and cut fuel
costs. Like other customers, ANA assumed the first
aircraft would miss the latest delivery deadline of mid-
2009, given the strike that shuttered Boeing's production
for nearly two months, the slow pace at which production
has resumed and the discovery that thousands of fasteners
on the first aircraft would have to be reinstalled. The
greater concern, Mineo Yamamoto, chief executive of
ANA, told the Tribune on Thursday how badly delayed
subsequent 787s will be. Boeing has 895 of the planes on
order, and analysts expect its production to be disrupted
.. 
.. 
.
.
-
--
well into the next decade. ANA had planned on delivery
of 50 Dreamliners by 2011 in order to take advantage of
50,000 landing slots that will become available at Tokyo's
airports. 'This is going to have a major impact on our
cost structure,' Yamamoto said. ANA likely will have to
revisit plans to order nine new 767s, the midsize plane
being replaced by the 787, and has delayed plans to retire
similar aircraft in its fleet, Yamamoto said. Also in
question: How will Boeing compensate ANA for its
difficulties? The two sides had agreed on terms to help
defray ANA's costs from the three previously
announced delays. Because Boeing isn't contractually
obligated to pay costs created by strike-related delays,
ANA will have to figure out the penalties due as a result
of a the fastener-related slowdown, said ANA spokesman
Rob Henderson."
15 Busines Firm a "It has been a rotten year for Boeing's (BA) On a
Dec. sWeek & commercial jet business. Production glitches and a 58- Liberal
2008 "Can IB day machinists' strike this fall have pushed its newest Market
Airbus plane, the 787 Dreamliner, a full two years behind Econom
Keep its schedule. Archrival Airbus (EAD.PA) has pulled ahead y's
Edge on in the race for new orders, logging 756 net sales this misnder
Boeing? year, compared with only 640 for Boeing. At the same standing
" (Carol time, Airbus seems finally to have untangled its A380 and
Matlack mega-jet's production mess. And the strengthening of the mischar
) dollar against the euro has boosted Airbus' bottom line and acterizat
helped the European planemaker regain some of its ion of
competitive edge. All that, and yet the market for big an
planes looks worse than it has in years. Total orders this integral
year are likely to be half the level in 2007, and some enterpri
financially strapped airlines are canceling or delaying se
earlier orders. 'Traffic is collapsing,' says Nick architec
Cunningham, a London aerospace analyst with Evolution ture.
Securities. It's a perilous time-but it could be even more
dangerous for Airbus than for Boeing. Airbus' A350, its
planned competitor to the Dreamliner, looks to be falling
behind schedule, too. The company had expected to settle
on a detailed design for the A350 by October, but now that
timetable has slipped into 2009 as the planemaker
negotiates with airlines over specific design features.
That makes it almost certain that the A350 won't enter
service before 2014, at least 4 years behind the
Dreamliner's delayed launch in early 2010. The danger for
Airbus is that further slippage on the A350 will seal
Boeing's dominance in the high-volume, richly profitable
market for midsize widebody jets. 'Boeing may be
guaranteed a permanent majority,' says Doug McVitie,
an analyst with Arran Aerospace in Dinan, France.
Already, the Dreamliner has racked up nearly 900 orders,
almost twice the 478 logged by the A350. The
strengthening of the dollar, which has risen almost 20%
against the euro since the summer, certainly offers short-
term relief to Airbus. When the dollar was sinking, the
company noted that every 100 rise in the euro would
knock more than $1.3 billion off its bottom line, because
airplanes are priced in dollars but most of the
- -
manufacturing costs are in euros. Airbus has launched a
series of cost-saving measures, known as Power 8, aimed
at slashing more than $4 billion in operating costs. But
such savings will be much harder to achieve if Airbus has
to trim production in a downturn, because fixed costs
such as buildings and equipment will account for a
higher percentage of total expenses. Airbus already has
said it will postpone a planned increase in production
rates, and CEO Tom Enders said last month the company
could take 'further action if the situation deteriorates.'
Evolution's Cunningham thinks production cuts are
inevitable, as he predicts annual aircraft deliveries
worldwide will fall as much as 50% from 2009 to 2013.
What's more, the dollar is now weakening again."
17 Airwise, Firm- a "Boeing and Airbus could see up to 70 percent of the On
Dec. "Boeing Custo planes in their order book pushed back by struggling tempora
2008 , Airbus mer airlines as the global economic crisis puts a strangle hold 1
Seen on the recently booming travel industry, a leading analyst inconsis
Facing said this week. 'In terms of orders suddenly turning tencies
Mass out to be firm as jelly], that could be anywhere in
Order between 30 percent and 70 percent (of the backlog),' analysts
Deferral Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at Teal Group, told the of
s Reuters Aerospace and Defense Summit in Washington. modular
'We are seriously in uncharted territory.' 'I'm not enterpri
terribly worried about 2009; it's 2010 when we'll begin to se
see a shift,' said Aboulafia. 'Production cuts are architec
inevitable after 2010,' said Aboulafia, as it will not be tures.
possible for airlines to put into service the thousands of
new planes scheduled to be delivered, in the face of falling (Compa
traffic numbers. Others in the industry -- who have a re with
vested interest in the health of the plane production same
business -- have a more optimistic outlook. 'Most analyst'
pundits talk about a tougher year next year, with air s
traffic flat to down a little bit, calling into question stateme
some deliveries,' Stephen Finger, president of jet nts in
engine maker Pratt & Whitney, told the summit. 'I March
don't think the delivery issue is as pronounced as some 2008
people worry it might be.' Airlines could bounce back and
from the downturn quicker than some expect, said Finger, 2001.)
keeping demand for new planes relatively strong. 'I don't
dispute the flat-to-tough marketplace, but the optimist
in me says we might see something by the second half
of next year, with low oil prices,' said Finger. If airlines
can get back into profit by next year, that would 'shore up
the basics of aircraft acquisition,' Finger added, implying
that deferrals and cancellations would not hit plane makers
too hard. The coming dip in travel will not drastically
affect plane makers in the long term, Tom Captain,
leader of Deloitte's Aerospace and Defense practice, told
the summit. 'The data says we are facing some rain
clouds, but the longer term forecast is for 5 percent
annual growth in air traffic over the next 20 years,'
Captain said. That would exceed expected growth in
global gross domestic product over the same time,
Captain said, and keep demand for new planes strong over
the long term."
Jan. Comme Firm- a "I have received a very large number of comments - On the
2009 nts on Emplo from every management level - they have all been reflectio
"Not yee extremely positive and supportive. A sampling - many ns of
Accepta from 90 Series. From all disciplines. Mostly from former
ble" - retirees, but some from folks still on the payroll. The employ
Boeing Expletives have not been deleted, nor the typos or ees of a
Progra misspellings corrected; but the 'names have been changed more
ms to protect the innocent."' integral
Today enterpri
"I am afraid you are right. Son Bill (working there) and I se
http://w have talked about this. I think that all of the off-loading architec
ww.rbo we have done has resulted in the depletion of our ture,
gash.co technical skills and the scheduling expertese and viewing
m/boein knowledge that is demanded with it. I too am the
g com embarrassed. I remember when Jaun Trippe asked us to ongoing
ments.ht build the 747. If he were around today, I find it disinteg
ml unimaginable that he would ask McNerney or Carson ratioin
to build him a 797." of their
(Robert former
A. "I too am amazed that the folks in charge of this enterpri
Bogash) program at the get go are still Boeing employees. I am se.
also amazed that the current guys running the
program are still employees. McNerney is no idiot when
it comes to technical matters, but he's relying a guys
running BAC who came up on the defense side and who
have zero technical credentials. As you point out - this is
what you get when non-technical guys are trying to
manage highly technical companies."
"Aloha Bob, great job,l could not agree more, the whole
Boeing situation is embarrassing, especially the 787 and
tanker program. I agree the whole Boeing management
structure should be replaced and moved back to Seattle,
but how, count me in."
"I wonder if you sent an inquiry to the 90 series and
company directors on your mail list asking if they would
sign or do they believe it would be wise to send a letter of
concern and embarrassment to each Boeing Corporate
board member about the deteriorating Boeing
competitive position and flawed management of
programs and Company strategy and suggesting the
need of management change. Carson is the wrong
person, he is part of the problem, I have been in two or
three meeting with him and both he and McNerney
don't know squat on how to manage airplane projects.
Boy, the board really made a mistake when they let
Malally get away. He is the only one left that has the
experience and ability to manage a project. Well I think
the key is to communicate to the board member how
bad the project and management situation is.
How many will agree to sign a communication? Count me
in."
"Bogie,
I finished reading your essay for the second time. I get
~PI~~- ;;;;;;;;;;;~;~ 1***11 ~i**~
more angry every time I think of the down hill slide of a
once World Class touchstone. I would send your letter to
all of the people you mentioned. Maybe it will cause
someone to take some action. I think most of us who
have been involved in new programs keep assuming
that certainly they will do the right thing, but they
aren't going to. It is amazing how the culture at a
company can change so dramatically in such a short
time and never recover. What a case study for MBA
schools."
"I don't know where you get the time to put something like
this together but you hit the "nail on the head". I have
great concern about the future of "our" Boeing, our state
and our country. It looks like that generation of no failure,
I am owed, and no fault has arrived. I pray that my
grandkids are listening and learning their lessons well."
"Hello Robert.your recent summary of everything that has
gone wrong in recent years is truly amazing,very well
done,a real eye opener and heartbreaking all at the same
time.how could such a great company fall so far in such
a relatively short time?This current report is so
rediculous it's hard to understand how a general manager's
concept of accomplishment could be so far off the
mark.Does boeing still have a core objective to design
and build the best enginerred,manufactured and
delivered airplanes in the world?How do you think we
would have faired if we had put out a report like that?
Keep up the good work."
"Bob, when ready, your documents have to get in
McNerney hands. It is powerful - much broader than
mine. He has got to know the rest of his programs are
in trouble.
You started something- I am happy to participate - it is
worthwhile. Do not give up"
"Bob,
As always, you've cut through the fog and BS and said it
like it is - just like Blue, Wilson, Sutter, Paul Sandoz, Ev
Webb and all the others taught us! You ought to get an
Oscar for this one. In trying to think of a practical way we
can be of help to the current crew, I can think of no better
way of having a crowd of us ex-90 series managers
signing this and sending it to the BoD, and the Company
senior management. However, we have to be prepared to
actually DO something if they acknowledge they need
help. People like Carolyn, Mike Denton (now VP of
Engineering) et al should still understand this stuff and, at
least Mike, is really in a spot where he can take some
action (if he and his colleagues have the balls to make
the decisions). They will have to admit they're in a bind
and can use help - even if we offer it for free! Will their
egos let 'em?? Great job,"
_.. ~;; ~ ~ ~i**~ ~ ~;; ;~ ~ ~.. ~;;;;;~;;;
"Hi Bob,
You probably don't remember me but I was one of the
Chief Engineers in Commercial under Omar and
Wherman, Hammer and others... like you I retired years
ago... I was one of those guys who they gave all the
unusual jobs to that needed sorting out ..I had a pretty
good record for under running budgets and getting things
done on time. Gissing made me the program chief for the
xxx I did the same with the xxx..I was deputy chief on that
program. Anyway...I have just read your blast on the
situation at Boeing. I received it via Jim V. Gee I couldn't
agree more with all that you said. (But you did miss out
the incredible work we did with the YC-14). I too have
suggested to others on numerous occasions they need to
invite a few of us sharp minded retirees back to see if
we can sort out the mess. I bet in a few months we
could work wonders. I hope you send your message to
those that matter ..all the board of directors need to see
it. Thanks again."
"Wow! Thanks Bob. I'm an 'almost retired' Boeing guy
myself. You are unfortunately correct. Since I left your
group many many years ago I have had quite a few really
nice assignments. I am now the xxx manager for all
new airplanes and derivatives. We come up with.....
designs for future products. A 'production' team then
comes in and 'makes it happen'. That's where the
problems really start. I was removed from my position
on the 787 4 years ago by a new McD program
manager brought in for the 787 for saying 'no' to him.
They did not want to hear the truth. That happened to
many of us. He got promoted when the 787 xxx
programs started coming up in trouble. Sound
familiar? Thanks again, keep talking and maybe the
embarassments will eventually stop."
"During our Sonic Cruiser days I was leading the xxx
team. A 'new' person came in and was to lead a 'special
study' where we investigated the value of xxx on the
airplane's economics. This new guy called a team meeting
of all the leaders and explained the study and it's schedule.
It looked good, but would impact other studies already
under way at that time. Since the other study leaders were
not present and no upper management to place priorities,
when the question and answer period began I asked, 'How
do we phase this in with current studies and place
priorities?' His response was a very curt, 'My progaram
is the most important and anyone who doesn't
understand this should write the name of his
replacement on the whiteboard as he leaves the room.'
Fresh up from the farm at Long Beach! He became 2nd
level on 787. There were many others."
"I have just read it for the fourth time and wanted to tell
you personally that it is exciting to know there are people
......... ............
that know how great Boeing was and where The Company
is today. With all the real leaders you have known and
worked with I have no misconception you will remember
me. I was the XXX for the first 777 assembly. Remember
? Those were the days when we went to the Suppliers and
made sure our products were completed with Quality built
in and on time. I remember calling back to Seattle and
saying there was no way the first section would ever make
it on schedule. Within days we had an entire cadre of
Boeing people on site helping. Sure do miss THAT
Boeing. I am still working so I would appreciate your
not sharing my name with others. Every day is a
challenge. The 'New Breed' has no conception on how
to complete the task but they are really quick to get rid
of anyone who is not a yes man. Working Together -
Reduce Flow Time - Eliminate Redundancy (meaning
Inspection) have become the Mantra. If you do not
support that then you are destined to disappear. It gets
tougher each day because the Managers I grew up with are
all retiring and I do not have much influence without them.
There are just too many who have come from the New
Breed and I don't stand much of a chance when it is me
vs. them. I will say that as long as I am able I will do
The Right Stuff and NEVER drink the bath water that
would compromise safety. Oh well Just wanted to say
Thanks."
"Bob,
You and I first had contact 22 years ago when a letter I
sent to Frank Shrontz was handed off to you. Your
posting is making the rounds internal to Boeing and I've
invited my managers have a read. I suggest that it may be
uncomfortable, but necessary to look into the mirror that
others are holding up. Whether as a retiree or someone
recently returned to the company, it is very painful to
realize where we are and try to figure out how we got here.
When Bair got up to pitch the 7e7 status and I saw all
green squares with a couple of yellows, I waited for
Alan to pounce. After all, there is no way that a project
taking on so much technology and schedule risk could
possibly be riding along with no critical issues at that
stage in development. The pounce never came. I was
stunned. I knew Alan had the experience to know
better, but I guess maybe he had already checked out.
My worries for our management culture and
competence have grown since then. I'm not schooled
in organizational development, but I believe that a
culture of 'yes men' has taken hold over the past
decade or so. Engineers who provided analysis pointing
to problems now plaguing the 787 program were
shooed out of the room and off the program. I looked
at the RFQ for some of the avionics systems and I was
mortified. System integration was not addressed. I was
roundly criticized for carrying significant contingent
risk in the out years of my proposed schedule because I
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predicted that we would have to provide significant
resources in support of integration and test that was
not in the scope of work. This has come to be true for
many suppliers. Subsequent decisions such as shipping
structural shells just to hold to the rollout date have no
doubt cost us hundreds of millions of dollars, if not
billions. That said, many of our supplier development
efforts are chronically deficient. Thank you for posting
your observations on Boeing delays and facilitating dialog
and comments. Sharing this can only help."
"A couple of years ago the chief engineer of xxx made a
statement addressing a newly formed study team. He said,
'We need to work hard to achieve our 50% share of this
market'. I stood up and said in front of many leaders,
including
some VP's 'What do you mean 50%? My Boeing has
lived with 80%. Don't
brainwash our youngsters into thinking 50% is ok. It's not
ok with me'. Not a soul stirred. To me that was the day
the music died."
"Sad but true. Is this the start of the book? Sounds as if I
should be buying puts instead of calls?"
"I doubt you'll get many kudo's from the big boys at
Boeing, but it does call a spade a spade. It will be
interesting to see how its rec'd."
"Would you mind if I sent it to Carson? Answer: No.
(Subsequently went to Carson.)"
"Bob, If you have a list of people you send your blog to, I
would like to be on it. We met a couple of times over the
years. I was in Flight Test from 1965 to 1998. Advanced
to xxx, got busted in 1997 for speaking out about what
you describe and retired in xxxx. I am hearing rumors
about changes in flight test that disturb me. Not only will
they not make their pipe dream of a schedule, but think
that because of inexperience the chances of losing an
airplane are greatly increased."
"TJ forwarded your article to me and it was a great
pleasure and delicious treat to read another Bogash screed
peeling hide from the guilty. After all these years, you
probably don't even remember my name but I certainly
remember yours from your days as our Tech-Rep in
Montreal holding hands with the Nordair guys in the early
days of our 737 gravel runway travails. How the mighty
have fallen! Our once proud and venerated Boeing
Company seems incapable of doing anything
demanding these days such as bringing a program in on
time and on budget. Much of this failure I attribute to
the products of that ill-advised Sloan Program which
selected promising young guys very early in their
careers, extruded them through the B-school die at a
- -
tender age, instilled perfect confidence in their
immature judgment and assigned them rank and
responsibility far beyond the merits of their wisdom
and experience. These guys were rotated through the
various chairs at warp speed and from my observation,
many did not gain much real knowledge in the process.
Most were definitely good guys, really smart, and
several I counted as friends but most lacked the
tempering which the fires of adversity forge. They
needed more time as front-line grunts working night
and day under some obstreperous airplane on the flight
line to drive home the realization that there were NO
small problems which kept the machine grounded. If it
did not dispatch on schedule, we had failed, period and
excuses were small comfort; very small. During the early
days of the 737 when we were plagued with trailing edge
flap problems, I was absolutely delighted when Dick Ault
of Western came to town to explain things to our leaders.
Dick had a colorful way of clarifying the impact of an
AOG in idiomatic English that our leaders could
understand. He, John Borger, Frank Kolk and several
others whose names elude me at the moment were real
airplane guys who knew how to make things work.
Unfortunately, the wisdom accumulated during that era
seems to have been displaced by quarterly results and
political correctness; the precious legacy forfeit.
Geezers have complained about subsequent
generations for all of recorded history but in this case
the objective results furnish solid basis for
dissatisfaction. It isn't just a nostalgia trip."
"Bob, well said and to my way of understanding, right on
the mark. with your permission, I'd like to forward it to
some of my pen-pals, but will wait until you give the ok.
It seems ready to go to me."
"Hi Bob, long time no communicate. I feel fortunate to
have received a copy of your 787 analysis and sincerely
hope you have somehow gotten it to the attention of those
people at the top who really need to see it. I too have been
retired for several years now and I dismay every day at the
conditions at the company today. I made my career in
those certification plans and schedules and stand up
meetings and know whereof you speak. Everyone I talk to
today is extremely unhappy with the cavalier attitude that
derives today to work statements, configuration control,
schedule commitments, oversight, etc. I agree with some
of the comments you have received however, specifically
with Mulally. He did a good job on the 777 but, in my
view, somehow lost track of most of the core
competencies at Boeing later in his career, specifically
with the planning of the 787. I think you were too easy
on him. Anyway, congratulations on a well written
piece. "
"I never did meet you but having reviewed you web site I
wish that I had. I spent 32 years of my life at Boeing,
ended up as the chief engineer on the xxx retiring in 20xx.
I first thought that Boeing was going astray when we
sat through poetry sessions under the sponsorship of
Condit. I don't know if you had to undergo these. I am a
firm believer in the process of a master schedule,the war
rooms that are a part of it, and with the responsibility that
everyone has to ensure its completion. In all of my time at
Boeing we never deviated from the belief that schedule
was the most important (after safety) thing for Boeing. Our
task was to deliver airplanes on time to our customers. No
excuses. Keep up the good work."
"Bob,
I can't believe the mess McNerney's allowing to
develop in Longacres. I haven't been able to reach
Carolyn, but I am dismayed to no end that she is
leaving. What's really missing is replacement of
Carson and Albaugh - the two most recent disasters as
CEOs."
"Bob,
I've now read your piece a couple of times.
There isn't a thing that I don't agree with. I believe you
have put your finger exactly on what's wrong at Boeing
presently - a paucity of true leadership and
management. I wondered how some of the people
currently in charge at Boeing might react to reading what
you wrote."
"Hi Bob:
Not sure you remember me, but I was the guy that your
group hired to take over for xxx when he retired. I started
the day you left. I just finished reading the whole page
you wrote and cannot believe how much of it I have ranted
about for 15 years. The management that came in after
you have all been poor, they all want to disengage the
supply base and manage by MBA. BO and MS were the
worst managers I have encountered in my 35 years and
they ran the quality group into the ground. I have been the
lead of the xxx group for xx years and have dug in on the
747-8 and will not allow building and shipping hardware
that does not conform. It has cost me raises and
promotions, which just shows you the mentality of the
leadership at Boeing. The 787 leadership ran right over
us technical experts and did what they wanted without
regard to quality. Even AS9100 proves their mentality as
it is a washed out version if DI-9000. You will be happy
to know that some of us are starting to hold leadership
accountable, some of us have enough time that we do not
care what they think and guys like me are on them daily
when they make stupid decisions. I have been kicked out
of many offices over the last couple years, and proud of
it! I keep telling them that after 35 years, it is my job to
hold them accountable. Thanks for saying it, just
validates what some of us old timers have been saying for
years. We need that old management style back or we
are doomed!"
"Whoa...you really did blow a gasket! Not unjustifiable.
...but very sobering and as you say, embarrasing."
"One theory I believe in, is that shortly before McD
bought us with our money they went thru a cleansing
with all managers being removed from their current
positions and all having to re-apply. What this did was
weed out the timid and reward agressiveness. It was
that pack of wolves which survived to get introduced
into the current flock of Boeing folks who had been
hammered the past 5 years on 'Working together',
'team building', 'concensus decisions', ie, the sheep.
The result was inevitable, the wolves dined famously on
the sheep. We could always spot a McD transfer from
other new folks by behavior. Middle management was
taken over, not to mention many top spots."
"Hi Bob,
Good to see you are still your same old self.
How "right" on you are - Quite insightful. I retired, but
came back as a contractor. Believe it or not the Quality
Director in place when the 787 started up, at that time,
(Now two Directors ago)
decided that we, Boeing Supplier Quality, should not
be part of the oversight on the 787 Program. Didn't
take too long to figure that was a wrong management
decision. My little saying, which I have told our
management: When I came to Boeing 40 years ago, it was
'Kick ass, take names, build planes', now it is 'Sit down,
hold hands, build plans', Unfortunately all we do is build
back -up plans for those we built in the first place ! !
"Bob,
I share many of your feelings. I can remember going to
a 'team meeting'
and asking the 'dumb' question, "who is in charge?" It
turns out that
no one was in charge. The team concept came from
Toyota, who have a flat management. Dollars to
doughnuts, the Boeing management is far from
flat. I am surprised that the Board of Directors, if it
has any technical people on it, hasn't taken firm steps.
I read your essay, and agree with you! I am for
sending your material to the BOD. (From a former
Board member.)"
"Yesterday, Dec. 12, marked 52 years since I hired into
the Boeing Co. It has fed and clothed me and my family
for all that time, or at least gave me the wherewithall to do
it. I've been terribly disappointed in how a great company
has been run, and thought I could just wash my hands of
it. However, that just aint so. I think they need to get
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some "corporate memory" back at the controls as the
boys in charge just have no internal compass and/or
the pride it takes to make schedule king. Naturally, as
an old Quality guy, King Schedule sometimes made me
crazy, but when all was said and done, they product out
the door was usually pretty damn good, and mostly
on time. I believe those guys breathed a huge sigh of
relief when those shanked fasteners were found on the
787 as it gave them another excuse to be late. If you can
call McNerney, you should. Just to be sure he sees the
article. I would think his reaction to it would dictate
where it goes from there. Bob, I know your getting
advice from all corners, but in the end its your call. And I
know you didn't ask any advice from me. So whatever its
worth, at least its free. If I can be of help just let me
know."
"Bob,
It's an interesting tome. Have you thought of sending
to Mr. McNerney
'as-is'? What I'd really like to see is a national business
writer do a post mortum on the Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas merger (acquisition if you like). This is the one
Condit can be hung with: Tell me Mr. Condit; what on
earth were you thinking of when you hatched this dumb-
ass move? You stayed at Boeing too long and Mr. Wilson
was right: he promoted you over your head. Bottom line?
With MDD, Boeing acquired ZERO long term business
base along with a MDD personnel culture of "me first"
and 'everything else is tied for last'. Sears goes to jail -
no Boeing loyalty, Stonecipher gets fired for ethics
issues - no Boeing loyalty, Albaugh tries hard for the
CEO job at BAE Aerospace - no Boeing loyalty.
Reading this self-congratulatory, syrupy litany of trivia
makes me feel like Alice in Wonderland. It's little
wonder these guys can't produce airplanes; they are
too busy sitting around in quality circles, holding
hands and singing Kumbaya. Where in the world did
the once mighty Boeing Company find this bunch
pansies and what lunatic installed them in positions of
power, power to make or break our beloved Boeing
where we happily toiled for so many years? When I
read pronouncements from the 'company leadership'
occasionally, I never recognize a single name anymore and
ask myself 'who is this weenie, where did he come from
and what has he ever accomplished'? During my
checkered career, I knew almost all of the 'movers and
shakers' at Commercial Airplanes, even those who were
still grunts in the trenches. It wasn't hard to spot even
new graduates who had the 'right stuff', but if any are
still on active duty they have been suffocated by all the
PC BS and will remain anonymous. If any of the tough-
fibered, old guard are still with us, they must be having an
attack of the vapors. Guys like Sutter, Gissing, Tattersall
and a hundred more whose names escape my feeble
memory at the moment would be pulling their hair out by
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the roots. What a pathetic mess!"
"Bob,
JM forwarded your 12/13/08 email to me. I just finished
reading it with increasing sadness. Fascinating - great
work. In 1987, when we first started talking about
what would become 'World Class Competitiveness', I
knew that if Boeing stayed the course (not just the
usual 6 months for another "yes we can" program), we
would demolish the competition and dominate the
industry for generations to come. We did stay the
course quite a while. Alan Mulally embraced WCC
and led the 777 to a smashing success. For the first and
only time, I truly loved to come to work. It was fun and
we knew we were finally doing it right ....... That really
was a major reason that the 777 first flight was nearly
flawless. We ran the SIL through every nasty failure we
could dream up. We found stuff and stuff got fixed.
When the 737NG was proposed, I suggested that it should
be a new airplane, built as a miniature 777 with a common
cockpit and systems. This would also be an excuse to
miniaturize and improve the 777 systems package, which
could then be offered as a retrofit to all previous Boeing
jets, as well as Airbus and Douglas jets. The airlines could
finally have "common" fleets of airplanes - that all looked
like Boeing 777's. But no! We went cheap and built
the 737NG. We pulled it off at great expense and
effort, but it was the beginning of the end of WCC.
With the 'early retirement' of 1995 coupled with the
demographic age bubble in engineering as well as our pilot
office, I could see that if the company did not provide for
our replacements in time for us to train them, there would
be a two-thirds wipe out of experience in about 10 years.
As you describe in the 'Tome', it happened. I had great
hopes for Phil. I knew him when I was a new aero
engineer at Everett in 1972. But alas, he sold us out to
MD. We should have waited until they went bankrupt
and then picked up the pieces - sans their
management. But no! We let them run us into the
ground, just like they did with Douglas and then MD.
Then they move headquarters to Chicago with the rest of
the mobsters. 'You are known by the company you keep.'
Well, other than that, I don't have strong feelings in the
matter. I retired in 2002 and built a new house. There is
life after Boeing, and it is good. Everyday is Saturday.
I'm so busy now; I can't imagine ever having had any time
to go to work."
"If it were me, I would consider sending it to
McNerney and others on the board and ask them if
they cared to comment on it before you give it wider
distribution, such as the times, etc. Once you let this
cat out of the bag they are going to go into a defensive
mode and will never listen. If the main goal is to right
the ship, perhaps they need to give your piece a
scrutinizing squint, before it falls on them like an A-
bomb."
"This is typical 'everything is just fine' attitude...We
have gone way to far to the right in our approach to
teaming and consensus decision
making....and rewarding a 'didn't get it done' behavior
in my opinion.
There needs to be fatalities (not real) but people being
told they don't have jobs based on their lack of
managing a program, meeting costs, and deliverables
on time, and oh, forgot about a quality product.
Sometimes I think I am getting too old for this stuff...."
(Current Director in Chicago)
"Bob,
I don't know how you do it -- I could never type fast
enough to write that much no matter how much I knew.
But I bet ol' Jim B. is rolling over and over. Personally, I
think things started going south about the time Boeing
began trying to not recognize individuals as heroes and
standouts. Instead, it was Working Together. For
example we no longer put the names of the fight
crew on the sides of the cockpit -- it was the WT term
(777). I talked a lot to Jack Steiner. He bemoaned the
fact that Boeing no longer had 'faces in the window'
(his term) in the form of chief engineers, designers, etc.
Instead, everything was WT and was being reduced to
the LCD. The Sutters, Wygles and their ilk were
pushed aside. But the result was there was no one for
the employees to look up to and worship as examples."
"I read the whole thing. Great. You hit it right on the head.
Touchy feely my ass. A sharp hard kick in the ass is
what's needed. Boeing has become a company of wimps
managed by incompetent wimps. If this happened in
China, a lot of people would be making small rocks out of
big ones. And they would make schedule. The triumph of
bullshit over performance."
"I read Bob's material from end to end and I learned a lot
more than I knew. The situation is much worse that I
expected. I am in full agreement in his analysis of the
management problems. It just seems there is no one in
full control. Kind of like lost sheep. Jim, I certainly don't
want to sound like I am a sexist and biased, but I think a
lot of the problems started by promoting a lot of people,
women included, into positions they knew nothing about,
just to fill quotas. Next, education and degrees are
wonderful, but a degree does not guarantee the holder
could organize and manage a goat roping contest. It
seems the company is now only reactive instead of
proactive..When did they throw out source and receival
inspections, along with onsite monitoring of the critical
stuff? It may very well be that the suppliers are held
up for late engineering data. We have seen that before. I
remember going to LTV to rattle their cage and I did, but
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they asked when they might possibly expect the
engineering for a small change that would have worked a
big problem? They had been waiting about two years. I
called Red McCallum and he got the ball rolling and that
problem was solved in about a week, but authorization to
proceed with the new change was instant. That is where
an onsite interface really pays off. It just seems that it
is only a matter of time before we see a major collapse
of the company. When that happens, the time will be
ripe for Toyota to step in and take over, as they said
they will become the transportation system of the
world. A retired Douglas/Boeing employee forwards the
Boeing magazine to my dentist friend who is an aviation
enthusiast. My friend asked me why are there so many
Vice Presidents at Boeing. I told him it wasn't always
that way. Anyway, I want no part of it, except I want
them to get their act together as I am still holding a lot
of stock certificates. will be interesting to see the results
of the changes in the next six months. Better close. Stay
warm out there, and stay healthy. My old knees are giving
me fits, probably to many years on the hard concrete. I
don't want any more surgeries."
"From my little knot hole I believe you're dead on. I felt
the bull shit would sink us long before I retired and was
sent to people skills class over and over to some how
change my theory x way of thinking, It never worked and
I'm glad it didn't. When I was young and fighting
incompetent management I use to say to my self that's ok
you bastards I'll out live ya. Then when I got to a point
and time to make a difference along comes political
correctness and make everyone feel warm and fuzzy.
They deserve what they've made and if it weren't for the
fact that I still feel a sense of loyalty to The Boeing
Company I grew up in I'd say fuck em all. Truth of the
matter is the people down there today couldn't handle
the old ways of doing our day to day business. They've
been made soft with all the bullshit programs and
management that doesn't know how to call bullshit
when these limp dicks get up and starts pumping out
their excuses. Time to remember 'The initial objective is
to build airplanes"'.
"1 think you're a little bit soft on the reasons for
failures. (just kidding) I have said before (and you
touched on it) that the educated idiots got control of the
Company and started playing silly games instead of
building airplanes. People who don't have a clue about
what it takes to actually build a product. I wonder how
long before our retirement plan is canceled?"
"Bob has compiled an outstanding analysis of the
evolution of Boeing commercial airplanes. It is a very
thought-provoking peice of work. The main issue as I see
it is that the new leadership's view of all of this truth this
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would differ from yours or mine. While one would hope
it would be received with the respect it is due and
actually result in some sort of leadership "revival", I
believe that the current leaders will not receive it well.
As Bob stated at one point, 'maybe Boeing is reflective of
our society as a whole', is something to think about. Take
a look at the auto industry, banking, financial institutions,
etc. Most of the major organizations seem to be
performing similarly. They have well educated leaders
who have bounced around other major organizations,
built up thier resume's, and are able to put a 'spin' on
just about any situation (like many of the spins Bob
captured for this document). I'll bet a very similar
document could be compiled for Chrysler, General
Motors and others. As far as a solution goes, the new
leaders have hit critical mass, so I don't now if turning
back to basics is possible. I commend Bob for this
magnificent effort, though I am not surprised. For a long
time, I thought I would join Bob's team at some point. He
was interested in hiring me just before I came to work for
you and several times after. I believe he has always tried to
make a big difference for Boeing."
"re the 787 and general demeanor it's all true. Several
people my level thru out lots of orgs (I am on a lot of 787
teams) are all saying the same thing nothing is getting
passed on to the top. One really smart woman who was
a 'nay sayer' was removed from her job for not
shutting up!! We will see that she is right real soon. I
also agree there are going to be more delays, and
finacially I can tell you things (not on line) that will
make your toes curl. Thanks for all of the effort and
blood,sweat and tears that went into your treatise. You are
right on! I fear that a solution is beyound the capability
of anyone currently on the Boeing payroll. I would like
to think that this too shall pass, but I am afraild that what
will pass will be Boeing."
"OK my put. It will be concise. Bogash has given us a
most insightful well researched, historical, account. J. has
given us a more concentrated and good analysis. B., as
usual, has put some balance into the discussion. I agree
that we did not train the next generation or lost it by failing
to transition. But, I think you have all missed a major
dimension. To the extent that we are talking about the
787, we are not talking about the kind of program we
participated in bringing to successful conclusion, relatively
on time and within the money. This program gave away a
large degree of engineering responsibility and asked for
the delivery of complete assemblies. The 6 o'clock stand
up meetings should have occurred in other corporation's
plants. Their managements should have seen to
comprehensive manufacturing and assembly plans and so
on. And while we had earlier program participants living
with our engineering and our engineers in a supervisory
role at major subcontractors, coupled to experienced
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planning, tooling and manufacturing, people, we left
these them to their own devices."
"I think that you've hit the nail on the head.. Straight
forward and to the point. But given Boeing's current
management tree nobody is left that thinks the legacy
way and I don't for see anything changing except our
bottom line, going in the negative column. And I have
always said from the time that Stone Dicker took over,
Boeing was on a down fall because of his putting non
aerospace personnel in high positions that new nothing
about an airplane... Still the practice today. Lots of
educated people but most without any aerospace
experience... I don't see things getting any better any time
soon. I think Boeing is in for some really tough times
in the not to distant future. Thanks for sharing."
"Excellent evaluation. We need to get this in the hands of
the right people. But who is that? The Board must be
asleep."
"I sent That Bogash article to my brother in law who was a
corp. director reporting to T Wilson when he retired.
His comments: Hi Ray - A rather lengthy study on Boeing
management. I read it all and I substantially agree with it.
Things have really changed at the old shop - I remember
when Bill Allen ran things that the pressure to keep
schedule was enormous (I believe we even bragged that
Boeing had not missed schedules for 4 or 5 years. I seem
to remember that heads of mfg and eng even lost their jobs
when we missed schedules. There is no question that the
787 represents a great technical challenge, but so did the
747 and the article you forwarded referred to schedule
slides on all kinds of programs. I don't know who the guy
is that wrote that article, but it represented a lot of work.
Pete"
"Dear Bob,
I worked for you from 1991 - your departure. I was in
Chicago when you traveled there [for our midwest] staff
meeting. You spoke frankly in that meeting and I shall
never forget that heartfelt speech. Thank you. My name
is T. I began with Boeing, fresh out of college, in 1978.
Like most of us, I worked for some excellent managers
and some poor managers. It's just the way it is. Further to
your writings, it is my observation that the most
essential Boeing 'paradigm shift' the past 30 years has
been this: In the 1970's and 1980's you could be
damaged or fired for lying to executive management;
more recently you can be damaged or fired for not
lying to executive management. I have seen this and
experienced it first hand. Like you Bob, I have many
friends who remain in management at Boeing. Several
were drafted into the 787 program. Their consensus of
the program is that the problems are seldom technical
in nature, but rather stem from management
...............
corruption - for lack of a better, or worse, term. If I
could pass along one management recommendation to Mr.
McNerney it would be to simply reward 'functional
correctness' (my word) instead of 'political correctness'
which became so overwhelmingly prevalent during the
1990's. Best wishes to you Bob Bogash!"
"Bob,
I thought it is a well written article. I would have added a
few comments like "Some how, Boeing must shed its
McDonnell symbol, relocate its Headquarters back to
Seattle, and shed its McDonald & McDonnell executives
within the Seattle area Boeing facilities. Boeing must
return to a Quality Assurance plan that was introduced on
the 777, and provide on site support in Engineering,
Quality Assurance and Program Management at its major
suppliers.' The real problem is to convince any of them
that a) there's a problem, b) it is fixable, and c) that
you have the solutions. These solutions would have to be
cost effective and somehow be made palatable to the
existing folks. That means acceptance at the highest levels
and top down enforcement by edict. That's a big row to
hoe -- maybe impossible."
"If Wilson was still in charge we/they would not be in
this mess. Maybe management should answer the
question; WWWD, 'What Would Wilson Do?' After
that they could go fouth and fire someone.."
"Your piece was on target! Promotions while I was still
there (end of 2000) seem to fulfill quotas rather than
promoting personnel with the capability to get the job
done. Sort of a quick dance through the chairs to higher
levels. I would like to see a video of the 'Head Shed'
reading your tome."
"Thanks for the humor. I needed a lift. A friend of mine
bumped into Frank Schrontz the other day and asked him
what he thought of the program delays and the leadership
in Chicago. Frank just rolled his eyes. It was Condit
more than anyone who considered Boeing a fine place for
his social experiments. What business does the company
have diluting the workforce for all these warm and fuzzy
programs. It's time to go back to basics, focus on airplanes,
cut the meetings, do the work. Oh well, our days in the
saddle were not perfect but surely it is more satisfying to
struggle with an engineering or production problem than
meeting environmental goals, etc."
"Jeez, what tripe. This guy couldn't find his ass with both
hands....probably spend two hours every morning on their
makeup.
God, help Boeing. Do they even know how to spell
priorities."
"Kind of makes me want to puke, he (Carson) should
~I""""~ L ~-
have been candid about problems. Total dribble."
"Bob,
I have read your sixty some pages with interest,and have
taken the liberty of sharing them with others. I also must
say that I generally agree with the points you have made.
Since you have not read my analysis, here it is. I have not
read your latest draft, but I will. I have though, read your
suggestions on what us old crocks can do. Some of us
have been thinking along similar lines, and have come up
with all the same suggestions, except the double box. And,
Oh yes, we did not limit participation in any solution to
retired 90 series, or execs. Will comment further on your
latest writing when I read it. But, I am on your side, and
particularly agree with your post script."
"Bob,
In short, I think that all us old guys generally agree
that the root cause of the 787debacle, was the can do,
results oriented culture the company used to have,
going South and being replaced by a touchy feely,
efforts count, team oriented, culture. And it took about
20 years for that change. I don't see that any of the
suggestions for a fix that any of us have come up with
address that problem. First, the guys in charge, starting
with McNerney, have to agree that the culture has gone
to Hell. I don't think that they will do that, partly
because they don't have their ear to the ground, and
partly because our general culture is tending to
embrace those values which we think are causing the
problem. They are apt to dismiss our concerns as
merely rants of old time Hard Ass management types,
out of touch with the times, who on principle, don't
think the new team knows what they are doing. But
let's say that a miracle occurs, they agree with us, and
want to turn it around. How do you undo 20 years
worth of ingrained programming overnight."
"To a geezer who has been 'out of the loop' for a very
long time, much of this sounds like touchy-feely,
PC bullshit. When did we cease responding to customers'
urgent requests for assistance and when did our Training
outfit cease to be 'customer-focused? What genius decided
that our business objective was demonstrating
'environmental leadership' rather than designing, building
and supporting the finest transport category aircraft in the
world? With such apparent confusion over a candid,
unambiguous mission statement among the leadership, is it
any wonder that the troops are confused and demoralized
or that things aren't getting done on time? I'm almighty
glad to be retired. Indeed, neither of us would have fit
comfortably into what that outfit has become; we were
too much type A, let's get it done personalities."
"Gee Bob, you're on a roll!! .... I wouldn't have
expected Carson or Bogue or any of our 'leaders' to
highlight all the bad. I would like to think those
responsible for the "bad", however, will be held
accountable...but I doubt it."
"I know the guy who wrote this quite well, Bob Bogash,
have known him for probably 40 years and he has a unique
window to see what is going on at the company today, and
he tells it like it pretty much is. It is worth the time to
read it if you wonder what is happening with the 787
and more importantly, the culture at Boeing today.
Those of you with fond memories of Boeing will be
saddened."
"If you want to understand what has happened to Boeing
in the last 20 years, (I retired in 1990 & things were fine
then) and have an hour of free time, (it's 20 pages long and
I got to pg. 10 the first sitting), take a read of Bob's article
below."
"Read Bogash's attachment (its' overly long, but worth an
hour of your time). I never knew the gentleman or where
he was in the company, but he was somewhere where he
really understood what it took to make a program a
success. Supplier management really hits home - so do the
schedules. So do placing techinical types into top
management positions, even planners, instead of finance
types and humanitarians. But as to what can be done now -
maybe all of those concerned should volunteer to go go
back and bail them out. Are you ready?"
"The 777 program had a culture, as you say, of bringing
ideas up from below, early in the program, to make
adjustments upstream involving suppliers, customers,
FAA and others. The 787 has a culture of paralysis and
indecision. Why is that? An engineer told me this
story. He told his supervisor, 'The supplier I monitor
will not make their delivery date.' 'How do you
know?' 'I've worked on many programs. I know what
to look for. I talk to them on the phone, I've been to
their facility, I know their resources - they won't make
their delivery date.' 'Have they missed a date, yet?'
'No.' 'Tell me when they miss a date.' The engineer
was furious, but he acknowledged the cultural message
inherent in his supervisor's attitude. I told this story to
senior 787 management. Their immediate reaction was,
'Give me the name of the supervisor!' I said, no partly
because I had no idea who the supervisor was, but mostly
because they had missed my point. The supervisor did
what he did because he was a smart guy. He knew that
the engineer's information was an invitation for career
damage. Suppose the supervisor accepted the report.
The business model has no structure for acting on that
information. The business model assumes success. The
business model is based on contractual commitments
between Boeing and the supplier. In the 787 business
model, the supervisor has no recourse, even if be
accepts the advance warning from the engineer.
~ ~~
Similarly, the second level supervisor has no recourse.
Even the program leaders I was talking to had no
recourse, in the 787 business model, to act on
information about pending problems. The 787 business
model has no room for coordination costs. That's the
whole point of the 787 business model. Write a
contract. Give them their performance specifications.
Snap the parts together. This will quickly create a
culture of indecision and paralysis. To this day,
engineers express frustration that the changes required
now fall to them at Boeing, requiring duplication of effort,
rework, and redesign. Even so, the computer tracking
systems, decision-making processes and lines of authority
have never been shifted to Boeing - everything is done on
an ad hoc basis, and takes many times the effort and
expense that it should. The fundamental business model
has never been changed, and the culture it breeds cannot
change in isolation. In the 777 program, change and
authority and relationships were built into the
program's culture. The 777 business model put Boeing
in a decision-making position, and the other
stakeholders were involved in close coordination. The
777 business model said, 'Let's get all the coordination
costs in, upstream, where they are manageable and
cheap.' That business model promoted a working
together culture. The 787 business model assigned
authority and responsibility to suppliers. We gave them
inadequate direction, poor oversight, no feedback, and
let them fail at great cost. Now, we are paying the
coordination costs downstream where they are messy,
expensive and slow. The business model determines
the program's culture. Outsourcing is not the issue,
exactly. The program will work if it can do 3 things:
1 Produce the best possible plan,
2 Build in awareness of progress to the plan (meeting
schedule, as you say) or timely awareness of
deviation from the plan, and
3 Reallocate resources to get back on plan.
These conditions all require a capable and effective
technical design and manufacturing community. The
787 business model failed in all three. Predictably. The
777 program succeeded in all three. Both had a lot of
outsourcing, although the 787 has a lot more
outsourcing. Personally, I think all three requirements
represent vertical integration, and they argue for less
outsourcing rather than more."
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2009 in ney, er 2010, is rethinking the global outsourcing model that ctural
Dreamli Chari critics say has caused much of the nearly two-year logic"
ner man holdup. The company is making plans to bring more employ
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Busines The The Failed 'Hollywood' Model: Union officials say past enterpri
s Week Boeing executives at Boeing used Hollywood as a model as they se
(Joseph Compa developed their plans to outsource production on the architec
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Weber) ny. 787. Moviemakers bring together independent ture for
Scott contractors-actors, camera operators, publicists--on further
Carson a project basis for many films, avoiding the expenses of modular
, CEO having all such staffers constantly on the payroll. By ization.
Boeing treating planes as such projects, advocates of
Comm outsourcing figured they could do the same in
ercial producing aircraft. 'It turns out that we're not the
Airpla motion picture industry,' quips Stan Sorscher, legislative
nes. director of the SPEEA. He says staffers and project
teams are not easily interchangeable in manufacturing
products as complex as jets.
Chief Executive W. James McNerney Jr., who took the
helm at Boeing in mid-2005, inherited the aggressive
outsourcing approach from prior CEOs. He appears to
be amenable to dialing it back, if needed. McNerney
would not be available to discuss his plans, a company
spokesman said. However, in his interview with Aviation
Week, commercial planes unit chief Carson said the CEO
IMcNerneyj had 'concerns' about 'the deals we had
done in the supply chain.' Added Carson: 'The fact
that we're struggling with it now verifies that his
concern was valid."'
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Manage Watanabe will become vice chairman. Toyoda, the 52- exogeno
rs" year-old grandson of founder Kiichiro Toyoda, will us
(Alan have to stanch the carmaker's sales slump as it forecasts crisis.
Ohnsma the first operating loss in 71 years. He may curb the
n and expansion strategy that allowed the company to top
Naoko General Motors Corp. in sales for the first time last year.
Fujimur 'This kind of move is rare for an old-line company like
a) Toyota and very refreshing,' said Koichi Ogawa, who
helps oversee $28 billion at Daiwa SB Investments Ltd. in
Tokyo. 'The new management is going to break the
past hierarchies.' Honorary Chairman Shoichiro
Toyoda, Akio's 83-year-old father, and Adviser Hiroshi
Okuda, 76, may step down from Toyota's board,
Chairman Fujio Cho said on Jan. 20. Paul Nolasco, a
Toyota spokesman, declined to comment on any changes
in management. Toyota's American depositary receipts
fell $5.80, or 8.6 percent, to $61.72 at 1:34 p.m. in New
York Stock Exchange composite trading. The ADRs lost
32 percent of their value in the 12 months through
yesterday.
'His Own Team'
'It's not that different than what would happen with a
big company in the U.S.,' said Maryann Keller, an
. .......... .................
independent auto analyst and consultant in Greenwich,
Connecticut. 'A new CEO wants to put together his
own team.' Toyoda's challenges include reversing last
year's 15 percent sales drop in the U.S., for decades the
automaker's main source of profit, even as companies and
analysts cut their 2009 outlooks. Auto sales may fall to
between 10 million and 10.5 million this year, the lowest
level in 27 years, from 13.2 million in 2008, according to
IHS Global Insight, a Lexington, Massachusetts-based
market forecaster. Toyota's total sales last year fell for
the first time in 10 as the global recession and tighter
credit decimated vehicle demand worldwide. The
economic slowdown has prompted the company and
Japanese rivals including Honda Motor Co. and Nissan
Motor Co. to cut jobs and production and driven Detroit
automakers GM and Chrysler LLC to seek government aid
to stay in business.
Production Cuts
Toyoda also must find ways to utilize plants opened in
North America since 2006 that have given the company
too much production capacity in the region as overseas
sales declined 4 percent to 6.82 million last year. Toyota
last week announced broad production cuts affecting
all U.S. and Canadian auto-assembly and engine
factories through the end of the current quarter. Last
month, the company indefinitely suspended construction
of a plant in Blue Springs, Mississippi, that was to start
making Prius hybrids in 2010. The company's sales
slipped by 4 percent to total 8.97 million vehicles in 2008.
That compared with GM's 8.35 million. Toyota in
December forecast an operating loss of 150 billion yen
($1.7 billion) in the year ending March 31. That compares
with a previous profit forecast of 600 billion yen. Next
fiscal year will be worse, as the yen strengthens against the
dollar and the U.S. market continues to shrink, analysts
said.
Focus on Customers
Toyoda will focus on customers and spend as much time
as possible on the company's production and sales, he said
earlier this month. 'I want to be president closest to the
site,' Toyoda said in Tokyo on Jan. 20. 'I'll try to make
changes without being tied down by the past.'"
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27 Bloomb Firm a "'Boeing has been trying to put a rather upbeat face on On a
Jan. erg, the reality of the market, and I think they're behind modular
2009 "Boeing the curve,' said Jon Kutler, chairman of Admiralty enterpri
Recover Partners Inc., a Los Angeles-based investment firm that se
y May focuses on closely held aerospace companies. 'It's going architec
be to be a tough year.' ture's
Stunted non-
as 'Operationally, 2009 will be a much better year than systemi
Custom 2008,' said William Alderman, president of Alderman & c
ers Co. Capital, a broker dealer specializing in aerospace and understa
Clamor defense in South Norwalk, Connecticut. 'But financially, nding of
for we are in the midst of a deep global recession, and the its
Credit" financing sector is in pretty bad shape.' Boeing shares problem
(Susann still may be attractive if the company meets its s.
a Ray) development goals with the 787 and other delayed
programs and ships as many or more planes than in
2008, Alderman said. The company's average 12-month
target price is $48.71 in a Bloomberg survey of 14
analysts. 'There are troubles on the horizon for
Boeing, but they're not operational or technological,
they're purely financial," said Alderman, who doesn't
own Boeing stock. 'Long-term, I'm wildly optimistic for
Boeing.'"
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n) Today's conference call needs to go beyond the norm, investor
Barclays Capital analyst Joseph Campbell said in an s.
analysts report. Boeing must make an extra effort to
clarify what's happening with its financials, he said.
The company suspended financial guidance during the
Machinists strike last year. 'This hiatus has left the
investment community in the dark about much more
than the strike,' he said. Shareholders have more
unanswered questions than any time in recent memory,
Campbell said. The company typically gives guidance
about the current year and the following year about this
time, Campbell said. It should also provide insight on
why the production and delivery rates are what they
are, especially given lower demand for travel and
requirements for aircraft, he said. Investors have
numerous questions on the 787, which has had four
schedule slips and a two-year delay, Campbell said.
They want a road map of milestones that must be met on
the 787's first flight, scheduled dates of delivery of each
test aircraft to the flight test program and milestones for
. ... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ...
certification, he said. They also want details of the
planned production ramp-up for the 787-8 and how the
current schedule compares with the original one and with
the last revised one, he said. That way, it is 'transparent
whether and when Boeing is planning to recover to
previous delivery commitments,' Campbell said. Boeing
also has been quiet about the impact of the 787
program on its financials, he said. 'With the 787
program now two years late, it is clearly overrunning
its cost targets, it has significant penalties to customers,
and we feel it is time for Boeing to shed more light on
what is going on with the 787 costs and how the 787 is
affecting the overall Boeing financials,' he said."
28 Forbes, Firm- a "Airplanes don't have rear-view mirrors, and neither, On the
Jan. "Investo Investo it seems to investors in aircraft makers. Boeing offered investor
2009 rs Look r an expectedly weak fourth-quarter earnings report on s'
into Wednesday, but its shares rose after the company systemi
Boeings offered a reassuring view of its future. 'It was a c over-
' Future relatively neutral performance compared to what was confide
(Carl anticipated,' said Paul Nisbit of JSA Research, referring nce in
Gutierre to the fourth quarter, 'but it's history now, and it looks their
z) like everything else is going to go along according to investm
plan.' The aerospace and defense firm's performance over ent.
the final three months of 2008 was defined by a labor
strike, which the company said led to passenger and cargo
jet deliveries falling by more than a half. But even though
Wall Street was fully aware of the strike, the Chicago-
based company's 27.4% drop in sales was still short of
analyst expectations. In addition to crippling deliveries,
Boeing also blamed the 58-day machinists strike, which
ended in early November, for the quarter's loss, because of
an estimated $1.09 per share charge it produced. Boeing
also had a hefty--and unexpected--61 cents per share
charge because of changes it had to make to its 747 line
after finding its structure wasn't strong enough. There
were other charges too, Boeing said, like a legal reserve
that cost nine cents per share. Boeing's 2009 outlook
range of $5.05 to $5.35 per share was also well short of
Wall Street's prediction of $5.68 per share. Its sales
outlook of $68.0 billion to $69.0 billion is inline with
expectations. Even though the outlook is well below
expectations, the market was forgiving because the
forecast includes $1.10 per share worth of one-time items.
'There are added pension and retirement costs, as well
as others, which no one expected six months ago,'
Nisbet said, who expects Wall Street to come down to
Boeing's range."
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Transcri The On the topic of development programs, let me first talk us
pt Boeing about the 747-8. The work statement on this airplane has events.
Compa expanded since the start of the program to meet
ny performance commitments to our customers, and to
recover from our original underestimation of the scope
of engineering work that needed to be done on this
airplane. The resulting design changes, which have been
substantial, coupled with limited availability of
engineering resources to do the work, drove the schedule
change we announced in November. Since then, a full
assessment of the supply chain impact of these and other
additional design changes, along with increased pension
costs, resulted in the reach-forward loss we recognized
in the fourth quarter. James will talk more about this
charge in a moment.
I'm disappointed that we weren't able to provide you
insight on this charge sooner, but our full assessment
was only completed earlier this week. I'm also
disappointed with the outcome. But let me say one more
thing. Notwithstanding the challenges this program has
presented us, we still believe the 747-8 is a very
competitive airplane with a strong future in a
significant market niche. It is worthy of investment and
will provide great value for our customers.
Turning to the 787, that program made notable progress
in 2008, including Power On in June, successful tests of
the landing gear, horizontal stabilizers and wing box, and
high pressurization of the static airframe. The FAA also
approved the 787 maintenance program. In spite of that
progress, however, we also endured challenges, including
delays from the machinists' strike and the requirement to
replace certain fasteners, all of which resulted in the
revised schedule we announced in December.
The fastener replacement activity is moving along and is
largely behind us on the first two flight test airplanes. We
are on track for first flight in the second quarter. Prior
to that, we will be exercising a series of gauntlet tests
during which we run the airplane systems on the ground as
if it were flying. After those tests and the ground vibration
test on airplane number two, it's all about getting airplanes
in the air and successfully completing the flight test and
certification process.
We also continue to make progress with our 787 program
partners to improve the condition of assembly of airplanes
coming into our Everett factory. Our main focus now is
working with the supply chain to get the production
system into a rhythm and [rather] work back to normal
I
levels. As we've mentioned before, our plans call for
reaching a production rate of ten airplanes per month in
2012, and we will evaluate possibilities to increase
and/or accelerate that rate.
We are having ongoing discussions with our customers on
how the delays and the current business environment are
affecting their business models, and what steps we can
take to constructively mitigate the impact. The 787
backlog remains high at about 900 airplanes. Although we
booked 93 new orders in 2008, we do expect some puts
and takes on 787 orders in 2009, with one customer's
orders for 15 787s late in the next decade coming off the
books this week. Despite a modest level of orders chum,
we are confident in the long-term value of the 787 for
our customers.
To address what has clearly been unsatisfactory
development program performance at BCA, Scott
Carson and I have undertaken a fundamental
realignment and strengthening of the BCA
organization, its processes and leadership. We are
reintroducing rigorous functional discipline with clear
lines of sight and accountability, and tighter integration
of program, business unit and corporate decision
making. We both believe it's time to end the era where
development programs were stood up to operate as
islands of their own.
While this structure served a purpose to foster the kind
of tremendous innovation like the 787, our recent
experience has shown it to do so at the expense of
execution and predictable performance. Our objective
is to advance a new era and operating model
characterized by seamless integration of business unit
and corporate functions, reliable and disciplined
execution, and responsible and accountable program
leadership.
More specifically, late last year we substantially
reorganized BCA to strengthen airplane programs and
supply chain management. We put all airplane
programs together in one organization under Pat
Shanahan to allow for more disciplined and efficient
management of program resources. Notwithstanding
this change, Pat will continue to own the 787 until its
introduction; though we continue to add leadership to the
program most notably Scott Fancher, the new program
leader, who comes to us from managing some of the more
difficult, technical and supply chain programs in IDS.
We also elevated the supply chain management
function and we consolidated within it management of
both internal and external suppliers under Ray
Conner. With Scott's leadership, Ray and Pat are
working closely together to improve both development
program performance, and overall operational
performance and productivity at BCA. We will be
taking the results of their work and additional measures
to further strengthen the team and the operating model
will be critical to our success in 2009 and beyond.
Now, despite the significant challenges we faced in 2008,
there were many areas of the business that performed very
well. Virtually all of our production and services programs
in both defense and commercial are executing to plan or
better. Programs like the FA-18, the 737, commercial
services and defense support systems, to name just a few,
are providing customer value and delivering strong
double digit margins.
There are also many development programs, like GMD,
FCS and the 777 freighter, that are achieving both
technical and financial milestones according to plan. As
we begin 2009, a year that no doubt will test us again,
we are reassured by the fact that our fundamental product
and services strategy and competitiveness remain intact.
Fundamentally, this is a solid company with a strong
growing core business.
While it's hard for us to know the final impact of all of
this, we can and must prepare for the continued market
uncertainty, while ensuring our ability to fund our growth
initiatives. In that regard, we have stepped up our drive to
get more competitive and productive. We are being ever
more aggressive in managing both costs and investments.
Specific actions we are taking include streamlining
organizational structures, reducing discretionary and
capital spending, eliminating unnecessary work, and
reviewing staffing levels, all to drive higher levels of
productivity. Part of that, unfortunately, will mean reduced
employment in certain areas of the company. We are
targeting these reductions to exceed 6% of our current
workforce, or approximately 10,000 positions to
support our productivity efforts and infrastructure
reduction. This will occur through a combination of
attrition, retirements, reduction in some contract labor, and
layoffs. While difficult decisions must be made, we will
do as much as we can to assist our employees who are
affected by them.
Despite this challenging environment, our backlog is
holding. In 2008, we had but six order cancellations at
BCA and accommodated about 110 aircraft deferrals. The
deferrals represent about 3% of our commercial backlog,
which is not out of the norm. We do expect to see an
increase in the numbers of deferral and cancellations in
2009. However, the size, diversity and quality of our
backlog provides greater flexibility than we've had in the
past to accommodate our customers.
. .. ................................. ........
As you all know, the financing environment also remains
challenging. Boeing Capital regularly examines overall
financing capacity as well as specific financing sources for
each aircraft to be delivered by BCA. In 2009, we believe
financing sources are sufficient to meet expected
requirements for our products. We are assuming in our
guidance that BCC will need to do about $1 billion of new
financing in 2009. The actual amount could be more or
less, but we feel will be in a range that's manageable.
Let me summarize by reiterating that we are indeed facing
one of the more difficult commercial and financing
markets that most of us have ever seen. However, we have
a solid foundation from which to work through this
environment with half our business in defense, strong
commercial products and a large backlog. Equally
important is the fact that the actions we are taking now
are not business as usual.
Looking forward this year, our 2009 EPS and cash flow
guidance prudently balances pension and other cost
headwinds with an aggressive productivity plan, while
recognizing both operational and market uncertainties.
James Bell (Boeing):
Thank you, Jim, and good morning. I will begin with our
2008 results on slide four. Revenue for the year was $60.9
billion, which was down 8% from a year ago. Results were
impacted by the strike, which reduced commercial
deliveries by about 105 airplanes and revenue by an
estimated $6.4 billion. Earnings per share was $3.71, and
was impacted by an estimated $1.63 per share due to the
strike. Operating cash flow for the year was a use of $400
million, reflecting the strike impact of about 2.5 billion
and planned inventory buildup on the 787.
Now let's take a look at the fourth quarter performance on
slide five. Revenue of $12.7 billion was down 27% from
the prior year. The strike reduced fourth quarter revenue
by an estimated $4.3 billion and commercial deliveries by
about 70 airplanes, including the recovery of the galley-
delayed deliveries from the third quarter.
Earnings per share was a loss of $0.08, driven by the strike
impact of an estimated $1.09 per share, the 747 charge of
$0.61 per share and a litigation related reserve of $0.09
per share.
Now let me talk about BCA in a little more detail on slide
six. Commercial Airplanes fourth quarter revenue of $4.6
billion reflects an estimated $4.3 billion strike impact.
Operating margins were significantly impacted by both the
strike and the 747 charge. The 747 reach-forward loss
was $685 million. Late maturity of the 747-8 design
drove substantial changes for our supply partners. This
coupled with the already existing schedule pressure
caused significant disruption throughout the supply
chain resulting in the charge we took this quarter.
Now, about 50% of the charge is related to the late
maturity of wing design driving new load requirements
into the fuselage and statement of work changes for our
suppliers, causing both schedule disruption and increased
recurring production costs. Approximately 15% is related
to later than planned transition of component
manufacturing to lower cost suppliers due to their
production readiness. Another 10% is due to design and
load changes, which resulted in reduced commonality
with the 747-400 causing some of the procured
components and systems inventory to be obsolete. 10% is
the impact to our internal production process as a result of
the issues facing our supply chain. The remaining 15% is
due to, as Jim mentioned earlier, the higher pension costs
in our program accounting cost base.
Earlier this week, we concluded our detailed analysis of
these impacts and recorded the charge. For the year, BCA
delivered 375 airplanes and captured 669 gross orders,
ending the year with a backlog of $279 billion. This
backlog continues to reflect the strength in the market
demand for our commercial product portfolio.
For the year, IDS delivered a solid 10.1% margin on
$32 billion of revenue, as all its business segments
delivered outstanding performance that help offset the
AEW&C charge from second quarter. IDS continues to
pursue growth opportunities through targeted acquisitions.
During the quarter we completed the acquisition of
Federated Software and Digital Receiver Technology.
Now let's turn to slide eight and talk about our backlog. As
Jim mentioned, our backlog is at unprecedented levels. In
the current market environment, we expect some of the
backlog will get deferred to a later date or canceled. But
the size of our order book provides us much greater
leverage and flexibility than we've had in prior economic
downturns. If deliveries move out, we have more
opportunities to move other deliveries forward. It also
provides us a solid foundation to continue improving
productivity and financial performance.
Other and unallocated costs declined during the quarter,
primarily due to lower pension and environmental
expenses. Within the unallocated segment, we recorded a
reserve of approximately $0.09 per share related to
satellite litigation.
Now let me turn to our pension plan performance in 2008.
The overall equity market performance significantly
affected our pension plan funded status. Our asset
returns were down about 15% in 2008. The strategy we
implemented last year to reduce volatility in our net
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pension obligations has paid off. Transitioning our assets
from a high equity concentration to more fixed income
assets matched with our liabilities, resulted in substantially
better performance than the overall equity markets.
Since the third quarter discount rates have turned down
sharply which has increased our pension liability. Our
discount rate at year end was 6.1%. The company's
pension plans are now 83% funded on a financial
accounting basis, down from 110% funding at the end of
2007. This resulted in an equity adjustment of
approximately $8 billion in the fourth quarter, which
produced a negative book equity as of year-end. This
accounting adjustment will not impact our ability to pay
dividends or comply with our debt covenants.
Now let's turn to slide ten and discuss cash flow. During
2008 we used $400 million of operating cash flow
reflecting the strike and planned working capital increases.
During the year, we also paid down about $700 million of
debt at Boeing Capital, used about $900 million for eight
targeted acquisitions and used $2.9 billion to buy back 42
million shares.
Now let's turn to slide 11. Despite the significant
challenges we faced last year, our financial position
remains solid. We ended the year with $3.6 billion in cash
and marketable securities, and we reduced our debt loads.
However, because of the strike and development
program delays, we ended the year with a cash balance
that was lower than in prior years.
Turning to slide 12, our financial guidance reflects good
performance at our businesses in an uncertain market
environment. We're setting 2009 EPS guidance at $5.05 to
$5.35 per share. Our 2009 revenue guidance is $68
billion to $69 billion, and includes the 787 and the 747-
8 schedules announced in fourth quarter.
Our baseline assumption is that in-production
commercial airplane programs remain at stable
delivery levels over the next several years. However,
our financial guidance does consider risk around
operational performance and market uncertainties,
including the risk of potentially having to take modest
production cuts at BCA.
We expect first quarter revenue, earnings per share and
cash flow to be the lowest of this year based on timing of
volume and deliveries. Our 2009 commercial delivery
forecast is between 480 and 485 airplanes. We expect
higher levels in 2010 as we begin delivering our 787s.
Our 2009 operating cash flow guidance is greater than
$2.5 billion. This assumes continued inventory buildup on
our development programs and an assumption that BCC
will need to provide new aircraft financing of about $1
I
billion.
Now we will leverage our new aircraft financing with debt
so the impact to our cash balance will be significantly less
than the amount of airplane financing. For 2009, pension
funding is assumed to be approximately $500 million.
Mandatory funding in 2009 and 2010 is expected to be less
than $100 million in each year. Future year's required
funding will increase, unless markets rebound
significantly. For example, in 2011 if markets don't
recover, requirements could be in the range of a couple of
billion dollars.
Total company pension expense is expected to be about $1
billion in 2009. Our forecast reflects the actual 2008 asset
returns, a 6.1% discount rate and a long-term expected rate
of return of 8%, which is 25 basis points lower than our
assumption last year. The business units will be
recognizing greater pension expense than they have in the
past. Essentially all the $1 billion of pension expense in
2009 will be recorded at the units. IDS will realize about
half of the expense, and we expect a portion of that to be
reimbursable under government contracts in 2009.
We expect total unallocated expense to be approximately
$900 million in 2009, with other segment expense
forecasted to be approximately $300 million. R&D
expense is forecasted to be between $3.6 billion and $3.8
billion, reflecting the 787 and the 747 program delays
announced in the fourth quarter. We're not forecasting any
supplier cost sharing payments in 2009. We expect R&D
expense to decrease substantially in 2010.
Share repurchase will decrease significantly in 2009 to
approximately 200 million, which will offset dilution
from our compensation plans. We are forecasting total
capital expenditures to be $1.4 billion in 2009, which is
nearly 20% lower than in recent years as we manage down
discretionary spending.
Now let me turn to slide 13 to discuss how we will bridge
our 2008 performance to our 2009 guidance. In 2008, we
had significant impacts from the strike and charges
that we don't expect to incur in 2009. Overall, pension
expense will be higher by about $300 million. We realized
deferred compensation income in 2008 due to lower stock
prices. We expect to recognize expense this year as the
markets improve. Because of lower cash balances and
short-term interest rates that are close to zero, we are
forecasting significantly less interest income in 2009.
BCA is realizing greater cost absorption on existing
programs because of the strike and development
program delays offset by the business's aggressive
pursuit of infrastructure cost reductions that Jim
talked about earlier. Our 2009 guidance also considers
all of this, plus the operational and marketplace
uncertainties. We plan to provide 2010 financial guidance
later this year as we continue to evaluate the impact of
market uncertainties on our business.
Jim McNerney:
Thank you, James. To close, let me simply say that despite
progress and strong performance in many areas, we were
not satisfied with our results in what was a very
challenging 2008. For 2009 and beyond, our driving focus
is on improving execution where we have been
underperforming, bolstering productivity across our long
list of programs that are performing well and preserving
financial strength to deliver growth through this difficult
economic climate.
While recognizing the risks at hand, we do feel we are
relatively well positioned with the fundamental
competitive strength of our product and services, the size
and diversity of our backlog, and the long-term outlook for
the markets we serve. I remain optimistic about this
company's future and our ability to become the
strongest, best and best integrated aerospace company
in the world.
Ron Epstein (Bank ofAmerica/Merrill Lynch):
Jim, just a follow-up on your comments on how you are
changing the product development process. You
suggested that the programs can't be islands any more.
Can you give us some more color on there? Because it
almost seems like what happened on 787 cascaded into
747-8, and in the past it doesn't seem like program
development was as big an issue as it's become.
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
I think Boeing went through an era where creating
islands in the name of innovation and entrepreneurship
during a period, end of last decade, beginning of this
where we needed entrepreneurship and innovation,
was a very successful strategy. But I think as we look
back on it, we waited too long to move as the
requirement for execution around this innovation. We
took too long to move back into a model that integrated
functions that spanned the entire business that had
disciplines, that allocated people most effectively, that
shared best practices across programs. We waited too
long to move back to that model.
Now organizational, there are horses for courses and
organizational models fit different times, different
places. We are at a place where execution of supply chain
and development are fundamental and we need to move to
an organization that is single mindedly designed to do that.
That's the discussion we've had internally. Those are
the moves you began to see at the end of last year. There
will be more to come. There are tighter processes, review
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and approval processes, around those. But it's all about
execution and accountability, and leveraging the skills and
size that we have as a company.
Ron Epstein:
So what do you have to change I guess?
Jim McNerney:
As I mentioned, we have -- to use an aerospace term, we
have cored up our supply chain and development teams in
BCA. We have reintegrated the engineering function
more tightly into both the supply chain and the
development programs. The supply chain and
engineering were in the name of creating entrepreneurial
programs which were somewhat isolated from other
programs. Now they have to be tightly integrated and we
also have review processes that are more, shall we say,
more often and harder hitting.
Dour Harned (Sanford Bernstein):
On the 787, when you look at the flight test program that's
planned, as it has been, it's a shorter flight test program
than we've seen in the past. I know that's predicated on
more integrated system testing and advanced and also
more parallel flight test work. Could you talk about the
timing of when you are likely to see flight test units two,
three, four, and what you need to have out there in
order to make sure you can deliver on that timeframe?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
Doug, this is Jim. Obviously, getting the first two airplanes
completed and into the program on the timing that we've
talked about is step one and we are feeling comfortable
with the timing around those. As we mentioned, some of
the rework is largely -- the rework on those airplanes is
largely completed. The software integration is moving I
would characterize it as normally. We're integrating the
systems with real pilots on real airplanes, and we're getting
ready for the groundwork now. So we're feeling
comfortable there.
The next two airplanes are on schedule. You are right. It is
a tight schedule on paper, although as you know we've
been able to get a lot of work done. One of the benefits, I
guess you would say of, the delay, a lot of the systems
work done, and some certification work done earlier,
which gives us a little bit of a tailwind. Just to specifically
answer your question, the schedule has all six of the
airplanes being in the air within four months of the first
airplane being in the air, and it sort of comes out every few
weeks from the first airplane. We see no reason to say
that that schedule is not on track.
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen and Conmany):
Yes, thank you very much. IATA is, as you probably
know, forecasting a 3% traffic decline this year. What sort
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of risk do you see to your out-year delivery schedules?
Could you explain a bit more -- you talked about the
accrual rates assume the schedules are flat, but you have a
risk provision for lower rates. Are you assuming it flat or
lower rates? I guess I was a little confused by that.
James Bell (Boeing):
Cai, let me take a shot, and then Jim can jump in. So the
baseline assumption in our operating plan is that these
rates will stay stable throughout the planning period.
The reason for that is obviously we're under contract to
deliver airplanes that would require the stable rates in
order to meet those obligations. Now, we also said in our
guidance, we've taken in consideration operational and
market uncertainty, and so we have tried to provide for
this, although we think '09 is pretty stable, and I think
you'd probably agree it is also, but the out years are less
certain. There is no question about things which could
happen as the backlog moves around, and so we've tried to
provide in our '09 guidance the eventuality if some of that
does happen. But it won't impact our ability to make this
guidance, because we're not naive to the fact that even
though we have it in the backlog and under contract that
there can be some uncertainties out there that could cause
that to move.
Jim McNerney:
I think the only thing I would add, Cai, because you'd
probably want some more definition around that knowing
you. But it really is hard to predict. We've made a
modest assumption in here. But as you know, until you
understand timing, model mix, derivative timing, it's very
hard to come up with a specific kind of assessment. So
we've made a general, modest, should we say, sort of
provision in our guidance.
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
James, I know there are different ways to account for
the 787 delay, and its costs. I am aware these can
include discounts on 777s and zero margin 767, so I'm
going to approach the question from a different tact. If
I were a Board member of Boeing asking you for an
estimate of the all-in costs of the 787 between R&D,
customer penalty payments, supplier support
payments, discounts on other aircraft, everything, will
the 787 cost to Boeing, does it range about $15 billion,
$20 billion, $25 billion? Can you help us just round to
the nearest $5 billion? Thanks.
James Bell (Boeing):
No, if you were a Board member you would be an
insider, and we'd tell you exactly what the number is,
Heidi, in terms of what our thinking and assumption is.
But I think the best way to characterize it is we are
working closely with our customers. We are doing better. I
bet it's early yet than what we've assumed we would do
.. . .. .....
using all of what you said as ways to come to a way that
deals with the customer needs, while maintaining a
business case for Boeing that continues to have us
believe this plane will bring value to the company and
also deliver value to our customers. But you know we
can't get into specific numbers.
Heidi Wood:
A range of $5 billion is not specific. You can't give us
any kind of a range just so we can have an outside
sense as to what this could cost?
James Bell:
No, but let me just say this. When you think about the
87 and its introduction, as compared to other airplane
models and other new introductions we've done in the
past, we've sold almost a thousand of these airplanes,
and obviously you know in terms of a profitability
assessment of new products the most difficult
assumption is that of market. Here even though this
market has some risk, it's a lot lower than we've done
in the past. The fact that we do have the stability of
about a thousand units, we'll be able to work all these
issues over time and be able to, I think, work them to a
point that's satisfactory to both us and our customer
sets. The same holds true with the productivity on the
airplane being able to set the production rates for an
extended period of time having sold so many planes
that we still believe, and we do this assessment every
quarter that this airplane is going to deliver value to
our customers and to us. But I can't get into
specifically the cost elements, Heidi.
Heidi Wood:
Okay. Then maybe one you can give us color on. Can you
maybe then break us down the $2.5 billion cash drain on
the strike? That was pretty remarkable. How does that
compare versus prior strike cash impact, James?
James Bell:
I think that the strike had a lot to do with the amount of
advance payments we would've gotten on the 787, so
those moved. Also some of the development issues that
moved the schedule caused that issue as well as the 747-8.
But all the production models obviously moved. Now at
the early stage of the strike, our customers were still
paying advances, so we had to true that up.
Joe Nadol (JPMorgan):
I'd like to get just a clarification, and as well as question,
James. To clarify, could you help us with what the unit
margin assumption that's baked into the BCA number
for 2009 is relative to the 10% program? On the
question, Jim, just on the 47-8 can you walk us through
the cost benefit analysis you went through looking at
the program as to why you are still going forward with
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it and all components of it? There's the $685 million
charge. There's obviously a lot of R&D, and there's the
cash that you are going to be out in the next couple of
years that you are recovering at the end of the program. So
significant costs on this debt aren't sunk yet. Just
wondering why you are still going forward with the
program.
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Let me answer the second part while James gets set for the
unit cost question. Look, obviously, we have applied a
judgment here that says we have a very competitive
airplane here that has already got a good start on
orders. If we didn't believe that the revenues would
outweigh the costs, you are right, we wouldn't go
forward with it. I suppose if the airplane didn't have
the margin of competitiveness that we see on both the
freighter and the passenger side right now, we would
stop it. But we are committed to customers who value
this plane highly, and when you add it all up we still see a
viable business proposition here. Now, obviously, if we
ever got to the point where we didn't, we'd have to
work with our customers to come up with a different
answer. But that's not what we see right now.
Joe Nadol:
Okay. Did you bake in, in your cost benefit analysis
significant orders in addition to the 114 that are in
backlog that will be more profitable at the end?
Jim McNernev:
We did assume, like in most programs, where you've got
900 orders out of the chute. Most programs, if you look
through our history, have many, many fewer orders, more
are characterized sort of at the level of the 747-8. You
typically assume an accounting quantity that reflects your
view of reality, which is in general more than the actual
bookings you have at that time, and it's that kind of
thinking that we're applying to this 47-8 right now.
But, Joe, the accounting quantity is relatively conservative,
and we've contacted units outside of this current
accounting quantity. So we still think that this airplane
is going to deliver value to us.
Robert Stallard (Macquarie Research):
Jim, just a quick question on the deferrals. You said we
could expect deferrals to increase this year. Could give us
an idea of the scale of these. At what point you would
start to be concerned that this would have a negative
impact on your production forecast for 2010?
Jim McNerney (Boeing):
As I mentioned, it's very hard to predict the deferrals we're
going to see. I think our sense of it comes as we talk to our
customers, who we talk to every day, is that they will be
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greater next year than they were this past year. I don't
think the noise level are such that we think it will
impact production rates in the near term. If we did,
we'd have a different assumption on production rates
than we do. So we see the deferrals being handled within
the overbookings that we've got now or the ability to just
to move things around to accommodate different airlines
as they face their own business challenges. Remember
these airlines have taken out huge amounts of capacity,
most of them, largely older airplanes and so the airplanes
they are buying from us and our competitor aren't net
adds. In many cases they involve net decreases. So it's not
inconceivable that the way we see it is the right way to see
it.
Dominic Gates (Seattle Times):
On the 747, you've said that you're committed to the
program and you don't see cancellation of it. But I
want to ask about the passenger version. You were
expecting an order on that. You haven't got it. Given
that the airlines almost universally for this year ahead
are saying no growth. Do you expect to get a passenger
version order this year? Does going ahead with the
program depend on the passenger version?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Obviously, orders in general are under pressure and we are
assuming our orders will be down this year. We do have a
number of discussions we're having on the passenger
version of the 747-8. Exactly when they'll be converted in
this environment, it's hard to predict. Our assessment is
that both the cargo and the pax versions will be
buyable business propositions and add a lot of value to
our customers.
Obviously, we are in an environment now where the future
is really hard to predict specifically. So our call now is that
this is a terrific airplane that represents i good business for
us and we are confident that it will come. We'll keep
reading it with our customers as we go forward though.
Lynn Lunsford (Wall Street Journal):
Okay. I guess where I am getting is just trying to get a
little more color on that given where you see kind of the
overall economy, I think people who don't follow
aerospace may look at Boeing's plans to essentially
keep your production rates at sort of where they were
last year. Wow, how do they do that? Can you explain
a little better what plays into this that makes aerospace
different from virtually like every other manufacturing
business?
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
Lynn, we have long-term order books with financing
arranged typically 12 to 18 months in advance. We have
significant over-ordering. So I think our business in
some respects is different. But that doesn't mean that
longer term we're immune from fundamental changes
in demand or fundamental changes in the credit
markets, and that's not what we're saying here today.
What we're saying here today is, in this long cycle
business that we're in, we have visibility on the next ten
to 12 months and we feel comfortable with it. We're not
issuing guidance for 2010. We need to read and react and
see what the impact will be longer term. But we are
different in the sense that we do have a little more
visibility over the medium term than a lot of other
companies do.
Lynn Lunsford:
Great. One last question with regard to the 787, where
do you see the [long pole] at this point that did
somehow threaten the schedule that you are already
working on?
Jim McNerney:
I think the only thing that would concern me now, just
answering your question, would be something
unexpected that comes up in flight test. Some anomaly
or some operating characteristics of plane that we would
have to deal with. Now I don't worry that we couldn't deal
with it, but it could impact the schedule. There is a lot
more modeling done these days before these airplanes get
in the air, so you have a higher degree of confidence. But
that the unknown in flight test is a possible long pole in the
tent.
Susanna Ray (Bloomber News):
A UBS survey last week was suggesting that almost a
third of airlines are likely to defer their orders this
year. I think just a few minutes before you were talking
about anticipating a cancellation or deferral impact of
just 2% to 3%. So I am wondering what makes you so
much more optimistic.
Jim McNernev (Boeing):
All I can say is that we're talking to every airline every
day, and we are working through it. As I said, I think we
had modest amount last year, and I think the numbers you
just quoted were last year. We think there will be more this
year and we're comfortable that we can deal with it. If it's
worse than our assumption, we' 11 be back to you.",
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a business environment that will be very difficult for
Boeing going forward. Shares of Boeing hit a floor of
$40 per share during the October/November stock
market collapse. That was before the carnage in the
airline industry became apparent. Since that time,
conditions have only become worse for the group. The
way to survive in such an environment is to cut capacity.
That is not a good thing for Boeing, and why I made it
one of my Top 10 Stocks to Avoid in 2009. Thus far, I
have been dead on with my list that included Delta Air
Lines (NYSE: DAL) and United Airlines (NYSE: UAUA).
Both of those stocks are down big in 2009. Boeing, on the
other hand, has traded flat. In my opinion, the market is
missing something here. Boeing should be down in tandem
with these giant carriers. The fact that it is not, provides
investors an opportunity to sell before the market
catches on to the weakness. Wednesday Boeing
announced poor fourth-quarter results. The company
posted a loss of $56 million, or 8 cents per share in the
period. Analysts had expected the company to make a
profit of 78 cents per share. This is a big miss made
worse with a weak forecast for 2009. The company now
expects to make $5.05 to $5.35 per share in 2009. That is
less than the $5.68 per share analysts now estimate. Go
figure. But the stock was up $1 per share on the news.
Can you say inefficient? I can and I will. I would have
expected shares to be down 10% or more on this type
of performance. The real kicker for me is that 2009 is
baked into the cake due to the advance time for orders.
The fact that they are reducing that number is telling and
does not bode well for 2010."
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Transcri establishing our new Spirit Malaysia manufacturing
pt" facility. Spirit Malaysia is on schedule to be operational by
the end of the first quarter of 2009. Spirit Malaysia's initial
focus will be on Airbus products but overtime we'll
provide value to products across the Company. And we'll
add value immediately in 2009. Additionally we
announced and commenced construction of a
manufacturing facility in North Carolina. This new facility
will support Spirit's new business content on the Airbus
A350 XWB. Spirit North Carolina is expected to be
operational in mid 2010. I continue to be pleased with our
performance on the 787 program. Our team continues to
work well with the customer and our suppliers regarding
future production plans. I'll provide you additional
thoughts on the 787 programs later in the presentation.
Now let me provide you with my perspective on the
challenges we faced in 2008. As I've mentioned before,
I'm extremely proud of how the Spirit team planned
and executed our business during the two months
strike by machinists at Boeing. Our internal planning,
partnering with our customers, and working with our
unions representing Spirit employees allowed Spirit to
maintain production while avoiding layoffs and
furloughs. The reduced work week schedule enabled
the Company to execute a balanced approach to
address this difficult situation. This plan successfully
balanced the requirements of our customers, our
suppliers, the employees and shareholders, while
minimizing the impact to our communities and
maintaining the health of our business. I'm proud of our
team's ability to take challenges head on and deliver solid
performance in a non standard business environment.
Pension asset performance and the discount rate also
impacted our results for the fourth quarter and full year
2008. However, as you know our U.S. plan was frozen
when Spirit was formed and pension income and expense
is a non-cash item. The plan remains fully funded at year
end 2008. Now let's talk about some of the specific
accomplishments across the business beginning on slide 3.
All three of our business segments revenues and
operating margins were impacted by both the
machinists' strike at Boeing and the higher projected
pension expense which Rick will discuss in his comments.
Airbus products remained on track and our European
MRO operation is open at the Prestwick facility. And the
previously mentioned Spirit Malaysia facility is planned to
be operational in the first quarter of 2009. Now let me
turn to slide 6 and give you a brief update on the 787. We
delivered aircraft number five in late January and aircraft
number six, the last flight test aircraft is progressing
through the systems installation process. Overall product
quality remains high and we continue to work with the
supply base to enable a smooth production ramp up. We
are continuing to work closely with our customer on
incorporating necessary engineering changes on flight test
aircraft and the first in service aircraft. Our internal efforts
remained focused on productivity improvements and
increased utilization of the capability we have in place. We
expect to restart forward piece of large production later in
2009. Now let me turn it over to Rick who will provide
more details on our financial results and outlook."
Rick Schmidt (Spirit AeroSystems):
"Thanks Jeff and good morning everyone. Slide 15
provides further details on our U.S. defined benefit
pension plan in 2008 which you may recall was frozen
at the time of the divestiture from Boeing. At the end of
the year this plan was still more than fully funded with
planned assets at a 110% of planned liabilities. The
funding percentage is down from 157% at year-end 2007,
due to a 23% reduction in planned assets and a 53 basis
point reduction in the discount rate on a respective
measurement dates. Overall Spirit contines to have a
strong fully funded plan. Although, it is still subject to
the same influencing experience by many other
companies."
Jeffrey Turner:
"Thank you Rick. I will wrap up on slide 18 with a few
brief comments. Our core business is performing well,
we're conservatively capitalized, and financially strong.
Our continuous focus is on meeting our customer
commitments as we grow and diversify our business over
the long-term. We're equally as focused on cost
containment and improving profitability. Early in
2008, we implemented processes to limit hiring and
intensified our efforts to improve operational efficiencies.
These efforts are yielding results as we enter into the
uncertain market environment. Overall, given the
challenges we've faced, I am pleased with our 2008
performance and I am confident we're positioned to
support our customer requirements for 2009. In addition
we are doing the necessary contingency planning to
prepare for a range of possible economic outcomes. We
will now be glad to take your questions."
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
"Rick, you just talked about the capitalized development
in inventory, I think it was 235 for the 787, 235 million
and then another 100 plus on other programs. How much
are you amortizing per unit shift on 787?"
Rick Schmidt:
"787, is all being amortized over the first 500 units.
So, it's roughly 1.4 million a copy. And that will be
~*i*
amortized straight line again over those first 500 units."
Heidi Wood (Morran Stanley):
"Jeff, I had a follow-up which is ... I'm just wondering you
talked about the contractual commitments that you had
with the OEMs. I'm just wondering if you've got any kind
of an appetite to talk to them and renegotiate, just given
that the world has changed so substantially. I mean just
given the R&D that you're going to be spending on some
plans where the outlook may be changed, do have much
appetite to do that?"
Jeffrey Turner:
"Well, I think in general Heidi, I think we were open to
negotiations that are appropriate, that's a pretty broad
question I think. I mean clearly we feel good about the
business that we won, the programs that we wanted on,
and we feel very good about the long-term viability of the
market. I think, I mean clearly things have changed in
the short-term here. But we've been very conservative
in the way we manage our business. So, we don't see
anything on the horizon that would put us in a position
where we had to go, renegotiate. So, if it makes sense to
our long-term relationships and short-term needs, we
certainly will. But, nothing really pops to mind that's
having needed to do that at this moment."
5 The James Firm a "Despite its bulging current order book, Boeing showed On a
Feb. Street.c Bell, more signs Thursday that it is being impacted by the modular
2009 om, CFO, global recession. The company said its orders fell 72% in enterpri
"Boeing The January and also disclosed that it may slow production in se
Mulls Boeing 2010. 'Our 2009 financial guidance considers the risk architec
Producti Compa that we might have to make modest production cuts ur's
on ny starting in 2010,' CFO James Bell told an investor focus on
Cuts" conference. It was the first time that Boeing has short
acknowledged the possibility of production cuts, said Scott term-
Hamilton, publisher of an online newsletter that monitors pressure
aircraft manufacturers. 'At last week's earnings call, s,
Boeing was more ambiguous about this,' Hamilton said. resultin
As for January orders, Boeing said it received just 18, g in
down from 65 a year earlier, according to a posting on its unstable
Web site. In his presentation, Bell said that the long-
'weakening global economy (is) adversely affecting air term
traffic growth' and that Boeing is taking steps to address growth.
the problem, including its plan, announced last week, to
reduce its workforce by 6% or 10,000 positions during
2009. Boeing has a backlog of $352 billion, or five times
its annual revenue, including $279 billion in commercial
aircraft orders. When the previous slowdown occurred,
following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the commercial-
aircraft backlog was $83 billion, Bell said. However,
deferrals are increasing after eight cancellations and 110
deferrals in 2008, he said. While most of the 2008
deferrals were from U.S. carriers, who were quick to scale
back growth in the face of high fuel costs, Boeing expects
to see more foreign carriers scale back this year. As an
example of what is happening at airlines, even cargo
00
airlines, UPS said Tuesday that it is reviewing whether to
defer its aircraft deliveries. UPS is scheduled to take
delivery this year of five aircraft -- three 747-400s and two
767-300s, including a 747 it agreed to defer from late 2008
due to the strike against Boeing by the International
Association of Machinists. (UPS also agreed to defer a 767
delivery from 2009 to 2010.) Asked whether UPS might
push back aircraft deliveries, CFO Kurt CFO Kurt Kuehn
responded: 'If it makes sense to defer out, we'll certainly
talk with Boeing and other providers.' However, Kuehn
also noted that UPS wants to replace its aging DC-8 fleet
and that it has sufficient cash to pay for new airplanes."
5 Seattle James Firm a "With the cancellation of another 16 orders for its 787 On a
Feb. Post- Bell, Dreamliner, which is two years late, The Boeing Co. modular
2009 Intellige CFO, has started out 2009 losing more orders than it has enterpri
ncer, The won. Boeing has won 18 orders and lost 31 through se
"Boeing Boeing cancellations. A Russian airline backed away from its architec
Comme Compa order for 15 Dreamliners a week ago. The latest 787 order tur's
rcial Jet ny cancellation came from a Dubai leasing company. decision
Orders Underscoring just how difficult the current industry -making
Tumble downturn will be, Boeing Chief Financial Officer James process
" Bell told an industry conference Thursday that Boeing about
(James might have to lower production rates in 2010. Bell did growth
Wallace not say so, but if fewer planes are built the company could rates.
) trim or reassign some of the people who assemble its jets
in Renton and in Everett. Speaking at a Cowen & Co.
investors conference, Bell said it takes roughly 12 to 18
months to lower production rates in an orderly
manner. Boeing can reduce production more quickly,
which happened after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, but Bell
said Boeing's backlog gives the company more time to
keep rates at current levels. 'More of the pressure is on
deferrals,' Bell said. 'Now we are starting to quote some
open positions in 2010.' In the past, Boeing has said it
has more than enough customers who want to get
planes faster to take earlier delivery positions when
they become available through an order cancellation or
deferral. Now, there are open delivery slots in 2010. If
those can't be filled, rates would have to be cut. Bell
said there is a 'risk that we might have to make modest
production cuts.' Boeing is currently running its 737
production lines in Renton at record rates -- more than 31
planes a month are assembled there. But Bell said there is
more pressure on single-aisle deferrals (the 737) than
widebody planes, which are assembled in Everett.
The 787 is about two years late because of various
supplier and production issues, and many customers
like LCAL would have already received some of their
planes if not for the delay. Boeing is getting the first 787
ready to fly in the second quarter -- a key milestone that
was supposed to have happened in August or September
2007. Bell said because the LCAL deliveries would be
toward the front of the delivery schedule, Boeing has
'more latitude to work in moving other planes up and
offset schedule delays for other customers."'
- - - -- 
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5 Cowen James Firm a Cai von Rumohr: On a
Feb. and Bell, [Regarding the 787] "I think you said on your Q2 call modular
2009 Compan CFO, when you still had it in the forecast that you were enterpri
y The assuming break-even but actually still hoped that the se
Aerospa Boeing revenues would exceed the costs...how do you feel today, architec
ce/Defe Compa is this going to be like a very low margin plane for a tur's
nse ny long period of time?" over-
Confere promise
nce James Bell: and
(laughing) "No, obviously we're not going to expect under-
that... but right now, given what we know, this early on delivery
we're still guiding to zero margin on the initial
deliveries and we're going to grow that over time, and
for us to grow it there are a number of thing we're going to
have to do. We're really going to work to get the
productivity accelerated and a lot of that will be in the
supply chain, and so we have plans in work to make that
happen, and then obviously we're going to have to do a
good job in negotiating with our customers on the delay
penalties. So I think with those two things and the fact
that we've sold a thousand of these airplanes... it gives you
the production level predictability over time that you need
to go work those longer-term productivity issues. So
we're still optimistic that this airplane is going to
provide good value not only for our customers but for
our shareholders."
Cai von Rumohr:
"Terrific".
6 Seattle Richar Firm- a "Sir Richard Branson, founder of the Virgin Group, On the
Feb. Post- d Custo blasted The Boeing Co. at a celebration of a new Virgin further
2009 Intellige Branso mer airline, held Friday morning on Boeing's own turf. 'If disintgr
ncer, n, people in Seattle build our planes and deliver them on ation of
"Virgin founde time and, to be frank, don't go on strike, then we'll firm-
Group r of the continue to work with Boeing. If we have our airline custome
Founder Virgin completely messed up, with tremendous damage done r link in
Blasts Group to our own work force, then we'll go to Embraer or a
Boeing" Airbus.' 'The delay on the 787 has been an absolute modular
(Dan nightmare, and it's cost us a fortune. It really does enterpri
Richma make us think, 'Do we want to take a risk on Boeing in se
n) the future?" Branson said. architec
ture.
'The strike hurt hundreds of thousands of our
passengers,' Branson told reporters. 'It messed up Virgin
Atlantic, it messed up Virgin Blue in Australia, it
ruined people's Christmas holidays. It was absolutely
and utterly ghastly.' He continued, 'If union leaders
and management can't get their act together to avoid
strikes, we're not going to come back here again. We're
already thinking, 'Would we ever risk putting another
order with Boeing?' It's that serious.'
Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said later Friday in an e-
mail, 'We never want to disappoint our customers to
such an extent. We are committed to doing everything
we can in the future to satisfy our customers in the
l~i~ - -
manner they deserve."'
6 Seattle Steven Firm- a "At the same event, the CEO of International Lease On the
Feb. Post- Udvar- Custo Finance Corp. said Boeing and rival Airbus could see percepti
2009 Intellige Hazy, mer production drop as much as 35 percent in two years. 'It on of
ncer, CEO will come down in steps until it reaches equilibrium,' homoge
"Virgin of Steven Udvar-Hazy told Bloomberg News. 'It wouldn't neity of
Group Interna surprise me if in 18 to 24 months there were cuts of as enterpri
Founder tional much as 30 to 35 percent at both Boeing and Airbus. se
Blasts Lease Airlines are focused on survival, not ordering planes.' architec
Boeing" Financ Both companies have predicted a drop in orders this year. tures
(Dan e Udvar-Hazy said the slump will be longer than the decline among
Richma Corp. after the 2001 terrorist attacks. 'This could be a year competi
n) where the number of net cancellations and deferrals tors.
actually exceed genuine new orders,' Hazy told reporters
at the event. While Hazy said he's not predicting that,
'certainly the elements are out there for that to happen.'
Indeed, Boeing has started 2009 losing more orders than it
has won. Boeing said Thursday it won 18 orders in
January and lost 31 through cancellations."
8 The Firm- a "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has On a
Feb. Seattle Regula quietly decided to loosen stringent fuel-tank safety modular
2009 Times, tors regulations written after the 1996 fuel-tank explosion enterpri
'TAA that destroyed flight TWA 800 off the coast of New se
to York state. The FAA proposes to relax the safeguards architec
loosen for preventing sparks inside the fuel tank during a ture's
fuel- lightning strike, standards the agency now calls integral
tank 'impractical' and Boeing says its soon-to-fly 787 relation
safety Dreamliner cannot meet. Boeing has worked closely ship
rules, with the FAA to make the change in time for the 787 with its
benefiti Dreamliner, whose airframe built of composite plastic govern
ng makes lightning protection a special challenge. But the ment
Boeing's move has stirred intense opposition inside the local regulato
787" FAA office from the technical specialists - most of r.
(Domini them former Boeing engineers - responsible for
c Gates) certifying new airplane designs. The national union
representing about 190 Seattle-based FAA engineers this
past Tuesday submitted a formal critique to the agency,
calling the new policy 'an unjustified step backward in
safety.' In a lightning storm, the critique said, the less
stringent rules could leave a commercial airliner 'one
failure away from catastrophe.' FAA management,
contradicting its own technical staff, argues that relaxing
the spark-prevention standard is balanced by new
technology to reduce fuel-tank flammability that will
increase safety overall. Jim Hall, the former National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) chairman who
oversaw the TWA 800 investigation, said he's
disappointed in the FAA but not surprised. 'It appears
that management has overruled the judgment of the
people that have day-to-day responsibility for the
safety of aircraft,' Hall said. The rules the FAA is now
reinterpreting have been in place since 2001 after the
investigation into the TWA 800 fuel-tank explosion that
killed all 230 people on board the 747 jumbo jet. In a
detailed briefing on the 787's protection systems, two
high-level Boeing lightning experts - who spoke on
condition that they not be named - said the
Dreamliner cannot meet the requirement. 'Boeing
spent years trying to develop triple layers of structural
lightning protection for every 787 fuel-tank fastener
and joint, but we were unable to identify the technical
means at many locations in the wings,' one said. The
FAA will accept formal comments on the policy change
through Feb. 13. The critique submitted by the FAA
certification engineers' union, the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association union (NATCA), acknowledges
that the existing regulation is strict. It may have to be
revised in some way, said one FAA certification specialist,
who, like other agency engineers interviewed for this
story, asked not to be named to avoid retribution. 'A
bunch of us are in agreement as to how we can do that
and maintain safety,' he said. 'But it's not what our
management is trying to do in allowing catastrophic
single failures.'
By all accounts, the 787's inerting system is very effective.
But there's a catch: The FAA is not requiring that it be
'full time.' If a 787's inerting system breaks down, to
save the expense of grounding the plane, an airline will be
free to continue to operate it for 10 days while waiting for
replacement parts. That's despite an internal
recommendation from one of Boeing's own safety-
engineering team leaders in November 2005 that the
787's inerting system should be required to be working
before takeoff. 'This inerting system, if it was full time,
it would definitely be an acceptable level of safety,' said
a second FAA engineer who has worked on the 787's
certification. But without that assurance, he said, to fly
on a Dreamliner out of a lightning-prone airport in the
summer is a risk he's not prepared to take. 'I wouldn't
put my family on a 787 out of Miami,' said the
engineer, who formerly worked for Boeing.
FAA, Boeing too close? Tomaso DiPaolo, NATCA's
aircraft-certification national representative, charges that
when FAA engineers raised their safety concerns
internally management simply removed them from the
team developing the new policy. The FAA ignored its
own technical people, he said, while making sure
Boeing agreed with the policy change. 'It's another
example of the FAA getting too close to industry,' said
DiPaolo. 'It appears that whatever Boeing wants,
Boeing gets.' A Boeing internal document reviewed by
The Seattle Times shows the company had a 'team to
assist FAA in wording of interpretation' of the
lightning rule for the 787 as far back as August 2004,
just eight months after the new jet program launched."
10 Barclay Scott Firm- a "So as you can see from this chart, the environment is both On a
Feb. 's Carson Investo challenging... but at the same time presents great modular
2009 Capital , CEO, rs opportunities for those that have the courage to stand enterpri
2009 Boeing tall and move forward. se
Industri Comm architec
L~~~~ -- --- I
al Select ercial The team continues to work successfully towards the t noting
Confere Airpla second quarter flight milestone and the challenges that the that
nce nes flight test program will bring. We continue to be "courag
confident that we will deliver those airplanes to those e" is
customers that want them so badly in the first quarter of required
2010. to lead
the
But behind that lies a production system that continues enterpri
to operate and improve itself at incredible rates. We se.
began what we call our 'Lean journey' on the 737 product
about eight years ago. During the ensuing years, we have
reduced factory flow on the product by 50%, and we have
reduced our cost of quality by some 31% and continue
our relentless pursuit to drive even more cost out. Our
fundamental factories are running well and have not been
adversely affected by the challenges we face on the two
development programs.
We are absolutely focused on continuing the journey of
driving productivity through our factories on the
current products. And this journey of Lean is a
journey that will continue forever.
Joe CamDbeHl:
"The company has said that the 787 - whatever the
production quantities that you calculate your profits over -
we should plan on the initial quantities being zero."
Scott Carson:
"Correct."
Joseph CamDbell:
"But that means that - for example on the 747, you've
taken a forward charge so presumably any cushinon that
was on the 747 has been stripped out and you really are
operating right at zero - but in the 787 you don't have that
and so the question really gets to whether or not for the
entire block of 500 airplanes or whatever the number turns
out to be - you haven't disclosed - whether you really
think that we should as an investor group be thinking -
however long it takes you to ship 500 airplanes - you'll
have zero margins."
Scott Carson:
"No. You shouldn't be thinking that. So this is the
initial launch of the program, the initial deliveries and
we've guided you in that direction, specifically for the
initial series of aircraft."
10 Reuters, Scott Firm- a Boeing Co's delayed 787 Dreamliner remains on track On a
Feb. "Boeing Carson Investo for its first deliveries in the first quarter of 2010, Scott modular
2009 787 on ,CEO, rs Carson, chief executive of Boeing Commercial enterpri
Track Boeing Airplanes, said on Tuesday." se
for Q1 Comm architec
2010 ercial ture's
Deliver Airpla overpro
y - nes mise
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Executi and
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10 The Firm a "Boeing today announced a series of personnel moves On a
Feb. Boeing within its corporate and business unit Finance modular
2009 Compan organizations that will leverage the capabilities and enterpri
y expand the experience of leaders in several key roles. se
Website Commercial Airplanes Chief Financial Officer Rob architec
Pasterick, 53, has been named vice president of Finance ture's
and corporate controller, reporting to Boeing Corporate movem
President and Chief Financial Officer James Bell. He ent of
succeeds Harry McGee, 59, who becomes vice president top
of strategy integration for internal services, a new position financia
created to drive long-term efficiencies and greater 1
productivity across the company's internal business manage
support services. Ray Ferrari, 54, a 30-year Boeing rs
veteran with broad experience across the company's amidst
defense and commercial businesses, succeeds Pasterick financia
as Commercial Airplanes chief financial officer. Craig 1
Saddler, 49, now president of Boeing Australia and the reportin
South Pacific, will replace Ferrari. Boeing also named g
Jon Emery, 51, vice president and controller of the problem
Commercial Airplanes unit. 'These rotations and s
reassignments will broaden the skills and experiences (announ
of our senior team, strengthen our core finance ced that
capabilities, and improve the support we provide to day)
our business units,' said Bell. 'Each of these leaders'
demonstrated experience with, and understanding of,
our businesses will ensure our continued focus on
execution, functional excellence and seamless
integration across the Boeing enterprise.' The changes
are effective immediately."
10 Puget Firm a "The Boeing Co. made major leadership changes Tuesday On a
Feb. Sound at the finance unit in its Seattle-based Commercial modular
2009 Busines Airplanes division. enterpri
s se
Journal, The division's chief financial officer, Rob Pasterick, has architec
"Boeing been named vice president of the Chicago-based ture's
Shakes company's finance and corporate controller, and will movem
Up move to Chicago. He's being replaced by Ray Ferrari, ent of
Comme currently the vice president of finance for network and non
rcial space systems at Boeing Integrated Defense Systems in SBU
Airplan Washington, D.C. Boeing also named Jon Emery its new finan ce
es vice president and controller for the Commercial Airplanes manage
Finance division. He'll move to Seattle from his previous job as rs into
Divisio leader of the company's program risk assessment the
n" group and internal services productivity initiatives in SBU.
Chicago. Boeing also said Harry McGee, the company's
former vice president of finance and corporate controller
in Chicago, will move to Seattle to become vice
president of strategy integration for internal services, a
new position."
11 Seeking Firm- a "Much has been written about Boeing's murky future. On a
Feb. Alpha, Investo Will its customers cancel orders? Will the 787 ever be modular
2009 "Boeing r delivered? What new production snafu will happen enterpri
's Bad next? However, little has been mentioned about its se
Balance crumbling balance sheet In two previous articles, I architec
Sheet wrote about Boeing's weakening financials (Boeing Can't ture's
May Afford Another Strike and Boeing Headed The Way Of systema
Doom GM?) and predicted a miserable Q4. Boeing did not tic
It 1)disappoint. Its balance sheet saw tremendous asset underin
(Stephe destruction this quarter. Cash and cash equivalents vestmen
n t.
n were more than halved from Q4 2007 to Q4 2008.Short term investments went from $23 billion to
an.Disclos practically zero. Pension plan assets tumbled from
ure: $5.9 billion to nothing. In the meantime, inventory
Author climbed from $9.6 to $15.6 billion on the halt in
holds a commercial plane production-while goodwill and
short other intangibles rose from $5.2 to $63 billion (not
position much to hold onto).
in BA)
The liability side grew. Pension plan liabilities soared
from $1.2 to $8A billion. Ouch! All in all, tangible
equity dropped from $2.7 to a minus $6.8 billion, a
sad $9.5 billion loss. Boeing goes into 2009 with a
weak balance sheet It needed its cash, investments,
and pension plan assets, all victims of strikes,
production misteps, and a falling stock market. Those
cushions are now gone. It faces a large $7 billion debt
Moreover, it now faces a whole new problem in the
form of an $8.4 billion pension liability that dwarfs its
debt So far this year, Boeing has lost $9.5 billion in
tangible equity. That's not how you want to enter one
of the most trying times in our nation's economic
history."
o Jake Berzon
"Oh, who cares about fundamentals. Surely, US
government will rescue BA when its time comes -
they are a major government contractor, a huge
employer and our nation's pride and joy! :)"
o Marcap
"I agree with the author. Boeing is indeed in very bad
shape. With a negative book value for its shares,
and virtually no inside shareholders (less than 1/2
of 1%), it absolutely amazes me that their shares
are still trading at roughly $40. Very scary indeed!
But perhaps the scariest of all, is just how much
they are cutting costs in the production of new
aircraft. It's certainly not a time that I would want
to be placing an order for any."
o Stephen Rosenman
"Tatertot: I wanted to dramatize the collapse of BA's
assets in one year. The market totally ignored the
.................- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~~
balance sheet. It will take a herculean effort to
repair the balance sheet. Also the investing public
ignored the looming problem BA faces with its new
pension plan problems: pension plan assets went
from $5.9 billion to a $8.4 billion liability. Someone
needs to fire the guy in charge of the pension plan.
Note above remark is a swing of $13 billion in the
pension plan."
o opa-ooa
"Good article, but sort of useless for those of us who
wants to know what will happen in the future,
instead of what has already happened. But I guess
it's easy to throw in words like 'doomed' these days
and short everything to heck. Hope you shorts
enjoy it while it lasts. The night is always darkest
before the dawn."
o Stephen Rosenman
"Opa-opa: 'Doom' title was chosen by Seeking Alpha,
not me. The future for BA is dimmer in great part
because it has lost a vast amount of its assets. For
those of us who have followed this company, it's
pretty sad. Back, in 2005, tangible equity was $8.5
billion. Now it's in the hole $6.8 billion. That's
$15.3 billion in damages in 4 years! Who else could
wreck so much equity and prosper? As to the
future? Negative free cash flow, currency issues.
higher salaries and health costs (from strike),
customers walking or renegotiating contracts after
BA's failure to deliver, decreased air travel, quality
issues with fasteners, likely more 787 delays,
pension plan pressure, all should create more than
their share of problems for BA."
o Ibrtkne
"Some smart account out there, please correct me if I
have this wrong, but isn't the pension data
presented here somewhat apples and oranges? Isn't
the over-funded portion of the pension plan what is
shown as a net asset on the balance sheet? And isn't
the pension liability the actual long term pension
obligation? As far as the cash situation, didn't
Boeing make several acquisitions in the last
quarter, thus using up some of their stash of cash?
And wouldn't those acquisitions have just shown
up as other assets on the balance sheet instead of
cash? This piece comes across as not too well
researched or insightful. And from a serious
analyst perspective, the author's use of only two
data points is just plain silly."
o Stephen Rosenman
"To lbrtkng: Per SEC 10K, BA has incurred an $8.4
billion pension liability, largely owing to over a $7
billion loss (read sour investments). Its pension
~***
overfunding has disappeared, a $5.9 billion gone.
Therefore, the apples, oranges, together become
one big tomato of a $13 billion + drop in equity.
Where are those acquisitions on the balance sheet?
More goodwill, intangibles, and plants. As to 2
points, the market usually compares year over year
earnings. This is a comparison to year over year
equity, its breakdown into components of the asset
and balance sheet."
o Stephen Rosenman
"To lbrtkng: The balance sheet pension asset or
liability is equal to the difference between pension
assets and the actuary's estimate of pension
liability plus or minus the unrecognized
(unamortized) portions of past and prior service
costs, actuarial/experience gains or losses. In other
words, pension assets - liabilities are apples to
apples."
o Tatertot
"I understand that desire, but none-the-less, it would
be useful to see whether these are one-time events
or indicative of a trend. Boeing has already
dropped from $104 (peak) to about $40, so I'm
wondering how much this information has already
been incorporated into the stock price. If we have a
trend down, it may be worth going short side, but
two data points don't allow for that kind of
analysis. Like I said, I like the article, but I'd need
more before really acting on it."
o opa-opa
"Why don't you make a 2-point chart of BA's airplane
order backlog from 2005 to 2009?"
o Stephen Rosenman
"Tatertot: Tangible equity for 2004 was $8.5 billion,
2005 dropped to $8.2 billion, 2006 went to zero,
2007 $2.7 billion. Now we are at minus $6.8 billion.
That's a 5 year trend, almost a $4 billion dollar a
year loss in tangible equity on average a year. The
trend is worrisome. Opa-opa: This is a discussion
about the balance sheet. However, looking at the
above drops in tangible equity, it seems clear that
BA has not been able to use its sales to keep its
balance sheet in order."
o PeteK
"You bet Boeing is following GM's footstep. The union
is exactly the same as UAW or worse. They never
LEARN. The STRIKE last year was a deadly
BLOW to Boeing. What a timing to have a strike.
They have to pay for their stupidity for sure."
o TFG
II
"Yeah, blame it on the strike. Disconnected and short
sighted management has absolutely nothing to do
with it. Abandoning business and productions
systems that have worked for 75+ years, simply
because arrogance demands it, is not to blame
either."
13 CNN, Firm- I "Toyota Motor Corp. is taking additional steps to scale On an
Feb. "Toyota Emplo back production at its North American plants, the integral
2009 Unveils yees automaker said Thursday, in anticipation of worsening enterpri
New auto sales. Toyota said it will schedule additional 'non- se
Efforts production days' in April at certain plants. The company architec
to Trim has production facilities in Kentucky, California, Indiana tur's
Producti and Texas. Additionally, there is a 'strong possibility' that value of
on" Toyota will shorten work weeks at certain plants to 72 employ
(Ben hours from 80 hours, a program the company calls ment
Rooney 'work sharing.' 'This philosophy of shared sacrifice is stability
) the best approach for us, and hopefully will make us a
stronger company in the long term,' said Jim Wiseman,
a Toyota spokesman, in a statement. Toyota also said it
will eliminate executive bonuses and trim some
executive salaries, while bonuses for production
workers will be reduced. The company will offer 'no
wage increases for the foreseeable future' and a
'voluntary exit program' will be set up for employees
who wish to pursue other opportunities. Toyota said the
new actions 'are consistent with the company's
philosophy of making every effort to protect jobs
during the sales downturn.' The new measures come
after Toyota had previously established a hiring freeze,
eliminated overtime and suspended capital spending.
David Cole, chairman of the Center for Automotive
Research, said years of over-production in the auto
industry make scaling back output a necessity now that
demand for new cars has dried up. 'There's no
alternative,' he said. 'They have to balance production
with capacity.' Toyota, like most automakers, has high
fixed costs that make it hard to absorb a sharp drop in
sales, and the credit crunch has made it difficult for willing
buyers to finance a new car, Cole said. 'Toyota is a very
smart company, but they acknowledge now that they
overbuilt, and when you do that, you pay a price,' he
said. Last week, Toyota lowered its sales forecast for the
current fiscal year to 7.08 million vehicles from an earlier
projection of 8.87 million. It also said it expects to suffer
a net loss this year for the first time since 1950."
17 Seattle Jim Firm- a "Boeing Chairman and Chief Executive Jim McNerney On a
Feb. Post- McNer Investo has told company employees in an e-mail that a modular
2009 Intellige ney, rs- suggestion by some of them to freeze wages across the enterpri
ncer, Chair Labor company instead of cutting about 10,000 positions this se
"Aerosp man year is not the best way to weather the ongoing architec
ace and industry downturn. 'More than a few of you have ture's
Notebo CEO, written to me asking whether we could avoid layoffs non-
ok: The altogether by not paying incentive awards this year or integrat
McNern Boeing by freezing wages across the board,' McNerney wrote ed
ey: Compa Tuesday in a companywide memo. 'While these actions approac
Wage ny would preserve some cash during the year and lessen h to the
.
......1. ...
Freeze the immediate impact on people, our judgment (and factors
Wont't one shared by most major companies) is that they of
Work" would put us at a competitive disadvantage when it producti
(James comes to attracting and retaining the high-performing on.
Wallace people we need to consistently perform for our
) customers.' The incentive awards that McNerney referred
to in his memo is Boeing's Employee Incentive Plan,
which is a cash bonus paid to eligible workers each year
and is linked to how well Boeing did in meeting certain
financial targets the previous year. The payout can be for
up to 20 days' extra pay. Nonunion workers at Boeing, but
not executives, are eligible for the incentive plan bonus, as
are most engineers and technical workers represented by
the engineers' union known as SPEEA. But members of
Boeing's Machinists union are not part of the employee
incentive plan. Boeing announced last month that it
met enough of its 2008 financial targets for the plan to
pay out six extra days. In Washington state, about
48,120 eligible employees will receive an estimated
payout of $96.5 million this month. Companywide,
110,000 eligible recipients will receive an estimated
$220 million."
17 Seattle Jim Firm- a McNerney memo: On a
Feb. Post- McNer Investo modular
2009 Intellige ney, rs- Jim McNerney enterpri
ncer, Chair Labor Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer se
"James man, architec
Wallace Preside "History tells us that the quicker a company acts to ture's
on nt and counter adverse economic conditions, the better able it non-
Aerospa CEO, will be to work its way through a downturn and integrat
ce: The emerge stronger when the economy recovers. That's ed
Boeing Boeing why we began last fall to stress even more the importance approac
Won't Compa of improving productivity and finding new ways to operate h to the
Freeze ny more efficiently. As we suspected then, the economy has factors
Wages" continued to struggle mightily, putting even greater of
(James pressure on our commercial customers and potentially producti
Wallace further straining defense budgets. We have compounded on.
) the situation ourselves with the setbacks we had last
year with the machinists' strike and our performance
issues on key development programs. As I told
shareholders and analysts on our quarterly earnings call
last month, our strategy for weathering this storm is to
improve execution on our underperforming programs,
maintain strong performance on the vast majority of our
programs that are performing well, and preserve our
financial strength to enable continued investment in our
business and our employees, including our pension and
benefits plans. With that in mind, we have been taking
decisive action:
* To improve programs that have not been performing to
plan: We have bolstered program-management
processes, increased functional discipline and
oversight, applied additional resources and technical
expertise, and made leadership changes where we
believed it was necessary to improve the team's
~;~111~
performance. As part of that, we have also rebalanced
our program-review schedule to place greater time and
attention on underperforming programs. Reliable,
disciplined execution across all programs is not merely an
aspiration for us; it's an imperative. Our customers have
choices, and disappointing them has consequences for our
business and relationships.
* To maintain strong performance where it exists: We are
asking all employees to redouble their efforts to focus on
sustained, strong execution and to leverage our growth and
productivity initiatives to drive even higher levels of
efficiency and competitiveness. Sharing and replicating
best practices, ensuring functional discipline and
excellence, and raising issues and concerns early are all
key to keeping the hundreds of healthy, successful
programs inside our company healthy and successful.
* To preserve our financial strength: We have put a
spotlight on cash and asset management. In prior
years, we generated substantially more cash than we
needed for daily operations. Despite strong performance
across most of our programs, last year's strike, delays on
development programs, and lower returns on our
investments (due to the financial crisis) changed that. In
response, we have reduced discretionary and capital-
spending budgets. We have centralized and consolidated
organizational structures to both slim and strengthen them.
We are eliminating work that doesn't add value to our
customers, and we are reducing staffing levels to support a
trimmed-down infrastructure.
None of these actions are easy, especially those that affect
employment of our people. But they are all necessary
elements of our strategy to support our customers during
uncertain times and to ensure our competitiveness and
growth over the long haul. They require stepped-up
responsibility and accountability by leadership as well as
the involvement of every employee. As we work through
them, it's also vital that we stay fully engaged with our
customers. We cannot let our attention to internal efforts
distract us from serving them, nor can we leave any
impression that our focus on them has waned. Regarding
2009 employment plans: When we looked at it last fall, we
said we expected reductions in excess of our normal
attrition rate of 4 to 5 percent by the end of this year. Our
current estimate of 6 percent, or about 10,000 jobs, is
consistent with that initial expectation and the business
assumptions behind it. It's important to note that while the
planned reductions include some layoffs, they also rely on
attrition, retirements, not filling some open positions, and
cutbacks in contract labor. The mix of these elements
varies by business area and geography, and the reductions,
while weighted heavily in the first half, will be spread over
the course of the year. We're keeping close watch on the
dynamics of our business environment and the factors that
affect employment. We will be sure to keep you informed
should anything in our outlook change. More than a few
of you have written to me asking whether we could
avoid layoffs altogether by not paying incentive awards
this year or by freezing wages across the board. While
these actions would preserve some cash during the year
and lessen the immediate impact on people, our
judgment (and one shared by most major companies) is
that they would put us at a competitive disadvantage
when it comes to attracting and retaining the high-
performing people we need to consistently perform for
our customers. Having said that, I want to assure you
that we have taken (and will continue to take) steps to
mitigate the impact to our team. For example, we are
consciously restraining salary growth this year in order to
lessen the number of job cuts we need to make while
retaining flexibility to fund growth projects and preserve
key skills across the enterprise. We also continue to
provide the best transition assistance we can to laid-off
employees. The next 12 to 18 months promise us a steady
flow of tough business challenges and increased
opportunities to support our customers. Many experts
believe the economic news could get worse before it gets
better, and we've tried to anticipate some of that in our
plans. While it's hard to know the final impact, we must be
prepared should conditions worsen beyond the already
difficult environment we have assumed. But, as I've
mentioned above, we have a plan to deal with the situation
and it is a good one. We know what we need to do to
navigate this turbulence. If we execute well -- with
integrity and always consistently with our values
-- we will prevail through even the most difficult of times
-- and emerge stronger when the economic tide turns.
Thank you for all you are doing to support Boeing and our
customers. Jim"
Posted by unregistered user at 2/17/09 4:46 p.m.
"After all these statements in this memo, Boeing will still
see its shares drop to new lows and this time you will
have no one to blame but your so called top
performers."
Posted by unregistered user at 2/17/09 5:12 p.m.
"Corporate Greed!"
Posted by unregistered user at 2/17/09 5:33 p.m.
"I hate to say it but from what I've seen Boeing's
productiivity has to be the lowest of any coporation!
Mechanics goof off most of their day!"
Posted by unregistered user at 2/17/09 5:40 p.m.
"And nothing says come work for us like layoffs!"
Posted by unregistered user at 2/17/09 7:35 p.m.
"As thus the dysfunctional relationship between Boeing
Mgmt and it's employees continues. Boeing mgmt
.....  ............. ....
views it's employees as a cost to be minimized, and will
always default to layoffs rather than recognize their
own mismanagement. And the employees (union and
non-union) will always default to the get what you can
while you can mindset because there will be hirings
and layoffs every few years. And yes, the unions will
strike for the short term gains knowing the hire - layoff
cycle will continue. It is a self perpetuating cycle and it
can be endlessly debated about who's to blame. But the
results are clear for all to see."
Posted by ikkeman at 2/17/09 11:31 p.m.
"what a blowhole. spouting it high and far without any
direction or intention"
Posted by unregistered user at 2/18/09 1:39 a.m.
"General Electric Chief Executive Jeff Immelt has
waived his right to a bonus and performance-based pay
that would have netted him more than $12 million in
cash. So Jim McNerney we are waiting."
Posted by unregistered user at 2/18/09 4:42 a.m.
"Anyone else who leads a large corperation which has
had such a poor record in creating a new product
would have been sacked long ago. Where does the buck
stop? Thie guy should be paying Boeing to employ him
with his record."
Posted by Leelaw at 2/18/09 6:08 a.m.
"If for whatever reason it's not possible for Boeing's
board of directors to remove a failed CEO like Mr.
McNerney from office, can't they at least muzzle him a
la Mike Bair?"
18 Forbes, Jim Firm- a "Freezing wages and eliminating bonuses to avoid On a
Feb. "Boeing McNer Investo layoffs would be counterproductive for the Boeing Co. modular
2009 CEO ney, rs- and other big employers, the aerospace company's chief enterpri
Says Chair Emplo executive said. In an e-mail Tuesday to Boeing se
Pay man, yees employees, printed in full on the Web site of the Seattle architec
Freeze Preside Post-Intelligencer newspaper Wednesday, CEO Jim ture's
Counter nt and McNerney wrote that such moves would hurt the views of
producti CEO, company's ability to attract and retain high- incentiv
ve" The performing employees. The memo is one of the first ies for
(Tim Boeing responses by a major corporate chief executive to employ
Klass) Compa proposals for layoff alternatives. Such requests have ees.
ny gained force in the deepening recession since President
Barack Obama praised 'the selflessness of workers
who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose
their job' in his inaugural address last month."
18 Flight Eric Firm- a "As far back as May of last year, Boeing publicly On a
Feb. blogger, Fast, Suppli discussed that the brake control system was a key modular
2009 "Crane CEO er pacing item for the 787 program. Tracing the evolution enterpri
Co. Crane of this issue, which Crane and Boeing have stated is se
Reopen Co. resolved, today we find Crane announcing they need to architec
s 787 develop a new version of the software, potentially for ture's
Brake the 787-9, later blockpoint 787-8s, or even an inability
Softwar additional evolution for initial certification. The to
-- "
e recipient of the new software is unclear at this point, but it manage
Problem certainly something to be aware of moving forward. a
s" (Jon modular
Ostrowe Aviation Week - May 23, 2008: While Boeing VP and 787 supply
r) General Manager Pat Shanahan says most systems are chain
ready to go, the airplane's brake control monitoring system for an
supplied by Crane Aerospace to the former Smiths integral
Aerospace division of GE Aviation has fallen behind product
schedule and remains a threat to first flight in the architec
fourth quarter this year. Design concerns about the ture.
brake monitors arose during build and test reviews by GE
and Crane. As those issues were being worked out, power
supply issues also cropped up. A GE manager says the
team is making 'good progress' toward supporting
Boeing's flight test schedule. 'They are later than we
want, but they will support first flight,' the manager
said.
FlightBlogger - August 5, 2008: Boeing expects to have
all of the hardware on Dreamliner One qualified by the
second or third week of August, 'with the exception of
the brakes.'
Boeing - October 31, 2008: 'The issues with the brake
software are behind us, functionality required for flight
test is in the labs and is working well. (The final 'blue
label' version -- for flight test -- is in the lab and is
undergoing tests, all known software problems are
resolved. The formal 'red label' version will follow in two
weeks. We plan on a service-ready update during flight
test that adds some additional functionality including tire
pressure, operator initiated test, and dataload),' said 787
spokeswoman Yvonne Leach.
Crane Co. CEO Eric Fast - February 18, 2009: 'The
Company expects to complete development of the
brake control system for the Boeing 787 that meets the
originally specified requirements during the second
quarter of 2009 although engineering efforts at
reduced levels will be needed to support test flights.
However, Boeing has communicated certain changed
aircraft requirements that affect the brake control
system, and we have recently entered into discussions with
our customer, GE Aviation Systems, regarding
development of a new version of the 787 brake control
system, including whether this additional development
work will be funded by the customer. It is the Company's
position that it is not required to undertake this
additional development work without customer
funding, and the costs of such work, which could be
material, are not included in our guidance."'
19 The Firm- a "Crane Aerospace, a subcontractor to GE Aviation that On a
Feb. Seattle Suppli supplies the brake control system for the Boeing 787 modular
2009 Times, er Dreamliner, said today that it has to develop a new enterpri
"Crane version of the brake control system because Boeing has se
says it changed requirements. In advance of an investors architec
-- ;;;;
must conference Friday, Crane said it is in a dispute with ture's
develop Boeing and GE over who will pay for the extra inability
new 787 development work. Last summer, Boeing had identified to
brake the Crane brake control system as being behind manage
system schedule. Crane said today that the original version of a
as the brake control system is complete, delivered to modular
Boeing Boeing, and ready to fly on the first test aircraft." supply
changes chain
require for an
ments" integral
product
architec
ture.
19 Seattle Tom Firm- a "Underscoring the difficult state of the industry, and the On a
Feb. Post- Enders Custo & implications for the two biggest makers of commercial modular
2009 Intellige , CEO, mer B jets, Airbus announced Thursday it will cut production enterpri
ncer, Airbus of its single-aisle A320 family of jets as worldwide se
"Boeing demand weakens. And it will not go ahead with a architec
Delivers production rate increase for its biggest planes. The ture's
777 development came four months after Airbus said it unrealis
Freighte would not boost rates as planned of the single-aisle jets tic and
r", to 40 a month from 36. The rate is coming down to 34 a an
(James month starting in October. 'Many airlines are taking integral
Wallace capacity out of the market. I do not exclude further enterpri
) production cuts if the need arises,' Airbus Chief se
Executive Tom Enders said in a statement. architec
ture's
Boeing does not publicly reveal its production rates, but it realistic
is known to be building about 31 of its single-aisle 737s a and
month at its Renton plant. Although Boeing has said it early
expects to maintain production rates of all its planes at announc
current levels this year, Boeing commercial boss Scott ement
Carson recently said production in 2010 could be cut of
by about 10 percent, depending on how many orders are modest
deferred or canceled. Any significant cut in production capacity
could result in job losses. Boeing already has said it will cuts.
reduce its work force companywide by about 10,000
positions this year, including 4,500 commercial jobs in the
Puget Sound area. But most of those commercial jobs are
not in jet production. Some industry experts believe
Boeing's outlook is much too rosy."
23 Flight Firm a "While there are some areas where Airbus and Boeing On the
Feb. Global & concur on how the demand dynamics will play out over differen
2009 "Foreca 3 the next 20 years - such as in the twin-aisle category - ces
sting the these forecasts are ultimately an arm of their between
Long- marketing programmes so are driven by each modular
term airframer's product strategy and throiv up some and
Demand significant differences in opinion. A good example of integral
for this is the forecast for large airliner demand, where Airbus, enterpri
Airliner with the all-new 500-seat A380 in its product line, has se
s" (Max always been extremely bullish. The airframer's latest architec
Kingsle global market forecast predicts demand for 1,700 aircraft. ture's in
y-Jones Boeing, on the other hand - ever since it dropped plans for projecti
) a major stretch of the 747 around a decade ago - has ng
consistently put demand at fewer than 1,000 aircraft. turure
Boeing first delivered its current market outlook in 1964 custome
~---------------~----------------------- ~ ~;;;;;;;;;~
and has been updating its forecast annually ever since. r
Airbus began publishing 20 year market studies in 1988 - demand.
which crystalised as its 'global market forecast' in 1995 -
but has not stuck to the annual publishing schedule of
its rival. While short-term shocks such as 9/11, last
year's oil price escalation dramas or the current global
financial crisis have some bearing on demand in the
near term, the tendency is to assume, backed by
historic prerogatives, that any impact will be ironed
out and will not influence long-term trends. For
example, Boeing says in its latest current market outlook,
produced amid the high fuel prices in 2008, that 'the
forecast has been developed in a manner that considers
today's market environment, but takes a long-term view of
the market and the fundamentals that drive commercial
aviation. These include economic growth, world trade and
new aircraft capabilities.'
So how close have forecasts come to matching reality?
Comparing Boeing's 10-year outlook published in its 1998
current market outlook for fleet growth from 1997-2007
with the actual fleet data included in its 2008 current
market outlook indicates that its demand forecast was
optimistic. The fleet (excluding regional jets) was
expected to grow to 17,700 airliners in 2007, but the data
in Boeing's 2008 current market outlook shows that the
2007 fleet was 15,840 units. However, in 1998, Boeing's
current market outlook did not include regional jets - the
boom was still in its infancy then. This category is now
included, putting the total airliner fleet in 2007 at 19,000
units. Significantly, back in 1998 when Boeing was still
toying with ideas for a 500-seat airliner, it predicted
that the fleet in this category would grow to 1,240 units,
whereas in reality it would contract over the 10 years
from 1,016 units to 910. Airbus has traditionally stuck
to taking only a long-term, 20-year view in its global
market forecast, meaning that it is not yet possible to
compare its 1997 view of the market with reality.
However, it is worth pointing out that its 2003 global
market forecast failed to predict the size of demand for the
A380 from Emirates as it did not include the airline's
Dubai base among its forecast of the top 10 large-aircraft
hubs. In the wake of Emirates boosting its A380 orders to
more than 50 aircraft, Airbus quickly remedied this
omission in its next global market forecast and now has
Dubai placed third in the rankings behind London
Heathrow and Hong Kong."
23 Wall Shoich Firm P "Toyota Motor Corp.'s incoming president, Akio Toyoda, In the
Feb. Street iro has a sobering message for the giant company founded by reintegr
2009 Journal, Toyod his grandfather: It has gotten too fancy for its own good. ation of
"A a On Monday, three top executives who helped lead Toyota a gently
Scion former the past four years -- including Mitsuo Kinoshita, one of disinteg
Drives Preside the primary architects of the company's global rating
Toyota nt, expansion -- announced their retirement. The integral
Back to Toyota departures clear the way for Mr. Toyoda's planned enterpri
Basics" Motors makeover of the world's biggest auto maker. He is se
(Norihi Corpor expected to focus, most of all, on abandoning kakushin, architec
ko ation; or 'revolutionary change,' current president Katsuaki ture.
Shirouz Katsua Watanabe's term for changing the way Toyota designed
u and ki its cars and factories. It spawned technological
John Watan advances, but led to cars that were often costlier to
Murphy abe, produce. The 52-year-old Mr. Toyoda is also working to
) outgoi fix a pricing strategy that put the company at odds
ng with some U.S. dealers, who felt its cars were getting
Preside too expensive, according to people familiar with the
nt, situation. Auto makers world-wide are in pain, and Toyota
Toyota is much stronger than rivals such as General Motors
Motors Corp., which is flirting with a bankruptcy filing. Still,
Corpor Toyota is expecting its first annual net loss in 59 years.
ation; Mr. Toyoda may shutter factories in North America and
Akio Japan, where Toyota bulked up in recent years and is now
Toyod stuck with too much manufacturing capacity. It might
a, also be faced with its first layoffs in Japan since 1950,
incomi when 3,000 workers were let go. Mr. Toyoda blames
ng more than the recession, according to people familiar
Preside with the matter. He is sending the message that his
nt, predecessors worsened the problem by straying from
Toyota core ideas of thrift and efficiency. Among other things,
Motors there's a move away from technologically sophisticated
Corpor in-car gizmos like a solar-powered cooling system
ation designed for the new Prius. In addition, an expensive new
assembly-line technique of dipping car bodies into a vat of
paint and swirling them around -- nicknamed shabu shabu,
after a popular Japanese hotpot dish -- is under the
microscope. Toyota said in a statement that it feels its
management decisions made in the past were appropriate
for their time. Mr. Toyoda is the first member of Toyota's
founding family to take the helm in 14 years. 'I think
Toyota probably over-expanded a little bit in order to
compete with the American auto makers,' said his
father, Shoichiro Toyoda, 83, who himself was the auto
maker's president during the 1980s. 'There are a lot of
things that we have to review.' The younger Mr. Toyoda's
appointment as president is pending shareholder approval
in June. Mr. Watanabe, whose appointment as vice
chairman was announced along with Mr. Toyoda's
promotion, had been president since June 2005. The
shakeup reflects the sense of crisis within Toyota as it
navigates one of the toughest periods in its 70-year history.
For the past decade, it expanded at breakneck pace.
Under Mr. Watanabe, 67, Toyota posted record net profit
1.72 trillion yen in the ended March 2008. Last year it
unseated rival GM as the world's biggest auto maker in
terms of unit sales. Now, it is forecasting a 350 billion yen
net loss for the current fiscal year, ending March 31. And
not only are sales plummeting, but earnings are getting
further hurt by the strong yen, which means money earned
abroad isn't worth as much when converted into Japan's
currency. In a recent sign of the distress, at a meeting late
last year Mr. Watanabe appealed to mid-level managers
to 'share the pain' -- code for a salary cut -- then made
them wince by asking them to also consider buying a
new car to help shore up sales, according to people who
.. ... ..........
attended the meeting. An unprecedented number of
unsold cars in Japan has forced Toyota to stockpile
them in the parking lots of Fuji Speedway, a company-
owned track near Mount Fuji. Koichi Shimokawa, a
professor of business administration at Tokai Gakuin
University in Nagoya, says Toyota was so focused on
becoming the world's largest auto maker that it failed
to cut production quickly enough last year as economic
crisis struck the U.S., its largest market. 'Toyota was
overconfident in its competitiveness and they just kept
pressing the accelerator,' he says. Until late last year, it
appeared to be a horse race for the presidency between Mr.
Toyoda and Mr. Kinoshita, 63, the righthand man to Mr.
Watanabe, the current president. As recently as late last
year, when Toyota's powerful elders huddled to discuss
who should succeed Mr. Watanabe at the end of his two-
year term, some worried Akio Toyoda was too young.
Others felt that a large, publicly traded company like
Toyota shouldn't pick a family member for the top job,
even though Mr. Toyoda is a veteran who oversaw rapid
growth in China, among other things. A turning point
came in a meeting in November at the company's global
headquarters in Toyota City. Akio's father, Shoichiro
Toyoda, made a subtle remark to the assembled group,
according to people familiar with the matter. 'Why are
all the key decisions these days made by Watanabe-kun
and Kinoshita-kun?' the elder Mr. Toyoda said, using a
standard honorific for the two men. According to those
people, Shoichiro Toyoda seemed annoyed that Messrs.
Watanabe and Kinoshita had broken with Toyota
protocol last year by singlehandedly deciding what
vehicles would be built at a factory under construction
in Mississippi. They had switched to the Prius, a gasoline-
electric hybrid, from the Highlander, a sport-utility
vehicle, without first consulting other key executives. The
language was subdued. But the comment, along with
additional criticisms from other executives in other
meetings, ultimately tipped the scale in Akio Toyoda's
favor, the people say. Shoichiro Toyoda says he doesn't
recall the meeting. Toyota said in its statement that it
decided a new management team was needed to tackle the
tough situation it faces. It's not clear if a back-to-basics
approach will be enough to revive growth at the
sprawling firm, particularly amid the weakening global
economy. Other auto makers have promoted founding-
family members, with limited success. Ford Motor Co.'s
own founding-family scion, Bill Ford, took over from
Jacques Nasser in 2001. But Ford failed to launch popular
models, while sales of its profitable SUVs wilted as
gasoline prices rose. In 2006, Mr. Ford handed over the
CEO position to a nonfamily executive, Alan Mulally, a
former Boeing executive, who is still struggling to right
the ship. Asked whether the family name influenced the
choice of top executive, Shoichiro Toyoda said: 'We never
know who is going to be president. The current president
made the best decision about who is appropriate for the
.... ...............  ...............
next president, and it just happened to be my son.' The
family controls roughly 2% of Toyota stock. Akio
Toyoda himself, as one of five executive vice-presidents,
isn't entirely free of blame for the company's recent woes.
Since June 2007, he has overseen the Japanese market,
where sales and market share continue to fall. Toyota now
aims to generate 'reasonable profits' even if is global
sales (excluding sales of its two main affiliates, car maker
Daihatsu and truck company Hino) slump to seven
million, down from an all-time high of 8.4 million it
sold in 2007. Toyota currently has capacity to produce
about 9.7 million vehicles, according to an estimate by
consulting firm CSM Worldwide. Akio Toyoda has long
preached a traditional Toyota practice called genchi
genbutsu, a leadership maxim that boils down to get
out of your office and visit the source of the problem.
For the past year, Mr. Toyoda has been practicing genchi
genbutsu to quietly collect evidence that the company
had strayed, according to people familiar with the
situation. They say he was particularly concerned that
Messrs. Watanabe and Kinoshita placed strong
emphasis on achieving two trillion yen in annual
operating profit, a level it passed in the year ended March
2007. Driven by that profit objective, Toyota executives
reasoned American consumers would be willing to pay
a premium for a Toyota -- a change from a long-held
strategy of pricing cars at a value. Two years ago,
Toyota started raising prices on an array of models
including the redesigned Corolla, one of its most
prominent vehicles, launched in early 2008. Toyota's U.S.
sales arm had tried to price the Corolla about $1,000 to
$1,500 above what its U.S. dealers thought people would
pay for a basic family car, according to U.S. dealers. Not
surprisingly, sales were weak. Toyota sold 21,000 Corollas
in February 2008 down 25% from a year earlier. When
Mr. Toyoda got wind of the slow Corolla sales, he flew to
the U.S. to meet with dealers and investigate for himself.
Cliff Cummings, a veteran southern California dealer,
warned Mr. Toyoda over a steak dinner with a dozen other
dealers last March that premium pricing was the wrong
way to go. Toyota had built an image of sturdy
affordability, 'but now they were wrecking it,' Mr.
Cummings says he told Mr. Toyoda. Based on
subsequent conversations with the younger Mr. Toyoda
and other executives, Mr. Cummings says he expects the
company to overhaul its pricing strategy. The company
is also reining in its engineers, who have been designing
new features that occasionally appear to be out of
character with the company's utilitarian roots. For
example, the new Prius, launching this year, has an option
for a solar-powered ventilation system designed to keep
the interior cool when parked. Gizmos like these helped
lift the car's retail price to an estimated $28,000, according
to analysts, compared with the $22,000 currently.
'Frankly, that does worry me,' says Earl Stewart, one of
the top Prius dealers in the U.S., based in North Palm
......... E h_
Beach, Fla., He anticipates stiff competition from Honda's
new low-priced hybrid, Insight. 'I am already drastically
discounting my Priuses to maintain my sales rate,' Mr.
Stewart says. Then there's the shabu shabu paint system.
Toyota's manufacturing division is one of the company's
proudest operations, having developed a highly efficient
'lean manufacturing' philosophy that has been emulated
over the years by everyone from GM and Hewlett-Packard
to hospitals and supermarkets seeking greater efficiency.
Mr. Watanabe, the current president, had backed the new
technology as he encouraged his engineers to radically
shorten the painting process. To replace the traditional
system of slowly dragging a car through a 115foot-long
bath of anticorrosion undercoating, Toyota engineers came
up with a new process in which a car body gets picked up
by a robot arm, then swished around in a pool of paint,
cutting the length of the line. Engineers compare it to
shabu-shabu, which involves picking up slices of meat and
swishing it around in a hotpot to cook it. However, the
new system costs roughly four times as much to set up
as the traditional process, while producing what Mr.
Toyoda felt were minimal improvements in the quality of
the paint job and its efficiency, according to people
familiar with the situation Also likely to be axed: A new
'ecological plastic' that emits less carbon dioxide over the
course of its life than more traditional alternatives, but
which is costlier to produce. Another tough area Mr.
Toyoda must tackle promptly is the excess manufacturing
capacity in Japan. In the late 1990s, when a strong yen
made Japan a costly place to make cars, Toyota slashed
capacity at home and added production overseas. But the
yen reversed its direction, weakening to as low as 120 to
the dollar between 2005 to 2007. Toyota decided to take
advantage and do more of its manufacturing at home, since
a weak yen has the effect of making exports more
profitable. By 2007, it was producing 4.23 million vehicles
in Japan -- a million more than it made just eight years
before. That move was directly at odds with Toyota's
long-held philosophy not to make long-term decisions
on where to put factories, based on shortterm
currency-exchange rates, which can swing rapidly.
"We are not gods, we are not infallible," says Shoichiro
Toyoda, speaking of the company's management team.
'Sometimes even Tiger Woods misses a shot."'
6 Financi Jim Firm- a "Back in December, Boeing announced that its board of On a
Mar. al McNer Investo directors approved a 14 percent increase in the company's modular
2009 News, ney, rs dividend. Boeing's quarterly dividend will now be 40 cents enterpri
"Boeing CEO, per share, up from 35 cents, while the annual dividend will se
Hits a The be $1.60 per share. This is the fifth dividend increase in architec
New Boeing the past five years. CEO Jim McNerney said, 'This ture's
Low" Compa dividend increase reflects our strong financial non-
(Eric ny performance, record backlog and significant systemi
Cheshie liquidity."' c
r) financia
strategy.
I
9 Aviation Randy Firm- Ca "Despite an International Air Transport Association On a
Mar. Today Tinset Custo (IATA) warning that manufacturers might ship no modular
2009 "Lead h, mers more than 50% of this year's production, Boeing enterpri
Time Vice- refuses to take such a short-term view, preferring to se
Drops Preside look toward the horizon, assured that overall, long- architec
Five nt of term growth will continue. Unlike IATA, Boeing's ture's
Yearsat Market monitoring of the market and managing backlog feels attempts
Boeing" ing, certain things will stabilize and return to growth. And, of at
(Ian Boeing course, it is right considering the industry's six decades of producti
Goold) Comm consistent growth. The silver lining to the delivery on
ercial deferrals and cancellations, according to Boeing stability
Airpla Commercial Airplanes (BCA) Marketing Vice-President
nes Randy Tinseth, who spoke with Aviation Today's Daily
Brief in London, is a vastly compressed lead time for new
customers, prompting the company to enhance
communications on all fronts. 'The lead time now is to
late 2010; a year ago it was 2015,' Tinseth told ATDB.
'We are working with customers on a daily basis. Every
Friday morning we meet [internally] to discuss deliveries
over the next 12 months. Every month we talk with
production.' Boeing has learned from past mistakes.
'The benefit of this cycle is that we can take a very
thoughtful approach to Ichangel to avoid 'yo-yo-ing'
suppliers. That's what we learned in 1997 and 1998
lafter ramping up 737 production too quicklyl. Tinseth
believes operators will continue adapting to market
developments. He predicts a 1.4% drop in global domestic
product this year, and falls in passenger and cargo traffic
of 3-5%, and 5%, respectively - 'the largest decline ever
seen in the market,' he noted. With that background to
customer funding needs, the US manufacturer predicts a
modest $1 billion gap that it will address from its own
sources. But Tinseth is impressed by airline response to
the downturn: 'I've never seen operators so fast to
react; adjusting capacity and schedules, and parking
aircraft.' Tinseth says. Historically, cycles in global
revenue passenger miles on international scheduled
services have followed closely (but exaggerate by about
a half) world GDP trends. Generally, peaks and
troughs have lasted two or three years before the cycle
reverses -. that is until the boom in the past mid-
decade, which saw record orders placed over an
extended period. Those fat years prompted BCA CEO
Scott Carson to speculate in early 2007 that the
established pattern might be about to change, but
Tinseth suggests the jury is still out: 'We must wait:
Ithe present downturn] confirms the market is [still]
cyclic. There is no empirical evidence to de-link gross
domestic product from airline traffic.' What has
changed is Boeing's overall market approach, which these
days relies much less on domestic business. "In 2001, 61%
of our backlog was American; now it is 11% - more
diverse, more global." The latest boom has seen that
backlog increased constantly for five straight years, but
growth has stopped. "We expect our 'bill-to-book' [ratio]
to be less than one this year," concedes the marketing
executive, who also acknowledges another change.
'Record orders give a new flexibility in how we look at
[new businessi. Managing our backlog has now become
the priority.' Improved communications has made
Boeing more sensitive to the market and customers'
needs. 'You can almost detect a change in the market
over just two or three weeks,' concludes Tinseth.
'That's why daily conversations are so important. We
must remain close to customers, improve production,
and cut costs.' Doom-laden IATA remarks
notwithstanding, Tinseth remains optimistic: 'We'll stay
close to the market and ensure our backlog stays sold.'
Meanwhile, IATA's warning may prove to have no firmer
foundation than the guess and perception, which the airline
organization acknowledges it brought to the problem."
9 Flight Firm- ct "After incurring two years of costly delays to its flagship On a
Mar. Internat Suppli programme, Boeing is set to begin final assembly of the modular
2009 ional, ers sixth and final 787 flight-test airframe, paving the way enterpri
"Boeing for the first production Dreamliner. Major supplier se
Gears partners have delivered the majority of key structural and architec
Up for systems components to fminal assembly, with the forward tur's
787 and centre fuselage expected to be delivered around the attempts
Series second week of March. With these parts delivered, to re-
Producti structural partners are, for the first time, able to focus integrat
on" (Jon resources solely on preparing production aircraft. Centre e its
Ostrowe fuselage integrator Global Aeronautica, for example, will modular
r) have the first six production shipsets in its Charleston, supply
South Carolina facility by mid-March. Aircraft seven, chain.
which is due for delivery to All Nippon Airways in
February 2010, will be the first major engineering
blockpoint for the 787 programme, bringing significant
weight savings for overall performance enhancement,
although the first block one production aircraft are
expected to be delivered over the target weight. The
second blockpoint for additional design changes and
weight savings are expected for Aircraft 20. It is
believed that Boeing will gain significant weight
savings by introducing structural changes to the wing
and a revised electric architecture. Suppliers have
described the preparation of aircraft seven for delivery
to Boeing as more challenging because of the
significant design revisions expected to be required for
the production standard 787s. Much of the additional
work stems from revisions in the original engineering
as a result of late design changes for production
aircraft that will be incorporated at the first-tier
supplier level, rather than further down the supply
chain, where they otherwise would originate. For
example, a programme source told Flight International
that the production aft fuselage sections fabricated by
Vought Aircraft Industries is as much as 30% different
from the first six flight-test aircraft delivered. Several
such changes will originate in the centre wing box and
wing tank fabricated by Kawasaki and Fuji Heavy
Industries in Japan. Boeing revealed in March 2008
that it would have to strengthen internal structural
- -~ ~I*NEM,
spars due to premature buckling. Boeing said at the
time that aircraft seven would be the first 787 to have
that change incorporated at the supplier level, whereas
the first six test-flight aircraft required a retrofit to be
added on the final assembly line in Everett. In
addition, to better enable the forthcoming production
ramp-up and to speed up final assembly time, a
terminal fitting has been relocated from the wing to the
integrated centre fuselage section, although this change
presented a unique challenge to the 787 supply chain.
By relocating the fitting for its first incorporation with
aircraft seven, Boeing found that the width of the centre
fuselage had increased, causing a 'slight interference' with
a damage indicator panel within the 747 LCF Dreamlifter's
cargo bay, preventing optimal loading. The interference
was enough to warrant a simple retrofit to the Dreamlifter
that will be prepared in time for the first delivery, which is
expected in the second quarter. Boeing plans a service
bulletin to address this issue across the LCF fleet."
10 Forbes, Scott Firm- a "Boeing Co. said Tuesday the initial test flight and On a
Mar. "Boeing Carson Investo delivery of its long-awaited 787 jetliner remain on modular
2009 says , rs schedule. The Chicago-based aerospace company has enterpri
787 Preside postponed the introduction of the next-generation aircraft, se
Remain nt, built for fuel efficiency from carbon composite parts, four architec
s on Boeing times due to production glitches and a two-month strike ture's
Schedul Comm last fall. The delays have cost Boeing credibility and optimis
e'" ercial billions of dollars in anticipated costs and penalties. m.
Airpla Scott Carson, president and chief executive of Boeing's
nes commercial aircraft division, said Boeing continues to
work toward the inaugural 787 test flight in the second
quarter of this year and the first delivery in the first
quarter of 2010. 'The progress on a daily basis is
gratifying,' he said at an investor conference in New
York. 'We have now cleared all the equipment on the
airplane for first flight and are continuing to work
through the integrated software and hardware
testing.'"
10 CNN, Louis Firm- "European aerospace group EADS has announced On a
Mar. "EADS Gallois Investo 'satisfying' results for 2008, posting a net profit of E1.572 modular
2009 Profits , CEO, rs billion ($1.987 billion), despite the economic downturn. enterpri
Take off EADS EADS CEO Louis Gallois announces the 2008 results se
Despite during a press conference in Munich. In a statement on its architec
Downtu Web site, the company revealed earnings before interest ture's
rn" and taxes (EBIT) for the period amounted to £2.8 billion "reshapi
($3.55 billion). This compared to a £446 million net loss in ng"
2007. The Munich and Paris-based company attributed efforts
the results to its excellent underlying performance and to
significant positive foreign currency effects. 'We made become
significant headway in reshaping the company,' Louis more
Gallois, chief executive of EADS, said." efficient
10 Wall Firm- a "The corporate bond market has been strong in March, as On a
Mar. Street Investo companies with high credit ratings and solid balance modular
2009 Journal, rs sheets take advantage of investors' appetite for yield. enterpri
"Corpor Energy and utility companies have favored smaller issues - se
ate - usually averaging $300 million -- to refinance maturing architec
Bond debt. Investors see those sectors as much less risky than ture's
Supply others, including banks and finance companies. financin
Remain g
s Strong Boeing Co. is also in the market with a $1.85 billion strategie
in offering which will include five-, 10- and 30-year pieces. s.
March" The aerospace company is taking advantage of
(Kellie historically low interest rate levels combined with
Geressy investor demand for high-quality names, according to
) Todd Blecher, a spokesman for Boeing. The proceeds will
be used to support the company's general liquidity
position, which may include debt repayment,
repurchase of common stock, acquisitions, capital
expenditures and pension funding, he said. Boeing is
an infrequent issuer in the corporate bond market,
having last been seen in the U.S. market on Dec. 22, 2003,
when it sold a miniscule $11 million medium-term note.
'Now is a good time to take a step in building our
liquidity, given our overall debt structure. It seems a
prudent step to have a cushion in place on our balance
sheet, given what's happened in the economic
spectrum,' Mr. Blecher said."
13 "Boeing Firm a "With Boeing's poor 2008 performance, especially in On a
Mar. 's the commercial airplane division, the compensation of modular
2009 McNern its top executives was lower than it could have been. enterpri
ey was But somehow, despite the stock's dive and the se
Paid depressed profits, pay still rose for three out of the top architec
$14.8 four. Chief executive Jim McNerney earned 14 percent ture's
million more than the previous year. Only Commercial executiv
in Airplanes chief executive Scott Carson took a real hit. His e
2008" total compensation fell 19 percent from the previous year. compen
(Domini Adjusting figures reported Friday to reflect true 2008 sation,
c Gates) compensation, McNerney got $14.8 million in salary, based
bonuses and perks. That compares to $12.9 million in on the
2007. Carson's total compensation was $3.2 million, down labor
from $3.9 million in 2007. The pay for top company strike
executives was detailed in a filing Friday with the and firm
Securities and Exchange Commission. Boeing's filing perform
noted 'below target' economic performance in 2008 ance.
largely due to 'product development delays.' The
company's 787 Dreamliner program was further delayed to
almost two years behind schedule, and the 747-8 was
pushed out by nine months. However, the Boeing
board's compensation committee did not let another
problem - the two-month Machinist strike in 2008 -
factor into its executive pay awards. The compensation
measure that factors in the company's economic
performance was specifically adjusted 'to eliminate the
impact of the IAM strike' to ensure that the awards
'reflected underlying growth and performance,' the
filing said. McNerney requested cuts to his annual and
long-term incentive plan bonuses to reflect the depressed
profits, and the company board accordingly shrunk each
by 25 percent, knocking about $2.2 million off his
compensation. His 2008 annual bonus was 65 percent
lower than in 2007. But that was more than made up for by
the long-term incentive plan bonus, which is based on a
mft
three-year performance from 2006 through 2008 and was
buoyed by good results in the first two years. The perks
McNerney received in 2008 included $287,000 worth of
personal use of Boeing private jets, $67,000 in personal
legal services, and $60,000 for personal use of a company
car and driver. Top Boeing executives receive individual
performance scores annually that are one factor in
calculating their bonuses. McNerney's and Carson's
individual scores came in below target. The head of the
defense unit, Jim Albaugh, and chief financial officer
James Bell both received individual scores above target.
Albaugh got $5.1 million in 2008 salary, bonuses and
perks, compared to $4.1 million in 2007. Bell's total
compensation was $4.6 million, compared to $3.7 million
in 2007. Both men were up 23 percent on the previous
year."
16 Flight Firms- a "After sluggish sales in 2008 the ultra-large airliner On the
Mar. Global, Suppli & models face even bleaker prospects for new orders in future
2009 "Future ers B 2009. But of more immediate concern to Airbus and rate of
Aircraft Boeing is the need to get to grips with production issues technol
and that have dogged both their programmes. Boeing, which ogical
Engines has accumulated orders for 106 747-8s (78 -8F freighters (quality
: When and 28 -81 passenger models) since launching the General )
Will Electric GEnx-powered family three years ago, should innovati
they Hit now be flight-testing its 747-400 successor. But after a on in
the series of schedule delays - and two changes of the
Market? programme leadership within 18 months - assembly of ecosyste
" (Max the first 747-8F (the lead variant) is still not complete and m and
Kingsle first flight is at least three to four months away. Deliveries its
y-Jones) to launch customer Cargolux, which were due to begin late supply
this year, will now start no earlier than mid-2010. Boeing ecosyste
blamed the slip on a combination of issues including m.
supply chain problems, engineering requirements
(including the need for revisions to the wing design), the
787 crisis and its machinists' strike. 'After we got to the
90% release milestone of engineering drawings in early
third quarter of 2008 and started to begin production we
realised we weren't getting the parts in on time. A lot of
[the issues] came home at that point,' said 747 chief
engineer Michael Teal when the slip was announced last
year. Airbus, meanwhile, has just reached the 200-order
threshold for the A380 and has delivered 13 aircraft since
the first went to Singapore Airlines in October 2007. But it
is still battling with the overspill from production issues
that have dogged the programme. 'Production is not fully
under control, we've still got a bit of work to do,' says
Airbus executive vice-president programmes Tom
Williams. Output was due to rise from 12 aircraft in 2008
to 21 this year (having been reduced last year from the
earlier target of 25) and this has since been revised further
downwards to 18 as assembly lines struggle to transition
from the almost hand-built process used for early aircraft
to series production, dubbed 'Wave 2'. This year the bulk
of A380 deliveries will go to existing operators Emirates,
Qantas and Singapore Airlines, with Air France due to
become the fourth customer to receive the giant, at year-
end. The near-term commercial prospects for both the
A380 and 747-8 look difficult, with few if any new
customers on the horizon. Indeed Airbus' chief salesman
John Leahy predicted in January that A380 sales would be
flat this year - in the order of 10 aircraft. Until recently All
Nippon Airways had been the most serious new-customer
prospect for an ultra-large airliner deal. However, in
December last year the airline 'suspended' the actions of
its large aircraft selection committee and said that any deal
would have to wait 'until the market conditions look
right'. The lack of any serious new sales campaigns
might be a pain for the A380 sales team, but it could be
far more serious for the 747-8, which accrued just
three orders in 2008. To make matters worse, Boeing
has managed to land only one airline customer for the -
81 passenger version - Lufthansa - which became launch
customer for the 450-seater in 2006. Like the freighter,
the -81 has been subject to schedule slips with Lufthansa's
first delivery sliding from mid-2010 to the second quarter
of 2011. In the meantime, the market for the freighter
version - which is by far the stronger of the two variants
commercially - has disappeared as the cargo industry faces
a crisis of rapidly declining demand. In the wake of the
747-8 delay - and the related $685 million charge - Boeing
chief executive Jim McNerney hinted in January that
continuation of the programme should not be seen as a
foregone conclusion: 'We still see a viable business
proposition here,' he said. 'Now obviously if we ever
got to a point where we didn't, we'd have to work with
our customers to come up with another answer.' Faced
with these development and commercial issues, Boeing is
understood to have privately studied various options for
the programme, including terminating the 747-81 and
running the 747-8F as a standalone. In contrast to the
current woes at Boeing, Airbus has enjoyed a period of
good publicity as the A380 launch airlines have
experienced a relatively trouble-free introduction and
expanded their networks with little drama.
787/A350: The composite twins (Jon Ostrower in
Washington)
The commercial aerospace industry is finding that a
technology bottleneck runs through the mid-size long-
range widebody aircraft market. For Boeing, two years of
production and design problems have plagued its flagship
787 programme resulting in expansion disruptions for
airlines. Yet on a deeper level, development of both
larger and smaller aircraft is eagerly awaiting the
answers that will come out of the Dreamliner's
experience. The lessons learned by airlines operating the
787, which is expected to fly in the second quarter of this
year and enter service with Japan's All Nippon Airways in
February 2010, will validate or condemn the extensive
use of composite technology. Boeing has attempted to
answer all these questions in advance to the best of its
ability, but real-world operation will invariably reveal
...............................
unanticipated strengths and weaknesses in the technology.
With significant financial and engineering resources
occupied on preparing the 787 for its first flight,
certification and entry into service, the airframer has
neither significant staff nor capital to devote to the
future of the large-twin and narrowbody markets. As
a result, Airbus is waiting on the 787 to fly to inform its
own ongoing design and planning for its slightly larger
composite A350 XWB, which is expected to make its first
flight in late 2011 followed by a 2013 entry into service
with Qatar Airways. The cyclical planning logic then
returns to Boeing's doorstep as it waits for the larger 350-
seat A350-1000 and 314-seat A350-900 performance
expectations to firm up so the US airframer can decide
how to proceed with its 301 to 365-seat 777 programme.
On the smaller end of the aircraft spectrum, narrowbody
replacement appears to be pushed out beyond the next
decade as robust build rates and backlogs on the Airbus
A320 and Boeing 737 continue, though the material of
such a replacement for Airbus and Boeing remains
undefined. The manufacturers have each discussed
openly that the benefits of composite technology in low-
cycle long-haul operations may not carry over to high-
cycle short-haul operations. In the near-term, the
question for Boeing is whether or not it can deliver the
high performance expectations it has set for itself with the
787. Boeing has always touted a 10% better cash mile
cost over the 767, 20% improvement in fuel efficiency
and 30% savings in maintenance costs. Many of these
ambitious performance considerations have been hit by
reductions in the projected range of the aircraft from
between 8,000nm and 8,500nm to between 7,650nm
and 8,200nm, stemming from unanticipated weight
gain and speculation regarding lagging fuel burn
targets. Both Boeing and the 787's engine suppliers,
General Electric and Rolls-Royce, are undertaking
aggressive weight reduction and engine performance
improvement that will be incorporated by entry into
service as well as later block-point improvements.
Some airlines have begun to publicly speculate as to
whether or not the 787 will meet performance targets.
For example, Aeromexico chief executive Andres Conesa
recently expressed fears that the five Boeing 787-8s his
airline has ordered may fail to meet original performance
specifications including the ability to operate nonstop
flights from Mexico City to Asia. Prior to the global
economic collapse, both Boeing and Airbus accumulated
orders for their respective mid-size long-range widebody
jets at an unprecedented pace, garnering 878 and 483
firm orders respectively. Airbus may regard its 2013
entry into service date for the long-range twin as an
unintentionally shrewd move that positions its first
deliveries in line with an upswing for this inherently
cyclical industry. Yet, Boeing's almost two-to-one 787
backlog advantage provides an example of aggressively
tackling the replacement market of its own predecessor
ahead of its chief competitor. Whichever product claims
the title of market leader, both will be instrumental for
airlines with global long-haul ambitions. The A350 and
787 will hold an overpowering advantage over the ageing
A330 and 767 as they approach the mid- and later product
life.
Open rotor: Engines of the future
(Niall O'Keeffe in London)
Dramatic performance improvements are required of the
next generation of narrowbody aircraft, and open rotor
engines have been mooted as the means of delivery.
CFMlnternational, a GE-Snecma joint venture which
provides engines for both the Airbus A320 and Boeing
737NG families, is pursuing two programmes ahead of
those families' replacement. LEAP-X, an advanced ducted
turbofan due for certification in 2016, is targeted to
deliver a 16% fuel-burn reduction 'relative to today's
best of CFM', while an open rotor design, due by 'the
end of next decade', will deliver a 26% reduction,
according to the manufacturer. 'Given the potential fuel-
burn improvement, we just can't afford not to go on
investing and studying the open rotor potential,' says
Ron Klapproth, LEAP-X programme manager. In
Klapproth's view there is a natural overlap between
CFM's two programmes. 'If you've got a great open
rotor but you don't have a world-class core, you're not
going to meet the kind of performance goals that we set
out.' From April, GE and NASA will conduct wind tunnel
tests of counter-rotating fan-blade systems at the latter's
Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio. These tests are
geared toward noise limitation, a significant hurdle in open
rotor design due to the absence of a fan case. 'By looking
at variations in blade number and blade diameter and
spacing, as well as advanced shaping of the airfoils, we are
pretty optimistic that we're going to be able to make
significant improvements over what we flight-tested back
in the late 1980s,' says Klapproth, referencing prior
research into unducted rotor efficiency. Among airlines,
the open rotor concept has a vocal supporter in the shape
of easyJet, which in June 2007 proposed an open rotor-
powered 'ecoJet' as a solution to aviation's impact on the
environment. 'If you're going to spend $10-$15 billion
dollars on a new plane, it's got to be considerably
better,' says easyJet strategic planning manager Hal
Calamvokis. 'If you don't go open rotor you don't really
deliver those significant benefits.' By this reasoning, the
required performance gap simply cannot be bridged with
crew productivity and maintenance cost improvements
alone. The potential fuel savings steer Calamvokis toward
open rotors. 'The price of jet fuel is not going to go down
in the long term and in the long term carbon will be priced
in some way, shape or form,' he says. 'For this generation
of aircraft, it's fuel burn that we should be solving for.'
On the noise issue, Calamvokis predicts that open rotor-
powered narrowbodies will be quieter than the aircraft
..... . ........... .
they replace. He cites the investigative work of the
Institute of Sound and Vibration Research at the UK's
University of Southampton. Even the lower speed of open
rotor-powered aircraft (Mach 0.75 against the current
narrowbodies' Mach 0.78) is not, in Calamvokis' opinion, a
major drawback. 'As the price of fuel goes up we spot
rational airlines, who are incentivising their crews
correctly, flying slower,' he says, adding that some of the
time lost in cruise can be clawed back through faster
climb-out and descent. But enthusiasm for open rotor
designs is not shared by all. 'Initial hopes that open
rotors would be as fast as turbofans and have better
fuel consumption have proven unfounded,' argues Alan
Epstein, vice-president of technology and environment at
Pratt & Whitney, which plans to develop a version of its
geared turbofan (GTF) engine for the next generation of
narrowbodies. 'Open rotors' specific fuel consumption per
pound of thrust might be lower, but this is misleading,'
says Epstein. 'The fuel burn required to push the airplane
is what's important Open rotors will add tonnes of extra
weight.' He insists that the GTF represents a 'faster and
enormously quieter' option. CFM's Klapproth offers a
very different assessment. 'We see no real advantage to a
geared turbofan configuration, but we see some real
headwinds in terms of operational reliability,
particularly,' he says. Rolls-Royce has kept its cards
close to its chest, but battle lines are clearly being drawn in
the race to power future narrowbodies. It is now the task of
Boeing and Airbus to decide which option is best placed to
deliver a bold leap forward. 'It's actually possibly quite
fortunate that given the 787, A350, etc, they're just not
physically capable of doing anything quickly, which gives
us time to think radically," says easyJet's Calamvokis.
Narrowbodv replacement: Receding pressure
(Mary Kirby in Philadelphia)
Less than two years ago, airlines seemed largely united in
their demand that Airbus and Boeing accelerate plans to
develop single-aisle replacement aircraft. But the pressure
on airframers has subsided, for now, as carriers focus on
the task of weathering a global economic crisis of epic
proportions. Airlines ended 2008 with a $5 billion loss,
and expect a further $2.5 billion loss this year. 'To
better illustrate what this means, the industry-wide top line
revenues will fall by $35 billion, or 6.5%. The industry is
getting smaller. Airlines are cutting capacity,' says
IATA director general Giovanni Bisignani. With capacity
reduction comes delivery delays and order cancellations.
Indeed, Airbus and Boeing started the year with net orders
in deficit after a raft of cancellations. As such, the clout
wielded by airlines has diminished. 'The only way airlines
can get that leverage back is if the Bombardier CSeries
becomes a big success,' says Teal Group vice-president,
analysis Richard Aboulafia. The Pratt & Whitney geared
turbofan (GTF)-powered CSeries has just received a key
boost after Lufthansa's board in March approved an order
.......... ;;;;
for 30 of the type, firming its 2008 initial commitment for
up to 60 of the new jet. But other firm deals for the aircraft
have not yet surfaced. 'Airlines still need to replace
aircraft in 2013 - that's the year CSeries enters service.
What we are finding, understandably, is that given the
current financial situation many airlines are focused on
short-term issues rather than completing their fleet
negotiations for the long term," says Bombardier.
If Airbus and Boeing feel threatened by the 110/130-seat
CSeries, they are not showing it. Neither of the two firms
has defined replacement plans for the A320 and 737. The
lack of clarity has not slowed interest from engine makers,
which are working to introduce significantly more
efficient products. But, as it stands today, no new airframe
is expected to appear until at least the last few years of the
next decade. Airbus has been clear on this point. While
remaining closed-mouthed as to how it aims to keep its
A320 family competitive in the interim, the European
firm's chief operating officer John Leahy says he does not
expect a replacement aircraft to come available before
2020. That gives Bombardier 'a competitive advantage to
be sure, particularly as CSeries is the only current family
of aircraft designed specifically for the low-end, single-
aisle market', says Bombardier. The company estimates
the needs of the 100- to 140-seat commercial aircraft
market to be 6,300 aircraft, representing more than $250
billion over the next 20 years. Should the CSeries fail to
gain traction, however, the industry 'should probably
mourn rather than cheer', says Aboulafia, as it will give
airframers little incentive to move forward their timelines
for replacement narrowbodies, especially in light of
today's 'major impediments' to such development - slack
passenger demand, cheap fuel and pressured research and
development budgets. 'This is going to have a damaging
impact on the arrival of new technology,' he says. Air
France-KLM has been trying to persuade Airbus and
Boeing to launch a new narrowbody for years. KLM
senior vice-president for fleet development and aircraft
trading Jan Witsenboer late last year urged for quicker
progress in their narrowbody replacement projects,
saying: We wouldn't use an interim solution. We want
a definite solution, preferably much earlier.'
17 The Bertra Firm- a "PHOENIX - Airplane makers Airbus and Boeing On
Mar. Seattle nd Custo & remain bullish about 2009 jet-production rates. But modular
2009 Times, Grabo mers- I their views are starkly at odds with the outlook of and
"Jet wski, Custo many financiers of the airplane business. At a major integral
Financi managi mer's aviation-industry conference here, Airbus joined Boeing enterpri
ers See ng Investo in insisting upon a forecast that at least in the short se
Producti directo rs term is rosy, saying commercial-airliner production can architec
on Cuts r of hold steady this year. But the audience - people who tural
Coming Germa buy, sell or lease jet aircraft and the bankers who approac
Throug ny's finance them - was mostly not persuaded. Many at the hes to
h 2011" DVB annual conference of the International Society of managi
(Domini Bank Transport Aircraft Traders (ISTAT) were skeptical the ng
c Gates) money can be found to pay for the roughly 965 jets capacity
Boeing and Airbus have scheduled for delivery in 2009.
................
Bertrand Grabowski, a managing director of Germany's
DVB Bank, a major European financier of airplanes, said
that with the airlines facing rapidly falling demand, the
only question is how much and how soon both Airbus
and Boeing will cut production for 2009 through 2011.
'They will have to do it. It's a matter of fact,' said
Grabowski in an interview. 'How would you like to see
your client bleeding by taking delivery of aircraft they
don't need?' He expects production cuts starting later
this year, and worse to come in 2010 and 2011. That
assessment, in line with those of other analysts who asked
not to be named, contrasted with the presentation by
Mark Pearman-Wright, head of leasing and investor
marketing at Airbus. Pearman-Wright insisted funding
for this year's Airbus deliveries is secure and that the
plane maker will flatten rather than cut production in
2010 and 2011. 'We don't see a problem in funding the
deliveries until the end of the year,' he said, echoing the
message of Boeing Commercial Airplanes Chief Executive
Scott Carson to a Wall Street audience last week. 'I've
noticed the manufacturer mindset is more bullish,' said
Pearman-Wright. 'It's not so much Airbus versus
Boeing. It's the manufacturers versus the financiers.'
In a sobering assessment to kick off the conference
Monday morning, respected industry economist Adam
Pilarski, of Avitas, at least agreed with the manufacturers
that this year's deliveries are relatively safe. But Pilarski
went on to forecast that production will 'fall off a cliff' in
2011. 'The crash has to happen and it will be severe,'
said Pilarski. His prediction of combined Airbus and
Boeing production for that year is an ominous 666
airplanes, a 30 percent drop from today. Pearman-
Wright protested: 'We don't see that at all.' Yet across
the conference, the complaint is that credit is frozen and
money is not available. Leasing companies in recent
years have had ready access to debt to finance the bulk
of their purchases of new airplanes. They have sold
either older airplanes or stock to raise the cash for the
roughly 20 percent equity they must put up with such
purchases. Now, they have access to neither cash nor
credit. 'Raising equity and debt has become more than a
challenge,' said ISTAT President Mike Platt, chief
investment officer with jet-leasing company Aircastle.
Pilarski ended his presentation grasping for optimism. He
agreed that eventually air traffic will return to its historic
upward climb and the industry will recover. 'The long-
term future of aviation is still solid,' said Pilarski. But as
DVB Bank's Grabowski put it: 'The problem is 2009,
2010 and 2011.'
17 Busines Custo B "Executives who are able to produce halfway decent On an
Mar. sWeek, mer business figures have become a rarity in the current integral
2009 "Emirat financial crisis. Thus it comes as no surprise that Louis enterpri
es Gallois, 65, visibly enjoyed his appearance at a press se
Slams conference held in an aircraft hangar belonging to an architec
Airbus aviation museum near Munich on Tuesday of last week. ture's
on Gallois, who is CEO of the European aerospace and disinteg
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A380 defense giant EADS, was clearly in high spirits as he ration.
Defects reported on the group's successes from the previous year.
" Sales rose by 11 percent and profits increased to about
(Dinah C1.6 billion ($2.1 billion). EADS even exceeded its
Deckste internal cost-cutting targets. But Gallois became
in) - significantly more subdued when he was asked about the
translate coming months. He said that he had no idea how many-if
d from any-aircraft orders will be cancelled by customers in the
Der near future. The A400M, a military transport plane which
Spiegel has been delayed for more than four years, also
online apparently poses a considerable potential threat to Airbus
and its parent company, EADS. Gallois conceded that if
the buyer countries pulled out of the prestigious project,
the group would have to repay close to C6 billion ($7.8
billion) to their governments. This would put an enormous
dent in EADS's ample financial cushion of around C9
billion ($11.7 billion).
There is another, even more pressing problem, one that the
head of EADS preferred not to even mention. And yet it
has triggered consternation at its most important
subsidiary, Airbus. In mid-February, senior executives
from Airbus and the airline Emirates, the biggest customer
for Airbus's A380, attended a crisis meeting in Toulouse to
discuss the super-jumbo. Last summer, after a roughly
two-year delay, the Arab airline took delivery on the first
of 58 A380s it had ordered. The airline currently operates
four jets in this series. Nine others are in use at Singapore
Airlines and the Australian airline Qantas. The Airbus
executives could not have liked what they were told and
shown by the Emirates representatives. In a 46-slide
presentation, the aviation experts painstakingly listed
what they viewed as the giant jet's serious growing pains.
To illustrate their points, they included snapshots of
singed power cables, partially torn-off sections of
paneling and defective parts of thrust nozzles in the
engines as evidence of what they described as a shoddy
work ethic at Airbus and its suppliers. The confidential
manufacturer's information has since been leaked to
employees, triggering a mood of panic. 'Many good
people have resigned and are trying to move to other
projects,' reports a concerned insider. Airbus is doing its
best to calm the waves. 'We take our customer Emirates'
criticism very seriously and are doing everything in our
power to correct any reports of deficiencies as quickly as
possible,' says an Airbus spokesman. He also confirms a
'number of individual incidents that have impaired the
operation but not the safety of the aircraft.' Crisis
meeting? Cable problems? These words are reminiscent of
a humiliating chapter in the company's more recent
history, one that Airbus managers and their CEO, Tom
Enders, would rather see stricken from the annals of the
company. Because of production problems and labor
disputes in recent years, the mega-plane, celebrated by
experts and aviation fans alike, has been the cause of vast
amounts of additional work and a significant loss for its
. .............................................................
producers in the past few years. Some senior executives
are even suspected of having lined their pockets through
stock deals and of having concealed the true extent of the
A380 debacle from outside shareholders for far too long.
Through a massive effort, the group did manage to deliver
12 of its flagship jets last year. It expects to build another
18 this year and hand them over to customers. The
problems seemed to have been corrected, and the
company recently began a gradual shift from the costly
and time-consuming manual assembly of the A380 to
the long-planned commercial series production. Airbus
seemed to have cleaned up its act, only to be confronted by
the incendiary information from the Middle East. The list
of defects was long on clear language and short on
diplomatic niceties. On one of the slides, the experts
provide a detailed list of the prestigious plane's various
breakdowns. They say that the A380 has already been
grounded nine times, which represented a loss of close to
500 operating hours. In 23 cases, say the Emirates
managers, replacement aircraft had to be obtained at short
notice. Minor glitches, the critique continues, happen in
Emirates' A380 fleet about once every two days. In the
medium term, the Emirates experts write, the airline could
face the 'threat of a loss of confidence in the aircraft
and the brand image of the Emirates A380.' The Airbus
managers want to make sure that this doesn't happen. They
have sold only about 200 of their flagship jets to date.
According to industry estimates, Airbus will have to sell
about twice as many A380s to recoup its costs. Enders
and his staff are now doing everything possible to placate
angry customers. Each individual problem report is
analyzed and simulated. 'Defects are traced back to their
origin and corrected,' explains an Airbus spokesman.
'We have already made great progress in this respect in
recent weeks.'
Both Airbus and Emirates have reacted to this story since
it was released on Saturday ahead of publication in
Monday's edition of Der Spiegel. Airbus said Sunday it
was taking Emirates' criticism of the A380 'very
seriously.' 'We are doing everything we can to overcome
the issues,' an Airbus spokeswoman told Reuters.
Emirates for its part told the news agency that it has a
'good relationship with Airbus' and that it would
'continue to work closely with them to address these
technical matters.' The Emirates spokeswoman said
that the airline remained confident in the A380 and
had no plans to cancel orders. In addition, the aircraft
manufacturer is storing additional replacement parts
directly on-site in places where the super-jumbo is now
in use, so as to be able to respond more quickly to
problems as they arise. Airbus also plans to expand the
rapid response team it created specifically to address A380
concerns. It is even considering making some changes to
individual components. In private, Airbus executives point
out that problems are also encountered with other new
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aircraft models when they are used in commercial
aviation. Some 23,000 individual parts are used in the
cabin area alone, managers say, meaning that teething
problems cannot be ruled out completely. After all, they
say, the reliability of all parts and systems can only be
proved once the aircraft is in operation. Whether these
and other explanations will convince Emirates remains to
be seen. In its damning presentation, the company also
sharply criticizes the production processes at Airbus. For
example, the Emirates report concludes, the A380
models were not sufficiently tested before being
delivered to customers. Experts, on the other hand, note
that no other jet has ever been as thoroughly tested as the
giant Airbus. Nevertheless, they say, not all conceivable
scenarios involving every single part could have been
simulated in the dry runs. Some of the problems could
hardly have been foreseen, such as one involving the
plane's shower facilities. So far Emirates is the only A380
customer to provide two showers in first class. A
determined female passenger who was unable to operate
the showerhead promptly tore out the entire fixture-and
flooded the shower room. The Emirates experts believe
that Airbus should choose its suppliers more carefully
and limit their numbers. They also say that the
constant transport of parts and employees among
Airbus's locations throughout Europe makes it more
difficult to comply with prescribed quality standards.
'Our work is well organized and properly inspected,'
counters an Airbus spokesman. He also points out that
A380 production is becoming more and more
normalized. It is still not clear how the spat between the
aircraft maker and its dissatisfied customer will end.
Competitors Singapore Airlines and Qantas have also had
to ground their A380 jets several times in recent weeks
and months. The Asians have had trouble with the fuel
pumps and the on-board electronics. The Australians
noticed that the highly sensitive measuring sensors in the
tank were not working properly, although it is still unclear
whether the problem was attributable to the devices
themselves or was caused by impurities in the fuel.
Unlike Emirates, Singapore Airlines and Qantas have
taken a more relaxed approach to the problems.
However they, unlike the Arabs, have not just ordered
dozens of new A380s. Since the end of last week, the
Dubai-based airline has however tried to defuse the
conflict. 'Technical problems are to be expected in a
new aircraft, especially one in which so many new
technologies are used,' says an Emirates spokesman.
He is also quick to point out that order cancellations
are not planned. The A380, he says, is an 'outstanding
airplane."'
(Reader Comment from "Handsome"):
"These growing pains will be overcome - the B747 had a
bunch of them also - back in the day! Airbus will solve
these issues - I have found Airbus to be more agile and
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aggressive in solving new product development
problems than their brethren in Chicago/Seattle/DC -
based on my experience with the two supply chains!!"
18 Seattle Bob Firm- a "The leading players in the world of aviation financing On
Mar. Times, Genise Custo & said Tuesday there is a multibillion-dollar 'funding gap' modular
2009 "Money , chief mer- P between all the Boeing and Airbus jets due for delivery and
's Short executi Custo this year and the money to pay for them. Bob Genise, the integral
to Pay ve of mer's chief executive of Dubai-based airplane lessor DAE, enterpri
for Dubai- Investo provided a stark image of what that means to Boeing. se
Boein, based rs Genise, who maintains a home in Seattle, said he'll be architec
AirbusJ airplan surprised if he doesn't see 'white tails' parked alongside tural
ets, e Boeing Field when he's driving on Interstate 5 toward the approac
Experts lessor end of the year. That's aviation slang for completed jets hes to
Warn" DAE; whose buyers don't have the money to take possession. managi
(Domini Stephe There haven't been any white tails at Boeing for years. ng
c Gates) n Walt Skowronski, president of Boeing Capital, the capacity
Udvar- company's jet-financing unit, conceded that a gap exists,
Hazy, pegging it at somewhere between zero and $5 billion. Yet
chief he offered assurances that Boeing can manage its
executi scheduled deliveries through the problem. Stephen Udvar-
ve of Hazy, chief executive of International Lease Finance
Interna Corp. (ILFC), the world's largest aircraft lessor and the
tional biggest customer of both Boeing and Airbus, wasn't
Lease reassured. His company is owned by AIG, the giant insurer
Financ that's still struggling despite billions of dollars in federal
e bailout money. 'When a bomb explodes, the light flash
Corp.; travels a lot faster than the sound,' said Udvar-Hazy.
Bertra 'The flash occurred in September. But the sound hasn't
nd reached Seattle and (Airbus headquarters in) Toulouse
Grabo yet.' He and other leading airplane-financing experts
wski, spoke at the annual conference of the International Society
managi of Transport Aircraft Traders (ISTAT). They suggested
ng the funding gap caused by the virtual freezing of bank
directo lending is much bigger than Skowronski's estimate,
r of anywhere from $10 to $20 billion, and that Boeing would
Germa face severe consequences, such as:
ny's * Cutting production rates as early as the fourth quarter,
DVB eventually reducing output by as much as a third -
Bank which inevitably would mean slashing jobs.
- Having to finance airplanes itself, putting in up to three
times the $1 billion it anticipates, yet still not closing the
funding gap.
Robert Morin, vice president of the federal Export-Import
Bank, said the government is ready to offer as much as $10
billion in guarantees to help finance U.S. airplane sales
going overseas, mostly for Boeing jets. But that likely
won't be enough to close the gap, said the experts at
ISTAT. Boeing executives offered repeated assurances
that all deliveries for this year are financed. But Bertrand
Grabowski, managing director of Germany's DVB Bank,
called that an 'act of faith.' In an interview, he said
troubled banks have made soft commitments to both
Boeing and Airbus customers that they may not be able to
keep. 'Some of the Boeing deliveries are not secure ... for
the last quarter of this year,' Grabowski said. Some
recently European nationalized banks "have absolutely no
clue if they can deliver what they signed term sheets for,"
he said. European banks have dominated aviation
financing in the last decade. Udvar-Hazy said at least
half of those that used to be in aviation are now 'totally
shut out' of the market. Grabowski forecast that $5 to $7
billion of deliveries scheduled for 2009 - mostly for
Boeing and Airbus and with a few for Brazilian jet maker
Embraer - will 'evaporate' by year-end. Boeing and
Airbus would then have two choices, said Robert Martin,
chief executive of BOC Aviation, a Singapore-based
leasing company owned by Bank of China: 'They either
fund those deliveries themselves or cut back
production.' Boeing Capital's Skowronski said the
company expects to have to provide about $1 billion in
financing to its customers this year, but is ready to give
more. 'If it were to go to $2 billion or $3 billion, that's
generally not going to be a problem,' he said. The U.S.
government, represented by the Export-Import bank, will
close part of the gap by increasing its loan guarantees from
a typical $4 billion to $5 billion a year, to $9 billion or $10
billion. Ex-Im's Morin said 2009 could be the toughest
year of the down cycle. He expects to finance 150 to 170
airplane deliveries in 2009, mostly Boeing wide-bodies.
The European Export Credit Agencies will offer a similar
dollar amount in loan guarantees to support between 200
and 300 Airbus deliveries, mostly less expensive narrow-
bodies. 'This is making 9/11 look like a speed bump,'
said DAE's Genise. 'The liquidity crisis is not turning
around in three months,' he said. 'It's not turning around in
six months. It's a major disaster for the global economy
and it will be a major disaster for the airline industry
and the manufacturers."'
18 Air Steven Firm- a "Leasing companies today recommended that Airbus On
Mar. Transpo Udvar- Custo & and Boeing should slash production by about 25 modular
2009 rt Hazy, mer- I percent due to the current difficulties faced by operators and
Intellige CEO Custo and lessors in financing aircraft in today's economic integral
nce ILFC mer's environment. ILFC chief Steven Udvar-Hazy believes a enterpri
news, Investo 25-to-30 percent cut makes sense, while others on a se
"ILFC rs leasing panel today at ISTAT suggested 'similar' architec
Chief reductions, albeit at a slightly lesser range. Whatever the tural
Recom amount, Udvar-Hazy believes it is 'inevitable' there is approac
mends going to be production cuts, 'it's just a matter of when hes to
Airbus and to what degree'. Most speakers this week at ISTAT managi
and have identified a significant funding gap in aircraft ordered ng
BoeingS and those that will be financed, capacity
lash
Producti Responding to these comments, a Boeing executive in the
on audience said aircraft are committed to production in
25%" 2009 and if an airline can't finance it, 'we'll have
(Mary whitetails'. But in 2010 and beyond Boeing 'will be
Kirby) looking very carefully at supply and demand so that we
don't overproduce', he says. An Airbus executive in the
audience also chimed in, noting that Airbus is currently
producing 34 A320s per month, down from a previous rate
of 40 per month. 'We continue to monitor it' and Airbus is
III
being 'realistic and proactive', he says."
18 Air Steven Firm- a "Boeing's initial batch of 787s will be delivered On a
Mar. Transpo Udvar- Custo & overweight, despite Boeing's strong efforts to rectify the modular
2009 rt Hazy, mer 1 problem, ILFC chief Steven Udvar-Hazy said today at the enterpri
Intellige CEO ISTAT conference in Phoenix. 'Rest assured that the se
nce ILFC first batch of 787s will be overweight,' said Udvar-Hazy architec
news, in response to a question posed by ATI. The ILFC chief ture's
"ILFC's notes that Boeing is injecting a lot of resources 'into over-
Hazy: rectifying that problem' and rectifying the additional promise
Boeing' 'empty weight' on the first 787s. and
s Initial under-
787s 'In the long run, this will be an excellent aircraft. But I delivery
will be pity the airlines that get the first ones. Obviously those
Overwe aircraft will not be the same standard as those 787s later
ight" on.'"
(Mary
Kirby)
19 Schaeffe Firm- a "The Boeing Company is struggling to climb into the On the
Mar. rs Investo black this morning after some negative brokerage mental
2009 Researc r comments hit the Street. Falling freight demand is likely to models
h, bring about more delivery deferrals for Boeing's popular of
"Wall 777 jet plane, JPMorgan stated in a note. Before the open, investor
Street the brokerage firm slashed its earnings-per-share estimate s of a
Sentime for Boeing, Precision Castparts Corp., and Spirit modular
nt Sours Aerosystems Inc.. The brokerage firm cut its delivery enterpri
on The expectations for the 777 this year to 80 from 82, and to 70 se
Boeing deliveries next year from 80. 'The correction of global architec
Compan economic imbalances, particularly the credit-fueled bubble ture.
y" of American consumer demand, has significant
(Joceyln implications for the 777 perhaps more than any other
n aircraft,' JPMorgan said. 'We believe the announcement
Drake) of a production cut could be in the cards in the coming
weeks.' Sentiment on Wall Street has somewhat bearish
leanings at the moment. Zacks reports that the security has
earned 7 "buy" ratings, 10 "holds," and 2 "sells."
Considering the stock's weak technical performance,
there is still room for potential downgrades, which
could pressure the security lower. What's more, the
average 12-month price target for BA stands at $49.37,
according to Thomson Reuters. This estimate implies that
analysts are expecting the shares to skyrocket more
than 46% during the next 12 months. Any price-target
cuts from this group could also have negative implications
for the shares. Technically speaking, the security has
rolled higher from its March low and is currently sitting on
support at its 10-day moving average. However, the stock
is still below staunch resistance at its declining 10-week
and 20-week moving averages. These intermediate-term
trendlines have guided the shares lower since mid-
October 2007, resulting in a loss of more than 67%.
Not surprisingly, this negative price action has
garnered the stock some pessimism from options
players. The Schaeffer's put/call open interest ratio for BA
comes in at 1.14, as put open interest outnumbers call open
interest among near-term options. This reading is higher
than 93% of all those taken during the past year, indicating
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that options players have been more pessimistically
aligned toward the shares just 7% of the time during
the past year. This preference for puts can also be seen in
the action on the International Securities Exchange.
During the past 10 trading sessions, 5 puts have been
purchased to open for every 1 call purchased to open. This
ratio of puts to calls is higher than 98.8% of all those taken
during the past 12 months, pointing to extreme
pessimism among options players. Digging into the
stock's open interest configuration, we find that peak put
open interest in the March series sits at the 30 strike, with
nearly 4,500 contracts. The April 30 put also has open
interest of nearly 4,500 contracts. Meanwhile, the bulk of
the stock's put open interest sits in the May series. The
May 50 put has open interest of 21,400 contracts, the May
35 put has open interest of 18,700 contracts, and the May
30 put has open interest of 10,100 contracts. On the other
hand, peak March call open interest sits at the 35 strike
and numbers fewer than 4,100 contracts. The April 35 call
has open interest of 8,800 contracts. Meanwhile, peak May
call open interest sits at the 35 strike, with 15,200
contracts. The overall preference for puts over calls
indicates that investors have low expectations for the
shares during the near term. However, considering the
stock's weak technical performance, this pessimism is to
be expected. One group hasn't jumped on the bearish
bandwagon. Short sellers have avoided this stock, as
less than 2% of the company's total float has been sold
short. If the equity continues its downtrend, it's likely
to attract some of these bears. An increase in short
selling could pressure the security lower."
26 USA Scott Firm- a "The biggest sales boom in Boeing's cyclical history of On a
Mar. Today, Carson Custo making commercial passenger jets has come to a modular
2009 "Boeing , CEO, mers screeching halt. After selling 4,134 planes the past four enterpri
Says Boeing years, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, the company's se
It's Comm jetliner division, is racking up more cancellations than architec
Flying ercial orders for new planes this year. Industry analysts warn that ture's
High Airpla more cancellations may be in the offing as people are attempts
Despite nes flying less in the global recession. But top executives at at
Recessi Boeing, the USA's largest exporter by value of goods sold output
on" abroad, remain publicly confident. They've announced stability
(Dan only 4,500 job cuts so far - far fewer than the roughly like an
Reed) 30,000 laid off after the downturn in travel following integral
the Sept. 11 terror attacks. And none of the cuts are on enterpri
the assembly line. They're betting on two things to keep se
production humming for years: the company's staggering architec
$270 billion backlog of orders; and belief that the 30-year ture.
trend of growing demand for air travel will continue
beyond the current downturn. At current production rates,
it will take seven to eight years for Boeing to deliver the
nearly 3,700 jetliners on backlog, says Randy Tinseth, the
company's marketing vice president. 'We've clearly got a
much larger backlog than we've ever had in previous
cycles,' Tinseth says. 'That gives us flexibility as we go
through this downturn.'
DREAMLINER: Boeing's long-awaited 787 may
finally take to air
Scott Carson, CEO of the commercial airplanes division,
told investors at the JPMorgan Chase conference in New
York earlier this month that over the next 20 years the
market 'is a rich opportunity for us,' whether the ultimate
demand for commercial jets is 29,000 planes, as Boeing
projects, or just 27,000 if cancellations continue. 'We're
playing from a position of strength,' he said. Are
Boeing's leaders just whistling past the graveyard by
believing that economic forces that have engulfed many
large and successful companies in the past six months
won't ensnare the manufacturing giant? Richard
Aboulafia thinks so. 'Yes, Boeing has a record backlog,
but only a fool would believe in it,' says Aboulafia, an
aircraft manufacturing analyst at Teal Group in Fairfax,
Va. If airlines in the USA and around the world are
flattened financially by severe recession and deeply
diminished demand, they will not hesitate to forfeit down
payments and walk away from so-called firm orders for
new planes, he says. Even if carriers negotiate delivery
deferrals rather than cancellations, Boeing won't get
hundreds of millions of dollars in the next few years that it
expects to be paid upon completion of those planes, he
says. Boeing will start feeling the pinch in 2010,
Aboulafia predicts. He says financing is available for all
the planes that Boeing and its chief rival, Europe's Airbus,
plan to deliver to the airlines this year. 'But after that,' he
says, 'all bets are off. In a serious downturn - and this
certainly is one - production typically falls by about a
third. I can't see why in this downturn it would be
different.'
Others much less confident
Others are more pessimistic. Robert Stallard at
Macquarie Research in New York lowered his rating on
Boeing in January, warning that the company 'is
underestimating the potential for lower airline
demand.' Joseph Nadol at JPMorgan last week cut his
earnings estimates for Boeing and Airbus for this year and
next. In addition to rapidly weakening demand for
passenger planes, Nadol said, the cargo version of
Boeing's 777 is in particular trouble because air freight
volumes have 'collapsed' by 25% from a year ago.
Giovanni Bisignani, head of the International Air
Transport Association, the airlines' global trade group,
warned last month that Boeing and Airbus might not be
able to deliver up to half the commercial planes they
build this year. In Boeing's case, that would be about
240 of the 485 planes it is scheduled to deliver.
Bisignani said he based his prediction on conversations
with several airline CEOs who told him they can't afford
to pay for the new planes. Even more chilling was the
warning shot fired last month by Steven Udvar-Hazy, head
of International Lease Finance, the world's largest lessor
of commercial airplanes and the largest single customer of
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both Boeing and Airbus. Speaking with reporters at a
Boeing media event in Seattle, he predicted that both
airplane makers will be producing 'white tails' by the end
of this year. 'White tails' are planes completed without a
buyer, so they have no logo on their tails. Chris Tarry, an
independent industry analyst and consultant based outside
London, estimates that 1,600 to 1,800 already-ordered
Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s, both of which carry
about 150 passengers, are in danger of not being
delivered over the next three to 10 years. '(Airlines)
simply don't need them,' he says. If there's anything
Boeing understands, it's the wildly cyclical nature of
the aviation business. Past downturns have led to massive
layoffs, regional economic upheaval and larger U.S. trade
deficits. Boeing officials believe they can avoid most of
that pain this time by better managing production.
Carson told investors at the JPMorgan Chase conference
that the company won't decide until May or June
whether to slow production of planes scheduled for
delivery in the last half of 2010. Planes to be delivered
then would go into production early next year.
Suppliers need about six months advance notice of a
change. 'There's lots of uncertainty in 2010,' Tinseth,
Boeing's marketer, admits. 'That's why I'm trying to sell
some additional planes in the back half of 2010 in
expectation that there'll be some 'melt-away' from our
backlog, through deferrals mainly. 'But we've been
pretty successful in managing our business the last few
years during our biggest sales boom ever. We've been
very measured in our approach to increasing
production rates. We're not producing planes at nearly
the rate we did in the past, and that should keep us
pretty healthy during the downturn.'
There are other danger signs, however. In the first two
months of this year, Boeing sold only 22 new planes, down
from 195 in the same period last year. Worse, Boeing saw
32 orders for its new 787 Dreamliner canceled in
February. The roughly $1.75 billion or so that Boeing will
get from the new model 737 and 77 planes it sold in
January and February won't come close to offsetting the
nearly $5.5 billion it is losing from the cancellation of the
787s. Each 787 is priced around $170 million. Much of
Boeing's fortunes depend on whether the airlines have
access to capital. Airlines with good credit are going to
pay more for borrowing in this economic climate, industry
analyst Tarry says. 'Carriers that aren't very creditworthy,
and that's a lot of them,' he says, 'won't be able to accept
delivery of planes they've already ordered and certainly
won't order more.' That's left Boeing as the financier of
last resort for some of the planes it builds. Continental,
arguably the top performer financially among traditional
U.S. airlines and a top Boeing customer, has 13 new
aircraft coming this year. Only six are financed so far.
Gerald Laderman, Continental's treasurer, says the
airline has 'backstop' financing from Boeing for the
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31 Financi Louis Firm 3 "EADS is prepared to accept a limited cut in orders for the On the
Mar. al Times Gallois A400M military transport plane, in a bid to keep Europe's leadersh
2009 "EADS , CEO, biggest defence contract alive as government clients grow ip of an
Reassur EADS restless over rising costs and long delays. Louis Gallois, integral
es EADS chief executive, speaking in an interview with the enterpri
Custom FT, said for the first time that a limited reduction in orders se
ers Over would be 'manageable' for the Franco-German aerospace architec
Future group. However, he said any significant cut would have ture.
of 'an impact on the price of the planes' - a clear signal to the
A400M seven governments that launched the troublesome 20bn
other seven and will draw on that if necessary. Finding
less-expensive capital won't be easy. 'Some lenders
have just gotten out of the business of lending against
airplanes,' says John Pritchard, an attorney at Holland &
Knight in New York who specializes in aircraft finance
arrangements. 'But the (loan) terms have gotten a lot
tougher,' he says.
Southwest Airlines, which flies only Boeing planes and
is the best credit risk among U.S. carriers because of its
strong balance sheet, recently trumpeted that in
December it was able to refinance 17 late-model 737s at
10.5% interest on a three-year note secured by the aircraft.
Just a year earlier, it refinanced several planes at 3.6%
interest on an eight-year, unsecured note. 'It just reflects
that the market has gotten so bad that even a good lending
customer like Southwest could run into that kind of trouble
getting financing,' Pritchard says.
Other loans available
To bolster credit-backed sales, Boeing Capital, the
company's lending arm, is expecting to make $1 billion in
credit available to customers this year after not extending
any the last three years. The French government, a
shareholder in Airbus parent EADS - European
Aeronautic Defence and Space - is making more than $6
billion available to airlines buying or leasing Airbus
planes. Free-trade advocates may decry government
financing as an intervention in the market, but the
United States does much the same thing for Boeing's
foreign customers via the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
Last year, the Export-Import Bank backed $5.5 billon in
aircraft loans on 97 Boeing-built planes sold to 17 airlines
and two leasing companies outside the USA. Robert
Morin, head of the bank's transportation lending group,
expects 2009 to be a record year, with $7 billion to $9
billion in loan guarantees issued to foreign carriers and
leasing companies. About 90% of the planes Boeing
expects to deliver this year are destined for companies
outside the USA. Morin says he's hopeful that bank-
supported aircraft leasing will decline next year and
beyond as commercial lenders warm back up to the
market. Though it's too early to call it a trend, Morin says,
commercial lending on airplanes picked up a bit in the
current quarter after extraordinarily tight lending at the end
of last year driven by the global liquidity crisis."
I
19 ($26.3bn) project in 2003 that they should not push too
(Peggy hard for concessions. Mr Gallois' comments came as
Holling EADS sought to reassure customers and the market that it
er and remained committed to the A400M programme, already
Sylvia E2bn over budget and three years late. Doubts over
Pfeifer) EADS's determination to continue with the programme
were raised at the weekend by Tom Enders, head of the
group's aircraft arm Airbus, who suggested in an interview
with Der Spiegel magazine that he would rather scrap the
programme than continue under the current contract.
Cancellation could force EADS to pay back E5.7bn in
advance payments, more than half its net cash. Occar, the
pan-European procurement agency that placed the original
order for 180 aircraft, is preparing to launch official
negotiations with EADS over the terms of the contract.
This month, the governments agreed a three-month
moratorium on cancellations from today to allow the talks
to go on. But talks come as the enthusiasm of some of the
original customers - notably Germany and the UK - for the
aircraft may be waning. Mr Gallois said yesterday he was
confident a solution would be found. The EADS chief
appears to be betting that politicians will put pressure on
defence ministries to resolve the disagreements over
penalties in order to preserve jobs in a highly sensitive
sector. 'This programme is going to fly because the
defence and industrial challenges are considerable,' he
said. 'They need this plane and it is also about 40,000
highly qualified jobs in Europe. We have to find a
solution together.' Nonetheless, the UK government,
which ordered 25 aircraft and urgently needs a new
transport aircraft for operations in Afghanistan, increased
pressure on EADS yesterday, warning it would 'not be
content with a gap in capability'. John Hutton, secretary
of state for defence, told MPs the delays were a 'matter of
extreme regret' that posed 'very serious questions' about
the future of the UK's military logistics capabilities. He
said the government would decide whether to go ahead
with the programme at the beginning of July but warned:
'We will not be content with a gap in capability.' The UK
is considering alternative options to bridge the delivery
gap, including extending the out-of-service dates of the
ageing C-130 Hercules aircraft, and buying more C-17s
from Boeing, the US jetmaker. Mr Gallois said he
expected Airbus to deliver a new timetable to customers
after agreeing a delivery date for the propulsion system
software, known as Fadec."
31 Aviation Scott Firm a "Demonstrating a degree of public humility many feel has On a
Mar. Internat Carson been all too absent among the bankers collectively modular
2009 ional , CEO, responsible for the global financial crisis, Boeing enterpri
News Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Scott Carson offered no se
"Humbl Comm further excuses for the delays that have plagued the architec
ed ercial 787 and 747-8 this month during the J.P. Morgan ture's
Boeing Airpla Aviation and Transportation Conference in New York. overpro
Prepare nes 'The stumbles we have made have been embarrassing for mise
s to Fly us,' Carson said. 'They've been embarrassing for our and
787" customers, who were counting on us to have the right under-
(Gregor product in place at the right time.' To avoid further delivery
y Polek) embarrassment 'will require us to be humble,'
continued Carson. 'This will require us to not be taken
at our word, but to be ijudged] by our actions.'
Meanwhile, said Carson, Boeing continues to make
'solid progress' toward a third-quarter 2010 first
delivery of the 747-8, the first wing for which was ready
to come out of its jig and be placed into the so-called lay-
down position in preparation for attachment to the
fuselage."
3 Wall Firm a "Boeing Co. has reshuffled the customers for initial On the
Apr. Street deliveries of its delayed 787 and set aside plans to send addition
2009 Journal, the first six aircraft into commercial use, according to a al costs
"Boeing published report. The move would see launch customer associat
Shuffles All Nippon Airways take 11 of the first 30 aircraft, while ed with
787 Chinese carriers appear to have slipped from the first an
Order deliveries scheduled for next year, according to overly-
Book; flightblogger.com published by U.K.-based Flight aggressi
No International. Boeing declined comment on the report, ve
Takers which comes ahead of the first test flight scheduled for design
for First June. The 787 is more than two years behind schedule, and
Six" with its launch delayed several times by supply and design producti
(Ann problems. According to flightblogger, Boeing is switching on
Keeton) some aircraft to ANA that had been destined for Chinese schedul
airlines, who originally hoped to have the 787 in time e of a
for last year's Beijing Olympics. The Japanese carrier modular
declined comment." enterpri
se
architec
ture.
6 The Tom Firm- B "Airbus production boss Tom Williams has spent the past On an
Apr. Wall Willia Suppli five years raising the European plane maker's output. integral
2009 Street ms, ers Now, as airlines defer deliveries and cancel orders, he enterpri
Journal, Airbus faces a difficult balancing act: downshifting factories se
"Airbus VP of without killing prospects for a recovery. Airbus said architec
Aims to Operat Friday that it booked orders for just 16 planes in March, ture's
Pul ions compared with 54 orders in March 2008 and 37 orders the approac
back previous year. The company has said it may capture only h to
Without between 300 and 400 new orders this year, down from 777 stable
Stalling orders minus cancellations last year. Building jetliners is growth.
" so complex that slamming on the brakes can be almost
(Daniel as tough as hitting the gas. Factories that Mr. Williams
Michael had recently optimized for fast production by adding
s) equipment and staff must pull back without letting the
fixed expense per plane rise painfully. Airbus's dozens
of suppliers, which provide components ranging from
tiny rivets to massive landing gear, can't get stuck with
warehouses full of unsold parts or idle factories, or
they will be too weak when demand returns. And
laying off skilled workers could cause a brain drain
that slows an eventual recovery. 'It takes a long time
for us to train our folks who design and assemble
planes, so we've got to be careful,' said Mr. Williams,
Airbus's executive vice president for programs, in an
interview at the company's headquarters here. Since 2003
Airbus has increased production of its planes by 60%, to a
11~8~;
record 483 deliveries last year. But in October the unit of
European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. shelved plans
for further increases, and in February said it would reduce
deliveries of its popular single-aisle models to 34 a month
from 36 and consider further cuts. Airbus is trying to
trim output without hurting chances for a recovery.
Airbus, and U.S. rival Boeing Co., which said it would lay
off 4,500 workers but keep output steady this year, are
reacting much more cautiously than other major
industrial companies to the global economic slowdown.
United Technologies Corp., which makes aerospace
equipment, air conditioners and elevators, in March said it
will cut 5% of its work force, or 11,600 jobs. Caterpillar
Inc., which makes construction equipment, has announced
some 24,000 layoffs as it slashes output and mothballs
production lines. Airlines and industry officials predict
Airbus and Boeing will have to cut output more
drastically to avoid producing planes that customers
can't take. Douglas Harned, aviation analyst at Sanford
C. Bernstein & Co. in New York, predicted in a report
published last month that Airbus and Boeing will have
to cut deliveries next year by 20% from current plans.
Aircraft lessors recently called on both plane makers to cut
production to avoid glutting the market and undermining
the value of planes on their balance sheets. Airbus and
Boeing officials say building jetliners is different from
other industries because the planes, which carry
catalog prices ranging from $50 million to $300 million,
take roughly a year to build. As a result, the cycle
moves more gradually. Boeing's experience shows that
sudden shifts in production can be crippling. A decade
ago, the plane maker tried to boost output in a short
,period and quickly faced shortages of parts and
qualified staff. Dozens of unfinished jetliners sat
outside factories under tents as workers scrambled to
finish them. Resolving production problems pushed
Boeing deep into losses even as it delivered a record
number of planes. Since then, both Boeing and Airbus
have tried to avoid big swings in production volumes.
European labor restrictions mean Airbus can't cut staff
as easily as Boeing does. That's why over the past few
years the European plane maker has hired an
increasing number of part-time workers and outside
contractors, who predominantly work in less-skilled
areas. Mr. Williams says that by using them less, he
can cut output by roughly 20% without firing full-time
staff. Mr. Williams's first retrenchment over recent
months has been to reduce overtime shifts, which
Airbus had been using to meet strong demand, said the
56-year-old Mr. Williams, who has 37 years experience
making motors, jet engines and aircraft. Managing
suppliers poses a bigger challenge. More than 80% of
the value of each Airbus plane comes from outside
companies, according to EADS CEO Louis Gallois. Some
of these suppliers are much smaller and financially
weaker than the plane maker, and so aren't as well
equipped to handle a downturn, executives say.
Trimming production to 34 jets 'isn't such a big shift
for Airbus,' said Henri Courpron, a former
procurement boss at Airbus who now runs the aerospace
practice at aviation consulting firm Seabury Group. 'But if
in that process you kill one supplier, you may lose the
ability to build those 34 at all.' In 2005 -- copying a
model originally developed by Toyota Motor Corp. and
adopted by Boeing -- Airbus started working more
closely with its suppliers. Instead of simply ordering up
parts, Airbus gave its contractors more leeway to
design components and choose materials, while also
treating them more as partners by sharing information
and seeking greater feedback. Now, Mr. Williams said
Airbus procurement staff are 'walking the shop floor'
at suppliers' factories to spot signs of weakness, such as
thin staff or insufficient inventories. Suppliers say they
like Airbus's new openness, but still face a delicate
balance between meeting its needs and preparing
themselves for a sharper downturn. Claude Bolette,
director general of Belairbus, a consortium of Airbus
suppliers in Belgium, says that in addition to consulting
Airbus, he talks with other contractors to judge the market.
'Of course we'd like to have more robust information,
but it's very difficult for Airbus themselves to have an
accurate forecast,' Mr. Bolette said. In France, the
government has said it can now help small aerospace
companies that hit trouble by tapping a special fund of
up to leuro 1100 million ($136 million) that was
established last year. Dubbed Aerofund and financed
partly by EADS, the kitty was initially envisioned to
help suppliers grapple with the strong euro and the
challenges of investing for expansion. Mr. Gallois at
EADS recently urged other European governments to
follow the model. Even as Airbus and its suppliers
throttle back, Mr. Williams is planning for an eventual
upturn. From the day Airbus decides to boost or cut
output, its supply chain needs around a year to react
through steps such as hiring staff, buying machine
tools and sourcing raw materials. To shorten that
period, Mr. Williams' team has violated a key tenet of
lean manufacturing -- keeping parts inventories to a
minimum -- and squirreled away extra supplies of
components that take particularly long to prepare,
such as the metal forgings inside landing gear. 'With a
limited investment, we'll buy strategic components
with very long lead times and carry them ourselves,'
Mr. Williams said. 'It gives us more flexibility.'
10 The Scott Firm- a "Hit by the global trade downturn that has left airlines On a
April Seattle Carson Suppli struggling, Boeing finally conceded Thursday it will modular
2009 Times, , CEO, ers- slash production at its widebody jet-assembly plant in enterpri
"Job Boeing Labor the middle of next year. The move will hit employment se
Cuts Comm in 2010 at the Everett plant, which has some 28,000 architec
Will ercial workers, and could cause layoffs at Boeing suppliers ture's
Follow Airpla even this year. It also triggers accounting changes that delayed
Boeing' nes will cut back company profits starting this quarter. respons
s Jet- Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said the company e to
Assemb anticipates the work slowdown will bring 'employment cutting
ly reductions beyond those already announced.' Earlier this producti
Slowdo year, Boeing said it would reduce its commercial-airplane on.
wn" work force by 4,500 by the end of 2009, but said it
(Domini planned no slowdown in output. In the most significant
c Gates) production change, Boeing will slow monthly output of
its large 777s in June 2010 from seven planes a month
to five - a 28 percent cut. The planemaker also said it
will delay previous plans to modestly increase production
of its 747-8 and 767, each currently at about one per
month. Some cuts to jet production were widely
anticipated. Last month, Boeing Commercial Airplanes
Chief Executive Scott Carson said a 10 percent
production-rate cut was possible next year. But the
company has downplayed industry observers'
predictions of wider slowdowns. Boeing's airline
customers, especially those buying cargo jets, have been
postponing scheduled deliveries. World air-cargo traffic
declined by almost a quarter in 2008, according to Seattle-
based consultancy Air Cargo Management Group. The
production cut's effect on Everett employment may be
offset somewhat when assembly of the new 787
Dreamliner ramps up at the plant. But that will take some
time. An executive at a Boeing supplier said the 787
program is no longer planning for a furious buildup, as
many customers are likely to defer their Dreamliner
deliveries, too. 'Rather than ramping up, the (787
suppliers) are really slowing things down,' the
executive said. If the global economic crisis continues
and air travel doesn't recover, further cuts are likely at
other local Boeing plants. Though Boeing said that 'at
this time' it intends to hold production steady at its
single-aisle 737 assembly plant in Renton, aviation
experts believe a slowdown will occur there, too. Rob
Stallard, a financial analyst with 'Macquarie Research,
cited 'a widespread expectation that this is just the first
of several cuts for this downcycle, with the 737 rate
likely to be the next that goes down.' Because of the
shorter lead time needed to build parts for the much
smaller 737, Stallard said Boeing still has a couple of
months before it has to finalize the narrowbody production
rate for 2010. He predicted a cut from 31 per month this
year down to 25 per month in 2010. In a note to clients,
Stallard also warned that because some parts for the large
777 have longer lead times, 'The impact of the cut to the
777 rate will likely be seen in the aerospace supply chain
before the end of this year.' That could trigger some
layoffs at suppliers. Boeing warned that the
production decisions and unfavorable pricing trends
will reduce its first-quarter earnings 'by approximately
$0.38 per share.' That's a hit of about $275 million, or
about 30 percent of Wall Street analysts' average first-
quarter profit estimate of $1.24 per share. With reduced
deliveries, Boeing has to spread its production costs
over fewer airplanes, resulting in higher costs per
. .............
plane and lower profits. 'These are extremely difficult
economic times for our customers,' Carson said in a
statement. 'It's necessary to adjust our production
plans to align supply with these tough market
conditions.' Boeing insisted that the production
slowdown is purely a result of deferrals and not outright
cancellations. Airlines have canceled 32 orders for the
787 so far this year, but no 767, 747 or 777 orders have
been canceled."
13 Market Firm a "Boeing Co.'s announcement last week it would cut On a
Apr. Watch, commercial aircraft production is likely just the beginning modular
2009 "Boeing of a long downturn, said Cowen & Co. in a Monday enterpri
Lowere research note that downgraded the aerospace giant to se
d to underperform from neutral. 'The last three delivery architec
Underp declines averaged four years with 14% average annual ture's
erform drops,' said analyst Cai von Rumohr. 'But this cycle's value in
at early lairlinel traffic dip is worse, and lower oil prices a
Cowen" and limited airline credit availability will restrain downtur
(Christo replacement when the cycle turns.' Boeing shares were n.
pher down about 5% in premarket trading to $37.12"
Hinton)
16 Businee Gary Firm- f "Would Southwest Airlines have turned a profit the On an
April ss Kelly, Custo past quarter if it had charged checked-baggage fees? integral
2009 Week, CEO, mers- That was the interesting question posed during the enterpri
"South Southw Investo company's conference call to discuss its $91 million se
west's est rs first-quarter loss, which was a penny per share worse architec
Red Ink Airline than Wall Street had expected. A year ago, Southwest ture'e
and s (LUV) earned $34 million. Operating revenue dropped 7% mainten
Baggag to $2.4 billion from $2.5 billion. The company's vaunted ance of
e Fees" oil-hedging strategy turned sour late last year when oil custome
(Justin prices collapsed, and caused another $65 million hit in r loyalty
Bachma the most recent quarter. Moreover, the airline and
n) anticipates second-quarter revenue to fall short of the same lock-in
quarter of 2008, although CEO Gary Kelly said weekly
sales declines that accelerated throughout March have
stabilized. Southwest is offering all employees but senior
management a buyout package to leave, but says it has
no targets on how many of its 35,500 workers it wants
to shed. Southwest is working to align staffing to
capacity reductions. 'Honestly, we don't know how
many people will take this offer in this environment,'
chief financial officer Laura Wright said. 'We think
that whatever number takes it will be good.' But it is
the bag fee issue that cuts to the heart of why Southwest
will succeed or, if the lousy economy turns truly
draconian, becomes yet another ailing airline where the
revenues don't match the costs. The question was
proffered by Morgan Stanley airline analyst William
Green and spurred a somewhat spirited discussion (by the
relative standard of a Wall Street earnings call). In the
aggregate, $91 million is not a large sum for a huge airline
like Southwest to amass across its system and a $15 fee
certainly could have yielded more than that in the first
quarter. If one figures that only half of Southwest's 19.7
million revenue-producing passengers had checked a bag,
the take totals $148 million. "Why not put those in place?"
Green asked.
Save for JetBlue (JBLU), every other major carrier has
imposed a fee -- and they have been pleased greatly by the
new revenue. So why won't Southwest do it? 'I'm not at
all convinced it would be revenue positive and it would
certainly be disruptive to all the things we're trying to
do on behalf of the brand,' Kelly said. 'It is a very
competitive environment out there. We know that for a
fact.' What's more, Southwest operates firmly
committed to the belief that it stands alone in the
airline industry with a unique relationship to its
customers, who are extraordinarily price sensitive -
Southwest's average one-way fare is under $114 - but
fiercely loyal. 'If you lose one customer ... that's the
equivalent of a handful, if not ten or 12, bag fees,' Kelly
said. Southwest also thinks its ubiquitous 'No Hidden
Fees' campaign is taking hold among consumers and
reaping positive business results. Mike Linenberg, a
Bank of America analyst, further suggested that bag fees
could help Southwest maintain its financial lead over the
rest of the industry. As many others restructured in
bankruptcy, the cost advantages Southwest once
enjoyed have eroded, and its once-stellar revenue
performance is no longer remarkable. Kelly bristled at
that line of argument. 'The bottom line ... is that we
don't believe it would be revenue positive anymore
than we could argue that we could push through a $10
fare increase in this environment,' he said. 'There's just
so much that can be done there.' The airline stressed
repeatedly that it has no plans to charge bag check fees.
But if 2009 continues along the same dismal path in terms
of traffic, revenues and red ink, Kelly can expect the
chorus calling for a checked bag fee to grow increasingly
persistent."
17 Wall Thoma Firm- "Governments should help provide financing for On an
April Street s Gover airlines to buy planes, stepping in where credit integral
2009 Journal Enders nmen- channels are blocked, Airbus Chief Executive Thomas enterpri
"Airbus , CEO, Custo Enders said Thursday. Speaking to journalists after a se
Says Airbus mers- meeting of European aeronautics companies, Mr. Enders architec
Govern Suppli said aircraft makers don't need a direct government ture's
ments ers bailout but want state support for their customers and dampin
Should the smaller companies that supply parts. He warned g of the
Assist that aircraft manufacturers could cut production if the value
Plane economic situation worsens. Aircraft makers are chain.
Sales" struggling as airlines around the world cut routes and
(Adam postpone orders amid a steep decline in passenger traffic.
Cohen) In addition, low fuel prices give airlines little incentive to
upgrade their aging fleets with more fuel-efficient planes,
according to industry analysis. Airbus, a unit of European
Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., earlier this year said it
would trim production of its single-aisle A320 planes. The
company's U.S. rival, Boeing Co., this week said it would
cut the number of wide-body 777 planes it produces next
year by 29%. Mr. Enders declined to say whether Airbus
is planning further production cuts. 'Every one of us has
~rrri~i~ -----------------------~ ~ ----- ----------------
contingency plans,' he said. The industry estimates a $10
billion-to-$20 billion shortfall in the funding needed to
support 950 to 1,000 Airbus and Boeing deliveries this
year, according to a presentation delivered at Thursday's
meeting of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries
Association of Europe, an umbrella organization
representing 17 companies and 30 national associations.
Earlier this year, the French government offered C5
billion ($6.6 billion) in loans to help airlines buy Airbus
jetliners. However, this facility hasn't been used yet,
said Mr. Enders."
18 The Firm- "They look like ghost airplanes and they are a bad $300 On a
April Seattle Custo million omen for the airplane business. Two brand new modular
2009 Times, mers Boeing wide-body freighter jets painted all white are enterpri
"Boeing parked at Paine Field outside the Everett assembly plant. se
Parking Two more freighters freshly painted in the colors of architec
Jets China Southern and worth another $300 million flew ture's
Around this week not to Asia, but to a jet parking lot in the dealing
Puget Arizona desert. Meanwhile at Boeing Field, three 737 with
Sound, single-aisle jets have been parked outside for many weeks capacity
the awaiting delivery to Arik Air, of Nigeria. Next to them is a problem
Desert completed but idle AirTran 737. And in Renton, outside s upon
As Boeing's single-aisle assembly plant, two 737s originally entering
Buyers ordered for a Chinese airline are now repainted in the a
Stuggle livery of a Dubai-based airline that doesn't start service downtur
" until June. Because of a global downturn in air traffic, n.
(Domini with the airfreight sector particularly hard-hit, many
c Gates) airlines don't need new jets. In some cases, they can't use
the planes they have committed to take from Boeing.
Boeing insisted Friday that even the all-white airplanes
are not technically 'white tails,' industry jargon for
planes that have been built but don't have a customer
to take them. 'We have no white tails,' said Boeing
spokesman Jim Proulx. 'We have not built any
airplanes that are not designated for delivery to
customers.' What Boeing clearly does have is
customers in distress and some airplanes sitting as
expensive excess inventory far longer than the plane
maker would like. The idle 777s are a major reason
why Boeing announced last week it will cut production
of the jet from seven to five per month from the middle
of next year. One of the ghostly white-painted jets in
Everett is a 777 freighter owned by Air France. The list
price is $256 million, though according to data from
airplane valuation firm Avitas, after discounts it has a
value of $150 million. The second is a 747-400ERF cargo
jet ordered by LoadAir, a Kuwaiti airfreight company. Its
list price is $253 million, worth about $147 million after
discounts. A second LoadAir 747 freighter, the last 747-
400 that will ever be built, rolled out of the Everett factory
Thursday and will join its all-white twin. 'Those 747s for
LoadAir are on target for delivery in September,' Proulx
said. In February, Air France took delivery of the first
777 freighter off the line and a second one days later. The
carrier has yet to decide whether to store the third 777, an
Air France spokeswoman who asked not to be identified
told Bloomberg News. Painting the plane white perhaps
is to leave open the option of leasing it to someone else.
The airline said in February it will defer delivery of two
more 777 freighters to sometime between 2010 and 2012.
As for the two China Southern 777s now in Arizona, the
airline hasn't yet accepted delivery of the 777s. They were
stored by Boeing, an airline executive told Bloomberg
News on Friday from Guangzhou. Boeing declined to
comment on whether the aircraft have been put in storage.
China Southern, the nation's biggest carrier, said this week
it will save $1 billion this year by delaying aircraft
deliveries. It will delay delivery of the two 777s until the
end of this year or early 2010 and is discussing the timing
of two more planes now in production, the airline
executive said. 'We're working with them on their
delivery schedule,' said Boeing's Proulx. 'The fact that
two of the largest cargo operators in the world are
parking brand-new freighters is a sign of just how
awful the global airfreight numbers are,' said Douglas
Runte, managing director at Piper Jaffray Cos. in New
York, in an interview with Bloomberg. Global air-cargo
volumes will probably fall 5 percent this year, outpacing a
3 percent decline in passenger traffic, the International Air
Transport Association said last month. The 737 jets at
Boeing Field and Renton are passenger jets.
When asked about Arik Air's parked 737s last month, the
airline's managing director, Michael McTighe, said they
were being phased in and would be delivered by the end of
this month. He insisted that Nigerian aviation is not as
affected as elsewhere and 'Arik Air is set for major
expansion throughout West and Central Africa.' But at
least two of the planes have been parked at Boeing Field
for more than two months, creating a financial holdup for
Boeing. Airlines generally make down payments when
they sign purchase agreements and then pay the rest to
Boeing upon delivery. The AirTran jet parked beside the
Arik Air jets may also be slow to deliver. AirTran has cut
back its fleet plans and either deferred or sold 47 of the
Boeing jets it ordered. That includes two 737s it sold to
Arik in 2007. And Boeing was forced to look for a new
customer for two 737s in Renton originally destined for
delivery to OK Airways, a private Chinese airline. The
Chinese government suspended OK's service in December.
The two jets are painted in the colors of FlyDubai, which
doesn't begin operating until June. Boeing said the two
airplanes are parked waiting for refitted interiors."
20 ATW Gary Firm- "Southwest Airlines Chairman and CEO Gary Kelly On an
April Daily Kelly, Custo last week strongly rejected Wall Street advice that the integral
2009 News CEO, mer LCC begin charging for checked baggage to generate enterpri
Southw more revenue. During a conference call to discuss SWA's se
est third consecutive quarterly loss, multiple analysts architec
Airline pushed Kelly to follow other US carriers and implement ture'e
s baggage fees. But he insisted the move would drive away mainten
customers. 'The bottom line assessment is we believe ance of
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we're having a meaningful impact [telling consumers] custome
that we are alone in not charging bag fees and that r loyalty
[impressioni is increasing our demand,' Kelly and
explained. 'Southwest is a very well-known value brand. lock-in
. and it would be disruptive to all of the things we're
doing to build the brand. You just risk losing
customers.' He continued: 'I don't see there's any
reason for us to panic based on the first-quarter
results. [Not charging bag fees isl no different from us
not charging $400 Minneapolis-to-Chicago one-way.
We don't want to be another airline that nickles and
dimes customers. We don't believe it would be revenue
positive any more than we could argue imposing a
[largel fare increase right now would generate more
revenue compared to the customers we'd lose.'"
21 Bloomb Firm- a "It's 'increasingly possible' that the Dreamliner's maiden On a
April erg, Investo flight could be delayed again, slipping into July rather than modular
2009 "Boeing r taking to the air this quarter, JPMorgan 's Nadol wrote in enterpri
Profit an April 15 note. 'The first-delivery target of February se
Buffete 2010 is highly ambitious,' he wrote. 'We are still architec
d by looking for a late second- quarter first delivery, and ture's
Producti even there, our confidence level is not high."' expecte
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21 Financi Firm a "Airbus and Boeing seem to be in denial. The two civil On the
April al & aircraft makers are not fully facing up to the worst modular
2009 Times, P recession in decades, which has sent air traffic into a enterpri
"Airb tailspin and many airlines into the red. The se
us and International Air Transport Association expects the architec
Boeing' industry to lose about $4.7bn this year as revenues fall by ture of
s Plans $62bn, or 12 per cent compared with last year. It is not the
Fly in only the weaker airlines that are suffering. Last week Air media.
the Face France-KLM, Europe's largest carrier, said it was
of planning to cut 2,500 to 3,000 jobs by 2011. The week
Recessi before, it warned that for its fiscal year ending March
on" 2009 it would be reporting its first operating loss since
(Paul the merger of the French and Dutch airlines six years
Betts ago. It warned that it was unlikely to return into the black
and this fiscal year. It is not surprising to see more and more
Kathrin airlines deferring or cancelling orders for new aircraft
Hille) placed during the boom years. As in previous cycles, the
first sector to suffer is demand for more expensive
wide-body airliners. Qantas, China Southern and Cathay
Pacific have all in recent days announced plans to delay
delivery of some 93 mainly long-range aircraft including
nine A380 super jumbos. Air France-KLM a couple of
weeks ago said it was planning to delay delivery of two
A380s. This is bad news for European aircraft
manufacturer, Airbus, since delays in the delivery of its
flagship jumbo will put pressure on the financial viability
of its programme. But its US rival Boeing is in the same
boat and is cutting production of its 777 wide-body
aircraft. Both Airbus and Boeing expect to deliver the
same amount of aircraft this year as last, largely
because airlines are unlikely to cancel or push back
orders for aircraft due for delivery this year given that
they have paid about half the cost of these airliners
with their downpayments and progress payments. The
problem the two manufacturers face is with deliveries next
year and beyond. Cash-strapped customers will
increasingly seek either to delay or cancel orders for
aircraft they can no longer afford, or negotiate more
favourable terms with the manufacturers. The current
cycle is proving more challenging than previous ones
largely because of the credit crunch. Industry analysts
estimate a $10bn to $30bn shortfall in funding needed to
support 950 to 1,000 Airbus and Boeing deliveries. Yet the
two big makers are insisting the shortfall will only involve
$4bn to $5bn. France, for example, has offered E5bn
($6.5bn) in loans to help airlines buy Airbus aircraft.
Both manufacturers admit that the big test will come
next year and they are bracing for more customer
deferrals and cancellations. But they remain relatively
optimistic that the cycle will turn and pick up in 2011,
hence their resistance to making sweeping production
cuts in 2010. They have so far only announced 5-10 per
cent production cuts in their various aircraft ranges next
year. Most industry watchers believe this is wishful
thinking. Cycles in the boom-and-bust civil aircraft
business are long and the manufacturers will probably
be forced to cut production by 20 per cent to 30 per
cent, if not by as much as 40 per cent, according to a
UBS study."
21 China Firm "Airbus, the world's major aircraft producer, plans to cut On an
April Daily, its monthly global production of A320 in October, but its integral
2009 "Crisis assembly target in China will not change, a senior Airbus enterpri
not official said Tuesday. Due to the global financial crisis, se
Dampen Airbus will cut the monthly production of A320 architec
ing passenger planes from 36 to 34, but its target to ture's
Airbus produce 11 planes this year in China will not change, stability
China Marc Bertiaux, vice president of Airbus Cooperation and in
Assemb Partnership with China told Xinhua. By the end of 2011, output,
ly the Airbus Final Assembly Line in north China's Tianjin despite
Target" City will produce four A320 aircraft per month, mainly for negative
the Chinese clients, he said. Since China was not as badly exogeno
impacted as some other countries by the financial crisis, us
the country's economic growth has been maintaining a shock.
sound momentum, he said. 'The stable and fast
economic growth of China has also strengthened our
confidence to stabilize our aircraft production."'
21 Edubou Tom Firm- "Airbus/EADS and VSMPO-A VISMA boost their long- On an
April rse, Enders Suppli term relationship. Airbus, the world's leading aircraft integral
2009 "Airbus , CEO, er- manufacturer, its parent company EADS, a global leader in enterpri
lEADS Airbus Gover aerospace, defence and related services and the Russian se
Sign a nment Technologies State Corporation's integrated structure architec
Titaniu VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation, the Russian Titanium ture's
m manufacturer, have signed the biggest and longest-term develop
Supply contract in the history of Airbus/EADS cooperation ment of
Agreem with Russian industry. The agreement was signed today long-
ent with in Moscow by Sergey Chemezov, General Director of the term
VSMPO Russian Technologies State Corporation and Tom Enders, supply
President and CEO of Airbus in the presence of Vladimir contract
A VISM Putin, Russian Prime-Minister, Walter Jirgen Schmid, s in the
A, German Ambassador to Russia, Jean de Gliniasty, French midst of
Integratt Ambassador to Russia and Juan Antonio March Pujol, a global
ed Spanish Ambassador to Russia. The agreement covers recessio
Structur the supply of Titanium to Airbus and other EADS n.
e of the Divisions until 2020. The scope of the contract includes
Russian the supply of Titanium and covers die forging parts for all
Technol existing Airbus aircraft, including new programmes such
ogies as the A350XWB. VSMPO-A VISMA Corporation may
State also machine Titanium products in order to develop a
Corpor vertically integrated Titanium supply chain, starting from
ation" raw materials to finished products. The contract comes as
a confirmation of the framework agreement signed in July
2008 at Farnborough Airshow. The new agreement
further boosts the relationship between the companies,
which dates back to the early 1990s. It also enlarges
Airbus' cooperation with the Russian aviation industry,
which currently includes production of components for
Airbus at Russian plants, passenger to freighter aircraft
conversions (P2F) and joint Research & Technology
(R&T) projects. VSMPO-A VISMA Corporation
strengthens its role as a leading supplier of Titanium to
Airbus/EADS, covering major Titanium requirements. The
benefits of Titanium include strength and low weight
properties that are in high demand in the aerospace
industry. On aircraft, it is used in particular for landing
gear systems, pylons and structural parts of the fuselage
and wings. 'Airbus is preparing for long-term growth.
This agreement is an important pillar of our
internationalisation and especially our strategic
relationship with Russian industry,' says Tom Enders,
President and CEO of Airbus. VSMPO-AVISMA
Corporation, integrated structure of the Russian
Technologies State Corporation, is the world's largest
Titanium producer. At present the Company exports 70
per cent of its products, 30 per cent are sold in the
domestic market. Major customers of VSMPO-AVISMA
are the world's leading aircraft-building companies. The
Company is fully vertically integrated and employs
over 20 000 people."
21 "We are Scott Firm a "Now I believe that when it comes to ethical behavior in On a
April All Carson an enterprise like ours, that responsibility rests with every modular
2009 Ethical , CEO, one of us. Every one of us is a leader in that regard. And nenterpr
Leaders Boeing it's become far too easy for us to defer that to the Ethics ise
" Comm office. It's really a leadership issue. It is really the architec
Boeing ercial responsibility on the part of the employees to work ture's
Comme Airpla through their leaders to resolve issues that stated
rcial nes cause uncertainty and stress in their lives. I've value
Airplan emphasized that with my senior managers. I've placed
es ' emphasized it with our mid-level managers. on
"Excell I've emphasized it on shop floors when I have visited ethical
ence them. We need to have a culture where we're not leadersh
Hour" afraid to talk to each other, where we don't allow ip
ourselves to become intimidated by or intimidate
others in our communications if we are going to be
successful and survive. And so I would ask all of us to
think about it in that context and to act in the future as if
ethics is our responsibility and not the responsibility of
the Ethics Office. It's important in our business dealings,
but it's even more important in our personal
dealings inside the enterprise today."
22 Thomso Jim Firm- a "Jim McNerney (The Boeinr Conmany): On a
April n McNer Investo Thank you, Diana, and good morning everyone. Let me modular
2009 Reuters ney, r start today by discussing our first quarter performance and Enterpri
Researc Chari the unprecedented market environment that we're se
h man currently facing. As part of that I will talk about the things Archite
excerpt and we're doing to respond to those challenges. After that cture's
from CEO; James will walk you through our results and then we'll defense
"The James take your questions. I will start with Slide 2 please. of its
Boeing Bell, finanaic
Compan CFO, Our first quarter results reflect the impact of the steep al
y, Q1 The global economic downturn on the commercial airplane perform
2009 Boeing market, which overshadowed the otherwise good ance
Earning Compa performance in our Commercial Airplanes business
s Call ny and continued strong performance of our Defense
Transcri business. As announced earlier this month we had decided
pt" to bring 777 production rates down from seven to five
airplanes per month, affecting deliveries beginning in June
2010. We are also delaying plans to modestly increase our
747-8 and 767 production rates. In addition, the weak
global economy has driven significant declines in the
indices that are the basis of our price escalation
forecast for commercial airplane deliveries. Together
the production decisions and the lower escalation forecasts
reduced our first quarter earnings per share by
approximately $0.38 most of which represented a charge
on the 747 program. Commercial market factors aside,
our underlying business performance remained solid in
the quarter. BCA production programs continued to
execute well and improve cost performance. Our
Commercial Services business generated strong earnings
in margins even with softening revenue from spares and
passenger to freighter conversions. We're making
progress on the 747-8 program with fuselage and wing
assembly continuing on the freighter airplane. The first
freighter is scheduled to deliver in the third quarter of
2010. We are also working on the detailed design of the
747-8 Intercontinental, however with the softening
freighter market and the resulting decision to delay a
planned increase in 747 production first delivery of the
Intercontinental is now expected to move from second
quarter 2011 to fourth quarter 2011. This is consistent with
discussions we've had with our Intercontinental customers
and was factored into the first quarter production decision
financial impacts we shared with you earlier. On 787 we
are on schedule for first flight later this quarter. All the
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airplane systems, including engines, are cleared for first
flight. We've also completed the structural testing on the
static airframe that is required for first flight. Final
analysis is underway, but the results are positive. Earlier
this week we completed a full simulation of the first flight
using the actual airplane. The simulation exercised all
flight controls, hardware, and software. In the coming days
airplane #1 will move out of the factory to the flight line.
There it will be fueled and its engines operated prior to
doing a final systems check and the high-speed taxi tests
that lead to first flight. We are also making excellent
progress on airplane #2 on which ground vibration tests
need to be completed before first flight. Those tests are
expected to begin later this week. The 787 backlog
remains strong with 886 orders from 57 customers around
the world. This includes previously disclosed cancellations
of 32 airplanes and the order for eight 787s finalized with
Gulf Air last week. As mentioned last quarter, we expect a
modest level of orders churn on the 787 during the year.
Even so, the backlog is unprecedented for a new
airplane and we are confident in the long-term value of
the 787 for our customers. Our total company backlog
remains large at $339 billion. While that number is down
from last quarter due to current period deliveries, modest
cancellations, and price adjustments from lower escalation
it still represents nearly 5x our current and annual
revenues. New orders include the U.S. Air Force contract
for 15 C-17s that were previously funded under the fiscal
2008 budget, as well as integrated logistics and support
contracts. Fundamentally, this is a solid company with
strong core businesses. We are of course, like all
companies, facing a very challenging market environment
which I will address on Slide 3.
The global economy has further deteriorated and we are
facing economic times that are more difficult than many of
us have ever seen. This, of course, is impacting our
commercial customers in the form of lower air traffic
growth and challenging financing conditions. These
pressures, which are being addressed by various
governments' economic recovery packages, are also
putting pressure on defense budgets. Because of the
commercial and defense market uncertainties, we continue
to step up our drive to become more competitive and
productive. As discussed last quarter, we are
aggressively managing both costs and investments.
Unfortunately part of this means a reduction in
employment in certain areas of the company. We are on
track towards the estimated 10,000 position reductions we
expect by years end. We will continue to evaluate the
appropriate infrastructure levels at the Company,
especially in light of our recent decision to reduce
commercial production in 2010, as we get more clarity on
the U.S. Defense budgets. Despite the challenging
environment our backlog is holding strong. The only
commercial airplane cancellations so far this year have
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been the 32 787s I mentioned earlier. We have, however,
been working with customers to defer airplanes in
response to the unprecedented economic environment. In
the first quarter we accommodated about 60 airplane
deferrals from 2010 and 2011 into future periods. We are
in the process of working on more deferrals beyond that all
of which were factored into our production decisions made
earlier this month. Deferrals are occurring across all
regions and all models. I should point out that our
decision at this time to hold 737 production rates
reflects our practice of over committing 737 deliveries
along the way, which have so far offset the current and
anticipated deferrals. Now I have just a word on
production decisions. I want to emphasize that these are
big business decisions for the Company and are not simply
a reaction to today's view of the market. The market is
certainly a factor. It is obviously a factor. But, we also
consider customer contracts, significant cost elements and
major employment implications. While we monitor it all
regularly, the scope, and impact of these calls are
significant and need to be made deliberately. As you all
know, the financing environment continues to be
challenging. Boeing Capital conducts a bottoms up as well
as top down analysis of financing requirements by tracking
the status of each commercial delivery while at the same
time evaluating the sources of global capital availability.
Currently we still believe financing sources are sufficient
to meet expected requirements for our products in 2009.
Part of this includes an assumption that BCC will need to
provide about $1 billion of new financing this year.
However, we recognize the financial markets are fragile
and can change quickly. We believe we are in a good
position to handle any resulting outcomes this year. Let
me summarize by saying, again, that we are in
unprecedented times right now, but I believe we have a
solid foundation from which to work through this
environment with strong products and services and a large
backlog. Importantly, we are aggressively managing our
infrastructure, costs, and investments.
James A. Bell (The Boein? Conmanv):
Thank you, Jim, and good morning. I will begin with our
first quarter results on Slide 4. Revenue for the quarter
was $16.5 billion which was up 3% from a year ago.
Earnings per share were $0.86 per share which includes
the $0.38 reduction from Twin-Isle reduction rate
decisions and lower price escalation forecasts; $0.31 of
the impact is a charge on the 747 program. Because
this program is in a loss position, the production rate
and the escalation impact are recorded in the current
period for all units in the accounting quantity as
opposed to recording the impact over time as the units
are delivered.
Now let me discuss BCA in a little more detail on Slide 5.
Commercial Airplanes recorded first quarter revenue of
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$8.6 billion which is 5% greater than the prior year.
The increase was driven by higher airplane deliveries
offset by lower commercial service revenues. Operating
margins of 4.9%, seven points lower than last year,
were significantly impacted by the $347 million charge
driven by production rate decisions and lower
escalation forecasts. Our Commercial Airplane
contracts have escalation provisions which state prices
in current year dollars at time of contract signing and
allow for economic adjustments to be paid by
customers at the time of delivery. These adjustments
are determined from broad price indices. During the
first quarter the global recessions impact on
commodity and retail prices, coupled with moderating
wage growth, significantly reduced these indices. This
change does not affect current year commercial
revenues since pricing is fixed approximately 11
months before delivery, but it does impact our forecast
of future revenues. Lower revenue forecasts reduced
program accounting gross margins during the quarter
for our profitable programs and increased the loss
recorded on our 747 program. The first quarter impact
of escalation was approximately $235 million, $180
million of which were increased the 747 reach forward
loss. The Twin-Isle production decisions, which impact
production rates beginning in 2010, also affect current
period gross margins. Rate change disruption costs and
redistribution of hard to vary costs over fewer units in
the accounting quantity are the principle drivers. The
impact recorded in the first quarter reduced earnings by
approximately $200 million, $175 million of which was
included in the 747 charge. This impact was net of a
favorable adjustment to our prior 747 cost estimates. The
BCA team is focused on right sizing its infrastructure
and the associated costs to address the current market
challenges.
Now let's turn to Slide 7. Boeing Capital delivered
another solid quarter with pre-tax earnings of $37 million
on revenue of $163 million. BCC had modest new aircraft
financing in the quarter of approximately $135 million
which was offset by portfolio run-off. Our guidance still
assumes that we will finance about $1 billion of new
aircraft sales during the year. Now I want to remind you
that as BCC reduced its portfolio from a high of $12
billion to the current level of $6 billion we have been
preparing for this time of reentering the financing
markets. We are well positioned and are entering the
markets in a disciplined and a prudent manner.
Now let's turn to Slide 8 and discuss cash flow. We
generated $200 million of operating cash flow in the
quarter reflecting cash from earnings and liquidation of
inventory that we paid for during the strike last year. This
was offset by continued planned working capital build up
on our development programs, lower cash advances, and
~
timings of receivables. During the quarter we paid
approximately $300 million in dividends and used $50
million to buy back 1.2 million shares. We have
significantly reduced our share repurchases in light of
the current business realities.
Now let's turn to Slide 9. Our financial strength
remains solid. We ended the quarter with $4.7 billion
of cash and marketable securities including proceeds
from the $1.8 billion of new debt issued in March.
After our announcement to reduce commercial
production rates S&P put our A+ long-term credit
rating on watch, but confirmed our short-term rating.
Moody's reaffirmed our A2 long-term rating and our
overall credit ratings remain among the strongest in the
industry.
Now I will turn to Slide 10. We are upgrading our
financial guidance to include the lower price escalation
forecast and the resulting charge on the 747 program.
Earnings per share for the year are now expected to be
$4.70 to $5.00 per share. Now, we expect second and
third quarter earnings to be lower than fourth quarter
earnings reflecting revenue and R&D profiles. 2009
revenue guidance is unchanged at $868 to $869 billion.
The 2009 commercial delivery forecast also remains
between 480 and 485 airplanes. 2009 operating cash
flow guidance remains at greater than $2.5 billion. We are
diligently managing our cash and have action plans in
place to preserve our strong financial position. Having said
that, there are risks to our cash flow due to market
uncertainties and in particular its potential impact on
advances for commercial airplanes. We continue to
assume pension funding this year of about $500 million.
Total company pension expense is expected to be about
$900 million in 2009 with slightly more than that recorded
at the business unit and a small offset in the unallocated
segment. The R&D expense forecast is unchanged at $3.6
to $3.8 billion and we continue to expect R&D expense
to decrease substantially in 2010.
Now let me turn to Slide 11 and discuss our change in our
earnings guidance in more detail. As we mentioned last
quarter, our guidance at the time considered the potential
impact of modest production rate cuts. Had the Twin-Isle
production decision has been the only impact this quarter,
we would have maintained our earnings per share
guidance. However, the lower escalation forecast had a
sizable impact on our results, which is the principle driver
of our reduced EPS guidance. We're expecting somewhat
lower pension expense since last quarter, but higher
interest expense from the new debt issued in March.
We plan to provide 2010 financial guidance towards the
end of the year.
_ Jim McNerne:
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Thank you, James. To close let me simply say that we are
diligently working on improving productivity, right
sizing our infrastructure, and preserving our financial
strength given the current uncertainties in both our
commercial and defense markets. While recognizing the
risks at hand, we continue to feel that we are relatively
well positioned with the fundamental strength of our
products and services, the size and diversity of our backlog
and the long-term outlook for the markets we serve.
Ronald Epstein (BAS-ML):
I have a question on the 787 program. As we start to think
beyond kind of the flight test program and into the ramp-
up, what I have heard is Global Aeronaudca is still a bit
of a long tent pole that the center fuselage integration is
taking over what 300 days per section. How do you
work through that and how should we think about the
ramp of the program?
Jim McNernev:
Well I think the Global Aeronautica bottleneck, as you
characterized it, is something that is not unusual. I
mean the main body join is typically a challenge. But,
there is nothing we see, as we work through it, that will
prevent us from meeting our ramp schedule. As you
know, after the ownership change awhile back we have
taken more direct control of that factory, which I think
has moved along process improvements significantly
and we're making good progress there. While it has
represented a bottleneck we are confident that it won't
as we meet our production schedule.
Ronald EDstein (BAS-ML):
Okay and if I can I have a follow up question on 78. When
you look at the suppliers, and different suppliers are
developing either parts or subsystems for the program, you
have seen multiples of their original R&D budget that
they thought they would be investing. When we think
about the Boeing investment on 787 can you just
broadly say, I mean, how many times is it what you
thought it was originally going to cost the company?
Jim McNernev:
Well there is not an integer involved in the multiple,
okay? There has certainly been some pressure on
research and development, as you know, on some non-
recurring costs and there have been some cost
pressures that both we and our supplier partners have
born. But, it remains a very economic proposition over
time. I think this is a very innovative product that did
cost more and take longer, but the market has
recognized it as an innovative product by ordering
many multiples times any commercial airplane that's
ever been ordered before. So, we have a base over
which to spread some of these increased costs, but I
wouldn't characterize it quite as direly as your
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question implied. We have been wrestling with
pressures and they're slowly getting back into the box.
I mean the condition of assembly by our partners from
airplane 7, which is the first production airplane, on
out has improved dramatically. We are in very good
shape and quite frankly, I'm heartened by what I'm
seeing in the ramp-up right now.
Howard Rubel (Jefferies & Co.):
If I did the math right you did about 8.5% to 9% margins
in commercial and about 17.2 per R&D and that compares
with 19.8 a year ago. There are two parts to this question.
What are you going to do to recover part of the loss of
deflation? I mean the index works against you, but there
should be a lot of opportunities with the rest of the
industrial commodities being down to get some of that
back. The second part of this is cash is clearly a
challenge. Could you be a little more specific in terms
of what you're doing to try to improve the balance
sheet fund, but could you make it even better?
James Bell:
Let me try to answer that. As you know, on the escalation
side, particularly in the commercial airplane where this
impact has been felt, every quarter we get different
escalation forecasts and we basically have two
commodities, one is the CPI index and the other is for,
which is the consumer index, and the other is more
commodities related. They do change over time, so we
will naturally see some of that happen. As it deals with
the costs associated with that, the timing is different. As
you know we have long-term contracts which are fixed
price with our subcontract community, so to the extent that
some of those costs are going down we will have an
opportunity to renegotiate future contracts at lower prices
and then there are some contracts that we do have that see
an immediate impact, but it's minor. You will see some of
that and some of that is already into the impact you saw on
that escalation provision. But, over time it generally
balances it out. If we go into an inflationary period you
could see that change pretty rapidly. On the cash side,
clearly we're looking at a number of things relative to
how we manage our cash and be more disciplined
relative to inventory turns. Be more efficient with just
in time. We're looking at making sure as we move the
schedules on production rates and on the deliveries out
that we also align that as perfectly as we can with the
subcontract community so that we're not getting
inventory before we need it. We've cut back on capital
expenditures. We are really looking at everywhere that
we spend money that doesn't affect or go into the
product. We're cutting back on all things that we
would call non-essential. We're having daily cash calls
where we're making sure we're monitoring advance
pays and we're monitoring our disbursements to make
sure that we're paying just in time in accords with our
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contract terms and that we are aggressively pursuing
our payments as they are required by contract. We
think the combination of all of that is going to make a
strong balance sheet even stronger.
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
James, could you walk through your cash flow guidance?
You know with a flattish quarter here in the first quarter,
you talked to some of the pressures and things that are
going on in the beginning of the call, but how do you get
to generate operating cash of $2.5 billion in an
environment where we would suspect your building
787 inventory the advances are drying up from the
absence of orders and you'll be increasing financing
through out the year.
James Bell:
There are a couple of things. First of all, the advances
really aren't drying up as a result of the orders. We are
not expecting a lot relative to cash receipts on the orders.
In fact it is a relatively modest number because the
deliveries are so far. The orders that we would write today
are for deliveries so far out in the future. The real issue is
we do have quite a bit of receipts that are associated with
deliveries after 2009 and those are the PDPs that are set on
the payment schedules and the inventory; so clearly, we're
looking at making sure we stay on track and we are able to
collect those. The financing, as you know, is going to be
leveraged, so even though it is included in the total in cash
in the cash balance, it is not going to have a major impact,
but we have included the billion dollars already in that
guidance. Again, we've only done $135 million so far this
quarter, but we think we'll do the whole billion over the
course of the year. We think we're in pretty good shape
and with the run rate in terms of what we'll deliver this
year, and with the other initiative that we put in place to
manage cash we think we're going to be in pretty good
shape.
Joe Campbell (Barclays Capital):
I have a question about the numbers, which I think Jim
gave us, on the 60 deferrals from 2010 and 2011 that you
saw in QI that moved to the out years. Now, I think that
the number, I don't know, we probably guessed it or
triangulated, that the number of wide bodies that moved
was something a little over 50. So, it sort of suggested
there really wasn't much movement in all the other
airplanes. I was wondering if that is about right. I mean, I
would have thought that there was a lot of in and outs
and that that was what you were trying to convey. If
you could give us a sense of even if the 73s, which are
apparently so far okay, can you give us some sense of
how many moved out and somebody else moved in so
that we can get a sense for the fluidity of the 73?
Jim McNernev:
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Yes. The number is more like half-and-half narrow
body and wide body deferrals. As I also said in my
comments, we're working others beyond the [interposing].
Joe CamDbell (Barclays Capital):
But Jim you moved, I mean if you cut the production of
seven 77s from seven to five than that is going to be more
than 30 airplanes, so how could it be half-and-half? I
mean we cut the wide bodies by almost that much, I would
have thought.
Jim McNerney:
I'm sorry, would you say it again Joe? I mean, we're
talking about 60 airplanes, a little more than half of which
were narrow bodies, a little less than half of which were
wide bodies, and we're working some additional deferrals
right now, as I commented on; when you add that all up
that does roughly true up to the production decision.
Remember, we are taking into account some things we're
working now beyond just the 60.
Joe CamDbell (Barclays Cavitah:
Yes, okay, but what I really wanted to talk about was
what is actually going on in the narrow bodies?
Presumably there is movement even though it nets out,
apparently, to a number that's consistent with
production. I just want some sense of whether it is 100
guys moved out and 100 guys moved forward or
whether it's five guys moved out and five guys moved
forward.
Jim McNerney:
There is more moving out than moving forward, but
what you have to remember, I think, Joe is that remember
we restrained production rates. The big picture is that
Airbus and us had roughly the same number of narrow
body orders over the last few years. They ramp up
much more aggressively on production rates and we
were restrained. Remember they were in the high 30s
we were in the low 30s, so we had a lot more over
ordering in our backlog, anticipating that someday
there may be a softening, which is what we're seeing
right now. So, we are working through the over ordered
portion of the backlog and when you look at what we
deferred within the 60 plus the other ones we're working
now and are estimating based on that experience, we still
think we're in good shape on the production rates. And, it
is because we had a much larger margin of unslotted
orders that we took, okay?
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
I want to take a step back for a moment. In the first
quarter of '08 the 747-8 was described as on track, and
over the span of four quarters things went so awry that
you took over $1 billion in charges. Even as recently as
the January call you described the -8 as a viable
business and adding a lot of value to customers. While
acknowledging that the 787 is likewise going to deliver
value and is a viable business can you describe the key
under pinnings that anchor why the 787 won't be
susceptible to reach forward loss kind of four quarters
from now?
Jim McNernev:
There is a specific accounting calculation, Heidi that I
know you are aware of, but I think the big picture is a
large accounting quantity when the time comes to
make that decision, which will be when we deliver the
first airplanes. Having worked through a lot of the non-
recurring up front costs and having a much better handle
now on the cost curve that is in front of us, when you
make the assessment it trues up to where we are. There is
not a loss on the program right now. Could things
change, yes, but there just isn't It is largely driven by
the market acceptance of this product.
James Bell:
Heidi, let me just add one comment. Traditionally when
you look at us on a new airplane development
program, at this stage in the program we've only sold
100. So, the major risk is the risk to market and the
pricing associated with that. The fact that we've sold so
many has given us a lot more cushion on this particular
airplane in terms of a forward loss, because we really,
having sold them we have the market and we have the
pricing pretty much set. Then obviously there are a lot
of moving parts on the cost side, but as Jim mentioned,
as we move through time we're getting a better handle
on that. Now, could something happen in four years
and four months? I mean unless it was dramatic, I
think something coming out of the flight test program
that would cause a major new cost element obviously
that is always a potential because it is a development
program, but generally I would say to you we are in
much better shape on this program to avoid that than
we have been on any prior program.
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
That's excellent and James, how do cancellations flow
through to relieve the presumed costs on customer penalty
payments? I mean doesn't early cancellations relieve the
entire skyline and presumably save you quite a bit of
money?
James Bell:
Obviously if a customer cancels you have more space to
work with. The space was crowded otherwise so it does
provide you more opportunities to move airplanes up and
back depending on what the customer needs are. But, as
you know, cancellations are not what we're looking to
achieve in order to deal with our penalties. We would
rather just go ahead and get this program back on
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track, but obviously you get some relief, but that is not
what we're aiming for.
Myles Walton (Oppenheimer & Co.):
The $787 deposits on the 880 aircraft or so, are those at
this point, are those refundable deposits or are they both
still nonrefundable deposits?
James Bell:
They are non-refundable.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morgan):
Back on the 747 program, I am just wondering if we could
get sort of a bigger picture update, Jim, on where we are
there. I mean freighter demand is part of the reason
you cut the 777 rate and that's where if it's only part of
the backlog for 777 it's most of the backlog for the 47.
You have this delay in the Intercontinental by a couple
quarters which may have not been disclosed previously,
but you decided that a number of months ago. In any case,
anytime anything goes wrong anywhere in the commercial
business whether there is a 37 cut, an 87 slide, anything.
Are you going to have another 47 charge? I am just
wondering what your comfort level is here with the
backlog, the freighter demand, and that we're not
going to have significant more problems down the
road.
Jim McNerney:
Well listen, the economic situation is uncertain and it has
had significant impact on the freighter market, as you have
seen. We can't predict with absolute certainty that our
current read of the market will hold forever; so adjusting
production rates is part of this business. We think
we've got it right now, but we'll have to keep reading
and reacting. Now that is a separate question from do
we have a good business. You have to live through
some ups and downs. Unfortunately we're getting a
down here in the midst of the development phase of the
program. But, we have seen very few signs that
customers are running away. We see signs that
customers want deferrals and in fact want to hold onto
the business and are willing to keep making the
progress payments required to have it. It is more of a
story of an adjustment to a very difficult economic
environment than it is a story about a program that
doesn't make sense to customers. These new airplanes,
the 87 and the 47-8 that you're talking about are very
productive airplanes and very productive alternatives
to what they're flying now. I mean the 47-8 is the only
airplane now in the, sort of the, 390 to 500 passenger
airplane, which translates to a freighter size that is also
extremely efficient. We have to live through some ups
and downs here, but these are long term, good
businesses.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morgan):
I think where I'm going, Jim, with this is the 87, I think
we can all agree, has unprecedented demand and it's
going to be a great platform for airlines over the very
long term. The 47 just seems to me much, much ore in
doubt. The basis of it is freighter demand and we're in
a loss position now. I guess I am trying to get my arms
around how much worse things can get on the 47. I
mean what's the number?
Jim McNerney:
Well, I mean the number is the number we've given
you now, is what we think it is. Again, customers are
not running away. There are a number of discussions for
other orders that, admittedly, are doing slow in the current
economic environment. We think this is a good niche
airplane. I mean, this is not a brand new innovation
like the 87 is to your point, but this is an airplane that
fills a good, solid niche and we typically launch
airplanes with 100 orders. This is more like the normal
airplane we launch. Everything isn't the 87. Could it
get worse? Sure. I mean if the market, the economic
environment continues to tank for another three or
four years I think the impact of deferrals and
production rate changes could put additional economic
pressure on it. Is it enough to kill the program? I don't
think so. I think this is a good product that serves a
good market.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morgan):
Are we past the point where you could kill the
program, or is that still a potential?
Jim McNerney:
We don't intend to kill the program.
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen and Company):
In terms of opportunities, your commercial R&D was
down sequentially in the quarter despite a lot of activity on
the 787; should we expect it to continue on down
sequentially in the second?
James Bell:
No. We will be, it was sort of the timing that really
impacted this quarter. You will probably see it a little
higher in the second. Third quarter will probably be pretty
stable and then we will come down in the fourth quarter.
We should be down year-over-year, but don't take away
from the first quarter. That is going to do down second and
third, but it will go down in fourth.
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen and Company):
Excellent, thank you very much and good quarter.
Itav Michaeli (Cit):
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I wanted to dig in a little bit more on the two-year cash
flow picture. Do you think you can get back to the cash
flow power that would enable you to have the flexibility
back into a billion plus in share buybacks in the next
couple of year? How should we think about that playing
out in the next two years?
James Bell:
Relative to the buy back program, we'll look at what that
looks like in the next year. Obviously we're going to
minimize it this year given what we see as pressure on
cash, but going into 2010 we'll take a look at and see
where we are then and see whether or not we have the cash
to continue to get back up to the buying levels we've
experienced in the past. We obviously have the
authority from our board to buy the shares, so that is
not the issue. The issue is the priorities that put
demands on cash and then how we address those with
the current cash flow in the current environment.
Itay Michaeli (Citi):
That's helpful. You did raise some debt
opportunistically in Q1. Is there a minimum cash
balance you like to have at this part of the cycle that we
should be thinking about? You know, for you to maybe
tap the market again if cash flow comes under some
more pressure. How should we think about where you
like to have your baseline fall?
James Bell:
Well we need about $2 billion for operation cash, so
that's kind of it. Then in this environment you surely want
a safety net, given the fact that we have two major
development programs that haven't gotten through their
flight certification programs yet; so you would want that.
So we could possibly do more, it just depends on what the
circumstances are as we view the opportunity in the
market pricing wise and other factors.
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
I have a very specific question about the 787 flight test
plans. First, I just want to clarify my own understanding of
a response you gave earlier to Ron Epstein, when he asked
about the multiple in terms of the spending on the 787,
you said no integer involved. I am taking it that means
it is less than two, correct?
Jim McNerney:
Yes. Dominic, I was being somewhat facetious in
response to a question that implied that it was some
egregious multiple. I think, as you know, there have
been some cost pressures that both us and our
suppliers have faced and we're dealing with it.
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
But it hasn't doubled from what you originally
expected in '03? From that response you gave, is it
right of me to make that assumption?
Jim McNernev:
I think that's true, Dominic.
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
All right and to my own question, the first six tester planes
are apparently now unallocated after you refigured your
customer delivery schedule. Are there concerns about
selling those planes, getting those planes placed, given
the weight problems that they have and where do we
stand on weight with the ones that follow on?
Jim McNerney:
Listen, the first production airplane that will be delivered
is airplane #7 as I mentioned today. We will find homes
for the first six airplanes. We have discussions ongoing
with people and I am confident that they will end up
placed."
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Rothfed an aircraft this late in development. As one of many
er) grim jokes making the rounds on Boeing's factory floor
goes, 'Maybe they meant a bad dream.'
The Dreamliner's delays are expected to cost Boeing as
much as $10 billion in canceled orders and
compensation to airlines. The fiasco has become an
object lesson for manufacturers in how not to do global
outsourcing and has eroded Boeing's reputation for
efficiency and innovation.
Now, on the eve of its big launch, the Dreamliner carries
the company's hopes of recapturing lost revenue and
repairing the damage to its image. If the plane passes the
rigorous yearlong series of flight tests that begin this
spring, it could lead Boeing out of the financial crisis.
But if the Dreamliner fails, Boeing could become the
General Motors of the skies, with enormous repercussions
for the U.S. economy and the U.S. manufacturing base.
Although Boeing announced in January that it was laying
off 10,000 workers, it still employs more than 150,000
people in the U.S. and is the nation's No. I exporter.
About 70 percent of Boeing shares are held by
Irr
institutions, including all of the major mutual funds
and Bank of America Corp., its biggest shareholder.
Indeed, a machinists strike last fall crippled Boeing's
production and contributed to a 6.2 percent decline in the
U.S. gross domestic product in the fourth quarter. Boeing
is so vital to a recovery that if it sputters, the federal
government may be forced to bail it out, as it has
automakers GM and Chrysler LLC.)
The plane fell victim to infighting between Boeing's
bean counters and engineers, who had to gamble on a
low-cost-but unrealistic-manufacturing strategy.
'We may have gone a little too far, too fast' with the
technology and materials and in outsourcing
production, Boeing chief executive James McNerney
told Condi Nast Portfolio. 'The program was more
than we could handle.'
The Dreamliner debacle would be bad news in good times,
but it is a nightmare for Boeing in this global economic
crisis. Boeing has received about 900 advance orders for
the Dreamliner, the most of any new plane, at about $200
million apiece. But with air traffic down from last year,
carriers have begun to cancel orders. 'I'd have concerns
about every customer right now,' says Richard
Aboulafia, a vice president at Teal Group Corp., a
consulting firm that follows the aerospace and defense
industries. Aboulafia estimates that between 30 and 70
percent of all orders for jets industrywide will be at
least deferred, if not canceled. In his worst-case
scenario, 630 orders would be postponed or dropped
outright, a potential loss of $126 billion in revenue.
Airlines could seek as much as $4 billion in
compensation for losses linked to delays, and Boeing is
not expected to make any money on the first 100 or so
Dreamliners it delivers. Some carriers, weary of
waiting for the Dreamliner, bought or leased planes
from Boeing's biggest rival, Airbus SAS, a European
consortium. 'We're pretty fed up,' says the chief
executive of one major carrier that ordered 15
Dreamliners. 'We've gotten no clarity from Boeing.'
Perhaps worst of all, Boeing has forfeited a significant
revenue stream-from Dreamliners that would have been
delivered and paid for-that could have propped up the
company through the downturn. Boeing's cash reserves
plummeted during 2008 from $7 billion to $3 billion,
which will make it difficult to develop new planes.
While conceding that the next few years will be tough,
CEO McNerney dismisses the notion that the Dreamliner's
moment has passed. Because of the long lead time from
conception to delivery, he says, it's not unusual for a new
plane to bump up against a recession. And since Boeing
can make fewer than 100 Dreamliners a year, the company
would have a five-year backlog even if half of the 900
orders were canceled. 'The fact is that 95 percent of the
pipeline for the Dreamliner would have been exposed to
this financial crisis even if we delivered on time,' says
McNerney.
The Dreamliner's problems have exacerbated the
broader decline of Boeing, once one of the world's most
admired manufacturers. In the past year, Boeing's stock
price has lost about 60 percent of its value, more than the
Dow Jones industrial average. In trying to fix the 787,
Boeing shifted engineers away from other projects,
causing a lag in developing freighters and other
passenger planes. Boeing's revenue dropped 8 percent,
and its operating income fell 32 percent from 2007 to
2008. The latest results offer no comfort. In early April,
Boeing reduced expectations by 38 cents a share for first-
quarter earnings, which will be announced April 22, and
said production of the 777 will be trimmed from seven to
five aircraft per month starting in June 2010. In response,
a number of top analysts downgraded Boeing's stock
and Standard & Poor's Rating Services began a review
of the company's debt for a possible downgrade. And
after dominating jet manufacturing for decades, in 2008
Boeing fell behind Airbus in orders and shipments by more
than 100 planes.
Boeing's slide can be traced to the company's ill-fated
$13 billion purchase of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Under chairman John McDonnell and chief executive
Harry Stonecipher, McDonnell Douglas starved its
design and engineering operations and became little
more than a sales organization, barely surviving on
offshoots of its aging DC-9 and DC-10 models. The
1997 acquisition infected Boeing's forward-thinking
culture, emphasizing cost-cutting at the expense of
innovation.
McDonnell and Stonecipher, both of whom joined
Boeing's board, successfully argued for improving
profit margins on existing lines instead of introducing
new commercial jets. Boeing cut its annual research-
and-development budget for commercial aviation from
more than 4.5 percent of airplane sales in 1997 to
slightly more than 3 percent in 2003. At the same time,
Airbus' R&D budget topped 8 percent of sales.
But by 2003, Alan Mulally, who headed Boeing's
commercial-airplane division, was convinced that Boeing
needed a fresh plane. Inspired by Toyota's combination of
technological prowess and lean efficiency, Mulally had
spearheaded development of the 777 in the early 1990s,
transforming Boeing into a world-class manufacturer. Now
he believed that to preserve its eroding market-share
leadership, Boeing had to produce a jet that would capture
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the imagination of the airlines and the attention of Wall
Street. Originally called the 7E7, Mulally's baby was
renamed in a public contest that drew 500,000 online
voters. By a large majority, they dubbed it the Dreamliner.
Mulally's ambitions collided with the frugality of the
former McDonnell Douglas executives. Conceptual
drawings showed that the Dreamliner's cost would at
least match the $10 billion-plus price tag of the 777.
After becoming chief executive in 2003, Stonecipher
said he intended to seek board approval for the
Dreamliner. However, the unspoken message was 'but
not at the current price,' says Jon Ostrower, an aviation
insider who writes for Flightglobal.com. Mulally was told
that the plane's projected development costs would
have to be 50 percent or more below the 777's.
To meet this demand, Mulally came up with a wildly
unorthodox plan: He would farm out the design,
engineering, and manufacturing of the 787-virtually
everything except final assembly-to suppliers that
would shoulder more than $9 billion of the project's
$13 billion cost, in exchange for lucrative, multiyear
guaranteed contracts and a slice of the plane's sales.
These outside companies would coordinate with one
another to produce whole sections of the plane, stuffed
with assembled components, systems, ducting,
insulation, and wiring. Boeing workers in Everett
would merely have to connect the major parts of the
aircraft.
No large manufacturer had ever before so audaciously
turned over control of the entire process-from
concept to shipment-to outside firms. In a critical
oversight, no provision was made for monitoring the
suppliers. Mike Denton, vice president of engineering
for Boeing's commercial-airplanes division, recalls that
the vision for the Dreamliner was 'not to encumber the
partners with the Boeing way of doing everything. So
we erred on the side of giving them more free rein than
in retrospect we should have.'
By the end of 2003, the company had greenlighted the
Dreamliner. Moving quickly, Boeing signed up dozens of
suppliers. Japan's Mitsubishi Corp. agreed to make the
wings; France's Messier- Dowty SA took on the main
landing gear; and Italy's Alenia Aeronautica SpA would
build the 64-foot-wide horizontal stabilizer. The vertical
fin, the sole piece of the airframe slated to be made in the
Seattle area, would connect to a rudder from Chengdu,
China, and a front-facing edge from Shenyang, China.
In 2005, Stonecipher was fired for having an inappropriate
relationship with a female executive. After McNerney was
chosen as chief executive, Mulally left Boeing in 2006.
Whether Mulally could have made a success of the
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outsourcing strategy, had he stayed, is one of the great
what-ifs of the Dreamliner saga. He became chief
executive of Ford Motor Co., where he introduced more
efficient techniques in the automaker's factories. In part
because of Mulally's streamlining, Ford has been able to
wave off government bailout money taken by its rivals.
The suppliers were expected to deliver their completed
parts in early 2007, giving Boeing enough time to
assemble the initial Dreamliner for its first public
display on July 8, 2007--or 7/8/07-a date chosen to
match the plane's model number. Under pressure from
Boeing, the suppliers sent to Everett as much as they
had finished. Sections arrived in an incomplete or
defective state, or failed to fit adjacent parts made by
other suppliers. The Dreamliner that Boeing rolled out
to the applause of 15,000 workers and their families
and friends resembled a mismatched model airplane.
Unbeknownst to Boeing, one important supplier was
being pared down by a prominent private equity firm.
Vought Aircraft Industries Inc. was supposed to build the
two aft barrels of the fuselage in a new factory in
Charleston, South Carolina. Once completed, these parts
were to be sent next door to another new factory-a joint
venture between Vought and Alenia Aeronautica-to be
connected to fuselage sections, wiring boxes, and the main
landing gear.
But Boeing didn't realize that the Carlyle Group, which
had acquired Vought in 2000, was starving it of
resources while making a few cosmetic improvements
to attract potential buyers-a once-common private
equity tactic. By early 2006, Vought was facing a severe
'liquidity crisis' and nearly went bankrupt, chief
executive Elmer Doty told analysts. It couldn't afford
the new plants, employee training, and fuselage design
and assembly and had to 'reconstitute' its engineering
department. 'We are among the riskiest, if not the
riskiest' of the Dreamliner suppliers, Doty
acknowledged.
When Vought sent empty fuselage barrels that were
short of vital fasteners, Boeing finally took notice. The
company compelled Vought to fire the executive in
charge of operations in Charleston and then acquired
Vought's 50 percent stake in the joint venture with
Alenia. After having spent almost $300 million on the
Dreamliner project in 2008, Vought had to borrow
$200 million more last year, when it finally shipped the
first of its fully completed fuselage sets. Vought has
asked Boeing to redraw its contract to cover more up-
front expenses. So have other hard-pressed suppliers,
potentially costing Boeing hundreds of millions of
dollars.
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McNerney says Boeing has learned from its mistakes and
now monitors suppliers closely. Hundreds of Boeing
employees were dispatched to suppliers to implement the
'Boeing way,' and McNerney has visited many of the
factories, sometimes unannounced. 'We overwhelmed the
suppliers with Boeing folks in reaction to not having
enough early on,' he says.
Across from the Dreamliner's placid bunker, on the
opposite side of the vast barnlike plant, Boeing's storied
past and manufacturing prowess are impressively on
display. A platoon of 777s is under construction on a
production line superior to any other in the aerospace
industry--one Boeing decided not to use for the
Dreamliner because outsourcing was cheaper. Rather
than assembling 777s one by one, parked side by side-the
traditional approach for jet builders-Boeing has coupled
its famed wide-body to a continuously moving platform
that creeps along at a scarcely noticeable 1.8 inches per
minute. Boeing does its utmost to avoid assembly delays
of even a few minutes. Boeing workers monitor each 777's
exact coordinates on the factory floor from the time the jet
ambles in from the plant's rear gate, with just its aft
fuselage joined to its main body, to the time it reaches the
300-foot-wide hangar doors as a completed plane. Boeing
consistently makes about seven "triple sevens" a month
and boasts a backlog of about 350 orders for the $250
million plane. In the first two months of this year, the
777 had a net gain of three orders while the Dreamliner
lost 32. The moving assembly line in the 777 plant in
Everett-and another in Renton, Washington, where
the 737 is built-has produced impressive results that
the Dreamliner program can only, well, dream about.
Assembly time is down 21 percent, time spent in the
factory has been reduced from 26 days to 17, and 20
percent of mistakes have been eliminated. By these
measures, Boeing is at least four years ahead of Airbus.
Despite Boeing's recent failures, its innovative spirit--
reflected in the 777 and in the Dreamliner's design--
remains praise worthy. If the economy rebounds by the
time the Dreamliner makes its first commercial flight next
year, the plane could still become the blockbuster Boeing
envisioned. But so far, it's just a cautionary tale. 'The
lesson is that manufacturing programs cannot operate
as islands,' McNerney says, but must meet companywide
standards. 'I think we are centered on that now,' he notes
ruefully. 'A little later than we needed to be for the
787.'"
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huge backlog of orders, diversification between
commercial airplanes and defense, and its continued, albeit
halting, progress on the 787. McNerney also reiterated
that that oft-delayed new passenger jet will take to the air
before the end of June. 'We are on track to fly this
quarter,' he said, without giving a more specific date
on its first flight. A week after Boeing posted a sharp
drop in quarterly earnings, McNerney acknowledged that
the company still isgoing through 'a tough patch.' He
noted that the world's airlines are expected to see a 12
percent decline in revenue this year, or about twice the
drop they experienced after the terrorist attacks of
2001. 'Almost overnight, we have gone from flying
with the wind at our backs to flying into the teeth of a
strong headwind,' he said at Boeing's annual meeting at a
museum in Chicago. Nevertheless, he maintained that the
current downturn is 'a once-in-a-lifetime storm and not a
permanent condition.' The company, he said, believes
that the recession will inevitably give way to a new era of
economic growth and prosperity."
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"A culture where people are not afraid to raise issues,
and not afraid to admit that they don't have all the
answers is probably a culture where people are going
to ask the right questions and bring the right resources
to bear."
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James Bell:
"The end result of that is going to be ethical behavior in
everything you do."
Shephard Hill:
"There can't be any question about what motivates us,
other than doing the right thing."
Scott Carson:
"It's my expectation that we all be part of owning and
perpetuating the culture that we value that has led to
our success."
James McNerney:
"By living within the values that produce the culture,
and by interacting and setting examples for others, it's
a big deal."
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"Spirit operating margins of 11% and fully diluted earnings per of its
Aerosys share of $0.45. Financially, the impact of the strike at finanaic
tems Boeing reduced the first quarter earnings by $0.18 per al
Holding share. During the quarter the primary end market for perform
s, QI Spirit's core business continued to soften as demand for ance
2009 commercial air travel declined. We've been taking the
Earning appropriate actions over the past several months as we
s Call focus on meeting our customer requirements and
Transcri managing through the business cycle. I'll discuss
pt" several of those actions we have taken in more detail in a
few minutes. During this quarter, we opened our new
Spirit Malaysia manufacturing facility as planned. Our
Spirit Europe team and Wings segment leadership did an
outstanding job of bringing the new facility online and the
new Malaysian team is doing a great job. As you know,
Spirit Malaysia's initial focus will be on Airbus products,
but over time, we'll provide value to products across the
company. The new operation is adding value immediately
in 2009. I continue to be pleased with our performance on
787 program. Our team continues to work well with the
customer and our suppliers regarding change management,
flight test preparation and production plans. We look
forward to making solid process on the 787 program
through the remainder of 2009. Now let me turn to slide
six and give you a brief update on the 787. We delivered
aircraft number six in March, and aircraft number seven,
the entry into service airplane is progressing through
systems installation process. Overall, product quality
remained high and we continue to work with the
supply base to enable a smooth production ramp up.
We are continuing to work closely with our customer as
we incorporate the necessary engineering changes on the
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initial end-service airplanes. Our internal efforts
remained focused on productivity improvement and
increased utilization of the capability we have in place.
We expect to restart forward fuselage production later in
2009. Now let me turn to slide seven, and provide you my
thoughts on the business environment. Clearly these are
challenging times. The global economy continues to
impact air travel across regions of the world. In the face of
these challenges, we are seeing our customers work to
match supply with demand. We've seen our customers
announce plans to delay development programs, to reduce
production rates on certain products, to forego previously
planned production rate increases on other products and
indicate caution yet continued solid demand for other
products. This tailored response by our customers due
to current market conditions from my view is a direct
result of the more measured increase in production
rates undertaken since 2006. The more measured and
tailored response is to market demand with the goal of
reducing the magnitude of cyclical swings to the extent
possible benefits stakeholders across the industry. We
know that the airplanes business go through cycles. And
we've learned much from the past that positions us well for
the future. We've structured business arrangements to
share upfront development costs for new programs. We've
maintained a continuous focus on cost and inventory
management as well as productivity improvement. We've
been prudently conservative in estimating future demand
for products, and we've taken aggressive proactive action
freezing executive management and some non-
management salaries, and are hiring only to revised (ph)
critical skills. At Spirit we've shown that our team can
respond effectively to changing business requirements in
difficult situations, and do so in innovative ways that keep
our company positioned to support our customers and to
create long-term value. We believe we are well
positioned to accomplish this at Spirit. Now let me turn it
over to Rick who will provide more details on our
financial results and outlook. Rick.
Rick Schmidt (Spirit Aerosystems):
Thanks Jeff, and good morning everyone. Slide nine,
summarizes our financial results for the first quarter
which continue to be influenced by the residual impact
of the strike at Boeing.
Operating income margins were 11% in the quarter,
about a 160 basis points below the prior year period
largely due to the lower revenues from the strike and
the small negative cum-catch adjustment. Sequentially
margins were up significantly from the fourth quarter due
to higher sales volume in the absence of a $27 million
negative cum-catch adjustment booked in the prior quarter.
Jeff Turner:
Thank you, Rick. And I will wrap up on slide 18, with just
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a few brief comments. Our core business is performing
well. We are conservatively capitalized, and remain
financially strong. While are passed the challenges posed
by the strike, we are taking the necessary steps to
successfully manage through this cycle, and our core
businesses, and meet customer requirements on new
programs. There is no question these are challenging
times across the commercial aviation and aerospace
industry. And we are well-positioned to manage through
them. I believe that the current difficult economic time
will pass, and when it does, Spirit is well-positioned to
take advantage of future growth opportunities and to create
value. We'll now be glad to take your questions.
Howard Rubel (Jefferies & Co.):
I want to talk about gross margin a little bit. I mean, it's
significantly better than the fourth, but not quite as good as
you've done. Could you put it in context of what you'd like
to see for the balance of the year. And I mean, there are a
number of offsetting items you have at some point of 320
rate change of 737, you might want to be preparing for
some change there. And then, the 787 obviously becomes
a greater part of the mix. So how should we think about
what you're going to do with them, what you can do with
gross margin to improve it from where it is and deal with
some of the challenges?
Jeff Turner:
Well I think Howard. First of all clearly margins do come
under pressure in reducing volume environment. Also I'd
remind you of the difference in margins as we shift to
newer products, specifically the 787, we've talked about
that in the past. Clearly, we remained focused on working
margins and productivity in our processes and so on. But I
do think we're in a period of time where margin
expansion is going to be difficult, and managing it to the
right balance is appropriate for us, as we look to manage
effectively through whatever downturn happens to be here,
and prepare our self for the upside. Rick, you have
anything to add to that?
Rick Schmidt:
Yeah, I would add to that Jeff. If you just look at margins
for the remainder of 2009, and I got you saw from the
margin percentage standpoint in the first quarter is
pretty much what you'll see for the rest of the year.
Now right now, all of our current contract locks largely
extend through the end of this year. So, we're approaching
to end of these locks and usually at the end of the blocks
you don't have a lot in away of the prices or adjustments in
your contract profitability, because most of it is driven by
actual costs it's behind you. So, pretty consistent margins
in the second half, Jeff mentioned mix, certainly, 787 as
we've talked about in prior calls has lower margin on a
base business. So that picks up, that will generate some
downward pressure on margins. But offsetting that is
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some revenue recognition and profit recognition on some
of our newer programs, which have somewhat better
margins than our legacy programs, and also our
aftermarket business continues to do well. And it has
somewhat better margins than our legacy business. Well,
for the near term, we those largely offsetting margins and
being fairly consistent over the next three quarters.
Doug Harned (Sanford C. Bernstein):
I am interested and wondering on the 787. And when you
look at the design changes that you've tried, and seems
like there have been a pretty consistent flow of design
changes. How are you looking at now the sort of scale and
the timing of when you might get reimbursed from Boeing
on this?
Jeff Turner:
Well again I think we've talked about that in previous
calls. There is a long term program, and a number of, the
number of pieces to that puzzle. I think it's sufficient for us
to say that we're making process with our conversations
with Boeing and we continue to work through the issues.
Doug Harned (Sanford C. Bernstein):
But you can't -- you don't know whether this will be
something that is likely part of the pricing that you have
when you deliver as opposed to something that you will
receive in advance?
Jeff Turner:
Well, we've had some advances and Rick talked about that
from the impact on the finance of this quarter. And those
will continue in the future. But, I don't have anything to
announce there in what we have -- other than the fact that
we continue to make progress. And we continue to have
discussions on a number of fronts. Rick, you want to add
anything to that?
Rick Schmidt:
No I would just -- I think Doug, you'll probably see a
combination of both, as these issues get resolved.
Although I would say, given the kind of the current state
of discussions. It would gravitate much more towards
future price changes on products. Would be reflected
over our contract lock and influence of the margins that
we've recognized in that lock.
Doug Harned (Sanford C. Bernstein):
Okay. And than second question on labor, as you look to
the miscellaneous (ph) contract ending in 2010, how are
you approaching that today in terms of the way you are
thinking about discussions in advance, any kind of a
timeline you may have for looking at those?
Jeff Turner:
Sure. Let me just say, we've been approaching that for
..............
three and half years now. So, we see the relationship
with our employees, and their representatives as a
partnership that we have to work all the time. And
clearly, we have a contract point mid-next year. But, you
can rest assure that conversations are underway, have
been. Clearly, we expect to reach agreements that are
meet to needs our employees that are market based
that clearly support the long-term viability of our
company and achieve goals. It's in certainly, in the
interest of the company and clearly in the interest of
the employees that have a viable, vibrant spirit So, I
think we've approached that whole partnership from
day one, as something that we need to keep in front of
us all the time.
Carter CoDeland (Barclays Capital):
Okay. And one more on the 787, the inventory build in the
quarter, how much of that was related to excess over
average, relative to other?
Rick Schmidt:
I don't have that in front of me Carter. But certainly,
continuing to complete the units that are here, attracts
costs. So, I would say the deferred costs certainly is a
large component of the increase in the quarter.
Well certainly, as we start to get a more normal
drumbeat of production, starting back up here on the
787 program, you're going to see the average cost per
unit is going to come down dramatically. And then the
units that we have in inventory today, both those that are
nearing completion and those that are further back behind
in our manufacturing process is been these units have been
there now for a couple of years. Things continues to be
build up, they continue to attract costs which makes
the early units much more expensive than what we'll
see going forward.
Carter Copeland (Barclays Capital):
But presumably, the benefits come from the units that are
produced once you restart production, because all of the
ones that are sitting there now are shouldering a lot of that
cost over the past couple of years. So, you'll need to get
through those units before you start seeing better excess
over average performance.
Rick Schmidt:
That that's absolutely right. But as you look at that graph
though, the breakpoint, happens probably quicker than
those people realize is. Again, this program has been in
the stop and start mode for an extended period of time
now. Now, once we really get going, I think you'll see
that the play at which we hit the average. So right now,
obviously our actual costs are over the average. But, the
play that which we hit the average and start in effect eating
into that deferred, I think will happen fairly quickly. It will
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happen within the first, 100 to 125 units.
Robert SDin2arn (Credit Suisse):
Rick, your guidance range is $0.20. Could you talk about
some of the major swing variables that are in there?
Rick Schmidt:
Well I'm sure. Probably one big one that we've talked
about in the past is in the R&D area that the one
variable that we still have in R&D are the 787
derivatives. We have factored into our guidance some
spending, R&D spending for the derivatives. Now, how
much we actually spend this year is going to be based on
the schedule for Boeing schedule basically, for us
supporting them and bringing those derivatives to markets.
So, that is somewhat of an unknown yet, as to how much
will fall into this calendar year. I think at this point, we
have been probably on the conservative side for how much
we think we'll spend this year. So, I think that's a variable
yeah certainly, revenues are always a variable. Right now I
think we have got a pretty good line of sight on what we
think revenues are going to be the rest of the year. And
there is, the big variables would be how many 787 units do
we actually ship this year, how much revenue do we
generate from some of our new programs. And some of
those aren't based on shipping units. They are based on
completing engineering work and on milestones. So, I
would say those are the big ones. Gross profit obviously
follows the revenue. So, I think the gross profit absent
some surprise that we can't foresee at this point, gross
profit will be in the range that we saw in the first quarter.
SG&A tends to be fairly predictable. We seen a fairly
constant level of SG&A over the course of the last year,
year and a half. So, I don't expect that to change much.
But I think its revenues R&D expense maybe a little bit in
interest expense, obviously, with the draws on our revolver
that we've experienced in the first quarter, it carries some
interest expense with it. So, the timing when we are going
to be able repay those will have some influence. But I'd
say those are the big factors.
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
Okay. And then the other thing I wanted to ask about you
may have touched on this earlier, but how should we think
about 787 cash flow, as you start to ramp up deliveries.
And I am asking this in context of the advances that you've
gotten from Boeing. So, can you walk us through how
those dynamics will evolve and then ultimately change?
Jeff Turner:
Well, what will happen is you might recall, we signed an
MoA last year, first quarter of last year. That provided
additional advances in 2008. And the repayment
obligations for those units were that for those advances,
were that -- they basically, those advances basically
covered the first 45 to 50 units that we would deliver.
... ...............................
So, in effect, Boeing has already paid us for the first 45
to 50 units that we will deliver. So, as we deliver those
units, that will -- that value of that delivery will apply a
100% to liquidate the advanced payment. So, the 396
million that we got in 2008 that will be repaid fairly
quickly over the rest of 2009. And then we'll start to
ramp up in 2010 and 2011. But once we have that behind
us then we're back to the old schedule which was the
original 700 million that we got, that was repaid 1.4
million a unit. So, once we get past this initial block of
units, then we'll kind of revert to the schedule that we have
before.
Carter Leake (Davenport & Company Lie):
And then any update on North Carolina facility. Is that still
as far as timing, is that still on track as you mentioned on
the last call?
Jeff Turner:
Yeah, it is still on track. Progress being made if you stop
by Kingston, you will facility come in up out of the ground
as it should, as you would expect and appreciate, we are
being very prudent. It's frankly a good time in the
environment to build. So, we are watching those
contracts closely. And clearly being prudent as we
know how to be the timing of those expenditures. That
project is coming along very well.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morgan):
On the 787, can you update us on where you are in terms
of your margin accruals there? And you noted in your
slides mentioned that you are trying to get the perspective
profits up there, what exactly are you doing?
Jeff Turner:
Well right now Joe, we are doing is preparing to speed up
production. We have done a lot of work, if you will,
analyzing the processes, and looking for a list of
improvement options and opportunities, ones we get it
running. The real key here for us to make improvements is
get some production momentum. Once we do that then
it comes off the drawing board to the reality of what's
happening in the processes. And that's when we can
really go to work, make any real improvements. So the
most important thing for us is to get too drumbeat on
that program and then make the in place
improvements.
Joseph Nadol (J.P. Morgan):
And so we're still in a positive margin situation here in
sort of a low single-digits, is that accurate?
Jeff Turner:
We are. We're in a small positive net margin for the
three packages that we have on the 787.
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Cai Rumohr (Cowen & Company):
Yes, thank you gentlemen. On its call, Boeing described
the pressures they're having from lower inflation
escalations which they are unable to pass on to their
suppliers and intimated they might make efforts to
pass some of that pressure on. How are you positioned
regarding inflation escalation and how far do your
contracts are your contracts priced looking out on the
legacy Boeing programs?
Jeff Turner:
Legacy Boeing programs are priced through 2012. And I
would just say parenthetically that all customers have price
pressure on suppliers all the time.
Robert Stallard (Macquarie Research Equities):
First on the 787, Jeff is there anything you could tell us in
which month you expect to start delivering again and
whether the monthly rate will be ramping up for a fairly
consistent rate per month?
Jeff Turner:
Well, a couple of volumes Rob, one is that we are
delivering, now in fact we delivered unit number six in the
first quarter. We have unit number seven in the final
installation -- systems installation area and it will soon be
ready for it poll. So, clearly the numbers that Rick gave,
we're going to have to speed up production deliveries if
you will to meet the demand for the rest of the year. The
point that I made is that we have had the winding on the
barrels the fabrication process shut down for quiet a
while now and we will resume that later this year. The
exact -- I did not mention and don't at this point intend to
give the specific time when we start that back up. It will be
very much dependant on the post signals that we get for
the product. But we will be ramping up that airplane per
the plan later on this year.
Robert Stallard (Macquarie Research Equities):
So if you look at the forward fuselage, it's still a little bit
(inaudible) when exactly it's going to start and just
something it sounds like its also a little bit time (ph) for
what the exact rate will be per month as well?
Jeff Turner:
But again, we've got a number of units in the process now.
We've shipped through line unit six. I think we've told
you before we wound through line unit 22. So, it's just a
question of timing of as those pulls start and that pulls us
back through our line when we fire up the winding process
again.
Rick Schmidt:
So I mean those are -- we were still on short work week
for part of the quarter. Its -- when you have that kind
of environment in your manufacturing facilities I mean
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that always creates certain amounts of inefficiencies
which end up showing up in deferred cost. So, I mean
those will be unwound over the remainder of the contract
lock."
13 Seattle Firm a "An attorney who worked in Boeing's ethics policing On
May Post- division says that he was demoted to being an allegati
2009 Intelige administrative assistant and then fired after raising ons of a
ncer, concerns about violation of government regulations. modular
"Boeing Joseph Sicilia, who lives in Spokane, filed a lawsuit enterpri
Worker against The Boeing Co. with the King County Superior se
Sues Court in April. A Boeing spokesman said Wednesday that architec
over the case has no merit. Sicilia worked for Boeing from ture's
Violate 2001 until his firing in November 2007. For most of his central
d time at Boeing, Sicilia worked in the Office of Internal trust
Ethics, Governance, which is the company's ethics department mechani
Wrongf based at Chicago headquarters. He reported to supervisors sms.
ul in Seattle, the complaint says. One of Sicilia's
Termina responsibilities was to ensure that Boeing complied
tion." with promises it had made to the federal government to
(Andrea maintain its ability to bid on government contracts. In
James) 2005, Sicilia perceived that certain policies enacted by
his supervisor 'would result in the misrepresentation of
compliance, thus equating to fraud,' the complaint says.
Later on, other program changes made within Boeing
further reduced corporate compliance with federal
acquisition regulations, Sicilia believed. He reported
his concerns up the management chain several times,
but the lawsuit states that his complaints were never
investigated.
"Boeing's got a strong compliance monitoring system
and effective mechanisms for reporting potential
wrongdoing," Boeing spokesman Chaz Bickers said.
"The suit is clearly without merit and Boeing will
defend it accordingly."
Sicilia's lawyer, reached by phone on Wednesday, says she
intends to seek a jury trial. 'Boeing takes a scorched
Earth litigation philosophy,' Spokane trial attorney Mary
Schultz said. 'Never admit. Never acknowledge. Never
say you're sorry.' 'This is one of these areas that the
American public is very concerned about these days,'
Schultz said, referring to the government contracting
process. 'People like Joe Sicilia are very important for
the integrity of the system.'
The lawsuit is filed in state court. Boeing faces at least two
other wrongful termination suits in federal court."
14 Flight Tom Firm "Airbus remains resolute that it sees no need for further On an
May Internat Willia single-aisle output cuts and could begin ramping up again integral
2009 ional, ms, by the end of next year. A320 family production, running enterpri
"Airbus EVP at 36 aircraft a month, will be reduced to 34 a month (at se
Single- Progra the start of final assembly) by October. Despite pressure architec
Aisle ms, from some corners for further single-aisle cuts, tur's
Output Airbus executive vice-president programmes Tom Williams views
Could ; John says Airbus is 'pretty comfortable' with the on
- --
Revive Leahy, adjustments it has already made, based on its producti
Next COO, 'watchtower process' that monitors each customer and on
Year" Airbus delivery two years ahead. 'Our visibility over the next six stability
(Max months is pretty good, but beyond that it gets a bit
Kingsle tougher,' he says. 'Into next year, we've kept our
y-Jones) cushion with overbooking [of slots], more in the second
half of the year.'
Chief salesman John Leahy says Airbus aims to get
through the downturn with flat production rates rather
than a boom/bust realignment of output. 'We can get
through this crisis if airlines just do aircraft retirements a
little bit faster during the 2009-10 period,' he adds. Leahy
says that although single-aisle output is declining, it could
soon be heading up again. 'We had planned to go to 40 a
month, and I think that by late 2010 or 2011, you'll see us
back at 40 again.' Williams agrees, saying that Airbus is
'looking at scenarios' to take the rate back up."
15 The Tom Firm 3 "Airbus chief executive Tom Enders is confident the new On an
May Australi Enders A350 XWB aircraft will not run into the problems integral
2009 an, , CEO experienced by its A380 superjumbo or the Boeing 787 enterpri
"Airbus of Dreamliner. The 787 is almost two years late and there are se
Upbeat Airbus rumours of further delays despite Boeing's insistence it architec
on the will fly by the end of this quarter. 'What makes me ture's
A350 confident is that we took as many lessons as we could relativel
Schedul away from the A380,' Enders told The Australian this y
e" week. 'But a lot still has to happen -- particularly as far as increme
(Steve training skilled workers is concerned.' Enders said the ntal
Creedy) two-year delay in the A380 because of wiring and IT approac
compatibility problems occurred mainly because of people h to
who were not skilled enough. They included new
management and blue-collar workers. 'And I think in product
most cases it was more management than blue-collar develop
workers,' Enders said. Airbus is planning to launch three ment
variants of the A350 in quick succession and has gained
483 firm orders from 30 customers since the program's
launch in 2006, a figure it says puts it 100 firm orders
ahead of the 787 at the equivalent point in its program.
Enders said the manufacturer had looked to its most
experienced staff from the 380 program to staff the 350
project. 'I always say, I readily admit, that lessons learnt
is perhaps less than 50 per cent of the equation,' he said.
'The other half is anticipating new problems. This is where
we are usually not very good, all of us.' Enders said
Airbus had also been looking at the problems experienced
by Boeing, including the huge supply chain problems the
Americans had faced with outside suppliers in its
extended enterprise. It seemed Boeing had been too
lenient with its suppliers and risk-sharing partners.
Enders said Airbus intended to have close contact with
its partners, rather than trust they would be on time
and deliver the desired quality to discover problems
close to the delivery date. 'It's one of the things that
doesn't happen automatically,' he said. 'It's part of
our extended enterprise concept.' Airbus was also not
intending to give suppliers as much responsibility for
design and engineering as Boeing did. 'While Boeing's
concept for the 787 was pretty revolutionary, ours is
only evolutionary in terms of risk-taking -- I hope it is,'
Enders said. 'But, hey, the jury is out, it will be out for a
few years. Every new launch means we take a risk.'
Earlier, A350 XWB program head Didier Evrard told
journalists attending the manufacturer's Innovation Days
technical briefing in Hamburg the program was
developing as planned and would be in service by 2012.
'It's not a risk-free or challenge-free program,' Evrard
said. 'But we are on time, we are progressing along where
we are meant to be with the maturity gates (milestones).
We met the first important one on time and we are ready
for the second one.' He said Airbus was standardising
its processes to make sure suppliers used the same
tools, the same methods and processes and that it
reinforced a collaborative mindset. He pointed to a
composites demonstrator program which built fuselage
mock-ups as an example. Evrard said it was important to
have the designers and manufacturing people working
together on the platform from the beginning. Designers
are also looking at simple and efficient aircraft systems
aimed at improving reliability. These include opting for
just three fuel tanks so there are pumps, a two-circuit
hydraulic system, simpler air system architecture and
design in the landing gear. Airbus estimates maintenance
should be a 'base visit' every 36 months, with a structural
overhaul required only every 12 years. It says this equates
to about a 10 per cent reduction in maintenance costs on
an A350-900 compared with the 787-9."
27 Wall James Firm a "Boeing Co is confident that its new 787 aircraft will hit On a
May Street McNer near-term milestones, including first flight in June and modular
2009 Journal, ney, first delivery early next year, but it won't make money enterpri
"Boeing Chair for a while, Jim McNerney, Boeing's chairman and se
CEO man chief executive, said Wednesday. 'The good news is architec
Confide and that we have what I'm confident will be the best-selling ture's
nt in CEO, airplane of all time, which gives us time to work on long-
787 The profitability,' McNerney said during the Sanford term
Schedul Boeing Bernstein Strategic Decision Conference. It is typical that views.
e, Long- Compa new aircraft don't make money during the development
Term ny stage, but the 787 experienced costly and unexpected
Success manufacturing-related delays of nearly two years. Down
" (Ann the road, Boeing can improve profitability of the
Keeton) program by further tweaking the manufacturing
process, as well as modifying the plane itself, he said.
'We can streamline supply chain and take more weight
out of the airplane,' McNerney said. The 787 is Boeing's
best-selling aircraft ever, garnering more than 800 orders
prior to its first test flight. At the same time, though, the
global market for commercial aircraft has slowed as
airlines cope with a worldwide recession."
4 Busines James Firm a "When the long-delayed Boeing 787 Dreamliner finally On the
June sWeek McNer takes wing above Washington State in its first test flight non-
2009 "Boeing ney, later this month, much will be riding on its sleek, carbon- systemi
.................................
's Chair fiber back. Some 56 buyers, ranging from Etihad Airways c
Dreamli ma and in the United Arab Emirates to Northwest Airlines, have strategie
ner CEO, ordered 866 of the planes--enough to keep Boeing busy s of a
Nears The for more than a decade. This state-of-the-art plane, slated modular
Takeoff Boeing to make its first commercial flights with Japan's All enterpri
" Compa Nippon Airways early next year, will set the Chicago- se
(Joseph ny based manufacturer apart from Airbus and other rivals for architec
Weber) years to come. But one thing the plane won't do is give ture.
Boeing much of a financial lift-at least not for several
years. First, Boeing will need to recover its research-
and-development costs, estimated at $3.5 billion to $4.5
billion. What's more, initial customers are expected to
pay a discounted price of $130 million to $170 million
per plane. That's far less than what Boeing pulls in on
such tried-and-true models as the 747, a bigger plane that
can retail for more than $300 million. At first, a Boeing
spokesman says, the new plane will be a "zero-margin"
affair.
The air travel slowdown, which is punishing carriers
around the world, looks likely to keep the number of new
planes in the skies down for a while. 'This looks like a
three-year downturn,' says Richard Aboulafia, a vice-
president at aerospace consultant the Teal Group. Boeing
reported on June 4 that it received just 20 orders for all of
its commercial jets in May, down from 67 in May 2008.
Commercial plane sales are likely to account for as
much as $33.7 billion out of Boeing's expected $68.2
billion sales in 2009, BernsteinResearch analysts
estimate. But next year the commercial unit's sales will
probably slip to $29.7 billion, they add, dragging down
Boeing's overall tally to $64.6 billion. And net income
could slide from an expected $3.3 billion this year to $3
billion in 2010. Nonetheless, investors appear to be
excited about the Dreamliner's prospects-as well as by
reports that United Airlines may order as many as 150
planes from either Boeing or Airbus this fall. Investors
have bid Boeing's share price up to about 50, the
highest it has traded since last fall and up sharply from
about 29 in March. Of course, Boeing shares fetched more
than 107 in the fall of 2007.
The company expects to roll out just a half-dozen of the
Dreamliners this year for testing. Then, once it is cleared
to fly commercially, Boeing is expected to deliver about
15 to carriers next year. The company says it will ramp up
manufacturing to produce as many as 10 planes a month
by the end of 2012, though analysts are skeptical of that
aggressive timetable. Bernstein analyst Douglas Harned
suggests the 10-per-month rate is more likely by mid-
2013; he expects only about 60 of the planes to leave
factories in 2012. Says Harned: 'The manufacturing
processes used to produce these aircraft are new, and the
ability to reach 2012 production rates has not yet been
demonstrated.' Boeing management contends it can
meet the production time lines. Even though the plane
..............-------- - --- - - - -
is already two years late and still must convince
regulators that it will be airworthy for the decades of
service each is likely to see, executives argue that they
have solved the supply-chain problems that dogged the
program. 'The airplane will fly in June, and we will
embark on the flight-test program,' Chief Executive
Officer James McNerney Jr. said at a recent investor
conference. Afterward the company will increase
production to the 10-per-month rate. Says McNerney:
'We think that's manageable.'
With airlines struggling with overcapacity and tight credit,
Boeing will be hard-pressed to move more planes of any
kind. The company has trimmed production plans for this
year and is cutting its workforce by some 10,000 jobs,
largely because of lackluster demand. BernsteinResearch
figures the company will deliver just 386 planes of all
sorts next year, down from an expected 456 this year.
The firm estimates that Boeing will deliver only 301
models of its most popular plane, the 737, compared with
an expected 358 this year. 'The real issue is: Do the
airlines need the airplanes? In 2010 we believe they do
not,' says Harned. Of course, analysts may have to rework
their projections if orders such as the expected one by
United come through."
7 The Bob Firm a "Even now, as General Motors fights for survival, there On a
June Washin Lutz, is something ambivalent about its prescription for modular
2009 gton Vice saving itself, a conflict implicit in a bit of symbolism that enterpri
Post, Chair recently greeted arrivals to the Detroit Metropolitan se
"Behind man, Airport even before they reached baggage claim. One of architec
GM's Gener GM's touted new automobiles sat on display in the center ture's
Attempt al of the automaker's airport gift shop. It was not the coming view of
to Motors electric car, the 2011 Chevrolet Volt, championed by Bob its
Change Lutz, the GM executive most identified with the Hail Mary integral
its that the vehicle represents for the bankrupt company, competi
Image is which faces the immediate future as a ward of the federal tor
Ambiva government. It was not one of the relatively new GM
lence hybrids. It was not even a mid-level sedan called the
about its Chevy Malibu, which has received flattering reviews and
Car of awards, in part for its better-than-average fuel economy. It
the was instead a car that flies in the face of all the worries
Future" about the American automotive industry, all the calls to
(Michae make it more environmentally responsible and therefore
I Leahy) more viable: the 2010 Chevrolet Camaro SS with a V-8
engine, General Motors' version of the fast and powerful
model that automobile enthusiasts commonly call a muscle
car. With an estimated 25 miles per gallon on the
highway, the 400-plus-horsepower Camaro SS is not a car
renowned for being fuel-efficient. It is another Bob Lutz
car, a monument to Lutz's and GM's enduring hope
that even as the company struggles to escape
bankruptcy as a smaller, leaner producer of fuel-
efficient vehicles, the glory days can somehow be
resurrected. 'Sexy with charisma,' is how Lutz
recently described the Camaro while in his office on a
square-mile expanse known as the GM Technical Center,
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the nucleus of the company's research and development
efforts. It is the kind of Detroit-speak he favors. 'Some
people don't care for those kinds of descriptions today --
it's a different time,' says Lutz, who drives a gas-thirsty
2009 Corvette, a dream car of muscle lovers. 'But we
have new vehicles, too. We have the Volt. We are
committed to the electrification of the automobile. We
know this is the time.' If you were to believe that Lutz
commissioned the Volt because he thinks the environment
needs to be saved from carbon dioxide emissions, or that
the United States has a moral obligation to lead a greening
of the planet, you would be wrong. 'If you look at most of
the mainstream media, you get the impression that 95
percent of Americans today want a vehicle like the
Chevrolet Volt or a Ihybrid such as the] Toyota Prius,'
says Lutz, until recently the former head of GM's
global product development and nowadays the
company's vice chairman and senior adviser. 'And
that, by God, the reason General Motors is in trouble, is
that we have not offered a vehicle like that. But when
you look at the reality, at today's fuel prices, most
Americans still want a conventional car.' Why the Volt
then? 'Because it is an important symbol. We need it. It
has a chance to change our image,' he says. As GM's
situation has become increasingly dire, and interested
parties from President Obama to shareholders have
demanded that the company start making more fuel-
efficient cars, GM has pointed to the Volt as evidence of
its changing ways. But the values that have long shaped
this iconic company are deeply held, especially the
passion for pushing the envelope of automobile
performance and power. In many ways, the Volt, and
GM's subtle shift from old design priorities, represent a
contradiction of those values. Meanwhile, some
industry observers are unconvinced that the Volt, even
if it runs flawlessly, can be the company's savior, and
view it as a miscalculated effort to woo back customers
by awkwardly trying to demonstrate a new cutting-
edge bent. 'I just think GM is focusing on the wrong
thing,' says Daniel Roos, an engineering professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies the
automobile industry. 'The quality of its cars was horrible
in the '70s and '80s, but it's much better now. It has world-
class vehicles: the Malibu and the Cadillac CTS. They
should be [promoting] those and capitalizing on their
strengths.' While regarding the Volt as a sign of modest
progress within GM, some critics see the car as
basically another half-step in a company prone to half-
steps. They point to the Volt's internal-combustion
gasoline engine -- dubbed by GM as a 'range extender,'
meant to supply electricity to the motor after the vehicle
has exhausted its 40-mile range on battery power alone --
as an indication that the plug-in electric car is not quite
what it purports to be. To these critics, the Volt neatly
reflects long-standing problems in GM's corporate
culture: a propensity for knee-jerk responses, an
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inbred caution even in the midst of reform and a
lingering preference for comfort over efficiency. Lutz
vociferously rejects such characterizations. Not only does
the Volt demonstrate GM's 'commitment to changing,'
he says, but also the car is simply 'the first generation of
an electric vehicle from GM' that will produce successive
generations of enhanced Volts, ultimately leading to a car
running entirely on electric power in excess of 150 miles.
Producing a car that does not scare away the customer
with its technology or cost must be GM's mission for
now, he says. The Volt has staunch supporters, too. A
school of automotive analysts thinks that the car represents
one of the last opportunities for GMto distinguish itself, to
lure environmentally conscious buyers, in particular.
Admirers and detractors alike largely agree on one point:
that, if GM is to recover, the Volt must be part of a broader
effort to reform the company's culture and push it toward
acquiring new automotive passions. The question
remains how GM executives, so proud of their
company's history, so in love with the cars of an earlier
generation, will cope with their own ambivalence to
change. And no one in the corporation embodies that
ambivalence more than Bob Lutz. Lutz strikes some
observers as an unlikely figure for launching an electric-
car program. The 77-year-old silver-haired, tanned and
gregarious former Marine aviator rides motorcycles, pilots
a helicopter that his GM colleagues say he lands on his
driveway, once called global warming 'a crock,' and
appeared on David Letterman's and Stephen Colbert's
shows to banter about GM's hopes for the Volt. Just the
new language associated with environmentalism irks
him. He momentarily looks bewildered when asked
whether the place of the modern vehicle is undergoing
a change in the culture, whether in time Americans
might chiefly appreciate a GM car simply for its
'utilitarian' value, a reliable conveyor of riders from
point A to B. Lutz raises his eyebrows.'Utilitarian?' A
car is not an appliance, he says. A car is not a washing
machine -- the proof of which is that people do not lust
after their washing machines. They lust after a
beautiful car, he says. If you want reliable, go get
yourself a refrigerator. A gorgeous car, he says, is an
expression of power and yearning, especially for
owners who hope the vehicles will inject excitement
and romance into their otherwise mundane lives.
'Show me a washing machine that can do that,' he says.
For years, Lutz worked under GM chief executive Rick
Wagoner, a longtime company finance chieftain who
green-lighted the Volt but was preoccupied in the last
years of his tenure with issues of GM's crushing debt and
how to keep the company from collapsing. Last
November, when Wagoner made the public relations
mistake of flying to Washington on a corporate jet to ask
congressional officials for government bailout loans, his
image was irrevocably damaged. A month later, in one of
his last high-profile appearances, Wagoner rode in a Volt
prototype along Washington streets before the second
round of hearings on the nation's crippled auto industry,
part of his effort to trumpet GM's evolving environmental
focus. But by then the executive's fate was sealed, a
consequence of the belief that he was linked with an out-
of-touch company. Pushed out by the Obama
administration, Wagoner gave way to new chief executive
Fritz Henderson, who quickly reaffirmed the company's
commitment to the Volt. During the tumult, Lutz went on
working, a self-described car man ensconced at a safe
remove from the finance men's woes and budget-slashing,
and happiest when he is talking about horsepower,
speed and performance. His office at the Technical
Center here in Warren sits amid a research-and-
development behemoth. Security is tight; visitors are
screened for camera equipment and anything else that
might procure trade secrets about prospective vehicles.
Near Lutz's office is a reflecting pool -- immense enough
to be a large pond. Farther down is a building called
Design North, where for decades, in a special showroom,
executives unveiled new GM automobiles for the brand's
dealers and other VIPs in a venue that once doubled as a
theater of sorts for entertainment luminaries flown to
Detroit to perform for the dealers, a roster that included
Lucille Ball and the Beach Boys. GM's only real
competition at the time came from Ford Motor Co. and
Chrysler Corp., backyard rivals with nearly identical
union-negotiated labor costs and roughly similar
product lines. It was an era of near absolute power for
the Big Three in the American auto market: They
could set a car's retail price at virtually any amount,
certain that consumers somewhere would buy it.
Prodigious profits led in time to prodigious costs.
Pressure and the threat of strikes from the United Auto
Workers union, wanting its share of the Big Three's
bounty, guaranteed not only rising wages that served
as workers' ladder to the middle class but also lifetime
health care and growing pensions. In time, GM was
responsible for funding more than 1 percent of all the
health-care costs in the United States. While smaller
and fledgling auto companies in Japan and Europe
were disciples of lean operations during the 1960s, in
preparation for one day becoming viable competitors,
GM preached expansion in the name of more product
brands and winning vehicles, shying away from no
expense if it might mean producing a more artful,
powerful and extravagantly appointed car. 'A lot of
waste in the glory days,' observes Lutz, who
remembers former GM design chief Bill Mitchell
authorizing the purchase of a new Ferrari V-12 engine
just so he could demonstrate to subordinate engineers
what he wanted the engine of another GM car, the 12-
cylinder Pontiac Firebird, to sound like. 'He spent
what today would be like $75,000 to get the engine,' a
laughing Lutz says. 'He could have done the same
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things with a recording or he could have rented a
Ferrari for a day. It's hysterical when you think about
it, crazy. It was a flamboyant era.' That is all gone
now. GM long ago stopped bringing famous entertainers
to Design North. In late March, the car being shown off
there is the four-door Volt, its metallic aquamarine paint
job twinkling preternaturally under track lighting. Powered
by lithium-ion batteries and scheduled for sale in
November 2010, the Volt will be able to transport a driver
as many as 40 miles on battery power alone before it needs
to be recharged, a task as simple as plugging into an
available outlet. The Volt was Lutz's idea, part of his
goal to remake GM's image from that of a corporate
dinosaur mocked for creating the kind of gas guzzlers
he tends to favor personally into a cutting-edge 21st-
century technological force capable of besting any of its
Japanese competitors. No rival occupies so much of his
attention as the company that has supplanted GM as
the world's chief auto seller, Toyota. Lutz sees several
reasons for Toyota's ascendancy, none more important
than becoming the darling of media analysts and
environmentalists in the wake of its seminal hybrid, the
Prius. By early this decade, the Prius had become a
genuine phenomenon, envied by competing auto
executives less for its sometimes pallid sales numbers than
for how the hybrid with the funny-looking sloped roof had
stamped Toyota in consumers' minds as the industry's
leader in technology, fuel-efficiency, reliability and
forward-thinking environmentalism. In early 2006 -
'much too late,' he acknowledges now -- a troubled Lutz
saw that driving a Prius constituted nothing less than a
values statement for many of its owners, a means to bask
in the perception of their own enlightenment. Even more
alarming, thought Lutz, was that some consumers not
enamored of the Prius itself nonetheless saw its existence
as proof of Toyota's wisdom. The Prius's presence alone
was drawing people to Toyota lots, where the curious
bought everything from bigger sedans to sport-utility
vehicles and trucks with about the same gas mileage as
their GM counterparts, groused Lutz. Part of what he
called the 'halo effect.' One sporadically selling hybrid,
he realized, had greened an entire company and
catapulted nearly every vehicle in its product line. It
was a disturbing sea change for GM executives. What
the 1920s Model-T had been for Ford -- a transformational
vehicle cementing the impression of the company's
dynamism -- the Prius was proving to be for Toyota.
Meanwhile, American automakers, including GM, suffered
under the perception that they were stuck in yesteryear and
saddled with cars of inferior quality. Personally, Lutz
was scornful of much about the Prius. He thought it
'pretty ugly,' he says, and technologically
unexceptional. But he could not deny the shrewdness of
Toyota's long-range strategy. He came to see a benefit in
what he regarded as the Prius's homely features,
particularly the sloped roof. 'That's where Toyota did a
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very clever thing: The Prius had its own unique
appearance,' he says. 'Just like the Volkswagen Beetle was
ugly in the '50s, the Prius had a certain ugly chic about it
that appealed to a lot of people, the same kind of
trendsetters who'd bought the Beetles long ago because to
do it was cool and showed you were not part of a
materialistic society.' If any moment presented GM
executives with an opportunity to overcome the
unfavorable perception of the corporation, Lutz thinks, it
came on the eve of the Prius's arrival in the American
marketplace. The Prius was already a moderate success in
Japan, where Toyota had introduced it in 1997, and GM
executives had to decide how, if at all, to respond to a
competitor's hybrid in the United States: Should they
enter the hybrid competition, too? Lutz and other GM
executives met at the company headquarters in Detroit
to ponder the matter. 'Somebody said, 'Do we have
[hybridJ technology?' ' Lutz remembers. " 'Oh, yeah,'
was the answer. 'Oh, yeah, we got the technology.
We've been building hybrid prototypes since the late
'60s.' Another executive asked what the cost of the
hybrid investment would be." 'Well, we're probably
talking about $600 Imillioni to $700 million,' "
someone answered, as Lutz recalls. Finally an
executive asked, 'What would we sell this thing for?'
'Well, the answer was: No matter how we twist the
numbers, we were going to lose a couple of hundred
million dollars a year,' Lutz recalls. 'And Rick
Wagoner quite rightly, along with the finance people,
said, 'We can't do that. We can't go to the board of
directors and come up with a program [for hybrids]
costing the bigger portion of a billion dollars and when
the board of directors [asks] why are we doing this, we
say, 'Well, we're going to lose money on it, but, well,
we're doing it to show that General Motors is
technologically advanced and environmentally aware.'
You know, back then, that wasn't going to receive a
very warm welcome.' The decision was made not to go
forward with a hybrid program. For a while, nothing
that Lutz and other GM executives saw in the Prius's sales
number made them think they had made the wrong
decision, Lutz says. But within a couple of years of the
Prius's release into the American market, he began
wondering whether GM had made a serious mistake.
The halo effect had created the perception that all
Toyota cars and trucks, regardless of size, were imbued
with the company's famed fuel efficiency. Meanwhile,
Lutz noticed that the attention paid the Prius had not
diminished Toyota's eagerness to produce big
profitable trucks and SUVs. The rival was climbing in
every category. In early 2006, Lutz decided that GM
could no longer afford to be without a dramatic response
to the Prius and other competitors' models. He walked into
the office of Jon Lauckner, vice president of global
program management and director of the corporation's
advance design, and said he wanted a 'game-changing
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car' capable of reestablishing GM as the worldwide
technological leader. Determined to leapfrog the Prius
and all other hybrids, Lutz proposed a purely electric
car, powered by lithium-ion batteries, which would
have a range of 150 miles or so before needing to be
recharged. He was an ardent believer in battery
technology, following a three-year stint as the chief
executive of a battery company during the 1990s. It was
not the first time someone at GM had said he wanted an
electric car. The last such effort at the Technical Center
had not ended well: During the '90s, the automaker spent
more than $1 billion developing a small two-seat electric
vehicle known as the EVI, using heavy nickel-lead
batteries before concluding that it was cost-prohibitive for
consumers and scrapping it to the disgust of fervent EVI
fans and environmentalists. Lauckner, who had carefully
studied the EVI and thought that the car would have been
wholly impractical with nickel-lead batteries, saw similar
problems with Lutz's vision of a car intended to go far on
lithium-ion batteries. 'Too expensive,' said Lauckner, who
made clear that with all the batteries needed for a vehicle
to travel about 150 miles, Lutz would merely be making
another battery-heavy, cost-prohibitive car. Known in GM
corridors as 'The Wizard,' Lauckner immediately had two
suggestions: a smaller battery pack that would at once
make the car affordable while guaranteeing the typical
American worker a ride long enough for a round-trip
commute each day; and a modest gasoline engine that
would kick in only if and when a driver ran down the
battery power. The engine would have an entirely different
use from the standard internal-combustion engine,
generating electricity to power the electric motor and, in
the process, extending the vehicle's range. Then Lauckner
removed a fountain pen from his pocket and started
furiously scribbling calculations that in time proved
prescient about everything from the necessary battery size
to the dimensions of the little gasoline engine. Later, with
GM surveys indicating that 78 percent of U.S. workers had
daily round-trip commutes of 40 miles or fewer, Lutz
posited that the vast majority of Americans who drove
their electric cars would ordinarily never need a drop of
gas. Forty miles became what Lutz and Lauckner called
the 'sweet spot' for their new battery's range, the distance
at which they surmised that most buyers would feel
comfortable with their electric car's capabilities, knowing
they had the backup of a gasoline engine capable of taking
them more than 300 miles. What made the 40-mile battery
range so ideal, Lauckner said, was that the distance did not
necessitate a mammoth-sized battery pack that would put
the car out of the financial reach of all but the rich. For
the first time, Lutz thought he saw a viable plan. And
while the presence of a gasoline engine meant that GM
could not call it a purely electric vehicle, Lutz and the
marketing people finally settled on an alternative
description that struck Lauckner as just right: 'extended-
range electric vehicle.' Not every GM official has alwaysI I
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shared the Volt team's confidence or agreed with the
timetables of Lutz, who by early 2008 openly talked about
the Volt coming out on the market in late 2010. Noting the
ongoing questions about battery issues, Wagoner publicly
indicated then that he was not so sure, saying only that a
release date for the electric vehicle was 'fluid.' But in the
summer of 2008, at a forum attended by other auto
executives and then-presidential candidate Barack Obama,
Wagoner recalibrated his position. Under increasing
pressure from government officials to demonstrate GM's
broad commitment to more fuel-efficient vehicles, the
beleaguered chief executive confidently restated GM's
goal to bring out the Volt in 2010. After Wagoner's
resignation this year, the newly installed Henderson and
his lieutenants reiterated the company's support of the
Volt, despite indications, he said, that the car would lose
money in its early years. For all the bold talk, the Volt
project exudes caution. Only about 10,000 of the vehicles
will be built in the first year, a limited production run that,
with the considerable cost of the lithium-ion batteries,
virtually guarantees a high market price, probably about
$40,000. Lutz is not worried: He expects the 10,000 cars
to be purchased quickly by well-heeled electric-vehicle
diehards who will receive a federal tax credit of $7,500.
While acknowledging that the price is a lot to ask of
middle-income consumers, Lutz stresses that he sees the
Volt falling to $25,000 or $30,000 in future generations as
technological advances and economies of scale cut the cost
of batteries. But no matter the vehicle's cost or loss in the
early years, he thinks the Volt must be built for his
desperate company to have any chance of displaying its
competence and new attitude. Failure now would be a
public relations disaster, he insists. 'We're talking about
our image here -- about remaking GM; it is essential to get
this done,' he says. Just the same, he would like to see
more help from the federal government, perhaps a boost of
the $7,500 consumer tax credit for the Volt, arguing that
with the considerable support that Asian and European
auto companies have received from their governments that
such a subsidy is richly warranted. The Obama
administration, however, has projected its own concern at
times about the Volt, an ambivalence that in moments has
resembled that of skeptics. While administration officials
have offered flattering descriptions of the Volt's potential,
Obama's auto task force noted the persistent questions
about the car's expected losses and whether its high price
tag might limit its appeal. Lutz senses the government's
surprise over how much it will cost to realize its vision of
a remade auto industry. Recalling a visit to the Technical
Center by Obama task force leaders Steven Rattner and
Ron Bloom, he says, 'We took them through a lot of our
advanced technology plants. And I will tell you that when
they saw the cost of some of these solutions' and
technologies such as batteries and hydrogen fuel cells
'they were stunned. These are very intelligent and well-
informed people, but they, Bloom and Rattner, were just
amazed about what a lot of this stuff is going to cost.'
Despite the seeming worries, Lutz sees important social
forces working in the Volt's favor, notably the passionate
desire of influential environmentalists and the intellectual
establishment to have electric cars succeed, he says, a
movement that strikes him as already creating an artificial
marketplace, a rigged game of sorts. His cynicism seeps
out when he ponders whether a single vehicle can restore
GM's charisma and consumers' confidence. 'Yes, it can,
because sex and charisma are to a certain extent
redefined today, especially by the media and especially
by the government,' he says. 'The focus now is on
conservation, the lowering of CO2s, sustainable energy
and so forth. So today, to be frank, we've got two
markets.' Lutz thinks something else is working on his
side and that of the Volt: 'Obama has said that he
wants a million plug-in vehicles on the market by
2015." The federal government, which will effectively
own about 70 percent of GM, must be heeded now, he
realizes. For now, Lutz views the Volt as nothing less
than the vehicle that helped deliver a government life
preserver to a drowning corporation. 'Think where GM
would be now if we had not made the decision to
productionize the Volt, a year and a half ago,' he says and
leans back in his chair. 'That is the real question. You
could argue that we were late but that the Volt has now
become the focal point, the rallying point for the pro-GM
forces. We can say, 'See, we can transform the automobile;
we can be the company that electrifies the automobile.' We
can say, 'Yes, we can.' " Lutz grins. Not everyone shares
his view that it is the right car at the right time. Barry
Bluestone, a political economy professor at Northeastern
University whose late father spent years as a United Auto
Workers vice president dealing primarily with General
Motors, fears that the Volt will look far less attractive to
consumers than an array of new and established hybrids
selling for much less. 'The car isn't coming out for
another year, and it has an extraordinarily high price,' he
says. 'I don't see how many people are going to get excited
about a $40,000 car, even with a tax credit, when they can
spend about half of that in some cases to get a hybrid. The
Volt might be the car of the future, but it certainly isn't
the car of the present.' The vehicle will face an array of
competitors. Tesla Motors, a Silicon Valley company,
already has produced and sold a small number of all-
electric cars priced at about $100,000, with reported plans
to sell an estimated 1,500 cars this year. The Mitsubishi
Corp. is launching its own electric car, MiEV, this summer
in Japan. And China will soon present an electric vehicle
that it eventually hopes to put on the foreign market.
'There's already an enormous amount of competition and
perhaps a global overcapacity,' MIT's Roos contends. But
GM's greatest hurdle remains its own image. Lutz and
other company executives are looking at what might be
a Gordian knot. How do you continue promoting and
selling the big powerful glory cars while arguing that
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you are a new GM? 'You do it with a car like the Volt,'
Lutz says. 'But we can't make any mistakes with the Volt.
We know we're facing a perceptual problem.' He frowns
and encapsulates what the modern view of the company
has become: 'It's that we make all our money off sport-
utility vehicles and large pickup trucks and V-8
engines, that we don't care about the environment, that
we pooh-poohed the Toyota Prius as being
economically unsound' -- he pauses and plunges ahead -
'which, at today's fuel prices [about $2.40 a gallon at that
moment], it still is, by the way.' He knows how impolitic
that will sound to some people. He smiles ruefully, not
backing down. 'The customer will never recover the
premium paid for the [Prius] hybrid system in fuel
economy,' he adds. Lutz is of two minds when talking
about the auto industry's evolution. The executive in
him trumpets the Volt as a key to the company's
future. The romantic in him wishes the government,
the media and the critics would leave the big, powerful
cars alone. He is already mourning what he sees as an
inevitability: the slow, painful death of the dazzling
machines. 'In time, the government is going to legislate
out of existence cars like the Camaro, the Corvette, the
Cadillac CTS -- all these acclaimed vehicles that have
lately gotten rave reviews from the automotive press
around the world,' he predicts. 'So, ultimately, we are
driven by legislation into the kind of excitement provided
by the Volt.' He says this without a scintilla of sarcasm.
At his core, as he frequently tells people, he is a car guy,
drawn to the technological challenge the Volt presents,
fascinated by the potential of batteries, understanding that
whoever prevails in the electric-vehicle competition may
be immortalized along with his car. It is just that he
cannot shake his conviction that, in the name of
change, Americans are being asked to give up
something that defines them and their culture, a beauty
and roar to which no monetary value can be attached.
Few things in his existence give him more pleasure
than driving his Corvette for the hour it takes him to
get to his home in Ann Arbor. He smiles while talking
about the 2010 Camaro, the car still sitting at that moment
in the GM airport gift shop. 'Given the tough economic
times and the high priority of fuel economy, we were
almost wishing we hadn't done the Camaro,' he says. 'We
looked at it as something radically mistimed.' But he says
the high number of advance orders for the car has justified
his skepticism about just how deep the public's love for
green cars will ever be. 'When you get out into the
marketplace, it's probably just 5 percent of the public
that desperately wants something environmentally
sound and is willing to pay a premium for it,' he says.
'I would say the East and West Coast intellectual
establishment kind of lives in its own world. When you
get to the broad American marketplace, excitement is
still kind of defined in the way it used to be.' He is
finished for the day. His career is winding down, he
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says; retirement will come later this year. 'Nice
afternoon for a drive,' he says, ready to head out for the
60-mile ride back to Ann Arbor, a university town, the
kind of town in which GM cars are not very popular, he
says. The closer he gets to home, the fewer GM vehicles
he will see, especially the big kind, the ones that college
towns typically deplore, the sexy kind, he says. It is what
he most yearns to drive, even as he pushes on behalf of the
small electric car back at Design North, the one he hopes
represents the company's salvation, glittering under the
showy lights. The conflict in him mirrors the history of
GM's and a country's ambivalence, just another reason
why any green transformation of the industry will be fitful,
he suspects. Driving to Ann Arbor reminds Lutz that GM's
survival hinges on a successful fight for the souls of
American auto buyers. It just so happens that, all along,
his soul has been one of them."
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'The background is a decline in airline traffic at least
three times worse than any 12-month period,
potentially compounded by an unprecedented
financing crisis,' said Nick Cunningham, an analyst at
Evolution Securities Inc. 'Production will have to drop
sharply to avoid a drastic oversupply of airline
capacity.' For 2009, Toulouse, France-based Airbus
still plans 480 deliveries, only three less than 2008, a
record year. Boeing plans 480 to 485, returning to a
growth trajectory intended before a strike cut 2008
deliveries to 375. Many planes being shipped this year
were financed before the credit crunch. For 2010, the
outlook is less clear, with suppliers less optimistic than
planemakers. 'I expect recovery to 2008 levels could
take several years,' United Technologies Corp. CEO
Louis Chenevert said May 28 at a conference with
analysts in New York. His company builds Pratt &
Whitney jet engines and owns Hamilton Sundstrand, which
makes electric systems for planes.
Evolution's Cunningham is advising investors to bet
against planemaker stocks now, rather than a few days
into the Paris show, when short-selling after the hoopla
of order announcements has been a common strategy.
The collapse in orders will be followed by a 'deep
decline' in deliveries spread over three to four years,
the analyst said. He favors selling shares of European
Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co., the parent of Airbus,
and also shuns engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce Group
Plc. John Leahy, Airbus's chief operating officer,
predicts that output won't change much in 2010.
Boeing hasn't given a forecast. The manufacturers plan
limited production cuts, even as airline traffic falls.
Singapore Airlines Ltd. says it will mothball planes if it
can't sell or lease them. British Airways Plc is
grounding aircraft and cutting winter seating by 4
percent. Southwest Airlines Co., the world's largest
discount carrier, will reduce capacity by 6 percent this
year. Global airline losses may total $9 billion in 2009
as revenue drops 15 percent, the International Air
Transport Association said June 8, doubling a three-
month-old forecast. IATA Chief Executive Officer
Giovanni Bisignani said planemakers may deliver 30
percent fewer planes in 2010 and must trim production
accordingly. The forecast is close to that made in
February by the biggest Boeing and Airbus customer,
Steven Udvar-Hazy, CEO of International Lease Finance
Corp. He predicted that planemakers will cut as much
as 35 percent, starting in the fourth quarter. The
manufacturers reject that contention, yet a number of
suppliers are making contingency plans for drastic rate
changes. 'There's considerable skepticism in the
supply base that Boeing will be able to hold production
rates level on the narrowbody line, in spite of their
insistence that they've overbooked production slots
enough,' said JB Groh, an analyst at D.A. Davidson & Co.
in Lake Oswego, Oregon. GKN Plc, Britain's biggest
maker of airliner parts, predicted in January that
demand for single-aisle planes would plummet by
midyear. Narrowbody planes include Boeing's 737 and
Airbus's A320 series, and represent two-thirds of
deliveries. 'Narrowbodies is probably an area that will get
hit,' with reductions of as much as 25 percent in 2010 and
2011, said Zafar Kahn, an analyst at Societe Generale in
London. Airbus intends to reduce monthly output of
A320-series planes to 34 from 36, starting in October. It
also will freeze output of widebody A330s and A340s.
Boeing is slashing production of the 777 by 29 percent to
five a month, starting midyear 2010, and postponing rate
increases on 767s and 747s. The U.S. company said in a
May 21 meeting with investors that it won't need to
revise narrowbody plans. Analysts say otherwise, with
at least five predicting the next day that Boeing will
announce a 737 rate cut this year. Boeing reduced its
20-year growth forecast for commercial- jet deliveries
yesterday, saying there will be a market for 29,000 new
-- -- - Tllk
planes, or 1.4 percent less than the number predicted 4a
year ago. The company had increased the forecast by a
cumulative 14 percent the previous three years. 'I'm
not changing our forecast, and I'm not saying we're
going to surprise ourselves, but we always do,'
marketing chief Tinseth said in an interview.
The state of plane sales is tempting some airlines back into
the market with the hope they can squeeze manufacturers
for discounts. ILFC's Hazy said June 8 that he will
increase orders in anticipation of greater demand from
carriers to replace older models. Hazy had planned 150
purchases through 2019 and may raise the number by 30
percent in the next 12 to 18 months."
14 Telegra Scott Firm a "Speaking ahead of the opening of the Paris Air Show on On
June ph, Carson & Monday, Scott Carson admitted he was 'a little more modular
2009 "Aviati , CEO 3 pessimistic' than the plane maker's in-house and
on Boeing economists, but said he sees no sign of a recovery in the integral
Industry Comm industry until the second half of 2010. The market is enterpri
Faces ercial now at the bottom, he said. Mr Carson also dashed se
Year of Airpla hopes that Boeing's much-delayed 787 'Dreamliner' would architec
Gloom, nes; make its test flight this week to coincide with the air show, ts' vies
Warns Tom which celebrates its centenary this year.The 787 is still on on
Boeing Enders course to make a test flight in June, as Boeing had growth.
Head" , CEO forecast, but it will be later in the month.
(Amy Airbus
Wilson) Tom Enders, chief executive of European rival Airbus,
said this weekend it could withstand as many as 1,000
cancellations because it has an order book of 3,500
planes, which will ensure it can keep going at
'maximum production' for the next five years."
14 New Louis Firm- a "Airbus executives warned over the weekend that output at On
June York Gallois Labor & their European factories could fall by as much as one- integral
2009 Times , EADS ( fourth over the next two years as the aircraft maker and its and
"Airbus CEO; suppliers adjust to the sharp drop in air traffic and modular
Warns Thoma widening losses at the world's airlines. But the company enterpri
Output s insisted that it could absorb those cuts without se
could Enders resorting to large-scale layoffs - at least for now. arhitect
Drop as , Earlier this year, Airbus said that it planned to slow ures'
Much as Airbus production of its A320 single-aisle passenger planes to 34 views
25% in CEO per month from a previous plan of 40, while output of its on
2010 wide-body A330 was frozen at a rate of 8.5 per month, managi
and down from 10 per month. Deliveries of the double-decker ng
2011." A380 are being limited to 14, compared with an initial negative
(Nicola target of 18 per month. But those cuts, which amount to a growth.
Clark) slowdown of about 15 percent, may not be sufficient to
meet the slide in demand from airlines, Louis Gallois,
chief executive of EADS, the parent of Airbus, said
Saturday. 'We have the flexibility to go further if
needed,' Mr. Gallois said. 'We are very sensitive to what
will happen in the second half of the year, to see if we
reach the bottom of the swimming pool,' Mr. Gallois said.
'We have no capacity now to see what will be the depth of
the crisis.' Thomas O. Enders, the Airbus chief executive,
said management could envisage production cuts
'somewhere in the range of between 15 and 25 percent' in
. ......................... U K
the years 2010 and 2011 if the slump in air travel
continues.
Boeing has said it planned to keep production steady in
2009 while laying off 4,500 workers. So far, Boeing
foresees slowing output on one of its assembly lines - for
the long-range, widebody 777 - by 28 percent in 2010.
Both Airbus and Boeing say they expect to deliver about
the same number of planes to customers this year as in
2008. 'There's a little bit of unreality,' said Nick
Cunningham, an aerospace analyst at Evolution Securities
in London. 'Things are very, very bad. It's just that
some people aren't feeling it yet.' Mr. Gallois and Mr.
Enders said Airbus expected to be able to manage its
production slowdown without any job cuts. 'But of
course this has a limit,' Mr. Gallois said. 'We need to
be careful in the way we manage our manpower,' Mr.
Gallois said. 'We have to be able to increase production
again when it is needed.' Airbus is eager to avoid fresh
layoffs in the current economic environment and after
eliminating 10,000 jobs in 2007 and 2008 as part of a
painful restructuring aimed at reducing its euro-
denominated cost base. 'Airbus will not countenance
any large-scale layoffs for social and political reasons,'
said Doug McVitie, managing director of Arran Aerospace
in Dinan, France. During the last downturn for the
aviation industry, after the terrorist attacks in 2001, Airbus
avoided layoffs and instead eliminated 6,000 jobs
through early retirements and termination of
temporary work contracts. Boeing cut its work force
by 30,000 and drastically cut back production rates.
'Boeing and Airbus do exactly the same thing
commercially - they build airplanes,' Mr. McVitie
said. 'It's just easier to hire and fire in the U.S.'"
15 Scott Firm a "If you were expecting the 787 to fly during Paris you're On a
June Carson going to be disappointed, but it will fly within the next modular
2009 , CEO two weeks. We forecast it would fly before the end of enterpri
Boeing the second quarter 2009 and if you count the way I do se
Comm that means two weeks. It will fly when it's ready and it architec
ercial will be ready by the end of this month." t's
Airpla knowle
nes dge of
(transpa
rency
about)
his
system.
16 Wall Tom Firm- a "Aircraft maker Airbus needs state loans to help On an
June Street Enders Suppli & finance development of its future A350 airliner in integral
2009 Journal, , CEO er- I order to compete on even terms with rival Boeing Co.'s and
"Airbus Airbus Gover 787 Dreamliner, Airbus Chief Executive Tom Enders modular
Needs nment said Tuesday. Speaking at a press conference at the Paris enterpri
State Air Show, Enders said: 'We have a competitor which se
Aid To has the most highly subsidized commercial airplane. artchite
Compe We want to level the playing field; this is what the ctur's
te
...... - --- -- M E
Equita reimbursable aids are about,' he continued. Airbus has views of
bly Vs long complained that Boeing receives indirect subsidies govern
Boeing to fund new product development from U.S. ment
government contracts and from its suppliers. support.
(Stefani
a On Monday, France and Germany said they are prepared
Bianchi, to contribute up to EUR2.5 billion in repayable loans
Nathalie toward the EURI I billion cost of developing the A350.
Boschat Spain and the U.K., which historically have industrial
and interests in Airbus, are expected to advance smaller
David amounts of cash in the coming weeks. Boeing has
Pearson complained that fresh European state aid to Airbus would
) violate a long-standing 1992 bilateral agreement limiting
the amount of state aid that each company can receive to
develop new products. It also complains that the loans
Airbus receives are at below-market rates, something that
Airbus denies. 'Such financing would violate the member
states' international obligations to abide by the rules of the
World Trade Organization,' Boeing said in a statement e-
mailed to news agencies. 'We are disappointed by
reports that the Airbus member states intend to
provide - and Airbus to accept - billions of dollars of
launch aid for the A350 just as the WTO is to rule on
the WTO consistency of such financing,' Boeing said.
'I'm not surprised that Boeing has complained. What
else could you expect? If I were them, I would want to
keep my advantage,' Enders commented Tuesday. 'So
far we have repaid governments 40% more than what
we have received. The U.K. government has been on
the record saying it's good business,' he added. Airbus
and ministers from France, Germany and the U.K. met
Monday but couldn't agree on funding of the A350
development. Ministers pointed to the absence of the
Spanish minister for transport as the main reason for a lack
of agreement. That led to speculation that Spain is
unhappy with its share of the A350 project. However,
Enders stated that Airbus has no conflict with the Spanish
government over the A350. In relative terms, he said,
Spain has benefited more than the other Airbus partners."
17 Seattle Pat Firm- a "Chicago-based The Boeing Co. says that when it decides On a
June Post Shanah Labor where to put a second 787 line, it will do so without modular
2009 Intellige an, VP emotion and will take labor stability into account. This enterpri
ncer, Airpla isn't exactly a surprise. A 57-day machinist strike last fall se
"Emotio ne reportedly cost the company more than $2 billion in lost architec
nless Progra revenue. Boeing had searched the entire country for ture's
Boeing ms, possible sites to build its first 787 assembly line. need
Conside Boeing Ultimately, the company settled on its existing aircraft /decisio
ring Comm factory in Everett. But analysts have predicted -- and state n to
Labor ercial officials are worrying -- that future 787 production will not grow
Stability Airpla occur in Washington. A new report by FlightBlogger Jon producti
for 2nd nes Ostrower sheds some light on Boeing's thinking and on
787 process for ramping up 787 production. Boeing's vice capacity
Line" president of airplane programs, Pat Shanahan, said that the and
(Andrea decision on where to put a second 787 assembly line resultin
James) will not take a long time. g
means
-I
'The sooner you make a decision, the better. We won't of
be pressed into making a decision. [It will be] very ensurin
measured. It won't be emotionally based,' said g labor
Shanahan. Shanahan declined to specify what locations stability
were on the "short list" for a second 787 production line, , which
but said there are 'lots of geographical options...the real is
options are around 'how do you secure assurance of orthogo
delivery?' And I think that's been a discussion topic nal to
around some of the disruption we've realized...at an
Boeing.' 'There are opportunities that we need to integral
assess and I've worked there for 24 years, I like the enterpri
people in Seattle, I grew up in Seattle, It's a great se
community, but when you have the customer telling architec
you you're making it really hard to choose your ture.
product because when we buy it you can't give it to us,'
said Shanahan."
17 Seattle Kiyota Firm- a "Executives with two of Boeing's major partners on the On a
June Times, ka Suppli 787 Dreamliner said Wednesday that ramping up the modular
2009 "787 Ichima ers current snail's pace production of the hot-selling plane will enterpri
Ramp- ru, cost big money and involve tricky contract negotiations se
up executi with Boeing. Boeing has an ambitious target of rolling architec
Won't ve at out 10 Dreamliners per month by the end of 2012, which ture's
Be Easy Mitsub would likely require a second Dreamliner production line. need
Boeing ishi Even as Boeing dropped a hint such a line wouldn't /decisio
Partners Heavy necessarily be in Everett, the partner executives made n to
Say" Industr clear at the Paris Air Show that getting the supply chain grow
(Domini ies; up to that speed will be difficult. Kiyotaka Ichimaru, an producti
c Gates) Jeff executive at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), which on
Turner makes the 787's plastic-composite wings in Japan, said capacity
, CEO reaching 10 Dreamliners a month will require substantial
of new investment as well as a revamp of the assembly
Spirit methods at the MHI wing plant in Nagoya. 'Just a
AeroSy speeding up of what we are doing' won't be sufficient,
stems said Ichimaru, general manager of the civil aircraft
and aero-engine department. 'We need a drastic
change in how we make some portions' of the wings.
Jeff Turner, CEO of Boeing partner Spirit AeroSystems,
said there's space in his plant to make 10 a month, but the
existing equipment and tooling can make only seven a
month. So he, too, has to make investment decisions
and reach a contract extension with Boeing. 'We think
we understand the demands of that buildup,' said Turner.
'We have to negotiate what that higher level of production
would be.' Spirit, which makes the 40-foot-long front
end of the Dreamliner fuselage in Wichita, Kan., is
regarded as the most successful of the 787's first-tier
partners. MHI and Spirit would have to ramp up
production correspondingly if Boeing built a second
assembly line. The first line in Everett was designed to
roll out only seven Dreamliners a month, and that's the
production rate all the partners originally signed on for
when they joined the jet program. In an interview
published on Flight International magazine's
Flightblogger Web site, Pat Shanahan, Boeing's chief of
airplane production, said in Paris that management is
studying possible locations for a second 787 assembly
- lr
line. There are 'lots of geographical options,' he said.
Ominously for the Puget Sound region, he implied that
the Machinist strike at Boeing last fall will weigh
against the Everett site. The real options are around
'How do you secure assurance of delivery?' " he told
Flightblogger. 'That's been a discussion topic around
some of the disruption we've realized ... at Boeing.' But
Boeing spokeswoman Mary Hanson said there's no time
frame yet for making a second 787 line decision and a
decision is not imminent. The comments of the two top
787 supplier executives suggest it may take awhile. MHI's
Ichimaru said he expects serious discussion with Boeing
'in the very near future' of the full cost of substantially
raising production rates. Complicating the situation, he
said, MHI has started detailed design on the wing for a
second, bigger Dreamliner variant, the 787-9, with
significant changes from the first 787-8 wing. And
even though the final 787-8 design was set long ago,
Ichimaru said, Boeing still sends in changes. The major
cause for that was Boeing's effort to win Federal
Aviation Administration certification of the wing's
lightning protection. To avoid electrical sparks inside the
wing fuel tanks, fasteners had to be removed and turned
around, and seals had to be applied. On the production
line, work that had been completed had to be undone. The
lightning protection changes, the new 787-9 design, the
plan to increase the rate - all of this is expensive even
as little money comes in because MHI has made so few
deliveries. Expanding production would mean 'we
have to accumulate more investment on top of the
investment we have already done,' Ichimaru said. 'We
need to think of some way to recover that.' He said
Boeing is being 'creative' in interpreting the contract and
trying to help. MHI could produce two wings sets a month
right now, but Boeing Everett is not ready for that pace
and the current requirement is much less. With the
bottleneck at the final-assembly plant in Everett, MHI
has so far shipped only nine wing sets since the first
arrived in May 2007. The next ship set is likely to go in
August. Ichimaru said MHI plans to bump up its rate to
between five and seven a month in gradual steps, each
time adding one extra set of wings per month. For
increases beyond that, improvements are needed,
including a revamp of the wing-assembly process,
which is much less efficient than the heavily automated
production of the giant wing panels. Higher rates
could also require a big cash outlay to buy a giant new
autoclave, or high-pressure oven, or even to build a
new facility.
In Wichita, Spirit AeroSystems produces its plastic
fuselage sections by winding carbon-fiber tape infused
with epoxy resin around enormous cylindrical molds, then
baking them in an autoclave. Spirit shut down its
fuselage winding and autoclave operation for most of
the past year after the Everett assembly line choked up
on Dreamliner No. 1. It is still idle today. 'It's cost us,'
Turner said. 'We've a factory ready to produce and it
went to a standstill.' He'd like to see the added revenue
from pumping out more 787 fuselages, but it has to be
'profitable revenue,' he said. That means managing
costs, investing wisely and negotiating a realistic
contract with Boeing for the extra production. That
approach has left Spirit financially well positioned in the
economic downturn. The company avoided layoffs
through the 787 delays, moving workers to the 777 and
737 lines, which were ramping up. When the
Machinists strike at Boeing put those lines out of action
for two months last fall, Turner put the workers on
shortened weeks to avoid layoffs. Now in the economic
downturn, he faces further strain: a planned 29
percent cut in Boeing's 777 production rate in mid-
2010 that will begin affecting his plant in the fourth
quarter and hit it hard early next year. Turner hopes
Boeing can stick to its plan not to cut the 737 rate too.
But he said he's prepared contingency plans in case it
does. He hopes more 787s rolling out will compensate at
least a little for the 777 cuts. Yet he knows a Dreamliner
ramp-up can't happen fast enough to make a big difference
soon."
17 Wall Akbar Firm- a "Qatar Airways may become an exclusive Airbus On a
June Street Al Custo customer and may pull its Boeing Co. 787 Dreamliner modular
2009 Journal Baker, mer and 777 orders after the U.S. plane maker has failed to enterpri
"Qatar CEO, deliver on the long-delayed program, the carrier's chief se
Air May Qatar executive told Dow Jones Newswires Wednesday. 'The architec
Become Airway writing is in the wall for Boeing and they don't care,' ture's
Exclusi s Akbar Al Baker said in an interview on the sidelines of the lack of
ve Paris Air Show. 'They're too busy having lunches and transpar
Airbus dinners.' Qatar Airways, based in the gas-rich Gulf cency
Custom state of Qatar, previously said it was seeking with its
er - compensation for delays in the delivery of the custome
CEO" Dreamliners, but Al Baker said the issue 'has gone way rs.
(Stefani beyond that' because the delivery delay is starting to
a affect the carrier's aggressive expansion drive. 'Boeing
Bianchi doesn't realize how much they're hurting their
) customers' plans,' he said. 'They're very much
mistaken if they think we're going to give them much
more time on the issue.' Qatar currently has 60 Boeing
787 aircraft on order, including options, and 24 777 jets,
including freighters and options. Al Baker said Qatar
Airways is also considering pulling its order of 777
aircraft, which the airline had planned to bring forward.
'Then Boeing will be left with a load of parked planes,'
he said. Al Baker said he will have to 'seriously think'
before doing any further business with Boeing and said
that the lack of communication on the issue has eroded
his confidence in the manufacturer. 'It may be that we
become an exclusive Airbus customer,' he said. Boeing
said it is aware of the issues raised by Qatar Airways and
is working with the airline to resolve the problem. 'We
know that our customers are very concerned by the
delays,' Marty Bentrott, Boeing's vice president of sales
... ........
for the Middle East and Africa, told Dow Jones
Newswires. 'Qatar Airways is a very important customer
to us and we're optimistic that we'll be able to work
through it."'
18 Flight Scott Firm- a "Boeing's top brass have finally come clean about the On a
June Internat Carson custom options under evaluation for a counter attack against modular
2009 ional, , CEO er Airbus's A350-1000, but a key customer - Qatar Airways enterpri
"Boeing Boeing - questions whether the airframer may have already se
's A350 Comm missed the boat. architec
Counter ercial Boeing Commercial Airplanes chief executive Scott ture's
-attack Airpla Carson says that the double stretch 787-10, a rewinged 777 product
Too nes; or an all-new design are 'potentially competing strategy
Smart Akbar alternatives' to meet future customer needs. However,
or Too Al Qatar Airways, which is the A350 launch customer and
Late" () Baker, has 20 -1000s on order but is also a key Boeing
CEO widebody client, is not impressed with the timing. The
Qater airline has orders and options for 60 787s and also has a
Airway large 777 backlog, and chief executive Akbar Al Baker
s; John says the airframer 'is doing things too late.
Leahy, Unfortunately Boeing is not run by commercially
COO minded people, it is being run by bean counters and
Airbus lawyers and if they continue to go this way they will
give an even bigger advantage to Airbus.' 'We look at
studies of all nature,' says Carson. 'Some studies could
even include such things in the future as potentially
rewinging the airplane. And while no commitments have
been made, each study has become a vital part of how we
extend the utility and increase the value of [the 777].'
'Both the -10 and a rewinged, upgraded, improved 777 can
offer great utility for customers. The trick is to find the one
that addresses the needs most broadly so we can have
broad-based market success,' says Carson. Carson also
said that a third option, a clean sheet design, is being
considered as well if the 777 rewing and 787-10 are
deemed to be lacking. 'The history of rewinging is
unblemished by success,' Aboulafia says sceptically,
believing that a clean-sheet 777 replacement may be the
likeliest option for Boeing, while a 787-10 might not be a
technically viable fuselage stretch. Airbus sales chief
John Leahy describes his rival's response as
'confirmation of the winner [Airbus has] in the A350
XWB. They clearly need to do something to update the
777'. Carson declines to specify either a proposed cost for
a rewinged 777 or a timeline to achieve such a goal,
although he confirmed that the development and definition
of the A350 would be a key factor in the decision-making.
'Certainly we pay attention to the capability of that
airplane, and not only the capability which will be
demonstrated as the airplane goes into flight test and the
way the airplane is being marketed because that creates
marketing expectations and allows people to think outside
the box about what the world will look like in the future,'
says Carson. Airbus plans to have the A350-900, which
competes directly with the 777-200ER, flying by 2012,
with an entry into service the following year. Carson also
declines to say whether, if the green light is given to the
787-10, it would be the second or third 787 derivative after
the stretched -9 or the short range -3."
19 Bloomb Scott Firm- ca "Boeing Co. 's 787 Dreamliner, absent from the Paris Air On
June erg, Carson Custo & Show this week after two years of delays, may not be the modular
2009 "Boeing , CEO mers 1 jetmaker's biggest problem. Airbus SAS's bigger A350 and
Faces Boeing has won almost 500 orders, 10 of them at the show, integral
$15 Comm forcing Boeing to turn its attention to the market for approac
billion ercial bigger planes with more than 300 seats. The Chicago- hes to
Dilemm Airpla based company is considering an upgrade of its 15-year- product
a as nes; old 777. Airlines say it should spend billions on a new develop
Airbus John aircraft instead. 'What Boeing makes next is the big ment, as
Racks Leahy, question,' said Doug Runte, a New York-based analyst at well as
up COO Piper Jaffray & Co. who estimates the U.S. company the
A350 Airbus; would need to spend $15 billion to develop a new model. modular
Orders" Tim 'Airplanes require a huge investment of money and effort. media's
(Andrea Clark, If you get it wrong, the consequences are enormous and coverag
Rothma CEO you have to live with it for a very long time.' Boeing, e.
n and Emirat which said it had 'bet the company' in the 1960s when
Susanna es spending twice its market value on the 747 jumbo jet,
Ray) faces a conundrum after adopting a rival strategy to
Toulouse, France-based for the long-haul plane market.
Airbus opted to build its 555-seat A380 superjumbo on the
basis that surging economic growth would spur demand
for bigger planes. Boeing argued that the increasing
complexity of global business travel required smaller
aircraft flying direct to a greater number of cities. It came
up with the 260-seat 787, which is due to make its first
flight this month. While both planes have proved popular,
the Dreamliner has the edge in sales, ranking as the
world's fastest-selling aircraft with 865 contracts worth
about $138 billion at list price compared with the A380's
200 valued at $65.4 billion. Boeing, though, may become
a victim of its own success. The Dreamliner proved so
popular that when Airbus offered a similar plane its airline
customers said they didn't need one and lobbied for a
bigger aircraft altogether. That resulted in the A350, a
model that has attracted 483 orders worth $115 billion.
'The 787 had considerable early sales success, which
forced Airbus to respond,' Raymond Jaworowski, senior
aircraft analyst at Forecast International, said in a note
from the Paris show. 'However, the A350 is more than
simply a 787 competitor. Airbus has positioned it to
cover a broad spectrum of the widebody market.' The
A350 is scheduled to enter service in 2013, giving Airbus
two 300-plus seat models less than six years old to range
against the 777, which debuted in 1995, the 767, dating
from 1982, and the 747 jumbo, an aircraft that was
delivered to airlines the year after man first landed on the
moon. Boeing's Scott Carson, who runs the commercial
airplanes unit, said this week in Paris he's concerned that
the 'maturing' A350 'will create some market
expectations' as it gets closer to flying and Airbus
develops new versions. Carson said Boeing will respond
with either a 777 incorporating a new wing design that
would improve efficiency and bring down operating costs,
an enlarged Dreamliner, or a completely new aircraft.
. .............. ................................. . ........
Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy said Boeing
has been forced to review its strategy because the A350
will be 25 percent cheaper to fly than the older 777. He
spoke after the company announced 58 firm orders at
the Paris show, including an A350 contract from AirAsia
X of Malaysia. Boeing won two orders. 'Scott didn't just
wake up one morning at the air show and decide that he
had $5 billion burning a hole in his pocket, so let's just re-
wing the 777,' Leahy said today in an interview in Paris.
'It's only when being faced with a threat that you want
to spend money like that. He's going to lose the market
if he doesn't do something.' Boeing will evaluate
additions to its aircraft lineup for the next decade in terms
of customer demand, competing products, available
technology and the resources available, Seattle-based
spokesman Jim Proulx said by e-mail. Tim Clark, CEO
of Gulf carrier Emirates, which will become the biggest
777 operator later this year, has little interest in a
larger-winged version of a plane with a fuselage made
from metal rather than the light-weight composites
used in modern designs, he said June 16 at the air show.
Clark, who has also dismissed Boeing's proposed 310-
seat 787-10 as likely to be underpowered, said in Paris
that a clean-paper design is the only way for the U.S.
company to go. Even then, Boeing needs to act before
Airbus offers a stretched A350 to narrow the capacity
gap with the A380, a move that would leave Boeing
with little room for maneuver. 'Given the challenging
economic environment, the sector will be forced to set
priorities and make difficult trade-offs about what
programs they can really afford,' David Raistrick, a
manufacturing specialist at Deloitte LLP, said in a note.
Standing in the way of a new widebody is the multi-
billion dollar bill that could harm the company if the plane
doesn't sell. Boeing must also decide whether pouring
its energies into building a successor to the 777 will
diminish its ability to compete with Airbus when the
pair come to design a new generation of single-aisle
planes. Both companies say they plan to replace their
A320 and 737 short-haul jetliners in a little over 10 years,
suggesting they will need to ramp up spending on research
and development from the middle of the next decade. That
may overlap with construction of a new Boeing widebody.
'That's part of the problem,' said Airbus's Leahy.
'That's the tough call they've got and I guess it's why a
777 derivative is tempting. You've got all these other
things you need to do and you say, if I could just get
away with five or six billion and come up with a good
derivative that would hold my place against the A350,
that would be the ideal solution. But history has shown
that rarely ever works." Should Boeing opt for a re-
winged 777 it could be first to the market with a single-
aisle replacement, though any new plane will require a
'vast improvement' in fuel efficiency based around new
engine technology, Morgan Stanley analyst Rupinder Vig
~~i~ ~II
said. 'If Boeing suddenly decides to come out with
something earlier, in around 2015, Airbus has told us
they'd have to do something very quickly,' he said. 'But I
think both of them now are comfortable with a later date
as they're grappling with their own problems in the
bigger-plane category.'"
19 Bloomb Clay Firm- a "Airbus SAS and Boeing Co. spent much of this week's On
June erg, Jones, Suppli & Paris Air Show urging suppliers to keep their assembly modular
2009 "Airbus CEO ers 13 lines ready to respond quickly when the recession ends and
, Boeing Rockw and orders pick up. Partsmakers aren't yet convinced. integral
Battle ell 'There is raging skepticism because there is no enterpri
'Raging Collins historical precedent for the ability to do what they're se's
Skeptici ; suggesting to do,' Rockwell Collins Inc. Chief Executive view of
sm' Fabric Officer Clay Jones said in an interview in Paris. His Cedar downtur
Over e Rapids, Iowa-based company builds avionics and parts for n.
Output" Bregie most Boeing and Airbus models. The world's two biggest
(Andrea r, commercial-plane builders together expect to deliver about
Rothma COO 960 aircraft this year, unchanged from earlier projections.
n and Airbus And neither Boeing nor Airbus has made a big cut to its
Susanna ; Jeff production plan for next year, insisting that suppliers
Ray) Turner can trust the strength of their backlogs and shouldn't
, CEO make rogue decisions to scale back. Carriers continue to
Spirit drop and push back deliveries because of the recession,
AeroSy and orders for planes have plummeted. Chicago- based
stems Boeing announced just one order for two narrowbody 737s
Holdin at the Paris event, and Airbus, based in Toulouse, France,
gs has sold 60 jets. The value of the transactions for the big
Inc.; two is expected to be far less than the $64 billion in orders
John at last year's show in Farnborough, England. That's led
Leahy, partsmakers to speculate that demand for their products is
COO bound to decrease. The world's airlines lost $10.4 billion
Airbus; last year, and the industry will lose another $9 billion this
Scott year as traffic plunges, according to the International Air
Carson Transport Association. In the last slump, deliveries at
, CEO, Boeing and Airbus dropped 31 percent from 2001 to
Boeing 2003. 'The retention of the narrowbody rates appears
Comm to be inconsistent with historical perspective,' Jones
ercial said of Airbus' and Boeing's intentions not to lop output in
Airpla the largest segment of the market. 'That's the nature of the
nes; conundrum we're in. So now we have to use our
Rob judgment.'
Gillett
e., Airbus 'can't blame' its suppliers for mistrusting the
CEO, company's forecasts, said Chief Operating Officer
Honey Fabrice Bregier. After all, he said, they've been burned
well by big, sudden cutbacks in the past eight months at
Aerosp regional-jet builders such as Embraer and Bombardier
ace; Inc., and business-jet makers Cessna and Gulfstream.
Alain Many also make parts for the automotive industry, where
Bellem sales tumbled 18 percent last year and 37 percent this year
are, through May. Boeing has said it will hold steady on its
Preside expected monthly manufacturing rate of 31.5 of the
nt world's best-selling plane, the 737. Airbus is only scaling
Hamilt back production of the A320 by two a month to 34. 'For
on Airbus so far, the situation is stabilized,' Bregier said.
Sundst 'We're taking every opportunity to explain to them
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rand that when we say we'll deliver in 2009 as many aircraft
as in 2008, we have that not only in the order book but
airline by airline, we have the customers, we have the
financing and we know we'll do it.' Boeing and Airbus
were cautious in ramping up output amid a record three
years of orders through 2007 that produced a combined
backlog of more than 7,000 planes, or more than seven
years worth of work. That means that now they don't have
to scale back as much as they did in previous down-cycles,
the companies said. The suppliers say they don't get much
advance warning when planemakers decide to slow down,
and lead times for some parts, such as landing gear, can be
up to 18 months. Some companies don't get paid until the
planes are delivered. To protect themselves, the
partsmakers say they are doing their own research to
forecast demand. 'I've seen at this show a great deal of
energy by both Boeing and Airbus to assure the supply-
base community that their forecast, particularly for
single-aisle product, is robust,' said Jeff Turner, CEO
of Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc., Boeing's biggest
supplier. The Wichita, Kansas-based company builds the
aluminum fuselage for the 737. 'It's my job as head of
Spirit to forecast what I think will happen in the
market.' Turner didn't say what his latest predictions are.
Airbus tries to supply accurate forecasts to help
suppliers keep production steady and to ensure the
planemaker has parts when it needs them, John Leahy,
chief operating officer of Airbus, said today in an
interview. 'You can only make changes at a gradual
rate,' Leahy said. 'The longest lead time item is
somewhere around two years. It's not just that you call
up today and they instantly have it. If you're trying to
ramp up or ramp down, you want to have some lead
time up to your deadline to smoothly do it.' Companies
such as Spirit and Rockwell Collins have said they will
hold to their contracts and deliver the parts Airbus and
Boeing order. The question is whether they will be
ready to ramp up again quickly when the planemakers
want. Many of the big suppliers have already cut jobs
or reduced hours. Scott Carson, the head of Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, said in an interview this week
that he's telling suppliers they need to be ready for a 10
percent production swing in either direction, depending
on the economy and the status of active order campaigns.
Ryanair Holdings Piec and UAL Corp.'s United Airlines
have said they want to take advantage of the recession
to seek discounts on hundreds of new planes, which
could compel a higher output rate, Carson said. Some
suppliers hope to hold steady through aftermarket
business. 'You're still flying airplanes, you have to do
repairs,' and those will pick up in the second half after the
busy summer season of air travel, said Honeywell
Aerospace CEO Rob Gillette. Still, the work won't be as
much as it was before because airlines have canceled
routes and grounded planes amid the slump. 'Obviously
the aftermarket has been impacted by much lower revenue
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passenger miles than we were working with when we did
our planning,' said Alain Bellemare, president of Hamilton
Sundstrand, United Technologies Corp.'s aerospace
systems unit. 'We took some very aggressive cost
actions and right now we are waiting to see what could
be the outcome."'
19 Wall Scott Firm a "Boeing Co., attempting to maneuver its 787 Dreamliner On a
June Street Carson through the turbulence it has encountered so far, is modular
2009 Journal, , CEO expected to conduct the plane's maiden flight in coming enterpri
"Dream Boeing days. But even after the plane is airborne, the se
liner Comm aerospace company will still be under pressure to architec
Still Far ercial complete an ambitious schedule of test flights and ture's
From Airpla government certifications. Any additional glitches could product
Reality nes force it to again delay delivery to its launch customer, All /
" (Peter Nippon Airways Co., set for March 2010. 'We've got to producti
Sanders get it up and flying, landl we'll all take a deep sigh,' on
) said Marlin Dailey, vice president of sales for Boeing system
Commercial Airplanes. 'We're looking forward to that strategy.
milestone, but it's just another step in the journey.' The
test flight, which Boeing has said will occur by June 30,
will open a new chapter for the Chicago-based company.
The Dreamliner, which was supposed to enter service in
May 2008, is considered the most technologically
sophisticated commercial aircraft ever built, but its
complexity has led to production problems and
postponed launch and delivery dates. Boeing has had
to provide concessions to its airline customers because
it has missed promised deadlines. The company has
seen a spate of cancellations, while its credibility with
investors also has suffered. Boeing's shares have risen
about 45% since mid-March. According to a research note
last month from Morgan Stanley aerospace analyst Heidi
Wood, customers' financing concerns have eased and
investors are confident in the company's order backlog.
The shares could get a further boost once the
Dreamliner makes its first flight but could suffer if the
program hits new snags. After the plane's inaugural
flight, Boeing will embark on a compressed test-flight
schedule expected to last roughly eight to nine months.
Previous Boeing test-flight programs usually have taken
about a year to receive the necessary certifications from
the Federal Aviation Administration. Scott Carson,
president and chief executive of Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, in an interview this week said 'one concern is
the sheer volume of reports we'll be giving the FAA
and their ability to process them [for certification].'
Boeing plans to use six planes during the testing phase. As
of now, only two of the aircraft have moved from
production to the flight line. The other four are in
various stages of final production. The accelerated
testing program will put the planes through hundreds of
scenarios, including extreme climates and simulations of
various emergencies, according to company officials. Test
pilots will fly the planes during the day, while
hundreds of engineers and mechanics will review the
results by night and prepare for the next day's tests.
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The last time Boeing launched a brand-new commercial
aircraft, the 777 in 1994, the 11-month testing phase
included nine planes that flew a combined 70 to 80
flight hours a month. The 787 testing phase could be
three months shorter, and the six planes are expected
to fly about 120 hours a month. In manufacturing the
787, Boeing essentially invented a new way to assemble a
commercial airplane. Unlike the company's previous wide-
body aircraft, which are largely assembled at the Boeing
factory in Everett, Wash., major portions of the 787 are
fabricated by contractors as far away as Italy and Japan,
and then shipped to the factory for final assembly. While
Boeing initially believed the process would reduce costs
and streamline manufacturing, the company and its
vendors struggled to manage the complexities. The
program was further plagued by a two-month walkout
by Boeing machinists last fall and bugs in the plane's
software. The 787's problems, and the global recession,
have rippled through other commercial-airplane programs
at Boeing. The new 747-8, an update to the venerable two-
deck jumbo jet that competes with Airbus's double-decker
A380 aircraft, also has been delayed. Beyond the test
flight, questions remain about how quickly Boeing can
accelerate production of the Dreamliner to its goal of
10 airplanes a month by 2012. The company and its
suppliers have cautioned that there remain potentially
significant kinks in the manufacturing system that
must be worked out before the plane's production rate
can increase significantly."
19 Busines Tom Firm- a "Even if the Boeing guys shrugged it off, you have to On
June sWeek Enders Custo & admit Airbus pulled off quite a feat by logging 112 proof
2009 "It , CEO mers B aircraft orders worth $11.8 billion, during the most- which
Wasn't Airbus downbeat Paris Air Show in many years. On June 18, niche an
a Airbus snagged a deal for 50 of its A320 narrowbody integral
Blowou planes, worth $3.8 billion, from Hungarian discount carrier enterpri
t, But Wizz Air. A Hungarian discount airline? Don't snicker. se
Airbus Wizz, founded by a former CEO of Hungarian flag carrier architec
Beat Malev, is thriving by attracting budget-conscious ture
Boeing" travelers during the economic crisis. Its traffic was up compete
(Carol 30% from January through May. It already has an all- s in.
Matlack Airbus fleet, so buying from the same source makes sense And a
- especially now, when Airbus is doubtless offering great modular
deals to win scarce orders. In fact, many of Airbus's media's
sales this week were to ambitious discount or regional reportin
airlines looking to take advantage of a buyer's market g of
to build their fleets. Others included Malaysian carrier modular
Air Asia, which ordered 10 of Airbus's new A350 enterpri
widebody jets, and Cebu Pacific of the Philippines, which se
is taking at least 15 narrowbody planes. 'There are some architec
rays of sunshine in the market, especially in the low- ture ("It
cost sector,' Airbus CEO Tom Enders said at a signing Wasn't
ceremony for the Air Asia deal. a Blow-
out",
Boeing sought to downplay competition for orders at referrin
the show - probably just as well, since it booked only g to
two, a pair of 737 narrowbodies sold to Japanese leasing Airbus'
group MC Aviation Partners Scott Carson, Boeing's 56-fold
commercial aircraft chief, told reporters that the company order
had decided several years ago to disclose orders as soon as intake
they were placed, rather than saving up big deals to over
announce at air shows. Trouble is, Boeing this year has Boeing)
had almost as many cancellations as sales. It has logged 76
orders, including 53 for the 737, 10 for its 777 widebody
and 13 for its forthcoming 787 Dreamliner. But airlines
have cancelled 66 previous orders, including 58 for the
787, leaving Boeing with a net order tally of only 10.
Airbus has had cancellations, too, though not as many as
Boeing. As the air show opened, its net order tally stood at
11, including 21 cancellations. Orders booked during the
show should boost the net tally to more than 100. True,
there doesn't seem to be much chance that Airbus will
meet its goal of 300 orders this year. But so far no
customers have cancelled orders for its A380 mega jet - a
fact that CEO Enders told me is 'quite a miracle,
considering what that program has gone through.' (On the
other hand, several airlines have delayed taking delivery of
their A380s.) And the order tally for the A350 now
stands at a solid 493, well behind the 866 logged by the
Boeing 787, but enough to get Boeing's attention. In
fact, Boeing said at the air show that it may upgrade or
even totally redesign the 777, in response to the A350. The
first version of the Airbus plane, scheduled to enter service
in 2013, is bigger than the Dreamliner and competes
directly against the 777. Since July 2006, when Airbus
began selling the A350 as currently configured, the two
models in the same size range as the 777 have racked
up 311 orders, while the 777 has gotten only 259. No
one could call this air show a stunning commercial
success for either Airbus or Boeing. But as they head
back to Toulouse, the guys from Airbus have a bit
more reason to smile than their U.S. rivals do.."
19 Bloomb Scott Firm a "The most talked-about plane at the Paris Air Show will be On a
June erg Carson the one that missed the flight. Boeing Co.'s 787 modular
2009 "Boeing , CEO Dreamliner would be delivered 'bang on schedule' in enterpri
Dreamli Boeing 2008, commercial-planes chief Scott Carson said in se
ner A Comm June 2007 at the industry's last Paris gathering. archtiec
No- ercial Instead, a date hasn't even been set for its maiden ture's
Show" Airpla flight after production and development delays put the systema
(Susann nes model back two years. Investor confidence in Boeing, tic over-
a Ray) whose stock has lost half its value since the first delay promise
in October 2007, won't be restored until the 787 takes to and
the skies, said Bill Alderman of Alderman & Co. Capital, under-
a broker specializing in aerospace. That should be in the delivery
next two weeks, Carson said in Paris last week, without
being specific. Even then the plane has hurdles to clear,
according to Craig Fraser, a Fitch Ratings analyst in New
York. 'The first flight is an important event, but there
are still a few years of potential risk with this
program,' Fraser said 'Flight testing may uncover
some other issues that could set back the program, and
production ramp-up is always a risk.' Four delays to
the 787 have also ceded ground to Airbus SAS, Chicago-
.. .. . .. . . .. . . . ... .. . .. . .. .
based Boeing's only bigger rival. Committed to building
the larger A380, the European company initially stalled in
its response to the Dreamliner, Boeing's fastest-selling
model with 865 orders. Airbus has since begun to close
the gap, racking up 483 orders for the competing A350,
which will now enter service three years behind the
Dreamliner. The 787 has lost 58 orders so far this year as
airlines cut capacity and trim spending to stem losses in a
global recession. While the Dreamliner will 'fly when it's
ready,' Boeing is 'absolutely committed' to getting it off
the ground within the next two weeks, Carson said in a
briefing with journalists last week. The executive said that
while it would have been "great" to have flown the aircraft
in time for the Paris show, the company chose not to be
driven by any particular event. Boeing plans to
complete the certification process by the beginning of next
year. Japan's All Nippon Airways Co. says it has been told
it will get the first 787 in February. 'There's a
confidence factor that's important,' Alderman said.
'The first flight matters in terms of market perception
regarding Boeing having its house in order.' 'The good
news is that it seems to be coming together at this point,'
said Wolfgang Demisch, a partner at Demisch Associates,
a financial consultant that focuses on aerospace and
technology companies. 'The teething troubles have been
just brutal, but they don't seem to have done mortal
damage to the project and the customers are still
excited about it."'
19 24/7 Firm c 'The head of Airbus left the Paris Air Show in a pretty On
June Wall St., good mood. His company succeeded in picking up a probabl
2009 "Paris relatively large number of new orders, although none of e causes
Air them was a blockbuster. According to The New York of
Show: Times, 'Airbus was expected to walk away from the air modular
Boeing show with about 110 orders and commitments worth about enterpri
Loses, $6.5 billion.' At Airbus rival Boeing, things are a little se
Airbus tougher. The company is still a long way off from being architec
Wins" able to actually deliver its Dreamliner to clients. ture's
(Dougla According to The Wall Street Journal, 'Boeing has had to underpe
s A provide concessions to its airline customers because it rforman
McIntyr has missed promised deadlines.' Some carriers have ce
e) canceled orders. What a difference a couple of years
makes. Not so long ago, Airbus was struggling with
schedules to launch its super-jumbo plane and was slow to
market with its latest mid-range offering. At the same
time, Boeing was quickly gathering orders for its 787 and
new stretch versions of the 747. In late 2007, the firm's
stock traded at $106. It is now less than half of that.
What happened? Horrible management at Boeing. It
had to delay the 787 because of problems in delivery of
critical parts and other production snafus. Then it broke off
negotiations with key manufacturing employees, which
caused them to strike. That caused delays in the process of
getting the 787 out the door. The maiden flight of the
plane was delayed four times. When the history of
Boeing is written, the move from industry leader to
troubled company will be blamed on the executives
running the company in 2006, 2007, and 2008 -- and it
should be.'
20 The Jim Firm- a "The two aviation giants agree on one other thing: the On the
June Econom McNer Gover & industry will not get a successor to its ubiquitous short- differen
2009 ist, ney, nment P haul workhorses, the 737 and the A320, for more than a ce
"Hard CEO, decade. That is partly because the 15-20% efficiency gain between
Poundin The that airlines say they want from the next generation is, modular
g" Boeing says Mr McNerney, 'a bar that keeps moving north' and
Compa thanks to the continuous improvements of 1-2% a year integral
ny; that the manufacturers are making to existing planes. enterpri
Louis se
Gallois Louis Gallois, the chief executive of EADS, the parent architec
, CEO company of Airbus, denied there was anything odd about tures
EADS, the timing: 'We do not plead guilty,' he said. 'Our approac
Tom support is much more transparent than Boeing's. We have h
Enders fully repaid with interest the support we received for the toward
, CEO A320 and A330 and we are already paying back on the the
Airbus A380 [super-jumbo].' Tom Enders, the chief executive of stakehol
Airbus, added that the aid was aimed only at 'levelling the der of
playing field' and that the European Union had described govern
the 787 as the most subsidised commercial aircraft in ment
history."
22 Bloomb Shoich Firm "On a mild day in February, Toyota Motor Corp. 's On an
June erg, iro honorary chairman, Shoichiro Toyoda, summoned 400 integral
2009 "Toyod Toyod executives to the redbrick factory in Nagoya, Japan, where enterpri
a Asks a, his grandfather had built weaving looms a century ago. se
How Honor The managers filed in for one of the customary updates architec
Many ary from Toyota's gray-haired, 84-year-old patriarch. What ture'
Times Chair they got was anything but ordinary. Two months earlier, quest to
Toyota man Toyota had forecast its first operating loss since maintai
Errs Toyota Shoichiro's father began making cars in the same n its
Emulati Motor factory, now turned museum, in 1937. Then in January, integrali
ng GM Corpor about three months earlier than planned, the company ty.
Failures ation; announced that Shoichiro's son, Akio, would replace
" (John Takeo Katsuaki Watanabe as president. Akio is scheduled to
Lippert, Fukui, assume his new job at a shareholder meeting Tuesday in
Alan CEO Toyota City. Even with these signals, the managers were
Ohnsma Honda ill prepared for the normally reserved Shoichiro's litany of
n and the carmaker's missteps and his dressing-down of
Kae Watanabe. 'How many times have you made a
Inoue) mistake?' Shoichiro grilled Watanabe, who sat silently
among stunned audience members, according to a
person familiar with the meeting. Shoichiro scolded the
president for being so anxious to boost sales and profits
that he'd let Toyota emulate now bankrupt General Motors
Corp. and Chrysler LLC. Toyota had become addicted to
big, expensive cars and trucks and had forgotten the
customers' need to save money, Shoichiro said, according
to the person's account. Shoichiro wasn't just lashing
out at Watanabe. He was railing against the threat to
everything his family had struggled to create. The
Toyodas built their first car when Henry Ford was
turning out almost 1 million a year in the U.S. During
World War II, the family opened dry cleaning stores to
get by. They adopted kaizen, the making of small and
~
continuous improvements, to fine-tune manufacturing.
They enhanced quality and squeezed costs to become one
of the world's most admired companies. Across the
Pacific, Ford Motor Co., Chrysler and GM were gorging
on Americans' car lust. They failed to heed sky rocketing
gasoline prices, declining workmanship and escalating
pay. Last year, with help from its gas-electric Prius hybrid,
Toyota pushed General Motors from its perch as the
planet's biggest carmaker. In its June 1 bankruptcy
filing, GM reported $172.81 billion of debt, more proof
of the U.S. industry's descent. Toyota's work isn't
done. To avoid the four-decade decline that humbled
GM, the Japanese company must fend off rising
competitors and adapt to the global reality of slowing
sales growth and shrinking profits, says John Casesa,
managing partner of auto industry consulting firm Casesa
Shapiro Group LLC in New York. 'If Toyota is unable to
react to a changing world, it will risk its very existence
over time,' says Casesa, who's covered the industry for
two decades. 'If the company internalizes the GM lessons,
it can maintain its leadership.' Akio's challenge is to cut
Toyota's dependence on luxury cars and branch out
from U.S. markets destabilized by easy credit. In its
race to top GM, Toyota splurged on enough new factories
to make 2 million additional cars a year. South Korea's
Hyundai Motor Co. targeted small-car buyers in China,
India and other emerging countries, where it sold 55
percent of its vehicles last year compared with 31 percent
for Toyota. 'Toyota went from being a scrappy
newcomer to becoming convinced the market was just
there for them to take,' says Maryann Keller, an auto
analyst and president of Maryann Keller & Associates in
Stamford, Connecticut. 'Toyota wrote the playbook and
Hyundai read it: Build great cars with great value, and
people will come.' Toyota investors won't see a quick
revival, says Christian Takushi, a portfolio manager in
Zurich for Swisscanto Asset Management AG, which owns
1.7 million Toyota shares. After reporting record net
income of $17.7 billion for the fiscal year ended on March
31, 2008, earnings took a $22.2 billion nose dive. Toyota
ended fiscal 2009 with a $4.5 billion net loss and the
company says it expects to lose $5.7 billion more in
fiscal 2010. Earnings won't recover for three years, even
if sales rebound, since Toyota is still paying for its
expansion, Takushi says. 'Toyota has overdone itself
with capital spending because they really wanted to be
No. 1,' he says. 'They're paying a high price.' Not all
investors are so pessimistic. 'Toyota is among the best,'
says Wendy Trevisani, fund manager for Santa Fe, New
Mexico-based Thornburg Investment Management Inc.,
which held 17 million Toyota shares in March. 'They
make every effort to address problems as seen by
current initiatives including management shifts. Their
balance sheet remains strong.' Toyota's $52 billion in
cash and marketable securities give it a comfortable
cushion, according to Moodya's Investors Service. And it
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will get some relief in the U.S. from the misfortunes of
bankrupt rivals, says Kota Yuzawa, a Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. analyst in Tokyo. The Japanese automaker
may be able to boost American market share by a third
to 21.3 percent by 2011 as GM and Chrysler shut plants
and dealerships. This prospect, which would make
Toyota the top-selling carmaker in the U.S., helped
send Toyota's shares up 29 percent this year, to 3,690
yen on June 19. That's still 56 percent below their 2007
peak of 8,390 yen. 'Toyota should emerge from the
downturn in an even stronger position relative to
competitors,' says James Hunt, who helps oversee $6
billion at Tocqueville Asset Management LP in New York,
including 37,000 Toyota shares. Hyundai's shares surged
84 percent this year to 72,500 won on June 19. Inside
Toyota, some chalk up the recent stumble to the
recession that's sent global car sales down 20 percent
since 2007. Shoichiro wasn't buying that excuse. He
told employees at the February meeting that Toyota fell
victim to hubris, according to the person familiar with the
gathering. Beginning in 2003, Toyota pushed to expand
manufacturing capacity by 25 percent to build 10
million cars a year. When Watanabe became president in
2005, he backed the growth plans and championed a $1.3
billion pickup truck plant in San Antonio, Texas, calling it
'a dynamic symbol of our bright future.' Watanabe, 67,
sealed his fate by failing to predict that sales would
plunge last year and not acting fast enough to recover,
people familiar with the situation say. In October, 2 1/2
weeks after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s bankruptcy
deepened the global credit freeze, a key Toyota lieutenant,
Executive Vice President Mitsuo Kinoshita, said sales
could rise to 9.7 million vehicles this year. In May, the
company predicted it will sell just 6.5 million vehicles in
the fiscal year ending in March 2010. 'If Toyota can't
adjust to a market that will be smaller, with less-
expensive cars, then somebody else will be heralded as
the next great automaker,' Keller says. It's up to Akio
Toyoda, 53, the first Toyoda in 14 years to run the
company, to ensure that that prediction doesn't come true.
First, he'll have to guide Toyota through unfamiliar times.
'We're facing a once-in-a-century crisis,' Akio said,
referring to the recession, in a January press conference
after his appointment as president. In a nod to Toyota's
new austerity, Akio, wearing a dark- gray suit with a pale-
pink tie, spoke in the lobby of the company's Tokyo office
instead of at the Palace Hotel or one of the other upscale
venues of previous years. 'I'll try to make changes
without being tied down by the past,' he said, reading
carefully from a script. 'I will consider measures
quickly.' Akio has been huddling in Japan with 11
department heads to discuss ways to slow Toyota's
expansion without completely killing it, people familiar
with the meetings say. He's planning to appoint five
executive vice presidents in key regions such as North
America. They'll handle product development,
.......... ........... . .......-
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manufacturing and sales locally. The heads of these
departments currently report to executives in Japan,
which slows decision making. 'Toyota has been
addicted to U.S. profits these last five years,' says John
Shook, a University of Michigan management instructor
and former Toyota engineer. 'They've been slow
everywhere else, particularly in China, where the growth
is. Hyundai could be the big winner.' The reorganization
is just part of Akio's makeover attempt. On May 18, he
unveiled the latest Prius to the Tokyo media. The newest
version of the hybrid boosts fuel economy by 8.6 percent,
to 50 miles (80 kilometers) per gallon. Akio said he hopes
to quadruple hybrid sales to 1 million annually during the
decade starting next year. 'Our answer to how a car
should be in the future is the new Prius,' he said. Then on
May 23, he traveled to Germany to drive a 500-
horsepower black-and-white Lexus sports car in a 24-hour
endurance race, finishing 87th in the 170-car field. Two
years earlier, in a blog he writes for Toyota's racing unit,
Akio said he admired Ulrich Bez, chief executive officer
of Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd., maker of fictional spy
James Bond's preferred car. He praised Bez for competing
in contests that underlings called too dangerous. 'Because
such a CEO leads the company, Aston Martin is able to
offer an emotional sports car,' he wrote. After another
race, Akio described a beer party with fans. 'We were
shaking hands, waving hands as if our arms would be
torn apart,' he wrote. 'It felt like it was the best
moment of my life!' Cliff Cummings, who owns two
Toyota dealerships in the foothills of the San Gabriel
Mountains near San Bernardino, California, says Akio is
starting to shake things up inside Toyota. He credits the
incoming president with pricing a no- frills Prius at what
Cummings considers a reasonable $21,000, almost
$11,000 less than fully equipped models. At $19,800,
Honda Motor Co.'s Insight helped force Toyota's price
down, Cummings says. 'Akio is taking Toyota back to
its fundamental values of dependability and economy,'
he says. Akio, who is fluent in English, learned Toyota's
ways from the ground up. On Oct. 30 of each year, he
visits the Kosai, Japan, birthplace of his great-grandfather
Sakichi, who received the family's first loom patent in
1891. During his freshman year in 1973 at Tokyo's Keio
University, Akio spent six weeks at the Punahou School in
Honolulu, where U.S. President Barack Obama was a
seventh-grader. Akio graduated from Keio with a law
degree in 1979. Three years later, he got a Master of
Business Administration from Babson College in
Babson Park, Massachusetts. Akio joined Toyota in 1984.
After factory and finance jobs, Shoichiro, then Toyota's
president, tapped Akio to make the Japanese sales office
more efficient by cutting inventories of unsold vehicles. In
1996, Akio spearheaded a service called G- Book that uses
mobile phones and Web browsers to provide traffic
updates to drivers. Two years later, he left Japan to
become vice president of a Fremont, California,
~--. ... .....................
manufacturing operation. Toyota, feeling the stirrings of
international ambitions, had begun the venture 14 years
earlier to gain experience in the U.S. By 2002, Akio was
running Toyota's China unit. He headed purchasing in
2005 and moved to global sales in 2008. Some suppliers
and dealers resisted Akio's ascension to president, saying
he'll have a hard time breaking from Watanabe, people
familiar with the situation say. For one thing, managers
Akio is promoting supported Watanabe's expansion,
including Yoshimi Inaba, 63, who'll head North American
operations, and Yukitoshi Funo, 62, who'll run global
sales. During Watanabe's tenure as president, both Akio
and Shoichiro backed major decisions such as building
new factories, the people say. 'I don't think anybody
sees Akio as a highly original kind of guy, but he's
really earnest," says James Womack, chairman of the
Lean Enterprise Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
which trains companies on the automaker's methods for
cutting production costs. 'He's been in the Toyota system
all his life. He doesn't know anything else but to go
back to the basics.' Watanabe, a Keio graduate like
Akio, joined Toyota in 1964. He rose through the
purchasing staff with a reputation as a cost cutter. From
2000 to 2005, he achieved I trillion yen ($10.3 billion) in
savings by streamlining Toyota's use of 173 components,
from headlights to horns to steering wheels. The savings
helped pay for Toyota's new plants. By 2005, he was
running the company as president. Watanabe opened the
newest factory in Woodstock, Ontario, on Dec. 4. Three
weeks later, he delivered Toyota's second major profit
warning and even then avoided acknowledging that he'd
made a strategic mistake. 'We should have arranged a
little bit more kaizen when we were on a growth path,'
he told reporters. 'On the other hand, many customers
bought our cars, so it's really a difficult judgment.' Akio's
quest to fix Toyota will take him to the scene of one of its
biggest setbacks: a former cattle ranch in San Antonio
where 600-pound (270-kilogram) wild pigs roam the
underbrush. Back in 2003, Toyota announced the factory
in an effort to undermine Detroit's last great profit bastion:
pickup trucks. The Texas plant opened in November 2006,
just months before cracks emerged in the U.S. subprime
mortgage market and gasoline prices began their rise.
Timing was just one issue. 'There was a lot of non-
Toyota thinking,' says Shook, the former Toyota
engineer. 'San Antonio seemed kind of crazy.' Starting
with its first U.S. factory in 1988, Toyota built the Camry
midsize sedan and others that had first proved their
popularity in Japan, Shook says. It designed each assembly
line to accommodate many models. In Texas, Toyota
broke these rules by dedicating a whole plant to the
largest pickup the company had ever conceived, the
Tundra. Toyota wanted to attract new buyers on their
home turf, Shook says. Watanabe authorized $3 billion
for the effort, a person familiar with the situation says. He
planned to turn out 250,000 Tundras a year in San Antonio
. . .. ............. . ......
and Princeton, Indiana. Today, Toyota builds 100,000
annually, only in Texas. Toyota was challenging Detroit
where it was strongest, says Eric Noble, president of
research firm Car Lab in Orange, California. As Toyota
was learning the truck-building ropes, Ford redesigned its
F-150 pickup. The new regular-cab F-150, with its 3,030-
pound payload and 20 highway miles per gallon for the
midsize engine, was an exemplary achievement in the
same way that the Prius is Toyota's best, Noble says. By
comparison, the Tundra had a 1,990-pound payload and
got 17 mpg. Even better for Ford, the F-150 won a five-
star safety rating from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration compared with Tundra's four stars. U.S.
carmakers are catching up in quality too. Chevrolet
customers reported 113 quality complaints per 100
vehicles in 2008, compared with 104 for Toyota, according
to J.D. Power & Associates, which tracks consumer
satisfaction. In 1981, GM had seven times the
complaints of Toyota. On the luxury end, Hyundai is
chasing Toyota's Lexus GS with its Genesis, a premium
sedan that sells for $10,000 less. Hyundai also is preparing
to bring its top-end Equus to the U.S. For the Tundra
pickup, the killer was price, dealer Cummings says.
Toyota charged $29,568 for a typical Tundra in 2007.
That was $4,000 too much based on what potential
buyers told him, Cummings says. 'By charging too
much, we forced customers to look elsewhere,' he says.
When Honda's retiring CEO Takeo Fukui looks at San
Antonio, he says he sees a clear difference between Toyota
and Japan's No. 2 automaker. Honda builds factories in
stages, adding the capacity to make 50,000 vehicles at a
time, instead of 250,000 at once. 'Toyota makes big
investments,' Fukui, 64, said in Detroit, where he was
attending an April engineering conference. 'Our idea is to
start small and grow. We consider ourselves a small
company, and the idea of having extra capacity is very
scary.' A foggy March Tuesday in San Antonio proves
Fukui's point about idle space -- and shows Toyota's
determination to learn from its miscues. Dozens of Toyota
workers, wearing green or orange vests that signify they're
on temporary assignment, inspect unfinished trucks. These
same workers cleaned parks and enjoyed yoga and Pilates
on company time when a 15.6 percent sales drop forced
Toyota to shut the plant for three months starting in
August and then cut a second shift. Ray Tanguay,
executive vice president for manufacturing in North
America, sees a silver lining in the downtime. The
company is using its kaizen process to build vehicles
with fewer workers, aiming for more profit when sales
pick up. 'We have to go back to our core values,' he
says. 'This might well make us stronger.' Kaizen-
sparked improvements are taking root in San Antonio.
Production manager Dan Antis says employees studied
everything from workplace diversity to how to hold a
screwdriver. 'When you're chasing volume, you don't
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have time to teach people,' Antis says. 'The kaizen
we're capable of doing after the shutdown is endless.'
Standing near the assembly line's end, team leader
William Steubing says he wanted a better way to handle a
20-pound plastic box that carries parts alongside
unfinished trucks. Initially, Steubing's team attached the
box to metal frames holding the trucks. As the Tundras
moved along the line, workers reached into the box for
headlights and other parts. When they emptied the box,
they'd lift it off the carrier and carry it back for refilling.
During the shutdown, workers designed a conveyor to do
that job. Now, as a truck moves forward, the conveyor tilts
up a corner of the empty box and snaps it off the carrier.
The box falls onto the conveyor and rolls back for
refilling. The change saves 11 seconds of walking per
truck. Steubing and his co-workers also got training in
welding and metal cutting. Then they recycled old
conveyors, spending $2,000 compared with $90,000 that
Toyota engineers had planned for a motorized conveyor.
These and more than 400 kaizen projects are making an
impact. Defects that workers reported in an internal audit
fell to 0.2 per truck from 1.2, comparable with Toyota's
best worldwide. Productivity measured by trucks made per
worker per day, not including temporary laborers, rose to
0.91 from 0.73. Toyota's North American factories
need to run at 70 percent to 75 percent of capacity to
break even, Tanguay says. They were at 60 percent in
March. He says he's cutting hundreds of millions of
dollars per year in costs. Starting in September, the North
American factories will break even, he says. 'If the
market comes back, we're going to be in a very good
position,' Tanguay says. While money-saving kaizen
improvements may help Akio on the factory floor, the
recession has made strategic planning harder, U.S. sales
chief Jim Lentz says. In his office in Torrance, California,
adjacent to the I- 405 freeway and its crush of thousands
of cars, Lentz says he can't predict with certainty how
many vehicles Americans will buy in coming years. Nor
can he tell what kind of cars people will want or which
technologies governments will allow. Lentz takes out a
black-and-gray chart based on Toyota's economic and
consumer research. It shows that U.S. auto sales may
rebound from an annualized rate of 9.6 million this
year to 17.4 million by 2015. He draws a line with a blue
pen showing that, conversely, sales could total 11.5
million in 2015 if the recession lingers. If that happens,
Toyota may lay off full-time workers, not just
temporaries. Even with President Obama's push to lift
fuel efficiency for new vehicles to a nationwide average of
35.5 mpg by 2016, environmental challenges are hard to
plan for. California's zero-emission-vehicle mandate
means Toyota and other automakers must build tens of
thousands of electric cars, fuel-cell vehicles and plug-in
hybrids starting in 2012. 'Product planning is riskier than
ever," says Bill Reinert, Toyota's U.S. manager for
advanced technology. 'You're betting five years out on
.... . ..
whether the public will adopt very different forms of
transportation.' Amid the upheaval, Toyota is making
concrete strategic shifts. It's building more compact cars
and setting up factories in emerging markets and countries
with large reserves of resources like oil, Watanabe told
reporters in May. It doesn't have much choice. Sales at
the Lexus luxury unit had generated more than half of U.S.
earnings, with 12 percent of sales, in the middle of the
decade. Consumers' lust cooled when the average U.S.
price for regular gasoline topped $4 a gallon in July 2008.
During the first quarter of 2009, Toyota's U.S. pickup,
minivan and SUV sales plunged 40 percent. Lexus sales
dropped 37 percent. The danger is that Toyota's moves
toward smaller vehicles may cut earnings in half, even
after the recession ends, says Koji Endo, an analyst at
Credit Suisse Group AG in Tokyo. And nobody's sure
how the price of gas, which has fluctuated by more than $2
a gallon in the past year, will affect consumer desires.
Even so, Toyota is banking on such cars as the iQ. At the
New York Auto Show in April, a lime-green model of the
micro- compact descended from the ceiling amid strobe
lights and techno music. The iQ fits sideways in a normal
parking spot, travels 65 miles per gallon and has nine air
bags. Toyota sells the iQ in the U.K. for $15,000. Such
premium small cars will help maintain profits as fuel
prices rise, Lentz says. Hyundai has already claimed some
turf that Toyota is targeting with smaller cars. Along with
affiliate Kia Motors Corp., Hyundai sold 4.2 million
vehicles last year, more than half of them in emerging
markets. Hyundai and Kia's combined profit dropped 7.9
percent to 1.56 trillion won ($1.2 billion) in 2008, partly
because the South Korean currency fell 26 percent against
the dollar. Combined sales rose 0.5 percent in the U.S.
during the January-March quarter and 50 percent in China.
'Toyota faces an identity crisis,' Casesa says. 'Their
spectacularly successful business model is not working,
and they are undergoing profound internal change
with the new president.' Shoichiro's retirement from
Toyota's board in June means Akio may be the next
Toyoda to speak to managers in the redbrick Nagoya
factory. By then, investors will have more signs of how
quickly -- and how thoroughly - Akio has acted on
Shoichiro's February warning about the dangers of
emulating Detroit."
23 Internal Scott Firm a "***This message is being sent by Scott Carson, president On a
June Boeing Carson and CEO of Commercial Airplanes, to all Commercial modular
2009 Memo., , CEO Airplanes employees.*** enterpri
posted Boeing se
on Comm Postponing 787 flight testing architec
forums.j ercial There are times when making the prudent and right t's
etphotos Airpla choice is the only choice. That's what we have done views
.net nes today with our announcement that we will take the time to on
reinforce an area within the side-of-body section of the choice.
787 before we begin flight testing.
Based on our preliminary analysis, and as recently as last
~""~ ;; . ........ '~'~ ;;;;~ ~
week, we believed we could work through this issue and
still begin flight test this month. Subsequent analysis over
the last few days led us to conclude that a modification
must be made before flight test. As we have stated in the
past, we will fly only when our team is convinced that we
are ready to fly and can conduct a productive flight test
program.
Our testing process is designed to identify these issues,
and experience tells us that structural modifications are not
uncommon for development programs. We gave
consideration to a temporary solution that would allow us
to fly as scheduled, but we ultimately concluded that the
right thing was to develop, design, test and incorporate a
permanent modification to the localized area requiring
reinforcement.
Now, it is important that our team has the time and
resources to develop a solution, conduct the appropriate
testing to validate the solution and incorporate the
modification prior to first flight. First flight and first
delivery will be rescheduled after we determine the
required modification and testing plan.
The emotions we feel today should not take away from the
787 team's incredible progress in recent months. We
have had strong results from our engine tests, our
systems tests and, with this exception, our structural
tests. We believe in the technologies, the design and the
systems that will make the 787 a revolutionary airplane
for our customers and their passengers.
As a team, we have worked through many challenges in
bringing this breakthrough airplane to life. I am
confident that as a team, we will work through this issue as
well. We will stay focused on executing the best solution
as quickly as possible, while keeping up the progress on
the other areas of the program.
I thank everyone on the team and everyone at Commercial
Airplanes for the hard work, dedication and perseverance
as we continue on this journey together.
Scott"
23 Wall Scott Firm a "Boeing Co. delayed the first flight and initial delivery On a
June Street Carson of its new 787 Dreamliner, saying wing-bending tests modular
2009 Journal, , CEO showed a structural weakness where the wings join the enterpri
"Boeing Boeing body of the aircraft. The Chicago company indicated se
Delays Comm Tuesday it plans to take some second-quarter charges architec
First ercial related to the delay. It will be several weeks before the tur's
Flight Airpla plane maker releases a new flight and delivery continu
of 787" nes schedule, Scott Carson, head of Boeing's commercial ed,
(Ann airplanes unit, said during a conference call Tuesday. systema
Keeton) Financial impact to Boeing's second-quarter results will be tic and
disclosed when the company releases earnings data next accelera
month, the company said. Carson said it was premature ting
- ---------------- 
to discuss the dollar impact of the delay, but that the over-
cost of small parts to reinforce the aircraft structure promise
would be 'immaterial' to the program. Boeing shares and
recently fell $4.17, or 8.9%, to $42.70 Tuesday as under-
investors expressed disappointment over trouble with the delivery
787, which is expected to help fuel Boeing's earnings in
coming decades. Carson said fixing the aircraft won't
slow the 787 production line, as already-assembled
aircraft can be modified with a number of small 'hand-
sized' parts that can be added wherever the planes are
now in the assembly process. With more than 800 orders
for the 787, Boeing expects in its initial production plan to
finish two planes per month, and has said it may add a
second production line to ramp up production in 2012.
The news Tuesday is another blow to Boeing, which had
steadfastly maintained the first flight would take place
by the end of June. The 787 is already two years behind
schedule, suffering a total of five delays on
manufacturing glitches. First customer All Nippon
Airways had expected to receive the first 787 aircraft in the
first quarter of 2010. Carson said Boeing began talking to
customers about the latest delay late Monday evening. It's
not clear yet whether the delivery delay will match 'day
for day' the holdup at the factory since Boeing will
continue with other tests as it reinforces the wing joints.
Boeing said Tuesday the problem was discovered during
recent, regularly scheduled tests on the first test aircraft.
While preliminary analysis indicated that flight test could
proceed this month as planned, Boeing decided late last
week to delay the first flight, a key milestone in any new
aircraft development. Scott Fancher, head of 787
production, said Boeing found unexpected stress points
about one-to-two square inches in size, at 18 locations
on the joint between the upper side of each wing and
the body of the aircraft. He said a computer model
didn't show that stress, and the model will need to be
changed to reflect results from physical tests that
sharply bent the wing of the aircraft. 'Consideration
was given to a temporary solution that would allow us
to fly as scheduled,' Carson said, 'but we ultimately
concluded that the right thing was to make a
permanent change. Boeing will work on structure
reinforcement with parts suppliers Fuji and Mitsubishi
'Structural modifications like these are not uncommon in
the development of new airplanes, and this is not an issue
related to our choice of materials or the assembly and
installation work of our team,' he added. He said the
structural weakness occurred where materials including
titanium and aluminum were used, along with new
composite materials that have made the 787's design a
game-changer for the industry. The lighter weight of the
aircraft is expected to save some 20% on fuel and harmful
emissions. Early last week, Carson addressed reporters
at the Paris Air Show, assuring them the first flight
was on schedule for as early as Wednesday of this
week. He said Tuesday the first flight could have occurred
1
as scheduled, but Boeing thought it prudent to delay the
787 schedule, which had become extremely tight."
23 Flightbl Firm- a By Raoul on June 23, 2009 10:05 AM On
June ogger.c Media "John, I enjoy your blog but I hope you and all the other question
2009 om writers (I consider you better than a mere blogger) will ing data
"BREA learn something from this. Especiall the so called fidelity
KING: 'Aviation industry analysts' Don't become so starstruck and
Boeing by Boeing and it's handlers that it impairs the facts. rival
Postpon Boing mught give you data, it might toss out some swag hypothe
es 787 and some shiney, but facts? You have to get those for ses for
First yourself. Yes, I know, 'WTH is this guy talking about?'. underde
Flight" Think about it John, you have been expertly stroked and livery in
(Jon groomed by one of the best PR machines in the world. a
Ostrowe You aren't writing about the hype, you have become modular
r) part of it. Boeing is a very troubled company, and has enterpri
been for a dozen years now. As shareholders lick their se
wounds over the past few days of sell-down, incurring architec
massive losses(again) we again wonder where the truth tue's
begins and ends with Boeing, and particularly where product
managerial and executive competance is or is not s.
present. It's our fault too. If we didn't choose to believe
them we thought maybe, just maybe they couldn't blow it
again at this late stage. Yes, I know, the focus of this blog
is on the technical/commercial aspects of aerospace, it's
not an investors symposium. But real damage has and is
being done, not just to us, but to the company. This is
not just another routine development difficulty. This
smacks of a deep, deep flaw in Boeing's current
methodologies and philosopy of doing business. The
sort of 'Go Fever' exhibited and egged on by Boeing
itself is bad mode of thinking to be in. It cannot turn
out well. I'm sorry, but it just cannot. Focusing on
every minute detail right down to every engine start or
the most meaningless movement of the aircraft on the
ramp misses the point entirely. The bloggers, the
aerospace press, et-al, just consistently give Boeing a
pass. Nobody is digging, nobody is asking tough
questions. It's my opinion that Boeing never had
control of this program to lose it. The test program is
rushed. Boing management and the media are infected
with GO FEVER. And that is a very, very dangerous
thing to have."
By Roger Fields on June 23, 2009 11:49 AM
"Boeing says that they delayed first flight because the
flight envelope would be to small for productive flight
testing. Sorry, don't buy that. Why getting all this
negative publicity if a first flight would have been
possible? Why not performing first flight by June 30
while they were thinking about a fix? Believe me, the
problem is bigger then Boeing admids, otherwise, they
would have gone for first flight by June 30 regardless
of the smaller flight envelope."
23 New Scott Firm a "The Boeing Company said on Tuesday that it would On a
June York Carson again delay the first flight of its new jet, the 787, the latest modular
2009 Times, , CEO setback in a program that is considered crucial to the enterpri
.....................~  .~
"Boeing Boeing plane maker's future. Boeing executives said that they se
Delays Comm had found additional stress where the wings attach to the architec
1st ercial sides of the plane. Minor modifications should fix the ture's
Flight Airpla problem, they said. But they also said it could be weeks over-
of nes before the flight testing could resume. And stock analysts promise
Dreamli said that it would mean a delay in the delivery schedule, a and
ner" concern that caused the company's stock to drop as much under-
(Christo as 9 percent Tuesday morning. The problems were the delivery
pher latest in a series of delays for what promises to be the
Drew) world's most sophisticated passenger plane and a key to
Boeing's future. The company has more than 850 orders
for the plane, which is known as the Dreamliner and is
supposed to be lighter and more fuel-efficient than other
commercial aircraft. Analysts said the company's flight
test schedule was so tight that the delay of several
weeks would clearly push back plans to deliver the first
787 by next March. "'There's no way that will hold,'
Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group, said.
'This is a pretty late stage in the preflight test schedule
to be finding structural showstoppers.' And that only
heightens concerns that Boeing could find more problems
once the test flights begin. 'This removes any hope that
they'd gotten a handle around the likely risks of things
they could find during the flight test program,' Mr.
Aboulafia said. 'It doesn't help the company's
credibility,' said Howard Rubel, an analyst at Jefferies &
Company. 'There's a sense of frustration that they were 90
percent at the finish line, and they're still at 90 percent of
the finish line.' Company executives said they
discovered the structural weakness last month. They
said they initially thought that it would not delay
having the first flight by June 30, an idea that they
continued to promote at the Paris Air Show last week.
But in a conference call with reporters and investment
analysts on Tuesday, Scott Carson, the chief executive of
Boeing's commercial airplane operations, said 'it became
apparent by Friday that the problem would limit how
rigorous the flight could be.'"
23 Forbes, Firm a "The delay of the first flight test of the best-selling, On the
June "Histor new-technology 787 announced Tuesday by Boeing Co. chronic
2009 y of the executives is the fifth in years of setbacks for the alling of
Boeing program. Here is a summary of the effort to build the the
787" first passenger plane made from lightweight carbon under
composite parts rather than metal: delivery
of a
ORIGINS - On Dec. 20, 2002, Boeing officially drops modular
plans for the Sonic Cruiser, which would have traveled enterpri
near the speed of sound, and on Jan. 29, 2003, the se
company establishes a leadership team for the 7E7, its first architec
all-new airplane since the 777 in 1990. Composites are ture.
chosen as the primary material the next June.
STARTUP - All Nippon Airways of Japan orders 50 of the
planes, and Boeing's board of directors approves the
launch of the 7E7 program on April 26, 2004. In January
2005 the model name is changed to the 787, and at the end
.........
of the year the first deliveries are set for early summer
2008.
FIRST GLITCHES - Boeing announces on June 9, 2006,
that bubbles have been found in the composites used in a
33-foot prototype of a section of the fuselage. On Nov. 6,
2006, Boeing says it's confident the plane can be lightened
by about 2.5 tons, enough to make it the most fuel efficient
commercial jet in the air.
SALES - Sales exceed 500 planes by April 3, 2007, and
Boeing begins looking for ways to accelerate production.
MORE GLITCHES - Boeing reveals production snags on
June 12, 2007, including a gap where the left side of the
nose-and-cockpit section is out of alignment with the
fuselage. Another problem is an industrywide shortage of
fasteners that hold the plane together.
FIRST DELAYS - On Sept. 5, 2007, Boeing says the 787
will begin flight testing in mid-November or mid-
December, months later than originally planned. On Oct.
10, 2007, Boeing delays first deliveries by six months.
PERSONNEL CHANGE - Boeing announces on Oct. 16,
2007, that Michael B. Bair, vice president and general
manager of the 787 program for the past three years, has
been replaced by Patrick M. Shanahan, previously head of
Boeing's missile defense systems in Wichita, Kan. Bair is
named vice president of business strategy and marketing
and, on Oct. 31, 2007, says some suppliers of major
components for the 787 have fallen short of Boeing's
expectations.
PROMISES, PROMISES - On Dec. 11, 2007, Boeing
Commercial Airplanes CEO Scott E. Carson says there
will be no further delay in 787 development, but a
three-month delay is announced on Jan. 16, 2008, and
an additional six-month stall is announced on April 9,
2008, postponing the projected debut of commercial
service to the third quarter of 2009 - the third revision to
the delivery schedule and the fourth change in plans for
first test flight.
LABOR DISPUTE - An eight-week strike by the
Machinists union that began Sept. 6, 2008, and lingering
production problems, including installation of improper
fasteners, pushes the first test flight into the second quarter
of 2009 and first deliveries into the first quarter of 2010 -
the fourth schedule shift, making the first 787 nearly two
years late. The top issue in the strike is job security as
union members maintain that if more of the key
production had been in-house instead of by subcontractors,
the 787 would have been completed before the walkout.
LATEST HANGUP - On June 23, 2009, Boeing
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announces that flight tests will be delayed an
undetermined number of weeks for the design and
installation of reinforcements along the upper part of the
place where the wings join the fuselage. Carson says
deliveries also will be pushed back."
23 The Mike Firm Ct "On a sunny day in July 2007, the Boeing Co. welcomed On a
June Hearald Bair, its 787 Dreamliner into the aviation world with a lavish modular
2009 .net VP rollout party in Everett. Boeing's Mike Bair, then the 787 enterpri
"What Strateg program vice president, stood outside the factory's se
Boeing y, immense doors smiling like a proud papa alongside retired architec
did Boeing 'NBC Nightly News' anchor Tom Brokaw, who emceed ture's
Right - Comm the event. Bair had told the thousands of workers, focus on
and ercial customers and suppliers who watched the rollout either in product
Wrong Airpla person or on satellite about the importance of innovati
on the nes incorporating the latest technology when bringing a on.
787" new aircraft to market. 'You've got to get it right,' Bair
(Michel said. From a technology perspective, Boeing got its
le new 787 right. From a preliminary execution
Dunlop) standpoint, Boeing got its 787 wrong. Standing there
next to their Dreamliner on 07-08-07, Boeing executives
surely had concerns about the aggressive schedule in front
of them. Even then, Bair and other company leaders
knew their first 787 was filled with temporary parts
and lacked the wiring and systems it needed for first
flight, scheduled for late August 2007. But no one
imagined it would take Boeing not two months, but nearly
two years to put its 787 Dreamliner into flight. Within two
weeks of that day in July 2007, a series of schedule slides
began for the mostly composite jet. By early September,
the company had pushed the 787's first flight to December
but maintained the original May 2008 delivery date.
'Right now we don't see this translating into delays,'
Bair said. 'The most important thing is to deliver the
airplane on time.' In early October, Boeing marketing
guru Randy Tinseth gave assurances the 787 was on
track. Less than 24 hours later, Scott Carson, president
of commercial airplanes, admitted that Boeing would
not deliver the first 787 on time. Over the next 14
months, the delays dribbled in, soiling Boeing's reputation
and spoiling a potentially wide lead Boeing could have
held over rival Airbus. Analysts and bloggers often
broke news of 787 setbacks before Boeing. And
problems -- underperforming partners, incorrectly installed
parts -- piled up, pouring over into other jet programs.
After the Machinists strike last fall, Boeing announced
delays to its 777 Freighter and 747-8 programs, blaming
the 57-day work stoppage, design changes and a shortage
of engineering resources for the setbacks. The problems
on the 787 forced Boeing to keep engineers on the
Dreamliner longer than anticipated, the company said.
Therefore, the engineers were late transferring over to
the other programs. Meanwhile, as Boeing pushed the
787's first delivery date further, its rival Airbus picked
up more orders for its A330. The European jet maker
saw a surge in orders for its A330 since Boeing first
announced delays to its 787 in 2007. Airbus received
..............----------- -- - ~ ; ; ; ;
198 net A330 orders in 2007 and another 142 in 2008.
Boeing's gift to Airbus also meant the European jet
maker's new A350 jet, also made mostly of composite
materials, won't be far behind the 787 into service. The
A350 is sized more to compete with Boeing's 777. Still,
the Dreamliner will be delivered just three years before the
A350. The 787's delays and extra costs give Boeing less
time and cash to dream up a competitor to the A350. But
Boeing's chief executive, Jim McNerney, sees some silver
lining in the 787's delays and is confident in the
Dreamliner's future, he said at the Sanford C. Bernstein
strategic decisions conference in late May. The
technology that Boeing is using on the Dreamliner will
be used on aircraft for decades, he said. 'We've figured
out how to build airplanes for the next 75 years,'
McNerney said. Boeing is using a spun composite barrel
for its 787. Airbus plans to use composite panels
instead. McNerney isn't sure Airbus' strategy will pay
off. Although Boeing's suppliers have struggled on the
787, the delays have allowed them to smooth out the
process -- an advantage in the long run, McNerney said.
'I1 think that's a huge advantage,' he said of the 787's
technology. 'Innovation is the key to us getting the
lion's share of the market."'
23 Seattle Scott Firm- a Ouestion: Joseph Campbell - Barclavs Capital - Analyst On a
June Post- Carson Investo "Just again back on the nature of the problem and where it modular
2009 Intellige , CEO r is, can you -- is this problem isolated to a single structure? enterpri
ncer Boeing So like is it -- I mean is it the Alenia piece? Is it the wing se
"Boeing Comm box from Fuji? Or does it involve stresses on several architec
787 ercial supplier components? Is it both starboard and port so that ture's
Flight Aiprla this is something that's symmetrical around the aircraft? explanat
Delay: nes; Or is it a single sided kind of issue?" ion for
Technic Pat under-
al Shanah Pat Shanahan - The Boeing Company - Airplane perform
Details an, VP Programs VP and General Manager ance
and and "I will jump in first and Scott can provide additional color.
Q&A GM So it's multiple structures and it's an integrated design.
Transcri Airpla So it's both the wing out of Mitsubishi and the side-of-
pt " ne body, which is part of the center section out of Fuji. And
(Andrea Progra the design and the models are developed concurrently by
James) ms Boeing, Fuji and Mitsubishi. That is the nature of this
Boeing integrated structure. So as we work through the solution,
Comm we will involve Fuji, Mitsubishi, and Boeing, in
ercial developing a comprehensive long-term answer. Scott?"
Airpla
nes; Joseph Campbell - Barclays Capital - Analyst
Scott "And it's both sides, but not the Alenia structure?"
Fanche
r, VP Scott Fancher - The Boeing Company - 787 Vice
787 President and General Manager
Progra "Correct, and it is symmetric. As Pat mentioned, every --
m all of our partners that have structure in this area and
participated in the design are on the team to determine
what the modifications are for this area."
JoseDh Campbell - Bacavs Capital- Analyst
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"So just to not -- hopefully this can be the end of this.
Somebody asks before it was along the entire wing, so it's
-- if you were to describe from the aft to tail or under the
belly or wherever these are located, is it possible to take
the multiple several inch -- one or two square inch places
and identify how many of them are there and from the
furthest point away, how big is the section affected?"
Scott Fancher - The Boeing Companv - 787 Vice
President and General Manager
"This is Scott Fancher. Let me try and take a crack at that.
As we mentioned earlier, we are talking on a one or two
square inch area. It is along the side-of-body join between
the wing and the side-of-body and particularly -- and
specifically limited to the upper portion of where the wing
and side-of-body join. And about 18 locations on either
side of the aircraft for a total of 36 locations. The exact
number may change a little bit as we analyze it, but that's
approximately the number. And I really want to
emphasize we are talking about a one or two square
inch area along that upper wing join area in multiple
locations. This is not a problem that extends out the
wings or down into -- it is into the aircraft. It's a very
limited area that needs structural reinforcement. The
modifications, again to emphasize, we are talking about a
handful of parts at each location and each one of those
parts you could literally hold in your hand. They will
be about the size of your hand or smaller. So not
complicated by any means."
Paul Merrion - Crain's Capital Business - Media
"Hi. I just wanted to go to the issue of the credibility in
the company's schedule and predictions of schedule.
You knew about this as of late last month, you said.
Why wait until now to say anything at all about it?
Including when the world's attention was on Boeing
last week at the Paris Air Show."
Scott Carson - The Boeing Companv - President and
CEO
"Paul, this is Scott Carson. When we were at Paris last
week we had been through the preliminary analysis of the
data and were of a mind that the airplane could enter
flight test with a credible flight test envelope as we
worked relatively minor modifications. The work done
by the team through the week last week narrowed the
envelope to the point where on Friday we determined that
to fly would be such a small envelope for us that it
would be an interesting exercise in having the airplane
in the air but not particularly useful in terms of
preparing the airplane for certification. So at that point
is when we made the call to delay the process, identify the
fix, test the fix, install the fix, and then enter a flight test
program that is fully robust."
Paul Merrion - Crain's Chicago Business - Media
......... .. .............  ...  .... ... ..... ....... ... .............. ............~ll llllllllll........ . ..
"So what would have been the worst case if you had
flown? Are we talking about cracks in the fuselage or
the wings falling off or what -- if you hadn't made this
fix before flying?"
Scott Fancher - The Boeing Compan - 787 Vice
President and General Manager
"The answer is our assessment is likely nothing would
have happened. This is an issue where stress
concentrations departed from the model. Absent being able
to anchor those two pieces of data together with
confidence based upon our design process, we would have
had to reduce the flight envelope we were willing to fly
and that gets you into the line of logic that Scott just
outlined for you. So it really isn't a matter of yes and no.
It is gee, because we've seen this departure and haven't
been able to anchor the data back to the model with
sufficient confidence, we need to narrow our margins and
that led us down the path that Scott described."
Pat Shanahan - The Boeing Company - Airplane
Programs VP and General Manager
"And we are always staying in process. And when the
process says stop, we stop."
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and
CEO
"Absolutely, absolutely."
Howard Rubel - Jefferies & Co. - Analyst
"Thank you very much. I mean you are talking about a
number of parts that sound like you could put them in
a grocery bag but maybe 50 pounds, 60 pounds. But
can you talk a little bit about the dollar outcome, Scott,
that we are seeing here? Are we talking hundreds of
millions of dollars or are we talking just a few million
to get this started and fixed?
Scott Carson - The Boeing Conmpany - President and
CEO
"Howard, I think it is premature to forecast where we are
in dollars. We understand the nature of the fix and I would
say the nature, not the specifics of the fix yet, because we
have to complete the models, run those models, and then
test the solution. As we get through those steps, I think we
will be in a better place to talk about the magnitude of the
dollars. The fix itself does not appear to be a big dollar
item. Obviously we need to understand the implications of
the flight test program and first deliveries to assess that."
Howard Rubel - Jefferies & Co. - Analyst
"Are we going to see though a day-for-day delay with this
and the whole schedule or are there some other items that
you might want to also incorporate to increase the margin
for discovering additional unknowns?"
~~ ~
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and
CEO
"We are going to continue to exercise the test program as
Scott Fancher described in his comments. So whether it is
day-for-day, I think again hard for us to call at this
moment. We do believe we will be using the time
productively however."
Howard Rubel - Jefferies & Co. - Analyst
"So I just want to go back though the dollar amount. The
fix itself just the titanium parts that you are talking
about, is immaterial to the price of the airplane."
Scott Carson - The Boeing Company - President and
CEO
"Correct."
Posted by unregistered user at 6/24/09 1:45 a.m.
"Can you smell the BS in that conference call or what?
They kept emphasizing that the mods would be
insignificant as both planes 001 and 002 would not have to
go back to the floor, yet they will require weeks to provide
a fix and more weeks to provide new time table. I wish I
was on that call and called them out on it. But then again,
these media types have no spine. I hate to say this, but I
believe Boeing is crunching the numbers as to how
much it would set them back to pay penalties and loss
of future revenue to just scrap this 7 Late 7 program.
Mark my words. This is the end of Boeing."
osted by fisquid at 6/24/09 9:34 a.m.
"The dollar amount is immaterial?? Customers are fuming
to the point that they're canceling their orders, net 787
orders for the year is less than zero (!), and for the last two
years they were supposed to be producing a plane a week
or more, at $150 million each, and the dollar amount of the
delay is immaterial? Make no mistake. This delay is
phenomenally expensive. No one is willing to admit it,
but massive amounts of money are lost when you've got a
product you can't sell. There's only a small window of time
before the competition has similar planes to sell. The delay
means MANY lost sales. Profits should have been in the
millions on each plane. Instead, they sit on their hands
through a time they should have been selling lots of planes
at $150M a pop. And Scott Carson is talking about the
price of the bolts, like that's the cost of the delay!
Sheesh! It's astonishing that the shareholders are
willing to tolerate this level of incompetence.
Immaterial, my foot."
24 Forbes. Firm- a "Boeing Co.'s most recent delay of its first test flight of On the
June com Investo its long-awaited 787 jetliner prompted at least two investor
2009 "Ahead r analysts Wednesday to cut their earnings estimates and 's
of the ratings for the aerospace manufacturer. Deliveries of the evaluati
Bell: long-range widebody have been delayed repeatedly. on of a
- ~~ I**...................
Boeing modular
Downgr Analyst Myles Walton of Oppenheimer & Co. said in a enterpri
aded"() note to investors that he is concerned about 'the likely se
downward pressure in new aircraft deliveries coupled archhite
with product development risk continuing for the next cture's
couple of years.' He reduced his rating on the stock to over-
'Underperform' from 'Perform.' He cut his cut his promise
estimate for 787 deliveries next year to 18 from 30, and and
reduced his 2009 estimate to $4.35 per share from $4.54. under-
He reduced his 2010 profit forecast for the company to $4 delivery
per share from $4.08 per share and cut his price target to
$40 from $42.
Morgan Stanley analyst Heidi Wood cut her 2009 profit
estimate for Boeing to $4.75 per share from $4.86 per
share and reduced her 2010 estimate to $4.50 per share
from $5.25 per share. She cut her rating to 'Equal Weight'
from 'Overweight.' 'Based on the program's track
record for continual negative discovery, we don't see
the wisdom in assuming yesterday's revelation
represents the very last setback,' she said in a note to
investors."
24 24/7 Firm- a "The federal government has set up a number of systems On a
June Wall St. Investo to effectively control the financial and credit systems systemi
2009 "Boeing rs along with most of the major firms that operate in the c
: Proof sector. The most aggressive, and perhaps most prudent analysis
That step, the Administration has taken is to force the most of a
Manage poorly managed banks to restructure their boards. The modular
ment Treasury put proposals before Congress to substantially enterpri
Incomp increase the power of the Fed, in essence giving it life or se
etence death power over banks that become, in its judgment, architec
Needs irreparably crippled. The auto industry has fallen under ture.
Regulati the same government thumb. Ford may have dodged the
on" unprecedented interference that comes with bailout
(Dougla dollars. GM and Chrysler are essentially wards of the
s state. The auto parts companies could end up in the same
McIntyr position if the government is forced to nationalize some of
e) them to keep the car industry from running low on parts.
What the government has failed to do is mandate that
stupidity be pushed out of the executive suites of
America's largest companies. Incompetence has always
been the enemy of employees, shareholders, and
customers. Each of these is much more evident in a
recession when the margin for error for creating profits
often falls to zero. Boeing delayed the launch of its 787
Dreamliner again today, for the fifth time. This disaster
will cost the company sales in upcoming quarters and will
force airlines which are flying old and inefficient planes to
pay more to operate them than they would have if the new
aircraft were delivered on time. The pressure on Boeing's
margins may well lead to layoffs. Shareholders watched
the value of the company's shares drop 6% yesterday. The
first of the five product setbacks came in October 2007.
Boeing's stock traded at just above $100 then. It
changes hands at $44 now. Boeing management made
a number of mistakes that contributed to the delays. It
did a poor job of managing the construction of the 787.
Sets of fasteners were installed incorrectly. The
company announced it would have to replace some of
them last November. Boeing was greedy with labor,
particularly when labor was critical to company
product release timetables. The International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
walked out on the company last fall. According to
MSNBC, 'Boeing lost about $100 million in revenue a day
from the Machinists strike.'
The most stunning aspect of the 787 delays is that they
have all happened under James McNerney, a losing
contender for the GE CEO job, and the aircraft
company's chief since 2005. This is almost as amazing
as the fact that all of Boeing's board members have
served since before the first delay of the Dreamliner.
No one has been held accountable. The board has not
even had the good sense to replace McNerney with a
more competent manager. McNerney is as much to
blame if not more so than bank executives such as
Vikram Pandit of Citigroup and Ken Lewis at Bank of
America are for the trouble at their companies. Pandit
can argue that most of the collapse of Citi was underway
when he moved to the corner office. Lewis can blame
Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke for shoving the Merrill
Lynch acquisition down his bank's throat and undermining
its balance sheet. The best McNerney can claim is that
he has been unlucky. Unlucky CEOs are even more
dangerous than incompetent ones. Luck lacks the
logical pattern that poor management has. The
Administration is leaning toward giving shareholders more
say in the selection and compensation of executives at
public companies. It is too early to tell how this will turn
out. Corporations may effectively lobby that their boards
are competent to handle the matter of hiring and paying
senior managers. Boeing is proof that the case for an
entrenched board is hardly compelling. A sixth delay
of the 787 launch may even earn McNerney a raise."
24 Flightbl Scott, Firm a "Boeing yesterday announced it was postponing first flight On a
June ogger.c Carson of the 787 citing the need to reinforce structure where the modular
2009 om, , CEO wing box meets the center wing box at the side of body of enterpri
"Under Boeing the aircraft. FlightBlogger takes a closer look at exactly se
standin Comm what the problem is and how Boeing came to yesterday's architec
g the ercial announcement. Because of the need to go back into the ture's
787 Airpla detailed design phase for this fix, combined with the potentia
Structur nes; need to fabricate, install and test at component and at I
al Scott full scale levels, several sources with a direct understa
Reinfor Fanche familiarity to the situation estimate that the fix will tement
cement" r, take 'months not weeks.' of its
(Jon VP/G problem
Ostrowe M Boeing confirms that the stringer cap separated or s.
r) Boeing 'disbonded' from the wing skin. Sources directly
Comm familiar with the situation say the shifting tension load
ercial from the stringer to fastener head also caused damage
Airpla on the structure.
. .......--- --- --------------------------------------------- . ................. N O
nes
787 It took 63 days for Boeing to decide to postpone first
Progra flight of 787.
m
April 21:
Boeing experiences the first signs of trouble on the
static airframe. During that test, the wings of ZY997
were flexed to a deflection of over 17-feet and an
equivalent of 120-130% of maximum load. During this
test, which was the limit load test, the strain measurements
on the stringer caps were reading higher than predicted.
Boeing's official announcement yesterday said the
company first discovered the problems in late May, but
several sources indicate it occurred during testing on
the static airframe in late April. 'We went in and did
some inspections and saw a number of things indicative
of what the strain gauges were saying,' said Scott
Fancher, vice president and general manager of the
787 program, said on yesterday's teleconference,
implying that the test had left visible damage to the
structure.
[Real-time revision (30 minutes later) to above statement:]
Late May:
Boeing experiences the first signs of trouble on the
static airframe. During that test, the wings of ZY997
were flexed and the strain measurements on the stringer
caps were reading higher than predicted.
Previously, on April 21st, Boeing conducted the limit load
test which saw the wings deflected over 17-feet and an
equivalent of 120-130% of maximum load.
Early June:
Preliminary analysis showed that the aircraft was still
cleared for first flight, though with a reduced flight
envelope. Sources indicate that the original plan was to fly
ZA001 and ZA002 on their respective maiden flights to
BFI as planned then park the aircraft while a fix was
developed that would allow an expanded flight test
envelope. Scott Carson, CEO of Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, confirmed this plan saying that 'the airplane
could enter flight test with a credible flight test
envelope as we worked relatively minor modifications.'
June 23:
Boeing makes a formal announcement of the first flight
postponement. The change in first flight was unknown
to many of those closest to the airplane. As late as the
evening of Monday, June 22, internal schedules
indicated first flight had shifted to July 2nd at 10 am
after holding at June 30th for more than a week before
and during the Paris Air Show.
By Gorbi on June 24, 2009 6:38 PM
"Well, I don't know what to say. First off, THANK YOU
Jon for the extremely detailed analysis of the situation.
Coming from a former structural design engineer here
in the San Diego area, and having designed aircraft
structures from traditional aluminum materials, I can
appreciate the complexity of the problem. Although it
sounds like a simple fix in layman's terms, it never is. The
reason it is more complicated is because we're dealing
with composites (plastics), and it's a much more difficult
material to predict than that of aluminum. I'm not so sure
that I would have gone with composite wing structures,
at least at the critical junctions such as the center wing
box/wing interface. Just like you're not going to build
composite landing gear structures, you might compromise
weight factors slightly, but you are assured of functional
reliability which gives you proven confidence. Hopefully
I am wrong, and overly alarmed, but I think this plane
may be overly 'plastic' in some areas, and I do believe
Boeing may have been overly ambitious in their scheme
to build the 787 in such a manner."
By CBI on June 24, 2009 7:08 PM
"Congratulations for this post. If this is true the fix will
be far from being trivial. This is a major problem if it
did happen at less than 130% weight load! I would not
be surprised that the first flight not takes place before
Q2 2010, at the earliest."
By Wes on June 25, 2009 9:13 AM
"This airplane has been consistently plagued with
problems since inception. The timeline in this indicates
to me that the people at Boeing have been hiding a few
things from the general public, shareholders, and the
airlines. This story reveals, more than anything else,
that they knew they had a problem with the wing more
than 2 months ago. How big of a problem perhaps
required a little more time to understand, but the problem
was concealed none the less. I recall the frequent, public,
'It will fly in June' comments from Boeings top
leadership. Boeing has damaged it's credibility and it is
going to take a long time to fix it. I believe there will be
a severe and lasting backlash from the customer base to
the tune of several hundred cancellations, perhaps as high
as 50%. Airbus will reap a huge benefit from this with an
increase in A-330 sales. In short, Boeing blew it
bigtime. As of today, I will no longer be a shareholder
in Boeing."
24 Motley Firm- a "Enough is enough, Boeing. Two years ago, when its On the
June Fool.co Investo maiden flight was supposed to usher in a new era of high- investor
2009 m rs- speed, low fuel-consumption aircraft for the world's commu
"Beeing Suppli airlines -- and a new era of profits for Boeing nity's
's ers- shareholders -- the 'Boeing Dreamliner' name was assessm
Nightm Custo apropos. But now you need to make it official: The 787 ent of a
are mers is now and forevermore to be designated the Boeing modular
Liner" Nightmare Liner. Yesterday, Boeing announced its latest enterpri
~" ----------------...............---
(Rich delay in the maiden voyage of 'ZA001,' Boeing's code for se
Smith) the first prototype 787. The stock promptly crashed -- architec
down 6.5% on the day -- and has continued to burn today - ture's
- down another 6% as of this writing. Which brings overpro
Boeing to a total of over 60% worth of market cap mise
destroyed since the company first began announcing and
delays in the project. underde
livery.
Misery loves company
Nor does the damage end there. A whole string of
suppliers -- from Honeywell to United Tech to Spirit
Aerosystems -- depend on Boeing getting its act together
so that they can bring parts operations up to speed.
Meanwhile, customers such as Continental and AMR,
parent company of American Airlines, who have ordered
large batches of 787s, need the plane desperately in order
to cut their fuel costs.
The 'SODDI' defense: Some other dude did it
Boeing blames its woes on a series of unfortunate
coincidences that have slowed development: parts
shortages and assembly issues with its suppliers,
redesigns, and of course, the crippling IAM labor strike
late last year. But the truth is that this is a disaster of
Boeing's own doing.
Once upon a time, I urged Boeing not to make promises it
could not fulfill ('underpromise, overdeliver,' I believe
is how the saying goes). Yet, since that April 2008 delay
(according to The Wall Street Journal, the fourth in what
is now a series of six and counting), Boeing pushed back
the 787's arrival date in December in addition to the
newest delay.
Worse still, Boeing admits that it was aware of the
787's structural defect -- the weakness in the plane's side-
of-body near where the wings attach -- as far back as last
month. Yet as recently as last week, Commercial
Airplanes CEO Scott Carson was still telling investors
that his bird 'could fly today.' A Boeing spokesperson
averred by saying Boeing 'truly believed' that ZA001
would fly in June, but that after failing to fix the defect in
time, Carson became convinced that canceling the test
flight was 'while difficult, the prudent step for us to take.'
Red ink, and red herrings
No one's disputing that, Mr. Carson. Certainly, your stock
would have suffered far worse had you proceeded with the
test only to have the ZA001's wings fall off in midair. I
shudder to think of the legal liabilities, even lengthier
delays in production, and lost sales that such a disaster
would have caused. But that's not the point. Nor is the
exact severity of the problem.
The real point is that you should never have promised
us that the plane would be ready by X date in the first
place if you were uncertain that you could deliver. The
old saw: 'Fool me once, shame on me. Fool me twice,
shame on you' comes to mind. And it gets this Fool to
wondering what consequence 'Fool us six times in a
row' should entail ...
Foolish takeaway
Boeing's latest snafu has so far cost its investors $4 billion
in market cap in two days' time, and I for one think it's
about time we stopped the bleeding. Does anybody have
Alan Mulally's phone number over at Ford ? I hear he's
got some small experience building airplanes. Maybe
when he's done fixing Ford, he could be enticed back to
Boeing? I can see the job ad now: 'Wanted: Veteran
manufacturing exec needed to pull blue chip plane
builder out of a tailspin. Aerospace experience desired.
Ability to think before speaking essential.' "
25 PlaneTa Firm- a "The numbers vary, but the hot tip this morning is that On the
June Iking, Custo up to 12 Airbus A330s will be added to the Jetstar fleet repercus
2009 "Dream mer by late 2010 or early 2011 to replace the 787 capacity sions of
liner Boeing has failed to deliver according to any of its past a
'Neverli broken promises. One thing that has emerged from modular
ner' various sources is that in its review of the state of the 787 enterpri
Bonanz program Qantas doesn't see a jet that will be se
a for competitive against the A330s until perhaps 2013, and architec
Airbus - that could be either a 787 which has benefited from ture's
up to 12 essential improvements over the current indications of over-
more Dreamliner capabilities or the all new Airbus A350. promise
A330s Qantas is moving fast on securing more A330s. Virgin and
for Atlantic snapped up 10 of the A330-300 model earlier under-
Jetstar" this week to cover its position after assessing that the delivery
(Ben Boeing 787-9, the stretched and improved version of the
Sandila 787-8 that suffered premature wing join failure in
nds) April, was never going to be delivered as promised in
2011 and 2012. Boeing, meanwhile, has set itself a task
of coming clean within a few weeks on how, and when,
it will fix the side-of-plane, oops, wing delamination
issue it finally admitted to earlier this week when it
cancelled the intended first flight of the 787 prototype
only days after its senior management insisted at the
Paris Air Show that it was going ahead as planned."
25 Forbes. Akio Firm f "The new president of Toyota Motor on Thursday warned On an
June com Toyod that the auto industry faced two more tough years, as he integral
2009 "New a, sketched out a roadmap to return the carmaker to profit. enterpri
Toyota Preside 'The new Toyota sets sail in very stormy waters,' se
Preside nt, Toyoda said at a news conference. 'But right now we're architec
nt Toyota working at full speed to cut costs and jump-start sales t's plans
Expects Motors with the support of various government incentives to
Challen Corpor being rolled out.' 'We want to do everything possible to navigate
ges to ation avoid a third consecutive year of losses,' he said, through
Continu adding he would take a 30 percent pay cut for the first a
e" year." challeng
ing
environ
ment.
25 Seattle Firm- a "Well, you've got to hand it to Boeing management for On a
June Post- Investo being consistent. Two J.P. Morgan analysts said in a modular
2009 Intellige r research note that multiple members of Boeing enterpri
ncer management assured them in private conversations se
"Fallout that 787 Dreamliner would meet its first flight architec
: Boeing deadline. So when Boeing said on Tuesday that first ture's
787 flight would slip -- again -- because the plane's body needs low
Flight reinforcement at the wing, the analysts were surprised. clarity
Delay 'We consider ourselves relatively steeled to of
Not disappointments on this program, but given everything commu
Even we had heard recently, including in private nication
Disclos conversations with multiple members of management
ed just last week, we were shocked by this news,' wrote
Privatel analysts Joseph Nadol and Seth Seifman in a research note
y dated June 23. They titled the note, 'Oh no, not again' and
"(Andre concluded that information dissemination is a 'major
a problem' at Boeing. 'The structural issue that has
James) caused the latest delay cropped up several weeks ago,
but there was not a hint of concern about it as
management continually highlighted the impending
first flight, including last week at the Paris Air Show
both in public and in private,' they wrote.
'Management acknowledged on the conference call
that it discovered this issue last month but noted it only
determined last Friday that it would cause a delay to
first flight. We believe that had management been
more up-front about this situation, perhaps the modest
level of credibility on this topic it had started to re-
establish over the past several months could have been
sustained.' Later, they add, 'We had expected further
problems with the 787 to materialize, but we were
thinking about Q4, and this press release came as quite
a shock.' They also mention that 'Boeing's need to
cancel first flight so close to the deadline also raises
questions about what other issues might crop up,
particularly since static testing is not yet complete.'
Dreamliner issues aside, the analysts also predict that
Boeing's 2009 and 2010 earnings should take a hit. Boeing
has said that the cost of reinforcing the 787 is negligible.
But the analysts expect further costs related to Boeing's
money losing 747-8 program and slimmer margins on
Boeing's other airplane programs. The J.P. Morgan
report prompted a story in The Wall Street Journal about
Boeing's 'communications woes.' The delay 'exposed
flaws not only in the plane's design, but also in the
company's lines of communication -- internally and with
business partners, investors and the public,' Peter Sanders,
of the Wall Street Journal, said. Doug Hamed, aerospace
analyst at Bernstein Research, is quoted in the story as
saying, 'During the last two years ... some investors
described optimistic statements by management as
misleading. On the contrary, we saw the answers as
honest, which is the heart of the problem. Management
appears to have been operating without adequate
visibility into the details of program performance in
the 787 organization and at suppliers.'
Stock fallout
J.P. Morgan did not downgrade its evaluation of Boeing's
stock, instead it kept it at 'neutral.' But two other firms
downgraded their expectations for Boeing shares. Analyst
Myles Walton of Oppenheimer & Co. downgraded the
stock to 'underperform.' He said in an investor note that
he is concerned about falling demand for new aircraft and
product development risk. And Morgan Stanley analyst
Heidi Wood reduced her profit estimate for Boeing and cut
her rating on Boeing's stock to 'equal weight' from
'overweight.' 'We believe first flight is three to six
months further out... which at a minimum pushes out
a 787 relief rally we thought possible by the same time
frame," Morgan Stanley said in a research note. Morgan
Stanley expects 787 first delivery to be pushed to
2011."
25 The Firm a "Boeing Co has been pummeled this year by economic On the
June Guardia weakness and Pentagon budget cuts -- factors well media's
2009 n, outside the company's control -- but Boeing has no one percepti
"Dream to blame but itself for the biggest threat to its long- on of
liner term outlook. The world's No. 2 planemaker this week endogen
Delay said it would delay the first test flight of its 787 ous vs.
adds to Dreamliner, the carbon-composite plane that promises to exogeno
Boeing' usher in an era of lighter, more fuel-efficient planes. us
s Long- Unlike previous delays that put the aircraft two years factors
term behind its original schedule, this one results from a in the
Woes" structural flaw and not from supply-chain or labor perform
(Kyle problems. 'There's a whole bunch of setbacks, ance in
Peterso concerns and unfortunate events, and then one very big a
n) area of focus that kind of puts the others in the modular
shadows,' said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace expert at enterpri
the Teal Group. 'It really is about the 787,' he said. se
'This is something they're doing, and not something architec
that's being done to them.' Customers with Dreamliner ture.
orders were disappointed by the latest delay. And experts
wondered if cancellations might follow. Such a turn of
events could take a toll on the company, which already has
suffered its share of bad luck. 'We have been
anticipating the 787 delivery, so it really is
disappointing if our delivery schedule will be pushed
back,' said a spokesman for Japan Airlines Corp on
Tuesday. 'Someone could definitely make the argument
that we're at the trough,' said Alex Hamilton, aerospace
analyst at Jesup & Lamont Securities. 'The orders were so
abysmal (this year) it's going to be pretty hard for them to
get worse.'
Boeing shares have fallen 5 percent since Tuesday, when
Boeing announced the 787 delay. But the stock has
dropped some 60 percent since October 2007, the year in
which Boeing saw a record number of net orders -- 1,413.
The number fell to 662 in 2008. Hamilton said that
because the stock tends to track aircraft orders,
investors are looking for signs of improvement in the
financing markets and signs of stability in the order book.
- ~ i i i ~ ML-
'This is a stock you want to buy in mid-2010,' Hamilton
said. 'They're just going to have a turbulent year.
There's lot that needs to be figured out."'
26 The Scott Firm- a "Boeing Co.'s disclosure Tuesday of the latest in a On a
June Wall Carson Investo string of delays of its 787 Dreamliner exposed flaws not modular
2009 Street , CEO, r only in the plane's design, but also in the company's enterpri
Journal, Boeing lines of communication -- internally and with business se
"Comm Comm partners, investors and the public. The week before architec
unicatio ercial Boeing announced the Dreamliner program's sixth ture's
ns Woes Airpla delay in six years, its executives were at the Paris Air low
Show at nes Show affirming that the new jet was on track to make clarity
Boeing" its maiden flight by the end of the month. This week, of
(Peter however, Boeing said its engineers and senior commu
Sanders executives alike had known since May of the structural nication
) problem that will keep the jet grounded, possibly for
months. It said it decided late Friday to scrub the first
flight, which was to take place by June 30. Without any
revised timetable for test flights or deliveries, investors
have been left with few clues as to when the company's
marquee product might get back on track. The
uncertainty has contributed to a 12% drop in Boeing's
share price over the past two days. For Boeing's
management, the latest delay creates a pressing need to
regain the trust of customers and investors. 'We
believe that had management been more upfront about
this situation, perhaps the modest level of credibility on
this topic it had started to re-establish over the past
several months could have been sustained,' wrote J.P.
Morgan aerospace analyst Joseph Nadol, in a research
note Wednesday. Boeing spokesmen said neither Jim
McNerney, Boeing's chairman and chief executive, nor
Scott Carson, CEO of its Commercial Airplane unit,
were available to comment. The Chicago aerospace
giant has been dogged by communications glitches since
it rolled out the first Dreamliner test plane two years ago.
Indeed, Boeing has staked much of its credibility on
promises it hasn't met. Both Messrs. McNerney and
Carson have touted efforts to be forthcoming with
customers about the plane's development, which began in
2003. And, by all accounts, Boeing was unusually open in
the first four years. Mr. Carson, who took charge of the
Commercial Airplanes unit in 2006, said in a Wall Street
Journal article in September 2007 that 'the whole issue of
transparency is key' to Boeing's ability to maintain the
confidence of investors and customers. But that fall,
plagued by communications and supply problems with
vendors scattered from Italy to South Carolina to Japan,
Boeing delayed the test flight and first delivery of the jet,
originally slated for May 2008. Company officials say
Mr. McNerney has been closely involved in the 787's
progress since the supply problems began, but some
analysts think internal communication remains a key
element in the Dreamliner's woes. 'During the last two
years...some investors described optimistic statements
by management as misleading,' wrote Doug Harned,
aerospace analyst at Bernstein Research, in a note to
investors Tuesday. 'On the contrary, we saw the
answers as honest, which is the heart of the problem.
Management appears to have been operating without
adequate visibility into the details of program
performance in the 787 organization and at suppliers.'"
26 The Frank Firm- a "The latest delay in the launch of Boeing Co.'s 787 On a
June Wall Pray, Custo Dreamliner, which has riled airlines waiting for the new modular
2009 Street chief mer fuel-efficient jet, is also upending the business plans of enterpri
Journal, executi aircraft-leasing companies, which are already struggling se
"Boeing ve of with the global credit crunch. Those companies, which architec
Delay A WAS offer airlines a way to add to their fleets without the ture's
Upends Aviatio investment required to buy new planes, own about a third lack of
Plans of n of the world's 16,000 jetliners and account for a sixth of integrati
Leasing Capita Boeing's 851 orders for the Dreamliner. They have already on
Firms" I Ltd landed leasing deals for scores of the new planes. The between
(Daniel leasing firms that were among the first to order the custome
Michael Dreamliner, which lists for around $175 million, had r and
s) counted on the planes to give them an edge with their supplier
airline customers. They now fear that edge is slipping goals.
away. Those with later delivery schedules said the latest
hold-up, announced Tuesday, has forced them to postpone
planning. 'It is a big problem for us,' said Frank Pray,
chief executive of A WAS Aviation Capital Ltd., a big
leasing company in Dublin that has six 787s on order and
had expected its first deliveries next year. 'As a lessor, we
are highly reliant on being able to place the plane.' The
Dreamliner-related disruptions, meanwhile, are helping lift
the market value of a rival: the Airbus A330. Lessors
holding A330s, made by European Aeronautic Defence
& Space Co.'s Airbus unit, are benefiting from firm
demand, even as a slump in air travel has eroded the
overall market. Aircraft lessors make their money
primarily by buying large numbers of planes at far
below list prices, and then renting them out to carriers
at profitable rates. Until recently, leasing companies
that placed early orders for Dreamliners were
positioned to charge airlines premium rents for the
sought-after planes. Boeing says the Dreamliner will be
20% less expensive to operate than existing models like
the Airbus A330. The Dreamliner was originally slated to
be delivered in May 2008. As recently as last week,
Boeing said that the plane would start test flights by June
30, and that the first commercial delivery, to Japan's All
Nippon Airways Co., would take place by April 2010. But
on Tuesday, Boeing said it wouldn't meet that timetable
due to structural problems discovered during ground
testing. That marked the sixth delay in the Dreamliner
program's six-year history. Boeing said it would
announce a new schedule in coming weeks, but the delay
has put existing lease contracts for the new jet into
question and interrupted lease negotiations with airlines,
lessors say. 'It is hurting our planning and talks with
potential customers,' said an official at a small leasing
company. 'It's all getting terribly complicated.' Another
lessor, Aviation Capital Group, a subsidiary of Pacific
LifeCorp, has five Dreamliners slated for delivery far into
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the production run. Partly due to uncertainty around
delivery dates, it has 'deliberately held off any advanced
discussions with potential lessees,' said Executive Vice
President Richard Cherney. He said ACG will probably
keep waiting 'until we have a better understanding of
when to expect our aircraft.' Still, Mr. Cherney said, he is
'fully confident there will be solid demand' for 787s
when they do arrive. Though Boeing's contracts call
for it to compensate buyers of the Dreamliner for
delivery delays, the hold-ups are taking some of the shine
off the model. This year, buyers have canceled at least 73
Dreamliner orders. Gary Liebowitz, an equity analyst at
Wachovia Capital Markets in New York, who tracks the
aircraft-leasing industry, said 787 prices and lease rates
also are likely to have slipped. 'The 787 was
generating a premium price 12 to 18 months ago, but
that's probably gone now,' he said.
One relatively bright spot for lessors has been the
Airbus A330. Lease rates for the A330, which first flew in
1993, have fallen as much as 15% over the past year due
to the decline in air travel, said Mr. Liebowitz at
Wachovia. Their asset value on lessors' balance sheets has
declined as much as 20%. But, said Mr. Liebowitz, 'They
would have dropped more if the 787 had been
delivered on time.' Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., which
ordered 15 Dreamliners in 2007, said Monday that to tide
it over until it starts receiving them, it will take 10 A330s
for delivery over the next two years. Dutch lessor AerCap
Holdings NV will provide financing for the six A330s the
airline is buying from Airbus and will lease the other four
to the carrier."
28 Seattle Heidi Firm- a "Last week, Boeing said that it would push back first flight On the
June Post- Wood, Investo of the 787 for an unknown amount of time, which shed investor
2009 Intellige analyst r; doubts on whether Boeing would be able deliver the 787 in s
ncer, , the second quarter of 2010 as promised. At least one relativel
"Predict Morga Firm- analyst says that the first customers may have to wait yet y late,
ion: n Gover another year for Boeing's all new 787 Dreamliner, which is yet
First Stanley nment already two years late. First delivery of the 787 could be systema
Deliver as late as 2011, Morgan Stanley analyst Heidi Wood tic
y of said in her most recent research note to investors. She concern
Boeing predicts that the 'earliest feasible time' that first flight s of a
787 will could occur would be the last quarter of 2009. Then, more modular
Push time will be needed to get the plane tested and certified. enterpri
Until What is particularly worrisome, Hood says, is that se
2011" Boeing's computer models did not predict the stress. architec
(Andrea But in order to get its new plane legally certified, ture's
James) Boeing must prove to the Federal Aviation executio
Administration that its predictive modeling works, n
Wood said. 'Based on the program's track-record for
continual negative discovery, we don't see the wisdom
in assuming (last week's) revelation represents the very
last setback,' Wood said. 'In fact, what worries us is the
potential for more negative insights through the
certification phase. Failure of the predictive models to
anticipate the stress points that suspended first flight
......... .......... -------------------------
presents real risk the FAA will now insist on more
data, slowing certification, hence our assumption for
2011 first delivery."
Posted by unregistered user at 6/28/09 5:52 p.m.
"Boeing got a free pass from Wall St for a long time.
That pass has now been withdrawn under the crushing
weight of missteps, misstatements, evasiveness and
now, outright lies. No amount of slick PR will
overcome the sentimate, though I'm sure Boeing PR
will give it herculean effort at McNerney's direction.
Boeing can now look forward to a lot of completely
justified cynicism from the financial community. A
house cleaning is way past due, and shows no sign
happening any time soon. The board of directors has
utterly failed in it's duties, preferring to leave
execution of the business plan to those with a proven
track record of failure to perform. If MS is correct,
there will be little to no revenues coming in from 787
before the bulk of Boeing's corperate debt comes due,
forcing them to re-finance it at soon to be higher
interest rates, and most likley having to engage in more
bond sales, taking out new credit lines, and eliminating
the dividend. The buyback is already gone, after years
of Boeing having re-purchased it's own stock at vastly
over valued prices. The company need fresh executive
talent, and sooner than later."
Posted by unregistered user at 6/28/09 5:56 p.m.
"It light of yet another snafu by management. I
propose an employee buy out of Boeing and sacking of
those Bolsevicks that run the company. I have no
doubt whatsoever that an ESOP is the only way for
Boeing to survive as an independent company."
Posted by Fimmeabreak at 6/28/09 11:03 p.m.
"McNerney is a fraud who is real good at artificially
inflating stock values for awhile without adding any
value to the underlying company itself (see 3M). Who
else but McNerney could have the market handed to
them on a silver platter by such an inept competitor as
Airbus and STILL manage to screw up so
spectacularly?"
Posted by unreeistered user at 6/29/09 3:50 a.m.
"I've said tis before and I will say it again. Boeing's 787
will not fly and will not ever. Boeing will end up
scrapping this program which will trigger Boeing's
demise."
Posted by J3 at 6/29/09 5:49 a.m.
"To me the question for historians now and in the
future is, How in detail, by what process, did Boeing
management actually make its initial 787 decisions that
have now proved so disastrous? Those decisions were to
~111
make an all-composite plane construced using autoclaves
to defeat the A332, with major parts designed and
produced by partners around world, without active
supervision by Boeing, so that Boeing did not even know
in advance that the first fuselage sections it would get
would be short about 30,000 parts not the 1200 it
anticipated (last according to Mike (where is he now)
Bair). It is now clear that this business plan was
fundamentally flawed in virtually every way, including
perhaps most importantly the unverified assumptions
that composites would substantially reduce weight and
that new engines would produce fuel savings that GE
and RR so far have not achieved. The 787 is now so
overweight that it is unlikely that Boeing will ever be
able to achieve the weights it promised to customers, so
that there may in the end be no advantage to the
composite construction after all. Airbus is now
beginning to suggest that its new higher MTOW 332
(which Turkish Air Lines just bought), will perform
about as well as the overweight 787-8. Airbus has wisely
kept production rates high to meet the cascading
demand to fill the delivery gap for the 787-8, or,
increasingly likely, replace it. If the 332 is about as
good and the 787-8, airlines will line up to buy it
because it is cheaper and they will get it on time.
There are real signs the Boeing Comm. 'Planes is
collapsing under the pressure of not being able to build
the 787. AB got $6B and $6B Mous at Paris and Boeing
got almost nothing. No new 777 orders, no new 787
orders. Just a couple of 737s. Who could have predicted
this at Farnborough a year ago? Qantas has cancelled -8s
and Branson has excoriated Boeing and its unions for not
delivering on time. Flightblogger reports Branson is
negociating for 50 A350s. If that happens, Boeing loses its
fifteen 787-9s. At Paris, Qatar's chief raged against
Boeing. If he dumps his 60 787s, many will follow and the
plane will be the Boeing Com 'Planes because AB will
dominatethe most lucrative markets, wide body 200-
350 seats, with the 332 and 333 and the A350-800-1000,
and Boeing will have no money to build a new competitor
in the 200-300 seat range or a new plane to replace the the
737. Regarding Alan Mullaly, it is way to early to
canonize him because he was deeply involved in
making the fundamentally flawed decisions that are
now destroying the 787, and possilby Boeing as a
commercial plane producer. Perhaps he did not leave
Boeing because he lost its presidency. Maybe Mullaly
forsaw all these problems and used McInterney's
appointment as a great chance to get out of Boeing
while the getting was good."
29 Wall Firm- a "The latest delay to hit Boeing Co.'s 787 Dreamliner On
June Street Custo has complicated an intricate set of negotiations, giving custome
2009 Journal, mer airlines a chance to wrangle concessions from the plane r-firm
"Boeing maker on delivery dates, installment payments and relation
Feels even the final purchase price. Delivery delays can ship in a
New wreak havoc on an airline's ability to plan its routes modular
II II II
Pressure and schedules. But they also can provide an opening to enterpri
to renegotiate complicated contracts that govern airplane se
Placate purchases. Boeing is coming under pressure from its architec
its 787 customers to offer fresh concessions. Industry officials say ture.
Buyers" that Boeing has recently stopped discussing compensation
(Peter terms for delays to the 787 and they speculate the
Sander, company is waiting until its actual delivery schedule is
Daniel clear. 'We want to discuss compensation, but Boeing
Michael hasn't opened the books,' said an official at one
s) Dreamliner customer. Already, the delays have cost
Boeing millions of dollars in penalties and concessions
to customers. 'Our focus is always on our customers
and as we've done throughout the development
program, we will work closely with them regarding the
program and the impact of this issue,' says a Boeing
spokesman. Even before the recent delays, some airlines
were getting frustrated with Boeing's frequent schedule
changes. Akbar Al Baker, chief executive of Qatar
Airways, threatened to cancel orders for both 787s and
larger 777s, which are now in production, because of
disruption caused by problems at Boeing. 'Boeing doesn't
realize how much they're hurting their customers'
plans,' Mr. Al Baker said at the recent Paris Air Show.
Qatar Airways has firm orders for 30 787s and options for
30 more. The first were due for delivery in 2011 but that
arrival date is now uncertain. Actual cancellations are
rare, but last week Australia's Qantas Airways Ltd. said
it scratched orders for 15 787s and delayed deliveries
on 15 others slated to arrive in 2014-15. Qantas --
which remains the largest Dreamliner airline customer
with 50 planes still on the books -- had some leverage to
cancel because of its large number of orders, industry
observers say. For Boeing, the cancellations have a
silver lining. The jet maker now has a little more
breathing room it can use to fill remaining orders more
quickly, thereby avoiding some penalties. 'From
Boeing's perspective, that's not necessarily bad news
when you have a rollout going this poorly,' says Peter
Barlow, an aviation attorney with Smith, Gambrell &
Russell LLP. 'The way purchase agreements are
drafted, a savvy purchaser will obtain daily damages,
and if a plane isn't delivered on time, the customer
receives a daily penalty Ifrom the manufacturer] that
can be a very big number.' Though the 787's list price
is roughly $178 million, customers typically receive
discounts. The price negotiated at the time of the order
is rarely the price paid when the plane is delivered
years later. Typically, customers make 'pre-delivery
payments' every six months, beginning about 18
months prior to delivery, that amount to around 30%
of the total purchase price. Payments often escalate as
the delivery date approaches, says Mr. Barlow.
Everything in that process is negotiable, Mr. Barlow
says.
Several carriers, including Air New Zealand Ltd., British
Airways PLC and Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., are coping
with 787 delays by ordering current-model planes from
either Boeing or Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic
Defence & Space Co. Virgin, for example, last Monday
announced an order for 10 Airbus A330s, which are
slightly larger than Dreamliners and not as cutting-edge,
but are available next year and in 2011. 'We weren't
prepared to have six years of no new aircraft being
delivered,' said Virgin spokesman Paul Charles. He said
Virgin is still talking to Boeing about compensation. 'We
would like to see the compensation reflect the ongoing
delays,' Mr. Charles said."
29 Seattle Firm a "Last week, Boeing lost an order for 15 of its 787 On non-
June Post- Dreamliners -- an order worth $3 billion. This is decidedly systemi
2009 Intellige not good news. And there you have it. Boeing has c logic
ncer, somehow managed to engineer two pieces of bad news of a
"Could into a sliver of relief with the following equation: modular
Boeing' (development delays) + (canceled orders) = (reduced enterpri
s 787 penalties)." se
Cancell architec
ations Posted by unregistered user at 6/29/09 9:42 p.m. ture.
be Good "What would be 'more effective' Public Relations and
News? Executives? Hmmmm ....don't know how Boeing could
Actuall lie even more, mislead and misrepresent more to the
y, Yes" shareholders and the public? Guess they can shoot for
(Andrea BERNIE MADOFF Ponzi scheme, get more investors
James) and the public based on lies while the big shots live the
high life? OH WAIT, THEY ARE DOING THAT.
SEC Needs to get on top while Boeing is heading to
become just another Enron and Worldcom."
Posted by unregistered user at 6/30/09 2:45 p.m.
"What exactly is the difference between BERNIE
MADOFF and BOEING'S EXECUTIVES AND
BOARD MEMBERS?"
Posted by unregistered user at 6/30/09 4:35 p.m.
"What's the difference ? 151 years of jail time, that's
the difference....."
Posted by unregistered user at 7/2/09 4:06 p.m.
"Making a potential disaster a Censored media
response. Brilliant! Is Boeing intent on following GM,
Chrysler, ABC news, the banks, and newspapers into
'the bold new frontier of future 'Amerika'?"
7 Press Scott Firm- a "Boeing announced today that it has agreed to acquire On a
July Release, Carson Suppli the business and operations conducted by Vought modular
2009 The , CEO, er Aircraft Industries at its South Carolina facility, where enterpri
Boeing Boeing Vought builds a key structure for Boeing's 787 se
Compan Comm Dreamliner airplane. The Vought facility, located in architec
y ercial North Charleston, performs fabrication and assembly of tur's
Airpla structures and systems installation of 787 aft fuselage reversal
nes; sections, which are made primarily of composite materials. of its
Elmer After the transaction, Vought will continue its work on modular
Doty, many Boeing programs, including other components of the supply
preside 787, as well as structures and components on the 737, 747, chain
... ...............
nt and 767, 777, C-17 and V-22 through operations located strategy,
CEO elsewhere. 'Integrating this facility and its talented it its
of employees into Boeing will strengthen the 787 program purchas
Vought by enabling us to accelerate productivity and efficiency e of an
Aircraf improvements as we move toward production ramp- underpe
t up,' said Scott Carson, president and CEO of Boeing rformin
Industr Commercial Airplanes. 'In addition, it will bolster our g
ies capability to develop and produce large composite supplier
structures that will contribute to the advancement of
this critical technology.'
'We take great pride knowing that we have been able
to satisfy the technological and physical demands of the
787 program alongside much larger companies,' said
Elmer Doty, president and CEO of Vought Aircraft
Industries. 'However, the financial demands of this
program are clearly growing beyond what a company
our size can support. We are pleased that we will
continue our 787 involvement at a component
manufacturing level, as well as provide ongoing
technical capabilities that have helped make
Charleston a world-class composite facility.'
Through the agreement, Boeing will acquire the North
Charleston facility, its assets and inventory and will
assume operation of the site, and the parties will resolve
all matters related to Vought's prior work on the 787
program. The cash consideration to be paid to Vought at
closing is approximately $580 million. In addition,
Boeing will release Vought from its obligations to repay
amounts previously advanced by Boeing. This
transaction is anticipated to close in the third quarter
following satisfaction of customary closing conditions,
including consent from Vought's lenders. Once acquired,
the North Charleston facility will be managed by the 787
program. 'We look forward to welcoming the South
Carolina team to Boeing and continuing our
relationship with Vought to bring the most value to the
787 and our other programs,' said Carson."
8 Chicago Firm- c "Add another $1 billion to the tab that Boeing Co. must On a
July Tribune, Suppli pay to fix production problems with its troubled 787 modular
2009 "Boeng er Dreamliner jet. That's the cost to Chicago-based enterpri
's Boeing of acquiring a source of the jet's persistent se
Dreamli supply-chain snarls: the South Carolina production architec
ner facility built for the 787 by Dallas-based Vought ture's
Costs Aircraft Industries Inc. Boeing announced Tuesday systema
Growin that it was paying $580 million for Vought's 787 tic
g" (Julie business in North Charleston, which constructs the rear constrai
Johnsso fuselage and tail-cone sections of the jet from super- nt in
n) hardened plastics. Boeing also will forgo $422 million it achievin
had advanced to cash-strapped Vought to help cover its g
manufacturing costs, said Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx. relative
'We believe our ability to accelerate production and cost-
efficiency at the South Carolina [plant] will generate a leaderhi
quicker return on that $400 million investment than p over
staying on the path we were on with Vought,' Proulx an
~ ~""""'"""~""'~ L
said. The acquisition, rumored for months, gives inetegra
Boeing full control over a weak link in a global supply 1
chain stretching from Japan to Italy that the aerospace enterpri
giant assembled to design and construct the new plane se
-- and to lower its development costs. Once the deal architec
closes during the third quarter, Boeing will take over plant turee.
operations with an eye to speeding production. It had
aimed to churn out 10 Dreamliners per month by 2012.
But after a series of delays, most recently for structural
problems disclosed in June, Boeing almost certainly has to
form a second production line for the 787, which is
assembled at its giant plant in Everett, Wash. 'Before, [a
second production linel would have been nice. Now it's
mandatory,' said Paul Nisbet, aerospace analyst with JSA
Research. The Vought factory could serve as an
assembly line for the 787-9, the next version of the
plane, far removed from the Everett plant, where
worker-friendly laws and the deep-rooted labor
tensions have contributed to a series of strikes, most
recently last fall. 'A purchase of the facility could kill
three birds with one stone,' aerospace analyst Joseph
Nadol of JPMorgan said Monday in a research report,
'enabling Boeing to reduce 787 supply chain risk,
giving it a head start on some of the investment
required for a second 787 line, and providing it with
the opportunity to diversify its commercial aircraft
assembly operations outside of Seattle.' Proulx said
Boeing hadn't decided whether it would open a second
assembly line. But Boeing appears to have paid a large
premium to gain the factory from Vought and its
private-equity owner, Carlyle Group, at a time when
the planemaker's cash reserves are shrinking. Boeing
held $4.24 billion in cash as of March 31, down 45
percent from year-earlier levels, and faces penalties
from angry 787 customers and demands for cash
advances from suppliers. In 2008, Boeing paid $55
million to acquire Vought's 50 percent stake in Global
Aeronautica LLC, a joint venture that joins fuselage
sections on the new jets. And Boeing would have faced
pressure to pump more money into Vought had the two
remained partners, Securities and Exchange
Commission filings show. Like most major Boeing
suppliers, Vought wouldn't have fully recouped its
costs for materials and production until the 787s are
delivered to airlines. The first Dreamliner was
supposed to be given to All Nippon Airways in May
2008, but may not arrive until 2011, analysts predict.
Vought had $165.4 million in cash as of March 29 and
warned in its quarterly financial statement that it
anticipated it would need more funding from Boeing or
other sources 'to continue our participation in the 787
program.' From the outset, Vought had struggled to
keep pace with Boeing's aggressive production
schedule for the 787 and to meet its exacting standards.
Aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia said Vought had
the engineering know-how, but lacked the resources of
~~i ~ --- --- --- -- --- ---- --- --- --- ---------- ~-------------- R-
the aerospace conglomerates anchoring Boeing's
supply chain to resolve the design and production
problems that come with a ground-breaking aircraft.
'The chain broke pretty much where you'd expect it to
break,' Aboulafia said."
8 The Norm Firm- a "Members of the state's congressional delegation said On a
July Seattle Dicks, Emplo Tuesday that Boeing is laying down an ultimatum to its modular
2009 Times, U.S yees biggest union: Unless a long-term agreement barring enterpri
"Key Washi strikes by the Machinists is reached by this fall, Boeing se
Lawma ngton will build a second production line for the 787 architec
kers State someplace outside Washington. 'The whole thing ture's
Warn of Repres comes down to, can they get a long-term agreement contract
Boeing entativ with the union, with a no-strike clause,' influential U.S. ual (not
No- e; Jay Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Bremerton, said in an interview relation
strike Inslee, Tuesday. 'That's what ultimately has to happen here in al)
Ultimat US the next two or three or four months - or they are interacti
um" Washi going to go elsewhere.' 'I think if they get this ons with
(Domini ngton agreement, they would stay.' In a separate interview, labor.
c Gates) State Gov. Chris Gregoire said Boeing Commercial Airplanes
Repres CEO Scott Carson told her recently the company is
entativ seeking a long-term no-strike agreement with the
e; Machinists union. Carson also said Boeing will likely
Chris make its decision on the location of a second 787
Gregoi production line this fall, though Gregoire said he did not
re, specifically link the two elements as an ultimatum. What
Washi the politicians seem to envision is some kind of 'social
ngton contract' with the union in which Boeing would
Gover publicly commit to stay in this region in exchange for
nor; labor peace. Concern about the location of a second 787
Scott line has intensified with news that Boeing is buying the
Carson Charleston, S.C., plant of 787 supplier Vought Aircraft
, CEO Industries. Dicks, the third-ranking member of the
Boeing House Appropriations Committee, is an aggressive
Comm lobbyist for Boeing on issues such as its bid for the Air
ercial Force refueling-tanker contract and is close to the
Airpla company's leadership. He said the ultimatum was laid
nes; out for him and other members of the congressional
Jim delegation by 'high-ranking people in the Boeing
McNer Company' whom he declined to name. Dicks also said
ney, that at a March meeting with Boeing CEO Jim McNerney,
Chair arranged by Gregoire and held in the Washington, D.C.,
man office of Sen. Patty Murray, 'McNerney was very
and candid.' 'The message was that we need to get a
CEO, resolution of this (strike) problem. We can't live with
The this.' Both of Washington's U.S. senators and most of its
Boeing representatives were present, Dicks said, as McNerney laid
Compa out how Boeing plans to do a detailed assessment of where
ny; to put a second 787 assembly line in an open competition,
Tom with Everett as only one option among several. Rep. Jay
Wrobl Inslee, D-Bainbridge Island, said McNerney made clear
ewski, that 'the relationship with the labor community,'
IAM particularly the question of strikes, 'was a major
district component of the decision.' The International
Preside Association of Machinists (IAM) has struck the company
nt; four times in seven sets of contract talks over the past 20
Tom years, most recently for two months last fall. Its contract
Buffen expires in 2012. Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said the
barger, company 'can't comment on any conversations our senior
IAM executives may or may not have with government
interna officials.' Gregoire said the time frame offered by Boeing
tional for a decision on a second 787 line has moved around
preside somewhat this year. Initially it had been set for the spring,
nt then shifted to early 2010, before moving again to
'sometime this fall.' Before the decision is made, she
intends to go to Chicago to make the case for the Puget
Sound region before Boeing's board. Gregoire described
Boeing's goal of a no-strike agreement with its union as
ambitious, noting that it's something politicians cannot
achieve by legislation. It's up to the two sides to
negotiate it, she said. 'This is such a huge ask of the
Machinists,' Gregoire said. 'The idea of labor giving up
the right to strike is a huge issue for them. There has to
be something on the other side equally compelling. The
magnitude of this is really challenging.' Snohomish
County Executive Aaron Reardon said Boeing's legislative
agenda and its drive to improve the state's business climate
are now secondary to 'a resolution of the differences
between the union and the company.' Dicks said any
overarching no-strike agreement would have to involve
some kind of binding independent arbitration of
disputes between management and union. But IAM
district President Tom Wroblewski balked at the idea
of setting aside the union's strike weapon. 'Take away
our only power?' Wroblewski asked rhetorically. 'I
can't see ever taking our power away.' There have not
yet been any deep discussions on the subject, he said. 'If
we were to have these discussions, the company would
have to come through with something, ... guaranteed
employment of some sort,' he said. 'The trade-offs
would be huge.' Dicks agreed. 'This is a two-way
street,' said Dicks. 'I've urged the Boeing leadership
that there's got to be give on their side.' Yet Tom
Buffenbarger, IAM international president, said if Boeing
wants to talk about a social contract, 'the union's ears
are always open. Talk to us about it.'
How practical is Boeing's threat to build a second 787
production line elsewhere? Building one in Charleston
would take a big investment by Boeing and other
partners. Not only would a new assembly plant have to
be built, but also a costly and technically complex paint
hangar. And suppliers such as Goodrich, which makes
the engine pods, and New Breed, which delivers all the
small parts to the line, would also need adjacent
facilities. Buffenbarger believes it wouldn't make
financial sense. 'Given the country's economic condition,
it would be hard for Boeing or any company right now to
make the investments needed to put Charleston in the
realm of a first-class aircraft-assembly site,' he said. And
apart from that infrastructure, he said, 'It takes a trained
work force, and one that's developed over years and
not over weeks or months.' The union will have to
decide whether Boeing's ultimatum is serious or a
bluff. 'It's poker,' said John Monroe, a former Boeing
executive who now consults for the Snohomish County
Economic Development Council. 'It's a hell of a risk.
We're talking thousands of jobs and billions of dollars.
It's high stakes.'"
8 Fool.co Firm- a "Boeing investors are finding it harder and harder to get a On a
July m Investo good night's sleep -- which is my clever way of saying that systemi
2009 "Banke rs- additional delays seem in store for the airplane maker's c
r Calls Custo already-much-delayed 787 Dreamliner. To hear Boeing market
'Shenan mers- tell it, multiple complications with getting the new valuatio
igans' Suppli plane airborne will not prevent deliveries beginning in n of a
on ers QI 2010. Such assurance may please customers like non-
Boeing" AMR (NYSE: AMR), Delta (NYSE: DAL), and systemi
(Rich Continental (NYSE: CAL), and prevent their c
Smith) cancelling orders as Qantas did earlier this month. It modular
may even incline investors to sigh with relief that the enterpri
worst is over. It isn't. According to a report just out of se
Broadpoint AmTech, Boeing's QI 2010 deadline is a architec
pipe dream. Whereas the aerospace giant believes it can ture.
rush its 787 through FAA certification in as little as eight
months, Broadpoint believes the FAA will still be poking
around the 787's innards a year from now. This, plus
continued supply-chain difficulties (which I believe
necessitated this week's purchase of subcontractor Vought
Aircraft's South Carolina facility), will continue pushing
back the delivery schedule. Result: Broadpoint predicts
Boeing won't see dollar one from 787 deliveries before late
2010 at the earliest -- and maybe not even by then.
Broadpoint's best-case scenario envisions no more than
eight 787's delivered over the course of 2010, and perhaps
three dozen more in 2011. If correct, this suggests we
could see more cancellations of orders for the oft-
delayed aircraft, rather than less. (Logically, this would
entail consequences not just for Boeing, but for suppliers
Honeywell (NYSE: HON), United Tech (NYSE: UTX),
Spirit AeroSystems (NYSE: SPR), and others -- all of
whom depend in part on the 787 sticking to its schedule in
order that they may sell the parts needed to build it. So
investors in these companies, beware.)
What's a Boeing investor to do?
In the short term, the prospect of more bad Boeing
news suggests only one course of action: Sell Boeing.
Longer-term, however, my Foolish colleague Rich Duprey
believes that all of Boeing's missteps add up to little more
than shifting 787 sales into the future. The profit
potential is still there; we just have to wait a little
longer to get it. To which I respond: But what if
frustrated customers don't wait? What if they cancel
their 787 orders and buy Airbus planes instead? In
that case, the logical decision for long-term investors
is... exactly the same: Ditch Boeing."
9 Flightbl Mike Firm a "On July 9, 2007, ZA001, or what was later to become On a
July ogger.c Bair, ZA001 wrapped up one final photo op for the morning modular
2009 om VP television news shows. The aircraft sat at the head of the enterpri
... ..... .....
"Comm 787 747 line gleaming brand new. Once the camera lights se
entary: Progra dimmed, the 787 was rolled back to Building 40-26 and architec
Its Time m, the real work to prepare for flight had begun, a task ture's
for Boeing that continues two years later. White plastic decals flow of
Boeing Comm were removed from the wings, painted foil covering low
to Talk. ercial unfilled fastener holes were removed, the full extent of quality
To Airpla the show N787BA had been prepared for the day prior informa
Itself" nes; could no longer remain unreconciled against the work tion
(Jon Scott that would be required to make it fly. Those working between
Ostrowe Carson directly with the airplane knew full well that the first stakehol
r) , CEO 787 was far from its maiden sortie, but why der
Boeing pronouncements like this from program vice president "chunks
Comm Mike Bair at the Paris Air Show in June 2007? 'The "; and
ercial aircraft will be structurally complete at rollout but will on the
A irpla still have systems, ducting, wiring and similar work to media's
nes; be done before first flight. When those tasks are assumpt
John completed, it will be powered up and proceed to ion of
Leahy, ground test before it flies.' Vought would confirm the
COO, publicly a year later that the first aft fuselage barrel infallibi
Airbus was only 16% structurally complete at the time of lity of
shipment to Everett. At the time the roll out festivities "the
came to a close, August 27th was the target for first flight, architec
one month and 18 days later. What followed is well t" and
documented. Almost exactly two years later, Boeing the
Commercial Airplanes CEO Scott Carson said fallibilit
assuredly to the gathered crowd of reporters at the y of the
Paris Air Show: 'We remain absolutely committed to system
our forecast that it will fly in the second quarter of this below
year. If you count the way I do, that means within the it.
next two weeks roughly.' Carson would also later tell
CNN at the show, 'The technical issues are largely all
behind us.' Just over a week later, Boeing revealed the
extent of the weakness in the wing to body join. Yet, in
that statement, there lies a question of how it got to
that point? How could an executive near the head of a
Fortune 50 company make such a statement? Was it
just a breakdown in communication? Or something
more telling about the state of the program? The
information, or the gravity of the information, didn't
flow where and when it needed to. Mr. Carson, in
responding to questions on the delay announcement said:
'When we were at Paris last week we had been through the
preliminary analysis of the data and were of a mind that
the airplane could enter flight test with a credible flight
test envelope as we worked relatively minor modifications.
The work done by the team through the week last week
narrowed the envelope to the point where on Friday we
determined that to fly would be such a small envelope for
us that it would be an interesting exercise in having the
airplane in the air but not particularly useful in terms of
preparing the airplane for certification. So at that point is
when we made the call to delay the process, identify the
fix, test the fix, install the fix, and then enter a flight test
program that is fully robust.' A program built on global
transparency did not live up to its own early expectation
and the lessons continue to be manifested in changes like
the 50% acquisition of Global Aeronautica in March 2008
and the establishment of the Production Integration Center,
a mission control nervous system for the global supply
chain that became operational in December 2008, and
most recently this week with the Vought South Carolina
buy out. Many program sources have suggested
privately that as Boeing has improved its visibility
outward, it still struggles with communicating with
itself. Good news flows freely to the top, yet the bad
news is not elevated to an appropriate level. They talk
of a 'kill the messenger' culture has established itself
inside the program, where the push to move ahead and
show marked progress is often in conflict with
requiring the often uncomfortable task of ensuring that
'power' has 'truth' in its hands to make good decisions
and communicate progress outwardly. During my time
in Paris, I received a message from South Carolina on
Tuesday morning that told of 'emergent first flight issues'
with no other details available. Another message from
Washington, just a day later suggested a rumor about
possible delamination in the wingbox stringers, but the
source added, 'it is just a rumor to my knowledge.' From
the point of view of covering the program, those rumors
were almost impossible to substantiate. Separating the
wheat from the chaff, takes a fine tooth comb that appears
much more difficult when nine time zones away. Yet, if
this outside observer could know of these two hints a
week before the delay announcement, how was this
information flowing inside the company? The story is
far from unfamiliar and Boeing is far from the first
aerospace company to face such a challenge.
At the height of the A380 delays facing Airbus, broken
communication, both internal and external, drew the ire of
airline customers, Wall Street and the media. On June 20,
2006, Flight International weighed in on the situation:
[Airbus Chief Operating Officer John] Leahy says it was
the 'low-tech stuff' that got them - the wiring harnesses
- but this will hardly reassure the customers. More
worrying is how Airbus management was apparently
unable to hear the timebomb ticking in the A380's Jean-
Luc Lagard&re assembly plant a few kilometres from its
Toulouse headquarters. Especially given that the join-up of
sub-assemblies for new aircraft had been on hold for two
months and working parties were furiously trying to
rectify problems on completed aircraft.
The problem of communication not only impacts the
outward credibility of the company's leadership, but
how Boeing's own employees view those running the
ship of state. If information isn't able to flow freely to
the top without perception of fear of reprisal or
penalty, then any report of information being
disseminated from the top down may lack the
credibility that the leadership needs to motivate
employees to solve the challenges facing the program.
. . .......
A 2006 speech by Boeing CEO James McNerney given in
the wake of the US Air Force tanker scandal tackled this
culture head on: 'So then we had to ask ourselves some
really tough questions: Were these lapses symptomatic
of a larger issue with our corporate culture?...Did our
people feel confident enough to speak up about ethical
concerns without fear of retaliation?' McNerney
discussed the solution to the problem: 'To make sure
everyone understands this, I think that you have to
create a work environment that encourages people to
talk about the tough issues--business- or ethics-related-
-and to make the right decisions when they find
themselves at the crossroads between hitting their
numbers for the quarter and stepping forward when
there's a problem.' Boeing should ask itself if
McNerney's vision has yet to become a reality."
By Trapperpk on July 9, 2009 6:31 PM
"Jon, By the way, 'the emperor has no clothes' is
common condition in corporate America. A
Corporation's communication flow tends to filter
critical data upward to protect programs and its
leadership from the appearance of
(actual)incompetance. The emperor is last to know
about the naked truth and its embarisment. Usually this
discovery is accomplished after speaking to large crowds
in bold tones. Somebodies gettin wacked!
Ouch!"
By Jerylt on July 9, 2009 7:14 PM
"Jon, This is an excellent and appropriate
commentary.and It is written with balance and
thoughtfulness. I am very pleased that you made these
thoughts public as they are expressed in many blogging
forums with more anger and criticism. I was outraged at
the way Boeing handled this cancellation. These last
minute problems may well be a part of the process but
Boeing's record has been so blemished from the past that
this call just seems to be a continuation of poor
communication and credibility. There is something flawed
in the reasoning that two days before the call , there was
still a possibility of it flying. It indicates a rushed finish, an
incomplete total diagnosis and promises that should never
have been made.. One wonders whether Scott Carson
and Jim McNearny are capable of changing the way
this Company communicates and whether they are
capable of being the leaders they are hired to be. They
are now trapped by their own lack of credibility and
have brought another cloud over this Company"
By The Big Ouestion on July 10, 2009 3:05 AM
"I would love for someone to ask Mr. Carson if he is
incompetent or a liar. Based on the happenings of the last
month, he has to be, in my eyes, either one or the other."
By Pointman on July 10, 2009 3:46 AM
~***~;..........................................................................................................................-
"My question is' 'What is so different with the 787 as
compared with other new technical marvels Boeing has
achieved in the past- delivered on time with the
707/737/747/777 models?' From it's creation the 787
program has gone out of it's way to be 180 degrees
opposite to every successful Boeing legacy
manufacturing process. The 'New Breed' at Boeing
expecting to put a revenue aircraft into the air using
untested materials, partners, technology, drawings,
managers, all at once was fantasy at best. This is the
only program I know of where management failure is
rewarded by promotion and bonus. Now we are 2 years
and counting....and the excuses keep coming."
By JR on July 10, 2009 10:00 AM
"Boeing upper management is still running around in
their little glass bubble oblivious to what happens
down on the shop floor. Hiding in an office
disconnected from 787 reality is nuts! It's time to leave
your over stuffed suits in the closet, get down on the
floor, out on the flightline and get to know every
engineer, inspector, supply clerk, mechanic, truck
driver right down to the janitors. It's 'OK' to reach out
and put a finger on the pulse and yes it's 'OK' to listen!
All the 787 problems just didn't pop up over night...
Boeing Upper management preaches one type of
culture for the employees but yet there is a whole
different culture that exists in the upper management
structure. I keep hearing upper management running
their lips tell the customers, press and the share
holders the ship is finally sailing into smooth waters.
The truth of the matter (and they know it) is, while
they run their lips, the ship is sinking under them! It's
time for a change....UN-STUFF THE SUITS!"
By eddietsunami on July 10, 2009 1:00 PM
"Unfortunately, I have to agree with the poster who said
that people in management (if they are indeed that out
of the loop), have to be clownishly incompetent or
huckster/liars. I am afraid it is the latter. The fact the
first plane was a Disney-prop of incompleteness points
this out. In my opinion this was un-ethical and stock
manipulation to roll-out something so phony and
misrepresented. It gave people the false hope that the
scattered-all-over-with-no-control supply chain would
actually work. With the purchase of Vought it becomes
clear now, even from Scott Carson's own mouth,
talking about 'efficiencies', that the outsourcing at all
cost model is a historic failure. Even if the plane flies
tomorrow the billions that have been lost, the lost
deliveries, the time and technological advantage over
Airbus that has been squandered, will never be able to
be replaced. The purchase of suppliers now is damage
control. The person who spoke of the 'emperor with no
clothes', yes, that is exactly the nick name the moving line
has been given. The purchase of Douglas (Boeing lost
I-~;;;;;~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~ ~"
billions), the moving line (no one will speak on the record
of the real cost), and now the great albatross of the 787.
Sadly, the only way for someone above the level of the
hundreds of vice presidents at Boeing can lose their job
is to screw their secretaries. Simply doing a really,
really poor job is not enough to be fired. Incompetence
is sometimes transferred and usually covered up, and
somehow described as a retroactive success (as buying
Vought is now). There is no accountability at the top.
The only people who truly care about the companies'
long term success are those most personally invested in
it, the longtime employees. Not the Johnny come
latelies like McNerney that have no ties to the
community or the company or its grand history."
By iloi on July 10, 2009 1:15 PM
"It comes down to two pssibilities: 1) Boeing's
leadership is lieing, or 2) Boeing's culture does not
promote truthful communications to leadership. The
bottom line is that the company leadership sets the
culture! Either way, the credibility and responsibility
belong with Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO, Mr.
Scott Carson. Changing 787 program leadership
(again) is not the solution - the responsibility is solely
Mr. Carsons."
By Mel on July 10, 2009 1:24 PM
"As a supplier to the 787 program, I see a problem that
hasn't gotten a lot of press. The partner model is
seriously flawed. In the perfect world, each parner
performs their tasks in lockstep with the others -
analogous to a rowing team. The reality is that each
partner is lashed to its own suppliers in a sort of three
legged race against the other partners. The problem is
that no one wants to win - everyone wants to come in
second to last. Losing, or being the one holding up the
schedule, draws international embarrassment, so no
one wants to lose. But, completing the assigned task
more than a week or so before the slowest partner
means holding very expensive ($millions) inventory.
This has created a stage for all sorts of theatrics. The
partners can see, often more easily than Boeing
managers, who is going to be holding up the program
(keeping in mind that this race is like the Tour de
France, where there are dozens of race segments.) But
no partner is going to tell Boeing, 'We aren't going to
hit our promise dates because we know that the
spoilers will be late.' Instead, they brick wall over a
'spec change.' Or, they tacitly conspire to tangle
fastener procurement to the point of non-functionality
(FUBAR might be better used here.) Or, they find a
Boeing selected single source supplier in their ranks
and hobble that supplier so that a delay in the partner
schedule is traceable back to Boeing. (The way they do
it is like a kid tripping his little brother every time
mom looks away and then claiming the little brother
-- --- I
can't walk.) Boeing managers have dismissed the
theory because they do not believe that the partners
are sufficiently clever to perpetrate such schemes. But
the partners had schedules requiring them to build
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of assemblies yet
they knew they wouldn't be paid for months, even
years. The partners had to figure a way out of that
trap. The partners resorted to all sorts of shinanigans
at the level of the minute details with the ultimate effect
of deliberately misleading Boeing at all levels. The
latest side body join problem may be entirely encompassed
by Boeing's internal communication loop. But, the entire
program has been rife with deceptions vigorously
advanced from low levels at the partners to low levels
at Boeing over small details. This creates context for
senior partner managers to rationalize delays to senior
Boeing managers. The delays appear fixable to Boeing
management because they are presented as
quantifiable technical or commercial problems. Boeing
still hasn't realized that those problems were created
and have been nurtured as the partners means of
controlling the schedule and thus, their cash flow. The
problems won't get solved until the partners decide to
let them be solved (or Boeing decides to take and pay
for each deliverable on each partner's schedule.) The
thing about airplanes is that they don't fly until the last
bolt is torqued down and the last i is dotted. The devil
really is in the details. Boeing's internal
communications are based almost exclusively, because
of the partner model, on communications from the
partners. Who knows? Boeing may not be able to
avoid making garbage out of good information. I do
know that Boeing is not clever enough to make good
information of the garbage that is coming in."
By Outsider on July 10, 2009 1:27 PM
Take it from a former Boeing employee, the culture
does not let 'truth' rise; rather, what those silly ones at
the top get is what they deserve, crap. Now, are all
companies in the military-industrial complex of this type (I
know, the concept ages me)? Well, I have worked for
several. For some reason, Boeing is different; I could
never put my finger on it. But, there was a Tech Excel
program developed to allow a way to ascend career-wise
without going into the monkey-ish stuff (yea, you, Scott
C). That is, it was a double ladder with supposedly those
higher up on the rungs of the TE ladder having as much
authority (over matters, not employees) as did those who
dance that silly dance the managers are so noted for (when
will they wake up to the fact that raking in 10s of millions
(Turner, you, too) doesn't make them successful in any but
a superficial sense?). Too, one would think that a
motivation for the program was to allow some people
(who did not feel it an insult to deal with facts and data)
actually look at things with proper eyes (not that mind-set
from the back-slapping hordes - yes, so many of them as to
--
be very heavy organizationally). We have not heard from
the TEs on the 787, that I can remember. So, was the
program trashed? Anyway, we have something that we
can toast to every year, even when the thing flies. We
need LeeLaw to coin something new for us. 'potemkin' is
old hat."
By Uwe on July 10, 2009 2:01 PM
"But why does this hit Boeing so much harder than
Airbus _the_ long time distributed manufacturer
Beyond the basic mechanism is it inability to span differnt
cultures or the predominance of 'dumb' non engineering
types in middle and upper management? What about the
potentialy overreaching contract arrangements pressed
through by Boeing?"
By Ray on July 10, 2009 2:04 PM
"Pay attention kids. This comment: 'By Mel on July 10,
2009 1:24 PM' has more truth in it than a decade of
statements by Scott Carson or Jim McNerney.
Here's a poli-sci view: Boeing's business model for the
787 was based upon colonial logic. The idea was that the
partners and vendors would behave mechanically....doing
precisely what Boeing wanted when Boeing wanted it.
However, the colonial model only works if you have the
ability to project force and impose your will upon the
colonists. If you don't, those pesky colonists will start
acting in ways that maximize their self-interest rather
than the interests of the colonial masters. We've seen
that from A to Z in this program....and anyone who spoke
the truth to Boeign corporate was punished. Now, there
is a bureaucratic battle within Boeing between the
McNerney camp who argue that their business model is
fine but the execution was bad....and the experienced
technical workforce (including those now in
management) who believe the business model is fatally
flawed."
By Uwe on July 10, 2009 2:46 PM
"For a change reader comments are a fount of insight.
Describing Boeing as colonial is an interesting insight
that jibes with my (tentative) assumption of overreach
by Boeing in partner interaction. Essentially risksharing
partners then are limited to taking a share of Boeings risk
plus having to bear their own risk as well. This would
explain why the japanese partners have been extremly
reluctant to expand production capabilities beyond the
initial commitments and why others have an
unblemished manufacturing relationship with Airbus.
Hubris then lies in placing blame on the partners.
Does Boeing have a chance to understand this short
term and work succesfully with equal partners on top
of the engineering problems (systemic and technical)
they are encountering (not only) in the 787 project?"
By Yann on July 10, 2009 3:55 PM
. ....... .. . ......
"Hi Uwe, AIRBUS distributed model was different of
what Boeing made. National companies building parts or
assembling aircraft were the owner of the 'economic
interest group' named AIRBUS. This organization built
A300, A320 and 330/340. The 'integrated' AIRBUS
compagny - in EADS - built the A380, and surprisingly
had to face management problems... One old AIRBUS
chairman - very angry - explained that such problem
would have not appear with the old AIRBUS structure, as
the one faulty for the delay was supporting the biggest part
of associated finacial penalties. This rule dissapeared in
the integrated company.
No, Boeing was in fact opening creating its own path.
More funny, AIRBUS is engaged in the same way of
masssive partnerization, with more and more fear in
the tech teams, coming with the same kind of
dissatisfaction. People are/were engaged on work and
product but feel more and more that it does not pay.
Last, their job are transferred offshore..."
By mel on July 10, 2009 6:10 PM
"Ray and Uwe, Great comments. In my view, another
issue with the 787 has been, ironically, its success. Boeing
fretted at the cost of a new airplane but also at the cost of
inaction. Someone at Boeing knew how badly aerospace
material and component suppliers want to be on new
programs because of the annuity value of being the
incumbent. So, they decided to 'sell' partner slots. The
buy-in was putting up the money for engineering,
facilities, tooling and inventory. Each of the partners
have put up tens to many hundreds of millions of
dollars to be on the team. No one was supposed to be
paid until the first delivery although some 'progress
payments' have been made. So, each company had a
picture of what they were going to put in, and then set
their pricing to affect a break even at several hundred
shipsets (each partners' break even point is different
and a guarded secret.) At the start of the program,
each partner maximizes their individual chance of
success by pulling whatever levers they can to make the
program successful - meaning they do the work that
was assigned to them. When the program had only sold
the launch customer 50 planes, I am sure all those
fellas were up at 6 and hard at it. But sales quickly
flew past 400. By then, all the partners were past break
even in their models. And, importantly, with 400 plus
planes sold, everyone, especially the partners, knew
that Boeing would turn heaven and earth (as in pay
any cost) to put this bird in the air. So now it is in each
partner's individual interest to raise prices and reduce
cost. On the price side, each partner was given a sole
source contract and by this point was too deep into the
program to be replaced (if Boeing doesn't like their
performance, the only real option is to buy the
partner.) Accordingly, the program bogs down with
claims by the partners of changes to the specs or in the
scope of work that require a 'reset' in the contract (a
price increase.) I would wager that this cost Boeing
tens of thousands of management hours, effectively
distracting them from issues related to building the
airplane. On the cost side, not only would partners
make themselves someone's victim to the effect that
their deliveries would be delayed and thus preserve
their cash, but also they would 'engineer' shortages of
something (engineering, materials, tooling, etc.) to the
end of becoming a pacing item in the schedule. Of
course, it would be made to look like someone else's
(preferably Boeing's) fault but the inevitable result was
that Boeing would show up with a suitcase full of cash
and a bus load of people to resolve the issue. This
approach has saved the partners millions on elements
of the program that they had budgeted for at the
program's outset. And, as stated above, this all made it
impossible for Boeing, management and otherwise, to
know what actually was going on. Personally, I have
never met a dumb Boeing or partner employee. More than
other large companies, Boeing people are remarkably
bright, honest, forthcoming and diligent. And, while there
were cultural challenges, I think Boeing embraced and met
the challenges to the effect of creating an important step
toward global harmony. (It doesn't make airplanes fly, but
they deserve credit for it.)
Net, I think the partner model is flawed logically - the
only fix would be to scrap it and try something
different. That said, given the partner model, I think
the program would be farther along if the program
had made its first few deliveries with less than 200
airplanes sold."
By 787 Accountant on July 10, 2009 7:39 PM
"I have seen several versions of 'the emperor has no
clothes' or the leadership is just incompetent discussion
lines. Maybe the best approach would be to ask how
could Carson and McNerney not know? Is there any
way possible that they could not know? Brand new
employees have visited the 787 line one time and have
been able to figure it out. Both Scott and Jim visited
the lines many times. For a time Carson was visiting
the line weekly. They know the problems and have
crafted exactly the system of fear needed to keep the
problems hidden, not from them but from the
shareholders and valued customers. Every morning
our emperors look at their naked bodies (one pasty and
saggy, the other artificially tanned) in the mirror and
go to work trying to convince people they are clothed."
By Bull-of-the Woods on July 10, 2009 11:19 PM
"With 5-1/2 years of exposure to the 787 program,
watching all of the leadership changes (which are
many), no one is currently accountable for the current
state of the program. All of the people who set-up the
failed business plan and program strategy are gone.
None are still associated with the 787 program and
most are no longer at Boeing. See the list below:
Alan Mulally (now at Ford) sold the 787 design and
business plan when the Sonic Cruiser flopped. Harry
Stonecipher (now discredited) was CEo who guided
Mulally's plans and concepts to get board approval. Frank
Statkus (retired after many senior management roles at
Boeing) was VP of Tools, Technology, and Processes.
Walt Gillette (retired after many Senior Engineering
Management assignments at Boeing) was 7E7 chief
Engineer and VP of Airplane Development, 787 Program.
Mike Bair (still with Boeing) was 7E7/787 Program
Manager then VP and General Manager, 787 Program.
Scott Strode (still with Boeing) was 787 VP Production.
Thus, you can't hang any of the current managers/Senior
Executives with the core problems caused by the fouled-up
program structure. Now you may be justified accusing any
of the current management of being unable to make the
current program structure function successfully. But, as
others have stated earlier, this form of outsourcing may
well be flawed-beyond-all-ability-to-recover (FUBAR).
In regard to the most recent program slide, I can
assure you that much of the workforce in Everett knew
about the wing structure problem in general terms
within a week of the tests being run. The fact that the
Senior Executives 'didn't know about them' is
intentional. If they know of matters of material
information that can affect investment value (stock
price) they are obliged to make it known to all - to the
public. Thus, these senior executives don't want to
know about big problems until they are fully
understood and what the impacts may be. Thus, this
information is closely managed and finessed right to its
disclosure. Incidentally, that's why FlightBlogger is the
key source of information for Boeing employees. It's a
rumor until it's confirmed by FlightBlogger. Boeing
Management doesn't communicate any better to the
workforce than they do with the Senior Executives - by
design I assert. Senior Management has known since
day one that the Partners were in big trouble in late
2005. I saw their status charts showing every partner
with problems and no plan to correct them - a red
'meatball' as overall status. Boeing people were already
on site at their facilities propping them up to get them
started on production. This was common knowledge along
with the lack of cooperation and communication of the
partners that had been well established by this time. Do
you suppose that's why everyone that build this business
model retired before the fat-went-into-the-fire?
Hummmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. So, please blame the
right people for the mess we have. There is plenty of
blame to go around to those from the past as well those
that are currently responsible. It seems that today's
management model, the so called matrix management
model (you have two or more bosses) along with the
- --
rotational management concept, means that there is no one
that is responsible for anything. The day of the 'Buck-
stops-here' is long gone - along with real leadership.
And that's the real issue, with Boeing, Jon - no
Leadership."
By BlueJ on July 12, 2009 4:22 PM
Jon, Great commentary and blog. As an insider I do not
see all the parts of this problem just my immediate
area. The worst is for all those working directly at Boeing
this is extremely depressing and all the cheer leading
does not go very far. We have wasted so much effort
going through panic slides one month at a time over a 2
year period that even the newbys do not trust the
schedule. To all those that have retired, this is a
different environment. And to think we used to joke
about peter principle, and now we are living it. So with the
new management training, where in this country of ours do
we have good technical leadership? I also have
compassion for those I have worked with that have
retired from management for 'health' reasons,
translate that as stress. The 787 will fly and it will be a
great airplane in service, but not out of the box."
By TheLastInspector on July 12, 2009 9:10 PM
"Jon wrote: 'Boeing should ask itself if McNerney's vision
has yet to become a reality.'
No one answered Jon's last sentence. The answer is
obvious-'McNerney's vision' as stated above never
became reality. But it was never meant to--it was just
tanker scandal CYA talk that the company never
intended to walk. And I can personally vouch that
people who speak up about ethical concerns or internal
Boeing corruption are retaliated against severely. My
case is one of many such examples, albeit one of the
more severe. Boeing SOX IT whistleblowers have been
fired for talking to the press about SOX violations.
People in Boeing's OIG have been fired when they
refused to ignore wrongdoing in Boeing's antithetically
named 'compliance organizations.' So, when people
are retaliated against for reporting lawbreaking within
Boeing to Boeing senior management and/or the press,
then it should not be surprising that the same
executives punish those bringing bad news about
program issues to upper management. The 787
program is perhaps the best example of program
mismanagement. The 'program management' used on the
program was obviously fatally flawed. One comment
that rings of truth above is that these announcements
are not made until the last minute and upper managers
given implausible deniability about having known
about them prior to the announcement to protect the
value of those executive's stock options. Why are
private corporations like Boeing seemingly incapable of
reforming incompetent and corrupt management?
Government moves at exponential speed in reform
~ ~;; ~;; ~~
comparatively. One group of politicians doesn't work
out and they are replaced the next election at the latest.
Where is such accountability with Boeing
mismanagement?"
By Rebecca Vanderbilt on July 13, 2009 1:31 PM
"Both Jim McNerney and Scott Carson need to be
fired. Especially Scott Carson who has lost complete
control over the flight program. Carson didn't have any
understanding on how airplanes are built. Carson did
not get involve in managing the aircraft development.
This is the single worst delay by BCA. Even 747 had
only a few months day and that was a completely game
changing aircraft with new technology and design.
Telling people that the 787 delay was a result of new
tech does not fly. Why were people in the 60s, without
the aid of current technologies, can build an aircraft on
time? Leadership is a huge issue here. It this is not
resolved, Boeing might as well go under."
By waddie on July 14, 2009 2:07 AM
"I was fortunate to work in product development on many
new airplanes during my career at Boeing. During my
time there, it was populated by very strong technical
people and the top program managers were very
strong technical leaders. There was room for
disagreement and it was recognized as necessary to
listen to disenting view points as long as you had your
technical facts straight. Toward the end of my career,
there were some not so subtle changes occuring. We
had a CEO that was enamored by GE's Jack Welch
and Boeing started getting like GE in their internal
thinking i.e. 'this is the GE position and everybody get
behind it or get out.' Some executive engineering
managers started behaving that way and it there was a
'shoot the messenger' mentality that started to be
exhibited. I once heard a guy that is now CEO elswhere
say to his managment team, 'It all right to bring me news
of a problem but you better have the solution!' Let me
tell you, in airplane development that's a near impossible
task because if you had the solution, you wouldn't have
had the problem to begin with. It was the begining of a
'management by fear' culture. It didn't help when the
merger took place and all the Douglas folks showed up
and displaced long time Boeing people who, by the
way, were the ones that helped put Douglas out of
business. Harry Stonecipher was a fear motivation
manager. Even his old colleagues at GE were glad he was
at Boeing and not there. I'm not saying that Boeing was a
utopia to work at. It was anything but. It was extreemly
competitive. But it was populated by people who loved
airplanes and loved to deign and build them. I
remember during my last months at Boeing, being
interviewed by some 'special task force members' and
being presented with the 'new way' of developing
airplanes with 'risk sharing partners' who were to be
-- - -
responsible for major parts of the aircraft. Boeing would
not audit their capabilities to do the job or monitor
their work as we had in the past, to 'save money'. I
thought it was nuts then and I said so. We had some
very strong history that led us to do those things.
(Santana said that those who ignore history are doomed by
it.) They said that would be the 'new way of doing things'.
The development schedules were shorter than we knew
were reasonable but they would find a way to do
everthing quicker. They didn't know how, but they
would. You know, 'now a miracle happens' kind of
thinking. Well they did it that way and the 787
Program is the result. I hate like hell to watch the
venerable company that I worked for look like a bunch
of bumbling clowns. It seems like everyday there's
more bad news. There nothing wrong changing the
way you develop airplanes IF you have the correct
planning to get you to the the delivery date for the
customer. But it can't come down to 'a miracle
happens!' You have to have the facts and data to know
you can do it. To get the facts and data, you have to
spend the money developing the processes ahead of
time. The program looked doomed to me from the
start. The program management for the 787 was
wrong from the get go. The guy in charge couldn't hit a
bull in the butt with a banjo and to put him in charge
of the most complex progam that Boeing ever
undertook in commercial airplane development was a
plum wrong decision. When the Chief Engineer
retired in the middle of the development, it was my
first tip off from the outside that Program was going
South. It seems like it's gone down hill from there. I
guess maybe 01' Alan took the Ford job to get away
from what started on his watch. He sold the plan to the
Board probably under a great deal of pressure from
Harry Stonecipher who was CEO by then. As I said, I
hate to watch all this happen but it seemed so
predictable from the start. Boeing needs to get back to
what made them the dominant player in commercial
airplane development and manufacturing for over 40
years. They need senior management to be ethical and
technically capable people who understand the
airplane business. Eliminate management by fear.
Tolerate different points of view when it's backed by
facts and data. Audit and monitor subcontractors or
partners or whatever the buzzword is for those guys
that make the major subcomponents. And honor your
commitments both internally and to the end user.
Boeing was on the right track with the 777 and they got
derailed on the 787. I hope they can get the train back on
the track and running in the right direction again. They
have the working people to do it but their management
leaves some thing to be desired. Thanks for letting me
ramble."
By Insider on July 18, 2009 9:52 PM
"The real man overseeing the BCA side of Boeing is
Mike Cave in Chicago. A McDonnell man. Specifically
a Harry legacy. It has been a well known fact since the
merger that you only tell Mike good news. Bad news
messengers are axed (and that would include Carson).
So every status meeting has been full of good tidings
and great joy. Until the rubber meets the tarmac."
9 Seattle Scott Firm a 'How does a quote like this happen? 'I personally On the
July Post- Carson believe the airplane could fly today.' -- Boeing culture
2009 Intellige , CEO Commercial Airplanes CEO Scott Carson, Paris Air Show, of
ncer, Boeing June 16, according to Bloomberg News Boeing is a big modular
"Boeing Comm company with about 160,000 workers spread across the enterpri
Culture: ercial world and a corporate culture that varies from division to se
Kill The Airpla division. Flightblogger Jon Ostrower presents an architec
Messen nes interesting debate on corporate culture within the 787 tures in
ger vs. program. In Ostrower's latest commentary, "It's time for mature
Speak Boeing to talk. To itself," he goes over some of the environ
Truth internal communication problems that plague the 787 ments.
To Dreamliner program. The story suggests that
Power" communicating program delays upward to
(Andrea management is a challenge, even while rumor
James) rampantly flies sideways and out of the corporate
borders."
Posted by unregistered user at 7/9/09 5:04 p.m.
"As a 20 year Boeing veteran, I can tell you that
communicating bad news is a career hazard. There is
no such thing as constructive criticism. Any sort of
criticism, negative analysis, or attempts to forsee
problems are viewed as contrarian negativism, (Being
ANTI BOEING) and are dealt with acordingly.Then
you find yourself suddenly passed over for raises,
promotions, If you are forthright, strident, or try to
argue your point, you can find yourself escorted out the
gate under armed guard. Being wrong is not negative,
as long as you are cheerful and dismissive."
Posted by unregistered user at 7/9/09 5:43 p.m.
"I personally believe the airplane could fly today.' --
Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Scott Carson, Paris
Air Show, June 16 and this is part of the Boeing ethics
policy that 1 think Scott Carson should revisit.
'Employees must not engage in conduct or activity that
may raise questions as to the company's honesty,
impartiality, or reputation or otherwise cause
embarrassment to the company.' In this regard I believe
that many top leaders in the Boeing Company have broken
their own ethics policy."
10 The Firm a "A prominent aerospace analyst has floated a worst-case On
July Seattle scenario that two years ago wouldn't have been thought modular
2009 Post- plausible. The 787 could easily get mired down in more (non-
Intellige delays. And 'there's also an unlikely but not impossible systemi
ncer worst-case scenario: a 787 that's simply a mediocre c)
"Say it aircraft,' writes Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst analyst'
Ain't with the Teal Group Corp. And if that is the case, he adds, s late
So: The Boeing can thank its merger with McDonnell Douglas, (and
- ~~ ~ ;;;;;; -~I
787 which replaced leadership with people who cared most revised)
Possibly about money. Boeing's all new 787 Dreamliner program evaluati
Just a has been delayed by two years, which has made the on of a
'Medioc company ripe for criticism and analysis. modular
re Airc enterpri
raft"' From Aboulafia's most recent aircraft letter: 'The proven se
(Andrea Boeing track record ('We're ten for ten!') has been architec
James) replaced by the unpleasant memory of McDonnell ture's
Douglas's checkered past. The nickel and dimed MD- systemi
11 mediocrity, the useless MD JSF competitor, the out- c
of-control cost overruns of the C-17, and worst of all, problem
the scandalous MD/GD A-12 carrier stealth attack s.
plane. The likely (or at least hopeful) scenario is that
the 787winds up like the C-17, a nightmare
development program followed by an impressive
technical achievement and a profitable production
phase. But we can't rule anything out. The A-12 is the
most haunting extreme outlier: a mere Potemkin
Village plane. Those of us at the 7-8-07 rollout wouldn't
have dreamt of that comparison at the time. But who
knows what to believe anymore? In short, the 787 has
become less of an adrenaline rush of optimism, and more
of await-and-see story. Boeing's latest delay -- its fifth --
and purchase of supplier Vought combine to prove that
the company's strategy of saving money from
outsourcing work to suppliers 'has been dwarfed by
the cost of remedying the damage wrought by that
strategy.' 'This is all seriously bad,' Aboulafia said. 'As
we digested the news, I paused to reflect on just what a
tremendous drug-like rush the 787 program once was, and
just what a ghastly let down it has become.' What was
supposed to be a category killer has turned out to be
even worse than the 'commercially irrelevant' Airbus
A380, Aboulafia said. Because, at least the A380 flies.
Finally, Aboulafia brings a sense of history to the
present: To understand how this happened, you need
to look back in time. A grossly oversimplified recent
history of Boeing: Twelve years ago McDonnell
Douglas effectively used Boeing's money to buy Boeing.
This resulted in a struggle between a faction that
wanted to invest in Boeing's future (basically the legacy
Boeing crowd) and a faction that wanted to invest in
Boeing's shareholders (basically the McDonnell
Douglas leadership). The future investment faction won,
but at a price: the McDonnell Douglas zombie bit them
before it died. To sell the new plane to the board and to
investors, they needed to get as much cost and risk as
possible off Boeing's books. This resulted in a short-
sighted decision to trust enormous parts of the 787's
development and integration work to partners, without
due diligence to ensure that these partners were up to
the job. (Disclosure: I was a big fan of this approach at
the time, and I still think production work outsourcing
is a good idea.) . . . Finally, the new Boeing also
disempowered the company's engineers, turning its
back on a decades-old management culture that didn't
--- ~-~- - --
always produce profits but did always produce great
planes. Instead, it embraced McDonnell Douglas's
culture of leadership by money people."'
Posted by halfshaft at 7/10/09 4:01 p.m.
"I have said it here before and I will say it again; 'We
told you so!!!' Legacy Boeing employees realized 10
years ago what Aboulafia is realizing now. 'Twelve
years ago McDonnell Douglas effectively used Boeing's
money to buy Boeing.' We were saying the same thing a
decade ago. Harry Stonecipher famously declared that
Boeing, 'was no longer and engineering company',
right before SPEEA went on strike for more than 40
days. SPEEA rightfully declared that they were trying
to save Boeing from it's own mis-management. It looks
like ultimately, they were unsuccessful. And again; I
wish someone would track down those truly responsible
for this mess and bit*h slap both of them; Phil Condit and
Harry Stonecipher. I guess at least Phil can be blamed for
setting the groundwork for the failure of only one aircraft
manufacturing giant. Harry was responsible for destroying
two companies. At least current management is still
following Harry's lead--blame a two week strike by the
evil union for 5 different delays over two years. Talking
about covering your incompetent as*!"
Posted by keepreadinifithurts at 7/10/09 5:57 p.m.
"I'm hearing a lot of SNIVELING, here, these miserable
union SOB's cut their OWN throats, JUST like at GM,
demanded too much revenue out of the whole process of
building an aircraft, and the health insurance companies
used the union people to get what THEY wanted too, is
there anyone left at Boeing that enjoys building and flying
airplanes, or are they all just a bunch of corporatized,
bureaucratized, pampered, spoiled, overweight, whiny,
money-grubbing stooges? It bears keeping in mind that
cloth-and-wire really aren't that far back in history, maybe
this whole glut-thing with overpriced passenger aircraft is
a hidden godsend, Airbus with their glued-together
garbage will end up doing it to themselves, so why try
to win the race to the bottom? Build 10 EXCELLENT
aircraft per year, and stop trying to be a global mega-
mega like GM did, which was a 'zing' on their
management and their inability to keep their profit
hubris in their pants. I think Boeing should harken back
to the days of radial engines and manual levers and so
forth, and see if they can sort of re-kindle the spark that
took the aviation world on its' century-long whirlwind
development spree, figure out what went right, what went
wrong, and what their future's going to look like. Maybe
McDonnell-Douglas and whatever else the Boeing whale
ate should be regurgitated within swimming distance of
shore...Boeing IS a global mega-mega...and most of those
people that run the place probably couldn't identify a
wheel chock if you pointed it out to em, so they're just
--
people riding the train, so to speak. Downsize!"
Posted by unregistered user at 7/10/09 8:24 p.m.
"It's a pity because Boeing has gone from a product
focussed organization to a share holder value org.
Merger with McDonnel Douglas started the rot. We
only have to look at Harry Stonecipher's record or lack of
during his tenure."
Posted by Tenochtitlan at 7/10/09 10:25 p.m.
"I hate to see great American corporations brought to
their knees because of Wall Street's predominant
culture of 'Immediate profits at any cost!' I hate to see
workers who took such pride in the fruit of their labors
forced to watch their legacy looted and scuttled by the
modern-day robber barons. And I hate to see clueless
'right to work'-ers blame the dedicated, loyal
employees, who made the company great, for the
abuses and negligence of the management. "I'm hopeful
that the 787 will become everything it's hoped to be, and
that Boeing will learn a lesson about the costs of
outsourcing manufacture and assembly: because what's in
the future for an airplane company that doesn't build its
own airplanes and abandons its own employees, and all
their knowledge?"
Posted by moioioio at 7/10/09 10:52 p.m.
"'The relation of men of wealth to the flying problem
presents many points of similarity to that of North Pole
hunting. It would be folly to back such attempts as
business propositions, or at least it could be considered
nothing better than the very rashest speculation... If
wealth is to be interested on a mixed basis of
benevolence and hope of pecuniary return, it ought to
be made sufficiently clear that the latter could hardly
be considered a satisfactory insurance against finally
resting in a pauper's grave...'
-Wilbur Wright to Octave Chanute Jan. 5, 1902
True then. Still true today. Bill Boeing made his fortune
in the timber business. He didn't start an airplane
company to get rich. He started an airplane company
because he liked airplanes and figured he could make a
good one. But being a good capitalist and entrepreneur,
he also succeeded at growing it into a (mostly) healthy
business. He struck a balance between passion and
profitability. This is why Boeing has now started down
the path to failure. If the only thing you want to make
is money, you are definitely in the wrong business.
That's not some sense of misguided nostalgia. That's
just the way it is."
Posted by lanMost at 7/10/09 11:39 p.m.
Aboulafia is an idiot!!! He writes about how Boeing has
had to spend billions buying back its failed outsourcing
strategy but his disclaims that he agrees with the
....... . .. . ..--------- ~~;;;;;;; ~ ---
concept. Well HELLOOOOO!!!! Richie, it isn't
working!!"
Posted by unregistered user at 7/11/09 12:32 a.m.
"Why do you give this guy the time of day, he cosistently
talks out of his ****, I listen to what he says and it's never
praise. Who the hell are Teal in some backdrop and who is
this guy who just seems to slag off Both Boeing and
Airbus all the time. Anytime there's some aviation news
why get this guys comment or opinion, i don't understand?
From the rubbish he spouts he should just be ignored, but
then half the rubbish he spouts wouldn't be news I guess!!"
Posted by rightwingrick at 7/11/09 8:11 a.m.
"This (Boeing history recently) is a perfect description of
what has gone wrong with much of American business.
It's not the unions; it's short-sited leadership that has
taken its eye off the long-term ball (quality product to
serve your customer better than anyone) and instead
focused on short-term money (how much can we get to
our stockholders next quarter by nickel and diming the
company to death). Want another local example? Take a
look at Weyerhaeuser."
Posted by barney48 at 7/11/09 9:12 a.m.
"Way late and over budget on the 787, a
NONGOVERNMENT project?? Clearly something's
wrong with this picture. Why aren't the beancounters
and lawyers, that supposedly run the company now,
lowering the boom? Maybe they're as incompetent as
the ones who seem to ruin company after company
because they don't know squat about their company's
product, or for that matter don't know squat about
anything other than the current year's bottom line (if
even that)."
Posted by Lookitsme at 7/11/09 9:40 a.m.
"Another great company being brought to it's knees by
stunning corporate mis-management. Naturally, the
higher level management types that have created the
problems will continue to reap their absurdly high
salaries, bonuses, and stock options while the folks who
actually do the work take it in the shorts..."
Posted by unregistered user at 7/11/09 4:21 p.m.
"When I heard that Boeing bought McDonnald
Douglass, I imediately sold Boeing. The only good AC
that Douglass made was the DC-3 and that was 75 years
ago. MCDonald AC were not so good. Now Boeing is
going to pay, pay, pay for it's greed. What in the heck ever
happend to the Taft-Hartley Act? That law was passed
especially to stop American Companies from becoming
monoplies. It's just like the Auto Business, we too will
loose our AC industry to Asia and now y'all want to USG
to run health care? Good luck!"
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Posted by The Unrepentant Lib at 7/11/09 4:22 p.m.
"Another great company, ruined by the corporate
mentality of short term profit over all other concerns.
To them their is no God but the Almighty dollar."
Posted by unregistered user at 7/11/09 4:31 p.m.
"Boeing arrogantly tried to surpass Airbus with the
787, but is is far behind the A350 on the technology
front. Once the structural redesign has taken place all
that extra weight will put the 787 on a par with the
A330, leaving the A350 to clean up. 787 cancellations
have yet to flow, there are many customers with itchy
trigger fingers."
Posted by Shoreline50 at 7/11/09 8:25 p.m.
"Unfortunately, Boeing has the worst of all worlds--
terrible management combined with terrible unions. They
need to:
1. Get the McDonnell Douglas symbol out of their logo.
2. Move their headquarters back to Seattle.
3. Purge the management of the failed McDonnell
Douglas people and get back to the Boeing
management style.
4. End strikes either through agreement or by having
additional production facilities elsewhere."
Posted by unregistered user at 7/12/09 4:01 a.m.
"Ahhhhhh, the unions. Once a good idea, now a
dinosaur. A rather self-destructive one too. Just keep
asking for more more more and walk with a sign. Then
badger your company until they have to give in. Next, they
go broke paying a "union man" ten times his due. Next,
Union Man whines when his company goes bankrupt and
be blames his company instead of his Union. Pretty
simple. Greedy unions get exactly what they deserve.
Always have and always will."
11 The Frederi Firm a "General Motors Co. kicked off a new era following its On a
July Wall ck exit from bankruptcy protection on Friday, with Chief modular
2009 Street "Fritz" Executive Frederick "Fritz" Henderson promising to enterpri
Journal, Hender transform the auto maker into a leaner and more se
"GM son, customer-focused company. The new company will put architec
Takes CEO, a premium on speed, accountability and risk taking, ture's
New Gener and root out the layers of management that had focus on
Directio al hobbled decision making, he said at a news conference. short-
n" (John Motors 'Business as usual is over at GM,' Mr. Henderson said. term
Stoll & ; 'Everyone at GM must realize this and be prepared to speed.
Sharon Edwar change, and fast." In a preview of a broader management
Terlep) d E. shakeup to come, Mr. Henderson said the company was
Whitac scrapping a number of senior posts and has disbanded two
re Jr., committees of top executives that made key decisions for
Chair the company's automotive operations. Mr. Henderson
man, expects hundreds of middle managers to be let go in the
Gener weeks ahead, and the company's sales and marketing
al operation will be reorganized. 'Our culture to this point
Motors has been an impediment,' Mr. Henderson, a 25-year GM
veteran, said. 'This is all about flattening the
~ I I
management structure.' Mr. Henderson said he is
adopting some techniques used by the alliance of Renault
SA and Nissan Motor Co., led by Carlos Ghosn. Several of
GM's highest-ranking executives studied Mr. Ghosn's
approach in 2006 while GM's board weighed a potential
merger with Nissan-Renault. Mr. Henderson and his top
lieutenants also are planning to hit the road in August to
talk to dealers and consumers to gain insight into the U.S.
market. In the past, GM based much of its decision making
on market-research studies, focus groups and strategy
meetings among executives. Dealers said the company
needs to reconnect with consumers. Mr. Henderson also
plans to engage in Web chats and to field criticism and
suggestions on an 'Ask Fritz' Web site. GM filed for
bankruptcy protection June 1. Friday morning,
General Motors Corp.'s best assets, such as its
Chevrolet and Cadillac brands, were sold to a new
company -- General Motors Co. The 40-day stay in
bankruptcy reorganization left the company with lower
costs, a lighter debt load and four automotive brands
instead of eight. The new GM is also getting several
new directors appointed by the U.S. government, which
now owns 60% of the company thanks to $50 billion it
committed to invest in the auto maker. 'We all want to
win, and we are going to win,' said Edward E.
Whitacre Jr., the former A T& T chief executive selected
to serve as chairman by the Obama administration's
auto task force. 'I know most Americans want this
company to succeed landi we certainly have the
fundamentals' to do so, Mr. Whitacre said. Mr.
Henderson has been leading GM since the late-March
ouster of former CEO Rick Wagoner. From his first day,
the 50-year-old Mr. Henderson has set a tone of urgency,
first by embracing the possibility of a bankruptcy filing
and then taking tougher actions than Mr. Wagoner
when it came to downsizing. The government made his
task easier in recent weeks when it decided to convert
nearly all of the money it provided GM into a 60%
equity stake. The United Auto Workers union,
bondholders and the Canadian government followed
suit, converting billions into sizable minority stakes in
the new GM. Mr. Henderson said he plans to repay the
government loans before the 2015 due date. In an
interview Friday, GM Chief Financial Officer Ray Young
said the company will spend the next few weeks
forecasting whether it needs as much as the government
has offered and trying to accelerate repayment of the
government loans. Among the first moves Mr. Henderson
will make will be moving longtime product czar Bob Lutz,
who planned to retire at year's end, from the design studio
to the marketing department. After building a career on
creating automotive hits ranging from the Ford Explorer to
Dodge Viper, Mr. Lutz, 77 years old, will return to his
professional roots and run marketing and
communications."
13 Seattle Firm- a "Periodic mass layoffs are an expected fact of life for On a
..........................0 0
Juy Post- Emplo almost all Boeing employees, particularly early in their modular
2009 Intellige yees Boeing careers, when their seniority is relatively low," enterpri
ncer, the company said, citing the cyclical nature of the se
"Instruc commercial aircraft business." architec
tor ture's
Pilots exogeno
Sue us
Boeing views of
Over the
Possible cyclical
Layoffs nature
" of their
(Andrea business
James) , and its
effects
on
labor.
20 Seattle Firm- a "Washington state's unions are teaming to support On a
Juy Post- Emplo politicians who will fight for worker rights and stand up to modular
2009 Intellige yees big business. On Friday, the Machinists, which make up enterpri
ncer, Boeing's largest union, and the UFCW released a joint se
"Unions statement in support of DIME PAC. architec
ask: ture's
Who "In the last week, some Democratic leaders implied that inter-
has unions should accept a no strike clause with Boeing, stakehol
Guts to adding fuel to this fire," the statement said. The unions der
Stand demanded answers: "Why did not one of these conflict,
Up to politicians say Boeing's no strike demand was outrageous with
Boeing, and that companies are equally responsible for strikes? labor's
Big Why did not one of these politicians say loudly the right to more
Busines strike is a fundamental, field-leveling right in a systemi
s?' democracy? Why did not one of these politicians point c
(Andrea to Boeing's failed outsourcing model as the main argume
James) culprit for their business problems?" nt than
the
firm.
21 CNN.co Micha Firm a "Budget airline Ryanair announced plans Tuesday to On a
July m el (la slash its winter flights schedule from its main UK hub, (late-
2009 "Ryanai O'Lear te- blaming a collapse in the British tourism industry, entrant)
r y, en rising airport costs and 'insane' aviation taxes. The modular
Slashes CEO, tra Irish carrier currently operates 40 aircraft out of Stansted enterpri
UK Ryanai nt) Airport, near London, but it plans to cut capacity by 40 se
Flight r percent to 24 aircraft by October 2009. That will mean a architec
Schedul 30 percent drop in the number of weekly flights and a ture's
e" loss of 2.5 million passengers between October and strategy
March 2010, Ryanair said in a statement. Ryanair Chief for
Executive Michael O'Leary said the move was motivated rapid
by the refusal of BAA, which manages Stansted, to cut (negativ
passenger fees despite falling traffic, including a six e) short-
percent drop during June. O'Leary also criticized term
government plans to raise Air Passenger Duty levied on growth.
travelers by £1 ($1.6) to £11 ($18) on short-haul flights,
calling the tax 'insane and damaging.' 'Sadly UK traffic
and tourism continues to collapse while Ryanair continues
to grow traffic rapidly in those countries which welcome
tourists instead of taxing them,' O'Leary said. 'Ryanair's
..... * . ....................
40 percent capacity cutback at London Stansted shows just
how much Gordon Brown's £10 tourist tax and the BAA
Monopoly's high airport charges are damaging London
and UK tourism and the British economy generally.'
Ryanair said it planned to switch capacity to countries
which had scrapped tourism taxes and passenger fees,
including Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain."
21 Forbes, Firm- a "'787 troubles are a major cause of increasing On a
July "Delays Investo weakness of the company's balance sheet and cash modular
2009 Drag on r flows, since inventories should continue to increase and enterpri
Boeing" research and development should remain elevated until se
(Melind it starts delivering aircraft,' said JPMorgan analyst architec
a Peer) Joseph Nadol, adding that delays to both the 787 and ture's
the 747-8 could result in financial penalties and systemi
pressure margins." c
problem
S.
21 Flightbl Firm a "With almost a month since Boeing announced it was On a
July ogger, forced to ground its 787s for structural reinforcement, the modular
2009 "A company continues to work to develop, install and test a enterpri
Month fix that can get its troubled Dreamliner into the sky after se
Later, more than two years of delays. According to a senior archihte
Boeing program source: 'There is good news and bad news. The cture's
Continu good news is we know what to fix, and how to fix it. continu
es Work The bad news is the location is a [expletive] to get to.' ed
Develop While the fix is being developed and a fully revised inability
ing 787 schedule finalized for airlines, sources at both Boeing and to stop
Wing partner suppliers indicate that the existing production plan process
Fix" has slid roughly one and a half to three months for the es and
(Jon delivery of Airplane Ten's components to Everett, even as solve
Ostrowe suppliers continue to prep parts for shipment. The slip, the root
r) sources say, allows Boeing to finalize and test the fix and causes
limit the number of aircraft in final assembly required to of
undergo the fix in Everett. Boeing previously stated that systemi
any fix developed would be able to be installed no c
matter the location of the parts in the supply chain. A problem
corps of Boeing engineers are working 80-hour weeks s.
to design the fix that allows the 787 to fly with a robust
flight envelope and achieve FAA certification with 150%
of limit load on the wing, sources say. Veteran structural
engineers tell FlightBlogger that the key to developing a
reinforcement centers around ensuring that the loads
that caused the initial problem at the site of the wing
stringer caps are not redistributed elsewhere causing a
further structural issue. Second, as the area is
stiffened Boeing engineers must take great care to
develop a fix that isn't susceptible to long term fatigue
issues that come from the normal structural aging of
the aircraft. Sources say the area that will be
reinforced at the side of body is extremely tight and
difficult to reach as the installation area of the fix will
provide very little room to install the fasteners to
secure the reinforcement. The installation of the fix may
begin as early as the middle of August, with installation
times around one month for each already assembled
airplane, sources estimate. Even with the remedial fix in
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_the works, a key discussion centers on the future of 787
production and when the permanent fix is designed
into the wing to body join. Sources say a revision of
the upper part of the wing to body join is almost
certainly necessary to create a permanent long-term
solution and eliminate the time consuming installation
of the remedial fix. Boeing says there are about 40
787s in process throughout the global supply chain and
a question yet to be answered is the timing of
incorporation for the permanent fix."
By Jerrylt on July 21, 2009 7:52 PM
"I find it a disturbing account of what appears to be a
complex solution for a complex problem. After all is
said and done, it still does not manage to fit into my
mind. With all the clarity that Jon brings to the
description, it still sounds like it is unresolved and
forces engineers to work '80 hour weeks' I remember
Scott Francer saying that a handful of fasteners will
solve this problem 'in situ' . And now we are presented
with an ongoing effort to come up with a solution. I am
sure there will be more accolades about how great and
efficient this plane will be and how it will change flying
forever. But until this plane is able to fly it remains a
myth...and an expensive one at that. It is still
outrageous that Boeing and its Parrners could not
manage to design a plane where the wings would hang
tight and enable it to fly. You think they would have
learned from Airbus' similar problem but clearly, they did
not. No one has been more of a fan of the 787 than I, but I
am worn out by the excuses and failures on the part of
this team to get things right. One of the key and crucial
parts of a plane and they design it inadequately. Please
do not fill this column with tales of challenges and how
this is expected. That is just 'plane' nonsense. This is
another screw up and it will cost in terms of time and
monies . All sorts of excuses will follow but that is just
sentiment. This is a another failure on the part of
Boeing and it does not leave me with any confidence
about its schedules, its solutions, its promises, etc. Until
they manage to get the 787 in the air flying it is a
project in the works and one that has been terribly
mishandled. I wish I felt better about this endeavor,
but Boeing and its Partners have taken alot of joy and
cost out of this and have left alot of credibility issues
still unresolved. Would Scott Carson and Scott
Francer please show us that handul of fastners at
tomorrows earnings presentation."
By Boeing Investor on July 21, 2009 7:59 PM
"The more I read this account, the more discouraging
it appears. There remain many challenges before a
solution is designed and installed. The article is an
attempt to bring some order and clarity to a problem that ,
in truth, remains disorderly and lacking in clarity. How
very disappointing."
. ...................... . .
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By Raoul on July 21, 2009 8:06 PM
"Just as I have said before. Installation of the fix in-situ
on completed aircraft will be neither easy nor cheap,
and the latest confirmation illustrates Boeing's folly of
continuing wing/body joins, rolling out, and fueling
aircraft before the repair is installed. Ask anyone
familiar with composite aerostructure asssembly and
they will tell you one of the most difficult operations is
close tolerance drilling of a titanium composite stack of
materials. And they will most likely tell you that THE
most difficult is back drilling into titanium to match
existing close tolerance holes in the underlying
composite, without damaging the existing fastener
holes in the composite. By continuing joins, Boeing
raises the danger/difficulty to new hights, by adding
restricted access, entry into a confined space, and entry
into at least some wet fuel cells."
By Jerrylt on July 21, 2009 8:16 PM
"Does Raoul's comment make sense. It seems to. Why are
they fueling up the planes and readying them for flight
testing when they do not have a solution to a problem
for any of them yet. Would someone explain...."
By Boeing Investor on July 21, 2009 8:28 PM
"Will be very interesting to see how Jim McNearny
covers this topic at tomorrow's earnings call. Since he was
unaware of the problem a few weeks ago, will he be
aware of it tomorrow? His able sidekick Scott Carson
may be prgrammed to be called in to conjure up some
minor excuses and schedule promises."
By Concerned on July 21, 2009 8:47 PM
"This makes my head spin. This is a three dimensional
problem that has yet to be solved."
By airplanesense on July 21, 2009 9:23 PM
"After reading Jon's as-usual excellent description and all
the above postings, it now seems evident it is time for
Boeing to bite the big bullet: forget the interim
fix/modification, redesign the entire body join area,
and build and fly only a/c with the permanent redesign,
even if it means scrapping all previous builds. If Boeing
proceeds with the interim fix/mod what will it gain?
Degraded a/c with the fix, reduced capability, and all
this will further delay the permanent redesign. At this
pathetic state more delay to build only the permanent
redesign is now the least worst option."
By JavPee on July 22, 2009 3:52 AM
"Jon, I am unclear on something here. The test that ran the
loads up to somewhere between 120% and 130% in April
supposedly did not reveal the problem with the 'side of
body' join. It appeared in some test with lower loads that
occurred in late May. The test in April that went beyond
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120% was supposedly not required for first flight. Boeing
claims that the 787 could have flown albeit with such a
small flight envelope such that it would not have been
worth it to fly. Here are a few questions:
1. Why can Boeing not give out the exact percentage of
limit load was achieved in the April test? Surely their
instrumentation should be accurate enough to measure
this.
2. Did the damage occur during the April test or
during the May test?
3. If it did occur during the April test, why did they not
find the damage until the later test?
4. If the damage actually did occur during the May test
(with lower loads), should not Boeing be totally
worried about such an issue? After all, this would be
roughly a case of fatigue failure occurring after a very
limited number of load applications.
5. Had Boeing not gone 'above and beyond' the
requirements for their first flight tests, could one surmise
that they could have had an unfortunate 'incident' with
their flight test aircraft?
Regards, John"
By Recipe For Disaster on July 22, 2009 6:32 AM
"Follwoing comments were apparently found on Aviation
Week (cannot find them myself).
'Boeing decides to build an airplane having
performance not previously achieved, using engines not
yet built, claiming fuel specifics not yet attained, and
constructed out of materials never before used for a
similar purpose. It specifies a barrel-fuselage structure
never before used on a large plastic airplane. It uses
vendors not familiar with the material and designs
using computer models that aren't verified. It
outsources nearly all work using vendors inexperienced
with Boeing and its processes. It specifies an electrical
system having three times the power of existing aircraft
systems, designed using a wild frequency technique not
previously used, operating at twice the voltage of
previous airplanes, using a system designer who hadn't
previously designed such systems. It guarantees to do
this with top-level management that has never built an
airplane or managed outsourcing, on a schedule never
before achieved on a conventional airplane, and plans
not to pay the vendors until the airplane is delivered.'
What could possibly go wrong?"
By Layman on July 22, 2009 9:45 AM
"A different perspective: Airbus elected to go the more
conservative composite route for the A350, even though
they started their design so much later - did they see
something that Boeing missed?"
By diane Wilson on July 22, 2009 10:10 AM
"@Concerned, I guarantee to you that the agressive
schedule is due in large part to pressure from Wall
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Street and from shareholders. They are not blameless,
and it takes very strong management to stand up to
them. Shareholders tend to take very short-term views,
and that can be (and usually is) detrimental to long-
term, high-risk development programs. In addition,
shareholders want certainty in a world where certainty
doesn't exist. Like any large company, Boeing's internal
communication is not flawless, but on the other hand, I
can easily understand that they would not want to
share bad news with investors until they have both the
technical facts and the business facts well understood."
By Shareholder on July 22, 2009 11:13 AM
"Listening to Earnings Conference call..McNearny's
address takes 787 with stride and indicates a fix is in
place and only implementation is the challenge. Not
alarmed nor thwarted but indicates 'lesson's learned' I
understand this attitude but it is a standard corporate
coverup for failures and mistakes. Challenges always
exist but this CEO would never own up to
mismanagement. Its just categorized as a normal
matter thus exculpating their ability to eliminate or
minimize these problems. Corporate stonewalling is
characteristic of Boeing and the present Officers are
masters at it."
By Edouard on July 22. 2009 11:25 AM
"Talk to serious insiders, talk to engineers working
with aerospace subcontractors on both sides of the
pond, and most, if not all of them, will tell you that
going the full plastic and full barrel option for an
airplane of this size was the riskiest possible. If the 787
ever flies, it will be a very average product, to the deep
disappointment of the 50 + airlines who succombed to
Boeing's PR. Let's hope Airbus will learn the full lesson
of this fiasco and draw the right conclusions with regard to
the A 350 (like beeing modest and transparent, for a
start...)."
By Pointman on July 22, 2009 5:38 PM
"I think if Boeing hadn't given away the wing and wing
box assembly to overseas partners the discovery and fix
would have been made earlier. That is the first time
Boeing as given away that exclusive structural property.
It's a wholly different process to walk over to the other
side of the factory and talk with the assembly engineers
in process- as opposed to breaking business/cultural
obstacles to have a dialogue. I read somewhere that
the Partners hold their own proprietary patents on
their parts and drawings that they supply to Boeing-
hampering quick redesign and recovery from setbacks.
Maybe someone could clarify that information.. Rumors
are running rampant all over the factory regarding
shutdowns and layoffs in the 787 program- the wish is
that management would be honest and level with the
workers and investors so we're not blindsided again."
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By Paulo M (Johannesburg, RSA) on July 22, 2009
6:24 PM
"That someone that leaked this information belongs to the
part of the Boeing Company that is precise, they know
their trade, they know exactly what is going on, they know
exactly how to get things to WORK, and they belong to
the exactly the same culture that built the Boeing 747, the
Saturn V/Apollo system, the Airbus A300, and the
BAe/Adrospatiale Concorde - whether or not we, the
public agree with these programs. These people are
engineers, they make things WORK and they are the
only reason why there's still high regard surrounding
Boeing and - like the general sentiment here agrees - in
sharp contrast to Boeing (and Airbus) Management.
Boeing's problems are the result of non-engineering
people making decisions on behalf of engineering folk.
Things as seemingly simple as product schedules ARE
exclusively for engineers to reasonably decide - NOT
Wall Street. It requires input from people working the
actual design. That the 787 has been the single largest
industrial effort worldwide over the past couple of years is
a pointer to the complexity involved in coordinating its
manufacture and assembly. That the 787 has been delayed
is a victory in common sense to allow for normal
procedures in aircraft development. Hear, hear! The
people that matter are in control."
By Anonymous on July 23, 2009 10:14 AM
"I have to say, it's disappointing to see Jon continue to
play cheerleader for Boeing. Jon is always very quick
to report positive milestones such as 'rock[ing] the
gauntlet' but less so on negative news that shows
Boeing is in disarray. Specifically, I find it
unbelievable that there is no post about the rumor that
first flight is delayed at least one more year, no post
about the earnings call and how Boeing skirted or
avoided many tough questions about the fix, the
program, etc. Jon's technical posts may be of high
quality, but as far as news, investigation, and commentary,
in my humble opinion, he might as well be a Boeing
spokesman."
just wondering replied to Pointman on July 23, 2009
10:25 AM
"Earlier this month I heard the rumor that Boeing was
going to start laying off the MT's on the 787 program.
Apparently there are 'too many MT's wandering around'.
My supervisor confirmed that rumor. He has told us to
'Look busy even if you have nothing to do. They're
looking for reasons to get rid of more people'. And yes,I
work on the 787 program/fiasco. The rumor of possible
shutdowns?! Wouldn't surprise me. Another rumor I've
heard is that the fasteners and the wiring on plane 7 is
screwed up and need to be replaced. That wouldn't
surprise me either."
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By Uwe on July 23, 2009 10:53 AM
"To Anonymous on July 23, 2009 10:14 AM
Afaik Jon started out as a professed Boeing fan with an
investigative mind. He never went overboard in dissing
rumors but tried to get information for substantiation (or
not, see the delam issue short of Xmas 2008). But i have
the impression that he has been consciously missled at
that time. He certainly seems to have lost his innocence.
I like his reporting style ( though I can't really get into the
'freshly painted planes are so sexy' thing ) and I like him
not jumping into the rumor millrace but waiting for
unsubstantiated information to condense into a more
reportable presentation.
Uwe"
By Jerrylt on July 23, 2009 11:48 AM
"Ewe, I certainly understand your response and do not find
it offputting in any way. I am trying to entertain the
possibility that lessons have been learned and that there is
an actual attempt to address the issue in the best way
possible. Given that posture, I think we are hearing alot of
rumors but do not truely know the extent and time frame
in front of the fix. That two unindentified engineers get
more credence than the President of the Company is an
example of this and is unfortunate. I am only saying
that we do not know the factuality yet but hope it will
emerge from credible sources...including the Company"
By SonOfEinstein on July 24. 2009 11:15 AM
"It's time to focus on re-designing the joint. The
interim repair will NOT suffice. It's too challenging to
implement feasibly. It won't work. Scrap the current
wings on ZA001 thru ZA006 and replace them with
new wings from Mitsubishi with the newly-
incorporated interface when they are ready. Tack on
another year to the schedule and bite the bullet. And
BTW ... fire Scott Carson while they're waiting for it
all to happen.
SoE"
By gorbidog on July 24, 2009 12:37 PM
"I 'somewhat' agree with 'SonOfEinstein' in that Boeing
might just have to 'bite the bullet' if this intermediate wing
repair job doesn't work out as planned. Ideally, it will
suffice for the test airplanes (hopefully!) but I'm quite
concerned that it's not the long-term solution, and
Boeing engineers and management obviously realize
this. I have also heard rumors about a production line
shutdown - and this would clearly be necessitated by
the fact that Mitsubishi is going to have to RE-TOOL
the wing mould to incorporate the PERMANENT
solution for this wing-body join interface. Realistically,
I don't see the 787 entering service for another two
years, because it's going to take another six months for
first flight (optimistically), and then roughly another
--------------
year for flight testing. Tack on some margin of six to
eight months for more UN-expected issues, and you
have late 2011 for first deliveries, or roughly FOUR
years past the original estimate. But it's better to be
SAFE than SORRY. Now the ONLY question is, with
all these delays, engineering cost overruns, penalties
and cancellations, is this plane going to be PROFIT-
able? Them bean-counters better start sharpening their
pencils!"
22 Seattle Firm a "The structural flaw that delayed the first flight of the On a
July Times 787 Dreamliner is more complex than originally modular
2009 "Boeing described by the company, and the plane's inaugural enterpri
787 takeoff is likely at least four to six months away, say se
May not two engineers with knowledge of Boeing's problem. architec
Fly This 'It's got to take at least three to four months just to get tue's
Year" something installed on an airplane,' said a structures continu
(Domini engineer who has been briefed on the issue. 'It's definitely ed over-
c Gates) a costly fix to go and do this work.' A second engineer, promise
who is familiar with the details of Boeing's construction and
method, said the fix must first be made on the nonflying under-
test airplane in the Everett factory. Assuming that's delivery
successful, it will take another month or two to install the
fix on the first airplane to fly. Both engineers said the
issue requires a thorough redesign of the plane's wing-
to-body join, and the necessary parts will be very
difficult to install on the test airplanes that have
already been built. The engineers' accounts differ
from Boeing's description June 23 when it
acknowledged a problem and again postponed the first
flight of the much-delayed plane. Dreamliner program
chief Scott Fancher said then that the fix would be 'a
simple modification' requiring only 'a handful of
parts.' But almost a month later, heading into today's
quarterly earnings report, Boeing has neither set a new
schedule nor outlined its planned fix of the problem.
The second engineer said the problem is caused by high
loads at the ends of the stringers on the upper wing skins.
Stringers are the long composite rods, shaped like I-beams,
that stiffen the inside of the wing skin. There are 17
stringers on each upper wing, all of them subject to
compression forces when the wings flex upward in flight.
At the point where each stringer ends, close to where the
wing and body of the plane are joined, those forces pull
the stringer away from the skin. During a wing-bending
test in May on the ground-test airplane inside the
Everett factory, the fibrous layers of the composite
plastic material delaminated at these stress points.
Such a separation of the material isn't likely to lead to
catastrophic failure of the airplane, but it would require
constant monitoring and potentially costly repairs by
the airlines. Any tear in the material would have to be
promptly fixed to avoid spreading of the delamination.
If Boeing's initial fix fails to divert enough of the load
away from the stress points, the delay in first flight
could extend beyond six months, pushing the date out
into 2010. 'There's no guarantee that what (Boeing) is
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doing will work,' the second engineer said. 'If the
testing or analysis shows it doesn't get rid of the load,
then the engineers are back to square one.'
Further delays
Beyond first flight, solving the structural flaw could
also further slow the plan for ramping up production.
Boeing's current focus is on an interim solution to the
stringer problem for the test planes that it has already built.
The first engineer said Boeing hasn't had time yet to
figure out at what point in production to introduce a
permanent redesign on all subsequent jets. 'None of
that is nailed down yet,' he said. 'There's no schedule.'
Boeing has a large team of engineers working on the
analysis, the redesign and how the fix could be
implemented. Those engineers are focusing on a solution
that will send mechanics inside the wings of the assembled
planes to trim the ends of each upper wing-skin stringer.
They will create a U-shaped cutout in the end of the
stringer, leaving the flanges at top and bottom untouched.
The U-shaped cut in the stringer ensures that the load on
the flange away from the skin, the inner flange, will
transfer entirely into the strong titanium fitting at the
wing-body join and not into the wing skin, the engineers
said. The hope is that will reduce the stress point load
enough to prevent future delamination. The reshaped
stringer ends must be refastened with newly designed parts
to the titanium fitting, which connects the wing stringers to
similar stringers on the fuselage side of the join. And the
design must accomplish this without creating another
stress point somewhere else. To reinforce the stringer
ends, mechanics will also add some fasteners that go
through stringer and skin. The 17 stringers on each side
don't all require the same reinforcement, but Boeing
wants one design fix for all, so whatever is the beefiest
reinforcement needed will likely be done for all the
stringers, said the first engineer. This retrofit will be
tremendously difficult to implement on the airplanes
already built because the mechanics will have to do the
tedious and meticulous work inside the confined space of
the wing. 'Drilling holes in titanium is difficult.
Drilling holes in composite is difficult. And the access
will be very difficult,' said the second engineer. And
when Boeing finally comes to do the job on Dreamliner
No. 1, it will first have to empty the fuel from the wing
tanks so that repair crews can work inside.
Previous problems
Excessive loads at stringer ends (known to engineers as
'runouts') is not something that should have struck
Boeing out of the blue. 'The problem with stringer
runouts has been identified in the past and recognized
as a problem,' the second engineer said. He said the issue
has arisen on other composite airplanes. Indeed, the first
engineer said the stress point at the end of the 787
stringers showed up as a 'hot spot' in Boeing's
---;--;-~
computer models before the delamination in the wing
bend test - but for some reason it was never
addressed. The delamination happened after the wing
bend test reached ultimate load, which is 50 percent higher
than the maximum load expected in service. The second
engineer said reaching that load proves that Boeing's
heavy titanium structure is as strong as it needs to be.
However, the delamination of the wing skin could have
begun well before that load was reached, he said. In the
tests of the proposed fix that lie ahead, he said, engineers
will have to inspect the stress points for delamination
closely at every increment up to the highest loads. Boeing
spokeswoman Yvonne Leach said the company 'will
provide details on the technical solution in due course as
we finalize our plans for implementation.' The company
reports its quarterly earnings before the stock market
opens today. In an early-morning teleconference after the
earnings news is released, Boeing management will be
quizzed closely by Wall Street analysts for more detail on
the expected program delay. It's likely the executives won't
yet have precise answers."
Duvallruss Duvall, WA July 22, 2009 at 11:33 PM
"l'm a long time stockholder. This situation is the last
straw. Not only are there serious technical, schedule
and cost problems with the 787, top management now
has little or no credibility with stockholders, customers
and other stakeholders. Boeings reputation has been
seriously compromised. When will the board 'clean
house'?"
LostintheGreatNorthwest Marysville. WA July 22,
2009 at 7:08 PM
"I believe it is clear that Fancher and his assoicates on
the program and probably all the way up to the CEO
have broken the law in that they willfully and
knowingly made false statements concerning the 787
that constitute violations of the Securities Law. If you
run a public company and you lie about the business
then you a defrauding the stockholders. You get to go
to jail. As to the two engineers, bad news gets worse with
age. Fancher is again really at blame. He could have
told the truth. Then there would not have been a leak."
foodmart Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 5:30 PM
"I support these Boeing engineers who leaked this info.
Whistle blowing is a tough decision, filled with neither
glory nor total shame. Simple truth: Boeing has lied or
misled its customers, stock holders, financers and
anybody who listened as to the condition of this
aircraft. What's criminal is that we were told by
Boeing that this fix would only take a few weeks, at
most. More lies. Can't trust Boeing management any
longer. Consider this whistle blowing as a sign of the
turmoil within the company. These executives have
forced good and prideful engineers to this, IMO.
~P" "
Imagine the horror of going to work everyday and
having to live and be responsible for building this plane
while your bosses acted like jacka$$es and lied their
butts off, yet never got in trouble, nor were held
accountable."
nonews2me Peck, KS July 22, 2009 at 4:23 PM
"For those of us old enough to remember the DC10
problems. We also remember the leadership at the
time.The lies the misinformation and what happend to
that company, They bought Boeing , a solid, proud,
strong, credible company for over 80 years. Now look
what they are doing with it. This all has J. mcdonnel
and H. Stonecipher written all over it.
BRILLIANT!!!!! !"
Dean Turner irvine, CA July 22, 2009 at 4:04 PM
"The bad thing about being the first mover is that the
competition can sit back and take notes so that their
execution of their composite aircraft is flawless. It's
good that Boeing is taking its time because we wouldn't
want a sequel to the book 'The DC-10 Case by John H.
Fielder and Douglas Birch. Although out of print, this
book can sell for $160.00."
hortonbb Kent, WA July 22, 2009 at 3:55 PM
"I'm disappointed that a couple of Boeing Engineers
took it upon themselves to in this reveal detailed
Company information to the Press. They withheld their
names in this press release because they violated
Boeing Company Communication Procedures and
would very likely be terminated for their reckless and
insubordinate actions. If these Boeing Employees had
had the courage of their own convictions, they would
have identified themselves and suffered the
consequences. Their hidden identities indicate mal-
intent and make all their claims suspect. Worse than
biting the hand that feeds them, they caused a lot of
noise that took everyone's eyes off the ball of getting that
airplane in the air. I hope they get busted for it."
theReferee Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 3:25 PM
"This project is a mess, and it will be hard to revive it
with the current team. The problem is not the
engineers or the union (in this case), it's the managers
at every level and the environment they have created.
Clean house; completely replace the bureacratic
management structure with a new, hardnosed,
technical team. Get people in there who know more
than just spreadsheets, electronic project schedules and
performance reviews. Get people who know how to
build airplanes. Start firing people! Start at the top."
LostintheGreatNorthwest
Marysville, WA July 22, 2009 at 2:17 PM
"Are there any other real engineers on line? The sketch
I
that I saw earlier and the pictures from MHI scared me.
Boeing has forgetten how to transition stringers. This
has nothing to do with unions. It has to do with the
guys I knew 10 or 20 years ago who were the best in the
world now being retired. You can't square off the
stringers like that. The transition is critical. Boeing
needs some real airplane builders because no real one
would have made these mistakes. BTW Boeing has
been quoted in this paper as saying they own this part
of the design so don't blame the Tier Is for this one. It
is square on the "B" and the liers like Scott Fancher
who don't know how to build an airplane."
stagfury SPOKANE, WA July 22, 2009 at 1:32 PM
"SELL!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
mukilteoman Mukilteo, WA July 22, 2009 at 10:43
AM
"Boeing's commercial plane division started going
downhill after Mulally left. It doesn't matter that he is an
'aerodynamics guy'. He is an excellent manager who
knows how to run a business. Boeing made a huge mistake
when they passed him over as CEO. The proof of his
ability is in results. Ford may be the only major car
company to not declare bankruptcy and/or take
government loans. Remember how Detroit lamented the
fact that he wasn't a 'car guy'? That's what took GM and
Chrysler down: too many traditional 'car guys' who
would not adjust to consumer tastes and could not
build consensus with unions to reduce costs to be
competitive."
FL390 Grtr SEA Area, WA July 22, 2009 at 10:28 AM
"It sure seems like Boeing has been backpedaling since
the merger with McDD. McDD commercial side was a
total failure -- warmed up obsolete technology....the MD-
11, MD-80, MD-90 and 717 should never have happened.
Did the failed McDD mgmt destroy Boeing?"
spokane cougar Spokane, WA July 22, 2009 at 10:26
AM
"Who is running Boeing? A two year old or a monkey?
What a joke of a company. Everything started going
downhill once they moved to Chicago. This continues
there might not be much competition between Airbus and
Boeing, as Airbus seems to be able to not make itself
look like a complete idiot all the time."
lifeliberal Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 9:46 AM
"This is simply corporate greed yet again running
wild. This company should be given to the workers
who actually build the planes. Obama needs to step in
here and take this over. If the unions owned the
company all the jobs would stay here and planes would
be built on time."
................................--------
CapHillMax Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 9:20 AM
"Boeing seems to have been on the slow, downward
slide ever since McDonnell Douglas execs did a reverse
take-over of Boeing. It's a shame that Bill Boeing's legacy
is being destroyed."
El Diablo Blanco Ocean Beach, CA July 22, 2009 at
9:11 AM
"Apparently the door seals don't even match up. Not
exactly a plane I'd want to fly in 15 years down the road."
Restore the Republic End the FED, WA July 22, 2009
at 9:09 AM
"EVERYTHING in the 787 program is a clusterFk.
That's what happens when you outsource major
structural parts to mitsubishi and others...you lose
precision. I won't be flying in this plane."
thunderbolt hawaii kai, HI July 22, 2009 at 9:07 AM
"Boeing 787...the De Havilland Comet of the 21st
century...I christen thee the Flying Mass Grave."
JCowles Kent, WA July 22, 2009 at 8:51 AM
"Doug H: 'Why were these people not identified? Were
they doing this against the wishes of their employer?'
Simple answers to simple questions: (1) they were not
identified because they would get their hinies fired if
their identities were made known; (2) they are doing it
because Boeing has not been straight with stockholders
or the public about the real seriousness of the 787's
structural problems. What the "Times" is doing is
what the "Washington Post" was doing in the 1970s
with Watergate: investigative journalism. So you have
a choice: do you trust the "Times" or do you trust
Boeing? Whose credibility is greater? Even MFC should
see the answer to that one. JC"
Bark Snohomish, WA July 22, 2009 at 8:38 AM
"As for production ... The original ' workforce
assemblying the 787 was mostly inexperienced kids
right out of high school or their first job at McDonalds.
Boeing hired them on the cheap (never works), @
$12.50 an hour. This generation did not grow-up like
my 'Baby Boomer ' generation. They were not drilling
holes or building things, rather playing video games.
This became a HUGH problem, causing much re-work
and bad holes, etc. A few weeks of 'training' does not
make an aerospace mechanic. It may sound simple to
drill a hole, but if you are not able to 'FEEL' a drill bit
going from composite to any 'metal' (or vice versa), the
hole is going to be elongated or any number of other bad
holes. The thing about that NOW is .... If you cannot drill
a GOOD hole in a wide open area ... how is it going to be
done while confined inside a wing, surrounded by various
structure, etc? That said ... The engineering was done
years ago, long before manufacturing and integration
.................
began in FAD. The analysis and design for the 'current'
Wing Box ' (which is the heart of the A/P), was proven
wrong after the fact via the fatigue A/P's ongoing testing.
As with any engineering ... the expertise and strengths of
each individual S/B evaluated by their management. It is
very apparent it was not done early on in this
development. Project Leadership was sorely lacking ...
Still is. Often when a new Program starts many people
are promoted out of existing programs beyond their
abilities = POOR Management. As for Commercial
President Carson .... I have said it before, he is not to
be believed. He is a mouthpiece for the powers that be
in Chicago and has yet to ' run ' ANY Program @
Boeing that did not fail. Also, he is NOT an engineer. If
Mulally had not gone to Ford no one would be hearing
from Carson. Of course the governor believes everything
he says ...Not having a clue as she doesn't. Retired - Eng
32 years (consulting 2 years 787), new programs - 767,
777, 747-400, Peacekeeper, RSLP, ALCM, on and on ....
This is NOT a union issue ... SPEEA or Mechanics."
Axion44 Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 8:00 AM
"Between the militant and lazy union and the inept and
ethically challenged management it amazes me that
anything gets done at Boeing."
TheWholeTruth Bellevue, WA July 22, 2009 at 7:32
AM
"Boeings profits up. Watching brainwashed neocons
and their mouthpieces bad mouth their American
brothers and sisters is sickening. Seems to me that
Boeing has PLENTY of cash to share with it's union
employees!"
bellevuezog Bellevue, WA July 22, 2009 at 7:04 AM
"Boeing-Best Engineers and Machinists anywhere.
Worst Management Ever."
certaindoom seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 7:03 AM
"Boeing profits up Q2, 787 might not fly in 2009. Yep,
I'd say the same jerks that moved the headquarters to
Chicago are full on getting their way. Mission
Accomplished guys. Lets all sing the praises of modern
day Boeing management, outsource everything in a
rear-guard action to end-run the union, doesn't matter
if a plane or two is delayed, we'll be closing down
everett and renton in a few years anyway. Make all
that expensive labor head south where they are
overjoyed to work for half. And you, Unions, you
happy yet? Called enough strikes to prove you're boss yet?
Let me put it to you like this, is your goal to drive your
jobs out of town? Mission Accomplished at you too.
When I moved here 20 years ago Boeing was one of the
pillars of the Northwest. For a while that stayed true. What
I see now is no longer the case. I don't know what
happened, but every time I run across an ex-Boeing
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employee at some other job he's typically an outdated
dinosaur, sometimes way overweight, and often does
not really measure up compared to guys I work with
that doen't have Boeing on their resume. I'm sure it just
matters by which division you were in or what you did, but
the big quality that Boeing did stand for in management as
well as in employment just does seem to be eroding badly
before our eyes. We need big successful businesses here.
Everyone that gripes about Boeing (me at least) wants
them to succeed because we all benefit when it succeeds.
But seriously. This 787 is just a wake up call to the rest
of us that Boeing might not be Boeing any more."
hoarsewhisperer Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 6:51 AM
"This is exactly what Jack Welch's GE disposable
employees philosoophy has brought to U.S.
manufacturing. Management are not the only people
with knowledge and experience that matter, and
engineers as well as the people on the line are not
interchangeable parts that can be replace from
anywhere on the globe without consequences. This is a
great example of the Hubris in American Corporate
Leadership."
tikitrek Seattle, WA July 22, 2009 at 6:25 AM
"A violation of company policy or an unofficial leak to
the press. I have no idea but it seems timely to be
releasing information that is too diffecult to release
officially. The mistrust seems to linger because of an
awareness by some or a feeling that other issues are
lurking in the wood work or is it in the composite
structure. They are complex issues but Boeing appears
to suffer more by not airing the issues early enough to
mitigate negative criticism."
mrblank Everett, WA July 22, 2009 at 4:23 AM
"What scares me most about the poor management and
dumb outsourcing of the 787. Is the fact that no matter
how hard I work or how many days in a row, I can't save
there butt this time.We are going loose an American
Icon, because of corporate greed, and lies. It is sad."
johnnyo513 Milton, WA July 22, 2009 at 2:46 AM
"I agree with C2H50H whole heartely and believe me
problems like this isn't just a 787 problem, the 737 has
so many problems on the production line that none of
them coming off the production line lately are
anywhere near air worthy!! There is almost more re-
work then original work being done, yet the company
continues to lay off production workers while trying to
keep the same production rates, only an idiot doesn't
see where thats going to lead to......."
Sam Marmon Federal Way, WA July 22, 2009 at 12:52
AM
"@takn - I know Boeing has an interest in what
iir"
information it disseminates in public, but I'm
concerned that what we've seen from the Boeing PR
and management isn't open, honest, and transparent
regarding the 787 program. It would seem there is a
willful negligence to understand the problems or an
effort to mask or minimize the magnitude of the issues.
While I'm sure these engineers are violating some
PRO, they are also shedding light on a program that
probably deserves more scrutiny from the public and
Boeing's investors."
22 Wall Jim Firm- a "Boeing Co. executives maintained Wednesday that its On a
July Streeet McNer Investo much-delayed 787 program remained profitable and modular
2009 Journal, ney, rs that the latest setback wouldn't require a major enterpri
"Boeing CEO redesign. The U.S. aerospace company said it would se
Says The provide an update later in this quarter on when the aircraft architec
787 Still Boeing might fly, after shelving a first flight in June because of cture's
Profitab Compa structural problems with the area where the wings join the possible
le, To ny body. Boeing Chairman and Chief Executive Jim understa
Update McNerney and Chief Financial Officer James Bell were tement
Progra pressed repeatedly about the 787's economics on a of
m In conference call after reporting second-quarter earnings. problem
3Q" While it has secured 850 orders for the 787, an existing s to
(Ann delay of more than two years has forced Boeing to investor
Keeton) increase research spending and pay penalties to s.
customers awaiting the plane. Bell admitted there
were 'concerns' about the program's financial
contribution, but said on the call that the company still
forecasts that it would be profitable over its lifetime.
McNerney said Boeing can make a 'straightforward'
fix to the 787's latest setback, brushing aside reports
that a solution could take months to develop. The
company will also provide an update on the financial
impact when it reveals a new flight and test schedule for
the aircraft. Boeing on Wednesday stood by its financial
outlook for full-year revenue in a range of $68 to $69
billion, with earnings-per-share in a range of $4.70 to
$5.00. Bell said Boeing is managing its cash carefully,
and could delay a pension payment this year, but
doesn't plan to cut its dividend. Investors and analysts
were stung by Boeing's sudden announcement last month
that Boeing would delay the first flight of the 787 for an
undetermined amount of time. While some customers
have asked to defer orders on a variety of aircraft due to
the global recession, McNerney said deferral requests have
slowed compared with earlier this year. McNerney said
Boeing doesn't see a need now to make further cuts in
aircraft production, but will continue to assess the
market."
22 Thomso Jim Firm- a Jim McNerney (The Boeing Comnany): On a
July n McNer Investo "The fundamental operating engine of this company is modular
2009 Reuters ney, r running very well right now. Production and services Enterpri
Researc Chari programs in both BCA and IDS delivered strong earnings se
h, man in the quarter, supported by our continued focus on Archite
excerpt and productivity improvements and disciplined cash cture's
from CEO; management. We are also making solid progress on some defense
"The James key development programs including the P8-A and the of its
Boeing Bell, 747-8. On the 747-8, we have performed the final body finanaic
Compan CFO, join and started systems installation on the first freighter al
y, Q2 The model. Assembly is now 75% complete on this airplane perform
2009 Boeing and the program continues to work toward a first flight late ance
Earning Compa this year and first delivery in the third quarter of 2010.
s Call ny Much to our disappointment, the 787 continues to
Transcri challenge us. As evidenced by our decision last month to
pt" postpone first flight due to a need to reinforce an area
within the side of body section of the airplane. Along with
Chief Technology Officer John Tracy, I have been in
frequent contact with the BCA team and reviewed the
program in detail last week. I can tell you the team is
making solid progress toward resolving this issue. We
have duplicated in our analytical models the condition
we discovered during static testing and we have
identified a technical solution chosen from a number of
options. From an engineering standpoint, the fixed
design is straightforward and involves a relatively
small number of parts supplied to the areas that need
reinforcement. There is nothing we have learned to
lead us to believe that this is anything but a local issue
which can be addressed with a local fix. The team is
currently in the process of evaluating alternative ways
to implement the preferred solution, taking into account
a variety of factors including accessibility of the physical
area requiring modification. We are approaching this
effort with an abundance of caution to ensure that no
collateral issues are created by the installation process
we select, particularly on airplanes already built. Once
the implementation approach is determined, an aircraft
modification and testing plan will follow. As these plans
firm up, the team will assess impacts on our flight test and
production schedules and then determine the resulting
financial impacts. While addressing this issue, we are
working hard to minimize any additional impacts on the
overall program effort. Postponing first flight was the
right decision; given the reduced flight envelope we would
have had available to us. I fully understand the desire
everyone has for revised schedules for first flight and first
delivery. We are working through this matter as quickly as
we can but will not sacrifice quality for expediency on
such an important effort. A thorough and comprehensive
plan will be finalized and shared later this quarter. This
latest 787 development strongly underscores the
importance of our drive and imperative to strengthen
enterprise, technical and supply chain disciplines on
our programs, both inside and outside our four walls.
We have and will continue to make changes to our
processes and organizations to accomplish this
objective. We have also been implementing tactical
adjustments to the 787 operating model with the recent
agreement to purchase Vought's South Carolina
operations being a key step in both optimizing work
between Boeing and our suppliers and also bolstering
our ability to develop and produce large composite
structures. We expect this transaction to close in the
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near future. We are learning from our lessons on this
program and will not hesitate to take the steps
necessary to ensure its ultimate success, even if it
means redrawing some lines that were established
when we first started. Despite the delay in first flight,
the 787 program is moving forward with critical flight
test preparations and has made some important
progress. We completed gauntlet testing and taxi testing
at speeds up to 130 knots on the first flight test aircraft.
The airplane performed as expected and we were pleased
with the results. Airplane number two has moved to the
flight line and has performed engine runs. Airplanes three
and four have completed power on and the team is in the
process of assembling the major sections of airport number
seven, the first production aircraft. Through all of our
experience on this program to-date, it's important to
remember that we are doing something here that has
never been done before. The innovation and technology
applied to this program is unprecedented in scope and
in the impact it will have on commercial aviation. We
remain gratified by a 787 backlog that stands strong with
850 orders from 56 customers around the world, and we
continue to believe the 787 is a game changer that will
add tremendous value to both our customers and our
company over time. Beyond the 787, BCA continues to
generate strong operating performance in a very difficult
period for the industry. Deliveries remain on track for the
year and the team has made good progress on productivity
and cost improvements to help offset a range of market
pressures that include, lower production rates,
softening spares volumes at lower delivery price
escalation forecast.
The environment continues to be challenging in both
commercial and defense markets. In April we announced a
reduction to our 777 production rates starting in June 2010
and we postponed rate increases planned for the 67 and the
47. Since that time, BCA has accommodated about 70
airplane deferrals in addition to the 60 processed in the
first quarter, and the backlog of deferral requests has come
down this quarter. Accordingly, there has been no
change in our current thinking about commercial
production levels including our assessment that we can
hold 737 at its current build rate. We will continue to
evaluate production rates based on market conditions and
customer discussions. The aircraft financing markets,
while still tough, are also showing signs of gradual
improvement. It has been encouraging to see U.S. capital
markets begin to open up with recent double EETC
offerings completed by a few U.S. airlines. We also
continue to aggressively manage our infrastructure,
costs and investments. As of June, we have reduced our
headcount by approximately 5000 positions versus our
November 2008 base line and we remain on track
toward the estimated 10,000 position reductions we
expect by year's end."
.. ......... ...............
James Bell
"Jim talked about the 787, but let me discuss how we
evaluate the financial status of this program. Each
quarter we perform a 787 gross margin accounting
analysis. At the pre-delivery stage in the program, the
primary purpose of this analysis is to determine if we
believe the program is in a profit or a loss position over
an initial quantity of airplane. Up to the point to decide
a body issue, our assessment was that the program was
not in a loss position. The cumulative impact of
scheduled delays including the current one being
assessed is obviously putting pressure on the program's
profitability. At the same time, BCA has an ongoing
effort to evaluate opportunities to improve efficiencies
within our factory and across the global supply chain
as we prepare to ramp up build rates. Both schedule
impacts and cost improvement opportunities are being
evaluated and upon completion they will be
incorporated in the 787 accounting position. This will
also include an assessment of potential financial impacts
on our current production programs. We will update you
on that in conjunction with the 787 schedule revision.
Included in the company's gross inventory is $7.9
billion related to 787 work in process, supplier
advances, tooling and other nonrecurring costs. Our
gross inventories on this program has been building at
approximately $800 million per quarter. As we work
through our 787 challenges, the remainder of BCA
continues to perform very well, strong execution in the
core production and services programs generated good
financial results in this quarter. BCA's second quarter
margins were 9.7%. Unit cost margins were 10.8%
driven by 777 model and customer mix as well as lower
supplier costs. The 777 deferred production balance
decreased approximately $400 million during the quarter
which reflects favorable mix and a lower supplier cost for
both delivered and work in process units. BCA won 57
gross orders during the quarter including 36 737's while
52 orders primarily 787's previously disclosed were
removed from the order book. BCA's backlog remains
large at $257 billion representing greater than seven times
current annual revenues.
Unallocated expenses increased this quarter as compared
to last year due to higher deferred compensation and share
based plan expense. Somewhat offset by lower unallocated
pension expense. We expected total unallocated expense to
be approximately $700 million in 2009 with other segment
expense forecasted to be about 200 million.
Now, let's turn to slide 8 and discuss cash flow. We
generated $1 billion of operating cash flow in the quarter,
reflecting cash from earnings somewhat offset by
continued working capital buildup on our development
programs and timing of accounts receivables. During the
quarter we did not acquire any of our shares, but we
did pay approximately $300 million in dividends. Turning
to slide 9; our financial strength remains solid. We ended
the quarter with $5 billion of cash in marketable securities
and that's up 6% from the end of the first quarter. Debt
declined during the quarter due to maturities principally at
BCC. As previously announced, we expect to be using
cash in the third quarter for the purchase Vought's
South Carolina facility and to pay guarantees related
to the Sea Launch Chapter 11 filing. In light of these
and other cash demands, our primary focus is to continue
aggressive management of cash flows related to our
operations. We are also fortunate to have good access to
the debt markets at reasonable rate. We have had a
successful bond offering in March and this form of capital
rising continues to be an attractive option for us. Now
let's turn to slide 10. Our financial guidance remains
unchanged and will be reevaluated upon completion of
the 787 assessment. 2009 earnings per share is expected
to be between $4.70 and $5 per share with revenues of 68
billion to 69 billion. The 2009 commercial delivery
forecast remains between 480 and 485 airplanes. 2009
operating cash flow guidance remains at greater than $2.5
billion, although the 787 schedule assessment will likely
put downward pressure on the timing and the level of cash
flows. We are still assuming 2009 pension funding of
approximately $500 million, although the amount of
mandatory contributions this year is less than $100
million. We will make a final decision on funding towards
the end of this year. Total company pension expense is
expected to be about $900 million in 2009, with slightly
more than that recorded at the business unit and a small
offset in the unallocated segment. The R&D expense
forecast is unchanged at $3.6 billion to $3.8 billion and
capital expenditures are expected to be approximately $1.4
billion."
Jim McNerney:
"Our priorities remain, getting the 787 on track and in the
hands of our customers, continuing to reposition our
defense business while extending our existing programs
and expanding in the international markets, growing our
services businesses, maintaining our lead in innovation
technology and preserving our financial strength through
productivity improvements and aggressive cash
management. I do believe we will get through the
current challenges and at the end we will be a
fundamentally stronger company with the right
products and better position to grow and improve
financial performance overtime. With that said, we
would now be happy to take your questions."
Cai von Rumohr (Cowen & Companv):
"Yes. Thank you very much. I guess 787 is on a lot of our
minds. Jim, you mentioned that the fix is
straightforward, but I guess first would be with this fix,
if it's straightforward, what does it imply for
performance of the aircraft maintainability and service
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life? Secondly, there have been all kinds of rumors
about kind of a partial redesign of the wing, is that just
to make it easier to kind of implement this fix or is it
something broader and what kind of rough range of
timeframes could this imply?"
Jim McNerney:
"Well, we have learned nothing, Cai that says this is
anything other than a local issue with a local fix. I'm
not sure where the discussion comes from that says a
major redesign of the wing is in the offing. We don't
see that. Having said that, we have been through the
analysis that confirms and predicts what happened
analytically. We have now have chosen the approach we
want to take on the fix itself in terms of the parts and their
placement to reinforce the area and we have done some
initial testing to give us a high degree of confidence that
we have got the right fix. Now we are onto putting
together an implementation plan which has some
challenges as you're moving around in very tight
spaces in the airplane and getting some things done and
that's what we are in the midst of doing. So a high degree
of confidence in knowing what to do and working
through with an abundance of caution exactly how to
do it, but with a great deal of confidence that we are on
the right path here. As to its impact on the
performance on the airplane, we don't see that. Either
performance metrics or maintainability, there is not
much weight involved. The performance of the
airplane is not impacted and therefore it's a matter of
working through this issue and getting to the other side
and getting the program back on track, and we will be
updating you as we said this quarter."
Howard Rubel (Jefferies):
"Thank you very much. I just wanted to talk for a moment
about inventories. It's appreciated that you disclosed the
size of the 787, but could you address how you're
recovering from the strike and why we're not seeing
some improved runoff and then also how is it that
you've now finally been able to or talk about the
success on the 787 in relieving some of the deferred
costs there, James?"
James Bell:
"Hey Howard. We have liquidated quite a bit of the
strike inventory we did over a billion one in first
quarter and another about half a billion this quarter.
Obviously, it's been more than offset by the increase in
inventory on our two development programs, both 787
and on our 747 programs and obviously that's been
impacted as the delivery of those units slide, but clearly
we have done that. Now, you talked about the how
we're going to relieve the inventory on 87. Obviously
we are not going to be able to do that until we start
getting into delivery and we'll have to wait until we
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complete the assessment of the fix to actually know when
that will resume and then how those inventories will be
relieved over time."
Howard Rubel (Jefferies):
"So we'll continue to see an inventory build for the next
18 to 24 months?"
James Bell:
"We will continue to see an inventory build until we
start delivering, that is correct."
David Strauss (UBS):
"Jim, just to clarify your comments on 787, so the fix that
you talk about and you identified in the press release, were
you're referring to is a permanent fix or is this a
temporary fix that you've identified?"
Jim McNernev:
"No. This is a fix that will both be retrofittable on
airplanes that have already been built and will easily
flow into the production process technically."
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
"Question on guidance. Why not just adjust it or
withdraw it when you know there is some type of cost
coming that's associated with the 787 fix or perhaps is
it simply absorbable this year and more of a 2010
event?"
James Bell:
"Rob, first and foremost at Jim mentioned and I think our
results reflect, the underlining engine in this company is
performing well and that's predominantly the basis of
our guidance, and until we really have a clearer
understanding of the impact of the fix on that
performance, we think it's appropriate to hold it and
just make sure we disclose that to date we haven't
included in it yet what, if any, impact on those numbers
the fix will have."
Robert SDingarn (Credit Suisse):
"Okay, and then of the 7.9 billion in 787 inventory; what
portion of that will be amortized over the delivery
aircraft?"
James Bell:
"All of it."
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
"All of it? Then some of its just work in process?"
James Bell:
"Yeah, some of it is work in process, some of it is
advances to supply chain which will ultimately result in
work in process being delivered to us in the future, and
then some are deferred costs like tooling, and so over the
course of this program we would expect all those costs to
be amortized over the deliverable units."
Robert Spingarn (Credit Suisse):
"I guess I'm talking about the latter portion that's going to
be somewhat linearly equal over each delivered aircraft.
So the development associated costs, the tooling, the
capitalized development."
James Bell:
"Yeah, that's probably the smaller portion right now of the
inventory balance, but in fact, it is the smaller portion of
the inventory balance right now, but it will be amortized
primarily over the bulk of the units.
Now, as you know in deferred production costs, that grow
as you introduce new models and there's new tooling, new
effort that is a benefit to the subsequently delivered units.
So that number will change over time, but it will get
amortized over the deliveries."
Ron Epstein (Bane ofAmerica-Merrill Lynch):
"Jim and James, just maybe a broader question. When
change that?"
Jim McNernev:
"I'll take a swing at that one. The story here is a tough
company. I do recognbze, though, where year question
It's an issubecause of th thousands upon thousands of tests we
do to confirm our analytics with static testing, in this case
or other kinds of tests that bear on certification, the
performance of the airplane and these literally are
thousands upon thousands that one of them turned up
wrong that we didn't anticipate. So the story here is not
information flow. The story here is the
comprehensiveness of our testgbecase we have got
to get this airplanWe all wish It didn't happen,
we all wish that we didn't sond so confident at such a
plane was on track and (Ming good about it as
subsequent testing has borne out."
Ron EDstein (Banc ofAmerica-Merrill Lynch):
"The one piece I guess I don't understand, Jim, is the
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issue about the stringer run out; the extra stress on the
stringers, particularly in a composite wing isn't really a
new issue, right? I think the engineers knew it a couple
of months ago other folks could actually have
experienced for the composite wings. I could have
predicted something like this might have happened, so
I guess that's what I don't understand, I mean how the
confidence could be there up till the very end and then,
then it was this one test that?"
Jim McNerney:
"The purpose of static testing is to confirm analytical
models based on the material you use and the forces and
stresses you put on them. By and large our analytical
models are pretty good, but the reason why you do static
testing is to confirm them and in this case they were not
confirmed and there are lessons for us. Of course we
understood stringers and wings and we do understand
composite structures, but this is one where the model
did not predict the behavior we should have done
better and we will do better but that's what happened
and we are going to as I said in my remarks we are
going to continue to tighten up our engineering
disciplines as we go forward and you always try to
learn from these things."
Joe Nadol (JPMorran):
"Question for either or may be for both Jim and James.
Just in the balance sheet, James thanks for the additional
color you gave in your prepared comments its tough at this
point to predict what the use of the cash are going to be on
the absence of the 787 schedule over the next two or three
years, but in terms of sources you hinted pretty strongly
that you are going to go back to the bond markets in
you did a successful $2 billion or close to it offering in
Q1. How much more do you think you can or want to
do in terms of bond offerings? Then if you could and
may be help out in terms of the rank order of alternative
source of cash. How are you thinking about dividend
policy in terms of the pension you have signaled that you
have may be a few hundred million dollars of opportunity
there not putting in, some of your discretionary
contribution, et cetera?"
James Bell:
"Yeah. You know, first and foremost, we are going to
continue to have aggressive management of cash in this
company and we are starting to see and I think you saw in
the second quarter benefits of that. We are controlling
pretty tightly any expenditure that doesn't directly support
our priority which is obviously getting the 787 airplane,
getting that development done and in the hands of our
customers, and any other expenditure that's not going into
the productivity or the production of our products we are
managing very, very carefully so that's our first priority.
Clearly, we do have the ability to get back in the bond
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markets and we'll probably do some of that, I don't
know exactly what the optimal number is, but you'll see it
and we'll let you know as we do that. We are not at a
point where we are considering cutting our dividends. I
want to be very clear on that. We are not there. We do
have some options relative to how much we put into
our pension plan and we'll take a hard look at that as we
go forward and, again, we'll be very aggressive in
managing our expenditures going forward and we will be
very disciplined in managing the cash inflows to make
sure that on delivery we are receiving the cash associated
with the deliveries and making sure we stay on our, get our
advances on time and for our contracts."
Joe Nadol (JPMorgan):
"Okay. Then just a clarification; you highlighted during
your comments that you're obviously, look at every
quarter you look t the program in igot a pretty
goindica to do tknowiatng fte you gwe have 850 orders, then
just issue is when the market looks out over the timeblock
size thatriod, we can estimate it and produce tha number ofve
said rplanes. So clearly it's going to be hier than what
when you delivered the first irpn, bt youhave to
have soCamething in (Brcls Caitwhen analysis
every quarter,- giv " ur backlog now oetd din 50
un"I'd tslike to stay of blothisk 787 inventory andse to
detrmionclusione that after yno gt a forwhedule together?"
James Bell:
"You're absolutely right, we haven't been clear on that
and we are not going to be, Joe. We A, aot going to
determine that until we start recording either a profit
or loss on this program, but I think you got a pretty
good indication knowing that we have 850 orders, then
the issue is when the market looks out over the time
period, we can estimate it and produce a number of
airplanes. So clearly it's going to be higher than what
you've seen traditionally, but witR we fnaty have to
book financials on our P&L statements, we are not
going to disclose what that number Is."
Joe Campbel (Baffrclays Caital):
"I'd like to stay on this 787 inventory and the
conclusion that it's not in a forward loss position. I
mean, you've got a lot of numbers, we've had a lot of
delays but as far as I can tell, really the only number
you've shared with us is the S bllion that we now see
this quarter in inventory and 10t wotdering, there's a
lot of delays, no commentary ever aboat, what the
cumulative overrun wi1 'you knowis going to be. I
mean, it seems lik its, 8 bilon, 6 bilion, 10 billion.
It's hard for me to understand given all the
commentary about need to pay penalties all the
suppliers say you owe thean each bond4* to even 1
billion. It seems like the run rate is another 800 million
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a quarter, plus whatever the extra R&D is and it
sounded in the comments like maybe you need other
Boeing efficiencies to make sure this thing doesn't have
a forward loss and if you're talking about $85 billion
you know, 800, 850 planes, you're talking about
estimating out to 2018. I mean, how are you sure that
you're not losing money on this thing?"
James Bell:
"Well, clearly we've had our challenges on this
program, Joe, and all you've said are things that we
have to take in consideration, but the one other thing
that drives most of this and which is normally the most
difficult thing to estimate over time is the revenue
stream. Well, we have sold 850 of these and we know
we are way ahead of our competition and the market is
still going to be robust over a timeframe that we think
we have the ability to estimate and there are a lot of
factors and a lot of moving pieces in determining that
and we go through a very careful disciplined process
quarterly to satisfy ourselves and our auditors that
where we are relative to profitability on this program.
Now again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, this
last assessment and combined with the cumulative
impact of the other things you mentioned, really puts
pressure on the profitability of this program, but on
the other side of this, we have a new production system
that allows us to really have substantial improvement
beyond anything we have ever experienced in the past
and then the assurance of the amount of orders. This
being the best selling wide body airplane in the history
of civil aviation gives us a lot of assurance that we'll
have production rates going for a you know, a pretty
long time and we ought to be able to harvest the
productivity. Now, obviously we have to capture all of
that and we'll be conservative as we have been in how
we would book keep that today and we'll learn more as
we go, but as you know, airplanes, 850 airplanes is a
wide body program and when you think of the 777 and
we have only sold a 1000 of those to-date and delivered
a little over 700 of them. Again, we have seen an
extraordinary improvement in performance over the
life of that program that we have to figure out how to
predict given the size of the program that we have in
front of us."
Joe Campbell (Barclays Capital):
"It sounds like we are trying to say that this delay is
local, we know the fix. You're talking about a program
that's $85 billion big if you pick these great big block
sizes, you must have spent, 20 on the way to 30 before
we get into production, and if we pay the you know, if
we count up the penalties and the other things. I'm
having a hard time trying to sort of reconciling how
this little local delay is going to push s close to being
an overrun position on the black side that's not big."I
.. .. .. .. .. 
James Bell:
"That's not what I said. I said to you the cumulative
impact of all the other schedule delays and then
what..."
Joe Campbell (Barclays Capital):
"Yeah, but we knew all these delays last quarter, and
we weren't worried then."
James Bell
"Oh, I've never said we weren't concerned about it,
Joe. I just said that when we have gone through and
done our assessments, we still believe the program to
be profitable. We have always been concerned with the
cumulative impact of the schedule delays and the
pressure it puts on costs. We also have been concerned
with the delays to our customers and how that converts
to penalties or settlements we have to work through
with them. I've never said we weren't concerned. What
I have said to you is that we have gone through a very
disciplined process and quite frankly, the element
that's most difficult to tie down and get high assurance
on is the revenue stream and we have it on this
program because of the unprecedented success of this
offering. So it's not like it's not without its challenges,
but so far we have determined that te program is
profitable. We'll be back to you as quickly as possible
with this latest assessment and see how that plays out
along with the other cumulative impact of the other
things and challenges we are dealing with."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"James I can ask then a small question on the fmancial
implications just to understand what buckets we should put
it in. The fix has been described as not costly. There's
41 planes involved, so clearly that's not what you need
to update us on the financial implications, or should we
be thinking about potentially higher R&D or greater
working capital build or greater supplier support or
customer penalty payments? Can you kind of just help
us?"
James Bell:
"Yeah, but Heidi, I think we got to look at all of those. I
don't know what the magnitude of each of those buckets
would be, but clearly there would be some R&D
associated with it. There would be some recurring costs
element of it. If it resulted in a schedule change or slight,
or adjustment, which it very well could, then we would
have to obviously deal with customers as well."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"Jim, you talked about one of the things. When you first
got on board that you and I hve css is this
cultural openness that was stresed d!rfitg the 177,
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Jim McNerney:
"Yeah. This one was asked when you were dropped,
Heidi, but let me say it agala, becaus -you *eate ii a
slightly different way. The story of this delay is not
about information flow or opennes. This is really a
story of the thousands ot tests that we do all the time
leading up to first flight and one surprislng us. The
purpose of static testing is to confirm analytical models
and this is one out of a thousand tests we did, where that
confirmation was not forthcoming and the flight envelope
available to us was not enough to really get enough out of
the first airplane's flight test. So, that's why we made the
call, but even though it did not look pretty, because we
were all confident that we were going to be flying the
airplane in June, because everything we knew is that we
were, but this outlying test result is, we had to deal with it
and we dealt with it right away."
Noah Poponak (Goldman Sachs):
"I'd like to dig a little deeper on 737. You gave us the 70
deferral number versus 60 in the first quarter. The 60
number you had said was about half and half narrow wide
body. Can you give us the split in that 70? Then you
mentioned the backlog of deferral requests being down, I
mean, can you sort of size that and give us a magnitude? Is
it very meaningfully down or slightly down and what kind
of second half deferral number does it imply versus what
we saw in the first half?"
Jim McNerney:
"Again, the deferral, I don't have the plane-by-plane data
here in front of me, but the deferrals were pretty much
proportional across model types in terms of what we
produce and also fairly proportional across geographies.
So, very tough to find a model or geographic theme, this
again leads me to believe that it's a broad systemic
economic credit issue for some airlines that are under
pressure. As to the trend, this quarter is down
meaningfully. Okay? Now, I again would treat that
data cautiously. The extent to which you think the
economy is totally out of the woods that would be a
meaningful number. The extent to which you believe that
the economy remains problematic until we see long-term
improvement would suggest treat it as one data point right
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now, be somewhat encouraged by it, but we all want to see
more."
Itav Michaeli (Cif'):
"Just wanted to drill back to the earlier question on the
balance sheet. You mentioned that the possibility of
looking to go back to the debt market, but when you
look at the full year cash flow guidance of $2.5 billion, if
you kind of hit that number, even when we assume, or
bake in the thought of cash outflow, it looks like you
probably end cash around the $4 billion 'ish level at the
end of the year. I know you mentioned earlier that the
May meeting that you thought 2010 cash flow would be up
meaningfully and the minimum cash is typically around 2
billion. So just wanted to drill a little bit more about the
thought process around with that being the debt
market at this time. Is it maybe just a desire to have more
cash or is there meaningfully less confidence in the 2010
cash flow trajectory?"
James Bell:
"Well obviously we want to make sure that we have
adequate liquidity to deal with the challenges that still
lie ahead that are presented by the 787 and the other
development programs we have. We also want to deal
with the Vought's transaction. We are going to use a
considerable amount of cash or 600 million or so of
cash there to close that deal, and then the issue with
Sea Launch where we had the up front take care of
those guarantees and we want to make sure that we
deal with all of those things and still have adequate
liquidity to deal with the operational challenges that lie
ahead."
Troy Lahr (Stifel Nicolaus & Companv):
"Thanks. James, how does the Vought facility purchase
impact your 787 profit loss analysis and are you
assuming that you guys end up doing a second line?"
James Bell:
"To your last question, it doesn't assume that at all, but it
does allow us to have better control over a significant
element of the production process that supports the 787
and obviously our intent in going in and acquiring it is to
drive better performance. So we don't know how that
ultimately will turn out but the hope, the aspiration is
that it would improve the performance in both cost and
technical performance on the program."
Troy Lahr (Stifel Nicolaus & Company):
"Okay, thanks, and then on the 787 now, I mean, given
the delays, how is that not impacting the 747? Because
in the past you've said the 747 is delayed because you
can't switch the engineers over. So, how is it that one is
delayed but the other one is still on track then?"
. .. .... .... ... .... .... ...
Jim McNerney:
"This is Jim. We are largely beyond that issue of the
engineering constraint. So these are fundamentally
independent programs now as we go forward."
David Greising (Chicago Tribune):
"I've got a two part question. The first is when you look
at the Vought facility purchase and you look at the
issues facing Future Combat System program, I think
if you look at them together it raises a bigger question
about the systems integrator strategy and the viability
of the kind of asset light approach that the company
adopted when launching the 787. I'd like to know, Jim,
what your view is of how viable that concept still is and
leadershWhereip here. One youof the anal sts asked about
can replicate the problems with, ta wing that was
missed early on and I weld i&ke you o comament also
on the question of your role as CEO of kind-of that ix
between accountability and vision. Where do you draw
the line, well how much of it and what part needs to be
insisting on accountability and what part needs to be kind
of providing vision for where this company needs to go?"
Jim McNernev:
"As to your first question on system integration, there
is no doubt that we are drawing a line in a somewhat
different place on 787, but still when taken in total is a
big systems integration job with lots of partners
working together, we have chosen to bring some of it
back in house and that's what I would anticipate as
learning as you go, making practical decisions on what
you do with partners and what you do yourself. This is
a very innovative program and we are learning as we
go, but we are not going to go back to the days where
we do everything in-house. Future Combat Systems is
more a story of the government wanting to reconfigure a
specific program in a way that still leaves us with a lot of
scope, but somewhat less scope, and that's not uncommon
in government contracting to sort of go back and forth and
we are going to figure out a way to add as much value we
hope as we would have added historically. So, drawing
the lines and adjusting is really the story as opposed to
is there one theory that's always right or one theory
that's always wrong.
The accountability issue; listen, I think there are a lot
of people in this company that feet accountable for the
results of the company. As a leader you are always
trying to balance that culture with a culture of
enterprising spirit and inspiration, and Ilin not sure
that one static test result is entlema*ic of the lack of
accountability in the company. Vou always want to do
better and we are going to learn from it, and we are
going to continue to drive discipfnes and
accountability in this company, and engineering tools
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Iaren't perfect, which is why you have static tests."
Dominic Gates (The Seattle Times):
"I have a question for Jim McNerney. I'd like to ask about
the machinists. Recently through the Washington State
legislators we learned that you at Boeing and you
personally are pushing to try and get some agreement
with the machinists that will stop the strikes that have
hurt you so much. Now that coming out the way it did
here, wasn't, it was seen as an implied threat, the
threat not to do the second line here. It wasn't received
very well by the machinists. Can you talk about your
strategy for labor peace and do you anticipate any such
agreement would come only through negotiations with
the machinists. Do you anticipate offering some carrots
that would go with the stick of the threat?"
Jim McNerney:
"The performance of this company and the role of every
person that works for us as we strive for better
performance is what this company is all about and we're
not issuing ultimatums. We're trying to figure out a better
way to work with our represented employees. We will
always, always try to do that. You're right. The past has
not been perfect. The IAM and the company are meeting
together, trying to find new ways of working together so
that we don't impact our customers and the
performance of the company as badly as we have
historically as we go through these disruptions. We're
going to keep doing that. At the same time, the as you
know and I think your question implied it we're going
through an evaluation of where we put the second line of
the 787, and we will continue a balanced evaluation there
looking at Seattle, Everett as well as other places and
come up with the best answer for the company, but as we
go through that process, we want to work with the IAM as
productively as we can."
Daniel Levin (Associated Press):
"There have been some reports suggesting that the 787
may not fly this year, that the fix maybe more expensive
and time consuming than initially described by Boeing. Is
that a reasonable estimate of the time frame for the first
flight at this point?"
Jim McNerney:
"Well, listen as we said before we're not in a position to
say what the impact is on our flight test and delivery
schedule. We have characterized the fix in the best way we
know how, and characterized where we are in the process
of both designing it and implementing it and we are
entering the implementation phase right now, and when
we understand that we'll have a much better understanding
of its impact on the schedule and our financials and we'll
be in a position this quarter to talk about those impacts."
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Susanna Ray (Associated Press):
"Jim, I am just wondering if you have enough
engineering experience in your top management levels
now and was it sort of shake up and new projections
that were announced in December. Was that a way to
address holes in that area and is there more that should
be done in that area to make sure there are no further
surprises?"
Jim McNernev:
"This company has strong engineering capability in its
management. Having said that, we can always do better
with our disciplines and we're always striving to do better
with our disciplines, and that's a never-ending challenge
particularly when you're dealing with the kind of
innovation that the 787 represents. If we were just
punching out aluminum airplanes, the challenge we
give ourselves wouldn't be as diffelt, bet we're
absolutely committed to lead innovation in this
industry and that has its challenges, and we're fighting
through them with one of the best engineering teams
around."
Hal Weitzman (The Financial Times):
"First a clarification, later on in thinking that James tol
us that the estimates to lathe best of our ability, the
profitability on the progrinitial stages, btnd wouldn'thich takes intous
what the initialof unit volumes and revenmy qu sti associawhre
arthese programs. As you point out the csts include in
primaour case because of some delays here, somte customer
settlements, some supplier impactsons for that impart we dealcosorare they and so thereg from as well as we work cost of thet
purchase?"
Jim McNerney:
"I think what James said, and James you could correct me,
but I think what James says was we go through a regular
process that estimates to the best of our ability, the
profitability on the program and which takes into
account dues of unit volumes and revenues associated
with that, as well as the cost and productivity we see on
these programs. As you point out the costs include in
our case because of some delays here, some customer
settlements, some supplier impacts that impart we deal
with and so there are as well as we work cost on the
airplane So, we add that all up through a process that
we have on a routine basis to assess our financial
position and we're going to do it again with latest fix
we are working on."
Hal Weitzman (The Financial Times):
"Where will most of the pressure come from? Will it
come from the penalties or will it come from the cost of
fixing the problem?"
Jim McNerney:
- -- -- -----------------------------
"It's hard to predict precisely. I mean every customer
arrangement is different from every other one. Every
supplier arrangement is different from every other one
and every engineering change or fix is different from
other ones and that's why in the minds of many, we're
taking too long to come up with the assessment, but it's
a customized assessment every time, even though the
process is routine."
Dan Reed (USA TODAY):
"and B is that necessarily a bad
thing, is it true?"
Jim McNerney:
obvious. Now, you are right. Some of that is good,
because it drives an organization and sets goals and
milestones that people reach toward, but I think we got a
balance wrong at beginning of this program."
Dan Reed (USA TODAY):
get the company to rebalanceto that?"
Jim McNernev:
"I think with regard to the issue, you and I are talking
about. It is rebalanced. In terms of base es for fture
programs going forward, we've learned a hard lesson
here."
James Bell:
"Operator, we have time for one last question."
Mike Mecham (Aviation Week):
"Can you help us understand at what point in the testing
you were with the bend of the wing? Was it close to the
nominal bend at the 100% rates, was it higher than that
and also is there any implication in the actual process of
making the wing? The processing of the wing, the auto
[Inaudible] and that sort of things implied here or is
strictly designed?"
Jim McNernev:
"Listen, this as I mentioned before is to the best of our
knowledge and we've learnt nothing that says different
that this is a local issue with a local fix associated with it.
We do not see a systemic issue with the entire wing."
Mike Mecham (Aviation Week):
"You were just a few days before first flight land. Had
you passed the normal loads that you would expect on a
wing or were you just getting to them. I mean, normally I
think I have a certification picture clear up to the 150."
Jim McNerney:
"As you know Michael, there's a lot of parallel testing
going on as you prepare for flight and in this case, it was a
retesting of a result that the team questioned and the
retesting showed us that we just didn't have the flight
envelope we needed for first flight."
James Bell:
"Operator that concludes our earnings call. Again for
members of the media, if you have further questions please
call our media relations team at 312-544-2002. Thank
yOU."
23 The James Firm- a "On the earnings call, Barclays Capital analyst Joe On a
July Seattle Bell, Investo Campbell asked Chief Financial Officer James Bell the modular
2009 Times CFO r question in plain English: 'Are you sure that you're enterpri
"Boeing The not losing money on this thing?' The concern is that se
Doesn't Boeing Boeing, despite the huge order book for 850 architec
Know Compa Dreamliners, may not be able to make enough money ture's
Yet ny on each plane to recover over time all the added costs non-
How piling up: the extra research and development needed systemi
Long to solve the current problems, the late penalties that c
787 Fix will have to be paid to customers and suppliers, and the approac
Will cost of holding all the expensive inventory for months h to
Take" longer without any income. Bell disclosed that Boeing costs.
(James has in its inventory almost $8 billion worth of 787
Wallace structures work - completed and partially built
) airplanes - for which it can receive no income until
the jets are delivered to customers. He said this 787
work-in-progress inventory is growing at a rate of $800
million per quarter. In response to Campbell, Bell
conceded that the new 787 delay 'puts pressure on the
profitability of this program.' 'We've always been
concerned with the cumulative impact of the schedule
delays and the pressure it puts on cost,' Bell said. 'We
also have been concerned with the delays to our customers
and how that converts to penalties or the settlements we
have to work through with them." But Bell said Boeing
expects to create efficiencies over the expected long
production run of the 787 that will reduce costs and
increase profit per plane to cover all the extra
expenses. 'We still believe the program to be
profitable,' Bell said.
In an interview later, Campbell said that in rough
numbers, using the figures releasd Wednesday,
Boeing wiM have spent up to $13 billion, o inventory
buildup by the time it starts deliverlng the 187s. It has
maybe an additional $8 billion to $10 billion sunk into
........  .  .. I
research and development, and it's on the book for a
few billion dollars more W customer 'and suppier
penaties Campbell estimates that the overrun on
costs attributable. to the delays up uatil now is around
$6 billion. But that doesitt iactude the additional costs
being incurred due to the wing-to-body flaw."
one-voice tulsa, OK July 23, 2009 at 6:31 AM
"This doesn't surprise me at all. Its the result of a bad
engineering culture from mismanagement. Boeing
engineering has never been great. A 'good' engineer at
Boeing is very bureaucratic, political, technically 20
years behind, technically limited, insular, timid, and
uncreative. This proves it. And Boeing has been asking
for it for years by treating engineers like crap. They
drive out talent and experience and attract lowly
grunts and bureaucrats. Outsourcing was a bad idea
too, because Boeing engineers were in charge of the
partner's engineers. Why would they want them to
succeed? Instead they stifled them even more than
engineers are stifled at Boeing and made things worse.
Now, much of the 787 engineering is being done by the
cheapest engineers they can find worldwide."
LostintheGreatNorthwest Marysville, WA July 23,
2009 at 3:53 AM
"Liar, liar. McNerney, Fancher et al are clueless.
They do not know how to build an airplane. That is
the tragedy. The once great company is sick. It needs
leadership amputation. You need engineers who know
how to build an airplane. Stringer run-out is not easy but
people did it correctly for years. It is driven by geometry
more so than material choice. Real engineers would not
have screwed this up."
Old55 Des Moines, WA July 23, 2009 at 3:36 AM
"I see this every day. Boeing upper management is a
failure. Sadly I see no future for the Boeing company."
23 The James Firm- a "Boeing's troubled 787 Dreamliner looks unlikely to On a
July Financi Bell, Investo make a profit for at least two years after its first modular
2009 al Times CFO rs delivery, as the aircraft-maker warned yesterday the enterpri
"Boeing The programme could make a loss in its initial stages. The se
Warns Boeing manufacturer is poised to announce the details of the fifth architec
Dreamli Compa delay to the 787 programme after discovering weaknesses tue's
ner ny in the structure where the wings join the body. Although it systema
Likely has repeatedly emphasised that the fault can be fixed using tic cost
to Make a relatively minor technical solution, Boeing is gearing up problem
Early for significant financial implications because of the s.
Years cost of solving the problem and penalties to customers.
Loss" The company warned yesterday that the latest delay could
(Hal eat into its projections for $68bn-$69bn in revenues this
Weitzm year and revealed that it was sitting on nearly $8bn of
an) inventory for the project, which is running more than
two years behind schedule. Boeing said it was still
working out how to fix the fault and did not yet have a
new timetable for the programme or know the cost of
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solving the problem, although it promised to give that
information before the end of September. James Bell,
chief financial officer, said: 'Up to the point of the side-
of-body issue, our assessment was that the programme
was not in a loss position.' 'The cumulative impact of
schedule delays - including the current one being
assessed - is obviously putting pressure on the
programme's profitability.'
Robert Spingarn, an analyst at Credit Suisse in New York,
said: 'It was interesting that they're finally addressing
the possibility of a forward loss.' 'We've thought a
forward loss is possible but do not think it would be
declared until the third quarter. I don't expect them to
book a profit on the 787 for at least the first couple of
years.' Boeing is suffering as the global economic
downturn hits air travel: it lost 41 orders for 787s in the
past three months and received only 13 new orders,
leaving it with firm orders for 850 aircraft. It continues to
face other problems: the aircraft-maker was forced this
month to take over a key supplier in an effort to gain
tighter control of the production process. The problems
with the 787 have raised questions about the company's
management. Jim McNerney, chief executive, batted
away suggestions that there was a lack of
accountability within Boeing."
23 Reuters, Firrm- a "The Boeing Co. on Thursday sold $1.95 billion of On a
July "Boeing Investo senior unsecured notes in a three-part deal, said IFR, a modular
2009 Co Sells rs Thomson Reuters service. The sale included $750 million enterpri
$1.95 of 3.50 percent five-year notes priced to yield 110 basis se
bin points over comparable U.S. Treasuries. It also included architec
Notes in $750 million of 4..875 percent ten-year notes priced to ture's
3 Parts" yield 130 basis points over Treasuries, and $450 million of approac
(Camill 5.875 percent 30-year notes yielding 145 basis points over h to
e Treasuries, according to IFR. Banc of America finance.
Drumm Securities, Deutsche Bank, and Morgan Stanley were
ond) the joint lead managers on the sale."
24 Wall St. Yoshi Firm i "Toyota Motor Corp. got 'a little bit lost' in its North On the
July Journal mi American strategy and fell out of touch with customers dis-
2009 "Toyota Inaba, and the market, its new North American chief, Yoshimi integrtat
Lost VP, Inaba, said Monday. After years of growth and profits ion of
Touch, Toyota at Toyota, Mr. Inaba said, elements of complacency an
Executi Motors and arrogance infiltrated the company, which prides integral
ve North itself on being efficient and customer-oriented as well enterpri
Says" Ameri as constantly improving. To address this, Mr. Inaba se
(Kate ca plans an overhaul of Toyota's North American architec
Linebau operations. 'Our sense has been always that we listen ture -
gh) to the market, we listen to customers, we listen to the and
dealer. That element is a little bit lost,' Mr. Inaba told a attempts
group of reporters. He added that he is conducting an to re-
'overall replanning of our North American operation.' As integrat
the global vehicle market sunk last year, Toyota posted its e.
first loss in 58 years and projects to record another loss
for this fiscal year. In the first six months of this
calendar year, the company's U.S. sales fell 38%, more
than the overall market's 35% decline. Last month,
i:
Akio Toyoda, great-grandson of the company's founder,
took over as president as Toyota seeks to return to
profitability. Mr. Toyoda is emphasizing swifter
decision-making by local executives and seeking to add
more 'passion' to the company's products, Mr. Inaba
said. Mr. Inaba -- who was dispatched by Mr. Toyoda to
fix its biggest market -- says Toyota's North American
operations could return to profitability in the next fiscal
year as he seeks to reassess the company's business. He
said he expects U.S. light-vehicle sales to grow to about
12 million next year, though it will take time to return
to the 2007 level of 16 million. He expects sales this year
to be about 10 million. In the short term, Toyota has 'to
figure what to do with idle capacity,' said Aaron
Bragman, an analyst at IHS Global Insight. 'Toyota is
used to weathering ups and downs. They don't
necessarily react on a short-term scale. They don't lay
people off and shutter all the factories.' Toyota grew
rapidly this decade, adding factories and expanding its
product line in North America, home to seven of its
assembly plants. It opened a new plant in Canada at the
end of last year. But in the wake of plunging sales, many
of its plants aren't operating at capacity and the company
is faced with deciding the fate of a 25-year-old plant in
California that is a joint-venture with General Motors
Co. Mr. Inaba disagreed with the contention that
Toyota expanded too fast in North America. 'We were
having a tough time catching up with demand,' he said.
He stressed that the U.S. auto market 'remains the most
important market for Toyota.' Struggling to cope with
overcapacity, Mr. Inaba said the company hopes to
decide what to do with its California joint-venture
plant 'as quickly as possible.' GM said it was exiting
the partnership as part of its bankruptcy
reorganization. As part of the overall replanning process,
Mr. Inaba said he is evaluating what to do with a
partially built plant in Mississippi where Toyota
planned to produce its Prius hybrid. That factory was
indefinitely postponed last year. Restarting work on it
depends on how strong demand is for the Prius and
how the company reshuffles production to address
overcapacity. Prius sales have fallen after soaring last
year amid then-high gasoline prices. To assemble the
Prius in the U.S. Toyota would seek to produce some of
the vehicle's parts locally, he said. Mr. Inaba also said
Toyota wants to grab market share that GM and
Chrysler Group LLC lose through their restructurings,
though he conceded that Ford Motor Co. is best
positioned to benefit from the downsizing. 'We
certainly want a good chunk of it,' he said. 'As the dust
settles down a little bit we would also like to go after
any incremental volume.'"
24 Flightgl Akbar Firm- a "Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker is meeting with On
July obal, Al Custo Boeing officials tomorrow to discuss the latest delays to adversar
2009 "Qatar Baker, mer the Boeing 787 programme, and possible changes to the ial
CEO to CEO carrier's 787 delivery schedule that could result in relation
Meet Qatar deliveries from 2011. Speaking to reporters at last month's ships
with Airway Paris Air Show Baker warned the carrier may cancel its within a
Boeing s 30-aircraft 787 order if the airframer does not quickly modular
Tomorr resolve delay issues. At a media briefing in Washington enterpri
ow to DC today, Al Baker says Boeing has responded to this se
Discuss warning by scheduling a meeting with the carrier. 'The architec
787 meeting is at their request because they are now ture due
Deliveri concerned which way Qatar Airways will go,' Al Baker to over-
es" says. 'They are taking a very proactive stand with promise
(Brenda Qatar Airways.' Al Baker says 'there are a few issues we and
n Sobie) will discuss with them' including the latest delays in the under-
787 test programme and the possibility of assuming earlier delivery
delivery slots. He says Qatar's first 787 is now scheduled
to be roughly the 50th production aircraft to roll off the
assembly line, but there should be an opportunity to move
up as airlines ahead of Qatar have requested deferrals.
Qatar's first 787 was originally scheduled for delivery in
mid 2010, but programme delays have pushed back all
deliveries by at least two years. Al Baker is now asking for
slots in 2011 and says if Boeing can only offer 2012
deliveries it may cancel its entire order. 'If it slips into
2012 for delivery then we'll have to consider cancelling
our order," he says. 'We'll have to consider
(cancelling] because if there is another big slippage the
deliveries will be at the same we are receiving this large
order of A350s and the A350 mission will be very close
to the 787. If there's a huge overlap then why am I
buying two types of airplanes that are doing the same
mission?' Qatar has 100 A350s on order. Its 787 order is
for 30 firm aircraft plus 30 options. The carrier had been
planning to use the 787 to replace its A330s on
medium-haul routes and open new long-haul markets.
Al Baker says the A350 will be used for similar routes
but Qatar decided initially to also acquire 787s because
it needed additional capacity earlier. 'We'll start
getting the A350 during the last quarter of 2013 if they
are on time,' he says. 'I think there could be a six
month slippage maximum, but at the same time I feel
more confident Airbus will deliver on time due to the
fact they're learning huge lessons from the mistake
Boeing has made.' Al Baker believes 2011 deliveries for
the 787 are still feasible despite the latest delays in the
aircraft's first flight. He explains while aircraft number 50
may now not be delivered until after 2011 Qatar should be
able to move up to a 2011 slot because airlines which are
now ahead of it no longer want their 787s until after 2011.
'The people that are committed to the airplanes before us
are not taking those airplanes,' he explains.
He adds Qatar should be in position to receive these slots
because 'others that have ordered after us don't have the
right' to move up and take these slots. Al Baker says
Qatar will not accept any early production aircraft
because these will be heavier and will have
performance limitations. But he believes Qatar can
move up to 2011 slots without having to take any of these
early aircraft. He says last month Qatar was 'about to
~""-~1~ ~..................~~
send [Boeing] a letter of termination' but Boeing's
response since his comments at Paris gives him hope the
manufacturer may be able to provide the delivery slots and
'other technical requirements' Qatar seeks.
'They knew that when Qatar Airways says something
it's not just talk but we will follow it up with our
decision,' he says. He would not specify what new
technical requirements Qatar wants Boeing to meet,
explaining they are confidential and customer specific. But
he says they do not involve performance guarantees
because these are already specified in the original contract.
'We have very water tight performance guarantees
they will have to meet or else they will have to keep on
giving us cash,' Al Baker warns. He says if Qatar fails to
provide the delivery slots and technical requirements it
seeks the Qatar government's new aircraft leasing
company could take over the order and remarket the 30
787s to other airlines. 'Or we'll just cancel it to send a
message to Boeing that they shouldn't mess around
with customers,' Al Baker quickly adds. The Qatar
Airways chief believes Boeing knew about the delays at
Paris although it did not announce them until the
following week. Al Baker also criticises Boeing for not
taking steps earlier to mitigate the delays. 'Boeing has
lost leadership. The mess of this programme should
have been corrected a long time ago,' he claims, adding
Qatar had a better relationship with Boeing when Alan
Mulally was still CEO. 'I'm having a meeting with Boeing
here [Washington, DC] tomorrow. They will have to brief
me exactly where this programme is,' Al Baker adds."
24 Seattle Akbar Firm- a "Boeing CEO Jim McNerney had better look out -- On
July Post- Al Custo another industry CEO says he would take the job, and adversar
2009 Intellige Baker, mer do better at it. Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker has ial
ncerl, CEO not been shy about his disappointment with Boeing's relation
"Qatar Qatar delays for the 787 Dreamliner. Earlier this week, he spoke ships
Airways Airway in Washington, D.C. at a media luncheon. within a
CEO s modular
Would USA Today reports: 'Unfortunately Boeing has lost its enterpri
Take leadership,' Al Baker said. 'The mess with this (787) se
Boeing program could have been corrected a long time ago. If architec
CEO they had correctly focused management, they could have ture due
Job, seen this coming.' When asked if he'd take the job as to over-
Make CEO at Boeing if it were offered to him, Al Baker said: promise
'Heads 'I would take it and a lot of heads would roll. Just like and
Roll' it my airline. ... People must deliver.'" under-
(Andrea delivery
James)
26 Aviation Jim Firm a "More than four weeks after the 1 Ith-hour cancellation of On a
July Week McNer the maiden flight of the 787, Boeing's leaders are not modular
2009 "787 ney, providing basic details about how the problem of a failed enterpri
Schedul CEO, wing test will be corrected and when the new jet will fly. se
e Eludes The In its past 787 program slips - there have been six of architec
Boeing" Boeing them - Boeing has been unable to keep to schedules ture's
(Michae Compa that gave it as much as six more months of breathing overpro
1 ny; room each time. Following that scenario, the company's mise
Micham James assurances that a new schedule will be set by the end of and
, Joseph Bell, September will make it difficult for first flight before under-
C. CFO, 2010. Some skeptics in the investment community believe delivery
Anselm The the first-flight delay could be as long as one year. Looking
o, Guy Boeing at deliveries, Cowen & Co. analyst Cai von Rumohr is
Norris) Compa estimating the previous goal of starting in second-quarter
ny 2010 will be stretched to the fourth quarter. Morgan
Stanley analyst Heidi Wood does not see them until 2011.
In a second-quarter earnings call last week, Boeing
Chairman James McNerney said the goal of program
managers has not changed since a failed wing test was
revealed a week before Boeing's previous deadline for first
flight. The 787 team wants a plan 'that is retrofittable and
will easily flow into the production process,' he said.
McNerney says a plan is in hand 'in terms of parts and
reinforcements.' It is needed to strengthen composite
stringers on wings already built by Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries (MHI) to prevent them from delaminating under
flight loads. The stringers are delaminating where they
join the center wing box made by Fuji Heavy Industries.
It is not clear whether retrofits will be limited to the
stringers or also involve Fuji's center wing box. While
some initial tests have been run, a way to install
strengtheners 'in tight-fitting spaces in the airplane' is still
being sought, says McNerney. Boeing has indicated that
its suppliers have assemblies for some 40 aircraft in
various stages of development. How many wingsets are
at MHI is unclear, although Credit Suisse analyst
Robert Spingarn estimates there are at least 25 shipsets
not yet mated. Boeing hopes to buy time by strengthening
the wings it has while it devises a permanent solution for
wings still to be built. The company revealed the size of
its 787 investment for the first time in a second-quarter
10-Q filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission that includes work in progress of $4.4
billion, supplier advances of $2.6 billion, and tooling
and other expenses of $866 million - a total of
approximately $7.9 billion. Jeffries & Co. analyst
Howard Rubel notes that work in progress rose $1.4
billion during the first half of 2009 and the other two
categories increased by about $150 million. Chief
Financial Officer James Bell says 787 costs are growing
$800 million a quarter, but asserts that 'as we work
through these tough challenges, execution continues
very well.' Wood concludes that delays are 'obviously
putting pressure on the program's profitability.' The
profitability and cash flow of any program as large as the
787 are always grist for analysts' mills - but especially so
when they get in trouble. Von Rumohr sees cash flow
being stressed next year and in 2011 by the 787 delay.
Spingarn was not soothed by McNerney's assurances.
'While Boeing characterizes the wing-join issue as a
local problem with a local solution, we think it could be
time-consuming and expensive,' he says. He is looking
for research and development spending to grow this
year and in 2010, contrary to Bell's forecasts of its
being 'relatively flat' over the next 18 months after
growing $110 million to $360 m
I I I I I quarter. Lookine at ash
deiered) rlls out. He chose that number because
change and program disruptions probably mean there
will he nn nrnductinn learnino curve until then. 1e
the ear t and po l as late a. Following
those assumptions, Rubel sees program costs reaching $45
billion by the 500th aircraft. A major advantage of the
composite fuselage is that the 787 requires far fewer parts
than a traditional aluminum airplane. That was supposed
to provide Boeing with a manufacturing breakthrough that
would speed production. But the company already has
surpassed the time it took to build, flight test and
deliver the first 777 - its last large-fuselage aluminum
airplane. McNerney acknowledges that early
production plans were rosy scenarios. 'This is very
[much] an integration program and we are learning as
we go,' he told the analysts as they sought some clarity on
why things went wrong. .
t has bto The program is now running
two years late. 'If we were just punching out aluminum
airplanes, the challenge we gave ourselves would not be
as difficult,' says McNerney. When Boeing said it had
a wing problem on June 23, program managers said it
would take 'a few weeks' to reset their plans. The fact
that McNerney was unable to go beyond that
assessment increased skepticism about the program.
'Second-quarter earnings per share beat our estimate and
the consensus estimate; but with the absence of a new 787
schedule, we see [the earnings call] as largely a nonevent,'
said JPMorgan analyst Joseph B. Nadol. The rest of
Boeing's second-quarter report was largely positive,
especially considering the worst economic crisis since the
Great Depression. The company posted a 17% gain in
second-quarter net income and eked out a 1% sales
increase. It holds a $32-billion backlog, including $70
billion in defense programs, that is nearly five times
current annual revenues. And its earnings per share rose
22% to $1.41. Airline customers deferred 70 deliveries in
the quarter, up from 60 in the first quarter, but the
company is not changing its production levels. McNerney
says the deferrals are spread across all airplane types and
there is no pattern to them other than a weak worldwide
economy. 'Our backlog of deferral requests is coming
down right now,' he says. The goal early this year to
deliver 480-485 airplanes is regarded as achievable.
Completion of the body join on the first 747-8
I
Freighter last week is an indication that the program is
no longer tied to a loss of engineers to support the 787.
Although defense budgets are under threat, Boeing's
operating margins rose 10.1% as revenues reached $8.7
billion, compared with a $7.9-billion performance last
year. While company officials have declined to provide
specifics of how much load the static wing was under
when it failed, it is a safe assumption that the team had
passed the 100% flight-load level that characterizes
normal operations. Comments made by the management
team indicate engineers were headed toward the 150%
extreme load level needed for FAA certification. At some
as-yet-unspecified point in the stress testing, Boeing's
predictive model did not equate with actual test results. As
a way of understanding the problem, engineers
apparently began retesting the wing at lower loads and
learned that it was failing them, too. How close those
loads were to nominal flight levels is unclear, but they
apparently were well below 150%. Aside from the 787
marking commercial aviation's first composite
fuselage, the program has stretched the industry's use
of a global supply network beyond anything seen
before. When suppliers were unable to meet earlier
delivery deadlines, many suggested Boeing had taken
the model too far. The company restructured its
program management earlier, but the 787's continuing
problems have raised the question of how quickly
senior managers learn about production issues. 'Bad
news doesn't appear to flow up,' said Bank of
America/Merrill Lynch analyst Ron Epstein. McNerney
denies that is the issue. 'This is not an issue of
information flow,' he responded. 'It's an issue of the
thousands upon thousands of tests we do. . . .One of
them turned up wrong that we didn't anticipate.' And
so the whole program is in limbo."
27 Market Firm- a "Boeing Co., the Chicago aerospace giant, was cut to equal On a
July Watch, Investo weight from overweight at Barclays Capital. The modular
2009 "Boeing r investment bank's aerospace and defense analysts also cut enterpri
Cut to their price target to $46 from $60. The analysts cited se'
Equal 'technical challenges and additional delays' on the 787 continu
Weight project 'for which Boeing is as yet unable to assess either ed over-
at schedule or financial impact.' The financial impact of optism
Barclay four delays in the project and 'the costs of pre-
s production, technical fixes, penalties to airlines and
Capital supplier claims' add up to 'significant, but as yet
" undisclosed overruns,' the analysts said in a report.
(Robert Because of the costs, the risk is increasing that Boeing
Daniel) will decide it must 'declare a forward loss on the 787,'
they said. On the other hand, once Boeing gets past the
startup problems and 'when, as planned in 2013, the
787 is being produced at 120 per year,' the plane 'has
the potential to be the most profitable aircraft Boeing
has ever had,' they said."
29 New James Firm a "After a 20-year run, the Ford Taurus was headed for On a
July York Farley, the scrap heap in 2007. The automaker planned to retire modular
2009 Times, head the name, and call its new sedan the Ford Five Hundred enterpri
~
"Once of instead. But Ford's new chief executive, Alan R. Mulally, se
Moth- global reversed course, figuring the Taurus name still had value, archthie
balled market even though its reputation had faltered as the car became cture's
Taurus ing, best known as a staple of rental car fleets. Those instincts focus on
is Back Ford will be tested when a new version of the Taurus begins radical
on arriving in dealer showrooms next week. How consumers product
Stage at respond will answer a big question for Ford: can it make develop
Ford" money on a full-size sedan? 'This a real acid test for our ment.
(Bill product strategy,' said James Farley, Ford's head of global
Vlasic) marketing. Ford says it will exercise a new sense of
discipline with the Taurus. Rather than aiming for a
home-run product that sells hundreds of thousands of
units - and then be forced to offer incentives to
persuade shoppers to buy them all - Ford plans to
build lower numbers of the Taurus. That way, it might
be able to avoid steep discounts so it can turn a profit
on each one. If the car languishes on dealer lots, though,
Mr. Mulally's fledgling turnaround could stall. The car's
base price of $26,000 is higher than some competing
models. Mr. Farley and other Ford executives readily
acknowledge that previous versions of the car were
utilitarian and hardly up to the standard of comparable
sedans from Toyota and Honda. But they also are
counting on the image of the old Taurus fading from
the public's consciousness. 'Its deterioration over time
has allowed us the freedom to write a business plan to
more realistic expectations,' Mr. Farley said. At its peak
in the late 1980s, Taurus was the top-selling car in the
United States with more than 500,000 sales a year. The
new model's targets are somewhere from 50,000 to 75,000
annually. 'Ultimately customers are going to judge you
on whether you're offering something new,' Mr. Farley
said. 'This car can't just be a little better. It has to be
demonstrably better in every respect.' The advertising
campaign, which begins next week on national
television, focuses on technology. One of the new
features is the 'blind spot information system,' sold as
an add-on, that uses radar to detect vehicles that can't
be seen in the mirror. Another is the so-called 'eco-
boost' engine that provides additional power without
using more fuel. Ford's marketig anagers spent a
month last year interviewing thne dozen of the car's
engineers to determine which features might be most
compelling to potential buyers. 'The design speaks for
itself, but we've got the goods to show when it comes to
features,' said Matt VanDyke, director of Ford brand
marketing."
29 The Tom Firm- a "The Machinists union at Boeing announced Tuesday a On a
July Seattle Buffen Emplo deal to ease the sting of the plane maker's continuing modular
2009 Times, barger, yees layoffs. The company has agreed to offer a voluntary enterpri
"Boeing IAM layoff package that could be attractive to older se
Agrees nationa workers. And yet - despite much speculation that a architec
to 1 long-term labor agreement is being negotiated to help ture's
Volunta preside ensure future plane work for the state - labor continu
ry nt; relations between Boeing and the International ed
Severan Doug Association of Machinists (IAM) remain perilous. Even adversar
~ I***~ ~;;;;;;;~
ce Kight, as IAM District 751 President Tom Wroblewski welcomed ial
Package VP the layoff pact, the union's national boss, Tom repation
but HR, Buffenbarger, flatly rejected Boeing management's ship
Broader Boeing publicly stated goal of a long-term, no-strike agreement with
Agreem Comm with the union. 'It's all smoke and mirrors,' said labor.
ent with ercial Buffenbarger. 'They aren't offering anything.' He
Machini Airpla added: 'This is all a drama being played out for the
sts Still nes benefit of the politicians and the Boeing Company.
Far Off" We're not going to agree to a no-strike agreement.
(Domini They had their chance.' The voluntary layoff package
c Gates) announced Tuesday could save the jobs of younger
workers as those approaching retirement see an advantage
in volunteering to leave early. The incentives include up
to 13 weeks of severance pay and continued health
benefits for six months. In addition, workers 49 and older
who volunteer will be eligible for a company pension
when they turn 55. Those are incentives designed to
appeal to those nearing retirement and who want to leave.
The severance pay offered is only half what a worker
laid off involuntarily would get. And workers with skills
deemed critical will not be eligible. However, a previous
Boeing voluntary layoff deal in 1993 offered no
incentives, said IAM spokeswoman Connie Kelliher. One
veteran Machinist said the Everett assembly plant was
abuzz Tuesday with talk of the deal. 'People who want to
leave can leave. This is a way that people with young
families, that the company has just gotten trained, they can
stay,' said the Machinist, who asked not to be named. 'It's
a win-win. (Boeing) is lowering its labor costs. It's good
for morale. It's good for the community.' Wroblewski
said the union has pressed for the deal since Boeing said in
January it intended to cut 10,000 jobs companywide this
year. The state has lost more than 3,000 Boeing jobs since
the recent peak last November.
Union sought deal
Wroblewski said discussions to improve relations will
continue. However, his boss, Buffenbarger, went out of
his way Tuesday to quash the notion that the layoff deal
might lead to a long-term, no-strike deal, an idea floated
by politicians to try to secure future Boeing work for the
region. Earlier this month, local politicians including U.S.
Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Bremerton, revealed Boeing is
pushing the union hard for a no-strike deal by the end of
the year. He presented one aspect of the talks as
effectively an ultimatum to the union: That a no-strike deal
would mean Everett would get a second 787 final-
assembly line, but that no deal would result in the line
going somewhere else. Dicks and Gov. Chris Gregoire
said Boeing needed to negotiate with the union and offer
something substantial in return. After those public
comments by the politicians, Boeing's top labor
negotiator, Doug Kight, laid out the barriers to any
long-term deal in a July 14 internal message to all Boeing
Commercial Airplane managers. Kight's message tacitly
confirmed that 'a series of discussions with union
ltt?
leadership' is indeed focused on reaching a no-strike
agreement. But he also laid out why it will be hard to
achieve: A stumbling block for management is that in
the absence of a strike option, it would likely have to
offer the Machinists some kind of independent arbitration
for disputes. 'It's important to realize that a long-term
labor agreement, enabled in part by some form of third-
party dispute resolution, would ask a great deal of both
sides,' Kight's letter said. 'It would be difficult for a
union to give up its option to strike. At the same time, it
would be just as difficult for Boeing to allow a third
party to make decisions that affect our competitiveness
and how we run our business,' the message went on. 'No
company could give away its ability to run its business
as conditions require.' Last week, in a teleconference
timed for the company's quarterly earnings report, Boeing
CEO Jim McNerney said talks are proceeding. 'The IAM
and the company are meeting together, trying to find new
ways of working together so that we don't impact our
customers ... as badly as we have historically as we go
through these disruptions,' McNerney said. 'We're going
to keep doing that.'
No substance
But Buffenbarger said there is no substance to the talks.
He said Boeing has refused all his suggestions of
independent mediators to aid the discussions. And
instead of offering some enticements to the union to agree
to forfeit its strike weapon, he said, management has been
asking the union for suggestions. 'They are trying to get
us to bargain with ourselves,' Buffenbarger said.
'We've seen that tactic before. We're not buying into
it.' A veteran local Machinist with knowledge of the talks
said there have been meetings both in Seattle and in
Washington, D.C. He cautioned Tuesday that
Buffenbarger's position as head of the union requires him
to adopt an aggressive public posture. He insisted 'labor
peace is still negotiable.' But if that's ever to happen,
Buffenbarger has a clear message as to who will do the
negotiating. 'Boeing is making another ill-fated attempt
to negotiate an agreement in the wrong places with the
wrong people,' Buffenbarger said. 'I invite the governor,
Norm Dicks and the other politicians to butt out."'
30 Busines Bob Firm- 3 "A bidding war for tiny Frontier Airlines? The bankrupt On an
July sWeek, Jordan, Custo carrier, which in June agreed to be acquired by Republic integral
2009 "South Execut mers Airways (RJET) for $108.8 million, has drawn the interest enterpri
west ive of Southwest Airlines (LUV), a major rival in the contested se
Airlines Vice Denver market. Southwest submitted a nonbinding architec
Moves Preside proposal on July 30 offering to pay a minimum of $113.6 ture'
in on nt ofor million for Denver-based Frontier. Any other interested real (or
Frontier Strateg parties have until Aug. 10 to submit a binding bid for the apparen
" y and carrier under terms approved by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court's t) dis-
(Justin Planni review of Republic's proposal. An auction is scheduled for integrati
Bachma ng, Aug. 11 at Davis, Polk & Wardwell, the New York law on
n) Southw firm representing Frontier in the restructuring. Southwest
est says it would operate Frontier as a wholly owned
rrr
Airline subsidiary 'for a period of time with its Airbus aircraft
s and personnel.' But that period would end within
about two years, after which Southwest would not add
Frontier's Airbus jets to its all-Boeing 737 fleet.
Southwest's bid, if successful, would mark a tiny step in
the U.S. airline industry's consolidation and could swiftly
reorder the competitive balance at Denver, a hub for
United Airlines (UAUA), long the dominant carrier. Over
time, Frontier's domestic capacity in Denver, currently
about 10% of the market, would likely supplement
Southwest's operation incrementally, as growth warrants.
In the interim, Southwest would immediately become a
stronger competitor to United, which has a 36%
market share at Denver, compared with 21% for
Frontier and 12% for Southwest, according to the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. As United has been
cutting capacity at Denver in response to the downturn
in air travel, coupled with its own efforts to curb costs,
Southwest has identified the market as one of its biggest
strategic opportunities. With Frontier the carrier could
easily become the largest player in Denver. If its bid is
successful, Southwest would also need to determine
whether to expand into two important airports Frontier
serves but Southwest has long avoided: Atlanta, the busiest
U.S. airport and a hub Delta Air Lines (DAL) has
defended staunchly; and Washington's Reagan-National
Airport, which has 'perimeter' constraints on how far
flights can operate.
Less Competition, Pricier Tickets?
Another byproduct could be higher fares, as Southwest
culls overlapping Frontier flights. Competition at Denver
has been fierce, with Southwest claiming much of the
credit for lowering fares. Average fares from Denver
have fallen by over 10% in the past year, 35.5% from 2001
to 2009, and now stand at $292, according to federal data.
Since 2001, only Long Beach, Calif.; Charlotte, N.C.;
Richmond, Va.; and White Plains, N.Y., have seen steeper
fare decreases among the top 100 U.S. airports. The
Frontier bid also would give Southwest entree to
Mexico, where it does not yet offer flights. On a
conference call with reporters, Bob Jordan, Southwest's
executive vice-president for strategy and planning, said
the company is pleased about the prospects of
expanding into Mexico with a Frontier acquisition. '1
can tell you that we are very interested in doing the due
diligence work in understanding the near-international
market,' Jordan said. 'I1 think that's a very exciting
opportunity for Southwest Airlines.' Acquiring a
carrier with Mexican destinations, as well as marketing
relationships, facility leases, and other necessary
infrastructure, makes it easier and less expensive for
Southwest to enlarge its network. The Dallas-based
airline has struggled to expand its services abroad, taking
tentative steps in recent months to develop code-sharing
agreements with Canada's WestJet Airlines and Volaris, a
. ................. ---------- ~Ir
low-cost airline in Mexico. In May, Southwest decided to
delay plans for its WestJet partnership, and final details of
the Volaris alliance are not expected until mid-2010.
Frontier also would give Southwest additional landing
slots at New York's slot-constrained LaGuardia airport-
which it began serving in June-and could give the
company additional opportunities to more easily link the
metro New York and Philadelphia markets to destinations
in the West with one-stop service."
31 The Arvind Firm - a "Indian flagship carrier Air India, struggling with massive On a
July Econom Jadhav Custo losses, has cancelled orders for five Boeing 777 planes, a modular
2009 ic , mer report said Friday. The Hindustan Times also said the enterpri
Times, Chair state-run airline was claiming 710 million dollars from se
"Loss- man the US planemaker for failing to deliver 27 B-787 architec
Hit Air and aircraft on time. 'The cancellation orders have already ture's
India Manag been issued by my engineering department,' Air India relation
Cancels ing chairman and managing director Arvind Jadhav was ship
Five Direct quoted as saying by the newspaper. He alleged that with
Boeing or, Air Boeing's failure to deliver the 27 B-787 planes had custome
Orders India caused large losses for the company. 'The entire rs,
" schedule of Air India has gone haywire. We have put a regardin
claim of 710 million dollars for their failure to deliver g over-
the aircrafts to us in time,' the Air India chief told the promise
newspaper. The airline faces a financial crisis after and
posting an estimated one billion dollar loss for the fiscal under-
year ended March 31 and is hoping for a big government delivery
rescue package."
31 Seattle Firm- a "When considering the health of Chicago-based The On a
July Post- Investo Boeing Co., what factors would you take into account? modular
2009 Intellige rs Boeing's business is coming to a point where it is being enterpri
ncer evaluated on Wall Street as either 787 Dreamliner- se
"More related or everything else, says Barclays aerospace architet
and analyst Joseph Campbell. As reported in this blog in the ure's
More, past couple of weeks, Boeing has several airplane delayed
Invstors programs -- particularly on the defense side -- that are valuatio
Place doing well, on time and on budget. But bad news about n of
Bets Boeing's much hyped 787 tends to overshadow all that. over-
Against As far as Boeing's stock is concerned, investors are promise
Boeing' increasingly betting against Boeing's success. &
s Aerospace analyst Scott Hamilton recently posted a list of under-
Success numbers showing the number of short sales on Boeing's delivery
" stock from the year that the 787 was launched in 2004
(Andrea through July 15, 2009. Hamilton received the data from
James) a Wall Street analyst who pulled it off of a Bloomberg
terminal, he said. The number of short sales grew from
just under 10 million in January 2004 to nearly 23
million in July. When an investor buys a 'short sale' on
a stock, he or she is essentially betting that the stock
will go down. It's a bet against the company's success.
I put the numbers into Excel, for a graphic representation,
and the result is telling: Analyst Campbell says that the
787 should be viewed as a growing asset, not a liability,
but also acknowledges that as long as the market is
uncertain about the 787, 'Boeing shares will be
volatile."'
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#342873 Posted by Redcedar at 7/31/09 4:54 p.m.
"Ever since the McD coup/Chicago move, Boeing has
been progressively taken over by the same folks with
the same disease who sank McD. The 787 is brought to
you by the McD team. The investors are seeing the
impact of their poor decision-making and are fleeing.
We need the current executive team to go away, we need
Boeing to come home. Perhaps the best part of this will
be when Commercial goes belly-up and gets sold off
because the McD side can no longer milk it to death,
and BCAG gets reborn as a Seattle company building
metal airplanes. Couldn't happen? Notice that all the
tooling now sits on wheels. All we need is a flat floor and
a roof. And when the IDS/McD guys run us into the
ground, that property in Everett will be up for a fire
sale."
#342906 Posted by mshowell at 7/31/09 5:35 p.m.
"Redcedar, I have to agree. The Nightmare liner is a
joke, a Spruce Goose. And because of it a and the
mickieD's, Boeing is slowly dying. The only thing
keeping it alive is the 737. I'm betting in twelve to
eighteen months they will announce the ending of the
787. It was and is a good idea, but it needs to be
throughly researched, maybe a much smaller plane
first."
#342936 Posted by unregistered user at 7/31/09 6:52
P.m.
"I've said it before and I'll say it again. B787 will not fly,
ever."
#343335 Posted by unregistered user at 8/1/09 12:39
"Condit was Boeing's Benedict Arnold. He sold out the
company because Harry told him he could get him more
money in 1 year than he had gotten in 35 years. And that's
what happened. From $2 million/year to $19.8 million
/year. The cost to Boeing.......McD executives getting the
top Boeing jobs over the Boeing heritage execs. EVERY
one of Boeing's problems, including Sears, they got from
McD. Both, Harry Stonecipher and McNerny are proteges
of Jack Welch of GE, who along with Roger Smith of GM
are the most NOTORIOUS CEOs in history, and you can
see results at both GE and GM. Unless Boeing gets rid of
the present CEO and senior executives and board of
directors very soon, Boeing will go bankrupt."
#343337 Posted by Vegas Dog at 8/1/09 12:56 p.m.
"I think Boeing is finished as far as being a viable
commercial aircraft manufacturer. It won't close it's
door in the near future, but is never the less a goner."
#343392 Posted by fisquid at 8/1/09 3:31 p.m.
"Boeing is not a goner if it can get rid of its current
leadership and get some new blood at the top. The
~ ~; ~............;
problem: the bills are now paid by legacy products
produced under previous management. If the current
management cannot execute a new design, then the
company goes bankrupt when its existing designs become
obsolete and stop selling. It's that simple. So, you know
what's going to happen, now you know when. Absent a
turnover in top management, you can rest assured of
what the future holds."
#343416 Posted by John Roger at 8/1/09 4:36 p.m.
"The three whiz kids that worked at GE under Jack
Welch have done nothing but harm to the companys
that hired them as CEOs: Boeing, Home Depot/Chrysler
and GE."
#343421 Posted by unregistered user at 8/1/09 4:46
P.m.
"#343336 got it right. Condit, who once ran the successful
777 program before becoming President and CEO, got
sucked in by Stonecipher and his minions who took over
so many Boeing corporate and commercial leadership
positions. The reason Boeing is not making tankers today
is because of now ex-con Mike Sears, who by the way ran
the military side of MDC. That arrogant jerk proved in
spades that he had no integrity and was not capable as a
corporate chief financial officer. Commercial airframes
for military purpose get logged as military sales. And for
the idiot who said MDC's military book of business is
saving Boeing, you better check again, because those
products are stale and C-17, is on the edge of being
discontinued. Thanks to Stonecipher, and the outdated
offering of the Harrier jump jet technology in the joint
strike fighter competition in 2001, Boeing lost out to
Lockheed Martin. Again, thanks to Stonecipher Boeing
R&D leading to the offering of the 787 was delayed for
something two years. The legacy of Stonecipher and his
decisions have nearly killed Boeing to date (ever hear the
fairytale the emporer's new clothes - it could have been
about Harry). Harry wanted to hear only things that
reinforced his views. That meant no bad news or
differing opinions. For the last 10 years, since trying to
digest the MDC and Rockwell acquisitions is a company
in search of its soul. There has never been a good
business case made for the expensive corporate move to
Chicago. Thank Stonecipher and the MDC contingent of
the Board of Directors for that, including Condit. It's less
than 300 miles from St. Louis to Chicago. McNerny got on
the board because he once ran GE engines before going to
3M, and only became CEO when Lou Platt (former HP
exec.), Boeing Board Chairman suddenly died. Can
anyone name anything that Harry Stonecipher did right,
other than ask for bigger more luxurient napkins in the
corporate dining room?"
#343434 Posted by unregistered user at 8/1/09 5:12
. ........ ... . ...............
"You idiots that always blame the IAM union workforce
for Boeing's problem have no idea what you are talking
about. I always hear that the hourly workers are paid too
much money. If that is the case, how come the salary
people at Boeing (non-union) have much higher annual
earnings and much better retirement benefits? The
corporate media has managed to brainwash all of you
fellow middle class workers into believing that it is the
worker salaries that are killing the companies instead of
the bad decisions that management is making. Answer
this, what per cent of Boeing operating costs goes
toward hourly worker pay each year? What would be a
fair number? 15% 10% ??? Actual costs to Boeing for
the hourly workers is only 2.8% ....How can that be
bankrupting Boeing?"
#343460 Posted by unregistered user at 8/1/09 6:05
P-m-
"This chart shows nothing. You need to plot this
against long sales, and against general short sales in the
down market since mid-2008."
#343468 Posted by 777mech at 8/1/09 6:27 p.m.
"You can blame both Boeing and McD execs for the mess
the company is in. Stonecipher and John McDonnell
told Mullally that he had to bring the 787 in at 50
percent of what the 777 cost, which was $10 billion.
How can you set a limit like that 15 years later on an
airplane more complex than the 777? So Mullally came
up with global partnership plan. Then cut and run."
#343496 Posted by Chronic at 8/1/09 8:18 p.m.
"From my knothole in the fence, they quit building
airplanes like they used to. They tried too many new
things at the same time. They decided they were so good
they did not need a certain type of integration lab--Wrong
Move! I was around during the 777 days. We had
problems then but overcame and moved on. Many lessons
learned but the knowledge was not carried on. I think the
787 team was like the Keystone Cops. Where did they
come from? Obviously not from our recent successful
past. We will get there and overcome but there are so may
1-told-you-so's it is just ridiculous. Too many parts farmed
out then finding out those partners could not keep up with
the job. We had to either supply workers to bail them out,
or to buy back those partners. A real cost savings solution.
What is even more ridiculous is all this being blamed on a
machinists strike. I wish the ignorant would get a clue."
#343517 Posted by unregistered user at 8/1/09 9:28
"Ah yes. MDC CEO John McDonnell who drove them
to the brink of bankruptcy, and hired Harry away
from Sundstrand to find a buyer for MDC commercial
and military. They couldn't compete against Boeing
and Airbus for commercial planes, had their A-12
Iri
Avenger bomber aircraft unilaterally cancelled by
Secretary of Defense Cheney for huge cost overruns, lost
in a preliminary round of the joint strike fighter
competition, and screwed up their rocket business. And,
as a board member and largest individual Boeing
shareholder, John Mc was actively involved through
Stonecipher in telling Boeing how to make and finance
commercial aircraft. Stonecipher should have never
crossed the threshold of a Boeing property."
#343530 Posted by unregistered user at 8/1/09 10:33 p.m.
"NOT A RANT: High short interest is actually
considered bullish in the near term. Short sellers risk a
margin call with every uptick in price. When they buy
to cover, the price ticks up again, and they have to
cover more, and more. Market players understand this,
and will tease out little blips in the prices just to start
this reverse run. Sooner or later the short sellers get
squeezed out and the price falls back to a stable point,
no telling where. Agree with 343460 that you have to
compare with long positions to confirm an inbalance."
#343557 Posted by Leelaw at 8/2/09 2:06 a.m.
"The problems plaguing the 787 program arose during
Mr. Mulally's leadership of BCA, whether he would
have done a better job of resolving the problems of his
own making than the demonstrably ineffectual Messrs
McNerney, Carson, and Duberstein (board ringleader)
have, will remain a mystery."
#343565 Posted by unregistered user at 8/2/09 3:08 a.m.
"it took Sunstrand 10 years to recover from Harry
Stonecipher, and even that was miraculous because
everyone thought that Harry had killed Sundstrand.
Donald Douglas Jr. killed Douglas, and Harry killed
McD-Douglas with a lot of help from McD."
3 The Fred Firm- a "A standoff between Boeing and the Machinists union On a
Aug. Seattle Kiga, Emplo that could thwart Everett's chances to win the second 787 modular
2009 Times, vice yees Dreamliner production line became clearer at an aerospace enterpri
"Boeing preside conference in Lynnwood on Monday. Boeing is pushing se
Looking nt of for a no-strike deal that would influence the decision, architec
at state which may come by the end of the year. But the ture's
Everett, and International Association of Machinists (IAM) sees no adversar
Other local need to reopen the current contract, signed last fall ial
Sites for govern after a two-month strike, and is working toward the relation
Second ment next scheduled contract in 2012. 'There's a ship
787 relatio disconnect,' Snohomish County Executive Aaron Reardon with
Producti ns, conceded. 'It has to be resolved.' Earlier in the day in employ
on Boeing Charleston, S.C., Dreamliner program chief Scott Fancher ees
Line" Comm officially unveiled the company logo on the side of its (unions)
(Domini ercial newly acquired fuselage-assembly facility. In a separate
c Gates) Airpla development in Charleston, a worker filed a petition last
nes; Thursday - the day Boeing formally closed on the
Larry purchase of the operation from its 787 partner, Texas-
Brown based Vought - to decertify the Machinists union at
, IAM the plant. That will likely trigger a vote that could oust
.~;;;~~;;;;;;;;;~ s~
legislat the union two years after it organized the factory.
ive and Because of discontent in the Charleston work force over
politic the contract the IAM agreed to there last November,
al that move has a good chance of success. If the
directo decertification goes through, Everett will be competing
r against a nonunion facility for the second 787 line.
Larry Brown, IAM legislative and political director, said
the union is working with Boeing to improve relations. He
said the union proposed to help Boeing be more flexible
in its production by deploying machinists to a mixed
assembly line that could roll out either 787s or 777s,
according to demand. 'Boeing already has the tools,
the facilities and the experienced workers in place to
open the second 787 line here,' he said. Brown said the
union hopes to raise the level of trust sufficiently so
that the contract negotiations in 2012 don't end in
another strike. 'The only possible guarantee of no-strike
when our current contract expires is for Boeing and the
Machinists union to be committed to negotiating a
settlement and not a strike,' Brown said. 'We have time
to build the kind of relationship we need to make that
happen.' In contrast, Boeing's Fred Kiga, vice
president of state and local government relations,
reiterated that management wants a long-term, no-
strike agreement and wants it in place well before the
current contract ends. 'I don't believe we have until
2012,' said Kiga in an interview. 'We at the Boeing
Company have a sense of urgency about finding
production stability.' Kiga said choosing a final-
assembly site somewhere other than Everett would, in
the event of a work stoppage at one plant, give Boeing
an alternative to keep its jets rolling out. In his speech
at the conference, Kiga decried the '20-year pattern of
labor disputes and strikes' with the IAM and expressed
optimism about the current talks with the union, which
he called 'long overdue.' 'We intend to continue the
conversation,' Kiga said. 'We have an opportunity. We
have seized it. ... We're hopeful we can take the risk of
labor stoppages out of the equation.' 'Nobody wants to
participate in the decline of the aerospace industry in
Washington,' he said. Politicians at the Lynnwood
summit encouraged the two sides to come to an agreement,
though they offered advice gingerly because last week
IAM international President Tom Buffenbarger in an
interview asked politicians to 'butt out' and leave
negotiations to the union. The summit's keynote speaker,
U.S. Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Bremerton, said the people of
Washington and their elected representatives have a
serious stake in the outcome, but conceded that only the
union leadership and Boeing management can get it done.
'The Hatfields and the McCoys have to stop feuding,'
said Dicks. He said the loss of a second 787 line could
well lead later to the loss of an assembly plant for a new
jet to replace the 737 toward the end of the next decade.
Dicks said the outcome of the IAM/Boeing talks could
prove to be 'Washington's finest hour or the most dismal
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setback and a loss of national leadership."'
3 Telegra Mark Firm- a "The company reported a pre-tax profit of £21.1m in the On a
Aug. ph, Rollins Suppli six months to June, down from £27.2m in the same period modular
2009 "Senior , CEO, er last year, which it blamed on weak land vehicle and enterpri
Profits Senior business jet markets, the residual impact of last year's se
Hit by Boeing strike and de-stocking by customers. The 787, architec
Boeing for which Senior supplies air ducts and other parts, is ture's
Dreamli already two years late and has been delayed five times by low
ner Boeing. Senior estimate it would increase sales by around trust
Delay" 12pc and its commercial aerospace revenue by around
(Jonatha 50pc, with each plane worth around $800,000 (£473,000)
n Liew) to the company. Mark Rollins, Senior chief executive,
said that although he did not expect the 787 to be ready
for another six months, Boeing's delay would not
adversely affect the company in the long-term. He
added: 'We have phenomenally good relations with
them and usuay have the" insle tracki bet they've
generally gone quiet for everybwly on the 787s, so
we're reliant on their public statements.'
'But we are talking with Boeing about what else they
could give us, so we may win some extra work because
of the delay.'"
3 Blombe Mark Firm- a "Boeing Co. may not get the 787 Dreamliner flying for On a
Aug. rg, Rollins Suppli another six months following its fifth postponement, said modular
2009 "Boeing , CEO, er Senior Plc, a British supplier of air ducts and other parts enterpri
Dreamli Senior for the plane. 'We estimate another six-month delay,' se
ner Chief Executive Officer Mark Rollins said today in a architec
Faces telephone interview. 'Their credibility is somewhat in ture's
Six- question."" low
month trust
Delay,
Senior
Says"
(Tim
Barwell
6 USA Firm a "This was to be Boeing's summer of triumph. Dozens of On a
Aug. Today its groundbreaking 787 Dreamliners were supposed to be modular
2009 "From in commercial airline service around the world by now, enterpri
Dreamli changing the nature of global air travel. A family of ultra- se
ner to high-tech spy satellites made by Boeing (BA) was to be in architec
Lost the heavens, reading the license plate numbers of the ture's
Military USA's vilest enemies from 150 miles up. Profits from systemi
Deals, regular launches of commercial satellites from a floating c
Problem launch pad on the equator were supposed to be rolling in. problem
s Nag The Air Force was to take delivery of a fleet of new air-to- s.
Boeing" air refueling tankers based on the Boeing 767. But none of
(Dan that is happening this summer. And some likely never will.
Reed) 'Every aircraft, and every defense program Boeing is
involved in is having problems," says Scott Hamilton, an
independent aircraft manufacturing and sales analyst and
consultant. "Boeing is, quite simply, a mess right now.
And I say that as an unhappy shareholder." This is
quite a turnaround for Boeing, which is America's
largest exporter. Barely a year ago, the company was
doing well. Or so it seemed. Its stock traded at a 52-week
----; ; I - - Irr
high of $68.75. It boasted an unprecedented backlog of
firm orders for jetliners worth well over $350 billion,
including more than 900 for Dreamliners, the fastest-
selling plane in history. It was coming off two straight
years of sales victories over Europe's Airbus. Both the
revolutionary 787 and the 747-8 extension of the venerable
Boeing 747 jumbo jet were moving toward their first
flights. Its defense and space business seemed to be
booming. Then came last fall's costly 58-day strike by
production workers at Boeing's Commercial Airplane
division that delayed delivery of dozens of planes. That
was followed by a fourth major setback for the 787 and
rapid deterioration of the economy that destabilized
Boeing's airline customers worldwide. A growing number
of less-publicized setbacks took place in the company's
defense and space business. Some were related to
changing program priorities and shrinking budgets under a
new president and Congress. Others resulted from
Boeing's failure to perform to expectations.
787 becomes 'Nightmareliner'
The Chicago-based company still managed to report a
modest first-quarter profit this year, then a large $998
million second-quarter profit, up 17% from the second
quarter of 2008. But industry analysts are fretting about
bloated inventory costs, sagging cash flow, increased
borrowing and mounting cancellations of orders. They
also worry about defense contracts that have been scaled
down, lost or threatened because of Boeing's inability to
deliver on its promises. Take, for instance, Boeing's role
as systems integrator of the Army's ambitious Future
Combat Systems program, the Pentagon's second-biggest
weapons development program. It has been scaled back
partly because of poor performance. Analysts also are
expecting Boeing to swallow a charge against earnings
of up to $500 million related to the June 22 Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing of the Sea Launch commercial satellite
launch joint venture. Boeing owns 40% of heavily
indebted Sea Launch. Companies in Norway, Russia and
Ukraine own the rest. On June 23, Boeing delivered its
most disquieting news yet. Ground testing of the 787
Dreamliner had revealed a structural failure in the world's
first jetliner made mostly of composite materials rather
than aluminum and steel. The discovery of 36 tiny weak
points where the wings join the fuselage forced a last-
minute scuttling of the 787's first flight. It was the fifth
time in two years that Boeing had to tear up its 787 test
and delivery schedules. Worse, officials still can't say
for sure when the project will get back on track, though
they hope the plane will fly by year's end. Industry
analysts were particularly peeved that this latest delay
came less than a week after Boeing executives had
assured them at the Paris Air Show that the 787's first
flight would be before the end of June. Wags, who'd
already been calling the Dreamliner the 7-LATE-7,'
came up with an even more scathing nickname: The
'Nightmareliner.' So when Boeing executives hosted a
conference call on July 22 to talk about the company's
better-than-expected second-quarter profit, the tone of the
conversation was anything but celebratory. Investors
instantly picked up on the analysts' concerns. Boeing's
shares, which already had fallen 35% since last August,
dropped another 2.4% to $42 that day and another nickel
the day after that. Wednesday the stock closed at $44.03.
Analyst Brent Miller, who follows Boeing for Gradient
Analytics in Scottsdale, Ariz., says the tone of the call
'was very negative, and the market's response was very
tepid' because 'management is starting to lose
credibility.'
Trying to turn a corner
That's damning criticism for any company, but
especially for Boeing, which had recently appeared to
have its act together after years of costly failures and
misdeeds. Veteran industry analyst Richard Aboulafia of
the Teal Group says that in the years following Boeing's
1997 merger with old rival McDonnell Douglas, the
company developed a habit of failing to deliver on
grand promises to win big defense contracts. At the
same time, Boeing's name was dragged through the
mud by a series of embarrassing ethical lapses by key
executives. The list of improprieties was long. But most
notably, former CFO Michael Sears ended up in prison
for trying to win the Air Force tanker contract by
offering a high-paying job to the Pentagon decision-
maker. Two former chairmen were shown the door in
2003 and 2005, the latter, Harry Stonecipher, for a
national headline-grabbing extramarital affair with
another Boeing officer. Jim McNerney, a former 3M
CEO and onetime head of General Electric's successful jet
engine division, was hired in mid-2005 to clean up
Boeing's mess. And, seemingly, he did. The straight-
arrow McNerney got high marks in his first three years
at Boeing's helm for changing the company's culture,
streamlining its organization and cutting costs. The share
price's run to record levels was viewed as evidence
McNerney had Boeing back and headed for a long run
of big profits. But McNerney also was riding on the
back of the promised riches of the Dreamliner. The
feather-light plane made of strong composites is billed as
20% more fuel-efficient and 30% less expensive to
maintain than its metal-skinned ancestors. For travelers,
Boeing says, it will be the most comfortable ride ever. Its
promise created a near-stampede by airlines scampering to
Seattle, home of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, to place
orders. By last fall, Boeing had more than 900 orders
worth $135 billion to $160 billion in revenue over the next
decade. The number of orders is now down to 850, as
airlines, upset by the delays or unsure whether they can
afford the planes, have begun canceling. Although that's
still a record number of orders for an airplane that hasn't
been certified to fly, the financial damage is an
........................
estimated $9 billion to $10 billion. And the question isn't
whether there'll be more cancellations, but how many?
Reaction to the latest bad news on the 787 has been
disappointment and consternation. 'Management not
knowing about these problems until the last minute is
horrible because it means engineering information isn't
flowing upward through the organization. That's
scary,' Miller of Gradient Analytics says. 'But what's
more scary is management knowing, and not teling. I
just don't know which it is.' Several analysts, including
at Barclays, Oppenheimer, Credit Suisse and Gradient,
have downgraded their ratings of Boeing's securities or
target stock prices. Even McNerney acknowledges
Boeing blundered by putting sales of the 787 ahead of
engineering. 'Clearly the initial plan outran our ability
to execute it,' he told analysts in the July 22 conference
call. 'We've learned a hard lesson here.' But the chief
source of Boeing's summer of discontent, the Dreamliner,
also represents the company's path to success - if it
can get the plane flying. Carol Levenson, a bond analyst
at GimmeCredit in New York, says Boeing has time to get
the Dreamliner fixed. 'Their credit quality is still pretty
good,' she says, 'so they can borrow money to make up
the damage this is doing to their industrial balance sheet.'
And Barclays Capital's Joseph Campbell, one of the
analysts who has lowered his Boeing ratings,
nevertheless says the 787 will be a big winner for
Boeing once it gets airborne. 'When ... the 787 is being
produced at 120 a year,' he wrote in a new assessment,
'(it) has the potential to be the most profitable aircraft
Boeing has ever had."'
6 The Firm- a "A decade ago, General Electric was the shining star of On a
Aug. New Investo American business. Its longtime chief executive, Jack modular
2009 York rs Welch, was named manager of the century by Fortune enterpri
Times Magazine, and its stock seemed always to go up. It ran se
"Inside a bewildering array of businesses but somehow always architec
G.E., a managed to make the expected profits. That record ture's
Little was viewed as proof of superior management, and the use of
Bit of battle to succeed Mr. Welch in 2001 was watched all over "strategi
Enron" the business universe. When a winner emerged, the losers c
(Floyd quickly were hired to run other major companies. G.E. misinfor
Norris) is different now. The stock has fallen and the aura has mation"
dissipated. This week General Electric agreed to pay or
$50 million to settle a suit filed by the Securities and "strategi
Exchange Commission that said the company fiddled c
with its books repeatedly early in this decade. In at deceptio
least one case, that allowed it to preserve its reputation n"
for making the numbers. Some of the details are eerily
reminiscent of Enron. As is customary in such
settlements, G.E. neither admitted nor denied the charges.
But it sounded contrite. 'The errors at issue fell short of
our standards, and we have implemented numerous
remedial actions and internal control enhancements to
prevent such errors from recurring,' said a company
statement. Another view of G.E. 's accounting standards
emerged a few years ago in a book written by a man who
. ... . . ........ 
worked there for six years in the early 1980s, before
concluding the corporate life was not for him and entering
a seminary. James Martin may be the only Jesuit priest
with a degree from the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania. 'The primary task of my first job was to
issue very long, monthly statistical reports,' he wrote in
his book, "'n Good Company: The Fast Track From the
Corporate World to Poverty, Chastity and Obedience.'
'The first month,' he recalled, 'I informed one executive
that our results were coming in low" because of losses
in overseas operations. 'So what?' replied the
executive. 'Just reverse a few journal entries.'
Corporate headquarters, he explained, would come down
hard on them if they missed the numbers. Another boss
told him he was 'taking those accounting courses way
too seriously.' The S.E.C. complaint makes it sound as if
those days came back, assuming they ever left. It tells of
corporate accountants discovering misstatements and
secret side deals, and of more senior executives telling
them to sign off on the books anyway. It outlines four
separate violations, two of which it says descended to the
level of fraud. It is notable how this investigation came to
be. Post-Enron, the commission used its authority to look
at G.E. 's books to figure out whether there were violations
in the area of so-called hedge accounting, which
determines whether companies can avoid reporting profits
and losses from a variety of derivative securities. The
commission evidently found three violations, two in hedge
accounting and the other in an Enronesque scheme to
inflate profits with fake sales. 'It was like peeling an
onion,' said David P. Bergers, the director of the Boston
office of the S.E.C., as one accounting issue led to
another. The fourth violation appears to have been
reported by G.E. All have been fixed in restatements.
While it may seem odd to view the government as an
underdog, it was. G.E. says it spent $200 million on
outside lawyers and accountants in dealing with the
investigation. By contrast, the S.E.C.'s entire annual
enforcement budget, spread over thousands of inquiries
and investigations, was less than $300 million when this
investigation began in 2005. You can be sure that G.E.
spent a lot of time arguing that the amounts involved, only
a few hundred million per violation, were not really
material to a company its size. There may be more to
come. The S.E.C. said that its investigation of G.E. was
over, but it did not say that about any of the accounting
officials at the company, or any of the people at KPMG,
G.E. 's longtime auditor. KPMG's role is interesting. The
complaint indicates that unnamed accounting officials at
G.E. failed to provide important information to KPMG,
but G.E. says that information was later given to the
auditors. The S.E.C. filing says that on one of the hedge
accounting issues, the KPMG auditors consulted the
accounting firm's national office. But when push came to
shove, and the question was whether to approve
accounting that the S.E.C. now says was clearly wrong,
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the local auditors signed off without telling the national
office what was going on. Could it be that the local
auditor feared the national office experts would have
backbone, and force him to anger a very important
client? A KPMG spokesman declined to discuss any
aspect of the case. This all took place in January 2003,
days before G.E. was to announce its annual profits for
2002, Jeff Immelt's first full year as chief executive.
Had G.E. not fudged the accounting, it would have
missed its profit forecast by $200 million. Not since
1994 had G.E. failed to make the numbers. You may
recall something similar happened at Arthur Andersen
when it was auditing Enron. In that case, the local
auditors chose to ignore the national office. It is easy to
have some sympathy for G.E. on the hedge accounting
issues. The rules are devilishly complicated, and the
accounting penalties for a small deviation can seem
excessive. For good reason, the rules are being rewritten.
But that sympathy vanishes when considering the
accounting alchemy that G.E. used to make its
numbers at the end of 2003. In a move reminiscent of
Enron's Nigerian barges deal, it 'sold' some railroad
locomotives to banks, with side letters and verbal
promises to assure the banks they could not lose
money. That enabled G.E. to book profits early and
make the numbers. The banks, facing S.E.C. actions
for doing similar deals with Enron, asked G.E. to
reassure them that KPMG knew about the side deals
and concurred with the accounting. The banks had
reason to be worried, given that G.E. executives had
asked them not to refer to the side deals in documents
seen by auditors. At G.E., a spokeswoman, Anne Eisele,
told me that it was wrong to think these violations were
'indicative of some larger problem in G.E.'s overall
culture, its finance function or compliance practices.
G.E. is committed to the highest standards of
accounting and good corporate governance. We are
confident in our controls and culture, which have been
made even stronger through the process that we've just
completed.' It is interesting to compare the G.E. and
S.E.C. versions of the locomotive deal. In a company
filing in 2007, G.E. said 'several individuals in our rail
business and in our capital markets group engaged in
intentional misconduct that misled those responsible
for accounting oversight.' It added that the accounting
oversight team failed to adequately review the
transactions. The S.E.C.'s complaint makes it sound as if
the matter was thoroughly aired inside G.E. in 2002, when
it was first used, and again in 2003. The corporate audit
staff challenged the accounting in 2002, but was overruled
by a 'senior accountant,' the S.E.C. said. G.E. added that
the amounts involved were so small that they were not
material, 'less than 0.2 percent' of the company's total
revenue or profits each year. The S.E.C. says the fudges
caused quarterly profits of the G.E. Transportation
Systems business to be overstated by as much as 40
percent. All those numbers are accurate. Tricks to take
profits in the wrong quarter, as in this case, are not
likely to change annual earnings very much,
particularly for the conglomerate. I doubt anyone at
G.E. thought at the time it would have been immaterial
if the company missed its profit forecasts. I called
Father Martin, now an editor at America magazine, a
Jesuit publication, and asked him to read the S.E.C.
complaint and call me back. He did. 'Little of this is
surprising,' he said. 'I was sometimes asked to squirrel
away 'excess earnings' in fake accounts with made-up
names, to be used when earnings were down in later
months,' he said. One such account was called 'Plug.'
Ms. Eisele, the G.E. spokeswoman, declined to comment
on Father Martin's book. Much has changed at G.E. since
Father Martin was hired. The long paper spreadsheets that
he used have been replaced by computers. Some of the
financial instruments involved in G.E. 's hedge accounting
violations had not been invented. But some things, it
appears, never change."
10 Flightbl Firm- cE "According to a report in this morning's Financial Times On a
Aug. ogger, Labor & Deutschland (German) and later confirmed by Flight, modular
2009 "A30X 3 Airbus will fully assemble the successor to A320, industry
to be currently dubbed the A30X, in Hamburg. This news comes blogger'
Assemb as the German government and Airbus are working out s
led at final terms for for C3.3B in A350 launch aid. Currently, newfou
XFW in A320 family production is primarily based in Hamburg nd
Return and Tianjin, while part of the A320-200 is built in integral
for Toulouse then flown to Hamburg for finishing. Let us, for point of
A350 a moment look beyond the obvious - and ongoing - debate view.
Launch about the merits/legality of launch aid, and try to examine
Aid" this deal through a different, possibly overlooked lens.
(Jon This long term deal addresses key questions about the
Ostrowe future growth and expansion of Airbus. It's not
r) surprising that Hamburg would be the final assembly site,
but the deal largely closes the book on any debate about
final assembly operations at Airbus for almost a generation
to come with A30X not set for service entry until at least
2020. If we examine this through a broader strategic
lens, with the involvement of national stakeholders,
Airbus has gained labor stability and industrial
predictability, with a distinct political subtext attached.
Yet, perhaps it's an appropriate point of juxtaposition
to the relationship between Boeing and its
stakeholders, the IAM and SPEEA. We are just months
away from the selection of a second 787 final assembly
line as Boeing weighs its options as perceived stability
vs. perceived instability. One viewpoint says that
setting up a second line in Everett would introduce
additional instability because of the risk of future
strikes and delivery disruption. On the flipside, a
native and experienced workforce with extensive
widebody assembly experience is an asset not to be
discounted. For a site outside of Everett, stability
would be found in removing the labor obstacle by
setting up a second line in a right to work state. On the
.. . . .
other hand, Boeing's own recent history has
demonstrated the challenges, and high cost, of setting
up a greenfield site. Ultimately, for Boeing and Airbus,
steadily growing the business means the predictability
of future costs, made all the more predictable by
stability. Decision-making on issues like the location of
aircraft final assembly operations will be driven by this
motivation. Yet does the push-pull dynamic between
Boeing and its unions, vis-a-vis the selection of final
assembly, add to the long term stability and
predictability of Boeing's business? If Boeing is facing
a potential forward loss on 787, then ensuring
predictable future costs is essential to the future of the
company. The question then becomes, how does Boeing
define stability? If both the mangagement of Boeing,
as well as its unions seek stability and predictability for
the future, then perhaps both sides should take a page
from its competitor's playbook."
By Paulo M (Johannesburg, RSA) on August 11, 2009
1:13 AM I
"Very good. In fact, excellent. This point of view would
seem to indicate that Boeing is far more predisposed to the
idea of cost - particularly labour, as you so rightly point
out - and for obvious reasons.
In my opinion, it would be a mistake for it seek out
production sites other than those in Washington
without making some sort of peace with the unions. As
far as I know, Boeing has had far more industrial
action taken against it by unions in the past decade
than in the preceding 50 years combined. Perhaps the
company could devote some effort at resolving that."
By 787 Accountant on August 11, 2009 3:22 AM
"From both perspectives, what is the cost of bad relations?
The unions are winning the strikes but losing the wars as
their numbers shrinking. Boeing lost a billion dollars over
the last strike. Boeing lost $700 million in the 2005 strike
over less than a $90 million difference which the union
got at the end of the strike anyways. Now instead of
working towards a longer term solution, Boeing is
willing to spend an additional billion dollars (my
estimate for building and tooling) to open a second line
elsewhere. Some business sense needs to be injected
into the process. Perhaps, instead of demanding a no
strike clause, Boeing should ask, of the union and
themselves, what would it take to sign a 30 year contract?
Perhaps they more in common than we think."
10 Market Gary Firm 3 "Southwest Airlines said Monday it has submitted a On an
Aug. Watch Kelly, binding cash offer of more than $170 million to acquire integral
2009 "South CEO, Frontier Airlines, which will be sold at auction as part of enterpri
west Air Southw Frontier's bankruptcy case. As part of the offer, Southwest se
Submits est would acquire about 80% of Frontier's existing Airbus architec
Bid to Airline fleet, or 40 aircraft, plus all of Lynx, Frontier's short-haul ture's
Accuire s subsidiary. 'We believe our bid ultimately should be integral
Frontier seen as the strongest offer by aH interested parties, approac
- ~------------------------------------ 
Air" including Frontier, its creditors, employees, and h to a
(Carla customers,' said Southwest Air's Chief Executive Gary modular
Mozee) Kelly in a prepared statement. The auction is expected to activity.
start on Thursday"
10 ActsLik Alan Firm- a "That is where the story took a detour that will go down as On the
Aug. e Inc. Mulall Custo one of my favorite life moments. I sent Scott Monty a leadersh
2009 "The y mer tweet; 'I'm test driving an Edge for the second time this ip style
Art of week. Have Alan Mulally call to tell me I'm not crazy.' of a
Leaders If you know me you know that was me just joking around locally-
hip - A like 'ha ha 1 know you and Alan are hanging at a BBQ this integral
Ford weekend so why don't you guys ring me up when you leader
Story" have a few in you?'. Something funny happened. Scott of a
(MSGir sent me a direct message on Twitter asking for my phone modular
o) number that following Saturday morning. 'Hmm' I said. enterpri
'That can't be. He's not going to have Alan call me'. I se
honestly figured Scott was going to call to give me some architec
insight into the Edge. When my phone rang with a ture.
Michigan number during my daughter's birthday party I
let it go to voicemail. I would call Scott back after. When
I finally checked the voicemail it was not from Scott
Monty, but rather Alan Mulally. He was singing the
praises of the Edge and what I thought was looking like a
cute PR stunt ended up being a sincere message with the
request to call him back. Let's pause for a second and
process this. The CEO of Ford Motor Company, a global
mega-brand run by a man who is probably more busy than
all of my friends combined, is taking time out of his
Saturday to call me? Seriously? No, seriously? So I
called back. Alan picked up and we talked. I shared my
experiences. Alan listened. He listened to me explain my
loyalty to VW/Audi. He listened about my need to save
money while I bootstrap my entire life as we get ActsLike
up and running. He listened while I ranted about two
dealerships blowing me off. This went on for over twenty
minutes. Instead of saying 'Thanks for your time. I hope
you buy the Edge.' Alan put some serious wheels in
motion. Alan first said that he really wanted me to get
into a Ford, because he believed in it so much and if it
helped offered me friends and family pricing (Amen!).
Anyone would be ecstatic at that point, but he went on
to tell me that we needed to get this dealership issue
resolved so he was going to contact their General Sales
Manager, Randy Ortiz, to have him follow up with me.
An hour later Randy calls. An hour after that Vincenza
"Enza" Sleva, the New England Regional Manager,
called and then while on the phone with Enza I
received two separate calls from the owner of Sentry
Ford, Fraser Lemley and his son Chris who is the
President. I was overwhelmed to be honest, but
everyone made themselves available to answer my
questions and to provide me an education on Ford and
how they do business. Each and every one of them was
available over the course of the month it took me to get
everything squared away to the point where I was
ready to make the deal. Everyone collectively worked
on this deal too. The Ford corporate team did not just
............... ....
pass the buck to the dealership. They stayed actively
involved. I made suggestions for carving out a better
deal. They made productive counter-offers. There was
never a no in the negotiations. They wanted to make it
work and in the end it did. I'm fully aware that this is
not a normal life experience and I'm not somebody with
access to the golden gates of global icons either. As a
professor of entrepreneurship at Boston University I
always stress the importance of leading by example,
respecting everyone around you, exhausting all solutions
before saying no and consistently doing the unexpected.
This is how you win people over and become a great
leader. Not only does Alan Mulally have a big fan, but
he also has a new customer."
11 The Mark Firm- a "Production workers at Boeing's newly acquired assembly On a
Aug. Seattle Blondi Emplo plant in Charleston, S.C., plan to vote Sept. 10 on a modular
2009 Times n, yees petition to get rid of the Machinists union. At a National enterpri
"Boeing IAM Labor Relations Board hearing in Charleston this morning, se
Charlest nationa the company and the International Association of architec
on 1 Machinists (IAM) agreed to the vote. A decision to tue's
Worker aerosp decertify the IAM at the Charleston facility could adversar
s to ace influence whether Boeing will move future airplane ial
Vote on coordi assembly work there, including a second production relation
Machini nator line for its new 787 Dreamliner. If the vote succeeds, ship
sts nonunion Boeing Charleston will compete directly with with
Decertif the unionized Everett plant for the new 787 work. That labor.
ication raises the specter for the Puget Sound region of Boeing
" developing for the first time a major final assembly site on
(Domini the East Coast that could siphon off production work on
c Gates) future airplanes. The petition that sparked the vote was
filed by Dennis Murray, a quality inspector at the
Charleston plant unhappy with the way the union forced
through a weak contract last November without
significant consultation with employees. 'I want people
to have a fair voice in what happens to them,' said Murray.
'That's the position a union traditionally fights for. In this
case, it's the workers fighting against the union to achieve
that.' The union was not immediately able to say how
many workers in the bargaining unit of almost 300
employees pay dues. Murray claimed more than 75
percent support for his petition among the workforce,
based on his own canvassing for signatures. In the weeks
ahead, the company will make its preference clear to
the workforce: Boeing management wants rid of the
union at the plant. Company labor relations spokesman
Tim Healy said managers will share 'facts and data' with
the workforce outlining the differing treatment of
unionized and nonunion workers at Boeing. 'We'll tell
them we prefer to deal with our employees directly,
without an intermediary,' Healy said. IAM national
aerospace coordinator Mark Blondin said the Charleston
workforce has the right to choose. He expressed
confidence that 'they are going to choose the IAM.'
'Facts don't lie,' said Blondin. 'Boeing does not treat
nonunion workers well.' Last month, Boeing bought the
Charleston assembly plant, which builds the composite
i ;;; ;;iiiiiiii~
plastic aft fuselage for the Dreamliner, from Texas-based
Vought. The Charleston operation had been plagued
with startup problems, partly due to the inexperienced
workforce. In addition, the long delays in the 787
program left Vought with no income stream and a
requirement for further hefty investment it was unwilling
to make. To secure control of its supply chain, Boeing
stepped in with a $580 million purchase, plus the
forgiveness of loans to Vought that bring the total cost to
$1 billion. A major obstacle the union must overcome
before the September vote is resentment among the
Charleston workforce over the contract the union
signed last November. The contract delivered a meager
annual raise of 1.5 percent, with a possible merit bonus
of up to 2 percent determined by managers. The union
ratified that contract in a last-minute, barely
publicized "emergency meeting" with only 13 people
present, to meet a one-year deadline. Murray was one
of the workers incensed by that tactic. The Boeing
acquisition offers a new opportunity to revisit the
decision. 'The contract with Vought did not live up to
many of those members' expectations,' Blondin
conceded. 'Not everybody got to vote.' But he said the
rushed vote was necessary because the company had
dragged out negotiations deliberately to try to oust the
union. He pointed out that the contract, however weak
economically, secured recall rights for those workers
being laid off. He said the union now has a right to
improve the contract. 'We've got a great track record in
negotiating contracts,' Blondin said. 'The leverage will
depend on the people and how strong they want to be.'
The labor showdown in Charleston is happening against a
backdrop of ongoing, tense negotiations between Boeing
and the IAM in the Puget Sound region. Last fall, the
IAM signed a new four-year contract here after a two-
month strike. Since then, the company has mounted an
unprecedented behind-the-scenes campaign to reopen
that contract and win a long-term no-strike agreement.
Boeing chairman Jim McNerney forcefully conveyed that
message to Washington state political representatives,
including Gov. Chris Gregoire and Rep. Norm Dicks (D-
Bremerton), in a meeting in Washington, D.C., in March.
He told the politicians that union relations would be a
major factor in the decision about where to locate a second
787 production line; the head of the 787 program said the
decision may be made before year-end. In July, following
the announcement that Boeing was buying the Charleston
plant, Dicks and Gregoire publicly called for both the
company and the union to make concessions, reach an
agreement and secure future Boeing airplane work for this
region. Talks between the union and the company have
been ongoing, though the union insists that it still has
received no formal proposal of a no-strike agreement. At
a conference in Lynnwood last week, Boeing vice
president Fred Kiga said that creating a second final-
assembly site outside the Puget Sound region would offer
~ ~~ ~ -----------------------------~ 1
the company the opportunity to continue production in the
event of a work stoppage here. But industry analysts are
skeptical that Boeing would make the second 787
assembly line decision based on the union issue alone.
Creating an assembly line in Charleston would require
substantial investment in tooling and buildings. And,
the lack of an experienced workforce in the area would
inevitably bring added risk to a program already more
than two years behind schedule. The IAM's Blondin
doubts that Boeing would risk further delays by placing
new 787 work outside Puget Sound. 'Is Boeing making
an emotional decision or an economic decision?'
Blondin asked rhetorically. Still, if Boeing is insistent on
radically reducing its vulnerability to labor unrest, a
win in the Sept. 10 vote in Charleston would certainly
provide the company extra leverage."
13 The Firm- a "NOT a lot has gone right for Boeing recently. After On
Aug. Econom Gover & declaring to the world at the Paris air show in June that its modular
2009 ist, nment 1 chronically delayed 787 Dreamliner would take to the air and
"Tradin before the month was out, executives were forced to integral
g announce an indefinite postponement of the high-tech enterpri
Blows" aircraft's first flight only days later because of a problem se
with the wing mounting. The company also seems to have architec
been hit harder by cash-strapped airlines cancelling orders ture's
than its main rival, Airbus. But Boeing is anticipating a differin
triumph in the next few weeks when the World Trade g
Organisation (WTO) comes to a preliminary decision on a approac
complaint made by America nearly five years ago about h
subsidies given to Airbus by European governments. In toward
2004 at the urging of Harry Stonecipher, Boeing's boss at the
the time, America terminated a 1992 agreement with the govern
European Union regulating government support for the ment
commercial-aircraft industry and initiated a WTO dispute- stakehol
settlement procedure. The agreement had capped der.
European launch aid for new airliners at 33% of all
development costs on condition that the money was repaid
at an interest rate that at least covered the cost of the
governments' own borrowing. For their part, the
Americans were allowed to continue with indirect federal
and state support for their aircraft industry as long as the
payments did not exceed 3% of the industry's sales. Much
of the subsidy received by Boeing comes in the form of
research contracts for its military arm, the results of which
can then be applied to its civil aircraft without charge.
Bob Novick, a legal counsel for Boeing, says that when the
company went along with the 1992 agreement it was on
the understanding that over time Airbus would wean itself
from launch aid. But by 2004, despite Airbus's control of
more than half of the global market in large commercial
aircraft, Boeing could see no sign of that. The giant A380,
which was made possible only by $3.5 billion in launch
aid from France, Germany, Spain and Britain, and was
designed to kill off Boeing's 747, was about to be rolled
out. Boeing was unhappy about the threat to the 747, its
venerable cash-cow. But its main priority was to try to
stop Airbus getting another slug of launch aid for its
proposed A350, a potential competitor to both the
American firm's highly successful 777 and larger versions
of its new lightweight all-composite 787. Whereas Boeing
felt it was betting the company on the 787, it believed that
Airbus could develop its rival aircraft with far less
financial risk and lower capital costs. In addition to a
claimed cumulative benefit of more than $100 billion from
launch aid over 20 years, Boeing says that Airbus has also
been the recipient of other handouts including funding for
roads and runways it relies on and soft loans from the
European Investment Bank. Boeing puts the combined
value of all the subsidies Airbus has received at $205
billion. Europe's response was to lodge a counter-
complaint alleging that Boeing gets an array of subsidies
from different American agencies ranging from
America's space agency, NASA, to the Export-Import
Bank of the United States (known as "Boeing's Bank")
as well as tax breaks from several states. Europe puts
Boeing's subsidy haul at only $24 billion over the past two
decades and up to 2024, but says that using America's
methodology, the figure would be nearer to $305 billion.
Europe also complains that Boeing has received launch
aid from Japan, where large parts of the 787, including
most of the wing, are made. It estimates that up to $7
billion-worth of government aid of one kind or another
has gone into the 787. The boss of Airbus, Tom Enders,
describes the 787 as the most heavily subsidised civil
aircraft in history. Airbus also notes that since 1992 it
has paid governments 40% more than it has received
from them, thanks to interest and royalties on
successful designs developed with state aid. In an
average year it repays about $500m. The WTO's ruling
on Europe's complaint should come within the next six
months. It would not be surprising if both complaints were
upheld, at least in part. Both parties say they are willing to
negotiate a new deal limiting subsidies and making those
that remain more transparent. That would send out a
message to other countries (Russia and China) wanting to
muscle in to the large commercial aircraft market. But
both sides also want to see who comes out of the WTO
process worst before starting talks. Unfortunately, there
will be plenty of opportunities to escalate hostilities in the
meantime. In the next few weeks European governments
are expected to agree to give some C3.5 billion ($5 billion)
in launch aid for the A350. Boeing describes it as a
'provocative' move, but an Airbus spokesman says the aid
is not in doubt and that Europe will not be 'intimidated'.
Another bone of contention is the battle between Boeing
and Airbus, with its partner Northrop Grumman, to supply
America's air force with its next fuel tanker-a contract
won by Airbus last year which is being fought over again
after Boeing protested. The grounds for further complaint,
and thus the opportunities for inflicting mutual damage,
are immense."
13 The Firm- a "Negotiation, not litigation, is the best way to limit the On
Aug. Econom Gover & subsidies to Airbus and Boeing-and stop a trade war. modular
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After five years of litigation and almost 100 bound
volumes of evidence, the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) is about to deliver its preliminary ruling on
America's (for which read Boeing's) complaint against the
provision of prohibited subsidies to Europe's commercial
aircraft industry (for which read Airbus). The United
States alleges that this support was worth $200 billion over
20 years. Whatever the outcome-and Boeing is confident
of victory-this will be only the first stage of a lengthy
process. In a few months the WTO will rule on a counter-
claim by the European Union that Boeing received about
$24 billion in subsidies over the past two decades as well
as large, non-repayable benefits from military and space
contracts. Both rulings are subject to appeal. Peter
Mandelson, Europe's trade commissioner before becoming
Gordon Brown's minister for everything, described the
dispute as the biggest, most difficult and most expensive
in WTO history. This first ruling is a potential
thunderbolt that could ignite a damaging trade dispute
between America and Europe at a time when both
economies need to present a united front on trade, to
prevent a slide towards protectionism. The origins of the
dispute lie in America's decision, at Boeing's prompting,
to withdraw in 2004 from a 12-year-old bilateral
agreement with Europe governing trade in large civil
aircraft. The agreement banned direct production and sales
subsidies, but let governments continue to funnel money
into new aircraft projects. It permitted both repayable
direct state aid (the European approach) covering up to a
third of all development costs, known as launch aid, and
indirect state aid (the American approach) if limited to 3%
of the domestic industry's sales volume. Boeing, however,
says it expected the deal to lead to a gradual reduction in
subsidies to Airbus. When this failed to materialise, it
withdrew. What caused its patience to run out? Two
things: the success of Airbus in achieving rough market-
share parity at the end of the 1990s, and resentment over
launch aid for the A380, the superjumbo designed to bring
to an end the long reign of the 747. Boeing also wanted to
shield its 777 and new 787 from "unfair" competition in
the form of Airbus's launch-aid-supported A350.
A tarFet-rich environment
Boeing is right to argue that all subsidies distort
competition. But although the i bsidies that Airb:a
receives are different from Boeing's, they are not
necssarily much worse. At least they are
transparent-and Europe claims that by 2007 Airbus
had repaid 40% more than it had been given. Nor has
the effect of the subsidies received by both firms been
anti-competitive. Boeing and Airbus fight like rats in a
sack for every sale, with the consequence that airlines
have been able to buy cheaper and better aircraft than
if one firm had been dominant. Two other points should
be borne in mind. The first is that it is out of date to see
either firm as a national champion. The size and
and
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architec
ture's
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g
approac
h
toward
the
govern
ment
stakehol
der.
~~ ;;;;;;;;;~
year. Leaving aside the trillions of dollars spent on
preventing financial collapse, industrial subsidies of a kind
almost certainly illegal under WTO rules have
mushroomed. General Motors alone has been propped up
to the tune of $55 billion. If America and Europe were to
go to war over subsidies now they would find what
military planners call a 'target-rich environment'. Both
sides should therefore hold their fire until the WTO rules
on Europe's complaint. Then, putting further litigation to
one side, they should head for the negotiating table. The
aim should be to secure a new deal along the lines of the
old agreement, but this time with an explicit goal of
phasing out the most egregious subsidies within a
reasonable period. The alternative of an escalating tit-for-
tat trade dispute between Europe and America does not
bear thinking about."
13 Flightbl Firm- a "Alenia Aeronautica has halted production of two On a
Aug. ogger, Suppli major 787 structural components due to wrinkles in modular
2009 "Breaki er the fuselage skin caused by manufacturing flaws in enterpri
ng: subcomponents of the one-piece composite barrel, se
Structur according to a letter obtained by FlightBlogger. The architec
al Flaw letter's subject: 'SECTION 44 and 46 STOP WORK ture's
Halts ORDER FOR BARREL' details a correspondence over-
Producti between Jay Campbell, sr. manager for supplier promise
on of management for the 787 fuselage supply chain, James E. and
Alenia Simmons section 44/46 sr. engineering manager and Ciro under-
787 Occipinti of Alenia Aeronautica in Naples, Italy. The delivery
Sections letter, signed and dated June 23 on Boeing letterhead,
(Jon was sent the same day Boeing announced the latest
Ostrowe delay in the program citing a need to reinforce the side
r) of body structure. Boeing and Alenia Aeronautica did
not respond to multiple requests for comment. The status
of production at Alenia's Grottaglie facility remains
unknown at this hour. This structural issue, sources say,
appears entirely separate from the wing fix. Section 44
and 46 are two of the four major structural components
that comprise the integrated center fuselage. Section 44, a
bonnet section, sits directly on top of the center wing box
(section 45/11) while section 46, a complete barrel, is
joined to the aft part of the center wing box. Campbell
and Simmons explain the justification behind the
production halt as 'related to stringer edge steps' causing
wrinkles in the skin of the fuselage that were larger than
previously 'demonstrated during the [preproduction
verification] PPV on these components.' Stringer edge
steps, as one veteran composite engineer explains,
comprise the stacks of the composite fibers that make up
the longitudinal structure that is cured and bonded to the
skin of the fuselage barrels to give it its strength. The
letter goes on to detail the recommendations for the proper
step height of each layer of composite fiber, plus or minus
-- ~~*i*~
a given tolerance. The letter says that the guide for
building fuselage stringers includes a note that says that
step heights beyond a given a specified tolerance 'will
lead to significant degradation of the structure.' The
tolerances and dimensions of the stringer were specifically
outlined in the letter and are not included in this report due
to the proprietary nature of the information. However, the
letter continues: 'Boeing engineering evaluations of the
cross-sections provided by Alenia demonstrate that
negative margins exist in the line 7-19, and line 20 and on,
configurations for section 46. Line 5 and 6 are still under
evaluation. While efforts are underway to refine that
analysis, it is doubtful that the negative margins will be
recovered, and that repair of at least line 7-29 will be
required.' Of those 25 shipsets, four have been
delivered to final assembly in Everett, Wash, eight are
undergoing center fuselage integration at Global
Aeronautica in Charleston, S.C. and the remaining 13
are in Grottaglie, Italy. Each 787 barrel section contains
80 stringers that run the length of the fuselage. The letter
did not detail what portion of the 80 would require repair.
The size of the edge steps on the stringers, the letter says,
were increased first on 'line 5 when Alenia began using
the GFM stringer manufacturing cell at Grottaglie.' Line 5
refers to Airplane Five or ZA005, the first General
Electric GEnx powered 787, that entered final assembly in
January of this year. Sections 44 and 46 were delivered by
Alenia for integration at Global Aeronautica in April
2008. GFM is a company that does milling, cutting,
routing and forging of various materials, including
composites components. During the manufacturing
process, the composite stringers are fabricated in a clean
room, loaded onto the preformed mold, or mandrel, then
are wrapped in a preset amount of carbon fiber tape. After
lay-up, which is done by a robotic wrapping machine, the
mandrel is bagged and moved to the autoclave for high
temperature curing. Boeing's instructions in the letter to
Alenia was to complete any carbon fiber placement
currently underway, but not to begin any additional
bonding or curing of barrels. According to the letter,
specifications were authored to control the height of the
'edge step' as a result of what was learned during
preproduction verification (PPV). The letter states that
Alenia determined it 'cannot comply with the
requirement' and had requested 'that the step height
control provisions be eliminated.' Boeing concluded that
'based on the structural analysis...this is unacceptable'
because the wrinkles 'represent a risk of a major
repair to every unit that is built without engineering
coverage.' Boeing's conclusions on this structural
analysis were conducted on two scrapped barrel sections
identified as being from Airplane 15 section 46 and
Airplane 20 section 44. 'Sections cuts from the scrapped
AP15 barrel show wrinkle geometry well in excess of
those found during the PPV.' Adding that the
specification 'does not allow wrinkles in the skin, and
the existing effects-of-defects data does not sufficiently
characterize the structural performance of wrinkles of
this magnitude.' Boeing has yet to provide a revised
schedule, known internally ZI8, that dictates the 787
production and delivery schedule to suppliers and airline
customers. The company has said a revised planning
schedule will be available by the end of September. This
structural issue appears to not affect the first flight
planning for ZA001 through ZA004, but it is yet unknown
if delivery planning of the early production aircraft will be
impacted while this issue is being resolved."
By TheLastInspector on August 13, 2009 10:29 PM
"The question should be, instead, given the current
mismanagement team, what cannot go wrong on the
program. These negative margins are likely just more
fallout from Boeing's decision to design the 787 to zero
safety margins. As pressure to save weight gets greater
with later line numbers to meet performance
guarantees, look for more problems cropping up. Its
disturbing to me, even though I was the one who originally
exposed that Boeing was designing the 787 to zero safety
margins, that these problems are coming so often and the
plane in many months from even flight tetsting that will
undoubtable expose many more problems, both with
structures and systems. Thanks to Jon for giving
investors the news they need when Boeing has
demonstrated it won't, if the news is potentially
negative in nature to the stock price. Their rosy coloring
of the bad news on the program in their last minute they
can hold the news from investors is troubling, and their
many announcements proven false even more so (schedule
of the program, etc.)."
By quiet uyv on August 17, 2009 3:52 PM
"I work at one of the 'suppliers' for the 787. I have also
worked with Alenia on the Tanker and on the F-35. The
incompetence of Alenia is very well known. It is
amazing to me that Boeing would continue to use these
guys as a supplier. As many previous posters have said,
it all boils down to money. The Bean counters have run
amok. They give zero credence to quality and the skills
of longtime workers and engineers. That doesn't count
any more, Program decisions are strictly driven by
cost. There is however no feedback as to real costs
when these low bidders screw up. Boeing has
completely lost its way!! Regarding Alenia and the
wrinkles, this problem occurred on ship 7 and up
because of the weight redesign. The skin ramps were
steeper due to a reduction in the basic skin thickness.
The 'Other' South Carolina supplier has seen these
problems and fixed them via the MRB system from the
onset. Regarding ridiculous schedules. Who was the
idiot that decided to roll out this plane on 7/08/07? As
one of these suppliers trying to meet this goal, we found
it totally impossible to spool up our supplier base. This
caused us to cut many corners with regard to levels of
completeness and in turn created far more problems.
When Boeing decided to complete these barrels in
Everett, that's when the real delays started. They were
not prepared for this effort and by taking over the
responsibility themselves; they caused the suppliers to
stunt the learning curve."
13 The Firm- a "Boeing's technical problems with the 787 Dreamliner go On a
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2009 Times er by the company. Engineers have discovered wrinkles in enterpri
"Boeing the fuselage skin just behind the wing that will require se
Stops repair work on all the completed fuselage barrels. architec
Work Boeing minimized the flaw as 'microscopic wrinkles in ture's
on 787 the skin plies' in just two locations near a fuselage door batchin
Fuselag and said the problem can be fixed with 'a simple patch.' g and
es Made 'The modification has already been designed and is being queuein
in Italy installed now (in Charleston,) South Carolina, and will be g and
to Fix installed at completed sections in Italy and Everett,' non-
Wrinkle Boeing said in a statement. Still, the wrinkling is serious systemi
d Skin" enough that Boeing's engineers ordered the supplier of c
(Domini the affected section - Alenia of Italy - to stop work explanat
c Gates) on new fuselage barrels until they can complete the fix ions.
of the manufacturing process. Boeing issued a stop-
work order June 23, the same day executives announced
the indefinite postponement of the Dreamliner's first
flight. Boeing spokeswoman Lori Gunter said that timing
was a coincidence, and the first-flight delay came because
of an unrelated problem with the upper wing join. 'This
[fuselage problem] was not a safety-of-flight issue and
would not have caused a delay in first-flight timing,'
Gunter said.
Stop-work order
The stop-work order states that the already completed
fuselage barrels on airplanes from at least No. 7 through
No. 29 will have to be repaired. Alenia has already
scrapped two fuselage barrels and sectioned portions of
them in an attempt to understand the defect. The
problem arises in the manufacture of the longitudinal rods
called stringers, used to stiffen fuselage skin. The edges of
the stringers are stepped, and Boeing's specifications
require accuracy in the manufacture of those steps to
within one-hundredth of an inch. 'Boeing engineering
evaluations of the cross-sections provided by Alenia,'
according to the stop-work order, showed the stringer
edges on all the barrels from Dreamliner No. 7 onward
'well in excess' of the required dimensions. Airplanes
Nos. 5 and 6 are still being evaluated, Gunter said. If the
stringer-edge steps are the wrong depth, the skin
around the fuselage wrinkles. When the fuselage
subsequently bends - as when an airplane lands, for
example - a wrinkled skin could cause the fiber layers
to separate and tear, requiring expensive repairs by an
airline.
New machine
. . .......... . .....
According to Boeing's order - signed by Jay Campbell, a
senior manager of the 787 fuselage-supply chain, and
James Simmons, senior engineering manager for the two
defective sections - the problem was introduced into the
manufacturing process in the building of airplane No. 5
when Alenia began using a new machine to build the
stringers at its 787 facility in Grottaglie, Italy. 'Boeing is
making every effort to work with Alenia to resolve these
issues,' the order states. 'Until the issues have been
resolved, this stop-work order will be in effect.' The
order states that the wrinkles are big enough that Boeing's
defects analysis 'does not sufficiently characterize the
structural performance of wrinkles of this magnitude.'
The order also cites a Boeing technical manual cautioning
that stringer-edge steps higher than 0.04 inch, compared
with the specification of 0.015 inch, could 'lead to
significant degradation of the structure.' Gunter said
the deviations found in the Alenia structures are not that
large. The order states 'Alenia has determined that they
cannot comply' with Boeing's requirements and
requested the step-height tolerances be relaxed. But
Boeing decided that 'this is unacceptable in that the
subsequent bow wave skin wrinkles represent a risk of
a major repair to every unit that is built.' The long-
term fix, Gunter said is to let Alenia continue to build
the stringers exactly as it has done, and to redesign the
skin at the wrinkle points by adding extra plies of
carbon fiber to make it stronger. 'Changing the
stringers is difficult,' Gunter said. 'The easier solution
is to strengthen the skin by adding plies.' Boeing will
do that on all Dreamliners as they are built from airplane
No. 30 forward, Gunter said. As for fixing the barrels
already produced, Gunter said it amounts to 'putting a
patch over the top' of the wrinkled skin. 'The
modification is relatively easy to make and requires no
special access,' she said. Responsibility for the flaw
appears to lie with Alenia, although Boeing declined to
assign blame. The stop-work order specifically states that
the assemblies built in Grottaglie do not meet Boeing's
specification. Alenia representatives in Italy did not
respond to e-mail requests for comment before publication
time. Gunter said the fuselage skin wrinkling is an
entirely separate problem from the one Boeing recently
acknowledged. On the day the stop-work order was
issued, 787 program chief Scott Fancher publicly
explained that first flight was being postponed because of
a problem with the upper wing join, not the fuselage.
Fancher described a localized separation, or delamination,
of the layers of composite fibers in a very specific area:
'specifically limited to the upper portion of where the
wing and side-of-body join.' But he said the problem was
limited to that area. 'This is not a problem that extends
out the wings or down into the aircraft,' Fancher said
June 23. Since then, Boeing elaborated on its 787 problem
most extensively in a teleconference call with Wall Street
analysts July 22, the day it announced its second-quarter
-- i
earnings. Boeing CEO Jim McNerney spoke at length
about the upper wing join problem, again as a localized
issue, and with no mention of the fuselage skin. Gunter
said Boeing did not mention the problem because it
was not considered a big deal. 'It's really a fairly routine
occurrence. It didn't have an impact on the budget or
the schedule,' she said. 'things come up regularly in a
development program and we just deal with them.' 'It
does not have a material impact on the program in
terms of either schedule or cost,' Gunter said. Boeing
has promised to come up with a new schedule for first
flight and delivery by the end of September."
Firm- c "My recent post about Boeing's leak that it had shut down On a
Suppli Alenia, one of its suppliers in Naples, Italy, encouraged modular
ers several people close to the company to contact me. One enterpri
of these people, who requested to remain anonymous, se
told me he spent two years working as a consultant architec
with the 787 program across several of Boeing's ture's
systems and manufacturing organizations. While I over-
have only exchanged emails with him and spoken to him promise
once, his concerns about the 787 program seem plausible. and
And he estimates that the 787's problems could take at under-
least another two years to solve. How so? My source delivery
told me that there are significant problems with a . Also
number of systems for the 787 -- news of which has so on a
far not reached the public. The delays to date have been non-
blamed on a variety of ills -- including suppliers not systemi
meeting deadlines, an insufficient number of fasteners, a c view
machinist strike, problems with the 787's wing assembly -- on
which is causing problems where the wing attaches to the leadersh
fuselage and most recently, fuselage skin wrinkling. But I ip.
was stunned by his claim that several of the systems --
which are being made by Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) --
a United Technologies (UTX) subsidiary -- are not
working. He identified the the 787's Environmental
Control System (ECS), which is intended to pressurize
the aircraft, as a particular problem. He says he
believes there is not a technological solution to the
problem. When I asked Boeing for comment, a
spokesperson said, 'The 787's systems are working,
including the environmental control system that
pressurizes the airplane. We are continuing to improve
and mature the systems, as is normal for a
development program.' A Hamilton Sundstrand
spokesperson told me that he had no knowledge of such
problems. However, my source told me he spoke just
yesterday with an engineer employed by a current
Boeing partner who confirmed that this problem has
not been solved. In addition to the ECS problems, he
says that the 787's electrical system has not lived up to
expectations and several redesigns are necessary before
the aircraft enters into service. I don't know what my
source's motivations would be for providing this
information, but given all the delays and leaks, I thought it
worth reporting.
- I
There is a deeper problem with the 787 and that has to
do with Boeing's management style. As I wrote in my
book, Boeing has a long history of command-and-
control leadership -- where top executives tell everyone
else what to do. Under its new CEO, Jim McNerney,
Boeing had adopted a so-called Transformational
Leadership (TL) approach which empowered workers
to make decisions, have ownership, and to take
responsibility for success and/or failure. TL was
behind Boeing's radical decision to outsource 60
percent of the 787 design and manufacturing to its
suppliers. In the past, Boeing had given its suppliers
very detailed specifications. But with the 787, Boeing
let the suppliers do the design and manufacturing. The
first manager of the 787, Mike Bair, was a
transformational leader. Bair took the blame for the
787's delays and Boeing replaced Bair with Pat
Shanahan from Boeing's defense unit. As such, Boeing
reverted back to its old command-and-control style of
leadership. My source claims that when Boeing spent
three days in the spring of 2008 with HS, the supplier
of the 787's electrical systems, Boeing issued orders to
its supplier about how it wanted HS to fix the
problems. Rather than listen to what HS thought
would work, Shanahan's team issued orders. And
according to my source, HS agreed to what Shanahan
wanted even though it did not believed that his ideas or
time-line would work. This story, if true, is deeply
troubling because it suggests that Boeing could be
panicking and reverting back to its old style of working
-- but this time without sufficient technical know-how
to make the right decisions. If Boeing is suffering from
this deeper management problem, delivering the 850
787 Dreamliners that the airlines have ordered is going
to be an even bigger nightmare than I had previously
thought."
20 Bloomb James Firm a "Boeing Co. said it has reduced travel costs by a third and On the a
Aug. erg, Bell, will keep cutting jobs this year as the recession hurts cost
2009 "Boeing CFO, airlines' profits, the Pentagon axes programs and delays implicat
Cuts The mount on the 787. The 787 Dreamliner's setbacks are ions of
travel Boeing 'having a significant impact on our financial a
Amid Compa performance,' Chief Financial Officer James Bell said modular
'Signifi ny in a memo posted on the company's internal Web site enterpri
cant today. The Dreamliner, a new airliner being built with se
Impact' lightweight composites to reduce fuel consumption, is architec
from indefinitely postponed while engineers reinforce sections ture's
787" along the wing. Chicago-based Boeing, the world's over-
(Susann second-biggest commercial jet builder, initially planned to promise
a Ray) deliver the first 787 aircraft in May 2008. 'The and
cumulative impact of schedule delays on this program under-
has resulted in signict ct overrns and penalty delivery
payments to customers that are putting pressure on the
program's profitability and increasing our cash
requirements,' Bell said. The $4 billion of new, long-
term debt issued over the past few months 'is not a
permanent solution' to strengthen the company's
~kl~
financial position, the CFO said. Boeing is about
halfway through 10,000 job cuts and will keep shrinking
the labor force as airlines order fewer aircraft and the U.S.
Defense Department scales back fighter-jet and missile-
defense programs that Boeing's involved in, he said.
FlightBlogger Prediction
The Dreamliner's maiden flight may be slated for late
November or early December, with the first delivery to
Japan's All Nippon Airways in the fourth quarter of
2010, according to a posting today on Flightglobal.com's
FlightBlogger site. The blog cited unidentified sources
familiar with the schedule and said that Scott Carson, the
head of the company's commercial operations, has already
viewed an internal document with a preliminary timetable
including planning for production and deliveries. Boeing,
which didn't immediately return a call for comment today,
has said it would provide a new schedule by the end of
September, after the latest delay was announced June 23."
20 The Firm- a "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on On a
Aug. Seattle Gover Tuesday extended the authority of Boeing Commercial modular
2009 Times, nment Airplanes to self-certify its aircraft and aircraft enterpri
"FAA technologies. Under the agency's new safety oversight se
Extends model, Boeing manufacturing and engineering architec
Boeing' employees will perform delegated tasks for the FAA, ture's
s including signing certificates approving new designs. attempt
Authorit The new system extends further an already established in- to
y to house inspection system at the airplane maker, whereby integrat
Self- much of Boeing's inspection work is delegated to more e
Certify than 400 company in-house inspectors. Though govern
Aircraft appointed by and accountable to the FAA, for the past ment
" decade those inspectors have reported their findings oversig
(Domini largely through an internal Boeing organization. The ht
c Gates) new system increases the authority of the in-house function
inspectors directly managed by Boeing, allowing them
to review new designs, oversee testing to ensure the
products meet all applicable standards, and sign off on
certification. The FAA is setting up a new Boeing
Aviation Safety Oversight Office that will monitor
Boeing's internal inspection organization through audits
and review of written reports submitted by Boeing. That
unit will initially have just eight staff, including two
engineers, growing to nearly 30 staff as the new system is
phased in. Following completion of training and readiness
reviews, Boeing will officially shift to the new
certification system, known as Organization Designation
Authorization, on Aug. 31."
cimelvin Bellingham, WA August 20, 2009 at 3:15 PM
"At first read this sounds like a terrible idea. Self
reguation usually does not turn out well. I do admit that
I am ignorant to the specifics of this and would also like
further elaboration."
citizenq Seattle, WA August 20, 2009 at 2:47 PM
"Would someone please explain as if to a 4th grader?
............... 
4
Given the many issues the latest Boeing jet has had and
the many 'fixes' it has required, why is a 3rd party not
testing/certifying it to ensure it can fly safely? I'm not
questioning Boeing's integrity - it's just a common
sense question."
25 Aviation Ulf Firm- a Air Berlin says it may cancel its order for 25 Boeing On the
Aug. Week Huett Custo 787s. Delays in the program are 'everything but consequ
2009 "AirBer meyer, mer satisfactory,' CFO Ulf Huettmeyer says. 'It's no fun ences of
lin CFO, anymore.' Germany's second-largest airline plans to a
Mulls AirBer make a decision in the next few months. The decision will modular
787 lin be based not only on the program status, but also on its enterpri
Order own long-haul strategy. The airline operates a total of 13 se
Cancell Airbus A330s that it originally planned to replace with architec
ation" 787s when it ordered the type in 2007. But it has since tue's
(Jens drastically scaled down its long-haul services after its over-
Flottau) strategy to revert to a more business traveler-oriented promise
model failed and it was forced to close down new China and
routes. Air Berlin officials say that given the 787 under-
program delays, the airline can easily cancel the order, delivery
which was announced on the eve of the 787 roll-out on
July 7, 2007. One alternative option considered is to
sell the delivery slots to another operator once demand
for the type resurges and economic conditions
improve."
27 The Jim Firm aC "The Boeing Company (NYSE: BA) today announced On a
Aug. Boeing McNer that the first flight of the 787 Dreamliner is expected by modular
2009 Compan ney, the end of 2009 and first delivery is expected to occur enterpri
y Chair in the fourth quarter of 2010. The new schedule reflects se
website man the previously announced need to reinforce an area within architec
and the side-of-body section of the aircraft, along with the ture's
CEO, addition of several weeks of schedule margin to reduce over-
The flight test and certification risk. The company projects promise
Boeing achieving a production rate of 10 airplanes per month and
Compa in late 2013. 'This new schedule provides us the time under-
ny needed to complete the remaining work necessary to put delivery
the 787's game-changing capability in the hands of our
customers,' said Boeing Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer Jim McNerney. 'The design
details and implementation plan are nearly complete,
and the team is preparing airplanes for modification
and testing.' Based on the revised schedule and other
assumption updates, the com-many has etermined that
the 787 program is not in a forward-loss position.
However, separate from the updated program
profitability assessment, the company has concluded
that the initial flight-test airplanes have no commercial
market value beyond the development effort due to the
inordinate amount of rework and unique and extensive
modifications made to those aircraft. Therefore, costs
previously recorded for the first three flight-test
airplanes wil be reclas ed from program inventory
to research and development expe#se, resoiting in an
estimated non-cash charge of $1.6 bRWon pre-tax, or
$2.21 per share, against third-quarter results. This
charge will have no impact on the company's cash outlook
going forward. The 787 team working the side-of-body
rl)"
reinforcement has completed initial testing and is
finalizing design details of new fittings that are expected
to ensure full structural integrity of the joint. The static test
procedure that uncovered the issue will be repeated and
the results fully analyzed before first flight is conducted.
Fatigue testing also will be performed on stringer
components to validate the long-term durability of the
modification. The first 787 test airplane and static test unit
have been prepared for the new fittings. Installation is
expected to begin within the next few weeks."
27 Boeing Jm Firm a James Bell (The Boeing Conmany): (time = 9:30) On a
Aug. "787 McNer "We will reclassify the $2.5 billion charge of modular
2009 Progra ney, manufacturing cost previously recorded from enterpri
m Chair inventory to research and development expense given se
Update man & that the sole use of these aircraft is flight test activities. architec
Webcas CEO, This amouit will be removed from the program ture's
t" The accounting cost base. Further expenditures incurred accounti
Boeing on those planes will be charged to R & D expense." ng of
Compa non-
ny; Robert Stallard Macuarie Research): (time = 12:15) perform
James "J#0s we it h i to thatity 't takv ance
Bell, the $2.5 blin write that 4he 787 wold be i a
CFO, forward loss situation?"
The
Boeing James Bell:
Compa "Ah, no it would not be.. We had some productivity
ny; assumption updates... When we completed that
Scott assessment, we found that we were not in a forward
Carson reach."
Preside Robert Stallard (Macquarie Research):
nt, "O.k. but taking the $2.5 billion out of the program
Boeing should have a pretty positive impact?"
Comm
ercial James Bell:
Airpla "I would agree with that."
nes;
Pat Joe Campbell (Barclays Caital): (time = 15:00)
Shanah "James you concerned us by raising the spectre of not
an, VP being able to rule out a forward loss on the last call,
Airpla and frankly we had thought that you were a long way
ne from that. And it appears that with your answer to
Progra Rob Stallard's question that whatever the undisclosed
ms, cushin between the expected revenues and the expected
Boeing costs are, certainly and apparently more and maybe
Comm considerably more than the $2.5 bilion which you have
ercial written off. Can you give us any color into what are
Airpla the issues that were resolved during the period."
nes
James Bell:
"... productivity improvements and some operating
model adjustments that we think will be appropriate
going forward. In the analysis, we found we did not
have a forward reach. Now, I'm not telling you that we
had $2.5 billion worth of cushin, but that analysis
determined that we were not in a loss position."
I
Joe Campbell (Barclays Capital): (time = 17:00)
"But if you took $2.5 billion out, effectively if you
weren't in a forward loss before the charge, the charge
effectively gave you $2.5 billion more profit later, by
expensing it now and taking it out so I'm just doing the
arithmetic to conclude that the cushin must have
exceeded $2.5 billion before the write-off, if you didn't
have a forward loss even without the write-off. I am
just trying to understand it."
James Bell:
"You don't understand it. That's not the right
conclusion. Your first part of the conclusion is correct,
obviously writing it off, taking the charge gives us more
cushin. It does not assume that you had $2.5 billion of
cushin prior to the write-off."
Joe Campbell (Barclays Capital):
"How could that be? I'm just... I don't follow that, I
mean if you took $2.5 billion out and you were not in a
forward loss, even had you not taken it out , then I
don't see why you wouldn't have more than $2.5 billion
before."
James Bell:
"We did the assessment first ... with it in. We left the
test airplanes in the program accounting quantity and
did the assessment first, determined that we weren't in
a reach, then we went through and did the analysis on
those three airplanes and determined that we needed to
re-classify the inventory."
Joe CamDbell (Barclays Capital):
"I am sorry, so now you have at least $2.5 billion. O.k.
Great, thanks very much."
Howard Rubel (Jeffries & Co.): (time = 18:50)
"Why should we have confidence in this schedule?"
Jim McNerney:
"We have a high degree of confidence in the fix and the
time it will take."
Pat Shanahan:
"I'm feeling good about where we are."
Ron Epstien (BofA Securities): (time = 25:45)
"What triggered the recognition that the three airplanes
weren't commercially viable? Couldn't you have made
that decision maybe six months ago? What triggered
that now?"
James Bell:
"We got information that the customers didn't want
the first six airplanes over the course of the first part of
...............
this year. We got all that information together...right
about now."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley): (time = 27:30)
"Question for you James. Based on the revised
schedule and other assumption updates, and you also
talked about operating model changes, based on lessons
learned, I am wondering if you are telling us in an
indirect way that R&D is going to be going up and that
you might be taking some of the development of the
derivatives from the suppliers. Can you sort of flesh
that out, and if so, how much of the derivative content
would you be taking back or describe what would be
going back in house."
James Bell:
"Heidi, I wouldn't go that far. I would say to you that
we will be looking at the R&D effort going forward and
how to better balance the plan we had previously to
one that gives us what we feel better control and better
efficiency, better efficient utilization of our technology
resources on our derivative models, so we are going
through that balance, we have made an assumption to
as to what that would mean to what we have had in the
past, but I wouldn't go so far as to saying that we just
take everything back and redraw the lines but we have
on an ongoing basis, over time had experiences here
that we have learned from and we've tried to figure out
how to utilize those experiences to improve the
performance of the program going forward, to improve
our discipline, our control over it, and as we come to
some concrete assumption as to how we're going to do
that, we include in our normal quarterly update of
profitability on this program. And that's what you're
seeing."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
"But James, I just want to understand from the
suppliers side, I mean they've been struggling with -
call it - four or five years of no cash on the program,
and they think that there are bills for re-work and re-
engineering, and in some ways maybe the only way to
make up the added expense was to seek better
economics on the derivatives. So in pe are
you putting the burden of the f 4rward loss more onto
the shoulders of the suppliers?"
James Bell:
"No, we're not."
Heidi Wood (Morgan Stanley):
(laughter)
James Bell:
"You asked and I gave you an answer. We're not.
Basically what I said we aere doing is we're looking at
~;;;;;;;~
how we can make this operating model better for both
us and our supply chain and make this program more
successful as we figure out how to manage this program
better going based on our experience and the lessons
we've learned, and that's what we are going to do. But
this is not intended to shift any burden to our supply
chain this is intended to make the performance on this
program stronger for both us and our supply
partners."
Joe Nadol (J.P.Moran): (time = 30:00)
"My question is about the predictive enginerring model.
It failed you on the wing-body join, it failed you I believe
last year on the wing box. Have you changed the model?
Have you decided to discard it and just ... what are you
doing?"
Pat Shanahan:
"We'll let see. The models still remain credible. So
there isn't a fundamental change in how we look at
composite design.
Joe Nadol (J.P.Morgan):
"Well have you changed the models such that what
actually happened now shows up as what would have been
predicted?"
Pat Shanahan:
"Absolutely. In the original model, there was a
condition that we did not evaluate. The update has that
condition modeled. We feel very comfortable now,
designing to those models."
Joe Nadol (J.P.Mor&an):
"What was the condition?"
Pat Shanahan:
"Well, it was a stress condition that we found in our side-
of-body in our test fixture."
Joe Nadol (J.P.Morgan):
"O.K. So you have complete confidence that now that
this one change has made the model work for every other
structural aspect of the aircraft?"
Pat Shanahan:
"Well, that's two questions. So the first question : I have
absolute confidence that tbeanalysis, the modeling and
the design associated with the side of body will work.
Cai Von Rumohr (Cowen and Company): (time = 33:00)
"Can you tell us about 787 production rates?"
Jim McNerney:
(whispering to James Bell) "It's the same ramp as the
prior schedule."
...... ... . ........
James Bell:
"It's the same ramp as the prior schedule."
Samuel Pearlstein (Wells Fargo Securities): (time =
36:00)
"Can you share with us the assumptions of forward
loss...what kind of order of magnitude you are using?
James Bell:
"Uh, No. What I can say is that we have sold over 800
airplanes, which usually on a wide-body program at
this stage of its production life, we've normally sold a
hundred. So you can kind of get a sense of where we're
going."
Myles Walton (Oppensheimer & Co.): (time = 37:30)
"Could you compare the $2.5 billion charge to R&D to
the R&D spent to date on the program?"
James Bell:
"Obviously this is a significant increase to R&D spent
on the program."
Mvles Walton (Opensheimer & Co.):
"But the $2.5 billion, is it 25%?"
James Bell:
"We don't tell ya. We've told you how much BCA has
spent on R&D ove the years but we have not, we don't
specifically give out what's on this program. Suffice it
to say that it is a significant increase to what we spent
today."
Jon Ostrower (Flight): (time = 44:00)
"The 787 has been in a crisis state over the past two years.
How has this affected your leadership?"
Scott Carson:
"Obviously it has been a challenge, and we have taken
steps a number of times to strengthen the team where
we thought the team needed adjustment based on the
lessons we were learning. We have obviously done a lot
more outreach and coordination with our supply base,
than we had initially. But I would say the team has
held up very well to the challenges having Boeing be as
large as it is, with as much capability across the
enterprise as we have, we have been able to reach out
and strengthen the team by bringing people in from
IDS and other locations within Boeing. I think the
team today is as strong as it bas ever been and has
held up well to the challenges."
Jim McNerney:
"I would echo that."
28 Bloomb Shinic Firm- All Nippon Airways Co., the first customer for Boeing On the
a
Aug. erg "All hiro Custo Co.'s more fuel-efficient 787 plane, will seek costs of
2009 Nippon Ito, mers compensation for a fifth delay in the delivery of its over-
Air will Preside Dreamliner. The Japanese carrier will consider buying or promise
Seek nt, All leasing new planes to make up for the delay, President and
Compen Nipon Shinichiro Ito said in an interview in Tokyo today. 'We'll under-
sation Airway study whether to bring in new planes or delay retirements,' delivery
From s Ito said. 'Discussions on compensation will start from for a
Boeing now.' Boeing said yesterday the Dreamliner will fly for modular
for 787 the first time by the end of this year and be delivered to enterpri
Delay" customers in the fourth quarter of 2010. The delivery se
(Chris target is about 2 1/2 years behind the original goal of architec
Cooper May 2008. ANA, has ordered 55 of the 787s, which will ture.
and seat as many as 330 passengers. The carrier's initial order
Kiyotak of 50 planes in 2004 was worth about $6 billion at list
a prices. Rival Japan Airlines Corp. has ordered 35 of the
Matsud aircraft. 'The delay could disrupt the introduction of the
a) 787s by a year, said Makoto Murayama, an analyst in
Tokyo at Nomura Securities Co. 'ANA will probably
receive compensation from Boeing in the form of
discounts on new orders.' All Nippon sold new shares
last month to raise as much as 142 billion yen ($1.5
billion) to buy planes."
28 Bloomb Firm- a "The European Union signaled governments will proceed On
Aug. erg Gover & with subsidies for the Airbus SAS A350 even if a pending modular
2009 "Airbus nment B World Trade Organization decision finds previous aid to and
A350 the world's biggest planemaker violated global trade rules. integral
Loans 'Independently of new developments in the current enterpri
'Have case before the WTO, it has always been our position se
No that any support for the A350 has no relation to the architec
Relation current WTO litigation,' Lutz Guellner, a spokesman for tures
to the European Commission, said today in a statement A relation
WTO WTO panel is set to issue a preliminary ruling Sept. 4, ship to
Ruling, addressing whether Europe violated WTO rules when the govern
EU three European nations provided launch aid for previous ment.
Says" Airbus models. Airbus benefited from risk-free grants
(Andrea worth $23 billion over the past four decades, the 2004
Rothma U.S. complaint alleged. Several weeks before the U.S.
n and filed its original complaint, then-Boeing Chief Executive
Jonatha Officer Harry Stonecipher said he wanted to block
n European countries from providing further loans. 'I don't
Steams) want to wake up next Wednesday and find that Airbus
is doing a new plane' with government help, he said on
Sept. 2, 2004. The U.S. filed its complaint on Oct. 6, 2004.
No Advantage
Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic, Defence & Space
Co., hasn't received an unfair advantage, European
officials say. 'It's not subsidy bt investment,' U.K.
Business Secretary Peter Mandelson said. Airbus itself
says it has a right to the loans. 'Boeing received more
than $5 billion in grants and other subsidies for the 787
from the U.S. taxpayer alone, none of which is
repayable,' the Toulouse, France-based planemaker
said in a statement. Loans for the A350 will 'ensure
fair competition and level the playing field with
Boeing,' Airbus said."
. .................. ..
30 Flightbl David Firm- a "The 787's environmental control system and electrical On a
Aug. ogger, Hess, Suppli system... have gone through significant development modular
2009 "Depen (forme ers challenges and revisions, a fact publicly acknowledged in enterpri
ds On r) 2008 by then CEO of Hamilton Sundstrand David Hess. se
What CEO, Simply stated 'We're all late,' Hess said of the entire architec
Your Hamilt 787 supply base, including his company's ture's
Definiti on contribution." overpro
on of Sundst mise
'Flight rand and
Test" underde
is?" livery
(Jon
Ostrowe
31 The Jim Firm a Boeing Commercial Airplanes President and CEO Scott On
Aug. Boeing McNer Carson announced today that he will retire from the leadersh
2009 Compan ney, company at the end of the year. Boeing Chairman, ip
y Chair President and CEO Jim McNerney has named Jim changes
website; man Albaugh, 59, to Carson's leadership role at Boeing in a
Memos and Commercial Airplanes (BCA), Both appointments are modular
to CEO, effective Sept. 1. 'Thanks to his leadership and enterpri
Employ The operational experience, Boeing Commercial Airplanes se
ees Boeing has performed extremely well in a tough business architec
from Compa environment and remains positioned solidly for ture.
Flightbl ny; continued market success,' said McNerney.
ogger Scott
Carson Message to Employees from Scott Carson
"Today I am announcing my retirement from Boeing. My
outgoi decision is tied to many factors, but perhaps the most
ng important reason for me was resetting the schedule on
Preside the 787. With this baseline in place the new leader will
nt, have a clear path forward. I also know that you will
Boeing give Jim the same outstanding support and world-class
Comm effort that you have demonstrated to me over the past
ericial three years. I wish you every success and thank you from
Airpla the bottom of my heart for the journey we have taken
nes; together. Sincerely, Scott Carson"
Jim
Albaug Message to Employees from Jim Albaugh
h, "To this day, I believe Boeing did more to change the 20th
incomi century than any other company on Earth. Over the past 90
ng years, Boeing has led the way in commercial aviation.
Preside Boeing is truly an iconic company and I believe we
nt, have the opportunity to change the 21st century just as
Boeing we have changed the last one. The 787 is the starting
Comm point. In its soul, Boeing has always been and remains
ericial an engineering company. As an engineer I look forward
Airpla to learning from and working with you. Working with the
nes. world's premier commercial airplane company team as
we prepare to fly two revolutionary airplanes - the 787 and
747-8 - is an opportunity of a lifetime. And today we are
facing significant issues on our two major development
programs. Going forward I believe we have three
imperatives: flawless execution, profitable growth and
improved efficiency. I know we have the right team in
place. Together there is nothing we can't do... JIM"
II
I. Feedback on Research
The following appendix summarizes the written (not spoken) feedback that the author has
received from participants involved in critiquing and co-developing the theory. The participants
have included executives in organizations comprising the primary sample, professors, graduate
students and other executives who challenged the theory's internal validity (by proposing
plausible rival hypotheses), external validity or generalizability and parsimony. Having taken
into account their feedback over the past seven years, and continuously iterating and updating the
theory, the following comments summarize the level of "fit" with their empirical experience.
Custom Executive Education at Fortune Global 100 Companies
Executive Feedback
"Ted, thank you again for your time with us and our leadership team. The breadth of your
talents continues to amaze me. You are helping guide us down a path that represents the
most significant (and most difficult) transformation this company has been through. This is
shaping up to be one for the history books and you are playing a pivotal role. I imagine it
won't be long before Porter is replaced by Piepenbrock in business schools. Cheers... "
Director of Business Strategy
Fortune Global 100 Company
* "You may be in some ways... bigger and more important than our fleadership] team... based
on your many achievements. " (Chairman, President & CEO)
"* Ted, thank you... I learned a lot. We need to find a way to have more time as these are
important issues for us to grapple with. " (President & CEO)
* '[Because of 'Red-Blue ' we are going to re-evaluate our whole business, our understanding
of the industry, what our competitor does and what it takes to be successful. ' (President &
CEO)
* 'Tremendous.' 'Fascinating.' 'Meaningful and impacting.' 'This is our future.' (President,
CEO; VP Business Strategy & Marketing; VP, CFO)
* 'Ted was among the best speakers we have ever had, and his topic was extremely relevant to
us. '(President, CEO)
* 'Ted's 100, 000 foot view of our industry allowed me to see for the first time a 100-year
history of where we've been and where we 're headed It helped me so much to move forward
with new understanding and conviction. ' (Chairman of the Board)
. . . ..............
* "Your presentation and subsequent questions reflect a deep understanding of our markets
and competitive environment. Your expertise, enthusiasm and energy are refreshing and
very welcomed. I shared several of your top-level observations with [our Chairman and
CEO] who was intrigued. Thank you again. " (SVP, Business Development & Strategy)
* "Expanding our comfort zones is what it will take to win. Count me in. " (SVP, Business
Development & Strategy)
* "Ted, enjoyed the meeting and conversation. Look forward to future meetings. " (SVP,
COO)
* "Our leadership team values the time we spent with you and the learning that has taken
place. You have challenged our thinking, and encouraged us to mature our strategies. I am
looking forward to seeing you again very soon. " (VP/GM)
* "i can't tell you how much I enjoy the time we are able to spend together. it really helps
remove the cobwebs from my brain and to re-energize me. i hope we are able to continue
our learning together and to continue expanding the size of the circle. " (VP/GM)
* "I can't thank you enough for your active involvement and encouragement. It really does
help to know you are working so hard to bring new thinking (and action) into the place. "
(VP/GM)
* "i really enjoy our meetings because i leave thinking about a lot more important, and
complex, issues than i did when i arrived " (VP/GM)
* "Great learning today.., you are a very good teacher. " (VP/GM)
* "Thanks ted. As always, it was good to see you and to get the old brain engaged. " (VP/GM)
* "i'd say the outcome was a major opportunity for us to move forward it gave me hope.
ted... thanks for helping us learn. " (VP/GM)
* "ted, thanks for staying in touch. i miss our discussions and the learning that has gone along
with those sessions. " (VP/GM)
* "as usual, our time together was too short. i always learn a lot and our discussions provide
a welcomed time for me to think about our future. " (VP/GM)
* "I wanted to let you know how much I enjoyed our lean enterprise discussions. I look
forward to continuing the conversation. " (VP/GM)
* "I think the world of Ted and the work he has been doing. " (VP/GM)
* "Everybody [on the Leadership Team] thinks it's beneficial to continue to use Ted" (VP
Business Strategy & Marketing)
* 'Many thanks for taking the time with us to share your thoughts and insights. I hope there
are opportunities going forward for us to continue to share and learn. '(VP, CFO)
* "I think we're in for several interesting sessions Ted and hopefully some real progress.
Thanks!" (VP, CFO)
* "Great perspective and review. Thanks. " (VP, CFO)
* "Ted, our "red v. blue" strategy is number one on our strategic agenda for 08. We need to
pull the team together to discuss how we'll rollout the discussions/data for the leadership
team--time is of the essence. Thanks for your support! " (VP, HR)
* "Thanks, Ted - always a pleasure. We're making progress - look forward to our next
session. " (VP, HR)
* "Ted - really enjoyed the time with you and the team. Look forward to future discussions!"
(VP, HR)
* "We had a good session with our Leadership Team, and Ted.. is critical to our efforts."
(VP, HR)
* "Nice to meet you. Very thought-provoking stuff " (VP, Strategic Management)
* "Ted has a gift, passion and provocative vision that reaches people. We are privileged to
learn and partner with him. " (VP, Strategic Management)
* "Ted, thanks for staying close to us, believing in us... and pushing us. You are making a
difference! (VP, Strategic Management)
* "It warms my heart to see the team finally get the traction we needed You told us from the
very beginning to go slowly and that it would take a long time. I wasn't sure if the team was
going to have the emotional resilience they needed to be successful, but they did and I love
them for it. I cannot thank you enough for believing in us and believing that a little strategy
team could help drive such significant change. Now you have senior leadership to drive and
lead this. Wow. Don't ever give up on us. We just might surprise you .)" (VP, Strategic
Management)
* "I always enjoy the dialog and exchange of thoughts, ideas and concepts. Sure hope we can
get this moving... " (VP, Finance)
* "Ted - I thought we had a rich conversation during the meeting and I look forward to
working with you in the future. " (VP, Finance)
* "Thank you for your years of contribution to [our company] and myself I know how much
you have helped me grow as a person and hopefully as a leader. " (VP/GM)
* "Thank you Ted. Inspiring to learn from you a usual. The whole team, even those who were
quiet received a lot of energy from the dialog. I look forward to the next engagement. "
(VP/GM)
* "Your presentation was outstanding and it really got me thinking. " (VP)
* "Ted, the magic you add to the equation for the leadership team, renewed my confidence that
we can pull this off To see that same spark of confidence energized among those who are
leading was fantastic. " (Director, Business Strategy)
* "You are an integral part of this team and I cannot envision us pulling this off without your
continued participation. " (Director, Business Strategy)
* "Ted, the level of your commitment to help us succeed is astounding. " (Director, Business
Strategy)
* "Thankyoufor your tireless efforts - continuously nudging the system in the right direction. "
(Director, Business Strategy)
* "Ted, thanks again for your tireless support of the team and [the company]. " (Director,
Business Strategy)
* "It was really helpful, as usual, to have your insight and guidance during such tense times. "
(Director, Business Strategy)
* "Your help in growing our understanding of the system and how to facilitate change is
incredible for me. My head is in the game and I'm enthused. I don't think I ever thought
we'd get to this day, this soon. I totally understand we have a long way to go, but still... It's
impressive. I've mentally recommitted to this, knowing it will continue to be hard but that we
can be agents of change. Thanks again. We couldn't do this without you. " (Strategy
Analyst)
* "Ted, i would like to thank you again for all the time and effort you have invested in me. i
hope you can see the immense impact it has had... and i'll always be grateful. i've had so
many kind words from the team regarding my leadership and support and i know that
wouldn't be possible without all that you have invested in me. With the deepest gratitude...'
(Strategy Analyst)
* "I want to thank you for your leadership. You have always helped me to find my True North
and have been the one leader who has never let us down. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "I am so grateful for your guidance and leadership and for supporting me in my toughest
times. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "Thanks again for your guidance and leadership." (Strategy Analyst)
* "Ted, I wanted to thank you for everything you have done for me and the team. You have
had and continue to have a profound impact on my life and the way I see things - and I am
grateful for that. Thank you again for continuing to help me personally. You are truly
extraordinary and I am grateful to have the opportunity to work with you. " (Strategy
Analyst)
* "You have this extraordinary ability to turn every situation, no matter how difficult, into an
opportunity. You truly embody this notion offinding the potential in all things. It is a rare
and beautiful thing to see. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "I want to say thank you. Thank you for your continued support as a part of our team.
Thank you for always helping us become better leaders. I hope you know that we consider
you part of the our family. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "Thank you for continuing to coach us in the learning process. Your contributions to the
team are appreciated Also, thank you for your commitment to us. I look forward to
continued engagements. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "Thank youfor the privilege to work and be a part of a team with you. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "Your work on enterprise architecture is right on! " (Strategy Analyst)
* "Your work /research has been inspirational, and I highly value both the substance/content
as well as the way you approach to have meaningful dialog." (Strategy Analyst)
* "This is a major change in our strategic direction. Your ingenuity, articulate presentation,
teamwork, and patience have paid off after years of steady approach in sharing the
enterprise architecture. Congratulations and thank you! Hope you'll be back here soon and
we can discuss more in depth!" (Strategy Analyst)
* "It was a very thought-provoking session. Thanks for taking the time and look forward to
further discussions. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "I attended your presentation at the Lean conference. My one word evaluation - 'Brilliant.'
Thank you for your I OOKft level analysis! " (Analyst)
* "As always, you have stretched my thinking and I think have set the stage for our continued
discussions. Ted, thanks for helping us to see clearer and for your passion on the subject. Its
contagious!" (Director, Strategic Initiatives)
* "I found our discussion fascinating and feel your knowledge of [our company] incredibly
valuable. I would like to keep a dialog open between us and work towards establishing
opportunities for you to share your wisdom with us. " (Director, Career Development)
* "Your dissertation is the most compelling, comprehensive explanation of business and
management I have seen. I recognize that it is much more than just business and
management but I'd run out of bytes trying to list all the disciplines that are encompassed. "
(Strategy Analyst)
* "I wanted to congratulate you on influencing and shaping how corporations and all of the
stakeholders think about sustainable competitive advantage... perhaps even allow us to
fundamentally reconsider how and why the corporation exists. " (Strategy Analyst)
* "Ted, I just wanted to say how much I appreciate you taking the time to chat. As I said
before, it was incredibly illuminating. I've spent the last several days feeling a bit like Moses
coming down from the mountaintop with a new found clarity. " (International Industry
Blogger)
Custom Executive Education at The University of Oxford
Executive Feedback
"We appreciate the thinking and originality of your research and the energy you bring to the
world of executive learning. Thank you for the time that you spend with us, Ted "
Gay Haskins
Dean, Executive Education
Said Business School, University of Oxford
"Ted's lecture at our executive education programme went over splendidly. "
Prof. Rafael Ramirez
Professor of Management, HEC School of Management, Paris
Fellow in Strategic Management, Said Business School, University of Oxford
* "Subject matter was outstanding. I found the subject matter a key element of our mission
success. "
* "Data was dynamite, great story for us to learn. Very knowledgeable presenter, he
mentioned lots of things from Wharton. "
"A fascinating insight into what may lie behind successful companies. It made me consider
own business strategy & question our approach to short & long term gain. "
"Astoundingly compelling thesis and seductively presented. Sampling this work in, say,
another two or three years would be interesting to get a better view of 'Redness' and
'Blueness' and perhaps taking 'Red' attributes into a 'Blue market'. "
* "Very thought provoking. Lots to think about and learn. "
"Main points:
o good 'out-of-the-box' analysis of underlying long term performance.
o high energy impact.
o knowledgeable of subject matter with good real world examples. "
* "Good connection to our company- very relevant and great discussion over dinner. Would
like to do more with the rest of our company on the 'Red - Blue' debate. "
* "Ted's material was excellent. The 'Red vs. Blue' contest is very relevant to our business
environment. "
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* "Provided a set of strong concepts that challenge the way things may be viewed. My thought
is how in an established organisation can you achieve the 'Red' outcomes? "
* "Provocative: this tension of 'Blue' vs. 'Red' companies is worth further exploration. And
is the best state being both? "
* "The red/blue concept is awesome and should continue as part of this course. "
* "We needed a whole day on this to get the benefit. "
* "Very interesting. "
* "Lots of information; extremely interesting. Good session, and overall enjoyment. "
* "Enjoyed the content and delivery. "
* "Wish we had more time on this. "
* "Very good although 'very fast' presentation. 'Red vs. Blue' comparison quite revealing.
Needed quiet reflection to understand what had actually been presented. "
* "Very stimulating. Excellent content. "
* "Excellent material. Great value. "
* "Very interesting - need more time."
* "Very thought provoking. Many lessons here. "
* "Very thought provoking analysis. Completely different perspective from anything I have
seen before. It will be interesting to see how we evolve, knowing this data exists. "
* "Obviously extremely knowledgeable. "
* "Very interesting concepts, though provoking. I would have enjoyed spending more time on
this and understanding the 'integral' business type further."
* "Very provocative. Good energy. Very lively and engaging discussion. "
* "Good material which stimulated thought. Could have debated for hours!"
* "Super speed!!"
* "A little quick - needed to spend much more time on this. Red/Blue interesting concept -
but requires more time. "
* "Massive amount ofmaterial. "
* "Outstanding!"
* "Ted was incredibly able to think at pace, however it needed more time and slower pace to
review the outcome and the impact to [our company]. "
* "Excellent model and concept which is very relevant to us. "
* "Excellent topic. "
* "I really enjoyed the fast paced, in-depth and interactive module. "
* "Unbelievable - real food for thought - we are blue. A high speed journey, could have spent
all day. "
* "Content was excellent. I would have liked the session to be extended. "
* "Very interesting. "
* "Overall I found Ted's session incredibly mentally stimulating; however, it may have been
useful to dedicate more time to this session. "
* "Very eye-opening discussion with some useful links to what we do. Ted discussed his
subject with passion! "
* "Ted has a massive knowledge on the subject. "
* "An eye-opener ofa session! A longer session could have been beneficial."
* "Great content and discussion. "
S" Very intriguing subject, rich in content and discussion and energetically put across! "
* "Very thought provoking. "
* "High velocity information transfer! Red and Blue meta-models will allow me to advance a
critical debate within the business relating to entering a new market."
* "Much learning and interesting subject matter. "
* "Thought-provoking. "
* "Very interesting, we could have spent longer on this topic. "
* "Fascinating stuff "
* "Red/blue concept was illuminating. "
S" Very bright individual with a good story to tell. "
* "Very interesting proposition. "
* "Thought provoking presentation. "
* "Ted had some incredible information. "
* "The red/blue concept was good. "
* "Very good concepts. "
* " Very good material. "
* "The 'blue' and 'red' models were interesting. "
* "Worth hearing for longer. "
* "It really challenged us to think differently about what we are doing. "
* "A lot to take in! "
* "Top notch!"
* "Good message."
* "Very compelling - opens up the aperture. "
* "Brilliant mind. "
* "Great content. "
* "Fascinating. Ted is always thinking. For me more time is required on this! "
Open Enrollment Executive Education at MIT
Executive Feedback
"Congratulations on the excellent presentation you made. I'm so thankful that I was invited to
attend your session. You could hear a pin drop... we were spellbound, hanging on every word.
Listening to you was like being in the presence of a great 'business prophet'. You will be known
as a da Vinci of the 21st century. You have the ability to engage an audience around a very
challenging and compelling subject, even inviting others to participate in the process of
discovery and debate. Your sincerity, humility, and competence were so refreshing. "
Dr. Rita Murray
CEO, Performance Consulting Group, LLC
* "Mr. Piepenbrock has a masterful understanding of a very complex business model and is
able to present this information is an understandable manner. "
* "Ted Piepenbrock shared a wealth of information that inspired excellent questions,
discussions and hopefully actions from all of us. I feel very privileged to have been in the
company of respected members of the leading industries in the country. It was an affirmation
to me that leaders of industries really do care, respect and seek out each other to exchange
ideas and knowledge to work toward a common goal of succeeding. "
* "I was fortunate to attend your event. I was very impressed with the depth of information
you shared. I have a burning desire in me to understand why there is such a difference from
companies like Toyota, Airbus and Southwest to all the rest. Your presentation was very
enlightening and inspiring; and presented with such passion that I feel very privileged to
have been able to partake in this type of forum. Thank you for sharing your years of
experience and knowledge gathering. "
* "Very well done and researched Ted has a high level of energy and was very engaging. "
"Excellent content. Thought provoking. Immediately started dissecting my own company
based on these values and criteria. "
* "Your talk was very interesting. If one of your goals is to be thought-provoking, you have
succeeded. "
"Nicejob, Ted! Clearly knowledgeable and passionate on the subject. "
"Wonderful work. The delivery was exceptional."
* "This is my first experience with MIT and I thoroughly enjoyed it. I would welcome the
opportunity to partake in future events. "
--
* "I enjoyed the day very much. Ted is an outstanding speaker! "
* "So much info. - so little time! Interesting, interesting, interesting stuff."
* "Love the concepts. "
* "Good data. "
* "Very good material being shared -fact based. "
S" Very good session. I learned a lot ofstrategyforfuture opportunity. "
* "Presenter was nimble and able to bring up slides to support the emerging conversation. "
S" Would look to schedule a presentation of this material for Senior Leadership. "
* "The content was informative and was a positive learning experience, somewhat different
than what was expected. "
* "First time I have seen this concept. "
Graduate Teaching at MIT
Faculty & Student Feedback
"This is either the work of a madman or a genius -
and at this point, I am inclined to think that it is the latter.
Dr. Michael Hammer
Author: Reengineering the Corporation
Time Magazine 's "25 most influential individuals"
Professor, MIT; Associate Fellow, University of Oxford, Said Business School
* "Ted's work is the stuff that ground breaking business books are made of"
* "Ted is exceptional, truly outstanding and consistently exceeds very high expectations. He is
a superb speaker and a brilliant analyst of strategy in the broadest sense. He is very mature
and has a great deal of experience interacting with senior executives. In many ways his work
and thinking have gone beyond my own.... "
* "Ted has developed an excellent mastery of the business strategy and organization behavior
literatures and would be an invaluable colleague. "
* "The class enjoyed your presentations very much. Your lectures received more positive
feedback than any other speaker! They really appreciated your work. "
* "Your work is very well perceived and helped to inform the broader set of attendees as to the
value of the kind of enterprise research we are doing. It definitely helped to differentiate us
from the typical "lean" research. "
* "You had a most impressive presentation. The implications of your work could be
significant. Keep up the great work ... and the passion..... "
* "You must have done an outstanding job at the symposium, since I've heard several people
mention your work. "
* "Ted, I believe there is a great story to be told. You can have a great life doing what you are
doing the way you are doing it. "
* "Things went GREAT with Ted today! Where can I start???? I have been blown away with
Ted's class today. It was meant to stop at 4 but it went on up until 6.30pm with at least 10
hardcore listeners until the end. I have been blown away. A really good presentation.. and it
was nice to see how his research has evolved in two years. "
* "I think the speaker series is a great addition to the content of the course. This was
especially the case with Michael Hammer and Ted Piepenbrock 's talk. "
* "Other concepts I found particularly interesting were Hammer's Process Enterprise and
Piepenbrock 's Modular versus Integrative. "
* "Ted Piepenbrock's lectures on integrated and modular enterprises helped me build on the
principles that Prof Charles Fine introduced in his book, Clockspeed. "
* "One speaker that I found particularly interesting was Ted Piepenbrock. I found that he
gave a fresh perspective on different types of enterprises. "
* "I thought that Ted Piepenbrock's presentation was a fascinating study in modular versus
integral enterprises and how that underlying structure of the enterprises slates it for making
or taking the market. Though I am taking a strategy course at the Sloan School, Ted's spin
on strategy was thought provoking and challenging to the simple frameworks that we use on
the Strategy course. I realized that in many of my courses at Sloan, we do not take into
account all aspects of the enterprise but instead focus on various sections. Ted's research
opened me to the idea of how organizations may be forced to significantly reinvent or die due
to the company architectures and the state of the industry. It is tempting to continuously
improve when a serious re-architecture is needed as Ted Piepenbrock pointed out. "
* "To understand architecture one needs to understand the political and cultural dimensions of
leadership and architecting, as Ted Piepenbrock described. And to facilitate a process of
reflection and organizational development, one must be able to diagnose the larger
structural forces generating interpersonal challenges, as well as contribute intelligently to
visioning and rearchitecting conversations. Within academia, the process orientation has
fallen by the wayside with the conclusion ofArgyris, Schon, and Schein's academic careers,
and the structural orientation is resurgent. The class, with the possible exception of Ted
Piepenbrock's presentations, swung too far in this structural direction. "
* "With Ted Piepenbrock's research/executive education efforts at [Fortune 100 company],
the audience is the Board of Directors, who are trying to make architectural decisions about
their enterprise. Ted's role is not to be an outside architect; rather he is operating as a kind
offacilitator in the board's own thinking about its architecture. He does, however, carry out
his own research in the firm - this gives him credibility with that audience and helps him
elucidate the key choices and consequences facing them in their architecting (i.e., modular
versus integral enterprise). It is, I would argue, more sophisticated in its understanding of
enterprises as enacted systems and enterprise architecture as a practice that requires
embedding. This isn't to say that implementation will be successful - Ted himself thinks it
will be near impossible for a modular enterprise to become integral. But he is putting the
possibility of implementation at the center by locating architects and audience in the same,
very powerful people and using himself and his expertise as provocation and facilitator. "
* "I attended your lecture on Boeing & Airbus I and found your presentation fascinating. This
is a fascinating topic for me and it will be great to become more educated in the concepts."
* "Ifindyour research on Red and Blue companies fascinating. "
* "Your lecture on Blue vs. Red companies, was one of the best and most interesting lectures I
had while at MIT. I think there are a lot of good lessons I can use throughout my career. "
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